Kurdish Studies

Using a nationally representative dataset from Turkey, we examined the effects of national identity, religious identity, religious practice, and intergroup contact on social distance towards disliked groups along ethnic (Turks vs. Kurds), religious (Sunnis vs. Alevis) and ideological divides (supporters vs. opponents of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to examine two mechanisms (via perceived threat and empathy) through which ingroup identification and intergroup contact influence social distance toward disliked groups. Perceived threat, but not empathy, mediated the effect of national identification on higher social distance towards Kurds, AKP supporters and AKP opponents. Both perceived threat and empathy mediated the effects of religious practice on distance towards Alevis. Intergroup contact had both direct and indirect effects (via threat and empathy) on social distance. Multigroup SEM showed that contact's effects did not vary across outgroup targets. By contrast, the effects of national and religious identity on social distance varied depending on the outgroup target. The findings highlight the importance of considering identity content and meaning attached to social categories in making predictions about the influence of identification with different social categories. The study of intergroup relations in social and political psychology has contributed to our understanding of societal conflict by shedding light on the drivers of intergroup conflict and tensions. A growing body of literature has examined the consequences of ingroup identification with groups at different levels of inclusiveness (e.g., Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) and of intergroup contact (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) in predicting attitudes toward outgroups in conflict. Typically, this research has examined one set of intergroup relations or conflict at a time, often in a context or a target group chosen by the researchers. Intergroup tensions, however, exist across multiple social groups simultaneously, such as ethnic, religious, or ideological divides. Such contexts raise questions about the implications of identification with different groups, and of intergroup contact, for societal polarization (e.g., social exclusion). When conflict exists along different fault lines, the same group (e.g., religious) can serve as a superordinate, a cross-cutting, or an exclusive identity. Importantly, the meaning attached to social groups also matters. Some groups are judged positively, while others are seen as threatening. Therefore, ingroup identification should have different implications depending on both the boundaries and the content of group identity. In the present research, we examined the influence of identification with two important groups-national and religious-as well as the level of intergroup contact social distance along three main societal divisions in Turkey: the ethnic divide (Turks vs. Kurds), the religious divide (Sunni vs. Alevis), and the ideological divide (supporters vs. opponents of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)-Justice

Oil corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan arose from US/UK and Turkish patronage systems and clientalism. This investigative paper examines how IOCs and other businesses began preparing the ground in northern Iraq to benefit themselves long before Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003. The people of the region have not benefited from the wealth generated by their own natural resources. The swindling has created 5000 new millionaires in Erbil and bolstered the pockets of US and UK politicians, ex-military and SAS personnel and corporate criminals.

IPBD (Iraq Projects Business Development) was set up in the UK in September 2002 by Hareth Zahawi and his son, Nadhim along with  Mahmoud Yousuf in preparation for the invasion of Iraq. They had two other companies called Cupola. IPBD was initially set up to launder American and British military personnel uniforms.

IPBD had $30 million paid into it in January 2003, and $300 million in 2005. It was a major US Contractor under George W.Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad. IPBD was the first UK company to get into Iraq in April 2003, and they had access to DFI funds and stolen Iraqi gold and oil - just like Erik Prince's Blackwater mercenaries for hire... favoured by Washington and the Bush administration for protecting US interests over those of Iraqis.

The few works on the Yezidi Genocide that have appeared thus far have mainly focused on the violence perpetrated against the Yezidis and no work has attempted the construction of a general historical narrative covering the essential political dimensions of the Genocide and its aftermath. This chapter begins to address this need by providing a basic chronology and description of pivotal episodes in the political history of the Yazidi Genocide.

This study explores who Turkish citizens view as the Other, their perceptions, evaluations, and the degree of Othering of these groups in the private and public spheres. Drawing from varied political science and social psychology literature, it also examines the role of social contact, perceived threat, and the strength of national and religious identification in predicting levels of Othering. Using a national representative sample, the findings reveal that Kurds are the most Othered group in the private sphere, while both Kurds and AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party) supporters are the most Othered groups in the public sphere. Regardless of who the Other is, lower social contact and higher levels of perceived threat are associated with higher levels of Othering of Kurds, Alevis, AKP supporters, and AKP opponents in both the private and public spheres.

