Lic. en Filosofía (UNCo), Doctor en Filosofía (UNC), y Profesor Adjunto a cargo de Filosofía Antigua, Filosofía Medieval y Problemas de la Filosofía Antigua. Su área de actividad se extiende a la filosofía antigua y algunos de sus alcances medievales y contemporáneos, y comprende el análisis filosófico y filológico, el comentario e interpretación, la anotación y traducción de textos griegos de autores y comentadores de la Antigüedad. Entre otros, sus intereses se aplican a los campos de la ontología, la metafísica y la ética antiguas y a los de los fundamentos antiguos de la filosofía del lenguaje, la semántica, la lógica formal e informal, la historia de la ciencia, la teoría del conocimiento en general y científico en particular.
El presente volumen reúne buena parte de los trabajos que oportunamente se presentaron en el IV S... more El presente volumen reúne buena parte de los trabajos que oportunamente se presentaron en el IV Simposio Nacional de Filosofía Antigua organizado por la Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua (AAFA), el cual se desarrolló del 28 al 30 de agosto de 2019 en el Centro de Posgrado de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Además de las 48 ponencias de destacados especialistas latinoamericanos, el libro contiene las conferencias dictadas por el Dr.. Eduardo Sinnott y la Dra. Virginia Aspe Armella.
La relación entre la Metafísica y los Segundos analíticos de Aristótele, Elmar Treptow. Horacio A. Gianneschi - Laura S. Carugati Traducción al español., 2023
Michael S. Kochin (K.) interprets the project of Laws (Leg.) by reading the Republic (Rep.) in th... more Michael S. Kochin (K.) interprets the project of Laws (Leg.) by reading the Republic (Rep.) in the light of Leg. and its concerns. K's work introduces a valuable perspective from which the Rep. and the Leg., far from being considered as political manifestos, appear as rhetorical examples and, in a way, as manuals of rhetoric. From this point of view, K calls attention to 'Plato's rhetorical problem' (p. 2), which arises from Plato's stance that 'men and women have distinctive occurrent aspirations and desires, (...) even though the natural standard for human excellence is the same for both sexes' (p. 2). Thus, Plato's effort at persuasion in these works is tailored to his masculine interlocutors. By means of a gendered rhetoric, Aristotle's master proposes to move the political community toward a unified standard of human excellence.
After presenting the main positions on the nature and function of the axiōmata, I will offer some... more After presenting the main positions on the nature and function of the axiōmata, I will offer some arguments in favor of the ideas that (1) the word "axíōma" is used by Aristotle with the theoretical function of describing a type of principle necessary in the ultimate explanation of intellectual teaching and learning proceeding via demonstrative science, paralleling how "matter" plays a theoretical role in the philosophical explanation of physical change (for example); (2) an axíōma fulfills, in the undertaking of each of the demonstrative sciences actually practised, the natural and constitutive function of providing the necessary and proper universality of its universal conclusions, a function to which the logical function of intervene –explicitly or implicitly– as a term (hóros) in the syllogistic premises; (3) the nature of each one of the axiōmata can be understood as an original, relational and unitary structure, generically transboundary (even when, due to its use in relation to generically different entities, it presents itself as generically distinguishable or determined), without any of this implying the evidentiary error of metabasis.
The purpose of this work is to offer some instrumental annotations for the philosophical study of... more The purpose of this work is to offer some instrumental annotations for the philosophical study of MA which is based on the recent critical edition of Oliver Primavesi (2020, hereinafter Prim.) faithfully translated by Benjamin Morison. The edition has been previously published in Primavesi (2018), with translation and commentary by Klaus Corcilius. The notes with details that I list below are not intended to review this extraordinary critical text of Prim., nor the remarkable work that includes it. On the contrary, I take for granted the general knowledge of its structure and contents to focus on some specific considerations about the formidable and complex closed recension that Prim offers. I think that they can at least facilitate part of the work of those who are interested in the thus renewed Greek text of Aristotle. My notes are organized into four general thematic groups related to the use of the apparatuses, the presence of the Attic language in the text, the modifications and improvements in the apparatus of the latest edition contrasted with that of 2018, and the detection of few blemishes present in both.
