Ofra Bengio

Ofra Bengio explores the dynamics of relations between the Kurds of Iraq and the Iraqi state from the inception of the Baath regime to the present.

Bengio draws on a wealth of rich source materials to carefully trace the evolution of Kurdish national identity in Iraq. Dissecting the socioeconomic, political, and ideological transformations that Iraqi Kurdish society has undergone across some five decades, she focuses on the twin processes of nation building and state building. She also highlights the characteristics of the Kurdish movement in Iraq relative to Kurdish communities elsewhere in the region.

This narrative of the profound vicissitudes of Iraqi Kurdish fortunes illuminates not only the complexities of politics within Iraq today, but also the influence of Iraqi Kurdistan on the geostrategic map of the entire Middle East.

Sunni-Shi'i relations have undergone significant transformations in recent decades. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran had a major spill-over effect on the entire Middle East, and the 2003 war in Iraq transformed the Shi'is into the dominant force in Iraq. The emergence of Iran as a regional power following Saddam Husayn's removal, along with the weakness of the Arab state system, raised the specter of the "Shi'i Crescent" threatening Sunni-Arab domination in the region.  The present volume demonstrates the complexity of Sunni-Shi'i relations by analyzing political, ideological, and social encounters between the two communities from early Islamic history to the present. While analyzing specific case studies in various Middle Eastern regions, the book provides a panoramic picture ranging from hostility to efforts of cooperation and ecumenism.

For Iraq, the Gulf War did not end with the ceasefire of February 1991, but continued on in various ways throughout 1991 and 1992. Iraq's case was unique in that despite defeat in war, Iraq persisted in pursuing its prewar positions and policies, namely, laying claim to Kuwait, challenging the US and its allies, and defying UN resolutions. Consequently, it also had to continue paying the exorbitant price of such positions: a long-term state of siege consisting of severe economic sanctions and diplomatic and political isolation both in the regional and international arenas. Iraq's behavior could be explained by various ideological, conceptual, political and strategic considerations. Hardened by ongoing internal struggles and a long external war, the Ba'th regime did not regard the confrontation in 1990 as any different from previous conflicts. If, indeed, the challenge appeared greater this time, then victory promised to be of equal magnitude. Furthermore, the ongoing state of war had domestic benefits in that it helped keep the population in a state of alert and channeled attention from deprivation wrought by the regime itself to an external adversary. Moreover, the enemy was not this time a conventional one but rather the very embodiment of the Arabs' and Islam's traditional adversary: Western imperialism, represented by the US. In addition, the world view which drove Iraq into a war with the US continued to motivate it in its aftermath as well. In Iraq's view, America's role as the world's only power was eroding steadily, leaving ample room for Third World countries to step in and replace it, or at least contribute further to its downfall. Indeed, Iraq's tenacious resistance to the US " tyrannical " policies was to constitute a key element in frustrating the American vision of the " new world order. " The strategic motivations that led Iraq into Kuwait were even more valid after Iraq was forced out. The two Gulf wars had left Iraq landlocked and, since a renewed confrontation with Iran in order to rectify this unfavorable situation seemed too dangerous and costly, Iraq chose to focus its attention on Kuwait, a much easier and more promising target. Furthermore, the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq as a punishment for this stance were not too difficult to bear. Experience with the prewar sanctions had taught it how to weather economic hardship, while postwar experience had shown that military threats by the West were more easily expressed than implemented. Considerations of foreign policy, therefore, overshadowed and even dominated domestic ones. This too was a unique feature of the Ba'thi approach: despite the cumulative damage to the Iraqi state, polity and society, the Ba'th continued in implementing the same foreign policies which had contributed so greatly to this damage. The most important manifestation of this process was the evolving challenge 447