Keywords: Othering, Turkey, polarisation, ethnicity, sectarianism, ideological divide

İtiraf etmeliyim ki, Bidlisi'nin geriye bıraktığı külliyatın 580 sayfalık hacimli bir kitap dolduracak kadar malzeme içerdiğini bilmiyordum. Vural Genç Acem'den Rum'a Bir Bürokrat ve Tarihçi İdris-i Bitlisi (1457- 1520) adlı çalışmasında yalnızca onun arşivini tümüyle okumakla kalmamış, İdris-i Bidlisi'nin çevresini de sıkı bir şekilde işlemeyi başarmış. Ortaya çıkan kitap, bir Bidlisi biyografisi olmanın ötesinde, onun yaşamında önemli yer edinen kişiler, gruplar, tarikatlar, saraylar ve şehirleri de birer birer tanıtmaktadır.

Türkiye, uzun yıllardan beridir çeşitli ideolojilerde ve yapılarda terör örgütleriyle çeşitli yoğunluklarda mücadele etmiş ve etmeye devam eden bir ülkedir. Kürdistan İşçi Partisinin de (PKK- Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê) bu terör örgütlerinin başında geldiği bilinmektedir. Ayrıca ülkeye maddi ve manevi anlamda verdiği zararlar çok büyük boyutlara ulaşmıştır. Bir terör örgütü olarak PKK, eylemlerinde silahlı yöntemlerin yanı sıra bu eylemleri ge-niş kitlelere ulaştırma, meşruiyet iddiasını sağlamlaştırma ve ele-man temini amacıyla yoğun biçimde propaganda faaliyetleri de yürütmektedir. Özellikle XXI. yüzyıl bağlamında terör örgütleri-nin propagandayı bir mücadele yöntemi olarak benimseme eğili-minin gün geçtikçe artış göstermesiyle PKK da propaganda uygu-lamalarını sürekli genişletmiş ve çeşitlendirmiştir.
Çalışmanın sonucunda hem Türkiye‟nin
hem de PKK‟nın propaganda dili, söylemi ve uygulamalarının
2000‟li yıllarda değişim gösterdiği, propagandanın giderek iki taraf
için de önem kazandığı savlanmaktadır. Son olarak da çalışmada,
Türkiye‟nin terörle mücadelede benimsediği propaganda yöntemleri
ve uygulamalarıyla PKK‟nın propaganda uygulamaları karşılaştırılmakta,
tespit ve önerilere yer verilmektedir.

Destana Rustemê Zal, ji mêj ve  di nav miletê Kurd de jî hatiye zanîn û gotin. Ev serpêhatiyên Rostem,  paşê bi destê Firdewsî hatine berhev kirin û ji ber ku farisî hatine nivîsîn wekî malê Persiyan hatine nîşandan. Firdewsî pirtûka xwe ya navdar “Şahname”yê de  beşekî fireh serpêhatiyên Rostem re terxan kiriye. Rostem hember Tûraniyan mêrxasiyekî berbiçav nîşan daye. Jixwe xelkê Arî ye, ango Aryan. Arî peywekî pehlewîye û wateya wî “ yên ku  bi agir in.” Peyva Arî dibe ku bê meneya yên ku êgir diparêzin jî be. Jixwe xelkên aryanê Zerduştî bûn û agir wekî tiştekî pîroz dihebandin .Li gor baweriyeke din jî Rostem û binemala wî Yarsanî bûne. Jixwe baweriya yarsanîtî jî heman heremê bi bandor bû. Navê rostem di nav heft fermandarên qenciyê, parêzerên yarsanitîyê de jî derbas dibe.  Helbesteke Şa Îbrahîm Eyyût de pesnê Rostem tê dayîn û tê gotin ku Rostem çawa tola Siyawiş ji Efrasîyab stendiye

Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey tackles a  theoretical puzzle in understanding the state policy changes toward minorities and  nationhood, first by placing the state in the historical context of the international system and second by unpacking the state through analysis of intra-elite competition in relation to the counter-discourses by minority groups within the context of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
What explains the persistence and change in state policies toward  minorities and nationhood? Under what conditions do states change their policies toward minorities? Why do the state elites reconsider the state- minority relations and change government policies toward nationhood? Adopting a comparative-historical analysis, the book unpacks these  research questions and builds a theoretical framework by looking at three paradigmatic policy changes: Ottomanism in the mid-19th century, Turkish nationalism in the early 1920s, and multiculturalism in Turkey in the early 2000s. While the book reveals the role of international context, intrastate elite competition, and non-state actors in such policy changes, it argues that state elites adopt either exclusionary or inclusionary policies based on the idea of “survival of the state.”

Öz
Kürt kadınlarının, modernleşmenin/demokratikleşmenin bir tezahürü olarak gösterilmesi hem
aile, hem din/dindarlık hem de çocuk yetiştirilme tarzına uygun bir sosyolojik yapıyı
barındırmaz. Çünkü Kürtlerin kadim tarihinden beri İslamiyet ile olan alakaları bilinmesi ile
Kürt annelerinin başlarının örtülü olmasına ve hemen her evde bir Kur’an-ı Kerim bulunmasına
rağmen şu an tarih tersinden işletilmektedir. Farklı sosyalist ve seküler merkezlerden alınan
komutlarla kadınların siyasileştirilmesi şimdi olmasa dahi ileriki dönemlerde olumludan çok
olumsuz bir etki yaratacak gibidir. Din anlamında yaşanan dezenformasyonun Kürt gençliği –
(YDG-H gençliği bunun en bariz örneğidir)- üzerinde yaratacağı tahribatlar ise Kürt siyaseti ve
ülkemiz açısından da önlenemeyecek aşamalara gelebilir. İşte bu makale de bizim üzerinde
duracağımız konu Kürt kadınlarının siyasileştirilmesi ve bu siyasileştirmenin Kürt ailesine ve
de dindarlığa verdiği tahribat ve Kürt aile geleneğinin geleceği konusunda duyduğumuz
endişeyi dile getirmek amacı taşıyacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Annelik, Aile, Kürt Siyaseti, Çocuk, Sekülerleşme.


Abstract
Kurdish women as a manifestation of modernization/democratization, does not have a
sociological structure that is suitable for family, religion/religiosity and child-rearing style.
Because; despite the fact that the Kurds have been familiar with Islam since immemorial times
and that, the heads of Kurdish mothers have been covered and a Qur'an has been found in
almost every house, the history is now reversed. The politicization of women with the
commands taken from different socialist and secular centers is likely to have very negative
impact on future periods, even if not today. The destructive effects of the disinformation
regarding religion on the Kurdish youth (YDG-H youth is the most obvious example of this)
(YDG-H: Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement Turkish: Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi) may
come at a stage that cannot be prevented for Kurdish politics and our country. Moreover, in this
article, we will aim to express our concerns about the politicization of Kurdish women, its
destruction of the Kurdish family structure and religiosity, and the future of the Kurdish family
tradition.
Keywords: Maternity, Family, Kurdish Politics, Secularization, Child.


