Giuseppe Bianco, Charles T. Wolfe & Gertrudis Van de Vijver (eds.), Canguilhem and Continental Philosophy of Biology, 2023
The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) ... more The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) by drawing on the resources available in Canguilhem's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies. It consists of six sections. In the first and second section, I outline the so-called 'mind-life problem' and two diametrically opposed responses to it: life philosophy (life subsumes mind) and transcendentalism (mind subsumes life). Against this background, I flesh out Canguilhem's 'slantwise' resolution, which argues that, while it is true that life feeds into mind, it is equally true that mind takes up and subl(im)ates life. In the third and fourth section, I focus on the first half of the proposed solution: I start by putting forward a non-reductionist account of life grounded on the idea of vital normativity, and then go on to show how this vital dynamism translates into human cognition via praktognosia (embodied and techn(olog)ical know-how). In the fifth section I tackle the second half of the solution: by delineating the idea of symbolic behavior and ex-centric positionality I try to indicate how mind, while grounded in life, is nonetheless able to transcend it. Finally, in the last section, I suggest that this Janus-faced dynamism between life and mind also holds true for the researcher investigating these topics,and hint at the broader philosophical implication of such a view for the practice ofscience and philosophy.
Vitalism and Its Legacy in Twentieth Century Life Sciences and Philosophy, 2023
The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expoun... more The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expounded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. I argue that the two authors independently developed complementary critiques of the mechanical-behaviourist conception of life sciences, which culminated in a surprisingly similar notion of life construed as a normative (polarized) activity, i.e., an activity that is not indifferent to its own conditions of possibility. Such an alternative conception of life has far-reaching consequences for the epistemology of life sciences, for it requires it to reconsider not only its object of inquiry - the nature of (the relationship between) an organism and its environment -, but also, since scientists themselves are living beings, the nature of its epistemic practices. What I call the truth of (a specific variety of) vitalism is thus reflected not only in how life is cognized, but also in how life cognizes (itself). This last point is of particular philosophical importance, as it paves the way towards a more dynamic conception of reflection (tentatively called ouroboric thought), which takes seriously that we, as cognizers of life, at the same time live the lives of cognizers.
Paper originally published here (free access): https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1092 (please ... more Paper originally published here (free access): https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1092 (please visit the site)
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This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (Section 1, part of Section 2), I put forward a critique of what I refer to as the ‘received’ or ‘standard’ view of mindfulness in the Western cultural milieu. According to the received view, mindfulness is the acontextual ‘core’ of Buddhism whose determining characteristic is bare (present-oriented, non-judgmental) attention to the flow and content of experience. As noted by many researchers, this conception is in stark contrast to the traditional Buddhist understanding, where mindfulness is not only embedded in a broader context that provides it with a specific philosophico-existential orientation (normative aspect) but is also construed as a reflective activity (noetic aspect). In the second part (part of Sections 2–4), I argue that one of the main issues with the standard view is that it frames experience in terms of what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls ‘objective thought’ (using objectivity, or ‘thinghood’, as an onto-epistemological standard of reality), which makes the two aspects of the traditional conception (normative and noetic) unintelligible. I then provide an alternative view based on the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that attempts to integrate the two aspects into a broader conception of experience. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notions of ‘phenomenal field’ and ‘radical reflection’, I argue that mindfulness needs to be understood as a reflective attitude that allows one to discern not only the content but also, and primarily, the context of each experience, and that this also includes seeing itself—the act of reflection—as an act that stems from, and returns back into, the pre-reflective current of existence.
In recent decades, the embodied approaches to cognition have become increasingly influential in p... more In recent decades, the embodied approaches to cognition have become increasingly influential in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, despite their invaluable contribution to the field, there is some concern that they may have succumbed to what I call the “fetishization of the irrational.” This can be gleaned from a somewhat disconcerting tendency of such approaches to construe mind and reason as secondary phenomena that occlude or even distort the primary level of lived experience. There exists a danger that, if left unqualified, a valid attempt to dispel one group of dualisms (mind vs. body) may bring forth another and perhaps even more pernicious group (rationality vs. experientiality). In the paper, I draw on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a major source of inspiration for the embodiment movement, to show that a more nuanced understanding of the relation between body and mind is called for. More specifically, I argue that, in human beings, the idea that the mind is seamlessly interwoven with the body should be construed as a twofold relation: not only in the sense that human mind is mind embodied, but also in the sense that human body is body minded, a virtual center of behavioral patterns of qualitatively novel kind (i.e., symbolic behavior). Mind, in this view, is a unique dynamic structure that encompasses our whole mode of being.
In this paper, I explore shikantaza, the Sōtō Zen practice of “just sitting”, through the phenome... more In this paper, I explore shikantaza, the Sōtō Zen practice of “just sitting”, through the phenomenological lens of late Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. One of the merits of the phenomenological approach is that it enables us to think of bodies not only as physical-objective, but also experiential-existential structures (Körper vs. Leib, respectively), and thus provides a conceptual framework capable of thematizing the profoundly corporeal dynamics of shikantaza without falling prey to physico-neural reductionism, as is often the case with contemporary scientific accounts. Drawing on the various “in-between” notions developed in the phenomenological tradition – most notably: phenomenal field, lived body, praktognosia, double sensation, and motivation –, I go on to portray shikantaza as a practical means of suspending “objective thought” (our habitual tendency to objectify experience) and of cultivating a form of corporeal/praktognosic reflection, which anchors the meditator in its lived corporeality on the hither side of the subject-object dichotomy. Further, I argue that the phenomenological reconceptualization of shikantaza in terms of embodied/praktognosic knowing challenges our sedimented beliefs about the nature and role of knowledge, and indicates that our currently established epistemic practices, centered on the ideal of objective (explicit) knowledge, need to be expanded with those aimed at exploring the prereflective realm.
Mind sciences have undergone a decidedly "embodied" or "enactive" turn in the past two decades. I... more Mind sciences have undergone a decidedly "embodied" or "enactive" turn in the past two decades. In its original conception, put forward by Varela et al., this radical shift of perspective was depicted as a continuation of a research program founded by Merleau-Ponty, and was said to encompass two levels. On a theoretical level it consisted of a move away from the cerebrocentric, information-processing, and representational models of mind and cognition towards the corporeal, enactive, and world-involving models. On a (meta)epistemological and (meta)methodological level it argued for the need to expand the methodological array of mind sciences to include the disciplined study of lived experience, and it laid the foundations for a fruitful exchange between scientific and phenomenological investigations. However, the progressive popularization of the enactive-embodied narrative has made us witness the narrowing of its far-reaching scope, whereby changes on the theoretical level are being extricated from their broader philosophical framework and wedded to more traditional epistemologies and methodologies. In this paper I try to shed some critical light on some of these developments, focusing particularly on two neglected themes of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that are highly relevant for contemporary enactive/embodied approaches: the unsurpasability of lived experience (cf. 'behaviorist fork') and the need to radically rethink the nature and dynamics of our reflective inquiries (cf. 'radical reflection').
I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical (re)construal of neurophenomenology. While gener... more I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical (re)construal of neurophenomenology. While generally sympathetic to his approach, I argue that, instead of reverting to Hegel’s “dialectics of ideas,” a more suitable candidate for the job would be Merleau-Ponty’s “dialectics of existence.”
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debate... more Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of " the transcendental " has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl's " transcendental turn " , although significantly altering Kant's original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty's subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions — from Kant's " transcendentalism of faculties " , through Husserl's " transcendentalism of pure consciousness " , to Merleau-Ponty's " transcendentalism of the flesh " — arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist " thought style ". In the final section , we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the " truth of naturalism " , while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (" transcendentalizing ") nature.
Context • In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current dev... more Context • In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem • Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects – notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition – have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method • We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the " middle way " ; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between " enac-tion " and " enactivism. " Results • We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications • Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains – theoretical, empirical, and existential – where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content • All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications.
> Context • The notion of " enaction, " as originally expounded by Varela and his colleagues, was... more > Context • The notion of " enaction, " as originally expounded by Varela and his colleagues, was introduced into cogni-tive science as part of a broad philosophical framework combining science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy. Its intention was to help the researchers in the field avoid falling prey to various dichotomies (mind/body, self/ world, self/other) bedeviling modern philosophy and science, and serve as a " conceptual evocation " of " non-duality " or " groundlessness " : an ongoing and irreducible circulation between the flux of lived experience (being) and the search of reason for conceptual invariants (knowing). > Problem • It seems that, within the burgeoning field of " enactivism, " these far-reaching dimensions of the original proposal are often either dismissed or simply ignored. For this reason, the article tries to answer the following questions: Does the move away from the original exposition of enaction matter? What, if anything, has been lost along the way? What are the implications of the elements that have been discarded? > Method • By drawing on some of the less well-known works of Varela, we spell out and elucidate some of the more radical aspects of the notion of enaction and the broader philosophical framework into which it was originally embedded. > Results • We argue that this broader philosophical framework is of utmost importance, as it shows that enaction is only one part of the multi-layered " change in the context " that Varela felt was needed to successfully instantiate a move towards the non-dual. This " change of context " involves not only a change in the way we think about dualities, but also a change in the way we experience them. The role of new scientific metaphors, such as enac-tion (but also autopoiesis, embodiment, etc.), is to function as conceptual evocations of this back-and-forth exchange between knowing and being. However, if this overall framework is discarded, as is often the case in contemporary accounts, enaction loses its radical impetus and becomes mellowed down to yet another version of naturalized epis-temology. > Implications • Taking the notion of enaction seriously implies a radical shift in our conceptions of science and knowledge, as it encompasses a theoretical and existential move away from a detached observer to embedded and engaged cognizer. Thus, our manner of thinking can no longer be considered in isolation from our manner of being , which indicates a deep interconnection between epistemology and ethics, and may entail profound changes in the definition of the aims, methods, and values of the research community: self-transformation as a consequence of, and condition for, understanding. > Constructivist content • The target article advocates a critical approach to realist presuppositions in contemporary science and philosophy, and emphasizes a deep interrelation between being and knowing, between ethics and epistemology.
Upshot: Since I am in general agreement with Werner's proposal, my commentary focuses on two aspe... more Upshot: Since I am in general agreement with Werner's proposal, my commentary focuses on two aspects that might expand and refine it further. The first is historical: by providing a brief account of some of the central notions from the works of Uexküll and Plessner, I indicate why a more encompassing historical and philosophical study of certain trends in (particularly German) philosophy of biology from the first part of the 20th century might be relevant to the topic in question. The second aspect is phenomenological: I problematize Werner's sparse and simplistic treatment of " experience, " arguing that a closer engagement with phenomenological tradition (especially the work of Merleau-Ponty) may yield results that are much more congruent with his overall line of thought.
Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin's illuminating article. After (a) ... more Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin's illuminating article. After (a) contrasting existential (Petitmengin) and theoretical (Kirchhoff and Hutto) views of neurophenomenology, I (b) embed Petitmengin's account of the experiential dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness into a larger framework by drawing parallels with previous experiments on unitive/non-dual experiences (Deikman). Finally, I (c) raise the question of how seriously we are willing to take the pragmatics of investigating and cultivating lived experience both in phenomenological research and in education and science in general.