Twice in one decade Iraq took the world by surprise: in September 1980 it invaded Iran and in August 1990 it invaded Kuwait. At first glance, these two incidents seem to be separate, but deeper analysis reveals that they are closely interrelated. In fact, the second invasion was meant to correct the stalemate caused by the first. There are similarities between the two invasions that have had far-reaching implications. In both cases, Iraq's ruling Ba'th Party took a step no previous Iraqi regime had dared to take, despite the fact that both the border conflict with Iran and Iraq's claim to Kuwait went back to the beginning of the modern Iraqi state. In each case, Iraq went to war against a country that seemed much weaker, hoping for a quick victory. Iraqi rhetoric prior to both invasions focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the subsequent military activity was directed at the Gulf region. In the event, both invasions turned into challenges to the regional and world economic order, and became traps for Baghdad. The invasion of Kuwait underscored paradoxes which appeared to be unresolvable. How was it that a country which was expected to devote itself to reconstruction after a bloody war embarked instead on yet another military adventure? How was it that Iraq managed to mislead and surprise a world presumably familiar with Iraqi rhetoric and methods? And how did a country that emerged from the Gulf War undefeated, due primarily to aid from the Gulf states and the West, begin to challenge the West before first settling its conflict with Iran? It appears that the key to understanding these paradoxes lies in the stalemate that marked the end of the Gulf War, which put Iraq under tremendous pressure to reach an agreement with Iran. Although Iraq portrayed the stalemate as a major victory, the war did not achieve Baghdad's minimal aim of ensuring Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt al-'Arab waterway, which Iraq gave up in the 1975 Algiers agreement. Without achieving this goal, Iraq remained virtually landlocked, dependent on neighboring states for shipping, and the eight-year war was rendered meaningless. Alongside these pressures, Iraq had to face the realities of a changing world order: the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, the emergence of the US as the sole world power and the wave of democratization which swept Eastern Europe and threatened to spill over into the Middle East. The combination of these internal, regional, and international pressures, together with long-held ambitions of turning Iraq into a regional, and Third World power, drove President Saddam Husayn to develop what one might call " Husayn's grand strategy, " which became the prologue to the invasion of Kuwait. The four-point strategy, which he began developing at the start of the year, was designed to: (1) contain internal economic, social, and political pressures by diverting 379

The most significant development of the year for Iraq was the ceasefire with Iran, which came into force on 20 August, putting an end to the eight-year war, though not necessarily to the conflict between the two belligerents. The ceasefire came at the height of a series of Iraqi military victories which had started on 18 April with the recapture of Faw which marked another turning point in the war. After six years of being on the defensive, the Iraqi Army assumed the initiative, and forced the Iranian Army out of occupied Iraqi territories (at Shalamcheh, Majnun, and areas in the Kurdish north) and forced the Iranian Government to the negotiating table (see chapter on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Analysts differed on whether to regard the ceasefire an Iraqi victory or not. More important was that Iraq considered it as the most important victory in modern Arab history. The truth of the matter was that Iraq had overcome one of the most serious challenges to its existence in its modern history. The challenge was twofold: along with the war with Iran, Iraq had to cope with the uprising of its Kurds, who acted in concert with Iran. To defeat this uprising and solve the endemic Kurdish problem once and for all, the Iraqi Army used the deadliest weapon a state ever turned against its own citizens: a chemical weapon (in addition to more conventional methods, such as the destruction of entire Kurdish villages and Arabization of the north). Iraq thus managed to maintain its territorial integrity, but did so at a high price; the brutal methods used made the chances of integrating the Kurds into the state even remoter. Thus, while the war may have strengthened national and patriotic bonds among the Arabs — Sunnis and Shi'is alike — it further alienated the Kurds from the body politic. President Saddam Husayn used the military victories to project himself as a national hero and an omnipotent ruler, but beneath the surface were acute problems, such as pressures for the democratization of the political system. Husayn reacted by announcing steps in this direction, which, as it turned out, were a cover for further eroding the power of the Ba'th Party, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and influential individuals in the ruling circle, while at the same time expanding his own personal rule and that of relatives and supporters. An even acuter problem for Husayn was to contain the ambitions of a victorious army. In various ways, he succeeded in removing this potential danger to himself. Likewise, the regime managed to ease the social and economic crises which are characteristic of a transitional period, and the great uncertainties and dislocations that they entailed. The military successes and the development of Iraqi-made weaponry catapulted the country to the position of a regional power and a competitor for leadership in the 500

