Papers on mind and action by Alejandro Rosas
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2018
( Download final version at https://bit.ly/2uF2SLi )
We propose two adjustments to the classi... more ( Download final version at https://bit.ly/2uF2SLi )
We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality (our capacity to share mental states of various sorts) as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account the fact that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal sharing and cooperation. Second, recent evidence suggests that there are hardly any differences in their mental-state attribution capacities. We argue therefore that our distinctively human capacity for shared intentionality is due to the effect on our cognitive skills of a (probably inborn) practical attitude. Accordingly, we propose that cognitive and practical skills, working together, produce our capacity for shared intentionality, and review evidence suggesting that the practical skill in question consists in the ability to adopt an attitude of equality.
Philosophical Explorations, 2018
Full pdf: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/HfiJcthrfs8itUwXm7jF/full
In line with recent eff... more Full pdf: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/HfiJcthrfs8itUwXm7jF/full
In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent's violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent's action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants' cognitive dispositions using Frederick's Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action's (and probably also the commitment's) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-‐way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account.
Manuscrito. revista Internacional de Filosofia, Dec 2013
In this article we discuss factors presumably responsible for the Knobe effect and offer a novel ... more In this article we discuss factors presumably responsible for the Knobe effect and offer a novel explanation. The Knobe effect refers to a peculiar asymmetry in attributions of intentionality to the foreseen side-effects of an action, depending only on their moral assessment and with no other changes in the circumstances: the bad effects, but not the good ones, are considered intentionally produced. We focus on the possible explanation: does the moral value of the effect explain the asymmetry? We analyze a variety of vignettes introduced in experimental studies and their results, trying to isolate the explanatory factors. We propose that a concordance or discordance between the moral valence of the side effect and the moral attitude of the agent, as judged by spectators, explains the asymmetry
Papers by Alejandro Rosas
Praxis Filosófica, 2014
Una literatura creciente en neuropsicología estudia el juicio moral aplicando dilemas morales a p... more Una literatura creciente en neuropsicología estudia el juicio moral aplicando dilemas morales a personas con daños neuronales o con rasgos de personalidad antisocial; y parece confirmar una tendencia al juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo, es decir, estas personas aprueban el sacrificio de un inocente para salvar varias vidas. Argumentamos que las evidencias encontradas no respaldan la hipótesis de dos módulos morales (Greene et al. 2004), sino más bien una disfunción en la capacidad empática o en el procesamiento de emociones, que apoyaría una psicología moral de corte Humeano. Abogamos, además, por ampliar el explanandum: del juicio utilitarista contra-intuitivo al juicio moral contra-intuitivo sin más. Esto permitiría investigar experimentalmente un amplio rango de variables afectadas por disfunciones en la capacidad para la empatía.
Download free eprints at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/BmKfMf9vU3ukxKwJGqRW/full
Rese... more Download free eprints at: https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/BmKfMf9vU3ukxKwJGqRW/full
Research on moral judgment with moral dilemmas suggests that “utilitarian” responses (UR) to sacrificial high-conflict dilemmas are due to decreased harm aversion, not only in individuals with clinical conditions, but also in healthy participants with high scores in antisocial personality traits. We investigated the patterns of responses to different dilemma types in healthy participants and present evidence that some URs to sacrificial dilemmas are morally motivated, as indicated by their empathic concern (EC) or primary psychopathy (PP) scores. In study 1 (N = 230) we tested students with four categories of sacrificial dilemmas featuring innocent victims. In study 2 (N = 590) we tested students with two categories of sacrificial dilemmas and two “real-world” moral dilemmas, where the agent can improve the lot of strangers by making a personal sacrifice. Results in both studies showed no decreased harm aversion in a pattern where the only UR is to the sacrificial dilemma where the number of saved people is very high, and significantly lower harm aversion only in the pattern of all deontological respondents in Study 2. The analysis by response patterns allowed a better discrimination of the moral motivations of participants and showed that at least some of them express moral concerns in their URs.