Öz: Çaldıran Savaşı'ndan kısa bir süre sonra Osmanlı hâkimiyetine giren Varto bölgesi, Hınıs ve Handırıs ile birlikte Bitlis sancağına bağlandı. 1540 yılına kadar Bitlis sancağına bağlı kalan Varto, Erzurum eyaletinin teşkili ve Hınıs'ın buraya tabi bir sancak haline getirilmesinden sonra Hınıs'ın bir nahiyesi haline getirildi. Varto'nun Hınıs'ın nahiyesi olarak idari teşkilattaki varlığı 19. yüzyıl ortasına kadar devam etti. 19. yüzyıl ortalarında Muş'a bağlanan Varto, önce nahiye daha sonra kaza olarak idare edildi. Bu çalışmada, günümüzde Muş'a bağlı bir ilçe merkezi olan Varto'nun 17. yüzyıl ortalarındaki idarî, sosyal, yerleşim, nüfus ve aşiret yapısı dört avârız defterine (1642, 1643, 1645 ve 1650) göre incelenmiştir. 17. yüzyılda Varto'da kaç köy olduğu, bu köylerde kimlerin veya hangi aşiretlerin yaşadığı, devlet merkezine ne kadar vergi verdikleri sorularına cevap aranmıştır. Ayrıca 16. yüzyıla ait tahrir defteri verileri kullanılarak iki yüzyıl arasında karşılaştırmalar da yapılmıştır.
Abstract: The Varto region, which came under Ottoman rule shortly after the Battle of Çaldıran, was connected to the sanjak of Bitlis with Hınıs and Handırıs. Varto, which remained under the sanjak of Bitlis until 1540, was transformed into a sub-district of Hınıs after the formation of the province of Erzurum and the transformation of Hınıs into a sanjak of it. Varto's presence in the administrative organization as the sub-district of Hınıs continued until the mid-19 th century. Being connected to Mush in the mid-19 th century, Varto was first ruled as a sub-district and then as a district. In this study, the mid-17 th century administrative, social, settlement, population and tribal structure of Varto, which is currently a central district of Mush, was examined according to four avârız registers (1642, 1643, 1645 and 1650). Answers for the questions "How many villages were there in Varto in the 17 th century?", "Who or what tribes lived in these villages?", and "How much tax did they pay the state center?" were sought. In addition, comparisons were made between the 16th and 17 th centuries by using the 16 th century tahrir registers data.

Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism and adopted a more pragmatic and moderate posture. Still, close ties between Iran and Iraqi Shi'a groups in particular threaten the chances for normalization between Jerusalem and Baghdad, while the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Also discussed is the positive Kurdish-Israeli relationship and areas of potential cooperation. At the same time, however, there exist Kurdish fears of negative reactions from non-Kurdish Iraqis and the Arab world and Israeli fears of antagonizing Turkey and jeopardizing its strategic partnership with it.

Diviso tra Turchia, Siria, Iraq e Iran, il Kurdistan rappresenta probabilmente uno degli scenari geopolitici più caldi del Medio Oriente. È il territorio di un popolo, i curdi, che vanta più di trenta milioni di persone la più grande "nazione" senza Stato - e che si sta rivelando un attore cruciale della regione. Nelle recenti crisi mediorientali, infatti, il "fattore curdo" si è rivelato una costante fondamentale: dalle guerre in Iraq sotto Saddam Hussein alla lotta contro il cosiddetto Stato Islamico, dal ruolo nei delicati equilibri politici turchi al conflitto siriano. Senza dimenticare che il Kurdistan è una delle regioni più ricche di petrolio. Conoscere i curdi, distinguere le loro istanze autonomiste o indipendentiste, le priorità che ne guidano l'operato nei diversi contesti statali in cui si trovano a vivere, è quindi fondamentale per comprendere cosa stia avvenendo oggi. In questo volume si offre un primo approccio globale alla "questione curda" grazie all'apporto di studiosi internazionali e alla curatela dell'lSPl, uno dei più importanti istituti di ricerca europei.

This article is the Arabic translation (with minor modifications approved by the author) of an English original ("The KRG's Relationship with the Yazidi Minority and the Future of the Yazidis in Shingal") that was published by NRT, a Kurdish media outlet in Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 31, 2017. This Arabic translation was published by NRT on March 19, 2017. Both versions are available on Academia.edu and also appear on the NRT website.

