Building Regional Peace: Iraq and the Kurds

BUILDING REGIONAL PEACE: IRAQ AND THE KURDS By Ofra Bengio* This article is based on a paper presented at the June 8-9, 2009 conference entitled “Israel and the Arab States: Parallel Interests, Relations, and Strategies,” jointly held in Jerusalem by the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The article discusses Israeli-Iraqi relations in the post-Saddam era, arguing that Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism and adopted a more pragmatic and moderate posture. Still, close ties between Iran and Iraqi Shi’a groups in particular threaten the chances for normalization between Jerusalem and Baghdad, while the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Also discussed is the positive Kurdish-Israeli relationship and areas of potential cooperation. At the same time, however, there exist Kurdish fears of negative reactions from nonKurdish Iraqis and the Arab world and Israeli fears of antagonizing Turkey and jeopardizing its strategic partnership with it. A CHANGING BAGHDAD ATMOSPHERE IN For 35 years, Israel was a major target for rhetorical, ideological, and military attacks by the Ba'thi regime.1 Yet with the collapse of the Ba'th and the many changes that have occurred in Iraq, Baghdad’s posture toward Israel has changed significantly. The harsh anti-Israel rhetoric has all but disappeared. Similarly, the vocal and actual commitment to the Palestinian cause has been reduced considerably. These changes were related to various tactical and strategic factors. An analysis of these factors must begin with Baghdad’s need to devote all of its energies to domestic issues: the atomization of the political system, which allowed for different foci of power to develop their own agendas; Baghdad’s ongoing inability to develop independent and clear-cut foreign policy lines; and Iraq’s frustration with many Sunni Arab regimes, which chose to ostracize Iraq in the years after Saddam’s fall. The deeper causes of the changes in Iraq’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict are directly related to the American presence in the country and its moderating influence on its partners there; the urge of the present 50 government in Baghdad to rid itself of Ba'thi influence, including the Ba'th’s ideological baggage; the more liberal, pluralistic, and open society and polity that has been developing in Iraq in spite of opposite currents; and most importantly the strengthening of the Kurds in their autonomous region and, especially in Baghdad. Having been Israel’s tacit ally from 19651975, the Kurds could now become an important moderating factor vis-à-vis Israel. The fact that since the establishment of the new regime the post of foreign minister has been in the hands of a Kurd, Khoshyar Zibari, is in itself very important. The same is true for the presidential post, which is manned by Jalal Talabani. Indeed, the Kurds have been playing an important role as a moderating force with regard to the Iraqi stance toward Israel, both in the parliament and in the government. Yet, without belittling this role, it must be stressed that on the whole, the toning down of the antiIsraeli mood in Baghdad has either been due to the American influence there or because there were more burning issues to deal with. On the political level, then, a certain change in atmosphere has been noticeable through some small, individual gestures and in direct and indirect moves by the Iraqi Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2009) Building Regional Peace: Iraq and the Kurds government. Thus, for example, in 2004, then Prime Minister Iyad Allawi shook hands with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom at the 2 UN. Allawi later explained that he acted out of politeness, but if one recalls Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s refusal to shake hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, one could say that the handshake was not without significance. Another famous handshake was that between Talabani and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in July 2008 at a conference in Greece. Subsequently, Talabani attempted to downplay the gesture, describing it as a "civilized social act" without special significance. He further stated that he was acting as leader of his Kurdish party and deputy president of the Socialist International, not as Iraq's president: "It does not mean any obligations for the state of Iraq,” he 3 emphasized. Still, one could have never expected such a gesture from President Saddam Hussein. Moreover, Talabani’s explanation is very interesting since it justifies in a roundabout manner relations between the Kurds and Israel. The visits to Israel in September 2004 and September 2008 of the head of the Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation and member of the Iraqi parliament Mithal al-Alusi is another case in point. Upon his return from Israel, the Iraqi parliament voted to remove Alusi’s parliamentary immunity, and the minister for parliamentary affairs even sought to prosecute him for “visiting a country that Iraq considers an enemy," a crime which could carry the death penalty.4 However, Alusi appealed to the Supreme Federal Court, which overturned the lifting of his immunity, ruling that it was unconstitutional, as no crime had been committed.5 Thus, more than the visit itself, the parliament’s ruling was of the utmost significance, establishing a precedent that could be used by other Iraqi politicians wishing to follow in Alusi’s footsteps. On another level, Iraq’s reaction to the Israeli war in Lebanon in 2006 and the war in Gaza in early 2009 was not as harsh and as vitriolic as those of other radical Arab states or even non-Arab Turkey. It is true that the parliament condemned the wars, as did Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,6 however, there was no attempt to mobilize the wars for domestic purposes. Another indication of the more moderate Iraqi stance was that it did not participate in the March 2009 Arab summit in Qatar, which convened to discuss Israel’s war in Gaza. As such, Baghdad aligned itself with the more moderate Sunni Arab countries, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which did not participate either. All in all, Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism, adopting a more pragmatic and moderate posture. These positive developments should be weighed against more negative ones. Most troubling are the ever-deepening ties between Baghdad and Tehran in post-Saddam Iraq. In fact, Iraq is now moving in the orbit of Iran, which will do its utmost to frustrate any cooperation between Baghdad and Jerusalem. Understandably, as long as the United States is in Iraq, Iran’s negative influence can be contained to some extent. However, one should also remember that the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Similarly, there are limits to Washington’s willingness to promote relations between Israel and Iraq. Thus, for example, on June 5, 2008, a non-binding resolution demanding Iraqi recognition of Israel was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, gaining the support of more than 60 congressmen, including several senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee.7 However, considering such a move risky for the Iraqi government, the White House did not press for its adoption and let it die a quiet death. Similarly, the new Obama administration’s move to open a dialogue with Iran might also further reinforce Teheran’s position in Iraq and thus frustrate any possible overtures by Baghdad to normalize relations with Israel. The dangers emanating from Teheran to Israel are likely to increase over the longer term, especially once American troops are no longer present in Iraq. Iran is likely to increase its ideological, political, and religious pressure on Iraq--especially on the Shi'a--to join what the Bush administration called “the axis of evil.” Worse still, Iran might use Iraq as a Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2009)