In 1998, the Ba‘th regime celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of its advent to power, no mean achievement by any standard. It had ruled Iraq for over a third of the country’s existence. Yet, survival alone was not a sufficient criterion for measuring the success or failure of the regime. In fact, whatever achievements the Ba‘th had attained in the first decade were slowly but surely lost during the two that followed. By 1998, the central government had lost control of Iraqi Kurdistan, the economy was in shambles, civil society was nonexistent, and the government hung together more by inertia than anything else. The regime’s agenda in 1998 barely differed from that of the preceding eight years: to lift the sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990; to end the country’s regional and international isolation; to preserve as much of its military power as possible, including its non-conventional weapons; and, most importantly, to preserve the regime itself. Iraq made four attempts in 1998 to eliminate the sanctions, with partial success: by the end of the year the sanctions were not as severe as before, but neither had they been lifted. The same may be said of Iraq’s attempt to break out of isolation. While it managed to take several steps forward on the regional and international levels in the first part of the year, it subsequently suffered a number of setbacks. Moreover, although repeated Iraqi efforts to block UN inspection of its non-conventional weapons program succeeded in bringing about a total halt of the inspections in August, Iraqi resistance to the inspection regime ultimately led to an American-British military strike in December. With regard to its most important goal, its own survival, the regime was put on the defensive. The United States, searching for an effective policy toward Iraq, sought to target the regime’s strongest point — its exceptional ability to survive. The idea was to back the heretofore fragmented Iraqi opposition to bring about the downfall of the Ba‘th regime. Though not entirely new, the scheme involving the highest echelons of the American administration, now became overt and was publicized in the media. Implementation required, first, peacemaking between the two rival Kurdish factions which were slated to carry the main burden of unseating the regime. The next step was to bring together all the other opposition groups, which were scattered across the world, to agree on an agenda. Lastly, the operation required financing. The plan, however, turned out to be a total failure, whether because of the amateurism of its initiators; the weakness of those who were to carry it out; President Saddam Husayn’s proficiency in survival, after a lifetime of experience; or all these factors together. Thus, in spite of the military strike of December, Saddam Husayn and the Ba‘th were still firmly in power by the beginning of 1999. 286

The guiding principles of President Saddam Husayn's Iraq remained constant in 1997: survival of the regime; achieving a total lifting of the UN-sponsored sanctions imposed in 1990; ending Iraq's regional and international isolation; and the preservation of as much of its military power as possible, including nonconventional weapons. As in the past, Husayn remained in absolute control of the regime and the sole arbiter of Iraq's fate. His policies on the home front were geared to containing the damage done to the ruling family a year earlier by the assassination of his two sons-in-law and other members of the family, together with the failed attempt on the life of his son 'Udayy (see MECS 1996, pp. 326-30). The president sought to rehabilitate his injured son, physically and politically, as well as the reputation of his two sons-in-law (most likely killed, ironically, on his own orders), to polish his own image and prevent a blood revenge that could destabilize his rule. On the national level, he sought to strike a new balance between " tribalism " and " statism " by curbing the power of tribal chiefs and customs he had earlier encouraged, and by infusing new blood into the Ba'th Party. The rejuvenation of the Ba'th was, in fact, part of the regime's attempt to cater to the needs of youth in order to prevent opposition arising from this restive sector. Indeed, notwithstanding the ongoing socioeconomic crisis, the domestic scene remained stable, due among other things to the extreme weakness and fragmentation of the opposition groups. The regime was largely passive in Iraqi Kurdistan, which remained beyond its control and which was the scene of two major Turkish operations, as well as minor inter-Kurdish fighting and skirmishes. The Iraqi army neither came to the " rescue " of one Kurdish faction against the other (as it had done in 1996) nor moved against the Turkish troops. Baghdad either considered the circumstances unfit for such involvement or thought it wise to let others do the job. In any case, the involvement of other neighboring countries in the Kurdish problem seemed a fait accompli. Iraq modified its tactics, though not its strategy, in the foreign relations arena. This modification was based on Iraq's reading of both internal and international developments , including the " oil-for-food " deal of 1996 (see MECS 1996, pp. 354-56) which enabled Iraq to export a defined quantity of oil and made many states eager to do business with Baghdad and have the embargo lifted; the Turkish-Israeli alignment (see chapters on Israel and Turkey) which disturbed a number of countries in the region; and the " restiveness " of numerous countries, particularly Russia and France, vis-à-vis the American-dominated international system, and their readiness to challenge it. As in the past, Iraq concentrated most of its efforts on the UN and the lifting of the embargo. This time, however, its tactics were different, being geared to 372

