One of the first and worst inferential pitfalls political scientists are enjoined to avoid is &qu... more One of the first and worst inferential pitfalls political scientists are enjoined to avoid is "infinite regress." Every cause has a cause in its own right. To begin inquiring into the causes of causes is to step upon a slippery slope, which threatens to hurtle political scientists all the way back in time to Marc Antony's fateful distraction from battle by Cleopatra's exquisitely sculpted nose.
The Limits of Authoritarian Governance in Singapore's Developmental State, 2019
In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other... more In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other Asian developmental states, stable authoritarianism is not the same thing as static authoritarianism. Authoritarianism after development has to be especially flexible and adaptable because the challenges development poses for authoritarian stability are effectively irreversible. He argues that Singapore is perfectly poised to follow the example of countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in pursuing democratic reforms, and that the People’s Action Party (PAP) would surely remain dominant under fully democratic conditions. The alternative for the PAP is to allow their relations with the most productive forces in society to deteriorate further, with troubling long-term implications for both economic development and political order. Superficial authoritarian reforms will not be good enough to return the PAP to its hegemonic glory days. Paradoxically, democratisation is the best way for the party to stay true to its most important founding principles.
How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of... more How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of such fusion, Poland and the Philippines, show how national and religious identities can become nearly coterminous. Located at opposite ends of the Earth, these are two of the world's godliest nations. 1 In both countries, close to 80 percent of respondents say it is important to be Catholic to be Polish or Philippine, respectively. 2 Not only are these societies deeply religious, with rates of belief and church attendance far higher than average in the Christian world, but the churches enjoy a great deal of societal and elite deference. Since the early 1990s, when new democracies were struggling to find their feet in both countries, over 80 percent of Poles and over 90 percent of Filipinos have expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Church. 3 This deep moral authority had translated into religious notables becoming critical leaders in anti-authoritarian resistance, 4 and has allowed the Church to gain enormous policy influence in the newly democratic regimes. 5 This article leverages the Poland-Philippine comparison to offer a political and historical analysis of the merging of religious and national identities. Much of the scholarship on the fusion of religion and nationalism makes one of two analytical moves: it either 1) focuses on an external religious threat as the inspiration for religious nationalism, or 2) demonstrates how national identity and religious belief hold elective affinities, allowing church and state to work together harmoniously. In the first set of accounts, an alien threat both mobilizes and sanctifies religious nationalism as a coherent identity and political project. 6 Here, religious nationalism arises in direct, fierce opposition to a "power committed to another religion." 7 A notable example is British Protestant rule in predominantly Catholic Ireland. 8 The second set of accounts traces how religion can collaborate with the state, as church and state construct interlocking mechanisms of social and moral regulation. 9 In this scenario, church and state eliminate internal religious rivals en route to building godly nations. 10
Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little ri... more Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and acr...
War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on... more War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.
provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India t... more provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India that affects a large number of people. The rest of the book offers an explanation for why upward mobility is restricted and how to improve it. Krishna argues that the main explanation for the blockage, other things being equal, is the “microclimate” in which the poor live. By this he means a combination of material and non-material factors. The material factors include, in particular, an educational infrastructure with easily accessible schools and the trained teachers. By nonmaterial factors Krishna means attitudes, information, values, and beliefs which, he argues, are just as important and can prevent upward mobility even in the presence of the right infrastructure. To illustrate, he offers the example of Chandru, who did not pursue a college education despite a full scholarship because his family believed that higher education was “not for the likes of us” and there were no role models or counter-examples or information to contradict that belief (p. 22). In proposing solutions, Krishna again focuses on microclimate—this time the microclimate of reform. The Indian state, he argues, is distant, and centralized and proposes uniform policies that do not fit well with local conditions. What is needed is an approach to policy that is proximate, localized, and flexible. He advocates the strengthening of what he calls “street level bureaucrats”— village-level patwaris (land registrars), village council secretaries, police constables, agricultural supervisors, and what he calls “last mile” institutions. He also advocates for a model of governance that incorporates local customs or that outsources tasks to institutions such as traditional village councils (p. 169). Krishna’s focus on microclimates—and in particular, the “soft,” non-material aspects of a microclimate—is one of the most important and eloquent parts of the book. The emphasis on changing the beliefs of citizens about who they can be and who they can become recalls Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach to development and welfare, revisited here in very concrete ways. And the emphasis on a localized, flexible approach to development suggests an illuminating connection with James Scott’s (1999) critiques of the modern, universalizing state, arrived at via a very different route. But in the end it is precisely the prescription for reforming the microclimate of development that deserves greater interrogation, not only by a reviewer, but also by the author. Krishna advocates the strengthening of streetlevel bureaucrats while glossing over the many ways in which street-level bureaucrats can and have contributed to the problem of reform through rent-seeking or other kinds of exploitative behaviour. Krishna acknowledges such behaviour, but does not fully engage with the problems it poses for his prescription. He simply asserts that it is a consequence of a “design weakness in the system” (p. 161) that can be neutralized by better training, motivation and citizen-centred institutions that enforce local accountability. The Broken Ladder would have been strengthened by a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of such institutions where they do exist. They have, for instance, been built into the design of the National Rural Employment Guarantee programme, as well as in panchayati raj (village self-government reform) in several states. Similarly, the book has a relatively uncritical approach to local customary institutions and practices, recommending that they be incorporated into local governance without fully engaging with the question of how these institutions can often magnify inequalities, or give new form to patriarchal or other socially conservative practices. Krishna notes that this possibility exists but dismisses it rather lightly: “Newspaper accounts have highlighted the monstrous judgments handed down on occasion by some traditional institutions. But these aren’t the only decisions they make, and they aren’t the only traditional institutions.” (p. 169). The Broken Ladder would have benefited from a more extended discussion of, and a more critical approach to, the local.
Contemporary political science has generated extensive literatures on the themes of war, civil wa... more Contemporary political science has generated extensive literatures on the themes of war, civil war, contentious politics, and social movements. But these literatures are often segregated in particular subfields, like International Relations and Comparative Politics, and typically speak past each other rather than to each other. Sidney Tarrow’sWar, States, & Contention: A Comparative Historical Study(Cornell 2015) offers a single, synthetic perspective on these topics. As Tarrow states, “I hope to show that the advent of war is sometimes driven by social movements; that movements often affect the conduct of war and sometimes change its directions; and that wars often trigger the rise and expansion of movements in their wake.” Few topics are more important than the ones considered in this book, and so we have invited a range of political scientists, from a variety of subfield and methodological approaches, to comment on the book.
Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive ... more Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive area studies research and others who view such work as unscientific, noncumulative, or of limited relevance for advancing broader social science knowledge. InSoutheast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu, a group of bright, young Southeast Asianists argue that contextually sensitive research in Southeast Asia using qualitative research methods has made fundamental and lasting contributions to comparative politics. They challenge other Southeast Asianists to assert proudly the contributions that their work has made and urge the rest of the comparative politics discipline to take these contributions seriously. This symposium includes four short critical reviews ofSoutheast Asia in Political Scienceby political scientists representing diverse scholarly traditions. The reviews address both the methodol...
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 2011
In this feature we highlight a recently launched book. We invite specialists in the field to comm... more In this feature we highlight a recently launched book. We invite specialists in the field to comment on the book, and we invite the author to respond to their comments. In this issue we focus on Dan Slater's Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian. Those invited to comment on the book are William Case, Gerry van Klinken and John Roosa. Registered readers may participate in the debate.