In-group and superordinate identities are key predictors for intergroup forgiveness, albeit with opposite effects. To investigate the identity-forgiveness relationship, we included perceived compatibility between in-group and superordinate identities as a predictor; and tested in-group bias and outgroup attributions of responsibility as mediators. As respective parties of an armed conflict in Turkey, Turkish majority and Kurdish minority respondents (N = 227) were interviewed in Turkey and Belgium. The results supported the path through in-group bias for all groups: in-group (Turkish/Kurdish) identity was associated with more bias and in turn less forgiveness; superordinate (Turkish citizenship) identity was associated with less bias and in turn more forgiveness. Compatibility, however, was associated with less bias only for the Kurdish minority. The path through outgroup blame was significant only for the Turkish majority: in-group identity predicted more outgroup blame and in turn less forgiveness. Theoretical and practical implications of these pathways to forgiveness are discussed.

Interview: Merve Erol with Adnan Celik and Namik Kemal Dinç for Perspectives, Issues 13, 2015, pp.42-51

An important center of the Armenian genocide was Diyarbakır. Both the urban Armenian population and the convoys passing through the city were massacred. In their study One Hundred Years of Sorrow - On the Track of Social Memory: 1915 Diyarbakır, (“Yüzyıllık Ah! – Toplumsal Hafızanın İzinde: 1915 Diyarbekir”) published by the İsmail Beşikçi Foundation, Adnan Çelik and Namık Kemal Dinç searched for the specter of genocide haunting the city by drawing on intergenerational transmissions, political facts and the reflections of the genocide in Kurdish literature.

By Merve Erol

This article critically examines the role of Islamist state discourse
and policies in the Kurdish region of Turkey. Academic works on
Islamism often address settings where Islamist movements and
political parties operate as anti-colonial and oppositional entities.
However, this article discusses how Islamist ideology has become
an instrument of governmentality to maintain and legitimize colonial
rule in the Kurdish region of Turkey under the Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). After contextualizing
the Kurdish issue as an internal colonization process
since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the paper focuses on
the AKP period to analyse the use of an Islamic discourse of unity
and brotherhood and attempts to foster the rise of a loyal conservative
civil society among the Kurds. Thus, it argues that the
internal colonial paradigm remains fully relevant to analysis of the
Kurdish issue during the last decade and that neoliberal Islamist
governmentality should be understood as a strategy complementary
to repression, to increase popular support for the government
and marginalize opposition.

Hîkaya “Beyi Se Bena?” ke ma ser o nê tehlîlî virazenî, nameyê kitabê hîkaya yê J. Îhsan Esparî yo. Na hîkaye, tewr verî 1997 de kovara Vateyî de hûmara 2, 3 û 4. de qisim bi qisim weşanîyaya. Hîkaya “Beyi Se Bena?” bi nameyê ke kovare de weşanîyaya, badî bi eynî nameyî 2004 de hetê Weşanxaneyê Vateyî ra çap bîya11. Kitab de tena yew hîkaye ca gêna û na hîkaye qasê 60 rîpelî yê. Bi no hawa merdim şêno sey yew hîkaya derge bihesebno.

* Bîlal Zîlan, "Hetê Şuxulnayîşê Ziwan û Îdyoman ra Tehlîlê Hîkaya Beyi Se Bena?", Şewçila: Kovara Edebî Hunerî, Hûmare 1, Dîyarbekir, Wisar 2011, rr. 47-57.

This paper argues that the fact that the Kurds have no nation-state of their own cannot be explained by sheer failure on the part of the Kurdish nobility, but the element of deliberate choice to avoid and evade the state is also involved. Although this is not a mainstream understanding of freedom and independence in the era of nationalism, it is clearly a no less valuable line of thought in Kurdistan. The rationale is that once one bows to a higher authority it does not matter if this authority is foreign or familiar; it is still domination and subordination.
The paper highlights a number of historical moments in order to demonstrate that the Kurds did not only resist incorporation in state-structures when they were pressured to do so, but they also prevented “states from springing up among them (Scott 2099; X).” for most parts of their history from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. The paper emphasizes that although the Kurds built alliances with stronger political powers, they refrained from alienating their political will to them; they remained loyal to local/regional authorities and small-scale political communities in Kurdistan; they took refuge in the mountains to keep the State away, and they crossed borders of (nation-)states with little regard for their legitimacy, all of which indicate that statelessness for the Kurds involves choice as well