In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents -in a darker than usual way- decisive details of ... more In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents -in a darker than usual way- decisive details of the methodology he devised for his science of nature. His indications seem to point the path along which Aristotelian biology should travel. However, numerous textual and systematic difficulties have given rise to a number of conflicting interpretations, in the context of a vigorous stream of philosophical research and debate since the last third of the last century. In this stream of studies, Michael of Ephesus's commentary on PA and his views on the subject remain relatively ignored. A complex multiplicity of factors seems to support the lack of sufficient consensus among leading contemporary specialists to explicitly consider those contributions. The purpose of this paper is to examine several of these factors and, based on the evidence provided by little explored aspects of Michael's texts, to offer arguments in favor of that consensus against a number of alternatives. I shall argue that the contributions of this late commentator deserve to be considered -mutatis mutandis- as seriously as it is done with the main ancient Greek commentaries; in particular, in the philosophical studies of those who are currently interested in that methodology or are engaged in Aristotelian biology.
The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward interpretation of some main passages where ... more The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward interpretation of some main passages where Aristotle reveals what he understands by πειραστική. Usually interpreters believe his inspiration has drawn from the philosophical profile of Socrates and its elenchus. Faced with a number of difficulties presented by influential views, I argue that there are no reason to believe that Aristotle would have distinguished peirastic from dialectic neither by the figures of their syllogisms nor because their starting points have a different nature of the éndoxa. By contrast, I defend the thesis that peirastic can be seen as a certain kind of expert knowledge that in practice becomes manifest as a successful refutation moment of the philosophically applied dialectic; at that moment the dialectic stricto sensu becomes reluctant to change the course of search for the principles of expert knowledge, insofar as such a movement would be a change in the direction posed by the sophistical threat of apparent wisdom on a given subject. I try to show how part of the —in Aristotle’s view— dialectical activity of Socrates fits in with various requirements of their inferential art of Topics. I suggest that this does not mean that Aristotle has built the peirastic on Socratic elenchus, but that he has used part of Socrates’ activity as philosophical evidence for his own fundamental dialectical conceptions.
El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad —dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles— de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales.
Al inicio de “Sobre las partes de los animales”, Aristóteles menciona la creencia compartida con ... more Al inicio de “Sobre las partes de los animales”, Aristóteles menciona la creencia compartida con su auditorio sobre la existencia de personas instruidas, quienes utilizan ὅροι como puntos de referencia en relación con el ejercicio de su capacidad de juzgar qué explica correctamente un conferencista. Sin embargo, el núcleo de la instrucción requerida y el modo en que ella puede ser alcanzada representan parte de las dificultades principales del texto. Me propongo volver a examinar el perfil del pepaideuménos de PA 639a1-12. Frente a una cantidad de alternativas, intentaré argüir que el núcleo ensombrecido de su instrucción puede ser mejor visto como el producto de ἐμπειρία sobre casos relativos al πρᾶγμα en estudio.
In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way... more In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way, Plato develops in Philebus 38b-39d. This theory explains how the human beings are capable of considering the experience's facts. At the core of this theory, the soul is the intermediate point of a general process that allows to emit a statement related to objects of the world. So this theory also registers as a part of the history of the philosophical contemporary semantics. I will argue that three analytically separable stages are distinguished in connection with this operational mediation of the soul. At the first stage, the human soul gets blindly the formal characters of those facts by means of a composite pathema, which corresponds to a hexis of doxazein (form an opinion) and produces a fundamental doxa-logos. The second stage is the moment of the doctrine that explains the reason why we are conscious of what we have grasped in the analytical previous level. At the third stage, one may emit the utterances of those facts. Every stage corresponds to a concept of doxa-logos which have different characteristics, and it is opportune that they are distinguished in the comprehension of that theory. I argue for this reading against a number of alternatives.