"In the past two decades, the notion of embodiment has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive... more "In the past two decades, the notion of embodiment has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Although virtually unknown at the beginning of the 1990’s, it has now become, in the guise of embodied and enactive cognitive science, a serious contender against the classical (cognitivist) conceptions of mind, cognition, and consciousness. By drawing on the thematizations of the body found in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, especially on the distinction between body as lived body (Leib) – a prereflective bodily awareness that shapes our experiential landscape –, and body as physical body (Körper) – a thematic experience of the body as an object –, it is maintained that mind and cognition are embodied in a twofold sense: (i) structurally, i.e., in the sense of being constituted by extracranial (neural, bodily, environmental, and social) processes, and (ii) phenomenologically, i.e., in the sense of including the experience of oneself as a bodily agent situated in the world. It is contended that this Janus-faced nature of corporeality, divided between “being a body” (Leibsein) and “having a body” (Körperhaben), may help undermine some of the age-old dualities (mind-body, interiorityexteriority, etc.) and thereby help anchor experience in materiality and materiality in experience.
The main focus of the volume at hand is to analyze, evaluate, and critically reflect upon, what might be termed “horizons of embodiment”. First, it purports to examine the scope and applicability of the notion of embodiment in relation to not only human, but also animal, vegetative, and perhaps even artificial life. Specifically, it aims to investigate to what extent, if at all, different construals of embodiment might contribute to a better understanding of different life forms – of their unique, if tentative, modes of being, cognizing, and experiencing. Second, it purports to examine, from both practical and theoretical perspectives, possibilities for a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) between structural and phenomenological approaches to embodiment: How can objective (third-person) and experiential (first-person) aspects of corporeality be combined so as to provide efficient means for the study of the living? Both perspectives wish to enrich and broaden our grasp of different grades, modes and dimensions of embodiment, bringing forth their tentative limitations and paving ways for their overcoming."
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether phenomenology, with its methodological and episte... more The purpose of this paper is to explore whether phenomenology, with its methodological and epistemological grounding in the first-person investigation of the lived experience, can enable us to gain insight into the fundamental structures of “the living”? To address this issue we will anchor our analysis in two central phenomenological notions. First is the Janus-faced construal of the body: the fact that, as a living being, I not only have an object-body (Körper), but also, and primarily, am a lived body (Leib). Lived body, it may be argued, is the epistemic ground zero of all phenomenological investigation, so any grounded bio-phenomenological account must start from there. Secondly, and interrelatedly, my embodiment is said to play the key role in empathy, which is often considered to be via regalis to intersubjectivity in phenomenology, and is therefore integral in how we approach and understand the other living being. However, to make the ordeal of taking the phenomenological notions of embodiment and empathy as methodological guides to the category of life even more challenging, our main object of research will not be human or animal, but plant life. The article consists of two main parts. First, we provide an outline of Husserl’s somatology, “the science of the lived body”, as a fundamental methodological and conceptual framework for a phenomenological re-construal of life sciences in general and botany in particular. Second, and with the aim of demonstrating why and how the somatological approach might be useful for re-conceptualizing vegetal life, we identify, in the writings of Husserl, a three-step procedure for operationalizing the native (empathic) perception of another living being (the three steps include: eidetic self-modification; intercorporeal pairing; and appresentation of an alien field of experience). After expounding on each step, we draw some tentative conclusions, particularly on how our analysis might impact the understanding of empathy: it is not synonymous with the imposition of anthropomorphic conditions onto the experience of the living. Instead, it must be understood as a gradual formation of a contrast foil whose aim is to efficiently bring to the fore the peculiarity of non-human life forms.
In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary approaches to m... more In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary approaches to mindfulness meditation, with a special focus on two aspects. First, I consider the claim that de-contextualized contemporary approaches may have serious ethical consequences (the so-called problem of "mindful sniper/zombie"); second, I investigate the suggestion that it may be misleading to construe mindfulness meditation as (simply) a relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique, as it is sometimes accompanied by unpleasant, even terrifying phenomena (the so-called "dark night of the soul"). In the last two sections, I weave the two narratives together by putting forward the following claim: traditionally-minded criticisms of contemporary approaches are ultimately correct, but for the wrong reasons––the historical context is not important in itself, but because of the role it plays in confronting the practitioner with the fundamental existential questions. In this sense, mindfulness meditation can be conceived as an important, but not the only element of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, whose ultimate goal is not relaxation or enhanced attention, but rather a radical existential transformation.
> Context • In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have b... more > Context • In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. > Problem • Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. > Method • By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and cognition, as propounded by Varela, Thompson & Rosch, we provide an outline of the original philosophical framework of enactivism and neurophenomenology. We focus on its three central tenets – reflexivity, subject-world co-determination, and the construal of cognition as situated, skillful and embodied action – and show how they collectively add up to a radical change in attitude towards the age-old philosophical dilemmas. > Results • We show how contemporary enactivist and embodied approaches relate to the original Varelian conception, and argue that many of them, despite frequent claims to the contrary, adopt significantly less radical philosophical positions. Further, we provide some tentative suggestions as to why this dilution of the original impetus might have occurred, paying special attention to the deep-rooted disparities that span the field. > Implications • It is argued that more attention should be paid to epistemological and metaphysical tenets of different proposals within the 4E movement in general and enactivism in particular. Additionally, in emphasizing the inescapable multilayeredness and contextuality of scientific knowledge, enactivism and neurophenomenology accord with pluralist accounts of science and might provide important contributions to contemporary debates in the field. > Constructivist content • The epistemological odyssey, construed as a journey to find a middle way between realism and idealism, is a central tenet of anti-representationalist, non-dualist constructivist approaches aimed at avoiding age-old philosophical traps.
In the past few decades, mindfulness meditation and other techniques of Buddhist origin have been... more In the past few decades, mindfulness meditation and other techniques of Buddhist origin have been rapidly gaining in recognition as means of facilitating psychophysical health and well-being. However, this growing enthusiasm has recently been checked by a host of criticism that questions the ways mindfulness has been (mis)construed and (mis)appropriated in Western culture. Critics have been especially vocal about the dangers of " mystifying mindfulness " : extracting it from its traditional framework and transforming it into a watered-down, decontextualized self-help method. Although sympathetic to its main thrust, we believe such criticism must be appropriately qualified. To begin with, what critics often neglect is the fact that Buddhism is not a homogenous tradition, but exhibits great diversity. For the most part, critics base their claims on Abhidamma Buddhism and tend to ignore the contribution of other (particularly Northern and East Asian) Buddhist traditions. Drawing on recent work on Mahāmudrā in Tibetan Buddhism and early Chan in Chinese Buddhism, the paper argues that contemporary conceptions of mindfulness have telling historical precedents, which have important implications for current debates. Specifically, we suggest that the inclusion of Northern and East Asian Buddhist traditions provides us with a more nuanced conception of
I address two topics that I consider particularly problematic in Quale’s "Religion: A Radical-Co... more I address two topics that I consider particularly problematic in Quale’s "Religion: A Radical-Constructivist Perspective" (CF 2015 11 (1): 119–126). First, I question the purported distinction between cognition and non-cognition, and second, I inquire into a rather vague construal of “mystical philosophies.” Given that both topics play important roles in the overall argumentative chain, their unfoundedness threatens to have serious consequences for the main conclusions of the article.
Giuseppe Bianco, Charles T. Wolfe & Gertrudis Van de Vijver (eds.), Canguilhem and Continental Philosophy of Biology, 2023
The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) ... more The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) by drawing on the resources available in Canguilhem's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies. It consists of six sections. In the first and second section, I outline the so-called 'mind-life problem' and two diametrically opposed responses to it: life philosophy (life subsumes mind) and transcendentalism (mind subsumes life). Against this background, I flesh out Canguilhem's 'slantwise' resolution, which argues that, while it is true that life feeds into mind, it is equally true that mind takes up and subl(im)ates life. In the third and fourth section, I focus on the first half of the proposed solution: I start by putting forward a non-reductionist account of life grounded on the idea of vital normativity, and then go on to show how this vital dynamism translates into human cognition via praktognosia (embodied and techn(olog)ical know-how). In the fifth section I tackle the second half of the solution: by delineating the idea of symbolic behavior and ex-centric positionality I try to indicate how mind, while grounded in life, is nonetheless able to transcend it. Finally, in the last section, I suggest that this Janus-faced dynamism between life and mind also holds true for the researcher investigating these topics,and hint at the broader philosophical implication of such a view for the practice ofscience and philosophy.
Vitalism and Its Legacy in Twentieth Century Life Sciences and Philosophy, 2023
The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expoun... more The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expounded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. I argue that the two authors independently developed complementary critiques of the mechanical-behaviourist conception of life sciences, which culminated in a surprisingly similar notion of life construed as a normative (polarized) activity, i.e., an activity that is not indifferent to its own conditions of possibility. Such an alternative conception of life has far-reaching consequences for the epistemology of life sciences, for it requires it to reconsider not only its object of inquiry - the nature of (the relationship between) an organism and its environment -, but also, since scientists themselves are living beings, the nature of its epistemic practices. What I call the truth of (a specific variety of) vitalism is thus reflected not only in how life is cognized, but also in how life cognizes (itself). This last point is of particular philosophical importance, as it paves the way towards a more dynamic conception of reflection (tentatively called ouroboric thought), which takes seriously that we, as cognizers of life, at the same time live the lives of cognizers.
Paper originally published here (free access): https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1092 (please ... more Paper originally published here (free access): https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/12/1092 (please visit the site)
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This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (Section 1, part of Section 2), I put forward a critique of what I refer to as the ‘received’ or ‘standard’ view of mindfulness in the Western cultural milieu. According to the received view, mindfulness is the acontextual ‘core’ of Buddhism whose determining characteristic is bare (present-oriented, non-judgmental) attention to the flow and content of experience. As noted by many researchers, this conception is in stark contrast to the traditional Buddhist understanding, where mindfulness is not only embedded in a broader context that provides it with a specific philosophico-existential orientation (normative aspect) but is also construed as a reflective activity (noetic aspect). In the second part (part of Sections 2–4), I argue that one of the main issues with the standard view is that it frames experience in terms of what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls ‘objective thought’ (using objectivity, or ‘thinghood’, as an onto-epistemological standard of reality), which makes the two aspects of the traditional conception (normative and noetic) unintelligible. I then provide an alternative view based on the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that attempts to integrate the two aspects into a broader conception of experience. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notions of ‘phenomenal field’ and ‘radical reflection’, I argue that mindfulness needs to be understood as a reflective attitude that allows one to discern not only the content but also, and primarily, the context of each experience, and that this also includes seeing itself—the act of reflection—as an act that stems from, and returns back into, the pre-reflective current of existence.
In recent decades, the embodied approaches to cognition have become increasingly influential in p... more In recent decades, the embodied approaches to cognition have become increasingly influential in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, despite their invaluable contribution to the field, there is some concern that they may have succumbed to what I call the “fetishization of the irrational.” This can be gleaned from a somewhat disconcerting tendency of such approaches to construe mind and reason as secondary phenomena that occlude or even distort the primary level of lived experience. There exists a danger that, if left unqualified, a valid attempt to dispel one group of dualisms (mind vs. body) may bring forth another and perhaps even more pernicious group (rationality vs. experientiality). In the paper, I draw on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a major source of inspiration for the embodiment movement, to show that a more nuanced understanding of the relation between body and mind is called for. More specifically, I argue that, in human beings, the idea that the mind is seamlessly interwoven with the body should be construed as a twofold relation: not only in the sense that human mind is mind embodied, but also in the sense that human body is body minded, a virtual center of behavioral patterns of qualitatively novel kind (i.e., symbolic behavior). Mind, in this view, is a unique dynamic structure that encompasses our whole mode of being.
