Routledge - EUROPA Regional Perspectives Book Series, 2020
After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the disma... more After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the USSR officially marked a period of significant retreat of Russia from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, with Russia’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s interest in the region has risen anew. Once again seen as a battleground to contest US hegemony, Russia has expanded its political, military and (to a lesser extent) economic relationships across the region. Most apparent in the military intervention in Syria, Russia has also been engaged with traditional rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, stepping into the vacuum left by the US Obama Administration. Is Russia’s re-engagement part of a strategy, or is it mere opportunism? Authors with different backgrounds, experiences and origins examine this question via an analysis of the historical drivers of Russian interest in the MENA region and the factors underlying current Russian policies.
Since September 2015, the strenuous battle that Moscow engaged in in defense of President Bashar ... more Since September 2015, the strenuous battle that Moscow engaged in in defense of President Bashar al-Assad has reverted the destiny of the country in Assad’s favor; without Russia’s military and political support to Damascus, the situation in Syria today would probably be very different. In some respects, we could even argue that the Syrian case depicts a paradox: while the United States’ weight and influence in the country has historically been limited compared to that of Russia, Syria is probably the country where Washington’s decision to not intervene has had the greatest impact, both on the domestic evolution of the conflict and in terms of fruits that other actors, and particularly
Moscow, have been able to reap. In other words, the Syrian context seems to perfectly reflect the redistribution of power ongoing in the MENA region, where other powers, often perceived as “anti-Western”, can interfere more easily. However, questions remain over the future of Syria in such a scenario. Will Russia and the other regional actors be able to
obtain the results they expected from their Syrian adventures? Can Moscow really hope for a “Russian Pax” in Syria? The first part of this chapter will deal with the origins of US-Russian “confrontation” over Syria and the redistribution of power that led to Russia’s intervention in 2015; the second part will assess the feasibility and sustainability of a “Russian Pax” in the Arab country. While answering these questions might be tricky, it
can be easily argued that the decline of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of old and new external players are tied up together.
Russia has returned to the Middle East. While few can argue against this fact, different internat... more Russia has returned to the Middle East. While few can argue against this fact, different international actors assess Moscow’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region differently. This chapter looks specifically at one international actor, as it aims to unpack the perceptions of the European Union (EU) regarding Russia’s presence, actions and strategy (or lack thereof) in the area. Following the Ukrainian crisis, relations between Russia and the EU have worsened, and room for cooperation has considerably shrunk. The MENA region also saw increasing frictions between Russia and the EU, mainly in the framework of the Syrian conflict. However, it also offers important possibilities for collaboration – again, chiefly in Syria. In order to highlight the fiercest divergences and the most promising cooperation avenues, we examine the following question: how does the EU perceive Russia’s role in the MENA area? We focus on EU perceptions around two aspects of Russia’s engagement in the region. First, we tackle Russian military engagement – thus focusing on the Syrian context, where the Russian intervention in late September 2015 changed the destiny of the conflict in favour of the Damascus regime. Second, we analyse the Kremlin’s diplomatic agenda in various regional contexts, ranging from the Astana peace talks on Syria to the Libyan scenario. Does the EU perceive Russia’s actions in these domains as compatible with EU goals and interests? Answering this question may be challenging. “Perception” is an abstract and controversial concept in International Relations (IR) literature: operationalising and assessing perceptions is a demanding task. While in this chapter we cannot engage in the long-standing debate on the cognitive processes governing foreign policy decision-making, we do acknowledge that studying how EU officials construct reality through discourse is crucially important. Therefore, we propose a two-step assessment to analyse the discourse and images used by relevant EU officials. First, we selected a number of written texts, including transcriptions of official speeches, foreign policy documents, press releases and so on to show how Russia’s actions in the broad MENA region are perceived at the EU official level. Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews with selected EU and national officials in order to go beyond the official view and gain insights into how the EU discourse comes into being, the key actors shaping it and major factors that might impact its evolution.
Russia in the Middle East and North Africa: Continuity and Change, 2020
After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the disma... more After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the USSR officially marked a period of significant retreat of Russia from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, with Russia’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s interest in the region has risen anew. Once again seen as a battleground to contest US hegemony, Russia has expanded its political, military and (to a lesser extent) economic relationships across the region. Most apparent in the military intervention in Syria, Russia has also been engaged with traditional rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, stepping into the vacuum left by the US Obama Administration. Is Russia’s reengagement part of a strategy, or is it mere opportunism?