Contents Acknowledgments 000 Contributors 000 1. Introduction: The Contributions of Southeast Asi... more Contents Acknowledgments 000 Contributors 000 1. Introduction: The Contributions of Southeast Asian Political Studies 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu 2. Studying States in Southeast Asia 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta 3. Democracy and Dictatorship Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political Regimes in Southeast Asia 000 Dan Slater 4.Developing Democracies in Southeast Asia: Theorizing the Role of Parties and Elections 000 Allen Hicken 5. Contentious Mass Politics in Southeast Asia: Knowledge Accumulation and Cycles of Growth and Exhaustion 000 Tuong Vu 6. In-depth Research and Knowledge Accumulation about Agrarian Politics in Southeast Asia 000 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet 7. Civil Society and Close Approximations Thereof 000 Meredith L. Weiss 8. Beyond Doctrine and Dogma: Religion and Politics in Southeast Asia 000 Kikue Hamayotsu 9. The Study of Political Ethnicity in Southeast Asia 000 Jamie S. Davidson 10. Southeast Asia and the Political Economy of Development 000 Regina Abrami and Richard F. Doner 11. The Missing Countryside: The Price of Ignoring Rural Political Economy in Southeast Asia 000 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung 12. Southeast Asia and Globalization: The Political Economy of Illiberal Adaptation 000 Greg Felker 13. Southeast Asia in Political Science: Terms of Enlistment 000 Donald K. Emmerson 14. Concluding Remarks 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu Notes 000 Bibliography 000 Index 000
... 1 Wahid then offered cabinet seats to all major and minor political parties alike, while Wira... more ... 1 Wahid then offered cabinet seats to all major and minor political parties alike, while Wiranto maintained his grip on the Indonesian military. Amien Rais and new Golkar leader Akbar Tandjung were appeased with the top positions in the Indonesian parliament. ...
... Barely a year later, in the aftermath of President Abdurrahman Wahid&... more ... Barely a year later, in the aftermath of President Abdurrahman Wahid's impeachment in July 2001, Golkar and PDIP managed to reproduce this cozy style of provincial politicking at the national level.8 As I will show below, these parties have used the spoils of office-notably ...
One of the first and worst inferential pitfalls political scientists are enjoined to avoid is &qu... more One of the first and worst inferential pitfalls political scientists are enjoined to avoid is "infinite regress." Every cause has a cause in its own right. To begin inquiring into the causes of causes is to step upon a slippery slope, which threatens to hurtle political scientists all the way back in time to Marc Antony's fateful distraction from battle by Cleopatra's exquisitely sculpted nose.
The Limits of Authoritarian Governance in Singapore's Developmental State, 2019
In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other... more In this concluding chapter, Dan Slater illuminates a critical point—that in Singapore as in other Asian developmental states, stable authoritarianism is not the same thing as static authoritarianism. Authoritarianism after development has to be especially flexible and adaptable because the challenges development poses for authoritarian stability are effectively irreversible. He argues that Singapore is perfectly poised to follow the example of countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in pursuing democratic reforms, and that the People’s Action Party (PAP) would surely remain dominant under fully democratic conditions. The alternative for the PAP is to allow their relations with the most productive forces in society to deteriorate further, with troubling long-term implications for both economic development and political order. Superficial authoritarian reforms will not be good enough to return the PAP to its hegemonic glory days. Paradoxically, democratisation is the best way for the party to stay true to its most important founding principles.
How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of... more How does religious nationalism arise? How do national and religious identities meld? Two cases of such fusion, Poland and the Philippines, show how national and religious identities can become nearly coterminous. Located at opposite ends of the Earth, these are two of the world's godliest nations. 1 In both countries, close to 80 percent of respondents say it is important to be Catholic to be Polish or Philippine, respectively. 2 Not only are these societies deeply religious, with rates of belief and church attendance far higher than average in the Christian world, but the churches enjoy a great deal of societal and elite deference. Since the early 1990s, when new democracies were struggling to find their feet in both countries, over 80 percent of Poles and over 90 percent of Filipinos have expressed "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the Church. 3 This deep moral authority had translated into religious notables becoming critical leaders in anti-authoritarian resistance, 4 and has allowed the Church to gain enormous policy influence in the newly democratic regimes. 5 This article leverages the Poland-Philippine comparison to offer a political and historical analysis of the merging of religious and national identities. Much of the scholarship on the fusion of religion and nationalism makes one of two analytical moves: it either 1) focuses on an external religious threat as the inspiration for religious nationalism, or 2) demonstrates how national identity and religious belief hold elective affinities, allowing church and state to work together harmoniously. In the first set of accounts, an alien threat both mobilizes and sanctifies religious nationalism as a coherent identity and political project. 6 Here, religious nationalism arises in direct, fierce opposition to a "power committed to another religion." 7 A notable example is British Protestant rule in predominantly Catholic Ireland. 8 The second set of accounts traces how religion can collaborate with the state, as church and state construct interlocking mechanisms of social and moral regulation. 9 In this scenario, church and state eliminate internal religious rivals en route to building godly nations. 10
Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little ri... more Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and acr...
