Russia in the Middle East

Russia’s political, diplomatic, military and economic footprint in the Middle East and North Africa has expanded visibly over the last decade.

This Chaillot Paper provides a detailed account of Russia’s spectacular return to the region. The paper depicts how major regional players have adjusted to the new reality but also addresses the question of whether Russia will be able to sustain its geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East.

Alors que la crise syrienne est entrée dans sa cinquième année, l’évolution du contexte sécuritaire en Syrie et en Irak depuis l’été 2014 met en lumière le rôle grandissant des Kurdes comme force combattante contre l’État islamique (EI). S’inscrivant dans le contexte plus général du renouveau de l’influence russe sur la scène Moyen-Orientale constaté depuis la fin des années 2000, le développement des relations russo-kurdes est entré dans une nouvelle phase depuis le début des années 2010. Russes et Kurdes disposent d’une série d’intérêts convergents qui s’articulent principalement aujourd’hui autour de la lutte contre l’EI et de la coopération dans le domaine énergétique. Les relations russo-kurdes n’en demeurent cependant pas moins dépourvues de contradictions inhérentes à la diplomatie à géométrie variable déployée par Moscou au Moyen-Orient : le Kremlin est en effet l’un des rares acteurs de la scène stratégique Moyen-Orientale à disposer de la capacité à discuter avec tous les États de la région. Or, la Turquie, la Syrie et l’Iran, qui sont autant de partenaires stratégiques pour Moscou, redoutent tous le danger séparatiste kurde. Jusqu’à présent, le numéro d’équilibrisme diplomatique du Kremlin lui a cependant permis de densifier ses relations avec les Kurdes sans pour autant compromettre celles avec les États riverains concernés par la question du Kurdistan.

Bu çalışma, küresel ve bölgesel şartların değişimiyle oluşan yeni bağlamın güçlü oyuncularından birisi olan Rusya Federasyonu'nun Putin dönemi ulusal güvenlik stratejilerini inceleyerek Rusya'nın Suriye krizine dahil olmasını ele alacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, özellikle Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin döneminde oluşturulan 2000, 2009 ve 2015 güvenlik strateji belgelerini siyasi, askeri, enerji ve ekonomi odağıyla inceleyecektir. Rusya'nın kısa ve uzun vadede belirlediği hedefler, bu hedefleri gerçekleştirmeye yönelik kullanılan araçlar üzerinden bölgesel ve küresel konjonktürel gelişmelerin ışığında bir sentez oluşturulacaktır. Ayrıca, Rusya Federasyonu'nun ulusal güvenlik belgesinde belirlediği tehditler de ele alınarak, RF'nin Suriye'ye girmesinin nedenleri, Putin dönemi hazırlanan ulusal güvenlik strateji belgeleri ekseninde değerlendirilecektir. Genel olarak, RF'nin Suriye krizine dahil olmasının oluşturulan güvenlik strateji belgeleriyle bağlantılı olup olmadığı ve yıllar içinde belgelerde olan dönüşümde Suriye'nin konumuna odaklanılacaktır.

With the Syrian crisis entering its fifth year, the changing security context in Syria and Iraq since the summer of 2014 has highlighted the increasingly important role played by the Kurds as a fighting force against Islamic State (IS). In a more general context of renewed Russian influence in the Middle East since the late 2000s, the development of Russo-Kurdish relations has entered a new phase since the beginning of the current decade. Russians and Kurds have several converging interests, the main focus of which is currently the fight against IS and cooperation in the energy sector. Russo-Kurdish relations are not without contradictions, however, due to Moscow's multifaceted diplomacy in the Middle East. The Kremlin is one of the rare strategic players in the region that has the ability to negotiate with all of its countries. Turkey, Syria and Iran, which are equally strategic partners for Moscow, all fear the danger of Kurdish separatism. Until now, the Kremlin’s diplomatic balancing act has enabled it to strengthen its ties with the Kurds, without compromising its relations with neighboring countries concerned about the issue of Kurdistan.