The period of no-peace no-war that followed the ceasefire with Iran in August 1988 exposed the imbalances in the Iraqi polity and society. Iraq looked like a giant trying to balance himself on a tightrope and though quite successful, the inherent dangers in the situation could not be overlooked. If geographically Iraq emerged from the war intact, the outcome was less clear-cut on the national level. About 20% of the Iraqi population — the Kurds — proved they were " Kurds first, " and it was now the task of the rulers in Baghdad to inculcate them with the Iraqi patriotism which they had always rejected, and to integrate them forcibly into the national body. The Hashemite family, which had ruled Iraq from 1921-58 and which the Ba'th had vilified as a symbol of anti-Iraqism, was now suddenly raised from the ashes to provide the depth lacking in Iraq's modern history and nationalism. This search for positive symbols of unity was complemented by energetic efforts to reconstruct both ancient Babylon and the modern cities and towns which had been damaged during the eight-year-long war. But the manipulation of history did not hide the problems of the present and the growing pressures for change in the totalitarian system. The regime attempted to swim with the tide by declaring its commitment to democracy, but it did little more than make cosmetic changes. The disliked Ba'th Party was losing more and more ground, but no alternatives were allowed to emerge. Nor was a free press tolerated beyond providing a safety valve for public frustration. This frustration was sharpened by the lack of progress in the peace talks with Iran, by the serious economic and social dislocations which both the war and the move toward privatization had caused, and finally by the heavy expenditures on the standing Army and the development of military industry. If Iraqis had expected that the end of the war would alleviate pressures and better their economic conditions, they were deeply disappointed. The military industrialization gained further impetus after the war, throwing into relief the imbalance between a developed arms industry and a fragile economy, between a strong Army and a weakened society. Displaying Iraq's military might became an important device not only for quelling dissent at home but also for promoting Iraq's standing abroad. The conventional and nonconventional arms in its arsenal and the reputation it had gained by using them were manipulated by Iraq to deter Iran from renewing the fighting. In also signaling its peaceful intentions toward Iran, Iraq often threatened Israel, thus attempting to strike a renewed balance between its orientations on the Gulf and on the Fertile Crescent. Iraq's self-projection as a regional power encouraged it to stake a claim, however disguised, to a leading role in the Arab world. Though the general atmosphere in the Arab arena was no longer congenial to such a role, Baghdad came to be viewed

This article argues that Kurdish society historically enabled the rise of charismatic women. More recently, upheavals brought by the so-called Arab Spring have acted as a catalyst for Kurdish women to improve their social standing. Along with gains made by Kurds in creating new autonomous spaces, the advancement of Kurdish women constitutes a “double revolution” that shows the feminist and nationalist agendas can be complementary, and not in conflict as they have for the greater part of modern history.

The abrupt upheaval in Iraq's leadership ranks is the greatest in its history as well as in the annals of the entire Middle East: from a single, all-powerful sovereign to a litany of rulers, leaders, and claimants to the throne; from the one and only Ba'th party to a vast array of parties, factions, and organizations. This essay analyzes the causes and consequences of this earthquake in Iraq and portrays the new elites which ascended to power. It argues that from the dawn of its existence, the Iraqi state's various regimes and leaders have endeavored to establish a stable polity that could boast of internal unity and a supra-sectarian allegiance with a measure of historical continuity but failed to do so. Consequently, the question that begs asking is whether the new elites will succeed where their predecessors have failed.

Iraq has distanced itself from its traditional radicalism and adopted a more pragmatic and moderate posture. Still, close ties between Iran and Iraqi Shi'a groups in particular threaten the chances for normalization between Jerusalem and Baghdad, while the U.S. ability or willingness to challenge Iran on this matter is limited. Also discussed is the positive Kurdish-Israeli relationship and areas of potential cooperation. At the same time, however, there exist Kurdish fears of negative reactions from non-Kurdish Iraqis and the Arab world and Israeli fears of antagonizing Turkey and jeopardizing its strategic partnership with it.

For many years the world used to hear about the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) terrorist actions in Turkey. Recently, however, a new factor entered the scene with great force—a popular uprising which resembles in some ways the Palestinian intifada and the other uprisings which have taken place since the end of 2010 in Arab countries. In the Kurdish lexicon it is called serhildan. The fusion between well-organized guerrilla activities and an open national movement has brought the Kurdish problem in Turkey into its most crucial phase ever. This essay will analyze the immediate and deeper causes for the Kurdish problem in Turkey and assess its impact on the stability and security of Turkey itself and on Ankara's foreign relations as a whole. The essay's main argument is that only a peaceful solution is likely to pull the rug from under the PKK's feet, thus enabling Turkey to cut the Gordian knot that ties this problem with its foreign relations and prevent Ankara's outside partners from using the issue as a weapon against Turkish interests.