Iraq Ethnic Politics, Anthropology and Sociology of the Middle East

אירועי הדמים באוגוסט 2014, שהובילו לגירושן של מרבית הקהילות היֶזידיות ממקום מושבן בצפון עיראק, האיצו את הבנייתה של זהות יזידית חדשה, המבקשת להיבדל ולהתרחק במודע מזו הכורדית שאימצו מרבית היזידים עד לא מכבר. עקב נסיגת הכורדים מאזורי היישוב היזידיים והפקרתם לגורלם, התאפשר לכוחות "המדינה  האסלאמית" להשתלט על שטחים אלה ולבצע פשעי מלחמה חמורים ביותר ופשעים נגד האנושות כנגד נשים, גברים וילדים. הפקרה זו אפשרה לתפישׂות קולקטיביות שהיו עד לפני זמן קצר נחלתם של אינטלקטואלים יזידים, רבים מהם גולים, להפוך באחת לסוגיה מרכזית המעסיקה את בני הקהילה בכל תפוצותיה. במאמר זה עידן בריר שופך אור על השורשים ההיסטוריים של שיח הזהות היזידי ומסביר כיצד המאורעות האחרונים מזינים את הטראומה היזידית, שנעשתה לכלי העבודה העיקרי בידיהם של מנחילי הזהות החדשה ולחומר נפץ פוליטי בכורדיסטאן העיראקית.

Disgusted with ISIS, some Kurds turned away from Islam following the fall of Mosul in 2014. Many became atheists, while others sought comfort in Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism, according to converts, was the “original” religion of the Kurds before they embraced Islam. In 2015, two Zoroastrian centers opened in Sulaimani, both of which are recognized by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Notably, neither has tried to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it is currently and has been historically practiced in Iran and South Asia. Instead, they have created their own versions of Zoroastrianism, which is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal. Kurdish Zoroastrians argue that the reason Kurds are “backward” is Islam. They seek to rectify the present situation through a Kurdish “authenticated” and “original” form of Zoroastrianism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these two centers, the present article examines this new religious movement in Sulaimani, an important city in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. It analyses the rise and distinctiveness of Kurdish Zoroastrianism looking at how Zoroastrian Kurds articulate their views on Islam, women’s rights, human rights, and Kurdish independence.

The Legacy of Iraq critically reflects on the abject failure of the 2003 intervention to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism, its citizens free to live in peace and prosperity. It argues that mistakes made by the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set a sequence of events in motion that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, the Middle East and for the rest of the world.

Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. Ignoring the legacies of the Iraq war and denying their connection to contemporary events could means that vital lessons are ignored and the same mistakes made again.

During the onslaught of the Islamic caliphate on Kobanî, Syria, media outlets across the globe broadcast pictures of brave and often unveiled Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), a quintessentially male force of destruction. The images of women fighting Islamist male aggressors aroused outrage, admiration, and pity among observers. But had all Kurdish fighters been male or had women fought for ISIS, viewers might have reacted differently. To examine some of the most widely disseminated gendered pictures and videos of the Syrian uprising in the media, this article draws on Mohja Kahf’s three categories, which typify how Muslim women, Arab women, or both are perceived by the Anglophone reading and viewing public: the first is victims; the second, escapees; and the third, pawns of patriarchy and male power. While this typology helps in examining gendered images of the Syrian uprising, it also obscures the socioeconomic realities on the ground.

The Legacy of Iraq critically reflects on the abject failure of the 2003 intervention to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism, its citizens free to live in peace and prosperity. It argues that mistakes made by the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set a sequence of events in motion that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, the Middle East and for the rest of the world. Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. Ignoring the legacies of the Iraq war and denying their connection to contemporary events could means that vital lessons are ignored and the same mistakes made again.

In Syria, there are two dominant scholarly opinions on ritual self-flagellation, which rest on different understandings of health and healing, and which form the topic of the first part of this chapter. The second examines miracle stories and ritual practices, which are both symbolic and productive of healing and sustain the legitimacy of the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab. The chapter looks at how Twelver Shi'is in Syria prior to the Arab Spring responded to the ambiguities surrounding the female Shi'is saint Sayyida Zaynab. Proponents of self-flagellation draw on 'traditional' medicine and argue that self-flagellation derives from cupping and constitutes a miraculous healing practice. Donating blood focuses on the community-not on individual devotees and the question of sainthood. The transactional aspect of the relationship between saints and Shi'is is highlighted in the ritual of nidhr (making religious vows) and in the sponsorship of majalis 'aza'.