I defend resentment as a legitimate and necessary moral attitude by neutralizing an objection tha... more I defend resentment as a legitimate and necessary moral attitude by neutralizing an objection that points to its hostile and morally repugnant character. The argument proceeds by embedding resentment in a view of morality as a social and communicative practice, supported by a common knowledge of apparently inborn moral expectations. In virtue of these natural expectations, every person is pre-institutionally entitled to goodwill and to the pleasure that arises from showing and receiving goodwill from others. Resentment arises naturally when these expectations are violated: it is a reaction to an offence, leading to a dynamic exchange that aims to restore a broken moral relationship between persons. The offender participates in this communicative exchange by undergoing a form of punishment that is self-imposed and expressed through feelings of guilt and contrition.
EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 2013
Can moral norms be unified under one superordinate content, such as harm? Following the discovery... more Can moral norms be unified under one superordinate content, such as harm? Following the discovery that children at an early age distinguish between moral and conventional norms, this question has been the focus of a recent interdisciplinary debate. Influential critics of the moral-conventional distinction have argued that the moral domain is pluri-dimensional and perhaps not even formally unified. Taking the five foundations theory proposed by Haidt and collaborators as guiding thread, I criticise two influential experiments against the unifying role of harm and point to new evidence from psychopathology and cognitive psychology, supporting the hypothesis that harming innocent people is a core concern of norms
identified as moral independently of cultural settings.
Social Neuroscience, Jul 10, 2014
The use of hypothetical moral dilemmas—which pit utilitarian considerations of welfare maximizati... more The use of hypothetical moral dilemmas—which pit utilitarian considerations of welfare maximization against emotionally aversive “personal” harms—has become a widespread approach for studying the neuropsychological correlates of moral judgment in healthy subjects, as well as in clinical populations with social, cognitive, and affective deficits. In this article, we propose that a refinement of the standard stimulus set could provide an opportunity to more precisely identify the psychological factors underlying performance on this task, and thereby enhance the utility of this paradigm for clinical research. To test this proposal, we performed a re-analysis of previously published moral judgment data from two clinical populations: neurological patients with prefrontal brain damage and psychopathic criminals. The results provide intriguing preliminary support for further development of this assessment paradigm
A growing literature in neuropsychology studies moral judgment with moral dilemmas, testing subje... more A growing literature in neuropsychology studies moral judgment with moral dilemmas, testing subjects with neural damage or with anti-social personality traits. It seems to confirm a tendency to counterintuitive utilitarian moral judgment, i.e., these subjects abnormally approve sacrificing an innocent person to save several lives. We argue that empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis of two moral subsystems in the brain, but rather a dysfunction in empathic capacity and emotional processing, that provides support to a Humean moral psychology. Additionally, we advocate extending the explanandum of this research program from counterintuitive utilitarian judgment to counterintuitive moral judgment. This would allow to experimentally investigate a broader range of variables affected by dysfunction in empathic capacities.
Ideas y Valores XLII, (153): 179-199, Dec 2013
In their answers to questions regarding “personal moral dilemmas”, patients with lesions to the F... more In their answers to questions regarding “personal moral dilemmas”, patients with lesions to the Frontal Cortex –FC– or Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex –vmPFC– display a disposition to directly injure another person in order to save lives, thus revealing a possible lack of empathy. However, their answers are normal when they evaluate behaviors lacking in empathy but without a utilitarian justification. We here defend that those patients suffer from a cognitive deficiency associated with Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis and with value judgments. The article critiques the “utilitarian patient” hypothesis that has become deeply rooted in cognitive neuroscience.
Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía: Suplemento 18 (2013), pp. 255-268. ISSN: 1136-9922, Jun 2013
Experimental economics provides evidence that social preferences drive human cooperation in the l... more Experimental economics provides evidence that social preferences drive human cooperation in the lab, but the dominant microeconomic model of a rational agent, Homo oeconomicus, denies such preferences. Assuming the evidence is cogent, what follows for the claim that humans cooperate on the basis of rational egoism? I describe three possible answers: 1) social preferences are backup mechanisms for rational egoism; 2) social preferences are required to
remedy for imperfect rationality; and 3) social preferences are the primary motives for cooperation, because rational egoism does not recommend cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect or private information. I argue for option 3): rational egoists without social preferences see deception and coercion as rational options.