In this paper, I explore shikantaza, the Sōtō Zen practice of “just sitting”, through the phenome... more In this paper, I explore shikantaza, the Sōtō Zen practice of “just sitting”, through the phenomenological lens of late Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. One of the merits of the phenomenological approach is that it enables us to think of bodies not only as physical-objective, but also experiential-existential structures (Körper vs. Leib, respectively), and thus provides a conceptual framework capable of thematizing the profoundly corporeal dynamics of shikantaza without falling prey to physico-neural reductionism, as is often the case with contemporary scientific accounts. Drawing on the various “in-between” notions developed in the phenomenological tradition – most notably: phenomenal field, lived body, praktognosia, double sensation, and motivation –, I go on to portray shikantaza as a practical means of suspending “objective thought” (our habitual tendency to objectify experience) and of cultivating a form of corporeal/praktognosic reflection, which anchors the meditator in its lived corporeality on the hither side of the subject-object dichotomy. Further, I argue that the phenomenological reconceptualization of shikantaza in terms of embodied/praktognosic knowing challenges our sedimented beliefs about the nature and role of knowledge, and indicates that our currently established epistemic practices, centered on the ideal of objective (explicit) knowledge, need to be expanded with those aimed at exploring the prereflective realm.
Mind sciences have undergone a decidedly "embodied" or "enactive" turn in the past two decades. I... more Mind sciences have undergone a decidedly "embodied" or "enactive" turn in the past two decades. In its original conception, put forward by Varela et al., this radical shift of perspective was depicted as a continuation of a research program founded by Merleau-Ponty, and was said to encompass two levels. On a theoretical level it consisted of a move away from the cerebrocentric, information-processing, and representational models of mind and cognition towards the corporeal, enactive, and world-involving models. On a (meta)epistemological and (meta)methodological level it argued for the need to expand the methodological array of mind sciences to include the disciplined study of lived experience, and it laid the foundations for a fruitful exchange between scientific and phenomenological investigations. However, the progressive popularization of the enactive-embodied narrative has made us witness the narrowing of its far-reaching scope, whereby changes on the theoretical level are being extricated from their broader philosophical framework and wedded to more traditional epistemologies and methodologies. In this paper I try to shed some critical light on some of these developments, focusing particularly on two neglected themes of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that are highly relevant for contemporary enactive/embodied approaches: the unsurpasability of lived experience (cf. 'behaviorist fork') and the need to radically rethink the nature and dynamics of our reflective inquiries (cf. 'radical reflection').
I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical (re)construal of neurophenomenology. While gener... more I examine Zaslawski’s proposal for a dialectical (re)construal of neurophenomenology. While generally sympathetic to his approach, I argue that, instead of reverting to Hegel’s “dialectics of ideas,” a more suitable candidate for the job would be Merleau-Ponty’s “dialectics of existence.”
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debate... more Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in transcendental philosophy, sparked by debates surrounding the question of the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. However, it is often the case that these debates fail to appreciate the alterations that the notion of " the transcendental " has undergone since Kant first introduced his system of transcendental idealism. The paper intends to critically examine some of these changes, arguing that Husserl's " transcendental turn " , although significantly altering Kant's original conception, remained faithful to the project of transcendentalism and wrought in its wake important resources for Merleau-Ponty's subsequent elaborations. The central part of the paper takes us through three conceptions — from Kant's " transcendentalism of faculties " , through Husserl's " transcendentalism of pure consciousness " , to Merleau-Ponty's " transcendentalism of the flesh " — arguing that they constitute a coherent transcendentalist " thought style ". In the final section , we claim that these progressive alterations in the meaning of the transcendental project can shed light on the debate about the (im)possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. We do this by providing a notion of the transcendental that makes room for the " truth of naturalism " , while simultaneously insisting on the necessity of a reverse (and supplementary) movement, namely that of phenomenalizing (" transcendentalizing ") nature.
Context • In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current dev... more Context • In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem • Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects – notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition – have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method • We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the " middle way " ; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between " enac-tion " and " enactivism. " Results • We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications • Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains – theoretical, empirical, and existential – where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content • All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications.
> Context • The notion of " enaction, " as originally expounded by Varela and his colleagues, was... more > Context • The notion of " enaction, " as originally expounded by Varela and his colleagues, was introduced into cogni-tive science as part of a broad philosophical framework combining science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy. Its intention was to help the researchers in the field avoid falling prey to various dichotomies (mind/body, self/ world, self/other) bedeviling modern philosophy and science, and serve as a " conceptual evocation " of " non-duality " or " groundlessness " : an ongoing and irreducible circulation between the flux of lived experience (being) and the search of reason for conceptual invariants (knowing). > Problem • It seems that, within the burgeoning field of " enactivism, " these far-reaching dimensions of the original proposal are often either dismissed or simply ignored. For this reason, the article tries to answer the following questions: Does the move away from the original exposition of enaction matter? What, if anything, has been lost along the way? What are the implications of the elements that have been discarded? > Method • By drawing on some of the less well-known works of Varela, we spell out and elucidate some of the more radical aspects of the notion of enaction and the broader philosophical framework into which it was originally embedded. > Results • We argue that this broader philosophical framework is of utmost importance, as it shows that enaction is only one part of the multi-layered " change in the context " that Varela felt was needed to successfully instantiate a move towards the non-dual. This " change of context " involves not only a change in the way we think about dualities, but also a change in the way we experience them. The role of new scientific metaphors, such as enac-tion (but also autopoiesis, embodiment, etc.), is to function as conceptual evocations of this back-and-forth exchange between knowing and being. However, if this overall framework is discarded, as is often the case in contemporary accounts, enaction loses its radical impetus and becomes mellowed down to yet another version of naturalized epis-temology. > Implications • Taking the notion of enaction seriously implies a radical shift in our conceptions of science and knowledge, as it encompasses a theoretical and existential move away from a detached observer to embedded and engaged cognizer. Thus, our manner of thinking can no longer be considered in isolation from our manner of being , which indicates a deep interconnection between epistemology and ethics, and may entail profound changes in the definition of the aims, methods, and values of the research community: self-transformation as a consequence of, and condition for, understanding. > Constructivist content • The target article advocates a critical approach to realist presuppositions in contemporary science and philosophy, and emphasizes a deep interrelation between being and knowing, between ethics and epistemology.
Upshot: Since I am in general agreement with Werner's proposal, my commentary focuses on two aspe... more Upshot: Since I am in general agreement with Werner's proposal, my commentary focuses on two aspects that might expand and refine it further. The first is historical: by providing a brief account of some of the central notions from the works of Uexküll and Plessner, I indicate why a more encompassing historical and philosophical study of certain trends in (particularly German) philosophy of biology from the first part of the 20th century might be relevant to the topic in question. The second aspect is phenomenological: I problematize Werner's sparse and simplistic treatment of " experience, " arguing that a closer engagement with phenomenological tradition (especially the work of Merleau-Ponty) may yield results that are much more congruent with his overall line of thought.
Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin's illuminating article. After (a) ... more Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin's illuminating article. After (a) contrasting existential (Petitmengin) and theoretical (Kirchhoff and Hutto) views of neurophenomenology, I (b) embed Petitmengin's account of the experiential dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness into a larger framework by drawing parallels with previous experiments on unitive/non-dual experiences (Deikman). Finally, I (c) raise the question of how seriously we are willing to take the pragmatics of investigating and cultivating lived experience both in phenomenological research and in education and science in general.
"In the past two decades, the notion of embodiment has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive... more "In the past two decades, the notion of embodiment has been quickly gaining currency in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Although virtually unknown at the beginning of the 1990’s, it has now become, in the guise of embodied and enactive cognitive science, a serious contender against the classical (cognitivist) conceptions of mind, cognition, and consciousness. By drawing on the thematizations of the body found in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, especially on the distinction between body as lived body (Leib) – a prereflective bodily awareness that shapes our experiential landscape –, and body as physical body (Körper) – a thematic experience of the body as an object –, it is maintained that mind and cognition are embodied in a twofold sense: (i) structurally, i.e., in the sense of being constituted by extracranial (neural, bodily, environmental, and social) processes, and (ii) phenomenologically, i.e., in the sense of including the experience of oneself as a bodily agent situated in the world. It is contended that this Janus-faced nature of corporeality, divided between “being a body” (Leibsein) and “having a body” (Körperhaben), may help undermine some of the age-old dualities (mind-body, interiorityexteriority, etc.) and thereby help anchor experience in materiality and materiality in experience.
The main focus of the volume at hand is to analyze, evaluate, and critically reflect upon, what might be termed “horizons of embodiment”. First, it purports to examine the scope and applicability of the notion of embodiment in relation to not only human, but also animal, vegetative, and perhaps even artificial life. Specifically, it aims to investigate to what extent, if at all, different construals of embodiment might contribute to a better understanding of different life forms – of their unique, if tentative, modes of being, cognizing, and experiencing. Second, it purports to examine, from both practical and theoretical perspectives, possibilities for a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) between structural and phenomenological approaches to embodiment: How can objective (third-person) and experiential (first-person) aspects of corporeality be combined so as to provide efficient means for the study of the living? Both perspectives wish to enrich and broaden our grasp of different grades, modes and dimensions of embodiment, bringing forth their tentative limitations and paving ways for their overcoming."
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether phenomenology, with its methodological and episte... more The purpose of this paper is to explore whether phenomenology, with its methodological and epistemological grounding in the first-person investigation of the lived experience, can enable us to gain insight into the fundamental structures of “the living”? To address this issue we will anchor our analysis in two central phenomenological notions. First is the Janus-faced construal of the body: the fact that, as a living being, I not only have an object-body (Körper), but also, and primarily, am a lived body (Leib). Lived body, it may be argued, is the epistemic ground zero of all phenomenological investigation, so any grounded bio-phenomenological account must start from there. Secondly, and interrelatedly, my embodiment is said to play the key role in empathy, which is often considered to be via regalis to intersubjectivity in phenomenology, and is therefore integral in how we approach and understand the other living being. However, to make the ordeal of taking the phenomenological notions of embodiment and empathy as methodological guides to the category of life even more challenging, our main object of research will not be human or animal, but plant life. The article consists of two main parts. First, we provide an outline of Husserl’s somatology, “the science of the lived body”, as a fundamental methodological and conceptual framework for a phenomenological re-construal of life sciences in general and botany in particular. Second, and with the aim of demonstrating why and how the somatological approach might be useful for re-conceptualizing vegetal life, we identify, in the writings of Husserl, a three-step procedure for operationalizing the native (empathic) perception of another living being (the three steps include: eidetic self-modification; intercorporeal pairing; and appresentation of an alien field of experience). After expounding on each step, we draw some tentative conclusions, particularly on how our analysis might impact the understanding of empathy: it is not synonymous with the imposition of anthropomorphic conditions onto the experience of the living. Instead, it must be understood as a gradual formation of a contrast foil whose aim is to efficiently bring to the fore the peculiarity of non-human life forms.