War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on... more War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.
provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India t... more provides sufficient evidence to indicate that upward mobility is a significant problem in India that affects a large number of people. The rest of the book offers an explanation for why upward mobility is restricted and how to improve it. Krishna argues that the main explanation for the blockage, other things being equal, is the “microclimate” in which the poor live. By this he means a combination of material and non-material factors. The material factors include, in particular, an educational infrastructure with easily accessible schools and the trained teachers. By nonmaterial factors Krishna means attitudes, information, values, and beliefs which, he argues, are just as important and can prevent upward mobility even in the presence of the right infrastructure. To illustrate, he offers the example of Chandru, who did not pursue a college education despite a full scholarship because his family believed that higher education was “not for the likes of us” and there were no role models or counter-examples or information to contradict that belief (p. 22). In proposing solutions, Krishna again focuses on microclimate—this time the microclimate of reform. The Indian state, he argues, is distant, and centralized and proposes uniform policies that do not fit well with local conditions. What is needed is an approach to policy that is proximate, localized, and flexible. He advocates the strengthening of what he calls “street level bureaucrats”— village-level patwaris (land registrars), village council secretaries, police constables, agricultural supervisors, and what he calls “last mile” institutions. He also advocates for a model of governance that incorporates local customs or that outsources tasks to institutions such as traditional village councils (p. 169). Krishna’s focus on microclimates—and in particular, the “soft,” non-material aspects of a microclimate—is one of the most important and eloquent parts of the book. The emphasis on changing the beliefs of citizens about who they can be and who they can become recalls Amartya Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach to development and welfare, revisited here in very concrete ways. And the emphasis on a localized, flexible approach to development suggests an illuminating connection with James Scott’s (1999) critiques of the modern, universalizing state, arrived at via a very different route. But in the end it is precisely the prescription for reforming the microclimate of development that deserves greater interrogation, not only by a reviewer, but also by the author. Krishna advocates the strengthening of streetlevel bureaucrats while glossing over the many ways in which street-level bureaucrats can and have contributed to the problem of reform through rent-seeking or other kinds of exploitative behaviour. Krishna acknowledges such behaviour, but does not fully engage with the problems it poses for his prescription. He simply asserts that it is a consequence of a “design weakness in the system” (p. 161) that can be neutralized by better training, motivation and citizen-centred institutions that enforce local accountability. The Broken Ladder would have been strengthened by a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of such institutions where they do exist. They have, for instance, been built into the design of the National Rural Employment Guarantee programme, as well as in panchayati raj (village self-government reform) in several states. Similarly, the book has a relatively uncritical approach to local customary institutions and practices, recommending that they be incorporated into local governance without fully engaging with the question of how these institutions can often magnify inequalities, or give new form to patriarchal or other socially conservative practices. Krishna notes that this possibility exists but dismisses it rather lightly: “Newspaper accounts have highlighted the monstrous judgments handed down on occasion by some traditional institutions. But these aren’t the only decisions they make, and they aren’t the only traditional institutions.” (p. 169). The Broken Ladder would have benefited from a more extended discussion of, and a more critical approach to, the local.