Era il leader di una delle più sanguinose milizie durante la guerra in Iraq, oggi Muqtada al-Sadr... more Era il leader di una delle più sanguinose milizie durante la guerra in Iraq, oggi Muqtada al-Sadr è alla testa di un movimento che porta in piazza migliaia di persone. Con toni populisti, chiede la fine della corruzione del governo del premier sciita Haider al-Abadi e riforme. I manifestanti che per settimane hanno protestato attorno alla green zone, cuore di Baghdad e simbolo per molti iracheni della ricchezza e corruzione dei politici, protetta da alti muri di cemento e da metri di filo spinato, hanno fatto poche settimane fa irruzione nel parlamento, a maggioranza sciita.
Routledge - EUROPA Regional Perspectives Book Series, 2020
After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the disma... more After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the USSR officially marked a period of significant retreat of Russia from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, with Russia’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s interest in the region has risen anew. Once again seen as a battleground to contest US hegemony, Russia has expanded its political, military and (to a lesser extent) economic relationships across the region. Most apparent in the military intervention in Syria, Russia has also been engaged with traditional rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, stepping into the vacuum left by the US Obama Administration. Is Russia’s re-engagement part of a strategy, or is it mere opportunism? Authors with different backgrounds, experiences and origins examine this question via an analysis of the historical drivers of Russian interest in the MENA region and the factors underlying current Russian policies.
Since September 2015, the strenuous battle that Moscow engaged in in defense of President Bashar ... more Since September 2015, the strenuous battle that Moscow engaged in in defense of President Bashar al-Assad has reverted the destiny of the country in Assad’s favor; without Russia’s military and political support to Damascus, the situation in Syria today would probably be very different. In some respects, we could even argue that the Syrian case depicts a paradox: while the United States’ weight and influence in the country has historically been limited compared to that of Russia, Syria is probably the country where Washington’s decision to not intervene has had the greatest impact, both on the domestic evolution of the conflict and in terms of fruits that other actors, and particularly
Moscow, have been able to reap. In other words, the Syrian context seems to perfectly reflect the redistribution of power ongoing in the MENA region, where other powers, often perceived as “anti-Western”, can interfere more easily. However, questions remain over the future of Syria in such a scenario. Will Russia and the other regional actors be able to
obtain the results they expected from their Syrian adventures? Can Moscow really hope for a “Russian Pax” in Syria? The first part of this chapter will deal with the origins of US-Russian “confrontation” over Syria and the redistribution of power that led to Russia’s intervention in 2015; the second part will assess the feasibility and sustainability of a “Russian Pax” in the Arab country. While answering these questions might be tricky, it
can be easily argued that the decline of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of old and new external players are tied up together.
Russia has returned to the Middle East. While few can argue against this fact, different internat... more Russia has returned to the Middle East. While few can argue against this fact, different international actors assess Moscow’s role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region differently. This chapter looks specifically at one international actor, as it aims to unpack the perceptions of the European Union (EU) regarding Russia’s presence, actions and strategy (or lack thereof) in the area. Following the Ukrainian crisis, relations between Russia and the EU have worsened, and room for cooperation has considerably shrunk. The MENA region also saw increasing frictions between Russia and the EU, mainly in the framework of the Syrian conflict. However, it also offers important possibilities for collaboration – again, chiefly in Syria. In order to highlight the fiercest divergences and the most promising cooperation avenues, we examine the following question: how does the EU perceive Russia’s role in the MENA area? We focus on EU perceptions around two aspects of Russia’s engagement in the region. First, we tackle Russian military engagement – thus focusing on the Syrian context, where the Russian intervention in late September 2015 changed the destiny of the conflict in favour of the Damascus regime. Second, we analyse the Kremlin’s diplomatic agenda in various regional contexts, ranging from the Astana peace talks on Syria to the Libyan scenario. Does the EU perceive Russia’s actions in these domains as compatible with EU goals and interests? Answering this question may be challenging. “Perception” is an abstract and controversial concept in International Relations (IR) literature: operationalising and assessing perceptions is a demanding task. While in this chapter we cannot engage in the long-standing debate on the cognitive processes governing foreign policy decision-making, we do acknowledge that studying how EU officials construct reality through discourse is crucially important. Therefore, we propose a two-step assessment to analyse the discourse and images used by relevant EU officials. First, we selected a number of written texts, including transcriptions of official speeches, foreign policy documents, press releases and so on to show how Russia’s actions in the broad MENA region are perceived at the EU official level. Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews with selected EU and national officials in order to go beyond the official view and gain insights into how the EU discourse comes into being, the key actors shaping it and major factors that might impact its evolution.