KEYWORDS: COOPERATION, PRISONER’S DILEMMA, RATIONAL EGOISM, EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION
In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither i... more In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.
Two methodologies are available for calculating the fitness of altruism, namely inclusive fitness... more Two methodologies are available for calculating the fitness of altruism, namely inclusive fitness and neighbor modulated fitness. Inspired by the second methodology, Fletcher and Doebeli (2009) propose a new approach to the evolution of altruism, where assortment plays a fundamental role. Weak and reciprocal altruism appear as genuine cases of altruism in this new approach. In this paper I argue that the approach implies a new concept of altruism: a cooperative behavior is altruistic whenever it requires positive assortment between altruists to evolve. Moreover, assortment between altruists is controlled by traits that evolve by natural selection in the individual altruists. The role of assortment, and its being controlled by individual traits that co-evolve with altruistic ones, is the fundamental new insight promoted by the neighbor modulated fitness approach. I also examine and reply to the criticisms of inclusive fitness theorists against this new perspective on altruism.
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Nov 7, 2012
In an experimental critique of the
moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007)
pr... more In an experimental critique of the
moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007)
present new experimental data about responses to transgressions
involving harm, where the novelty is that transgressors are
grown-ups, rather than children. Their data do not support the
moral/conventional distinction. The contrast between grown-up
and schoolyard transgressions does not seem, however, to
explain their results: they also use two schoolyard transgressions
with similar negative results for the M/C distinction.
I here attempt to explain away their results by calling attention
to two mistakes in their experimental design. One refers to
the use of questionnaire-items of the type that Turiel and collaborators
have called mixed-domain situations, which extend
over both a moral and a conventional domain. Participants respond
to these cases differently than to prototypical moral situations,
because some allow the authority rule to override the
moral rule. The second mistake emerges in the grown-up transgressions
labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority,
Spanking/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority. These are not the
typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has
been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been
subject to an injustice”. The victims are also transgressors and
harm is inflicted on them as punishment. Plausibly, rules about
corporal punishment depend on authority in a way that rules
about harming the innocent do not.
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Papers on mind and action by Alejandro Rosas
We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality (our capacity to share mental states of various sorts) as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account the fact that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal sharing and cooperation. Second, recent evidence suggests that there are hardly any differences in their mental-state attribution capacities. We argue therefore that our distinctively human capacity for shared intentionality is due to the effect on our cognitive skills of a (probably inborn) practical attitude. Accordingly, we propose that cognitive and practical skills, working together, produce our capacity for shared intentionality, and review evidence suggesting that the practical skill in question consists in the ability to adopt an attitude of equality.
In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent's violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent's action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants' cognitive dispositions using Frederick's Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action's (and probably also the commitment's) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-‐way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account.
Papers by Alejandro Rosas
Research on moral judgment with moral dilemmas suggests that “utilitarian” responses (UR) to sacrificial high-conflict dilemmas are due to decreased harm aversion, not only in individuals with clinical conditions, but also in healthy participants with high scores in antisocial personality traits. We investigated the patterns of responses to different dilemma types in healthy participants and present evidence that some URs to sacrificial dilemmas are morally motivated, as indicated by their empathic concern (EC) or primary psychopathy (PP) scores. In study 1 (N = 230) we tested students with four categories of sacrificial dilemmas featuring innocent victims. In study 2 (N = 590) we tested students with two categories of sacrificial dilemmas and two “real-world” moral dilemmas, where the agent can improve the lot of strangers by making a personal sacrifice. Results in both studies showed no decreased harm aversion in a pattern where the only UR is to the sacrificial dilemma where the number of saved people is very high, and significantly lower harm aversion only in the pattern of all deontological respondents in Study 2. The analysis by response patterns allowed a better discrimination of the moral motivations of participants and showed that at least some of them express moral concerns in their URs.
identified as moral independently of cultural settings.
remedy for imperfect rationality; and 3) social preferences are the primary motives for cooperation, because rational egoism does not recommend cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect or private information. I argue for option 3): rational egoists without social preferences see deception and coercion as rational options.