In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary approaches to m... more In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary approaches to mindfulness meditation, with a special focus on two aspects. First, I consider the claim that de-contextualized contemporary approaches may have serious ethical consequences (the so-called problem of "mindful sniper/zombie"); second, I investigate the suggestion that it may be misleading to construe mindfulness meditation as (simply) a relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique, as it is sometimes accompanied by unpleasant, even terrifying phenomena (the so-called "dark night of the soul"). In the last two sections, I weave the two narratives together by putting forward the following claim: traditionally-minded criticisms of contemporary approaches are ultimately correct, but for the wrong reasons––the historical context is not important in itself, but because of the role it plays in confronting the practitioner with the fundamental existential questions. In this sense, mindfulness meditation can be conceived as an important, but not the only element of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, whose ultimate goal is not relaxation or enhanced attention, but rather a radical existential transformation.
> Context • In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have b... more > Context • In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. > Problem • Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. > Method • By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and cognition, as propounded by Varela, Thompson & Rosch, we provide an outline of the original philosophical framework of enactivism and neurophenomenology. We focus on its three central tenets – reflexivity, subject-world co-determination, and the construal of cognition as situated, skillful and embodied action – and show how they collectively add up to a radical change in attitude towards the age-old philosophical dilemmas. > Results • We show how contemporary enactivist and embodied approaches relate to the original Varelian conception, and argue that many of them, despite frequent claims to the contrary, adopt significantly less radical philosophical positions. Further, we provide some tentative suggestions as to why this dilution of the original impetus might have occurred, paying special attention to the deep-rooted disparities that span the field. > Implications • It is argued that more attention should be paid to epistemological and metaphysical tenets of different proposals within the 4E movement in general and enactivism in particular. Additionally, in emphasizing the inescapable multilayeredness and contextuality of scientific knowledge, enactivism and neurophenomenology accord with pluralist accounts of science and might provide important contributions to contemporary debates in the field. > Constructivist content • The epistemological odyssey, construed as a journey to find a middle way between realism and idealism, is a central tenet of anti-representationalist, non-dualist constructivist approaches aimed at avoiding age-old philosophical traps.
In the past few decades, mindfulness meditation and other techniques of Buddhist origin have been... more In the past few decades, mindfulness meditation and other techniques of Buddhist origin have been rapidly gaining in recognition as means of facilitating psychophysical health and well-being. However, this growing enthusiasm has recently been checked by a host of criticism that questions the ways mindfulness has been (mis)construed and (mis)appropriated in Western culture. Critics have been especially vocal about the dangers of " mystifying mindfulness " : extracting it from its traditional framework and transforming it into a watered-down, decontextualized self-help method. Although sympathetic to its main thrust, we believe such criticism must be appropriately qualified. To begin with, what critics often neglect is the fact that Buddhism is not a homogenous tradition, but exhibits great diversity. For the most part, critics base their claims on Abhidamma Buddhism and tend to ignore the contribution of other (particularly Northern and East Asian) Buddhist traditions. Drawing on recent work on Mahāmudrā in Tibetan Buddhism and early Chan in Chinese Buddhism, the paper argues that contemporary conceptions of mindfulness have telling historical precedents, which have important implications for current debates. Specifically, we suggest that the inclusion of Northern and East Asian Buddhist traditions provides us with a more nuanced conception of
I address two topics that I consider particularly problematic in Quale’s "Religion: A Radical-Co... more I address two topics that I consider particularly problematic in Quale’s "Religion: A Radical-Constructivist Perspective" (CF 2015 11 (1): 119–126). First, I question the purported distinction between cognition and non-cognition, and second, I inquire into a rather vague construal of “mystical philosophies.” Given that both topics play important roles in the overall argumentative chain, their unfoundedness threatens to have serious consequences for the main conclusions of the article.
Predgovor k slovenskemu prevodu Nagarjunovih Temeljnih verzov o srednji poti (Mulamadyhamakakarik... more Predgovor k slovenskemu prevodu Nagarjunovih Temeljnih verzov o srednji poti (Mulamadyhamakakarika). / Preface to the Slovene translation of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika
Knjiga Utelešeni um, katere prevod – kot se to žal vse prepogosto dogaja – stopa pred slovenskega... more Knjiga Utelešeni um, katere prevod – kot se to žal vse prepogosto dogaja – stopa pred slovenskega bralca s četrtstoletnim zamikom (prva izdaja sega v leto 1991, nova, zvečine nespremenjena in z novimi predgovori opremljena, pa je izšla pred dvema letoma), je že kmalu po objavi dodobra razburkala vode kognitivne znanosti in filozofije duha, v zadnjem desetletju pa se je je v obeh disciplinah oprijel status nesporne klasike. Gre za delo, o katerem številni pravijo, da je v kognitivni znanosti sprožilo paradigmatski obrat ter pripomoglo k izgotovitvi in uveljavitvi novega teoretsko-praktičnega okvira, ki omogoča drugačno pojmljenje in raziskovanje spoznave (kognicije), uma in zavesti. Če so bili omenjeni pojavi še pred nekaj desetletji praviloma obravnavani v izrazito abstraktnem, breztelesnem in brezkrvnem duhu, so poslej znova postali konkretni, utelešeni in omeseni. Toda hkrati je knjiga veliko več kot le ogrodje nove paradigme, saj se njene temeljne podmene in ugotovitve ne nanašajo izključno na raven teorije in empirije, temveč zarezujejo v samo tkivo vsakdanjega življenja. Bralca ne pozivajo le k temu, da bi o spoznavi, umu in zavesti mislil in govoril drugače, temveč da bi jih na korenito drugačen način tudi za-in do-živel. V tem oziru bi lahko rekli, da Utelešeni um deli usodo prenekatere klasike, saj je v sodobnih razpravah večkrat navajan kot bran, večkrat mimobežno omenjan kot izdatno raziskovan – in tako njegovi radikalnejši vidiki pogosto ostanejo spregledani ali zanemarjeni. Ostalim klasikam pa je podoben tudi v tem, da takšen razplet ni zgolj posledica človeško-prečloveške lenobe, površnosti in želje po vzdrževanju teoretskega statusa quo, ampak tudi, če ne kar predvsem, narave besedila samega. Videti je namreč, da je misel v vseh vélikih filozofskih delih nekoliko zamaknjena – zamaknjena tako glede na takrat prevladujoče intelektualne tokove kot tudi glede na sámo sebe. Če pomislimo le na izmuzljivo dikcijo dveh monumentalnih figur, ki sta zaznamovali filozofijo 20. stoletja, Ludwiga Wittgensteina in Martina Heideggerja, sprevidimo, kako je velikokrat ravno tak pojmovni »počez« – in ne denimo brezhibna strukturiranost, sistematičnost, argumentiranost itd. – tisto, kar neko filozofsko stvaritev z vso silo vžge v meso zgodovine. Kak bolj pozitivistično navdahnjen bralec se bo ob tem nemara namuznil, češ, človekovo navdušenje nad obskurnim ne pozna meja, kak drug, bolj blagohoten interpret pa bo v tem videl pristen napor pojma: miselno in besedno ruvanje s skrajno mejo v nekem prostoru in času komajda misljivega in ubesedljivega. Zato tudi toliko zasukov in obratov, toliko prestopanja in jecljanja. Lahko bi rekli, da je ta »plodovita dvoumnost« – izraz, ki ga je Karl Ameriks skoval za opis Kantove filozofije (Ameriks 2006: 28) – na delu tudi pri poskusu ubesedovanja ideje o konkretni, iz »mesa in krvi« porajajoči se spoznavi, ki polni vrstice Utelešenega uma. Čeprav bralec ne bo imel težave slediti rdeči niti, ga bodo med branjem neprenehoma spreletavale sence, ki jim ne bo poznal izvora in pomena – zadeval bo ob medle sedimente (pol)preteklih in neartikuliranih (pris)podob, pri katerih bo sicer slutil, da napotujejo na nekaj »več«, a bo v sami knjigi žal povečini zaman stikal za tem »pre-« in »pod-sežnim«. Poglavitni namen spremne besede je zato Utelešeni um vpeti v širši kontekst in s tem vsaj deloma zaceliti hermenevtično rano, ki občasno zazeva v njegovi idejni teksturi.
The article outlines recent attempts to integrate cognitive science and phenomenology, with a spe... more The article outlines recent attempts to integrate cognitive science and phenomenology, with a special emphasis on the question of the (im)possibility of “naturalizing phenomenology”. The article consists of two parts: the first part examines, and tries to reject, the in-principle objections to the overall project, while the second part offers some theoretical and pragmatic suggestions, demonstrating its practical feasibility. The question of the in-principle (im)possibility is addressed by staving off criticism from both cognitive (the alleged non-scientific and subjectivist nature of phenomenology) as well as from phenomenological spectrum (the alleged incompatibility of scientific naturalism and phenomenological transcendentalism). The question of the practical (im)possibility, on the other hand, is tackled by presenting theoretical (the 4 EA model) and pragmatic approaches (neurophenomenology), purporting to show that it is, indeed, possible to transport the dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive science from the realm of the possible to the realm of the actual.
In the past three decades, the Western world has witnessed an unprecedented surge of different mi... more In the past three decades, the Western world has witnessed an unprecedented surge of different mindfulness-based meditative techniques. Mindfulness, commonly defined as a receptive and non-judgmental awareness of a moment-to-moment flow of consciousness, has sparked interest not only in (psycho)therapeutic and neuroscientific circles, but also in educational organizations, government agencies, corporations, even the police and the military. Recently, however, the steep rise in its popularity has been met by vocal criticism, calling into question many of the claims put forward by some of its most fervent advocates. The main aim of this article is to scrutinize two such criticisms and try to elucidate their mutual interrelationship. The first critique points to the fact that mindfulness seems to have been uncritically denuded of its traditional (religious and philosophical) setting, which might lead to unprecedented and potentially dangerous consequences (so-called “problem of the mindful sniper”). The second critique raises concerns about mindfulness being championed as a panacea for almost all ills besetting modern humankind. Critics maintain that not only are such claims exaggerated but that mindfulness-related practices might even be accompanied by “unpleasant” or “distressing” phenomena (so-called “dark night of the soul”) and might thus turn out to be contraindicated for some people. I will argue that both lines of critique are ultimately correct, but for wrong reasons – namely, the specific historical context that is claimed to have been left out is not important in itself, but because of the answers it provides to pertinent existential questions. In this sense, mindfulness will be construed as an important, but limited part of a much broader process of appeasing existential angst, a process whose goal is not relaxation or optimization of productivity, but radical existential transformation.