In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way... more In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way, Plato develops in philebus 38bB-39D. This theory explains how the human beings are capable of considering the experience’s facts. At the core of this theory, the soul is the intermediate point of a general process that allows to emit a statement related to objects of the world. So this theory also registers as a part of the history of the philosophical contemporary semantics. I will argue that three analytically separable stages are distinguished in connection with this operational mediation of the soul. At the first stage, the human soul gets blindly the formal characters of those facts by means of a composite páthēma, which corresponds to a héxis of doxázein (form an opinion) and produces a fundamental dóxa-lógos. The second stage is the moment of the doctrine that explains the reason why we are conscious of what we have grasped in the analytical previous level. At the third stage, one may emit the utterances of those facts. Every stage corresponds to a concept of dóxa-lógos which have different characteristics, and it is opportune that they are distinguished in the comprehension of that theory. I argue for this reading against a number of alternatives.
After a brief preliminary description of the ancient commentary movement relating to Aristotle’s ... more After a brief preliminary description of the ancient commentary movement relating to Aristotle’s treatises, this paper provides a first translation from ancient Greek into Spanish of Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 1a1-15. In this commentary, the exhausted topic corresponds to technical notions of homonyms, synonyms and paronymous: decisive conceptions that to a large extent determine the comprehension of Aristotelian philosophy. The translation of the Greek is direct and literal, and includes explanatory and analytical notes which character is as much philological as philosophical.
Luego de una breve descripción introductoria del movimiento del comentario antiguo a la obra de Aristóteles, el artículo presenta una primera traducción a la lengua española del comentario de Amonio, hijo de Hermias, al pasaje 1a1-15 del tratado Categorías de Aristóteles. El tema agotado en este comentario es el de las nociones técnicas de homónimos, sinónimos y parónimos: concepciones decisivas que determinan buena parte de la comprensión de la filosofía aristotélica. La traducción directa del griego y apegada texto, incluye notas aclaratorias, de discusión y de análisis, tanto de carácter filológico como filosófico.
El presente volumen reúne buena parte de los trabajos que oportunamente se presentaron en el IV S... more El presente volumen reúne buena parte de los trabajos que oportunamente se presentaron en el IV Simposio Nacional de Filosofía Antigua organizado por la Asociación Argentina de Filosofía Antigua (AAFA), el cual se desarrolló del 28 al 30 de agosto de 2019 en el Centro de Posgrado de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Además de las 48 ponencias de destacados especialistas latinoamericanos, el libro contiene las conferencias dictadas por el Dr.. Eduardo Sinnott y la Dra. Virginia Aspe Armella.
La relación entre la Metafísica y los Segundos analíticos de Aristótele, Elmar Treptow. Horacio A. Gianneschi - Laura S. Carugati Traducción al español., 2023
Michael S. Kochin (K.) interprets the project of Laws (Leg.) by reading the Republic (Rep.) in th... more Michael S. Kochin (K.) interprets the project of Laws (Leg.) by reading the Republic (Rep.) in the light of Leg. and its concerns. K's work introduces a valuable perspective from which the Rep. and the Leg., far from being considered as political manifestos, appear as rhetorical examples and, in a way, as manuals of rhetoric. From this point of view, K calls attention to 'Plato's rhetorical problem' (p. 2), which arises from Plato's stance that 'men and women have distinctive occurrent aspirations and desires, (...) even though the natural standard for human excellence is the same for both sexes' (p. 2). Thus, Plato's effort at persuasion in these works is tailored to his masculine interlocutors. By means of a gendered rhetoric, Aristotle's master proposes to move the political community toward a unified standard of human excellence.
After presenting the main positions on the nature and function of the axiōmata, I will offer some... more After presenting the main positions on the nature and function of the axiōmata, I will offer some arguments in favor of the ideas that (1) the word "axíōma" is used by Aristotle with the theoretical function of describing a type of principle necessary in the ultimate explanation of intellectual teaching and learning proceeding via demonstrative science, paralleling how "matter" plays a theoretical role in the philosophical explanation of physical change (for example); (2) an axíōma fulfills, in the undertaking of each of the demonstrative sciences actually practised, the natural and constitutive function of providing the necessary and proper universality of its universal conclusions, a function to which the logical function of intervene –explicitly or implicitly– as a term (hóros) in the syllogistic premises; (3) the nature of each one of the axiōmata can be understood as an original, relational and unitary structure, generically transboundary (even when, due to its use in relation to generically different entities, it presents itself as generically distinguishable or determined), without any of this implying the evidentiary error of metabasis.