Tout comme pour l'année 2015, la crise syrienne occupe en 2016 une place prépondérante dans l!agenda moyen-oriental et international de Moscou. Le niveau d'importance accordé par la Russie à ce conflit s'est d'autant plus accru que le Kremlin s'y est engagé militairement fin septembre 2015. Cette prolongation, aussi inattendue que logique, du soutien apporté par Moscou à Damas depuis 2011 a empêché l'effondrement du régime de Bachar el-Assad et hypothéqué tout règlement de la crise sans la participation du Kremlin. La Russie n'a pas ménagé ses efforts politiques et diplomatiques pour engager un processus de résolution de la crise à travers le format dit de « Vienne », qu!elle parraine avec les États-Unis. Si Moscou reste un interlocuteur difficile, sa position n'en demeure pas moins respectée par les pays arabes qui, s'ils s'opposent frontalement au Kremlin sur le dossier syrien, n'en admirent pas moins sa constance et sa détermination. La volonté manifestée par la Russie de s'ériger en acteur de premier plan au Moyen-Orient n'a ainsi jamais semblé aussi proche d!être concrétisée qu'en cette année 2016. Au demeurant, si le rôle central joué par la Russie sur le dossier syrien lui permet de pallier un déclassement stratégique présenté par beaucoup comme inéluctable, il soulève en revanche une série de questions quant aux objectifs poursuivis par Moscou dans la région.

La crise qui secoue la Syrie depuis 2011 et les développements qui portent sur les armes chimiques syriennes ont permis de mesurer le poids retrouvé par Moscou sur la scène diplomatique et navale méditerranéenne. L’accroissement continu de l’activité de la marine russe en Méditerranée orientale au cours des deux dernières années de même que le renouveau de l’influence russe constaté au Moyen-Orient ont conduit certains observateurs à évoquer le « retour de la Russie en Méditerranée ». S’ils ont été renouvelés depuis 1991, le caractère stratégique de la Méditerranée pour le Kremlin de même que les formes empruntées par la présence russe dans l’espace méditerranéen s’inscrivent toutefois dans une remarquable continuité par rapport aux époques impériale puis soviétique. Le Kremlin poursuit aujourd’hui un double objectif en Méditerranée : la reconstruction de l’influence et de la puissance russe sur la scène internationale et la protection des intérêts de la Russie.

Throughout the long twentieth century, Russia held a central place in Arab literary geography.  Not only the translated classics of modern Russian literature but the idea of Russia – and later of course the Soviet Union – exerted a magnetic pull on Arab intellectual life throughout its encounter with western-driven modernity.  Russia was a potent exemplar: a civilization that managed to overtake and in some senses join Europe, without giving up its own cultural integrity and while standing as an alternative to the west. Focusing on Mikhail Nu`aymah, Sonallah Ibrahim, and Mohamed Makhzangi, this talk will explore three key moments in the Arab-Russian literary encounter. Reading between the (bread)lines, we can see how talismanic "personal canons" of beloved Russian authors helped prepare – but ultimately worked to disenchant – Arab writers’ own experiences of Russian or Soviet life.

Après une parenthèse de plus de deux décennies, la Russie a réinvesti la scène stratégique moyen-orientale au cours des années 2010. Ce « retour » s’est déroulé sur fond de printemps arabes, et tandis que la crise ukrainienne endommageait durablement les liens entre Moscou et la communauté euro-atlantique.
Fort de son succès militaire en Syrie, la Russie est désormais perçue comme un acteur sécuritaire incontournable en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient, ou, en tout cas, comme une puissance avec laquelle il faudra compter et dialoguer en vue de résoudre les multiples crises qui secouent la région.