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POVZETEK: V zadnjih treh desetletjih je Zahodni svet priča neslutenemu razmahu številnih meditativnih tehnik, osnovanih na sekularizirani različici budistične čuječnosti. Čuječnost, običajno pojmovana kot sprejemajoča, odprta drža, v kateri brez presojanja motrimo vsebine lastnega doživljajskega toka, ni vzbudila interesa zgolj v (psiho)terapevtskih in nevroznanstvenih vodah, temveč zlagoma pronica tudi v izobraževalne in poboljševalne zavode, vladne institucije, podjetja ter celo v vojsko in policijo. Nad to sijočo zgodbo o uspehu pa so se pred kratkim začeli zgrinjati temni oblaki kritike, ki je postavila pod vprašaj prenekatero trditev njenih najbolj gorečih zagovornikov. V pričujočem prispevku se bom osredotočil zlasti na dva kritična tokova in skušal pokazati, v kakšnem medsebojnem odnosu sta. Prvi tok sodobnim pristopom k čuječnosti očita, da so to starodavno budistično prakso nekritično izbezali iz njenega izvornega (religiozno-filozofskega) konteksta in jo s tem popačili, kar lahko privede do neslutenih in potencialno nevarnih posledic (t. i. problem »čuječega ostrostrelca«). Drugi tok pa se nanaša na vse glasnejša svarila, da je podoba, ki čuječnost prikazuje kot vsesplošni lek za psihofizične tegobe in bolesti sodobnega človeka, neutemeljena in da lahko na čuječnosti utemeljene prakse spremljajo tudi veliko bolj neprijetni, celo zastrašujoči pojavi (t. i. »črna noč duše«). Na podlagi debat znotraj samega budizma bom zagovarjal mnenje, da so zaključki kritikov, ki svarijo pred dekontekstualizacijo, do neke mere pravilni, a iz napačnih razlogov – specifičen historičen kontekst namreč ni toliko pomemben sam po sebi, ampak zaradi odgovorov, ki jih daje na človekova bivanjska vprašanja. Čuječnost bo v tem oziru prikazana kot sicer pomemben, a vendarle zamejen del širšega procesa premoščanja eksistencialne tesnobe, katere cilj ni pomiritev ali optimizacija produktivnosti, temveč korenita bivanjska preobrazba.
Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studi... more Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, co-edited with Daniel Weiss; Leiden: Brill (Volume 9 in Philosophy of Religion – World Religions series); 2019.
Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and his thought in general continue to be highly relevant for present and future research on interreligious relations. Spanning several (sub)disciplines – from philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, comparative philosophy, comparative theology, to religious studies – the contributions engage with recent developments in interpretation of Wittgenstein and those in philosophy and theology of interreligious encounter. The book shows that there is an important and under-explored potential for constructive and fruitful engagement between these academic fields. It explores, and attempts to realize, some of this potential by involving both philosophers and theologians, and critically assesses previous applications of Wittgenstein’s work in interreligious studies.
A collection of papers dedicated to the relationship between mysticism and reason. Individual Con... more A collection of papers dedicated to the relationship between mysticism and reason. Individual Contributions: Sebastjan Vörös. "Renunciation of the self and the world: On mystical (un)knowing"; Andrej Ule. "Rational Language and Mystical Silence."; Gorazd Andrejč. "Existential Feelings and Religious Language: The Later Wittgenstein and Protestant Theology of the Mystical"; Raid Al-Daghistani. "Epistemology of the Heart: Contemplation, Tasting, De-Selfing"; Ana Bajželj. "At the End of Knowing: Reflection on the Nature of Extraordinary Ways of Knowing in Indian Philosophies"; Jan Ciglenečki, Borut Škodlar. "Mystical and Psychotic Experiences: The 'Parmenides' Project"; Alen Širca. "Ruusbroec's Mystical Thought"; Nadja Furlan Štante. "Female Mysticism, Path of Lofe and Intuition as a Transreligious Phenomenon"; Miloslav Gudović. "Mysticism and existential dialectics: reflections on spiritual struggles of Jacob Boehme"; Helena Motoh. "Translating Mystical Experience: Wang Daiyu's Great Learning of Islam". Sami Al-Daghistani. "Reflections on Reality, the Absolute and the Perfect Human Being - Toshihiko Izutsu's Views on Sufism and Taoism".
POVZETEK (slo.)
Mistika in mistična izkustva veljajo v dobršnem delu sodobnega akademskega disku... more POVZETEK (slo.)
Mistika in mistična izkustva veljajo v dobršnem delu sodobnega akademskega diskurza bodisi za ekstravagantni kuriozum, eksotično cvetico, ki uspeva le v ezoterični atmosferi duhovnosti in ima le malo opraviti z vsakdanjim življenjem, bodisi za obskurni monstruozum, groteskno mešanico vraževerja, čarovnije in iracionalnosti, ostalino prastarih predsodkov in mitične zavesti. Namen pričujoče razprave je pokazati, da so tovrstna stališča zmotna: mistika je resda mračna, a ne mračnjaška, ali drugače, dejstvo, da se mistična izkustva razumu izmikajo, ne priča o njihovi ne-, temveč onstranracionalnosti. Zadane naloge se bomo lotili v petih korakih. V prvem si bomo nekoliko natančneje ogledali, s kakšnim pojavom imamo opravka: zanimalo nas bo, (a) ali mistična izkustva sploh obstajajo – je mogoče govoriti o univerzalni doživljajski kategoriji ali so vsa izkustva določena z zgodovinskim miljejem, v katerem nastajajo –, in če obstajajo, (b) kaj (ni)so – so istovetna videnjem, zamaknjenjem itd. ali so nekaj povsem drugega? – ter (c) v kakšnem odnosu so s širšima kategorijama mistike (mistične poti) in religije. Nato se bomo lotili analize klasičnih nevrokognitivnih (nevroteoloških) modelov religijskega in mističnega doživljanja, ki so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih vzklili pod okriljem nevroznanstvene revolucije, in osvetlili nekaj njihovih največjih pomanjkljivosti. Videli bomo, da je ena od osrednjih težav tovrstnih pristopov neupoštevanje pojmovno-fenomenoloških določitev proučevanega pojava, zato se bomo v tretjem koraku lotili natančnejšega očrta fenomenologije mističnega doživljanja, kjer bomo utemeljili in razvili nastavke, ki smo jih le nakazali v prvem koraku. Ko bomo dobili boljši pregled nad fenomenološkimi značilnostmi mističnih izkustev, zlasti njihovo nedualistično (eno-nično) naravo, bomo v naslednjem koraku očrtali teoretsko-pragmatični znanstveni okvir (t.i. utelešena/udejanjena nevroznanost in nevrofenomenologija), znotraj katerega je mogoče te lastnosti jemati resno in se posledično mistiki ne le učinkoviteje približati, temveč z njo vzpostaviti tudi plodovit dvogovor. V zadnjem koraku se bomo lotili še vse prej kot enostavnega vprašanja o spoznavni vrednosti mističnega doživljanja – vprašanja, ali obstaja »mistična vednost«, in če obstaja, kaj z njo izvemo – ter z njo povezanima problemoma izrekljivosti (dozdevno) neizrekljivih mističnih izkustev in odnosa med mističnimi, psihopatološkimi in s psihedeliki sproženimi izkustvi. Ta zaključni korak nas bo na zanimiv način povrnil na začetek in pokazal, da sta jasnina razumskega pojma in tmina mističnega doživetja vpeta v globoko dialektiko: vsaka (breztelesna, abstraktna) svetilka pojma ima svojo (utelešeno, bivanjsko) temno pego, mračno točko, iz katere izteka in se vanjo naposled steka. In samo zato, ker je neosvetljiva, še ne pomeni, da ne biva: čeprav je nemara ni mogoče zajeti z neposrednim sijem pojma, se ji lahko previdno približamo preko sveta senc, ki se raztezajo med zgovorno svetlobo in molčečo temò.
ABSTRACT (Eng.)
The prevailing trend in the modern academia is to perceive mysticism and mystical experiences as either an extravagant curiosity – an exotic flower flourishing only in the rarefied atmosphere of spirituality, with little or nothing in common with everyday life – or an obscure monstrosity – a grotesque mixture of superstition, magic and irrationality, a residue of ancient prejudice and mythical consciousness. The main goal of the present thesis is to demonstrate that such beliefs are false: mysticism might be dark, but it is not obscure, or in other words, the fact that mystical experiences evade reason doesn’t imply their irrationality but rather their transrationality. The thesis consists of five subsequent steps. In the first step a brief preliminary sketch of mystical experiences is provided, focusing on some of the basic issues underlying the study, e.g. questions such as (a) do mystical experiences exist at all – is it possible to talk of a distinct and universal experiential category or are all experiences predetermined by the historical milieu in which they emerge? –, and if they do, (b) what are they – can they be equated with visions, raptures etc. or do they constitute a completely different experiential category? – and (c) what is their relation to the broader conceptual categories of mysticism (mystical path) and religion? In the next step, we turn our attention to the analysis of the classical neurocognitive models of religious and mystical experiences that have emerged under the aegis of neuroscientific revolution in the last two decades (the so-called neurotheology), emphasizing some of their more prominent empirical, conceptual, interpretative and (most importantly) philosophical shortcomings. As it turns out, one of the major problems that is bedevilling such approaches is their systematic inability to take into account the phenomenological and conceptual characterizations of mystical experiences. That is why in the third step a more thorough explication of the phenomenology of mystical experiences is given, thereby substantiating and elaborating a brief sketch expounded in the first step. After obtaining a better overview of phenomenological qualities of mystical experiences, especially their non-dual nature (oneness-nothingness), the fourth step provides a detailed account of an alternative theoretical and pragmatic framework (the so-called embodied/enactive neuroscience and neurophenomenology) that is capable of taking phenomenological accounts seriously and is not only able to approach mysticism more efficiently, but can also engage with it in a mutually enriching dialogue. In the last step we take on a highly problematic question of epistemic value of mystical experiences – is there such a thing as “mystical knowledge”, and if there is, what exactly does it consist of –, and two associated problems, namely the issue of the (supposed) ineffability of mystical experiences and the relation between mystical, psychopathological and drug-induced experiences. This final step brings us back to the beginning, demonstrating that intellectual luminance and mystical darkness are, in fact, not separate but tightly interconnected through profound dialectical dynamism: every (disembodied, abstract) lantern of conceptual reasoning has its own (embodied, existential) dark spot, from where it emerges and where it eventually returns. Just because this elusive spot is impenetrable to the emitted rays it doesn’t follow that it is non-existent: on the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that it is accessible through the experiential world of shadows, flickering on the borderline between the expressive light and the still darkness.
Key words: mysticism, mystical experience, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, neurotheology, embodied and enactive cognition, neurophenomenology.
The paper addresses some crucial phenomenological issues pertaining to anthropology and animality... more The paper addresses some crucial phenomenological issues pertaining to anthropology and animality in terms of what, following Plessner and Jonas, might be called philosophical biology. The main goal of the paper is (i) to provide an outline of a phenomenologically viable account of life as a specific way of being, (ii) delineate some of its implications for the conceptualization of plant and animal life, and (iii) underline its broader significance (phenomenologization of nature). First, it is claimed that current phenomenologically-inspired elucidations of life are deficient and that, for a thorough phenomenological investigation of human, animal and plant life, a more general account is needed, one that integrates both the organizational aspect (i.e., organism and its metabolism) as well as the experiential aspect (i.e., lived body and its intentional character) of a living being. After a close examination of earlier and more recent approaches to phenomenology of life (especially Barbaras, Goldstein, Jonas, Merleau-Ponty, Thompson, and Varela), a multi-layered, non-dualist model of life is provided, based on a dialectic of need (self-preservation; identity) and desire (self-transcendence; sense-making). Second, it is argued that the non-human life forms might be used as “acid test” for the soundness and comprehensiveness of the proposed phenomenological model. In this respect, some of its consequences for plant and animal life are delineated and critically compared with alternative conceptions (Barbaras, Jonas, Marder, Plessner). Third, the proposed account of life is embedded into an on-going debate on the naturalization of phenomenology. It is argued that the process of naturalization could prove successful only if it were accompanied by a reverse and complementary process, the so-called phenomenologization of nature, and that the phenomenological study of organic life might serve as an important first step in this direction.