The purpose of this work is to offer some instrumental annotations for the philosophical study of... more The purpose of this work is to offer some instrumental annotations for the philosophical study of MA which is based on the recent critical edition of Oliver Primavesi (2020, hereinafter Prim.) faithfully translated by Benjamin Morison. The edition has been previously published in Primavesi (2018), with translation and commentary by Klaus Corcilius. The notes with details that I list below are not intended to review this extraordinary critical text of Prim., nor the remarkable work that includes it. On the contrary, I take for granted the general knowledge of its structure and contents to focus on some specific considerations about the formidable and complex closed recension that Prim offers. I think that they can at least facilitate part of the work of those who are interested in the thus renewed Greek text of Aristotle. My notes are organized into four general thematic groups related to the use of the apparatuses, the presence of the Attic language in the text, the modifications and improvements in the apparatus of the latest edition contrasted with that of 2018, and the detection of few blemishes present in both.
In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents -in a darker than usual way- decisive details of ... more In De partibus animalium A1, Aristotle presents -in a darker than usual way- decisive details of the methodology he devised for his science of nature. His indications seem to point the path along which Aristotelian biology should travel. However, numerous textual and systematic difficulties have given rise to a number of conflicting interpretations, in the context of a vigorous stream of philosophical research and debate since the last third of the last century. In this stream of studies, Michael of Ephesus's commentary on PA and his views on the subject remain relatively ignored. A complex multiplicity of factors seems to support the lack of sufficient consensus among leading contemporary specialists to explicitly consider those contributions. The purpose of this paper is to examine several of these factors and, based on the evidence provided by little explored aspects of Michael's texts, to offer arguments in favor of that consensus against a number of alternatives. I shall argue that the contributions of this late commentator deserve to be considered -mutatis mutandis- as seriously as it is done with the main ancient Greek commentaries; in particular, in the philosophical studies of those who are currently interested in that methodology or are engaged in Aristotelian biology.
The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward interpretation of some main passages where ... more The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward interpretation of some main passages where Aristotle reveals what he understands by πειραστική. Usually interpreters believe his inspiration has drawn from the philosophical profile of Socrates and its elenchus. Faced with a number of difficulties presented by influential views, I argue that there are no reason to believe that Aristotle would have distinguished peirastic from dialectic neither by the figures of their syllogisms nor because their starting points have a different nature of the éndoxa. By contrast, I defend the thesis that peirastic can be seen as a certain kind of expert knowledge that in practice becomes manifest as a successful refutation moment of the philosophically applied dialectic; at that moment the dialectic stricto sensu becomes reluctant to change the course of search for the principles of expert knowledge, insofar as such a movement would be a change in the direction posed by the sophistical threat of apparent wisdom on a given subject. I try to show how part of the —in Aristotle’s view— dialectical activity of Socrates fits in with various requirements of their inferential art of Topics. I suggest that this does not mean that Aristotle has built the peirastic on Socratic elenchus, but that he has used part of Socrates’ activity as philosophical evidence for his own fundamental dialectical conceptions.
El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad —dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles— de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales.
Al inicio de “Sobre las partes de los animales”, Aristóteles menciona la creencia compartida con ... more Al inicio de “Sobre las partes de los animales”, Aristóteles menciona la creencia compartida con su auditorio sobre la existencia de personas instruidas, quienes utilizan ὅροι como puntos de referencia en relación con el ejercicio de su capacidad de juzgar qué explica correctamente un conferencista. Sin embargo, el núcleo de la instrucción requerida y el modo en que ella puede ser alcanzada representan parte de las dificultades principales del texto. Me propongo volver a examinar el perfil del pepaideuménos de PA 639a1-12. Frente a una cantidad de alternativas, intentaré argüir que el núcleo ensombrecido de su instrucción puede ser mejor visto como el producto de ἐμπειρία sobre casos relativos al πρᾶγμα en estudio.