Le Moyen-Orient a continué, en 2016, d'occuper une place de choix dans l'agenda international russe. Alors que sur le plan intérieur la Russie poursuivait sa lente extirpation de la crise économique, sur le plan extérieur le front ukrainien demeurait relativement stable sans néanmoins ouvrir une quelconque perspective de levée – même partielle – des sanctions occidentales qui pèsent sur Moscou. Dans ce contexte, la crise syrienne a de nouveau offert aux Russes une profondeur stratégique, d'autant plus qu"ils y ont consolidé leur position d'acteurs incontournables, aidés en cela par les flottements de Washington, puis par la transition politique aux États-Unis. Parallèlement à une séquence militaire plutôt réussie, le Kremlin s'est engagé dans un cycle diplomatique avec la Maison-Blanche en vue de conclure un accord politique visant à régler la crise. Si ce travail n'a pas abouti avec l'administration Obama, il n"aura pas été totalement vain – le vote de la résolution 2254 en décembre 2015 constitue un succès – ; il aura cependant mis en évidence les limites du couple américano-russe, qui vole en éclats face à l'épisode dramatique de la bataille d'Alep (automne 2016).

First published in American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles on 30th December 2010
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Here, I would like to merely ask the following question:

When Islam's worst enemies, namely the Zionist - fake Freemasonic regimes of England and France, permeate and penetrate an Islamic country from border to border and determine every aspect of its daily life and international position, does it really matter whether the local people pray five times per day, fast in Ramadan, and abstain from alcohol, pork and premarital sex?

In fact, it is ridiculous to think that Islam exists after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In reality, there is no Islam anymore. There is only a fabricated ghost - a spiritual elementary useful for the Satanic needs of the Zionist & Freemasonic gangsters who use printed pages of the Quran to clean their ass or to perform sexual rituals on them.

Without a cultural, educational, scientific, military, socioeconomic, and imperial rule effectuated under total control by the indigenous Muslim population and elite, there is no Islam.

To believe that Islam can possibly exist in a fake country whereby the criminal Freemasonic gangsters of England, France and America, disguised as diplomats, academia, and cultural advisors, move free, contact anyone, bribe and corrupt whomever they like, plot along with their local lackeys, and promote their agenda for total control of the former Ottoman province, is not simply idiotic; it is a crime against the interests of all the indigenous peoples irrespective of their religion, origin, language and culture.

What Kemal Ataturk understood and all the filthy Satanic sheikhs of Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, etc. cannot understand is the conclusion about the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the key role played by the Anglo-French Freemasons and Zionists in this ominous process, which spread terror and death throughout the Ottoman territories that the Satanic Western Zionist and Freemasonic mass media mendaciously and ludicrously call "Middle East".

Negli ultimi tempi un nuovo acronimo si è fatto prepotentemente largo nell’universo concettuale del dibattito che ruota intorno all’interpretazione del mondo in cui viviamo. Questo acronimo è VUCA, termine coniato in ambito militare intorno agli anni ’90, che sta ad indicare un mondo governato da quattro variabili: volatilità, incertezza, complessità e ambiguità (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity). La situazione nel Levante Arabo è il perfetto caso di scuola per chi volesse confrontarsi con tale contesto.

Türkiye, Suriye ile sınır komşusu olması, bölgeyle ilişkisi ve iddiası açısından Suriye’deki gelişmelerden doğrudan etkilenmektedir ve karşı karşıya olduğu zorlukları kendi çıkarları açısından yönetmek durumundadır. Bu zorlukların başında Rusya’nın Eylül 2015’in sonunda statüko yanlısı bir tutumla Suriye iç savaşına müdahil olması gelmektedir. Çünkü Rusya’nın müdahalesi ile sahadaki durum köklü bir biçimde değişmiştir. Türkiye’nin Ekim 2019’da Barış Pınarı Harekâtı’nı başlatmasına dek Suriye’nin kuzeybatısındaki Rus etki gücü, bu operasyonun ardından Fırat Nehri’nin doğusuna da geçmiştir. Mevcut durumda Rusya, Suriye sahasındaki en önemli aktör konumundadır. Küresel, bölgesel ve Türkiye’yi ilgilendiren sorunlara uygulanabilir çözümler üretmek amacıyla 2009 yılında kurulan Küresel Siyasal Eğilimler Birimi (GPoT), aynı amaç doğrultusunda Suriye’deki iç savaş 10. yılına girerken alanında uzman isimlerle görüşmeler gerçekleştirerek bir dosya çalışmasını hayata geçirmeye karar vermiştir. “Türkiye’nin Suriye’de Karşı Karşıya Olduğu Zorluklar” adlı bu dosya çalışması 4 başlıkta toplanmıştır. Bunlar; Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri, Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri, Göç Baskısı ve Sahadaki Durum ve Aktörlerdir. Dosya çalışmasının ilk konusu olan ‘Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri’ için GPoT Proje Asistanı Yasin Küçükkaya (Y. K.), 27 Mart 2020 tarihinde Marmara Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Doç. Dr. Emre Erşen (E. E.) ile bir röportaj gerçekleştirmiştir. Röportajda öne çıkan soru ve cevaplar aşağıda verilmiştir.