The article considers whether, and to what extent, mystical experience, which is supposed to be t... more The article considers whether, and to what extent, mystical experience, which is supposed to be transrational (non-dualist) and therefore ineffable, can be conveyed in language. The article consists of two parts. First, drawing on the Wittgensteinian distinction between “pointing” and “saying”, it is suggested that language not only speaks, but also acts. Mystical utterances are thus not on par with discursive utterances, in that they don’t refer to the mystical, but embody and enact it. Second, different means of expressing the inexpressible are outlined: from silence and bodily act, through evocative non-sense and paradox, to negation and scriptural metaphor. The expressive forms are analysed according to two mutually exclusive criteria, namely according to how consistent they are with the nature of the experience, and how suggestive their internal mechanisms are, i.e. how successful they are in approaching and addressing their recipient. It is suggested that the two criteria are inversely proportional to one another: the more descriptive and suggestive a given form, the less evocative and consistent it is and therefore open to grave misinterpretation.
Zavest velja na področju znanosti duha za največjo uganko. Z zavestnim izkustvom smo seznanjeni i... more Zavest velja na področju znanosti duha za največjo uganko. Z zavestnim izkustvom smo seznanjeni intimneje kakor s čimerkoli drugim, a ga obenem pojasnimo težje kakor karkoli drugega. V zadnjih letih je znanstvenim raziskavam podleglo ničkoliko duševnih pojavov, le zavest se trmoglavo upira. Videti je, da razlage kljub številnim poskusom vselej zgrešijo tarčo. Nekateri so celo zaključili, da je problem nerešljiv in da ustrezne razlage preprosto ni mogoče najti.
Če se želimo pri problemu zavesti pomakniti naprej, se moramo z njim soočiti na neposreden način. V pričujočem prispevku najprej izpostavim res težek problem, kar storim tako, da ga razločim od obvladljivejših problemov in skušam pojasniti, zakaj nam povzroča toliko preglavic. Nato podam kritiko nekaterih sodobnih pristopov, ki se problema zavesti lotevajo z reduktivnimi metodami, in dokazujem, da so se takšne metode že v načelu nezmožne spoprijeti z najtežjim delom problema. Pripoznanje te nezmožnosti odpira vrata k nadaljnjemu napredku. V drugi polovici članka dokazujem, da nam prestop k novemu tipu nereduktivne razlage omogoča izdelati naturalistično teorijo zavesti, in ponudim tudi svojega lastnega kandidata za takšno razlago: nereduktivno teorijo, osnovano na načelih strukturne koherence, organizacijske nespremenljivosti in hipoteze o dveh vidikih informacije.
Pričujoči članek se začne z eno od Chalmersovih (1995) temeljnih podmen: prvoosebno izkustvo pred... more Pričujoči članek se začne z eno od Chalmersovih (1995) temeljnih podmen: prvoosebno izkustvo predstavlja nereduktibilno polje pojavov. Menim, da v naravi ne bomo našli nobene »teoretične rešitve« ali »dodatne sestavine«, ki bi to vrzel uspešno premostila. Nasprotno, za raziskavo in analizo polja zavestnih pojavov potrebujemo rigorozno metodo in jasen nabor praks. Ker pristop, ki ga predlagam, črpa navdih iz raziskovalnega programa fenomenologije, sem ga poimenoval nevrofenomenologija. Svoje izsledke skuša artikulirati v luči medsebojnih omejitev pojavov, prisotnih v izkustvu, in sopripadajočih pojavov, uveljavljenih v kognitivnih znanostih. Pomembno je, da ta pristop postane del rastoče raziskovalne skupnosti, ki ga bo dograjevala in razvijala.
The volume edited by Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese, Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sen... more The volume edited by Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese, Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making, is a challenging read. It is challenging in that it invites us to discursively engage with, and make sense of, a topic that seems to evade, if not actively defy, discursivity and reason. The book is also challenging in that it forces the reader to grapple with its thick texture and constructs a coherent narrative from a variegated, at times even incongruous, collection of essays. Thus, from the very outset, its content and form seem to be attuned to the same key, namely that of wrestling with the absurd, of hermeneutically engaging with the dissonance of nonsense so as to tease out the consonance of sense. The volume, in short, enacts what it speaks of. However, lest the potential reader grow weary and pronounce the book not worthy of her time, let me quickly remind the reader of Spinoza's famous dictum that all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. Upon closer inspection, the book turns out to be not only a demanding, but – save few odd cases, to be explicated below – also a deeply rewarding read. The persistent reader is amply compensated for her interpretative struggles: the volume addresses many important, yet frequently neglected questions – questions pertaining to the very ground(lessness) of our knowing and being – and offers diverse solutions that are likely to stimulate fruitful reflection. As such, the volume embodies the multi-layered fabric of the absurd: what might seem out of tune from one perspective, may prove harmonious from another (higher) perspective.
Kot je razvidno iz pisanega cvetobera prispevkov, ki tvorijo tematsko tkivo zbornika, je za filoz... more Kot je razvidno iz pisanega cvetobera prispevkov, ki tvorijo tematsko tkivo zbornika, je za filozofsko pot Marka Uršiča značilna izrazita polifoničnost. A pri tem velja nemudoma naglasiti, da pri Marku to večglasje ni zgolj kontingentne, temveč načelne narave. Tematska raznovrstnost namreč ne izvira iz lahkotnega nagiba k mnogoznalstvu, temveč iz globokega prepričanja, da resnica ni nekaj statičnega, nekaj, kar bi bilo v lasti enega samega, najsi še tako izdelanega miselnega sistema, ampak nekaj dialoškega, nekaj, kar se udejanja skozi soočenje-izmenjavo "iz oči v oči"-različnih stališč in pogledov.1 Moj prispevek se tako že uvodoma odpoveduje zagovoru vnaprej izdelanega "prav" in vabi v prvi vrsti k seriji produktivnih "raz-prav", s čimer merim tako na gojenje skozi dvo-ali celo večgovor uresničujoči se Logos kot tudi na razbijanje samozadostnih in samorazvidnih pravilnosti, v katere se vse preveč radi zapletemo. Menim, da kot tak po duhu, če že ne po črki, sledi Markovim Letnim časom, in jemlje izbrane odlomke iz slednjih kot izhodišče za nadaljnje dialektične zasuke. Izbira teme me je sprva sicer spravila v precejšnjo zadrego, saj Markov filozofski opus zajema vrsto avtorjev in vsebin, ki me osebno močno nagovarjajo, a sem se naposled odločil, da poprimem za tematiko, s katero se v zadnjem času še posebej intenzivno ukvarjam, namreč vprašanje odnosa med izkustvom in znanostjo pri francoskem filozofu Mauriceu Merleau-Pontyju. Prispevek sestoji iz petih razdelkov. Po kratkem pretresu vprašanja o (ne)relevantnosti in motivih fenomenološke kritike znanosti se lotim njenega orisa v delih Edmunda Husserla (drugi razdelek) in Merleau-Pontyja (tretji razdelek) s posebnim poudarkom na problematiki t. i. "objektivne misli". V naslednjih dveh razdelkih se nato lotim razmisleka o naravi in dinamiki neobjektivne misli, ki mi služi kot osnova za zaključno refleksijo o (ne)možnosti objektivne znanosti. Namen prispevka je revitalizirati in reaktualizirati fenomenološko kritiko klasične (objektivne) znanosti ter spodbuditi razmislek in razgovor o njenih filozofskih temeljih. 1. Filozofija in znanost: oris naelektrenega razmerja V Jeseni (2010), tretjem delu že omenjene zbirke Letni časi, vzame Marko pod drobnogled fenomenologijo in njen izrazito naelektren odnos do naravoslovnih znanosti. Izraz 1 Prim.: "Naj povzamem: zavzemam se za odprt, 'večglasen' filozofski dialog, katerega namen je tudi v tem, da drug drugemu na svojih različnih poteh pomagamo tako, da si prisluhnemo in poskušamo drugega razumeti in zares sprejeti medsebojno različnost. Za smiselnost filozofskega dialoga sploh ni nujno, da pridemo do nekega konsenza, še manj do končne sinteze, v kateri naj bi se naše misli poenotile. Vseobsežna sinteza je bila vselej iluzija, nekajkrat v zgodovini veličastna iluzija. Toda dandanes ni dovolj spoznanje, da vélika sinteza ni možna, kajti pravkar minulo stoletje nas je precej bolj jasno kot prejšnja poučilo, da obstaja ireduktibilno mnoštvo filozofskih poti in da je ravno to mnoštvo filozofska resničnost. Morda se nam ta resničnost kaže kot 'shizofrena', vendar jo je treba vzdržati, kajti v nekem 'globljem' pomenu je ta miselna polifonija za filozofijo kot ljubezen do modrosti tudi 'odrešilna': uči nas, da nas resnica presega. Zato se je treba z razlikami in divergencami soočiti 'iz oči v oči': resnica je (tu, za nas) razcepljena, tako kot jezik tiste kače, ki je Adama & Evo zvabila iz raja v svet." (Uršič, 2004: xxx)
As Zen took root in the West over the past century, there emerged a number of differing interpret... more As Zen took root in the West over the past century, there emerged a number of differing interpretations of one of its key facets, namely the question of the relationship between language and enlightenment. The two camps which came to garner the most attention in philosophical circles are eliminativism, which understands enlightenment as the cutting off of linguistic and socio-cultural categories, accomplished by arbitrary means, and constructivism, which identifies satori with the exercise of certain linguistic and cultural conventions. In the present paper, we first lay out some of the most important criticisms of these two positions, arguing that the two accounts fall into the error of either demonizing or fetishizing language, respectively, before outlining a different approach to the relationship between practice and realisation, drawing on the largely neglected work of perennialist thinkers and a phenomenologically informed notion of symbolism. By taking the idea of the symbol in its double meaning, namely as that which “casts together” the culturally conditioned particularities of Zen into a unified tradition, and yet points beyond them as a “sign” of something that itself transcends all description, we propose an interpretation that can do justice both to the crucial role played by concrete practices and to the transcendent nature of their soteriological “end.”