Contemporary political science has generated extensive literatures on the themes of war, civil wa... more Contemporary political science has generated extensive literatures on the themes of war, civil war, contentious politics, and social movements. But these literatures are often segregated in particular subfields, like International Relations and Comparative Politics, and typically speak past each other rather than to each other. Sidney Tarrow’sWar, States, & Contention: A Comparative Historical Study(Cornell 2015) offers a single, synthetic perspective on these topics. As Tarrow states, “I hope to show that the advent of war is sometimes driven by social movements; that movements often affect the conduct of war and sometimes change its directions; and that wars often trigger the rise and expansion of movements in their wake.” Few topics are more important than the ones considered in this book, and so we have invited a range of political scientists, from a variety of subfield and methodological approaches, to comment on the book.
Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive ... more Comparative politics has witnessed periodic debates between proponents of contextually sensitive area studies research and others who view such work as unscientific, noncumulative, or of limited relevance for advancing broader social science knowledge. InSoutheast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu, a group of bright, young Southeast Asianists argue that contextually sensitive research in Southeast Asia using qualitative research methods has made fundamental and lasting contributions to comparative politics. They challenge other Southeast Asianists to assert proudly the contributions that their work has made and urge the rest of the comparative politics discipline to take these contributions seriously. This symposium includes four short critical reviews ofSoutheast Asia in Political Scienceby political scientists representing diverse scholarly traditions. The reviews address both the methodol...
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia, 2011
In this feature we highlight a recently launched book. We invite specialists in the field to comm... more In this feature we highlight a recently launched book. We invite specialists in the field to comment on the book, and we invite the author to respond to their comments. In this issue we focus on Dan Slater's Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian. Those invited to comment on the book are William Case, Gerry van Klinken and John Roosa. Registered readers may participate in the debate.
Contents Acknowledgments 000 Contributors 000 1. Introduction: The Contributions of Southeast Asi... more Contents Acknowledgments 000 Contributors 000 1. Introduction: The Contributions of Southeast Asian Political Studies 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu 2. Studying States in Southeast Asia 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta 3. Democracy and Dictatorship Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political Regimes in Southeast Asia 000 Dan Slater 4.Developing Democracies in Southeast Asia: Theorizing the Role of Parties and Elections 000 Allen Hicken 5. Contentious Mass Politics in Southeast Asia: Knowledge Accumulation and Cycles of Growth and Exhaustion 000 Tuong Vu 6. In-depth Research and Knowledge Accumulation about Agrarian Politics in Southeast Asia 000 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet 7. Civil Society and Close Approximations Thereof 000 Meredith L. Weiss 8. Beyond Doctrine and Dogma: Religion and Politics in Southeast Asia 000 Kikue Hamayotsu 9. The Study of Political Ethnicity in Southeast Asia 000 Jamie S. Davidson 10. Southeast Asia and the Political Economy of Development 000 Regina Abrami and Richard F. Doner 11. The Missing Countryside: The Price of Ignoring Rural Political Economy in Southeast Asia 000 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung 12. Southeast Asia and Globalization: The Political Economy of Illiberal Adaptation 000 Greg Felker 13. Southeast Asia in Political Science: Terms of Enlistment 000 Donald K. Emmerson 14. Concluding Remarks 000 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu Notes 000 Bibliography 000 Index 000
... 1 Wahid then offered cabinet seats to all major and minor political parties alike, while Wira... more ... 1 Wahid then offered cabinet seats to all major and minor political parties alike, while Wiranto maintained his grip on the Indonesian military. Amien Rais and new Golkar leader Akbar Tandjung were appeased with the top positions in the Indonesian parliament. ...
... Barely a year later, in the aftermath of President Abdurrahman Wahid&... more ... Barely a year later, in the aftermath of President Abdurrahman Wahid's impeachment in July 2001, Golkar and PDIP managed to reproduce this cozy style of provincial politicking at the national level.8 As I will show below, these parties have used the spoils of office-notably ...
This is a review of my co-edited volume by Gianluca Passarelli, political scientist at Sapienza U... more This is a review of my co-edited volume by Gianluca Passarelli, political scientist at Sapienza University in Rome.
This is a review of my co-edited volume, Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society, in Contemp... more This is a review of my co-edited volume, Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society, in Contemporary Sociology.
Uploads
Papers by Dan Slater