Santiago Virgüez-Ruiz

The relationship between legislative and judicial branches in constitutional democracies has been the subject of several academic debates. Nevertheless, this literature has made little reference to congresspeople’s role as active subjects in judicial scenarios, especially when they present complaints against legislation enacted during their incumbency. This study seeks to address the question of why members of the Colombian Congress make use of constitutional review to overturn laws that they took part in debating. Through the use of quantitative and qualitative analysis, this paper explains how the use of constitutional complaints by members of congress is not limited to a political strategy of opposition by independents and opposition parties, but also serves members of the governing coalition for at least three different purposes: i) to deviate from the political approach of the Executive bill when they do not agree with the contents or when the reforms affect the interests of their constituency; ii) to “clean up” Executive bills of content introduced by the opposition during the law-making process; and iii) to advance certain points of their own political agenda, avoiding the political cost of opposing the reform as it passes through the legislative process.