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Papers in English by Sebastjan Vörös
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This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (Section 1, part of Section 2), I put forward a critique of what I refer to as the ‘received’ or ‘standard’ view of mindfulness in the Western cultural milieu. According to the received view, mindfulness is the acontextual ‘core’ of Buddhism whose determining characteristic is bare (present-oriented, non-judgmental) attention to the flow and content of experience. As noted by many researchers, this conception is in stark contrast to the traditional Buddhist understanding, where mindfulness is not only embedded in a broader context that provides it with a specific philosophico-existential orientation (normative aspect) but is also construed as a reflective activity (noetic aspect). In the second part (part of Sections 2–4), I argue that one of the main issues with the standard view is that it frames experience in terms of what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls ‘objective thought’ (using objectivity, or ‘thinghood’, as an onto-epistemological standard of reality), which makes the two aspects of the traditional conception (normative and noetic) unintelligible. I then provide an alternative view based on the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that attempts to integrate the two aspects into a broader conception of experience. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notions of ‘phenomenal field’ and ‘radical reflection’, I argue that mindfulness needs to be understood as a reflective attitude that allows one to discern not only the content but also, and primarily, the context of each experience, and that this also includes seeing itself—the act of reflection—as an act that stems from, and returns back into, the pre-reflective current of existence.
Keywords: embodiment, Merleau-Ponty, mindedness, rationality, transformativism, vitality
Problem • Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects – notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition – have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down.
Method • We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the " middle way " ; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between " enac-tion " and " enactivism. "
Results • We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing.
Implications • Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains – theoretical, empirical, and existential – where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views.
Constructivist content • All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications.
> Problem • It seems that, within the burgeoning field of " enactivism, " these far-reaching dimensions of the original proposal are often either dismissed or simply ignored. For this reason, the article tries to answer the following questions: Does the move away from the original exposition of enaction matter? What, if anything, has been lost along the way? What are the implications of the elements that have been discarded?
> Method • By drawing on some of the less well-known works of Varela, we spell out and elucidate some of the more radical aspects of the notion of enaction and the broader philosophical framework into which it was originally embedded.
> Results • We argue that this broader philosophical framework is of utmost importance, as it shows that enaction is only one part of the multi-layered " change in the context " that Varela felt was needed to successfully instantiate a move towards the non-dual. This " change of context " involves not only a change in the way we think about dualities, but also a change in the way we experience them. The role of new scientific metaphors, such as enac-tion (but also autopoiesis, embodiment, etc.), is to function as conceptual evocations of this back-and-forth exchange between knowing and being. However, if this overall framework is discarded, as is often the case in contemporary accounts, enaction loses its radical impetus and becomes mellowed down to yet another version of naturalized epis-temology.
> Implications • Taking the notion of enaction seriously implies a radical shift in our conceptions of science and knowledge, as it encompasses a theoretical and existential move away from a detached observer to embedded and engaged cognizer. Thus, our manner of thinking can no longer be considered in isolation from our manner of being , which indicates a deep interconnection between epistemology and ethics, and may entail profound changes in the definition of the aims, methods, and values of the research community: self-transformation as a consequence of, and condition for, understanding.
> Constructivist content • The target article advocates a critical approach to realist presuppositions in contemporary science and philosophy, and emphasizes a deep interrelation between being and knowing, between ethics and epistemology.
it is maintained that mind and cognition are embodied in a twofold sense:
(i) structurally, i.e., in the sense of being constituted by extracranial (neural, bodily, environmental, and social) processes,
and (ii) phenomenologically, i.e., in the sense of including the experience of oneself as a bodily agent situated in the world. It is contended that this Janus-faced nature of corporeality, divided between “being a body” (Leibsein) and “having a body” (Körperhaben), may help undermine some of the age-old dualities (mind-body, interiorityexteriority,
etc.) and thereby help anchor experience in materiality and
materiality in experience.
The main focus of the volume at hand is to analyze, evaluate, and
critically reflect upon, what might be termed “horizons of embodiment”.
First, it purports to examine the scope and applicability of the notion of
embodiment in relation to not only human, but also animal, vegetative, and perhaps even artificial life. Specifically, it aims to investigate to what extent, if at all, different construals of embodiment might contribute to a better understanding of different life forms – of their unique, if tentative, modes of being, cognizing, and experiencing. Second, it purports to examine, from both practical and theoretical perspectives, possibilities for a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) between structural and phenomenological approaches to embodiment: How can objective (third-person) and experiential (first-person) aspects of corporeality be combined so as to provide efficient means for the study of the living? Both perspectives wish to enrich and broaden our grasp of different grades, modes and dimensions of embodiment, bringing
forth their tentative limitations and paving ways for their overcoming."
The article consists of two main parts. First, we provide an outline of Husserl’s somatology, “the science of the lived body”, as a fundamental methodological and conceptual framework for a phenomenological re-construal of life sciences in general and botany in particular. Second, and with the aim of demonstrating why and how the somatological approach might be useful for re-conceptualizing vegetal life, we identify, in the writings of Husserl, a three-step procedure for operationalizing the native (empathic) perception of another living being (the three steps include: eidetic self-modification; intercorporeal pairing; and appresentation of an alien field of experience). After expounding on each step, we draw some tentative conclusions, particularly on how our analysis might impact the understanding of empathy: it is not synonymous with the imposition of anthropomorphic conditions onto the experience of the living. Instead, it must be understood as a gradual formation of a contrast foil whose aim is to efficiently bring to the fore the peculiarity of non-human life forms.
***
This paper consists of two parts. In the first part (Section 1, part of Section 2), I put forward a critique of what I refer to as the ‘received’ or ‘standard’ view of mindfulness in the Western cultural milieu. According to the received view, mindfulness is the acontextual ‘core’ of Buddhism whose determining characteristic is bare (present-oriented, non-judgmental) attention to the flow and content of experience. As noted by many researchers, this conception is in stark contrast to the traditional Buddhist understanding, where mindfulness is not only embedded in a broader context that provides it with a specific philosophico-existential orientation (normative aspect) but is also construed as a reflective activity (noetic aspect). In the second part (part of Sections 2–4), I argue that one of the main issues with the standard view is that it frames experience in terms of what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls ‘objective thought’ (using objectivity, or ‘thinghood’, as an onto-epistemological standard of reality), which makes the two aspects of the traditional conception (normative and noetic) unintelligible. I then provide an alternative view based on the phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that attempts to integrate the two aspects into a broader conception of experience. By drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s notions of ‘phenomenal field’ and ‘radical reflection’, I argue that mindfulness needs to be understood as a reflective attitude that allows one to discern not only the content but also, and primarily, the context of each experience, and that this also includes seeing itself—the act of reflection—as an act that stems from, and returns back into, the pre-reflective current of existence.
Keywords: embodiment, Merleau-Ponty, mindedness, rationality, transformativism, vitality
Problem • Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects – notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition – have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down.
Method • We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the " middle way " ; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between " enac-tion " and " enactivism. "
Results • We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing.
Implications • Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains – theoretical, empirical, and existential – where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views.
Constructivist content • All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications.
> Problem • It seems that, within the burgeoning field of " enactivism, " these far-reaching dimensions of the original proposal are often either dismissed or simply ignored. For this reason, the article tries to answer the following questions: Does the move away from the original exposition of enaction matter? What, if anything, has been lost along the way? What are the implications of the elements that have been discarded?
> Method • By drawing on some of the less well-known works of Varela, we spell out and elucidate some of the more radical aspects of the notion of enaction and the broader philosophical framework into which it was originally embedded.
> Results • We argue that this broader philosophical framework is of utmost importance, as it shows that enaction is only one part of the multi-layered " change in the context " that Varela felt was needed to successfully instantiate a move towards the non-dual. This " change of context " involves not only a change in the way we think about dualities, but also a change in the way we experience them. The role of new scientific metaphors, such as enac-tion (but also autopoiesis, embodiment, etc.), is to function as conceptual evocations of this back-and-forth exchange between knowing and being. However, if this overall framework is discarded, as is often the case in contemporary accounts, enaction loses its radical impetus and becomes mellowed down to yet another version of naturalized epis-temology.
> Implications • Taking the notion of enaction seriously implies a radical shift in our conceptions of science and knowledge, as it encompasses a theoretical and existential move away from a detached observer to embedded and engaged cognizer. Thus, our manner of thinking can no longer be considered in isolation from our manner of being , which indicates a deep interconnection between epistemology and ethics, and may entail profound changes in the definition of the aims, methods, and values of the research community: self-transformation as a consequence of, and condition for, understanding.
> Constructivist content • The target article advocates a critical approach to realist presuppositions in contemporary science and philosophy, and emphasizes a deep interrelation between being and knowing, between ethics and epistemology.
it is maintained that mind and cognition are embodied in a twofold sense:
(i) structurally, i.e., in the sense of being constituted by extracranial (neural, bodily, environmental, and social) processes,
and (ii) phenomenologically, i.e., in the sense of including the experience of oneself as a bodily agent situated in the world. It is contended that this Janus-faced nature of corporeality, divided between “being a body” (Leibsein) and “having a body” (Körperhaben), may help undermine some of the age-old dualities (mind-body, interiorityexteriority,
etc.) and thereby help anchor experience in materiality and
materiality in experience.
The main focus of the volume at hand is to analyze, evaluate, and
critically reflect upon, what might be termed “horizons of embodiment”.
First, it purports to examine the scope and applicability of the notion of
embodiment in relation to not only human, but also animal, vegetative, and perhaps even artificial life. Specifically, it aims to investigate to what extent, if at all, different construals of embodiment might contribute to a better understanding of different life forms – of their unique, if tentative, modes of being, cognizing, and experiencing. Second, it purports to examine, from both practical and theoretical perspectives, possibilities for a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung) between structural and phenomenological approaches to embodiment: How can objective (third-person) and experiential (first-person) aspects of corporeality be combined so as to provide efficient means for the study of the living? Both perspectives wish to enrich and broaden our grasp of different grades, modes and dimensions of embodiment, bringing
forth their tentative limitations and paving ways for their overcoming."
The article consists of two main parts. First, we provide an outline of Husserl’s somatology, “the science of the lived body”, as a fundamental methodological and conceptual framework for a phenomenological re-construal of life sciences in general and botany in particular. Second, and with the aim of demonstrating why and how the somatological approach might be useful for re-conceptualizing vegetal life, we identify, in the writings of Husserl, a three-step procedure for operationalizing the native (empathic) perception of another living being (the three steps include: eidetic self-modification; intercorporeal pairing; and appresentation of an alien field of experience). After expounding on each step, we draw some tentative conclusions, particularly on how our analysis might impact the understanding of empathy: it is not synonymous with the imposition of anthropomorphic conditions onto the experience of the living. Instead, it must be understood as a gradual formation of a contrast foil whose aim is to efficiently bring to the fore the peculiarity of non-human life forms.