La crise syrienne a permis de faire franchir au partenariat russo-iranien un seuil qualitatif en lui ouvrant un champ inédit : celui d’une coopération militaire poussée. Avec la stabilisation des affrontements, le dossier syrien fait désormais office de « stress test » pour la relation irano-russe. La compétition multiforme à laquelle se livrent Moscou et Téhéran en Syrie est scrutée depuis l’Europe et les États-Unis où, en l’absence d’une stratégie syrienne, on table sur le fait que leurs intérêts divergents finiront par conduire Russes et Iraniens à la confrontation. Par ailleurs, l’accroissement des tensions dans la zone du Golfe est autant porteuse d’instabilité qu’elle créée la possibilité pour Moscou de se poser en médiateur entre différents protagonistes. Entre continuité et ruptures, la compétition coopérative à laquelle se livrent Russes et Iraniens reste ainsi un des fondamentaux de leur partenariat. Au demeurant, il s’agit d’un modus vivendi dont les deux estiment tirer plus de dividendes qu’ils n’en obtiendraient d’une confrontation.

The Middle East is increasingly awash with fake news and misinformation campaigns. As elsewhere Russia has become a major vector of these disinformation campaigns, which affect virtually every major flashpoint in the Arab world. Russia just opened a new info-war front in Libya.

Seit  2015  ist  Russland  Kriegspartei  in  Syrien.  Mit  seinem  Kriegseintritt verfolgte  der  Kreml  drei  Ziele:  das  Assad-Regime  zu  stabilisieren,  vom eigenen Krieg in der Ostukraine abzulenken und das Machtgleichgewicht in  Syrien  und  im  Nahen  Osten  zu  eigenen  Gunsten  so  zu  verändern, dass  der  Westen  als  Gegenleistung  für  eine  Mitsprache  in  Syrien die Sanktionen  gegen  Russland  aufheben  könnte.  Dieses  Kalkül  ist  kaum aufgegangen. Das Assad-Regime kontrolliert zwar militärisch weite Teile des Landes. Die Entfremdung vom Westen ist jedoch tiefer denn je. Im ei-genen Land ist der Syrien-Krieg unpopulär. Doch der Rückzug aus Syrien ist schwierig. Das Assad-Regime ist politisch labil, Frieden in weiter Ferne. Russlands  partielle  Verbündete  Iran  und  Türkei  verfolgen  Interessen,  die den  eigenen  widersprechen.  Und  Russland  droht,  zwischen  die  Fronten des Israel-Iran-Konflikts zu geraten

Цитата из статьи проф. М. С. Мегаломматиса «Почему Россия всегда терпела неудачи на Ближнем Востоке»
http://motimatik.livejournal.com/23641.html
Оказывается, "процесс 'арабизации' - уловка англо-французов, призванная обеспечить им постоянный колониальный контроль над Ближним Востоком".
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Читайте Мухаммеда Шамсаддина Мегаломатиса (Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis)!