Russia in the Middle East and North Africa: Continuity and Change, 2020
After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the disma... more After decades of intense interest and rivalry with the USA, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the USSR officially marked a period of significant retreat of Russia from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, with Russia’s economic recovery and the entrenchment of President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s interest in the region has risen anew. Once again seen as a battleground to contest US hegemony, Russia has expanded its political, military and (to a lesser extent) economic relationships across the region. Most apparent in the military intervention in Syria, Russia has also been engaged with traditional rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, stepping into the vacuum left by the US Obama Administration. Is Russia’s reengagement part of a strategy, or is it mere opportunism?
Era il leader di una delle più sanguinose milizie durante la guerra in Iraq, oggi Muqtada al-Sadr... more Era il leader di una delle più sanguinose milizie durante la guerra in Iraq, oggi Muqtada al-Sadr è alla testa di un movimento che porta in piazza migliaia di persone. Con toni populisti, chiede la fine della corruzione del governo del premier sciita Haider al-Abadi e riforme. I manifestanti che per settimane hanno protestato attorno alla green zone, cuore di Baghdad e simbolo per molti iracheni della ricchezza e corruzione dei politici, protetta da alti muri di cemento e da metri di filo spinato, hanno fatto poche settimane fa irruzione nel parlamento, a maggioranza sciita.
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Book Chapters by Chiara Lovotti
Moscow, have been able to reap. In other words, the Syrian context seems to perfectly reflect the redistribution of power ongoing in the MENA region, where other powers, often perceived as “anti-Western”, can interfere more easily. However, questions remain over the future of Syria in such a scenario. Will Russia and the other regional actors be able to
obtain the results they expected from their Syrian adventures? Can Moscow really hope for a “Russian Pax” in Syria? The first part of this chapter will deal with the origins of US-Russian “confrontation” over Syria and the redistribution of power that led to Russia’s intervention in 2015; the second part will assess the feasibility and sustainability of a “Russian Pax” in the Arab country. While answering these questions might be tricky, it
can be easily argued that the decline of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of old and new external players are tied up together.
Does the EU perceive Russia’s actions in these domains as compatible with EU goals and interests? Answering this question may be challenging. “Perception” is an abstract and controversial concept in International Relations (IR) literature: operationalising and assessing perceptions is a demanding task. While in this chapter we cannot engage in the long-standing debate on the cognitive processes governing foreign policy decision-making, we do acknowledge that studying how EU officials construct reality through discourse is crucially important. Therefore, we propose a two-step assessment to analyse the discourse and images used by relevant EU officials. First, we selected a number of written texts, including transcriptions of official speeches, foreign policy documents, press releases and so on to show how Russia’s actions in the broad MENA region are perceived at the EU official level. Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews with selected EU and national officials in order to go beyond the official view and gain insights into how the EU discourse comes into being, the key actors shaping it and major factors that might impact its evolution.
Commentaries by Chiara Lovotti
Moscow, have been able to reap. In other words, the Syrian context seems to perfectly reflect the redistribution of power ongoing in the MENA region, where other powers, often perceived as “anti-Western”, can interfere more easily. However, questions remain over the future of Syria in such a scenario. Will Russia and the other regional actors be able to
obtain the results they expected from their Syrian adventures? Can Moscow really hope for a “Russian Pax” in Syria? The first part of this chapter will deal with the origins of US-Russian “confrontation” over Syria and the redistribution of power that led to Russia’s intervention in 2015; the second part will assess the feasibility and sustainability of a “Russian Pax” in the Arab country. While answering these questions might be tricky, it
can be easily argued that the decline of the United States in the Middle East and the rise of old and new external players are tied up together.
Does the EU perceive Russia’s actions in these domains as compatible with EU goals and interests? Answering this question may be challenging. “Perception” is an abstract and controversial concept in International Relations (IR) literature: operationalising and assessing perceptions is a demanding task. While in this chapter we cannot engage in the long-standing debate on the cognitive processes governing foreign policy decision-making, we do acknowledge that studying how EU officials construct reality through discourse is crucially important. Therefore, we propose a two-step assessment to analyse the discourse and images used by relevant EU officials. First, we selected a number of written texts, including transcriptions of official speeches, foreign policy documents, press releases and so on to show how Russia’s actions in the broad MENA region are perceived at the EU official level. Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews with selected EU and national officials in order to go beyond the official view and gain insights into how the EU discourse comes into being, the key actors shaping it and major factors that might impact its evolution.