KEYWORDS: COOPERATION, PRISONER’S DILEMMA, RATIONAL EGOISM, EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION
moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007)
present new experimental data about responses to transgressions
involving harm, where the novelty is that transgressors are
grown-ups, rather than children. Their data do not support the
moral/conventional distinction. The contrast between grown-up
and schoolyard transgressions does not seem, however, to
explain their results: they also use two schoolyard transgressions
with similar negative results for the M/C distinction.
I here attempt to explain away their results by calling attention
to two mistakes in their experimental design. One refers to
the use of questionnaire-items of the type that Turiel and collaborators
have called mixed-domain situations, which extend
over both a moral and a conventional domain. Participants respond
to these cases differently than to prototypical moral situations,
because some allow the authority rule to override the
moral rule. The second mistake emerges in the grown-up transgressions
labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority,
Spanking/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority. These are not the
typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has
been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been
subject to an injustice”. The victims are also transgressors and
harm is inflicted on them as punishment. Plausibly, rules about
corporal punishment depend on authority in a way that rules
about harming the innocent do not.
We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality (our capacity to share mental states of various sorts) as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account the fact that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal sharing and cooperation. Second, recent evidence suggests that there are hardly any differences in their mental-state attribution capacities. We argue therefore that our distinctively human capacity for shared intentionality is due to the effect on our cognitive skills of a (probably inborn) practical attitude. Accordingly, we propose that cognitive and practical skills, working together, produce our capacity for shared intentionality, and review evidence suggesting that the practical skill in question consists in the ability to adopt an attitude of equality.
In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent's violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent's action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants' cognitive dispositions using Frederick's Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action's (and probably also the commitment's) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-‐way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account.
Research on moral judgment with moral dilemmas suggests that “utilitarian” responses (UR) to sacrificial high-conflict dilemmas are due to decreased harm aversion, not only in individuals with clinical conditions, but also in healthy participants with high scores in antisocial personality traits. We investigated the patterns of responses to different dilemma types in healthy participants and present evidence that some URs to sacrificial dilemmas are morally motivated, as indicated by their empathic concern (EC) or primary psychopathy (PP) scores. In study 1 (N = 230) we tested students with four categories of sacrificial dilemmas featuring innocent victims. In study 2 (N = 590) we tested students with two categories of sacrificial dilemmas and two “real-world” moral dilemmas, where the agent can improve the lot of strangers by making a personal sacrifice. Results in both studies showed no decreased harm aversion in a pattern where the only UR is to the sacrificial dilemma where the number of saved people is very high, and significantly lower harm aversion only in the pattern of all deontological respondents in Study 2. The analysis by response patterns allowed a better discrimination of the moral motivations of participants and showed that at least some of them express moral concerns in their URs.
identified as moral independently of cultural settings.
remedy for imperfect rationality; and 3) social preferences are the primary motives for cooperation, because rational egoism does not recommend cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect or private information. I argue for option 3): rational egoists without social preferences see deception and coercion as rational options.
KEYWORDS: COOPERATION, PRISONER’S DILEMMA, RATIONAL EGOISM, EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION
moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, Kelly et al. (2007)
present new experimental data about responses to transgressions
involving harm, where the novelty is that transgressors are
grown-ups, rather than children. Their data do not support the
moral/conventional distinction. The contrast between grown-up
and schoolyard transgressions does not seem, however, to
explain their results: they also use two schoolyard transgressions
with similar negative results for the M/C distinction.
I here attempt to explain away their results by calling attention
to two mistakes in their experimental design. One refers to
the use of questionnaire-items of the type that Turiel and collaborators
have called mixed-domain situations, which extend
over both a moral and a conventional domain. Participants respond
to these cases differently than to prototypical moral situations,
because some allow the authority rule to override the
moral rule. The second mistake emerges in the grown-up transgressions
labeled as Whipping/temporal, Whipping/Authority,
Spanking/Authority, Prisoner abuse/Authority. These are not the
typical transgressions unambiguously “involving a victim who has
been harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been
subject to an injustice”. The victims are also transgressors and
harm is inflicted on them as punishment. Plausibly, rules about
corporal punishment depend on authority in a way that rules
about harming the innocent do not.