In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way... more In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way, Plato develops in Philebus 38b-39d. This theory explains how the human beings are capable of considering the experience's facts. At the core of this theory, the soul is the intermediate point of a general process that allows to emit a statement related to objects of the world. So this theory also registers as a part of the history of the philosophical contemporary semantics. I will argue that three analytically separable stages are distinguished in connection with this operational mediation of the soul. At the first stage, the human soul gets blindly the formal characters of those facts by means of a composite pathema, which corresponds to a hexis of doxazein (form an opinion) and produces a fundamental doxa-logos. The second stage is the moment of the doctrine that explains the reason why we are conscious of what we have grasped in the analytical previous level. At the third stage, one may emit the utterances of those facts. Every stage corresponds to a concept of doxa-logos which have different characteristics, and it is opportune that they are distinguished in the comprehension of that theory. I argue for this reading against a number of alternatives.
In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way... more In this essay I defend a reconstruction of the epistemological theory that, in a metaphorical way, Plato develops in philebus 38bB-39D. This theory explains how the human beings are capable of considering the experience’s facts. At the core of this theory, the soul is the intermediate point of a general process that allows to emit a statement related to objects of the world. So this theory also registers as a part of the history of the philosophical contemporary semantics. I will argue that three analytically separable stages are distinguished in connection with this operational mediation of the soul. At the first stage, the human soul gets blindly the formal characters of those facts by means of a composite páthēma, which corresponds to a héxis of doxázein (form an opinion) and produces a fundamental dóxa-lógos. The second stage is the moment of the doctrine that explains the reason why we are conscious of what we have grasped in the analytical previous level. At the third stage, one may emit the utterances of those facts. Every stage corresponds to a concept of dóxa-lógos which have different characteristics, and it is opportune that they are distinguished in the comprehension of that theory. I argue for this reading against a number of alternatives.
After a brief preliminary description of the ancient commentary movement relating to Aristotle’s ... more After a brief preliminary description of the ancient commentary movement relating to Aristotle’s treatises, this paper provides a first translation from ancient Greek into Spanish of Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 1a1-15. In this commentary, the exhausted topic corresponds to technical notions of homonyms, synonyms and paronymous: decisive conceptions that to a large extent determine the comprehension of Aristotelian philosophy. The translation of the Greek is direct and literal, and includes explanatory and analytical notes which character is as much philological as philosophical.
Luego de una breve descripción introductoria del movimiento del comentario antiguo a la obra de Aristóteles, el artículo presenta una primera traducción a la lengua española del comentario de Amonio, hijo de Hermias, al pasaje 1a1-15 del tratado Categorías de Aristóteles. El tema agotado en este comentario es el de las nociones técnicas de homónimos, sinónimos y parónimos: concepciones decisivas que determinan buena parte de la comprensión de la filosofía aristotélica. La traducción directa del griego y apegada texto, incluye notas aclaratorias, de discusión y de análisis, tanto de carácter filológico como filosófico.
Uploads
Además de las 48 ponencias de destacados especialistas latinoamericanos, el libro contiene las conferencias dictadas por el Dr.. Eduardo Sinnott y la Dra. Virginia Aspe Armella.
El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad —dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles— de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales.
Luego de una breve descripción introductoria del movimiento del comentario antiguo a la obra de Aristóteles, el artículo presenta una primera traducción a la lengua española del comentario de Amonio, hijo de Hermias, al pasaje 1a1-15 del tratado Categorías de Aristóteles. El tema agotado en este comentario es el de las nociones técnicas de homónimos, sinónimos y parónimos: concepciones decisivas que determinan buena parte de la comprensión de la filosofía aristotélica. La traducción directa del griego y apegada texto, incluye notas aclaratorias, de discusión y de análisis, tanto de carácter filológico como filosófico.
Además de las 48 ponencias de destacados especialistas latinoamericanos, el libro contiene las conferencias dictadas por el Dr.. Eduardo Sinnott y la Dra. Virginia Aspe Armella.
El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad —dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles— de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales.
Luego de una breve descripción introductoria del movimiento del comentario antiguo a la obra de Aristóteles, el artículo presenta una primera traducción a la lengua española del comentario de Amonio, hijo de Hermias, al pasaje 1a1-15 del tratado Categorías de Aristóteles. El tema agotado en este comentario es el de las nociones técnicas de homónimos, sinónimos y parónimos: concepciones decisivas que determinan buena parte de la comprensión de la filosofía aristotélica. La traducción directa del griego y apegada texto, incluye notas aclaratorias, de discusión y de análisis, tanto de carácter filológico como filosófico.