Русская политика на Ближнем Востоке всегда отличалась недальновидность. Российские ориенталисты лишены оригинального мышления.
"Царство славное Салтана..."
http://igor-dzhadan.livejournal.com/60790.html
13th June 2008
Reference to and Comment about Prof. M. S. Megalommatis' article "Why Russia always failed in the Middle East"
First published in AfroArticles, American Chronicle, and Buzzle on 18th January 2008
http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard/Article/Why-Russia-always-failed-in-the-Middle-East/72601

The Soviets were South Yemen´s major partner, but South Yemen does not exist anymore. The Soviets built the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, but a few years later the opportunistic president Sadat terminated his country´s relations with the USSR, as Henry Kissinger had offered him a simulacrum of victory in 1973.

In the wider region of the Middle East, the Russian foreign policy has been characterized by the following traits:
Tuesday, February 05, 2008
Why Russia always failed in the Middle East
http://red-army-family.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html?view=sidebar
http://red-army-family.blogspot.com/2008/02/why-russia-always-failed-in-middle-east.html
First published in AfroArticles, American Chronicle, and Buzzle on 18th January 2008

Bu çalışma, küresel ve bölgesel şartların değişimiyle oluşan yeni bağlamın güçlü oyuncularından birisi olan Rusya Federasyonu'nun Putin dönemi ulusal güvenlik stratejilerini inceleyerek Rusya'nın Suriye krizine dahil olmasını ele alacaktır. Bu doğrultuda, özellikle Rusya Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin döneminde oluşturulan 2000, 2009 ve 2015 güvenlik strateji belgelerini siyasi, askeri, enerji ve ekonomi odağıyla inceleyecektir. Rusya'nın kısa ve uzun vadede belirlediği hedefler, bu hedefleri gerçekleştirmeye yönelik kullanılan araçlar üzerinden bölgesel ve küresel konjonktürel gelişmelerin ışığında bir sentez oluşturulacaktır. Ayrıca, Rusya Federasyonu'nun ulusal güvenlik belgesinde belirlediği tehditler de ele alınarak, RF'nin Suriye'ye girmesinin nedenleri, Putin dönemi hazırlanan ulusal güvenlik strateji belgeleri ekseninde değerlendirilecektir. Genel olarak, RF'nin Suriye krizine dahil olmasının oluşturulan güvenlik strateji belgeleriyle bağlantılı olup olmadığı ve yıllar içinde belgelerde olan dönüşümde Suriye'nin konumuna odaklanılacaktır.

This thesis tracks the religious, political, social and cultural presence and activities of the Russian Empire in Syria and Palestine and the policies of the Ottoman Empire against these. In the first part of the thesis, the characteristics of the relations of the Russians with Syria and Palestine after the adoption of Christianity, the place of Syria and Palestine in the 18th century Ottoman-Russian diplomatic texts, the first Russian Consulates in the region and the establishment of Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem in 1847 are examined. In the second part, land purchases for Russian pilgrims in Jerusalem as a result of the activities of the Palestine Committee established under the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, the construction of churches and guest houses, the procurement of land across Palestine under the administration of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, competition between the Russian authorities in Jerusalem and Russian support of Orthodox Arabs against the governing Greek clergy of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem are analyzed. In the third part of the thesis, the establishment and administrative structure of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society founded in 1882 as a result of the restructuring of Russian politics towards Syria and Palestine, the patronage of Russian Oriental studies towards Syria and Palestine, the management of travels of Russian pilgrims and their social and economic structure are evaluated. In the fourth chapter, the election of the first Arab Patriarch to the throne of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch in 1899 as a result of Russian support of Orthodox Arabs against the Greek clergy, the initiation and development of Russian educational activities in Syria and Palestine, and the ideological structure of these activities are examined. Accordingly, the process of transferring the schools of Patriarchate of Antioch to the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in 1895, the attitude of the Ottoman State towards the Russian schools, and the recognition of the entire Russian presence including Russian schools by the Ottoman State in 1902 and 1905 are analyzed. The structure of Russian activities after 1905, as a turning point both for domestic subjects and foreign policy for Russia and the end of Russian presence in Syria and Palestine in 1914 with the entry of Russia into World War I in the enemy front of the Ottoman Empire and the effect of the graduates of the schools of Palestine Society on the “Orthodox Arab Renaissance” are emphasized.