***
POVZETEK: V zadnjih treh desetletjih je Zahodni svet priča neslutenemu razmahu številnih meditativnih tehnik, osnovanih na sekularizirani različici budistične čuječnosti. Čuječnost, običajno pojmovana kot sprejemajoča, odprta drža, v kateri brez presojanja motrimo vsebine lastnega doživljajskega toka, ni vzbudila interesa zgolj v (psiho)terapevtskih in nevroznanstvenih vodah, temveč zlagoma pronica tudi v izobraževalne in poboljševalne zavode, vladne institucije, podjetja ter celo v vojsko in policijo. Nad to sijočo zgodbo o uspehu pa so se pred kratkim začeli zgrinjati temni oblaki kritike, ki je postavila pod vprašaj prenekatero trditev njenih najbolj gorečih zagovornikov. V pričujočem prispevku se bom osredotočil zlasti na dva kritična tokova in skušal pokazati, v kakšnem medsebojnem odnosu sta. Prvi tok sodobnim pristopom k čuječnosti očita, da so to starodavno budistično prakso nekritično izbezali iz njenega izvornega (religiozno-filozofskega) konteksta in jo s tem popačili, kar lahko privede do neslutenih in potencialno nevarnih posledic (t. i. problem »čuječega ostrostrelca«). Drugi tok pa se nanaša na vse glasnejša svarila, da je podoba, ki čuječnost prikazuje kot vsesplošni lek za psihofizične tegobe in bolesti sodobnega človeka, neutemeljena in da lahko na čuječnosti utemeljene prakse spremljajo tudi veliko bolj neprijetni, celo zastrašujoči pojavi (t. i. »črna noč duše«). Na podlagi debat znotraj samega budizma bom zagovarjal mnenje, da so zaključki kritikov, ki svarijo pred dekontekstualizacijo, do neke mere pravilni, a iz napačnih razlogov – specifičen historičen kontekst namreč ni toliko pomemben sam po sebi, ampak zaradi odgovorov, ki jih daje na človekova bivanjska vprašanja. Čuječnost bo v tem oziru prikazana kot sicer pomemben, a vendarle zamejen del širšega procesa premoščanja eksistencialne tesnobe, katere cilj ni pomiritev ali optimizacija produktivnosti, temveč korenita bivanjska preobrazba.
Interpreting Interreligious Relations with Wittgenstein argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and his thought in general continue to be highly relevant for present and future research on interreligious relations. Spanning several (sub)disciplines – from philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, comparative philosophy, comparative theology, to religious studies – the contributions engage with recent developments in interpretation of Wittgenstein and those in philosophy and theology of interreligious encounter. The book shows that there is an important and under-explored potential for constructive and fruitful engagement between these academic fields. It explores, and attempts to realize, some of this potential by involving both philosophers and theologians, and critically assesses previous applications of Wittgenstein’s work in interreligious studies.
Sebastjan Vörös. "Renunciation of the self and the world: On mystical (un)knowing"; Andrej Ule. "Rational Language and Mystical Silence."; Gorazd Andrejč. "Existential Feelings and Religious Language: The Later Wittgenstein and Protestant Theology of the Mystical"; Raid Al-Daghistani. "Epistemology of the Heart: Contemplation, Tasting, De-Selfing"; Ana Bajželj. "At the End of Knowing: Reflection on the Nature of Extraordinary Ways of Knowing in Indian Philosophies"; Jan Ciglenečki, Borut Škodlar. "Mystical and Psychotic Experiences: The 'Parmenides' Project"; Alen Širca. "Ruusbroec's Mystical Thought"; Nadja Furlan Štante. "Female Mysticism, Path of Lofe and Intuition as a Transreligious Phenomenon"; Miloslav Gudović. "Mysticism and existential dialectics: reflections on spiritual struggles of Jacob Boehme"; Helena Motoh. "Translating Mystical Experience: Wang Daiyu's Great Learning of Islam". Sami Al-Daghistani. "Reflections on Reality, the Absolute and the Perfect Human Being - Toshihiko Izutsu's Views on Sufism and Taoism".
Mistika in mistična izkustva veljajo v dobršnem delu sodobnega akademskega diskurza bodisi za ekstravagantni kuriozum, eksotično cvetico, ki uspeva le v ezoterični atmosferi duhovnosti in ima le malo opraviti z vsakdanjim življenjem, bodisi za obskurni monstruozum, groteskno mešanico vraževerja, čarovnije in iracionalnosti, ostalino prastarih predsodkov in mitične zavesti. Namen pričujoče razprave je pokazati, da so tovrstna stališča zmotna: mistika je resda mračna, a ne mračnjaška, ali drugače, dejstvo, da se mistična izkustva razumu izmikajo, ne priča o njihovi ne-, temveč onstranracionalnosti. Zadane naloge se bomo lotili v petih korakih. V prvem si bomo nekoliko natančneje ogledali, s kakšnim pojavom imamo opravka: zanimalo nas bo, (a) ali mistična izkustva sploh obstajajo – je mogoče govoriti o univerzalni doživljajski kategoriji ali so vsa izkustva določena z zgodovinskim miljejem, v katerem nastajajo –, in če obstajajo, (b) kaj (ni)so – so istovetna videnjem, zamaknjenjem itd. ali so nekaj povsem drugega? – ter (c) v kakšnem odnosu so s širšima kategorijama mistike (mistične poti) in religije. Nato se bomo lotili analize klasičnih nevrokognitivnih (nevroteoloških) modelov religijskega in mističnega doživljanja, ki so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih vzklili pod okriljem nevroznanstvene revolucije, in osvetlili nekaj njihovih največjih pomanjkljivosti. Videli bomo, da je ena od osrednjih težav tovrstnih pristopov neupoštevanje pojmovno-fenomenoloških določitev proučevanega pojava, zato se bomo v tretjem koraku lotili natančnejšega očrta fenomenologije mističnega doživljanja, kjer bomo utemeljili in razvili nastavke, ki smo jih le nakazali v prvem koraku. Ko bomo dobili boljši pregled nad fenomenološkimi značilnostmi mističnih izkustev, zlasti njihovo nedualistično (eno-nično) naravo, bomo v naslednjem koraku očrtali teoretsko-pragmatični znanstveni okvir (t.i. utelešena/udejanjena nevroznanost in nevrofenomenologija), znotraj katerega je mogoče te lastnosti jemati resno in se posledično mistiki ne le učinkoviteje približati, temveč z njo vzpostaviti tudi plodovit dvogovor. V zadnjem koraku se bomo lotili še vse prej kot enostavnega vprašanja o spoznavni vrednosti mističnega doživljanja – vprašanja, ali obstaja »mistična vednost«, in če obstaja, kaj z njo izvemo – ter z njo povezanima problemoma izrekljivosti (dozdevno) neizrekljivih mističnih izkustev in odnosa med mističnimi, psihopatološkimi in s psihedeliki sproženimi izkustvi. Ta zaključni korak nas bo na zanimiv način povrnil na začetek in pokazal, da sta jasnina razumskega pojma in tmina mističnega doživetja vpeta v globoko dialektiko: vsaka (breztelesna, abstraktna) svetilka pojma ima svojo (utelešeno, bivanjsko) temno pego, mračno točko, iz katere izteka in se vanjo naposled steka. In samo zato, ker je neosvetljiva, še ne pomeni, da ne biva: čeprav je nemara ni mogoče zajeti z neposrednim sijem pojma, se ji lahko previdno približamo preko sveta senc, ki se raztezajo med zgovorno svetlobo in molčečo temò.
Ključne besede: mistika, mistična izkustva, epistemologija, filozofija duha, filozofija znanosti, filozofija religije, nevroteologija, utelešena oz. udejanjena kognicija.
ABSTRACT (Eng.)
The prevailing trend in the modern academia is to perceive mysticism and mystical experiences as either an extravagant curiosity – an exotic flower flourishing only in the rarefied atmosphere of spirituality, with little or nothing in common with everyday life – or an obscure monstrosity – a grotesque mixture of superstition, magic and irrationality, a residue of ancient prejudice and mythical consciousness. The main goal of the present thesis is to demonstrate that such beliefs are false: mysticism might be dark, but it is not obscure, or in other words, the fact that mystical experiences evade reason doesn’t imply their irrationality but rather their transrationality. The thesis consists of five subsequent steps. In the first step a brief preliminary sketch of mystical experiences is provided, focusing on some of the basic issues underlying the study, e.g. questions such as (a) do mystical experiences exist at all – is it possible to talk of a distinct and universal experiential category or are all experiences predetermined by the historical milieu in which they emerge? –, and if they do, (b) what are they – can they be equated with visions, raptures etc. or do they constitute a completely different experiential category? – and (c) what is their relation to the broader conceptual categories of mysticism (mystical path) and religion? In the next step, we turn our attention to the analysis of the classical neurocognitive models of religious and mystical experiences that have emerged under the aegis of neuroscientific revolution in the last two decades (the so-called neurotheology), emphasizing some of their more prominent empirical, conceptual, interpretative and (most importantly) philosophical shortcomings. As it turns out, one of the major problems that is bedevilling such approaches is their systematic inability to take into account the phenomenological and conceptual characterizations of mystical experiences. That is why in the third step a more thorough explication of the phenomenology of mystical experiences is given, thereby substantiating and elaborating a brief sketch expounded in the first step. After obtaining a better overview of phenomenological qualities of mystical experiences, especially their non-dual nature (oneness-nothingness), the fourth step provides a detailed account of an alternative theoretical and pragmatic framework (the so-called embodied/enactive neuroscience and neurophenomenology) that is capable of taking phenomenological accounts seriously and is not only able to approach mysticism more efficiently, but can also engage with it in a mutually enriching dialogue. In the last step we take on a highly problematic question of epistemic value of mystical experiences – is there such a thing as “mystical knowledge”, and if there is, what exactly does it consist of –, and two associated problems, namely the issue of the (supposed) ineffability of mystical experiences and the relation between mystical, psychopathological and drug-induced experiences. This final step brings us back to the beginning, demonstrating that intellectual luminance and mystical darkness are, in fact, not separate but tightly interconnected through profound dialectical dynamism: every (disembodied, abstract) lantern of conceptual reasoning has its own (embodied, existential) dark spot, from where it emerges and where it eventually returns. Just because this elusive spot is impenetrable to the emitted rays it doesn’t follow that it is non-existent: on the contrary, there are good reasons to believe that it is accessible through the experiential world of shadows, flickering on the borderline between the expressive light and the still darkness.
Key words: mysticism, mystical experience, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, neurotheology, embodied and enactive cognition, neurophenomenology.
Če se želimo pri problemu zavesti pomakniti naprej, se moramo z njim soočiti na neposreden način. V pričujočem prispevku najprej izpostavim res težek problem, kar storim tako, da ga razločim od obvladljivejših problemov in skušam pojasniti, zakaj nam povzroča toliko preglavic. Nato podam kritiko nekaterih sodobnih pristopov, ki se problema zavesti lotevajo z reduktivnimi metodami, in dokazujem, da so se takšne metode že v načelu nezmožne spoprijeti z najtežjim delom problema. Pripoznanje te nezmožnosti odpira vrata k nadaljnjemu napredku. V drugi polovici članka dokazujem, da nam prestop k novemu tipu nereduktivne razlage omogoča izdelati naturalistično teorijo zavesti, in ponudim tudi svojega lastnega kandidata za takšno razlago: nereduktivno teorijo, osnovano na načelih strukturne koherence, organizacijske nespremenljivosti in hipoteze o dveh vidikih informacije.
However, lest the potential reader grow weary and pronounce the book not worthy of her time, let me quickly remind the reader of Spinoza's famous dictum that all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. Upon closer inspection, the book turns out to be not only a demanding, but – save few odd cases, to be explicated below – also a deeply rewarding read. The persistent reader is amply compensated for her interpretative struggles: the volume addresses many important, yet frequently neglected questions – questions pertaining to the very ground(lessness) of our knowing and being – and offers diverse solutions that are likely to stimulate fruitful reflection. As such, the volume embodies the multi-layered fabric of the absurd: what might seem out of tune from one perspective, may prove harmonious from another (higher) perspective.