This chapter seeks to document and examine the Iraqi people’s exercise of their right to protest and the influence these protests have had on the political landscape of the post-Saddam era. Since 2003, the Iraqi people have frequently taken to the streets en masse, to air their concerns about everything – from the ongoing US-led occupation to the government’s failure to provide basic security and infrastructure and to the airing of ‘indecent’ programmss on Iraqi television. This paper concludes by arguing that Iraqi citizens who play an active role in their own governance and participate in democratic mechanisms such as elections and mass demonstrations are helping to create a more robust democracy.

In post-2003 Iraq, the Kurds have continuously appealed for territorial rights in the regions where they claim to be the majority and have demanded a quota in the Iraqi state apparatus. As a result, conducting a census has become one of the most important battlefields in Iraq’s contemporary politics. In this Crown Paper, Dr. Fuat Dundar traces the use of statistics as a political tool in Iraq back to the exploitation of statistical data during the British mandate period (1919-1932). He also examines sets of British, Turkish, Iraqi, and League of Nations population data within the political context of its time. In particular, Dr. Dundar illuminates how the population data on Kurds—collected by the British—were used to protect the latter’s political and military interests as well as to maintain the status quo. In this way, statistics, ordinarily considered to be a scientific and objective tool, became a subjective tool in the service of political disputes.

Towards the end of the decade long Iran–Iraq war, Saddam Hussein launched a deadly attack against the Kurds, known as the Anfal Campaign, killing more than a hundred thousand. One of the largest acts of genocide occurred on 18 March 1988 in the Kurdish city of Halabja. On that day, sweet-smelling poison gas was poured over the city, killing at least five thousand. Since 2001 Kurdish moviemakers have memorialized the tragedy of the Halabja massacre by producing cinematic dramas and narrative documentaries. These films are part of a discourse of authenticity and a politics of culture that permeate the Kurdish independence movement. This essay proposes that Halabja films can be divided into three stages: the era of consolidation, 2000 to 2009; the golden era, 2009 to early 2014; and the fall which followed the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Each era reveals new attitudes towards politics, society, and the massacre.

This book proposes a significant reassessment of the history of Iraq, documenting democratic experiences from ancient Mesopotamia through to the US occupation. Such an analysis takes to task claims that the 'West' has a uniquely democratic history and a responsibility to spread democracy across the world. It also reveals that Iraq has a democratic history all of its own, from ancient Middle Eastern assemblies and classical Islamic theology and philosophy, through to the myriad political parties, newspapers and protest movements of more recent times. This book argues that the democratic history of Iraq could serve as a powerful political and discursive tool where the Iraqi people may come to feel a sense of ownership over democracy and take pride in endorsing it. This could go a long way towards mitigating the current conflicts across the nation and in stabilizing and legitimating its troubled democracy. Taking an interdisciplinary approach and referring to some of the most influential critical theorists to question ideological assumptions about democracy and its history, this book will be useful to those interested in political and legal history, human rights and democracy.

يشهد العراق، خلال الفترة الحالية، تفاقما في أزمة "شرعية" الحكومة العراقية، قد تنعكس علي الوضع الأمني في العراق، في تكرار لما شهده العراق عام 2007، حين ترجمت الخلافات السياسية بين المالكي والقوي المؤتلفة معه إلي أعمال عنف في المدن العراقية. او الحديث عن تفاقم هذه الأزمة يدعمه مؤشران، الأول خاص بالتحركات التي قام بها التيار الصدري في الفترة الأخيرة، من أجل الحصول علي تأييد نواب البرلمان لسحب الثقة من المالكي، ثم إصرار القائمة العراقية، وبدرجة ما بعض تيار الصدر، علي استجواب المالكي داخل البرلمان، تمهيدا لسحب الثقة منه بموافقة خمس الأعضاء، بعد فشل محاولة سحب الثقة منه من خلال رئيس الدولة. ويتعلق المؤشر الثاني بما صاحب هذا التحرك من حرب كلامية بينه والرئيس نوري المالكي، والتي حذره فيها من تكرار عملية "صولة الفرسان" التي استهدفت كوادره في البصرة في 2008.

Many Kurds claim that Zoroastrianism was their “original” religion before they converted to Islam.  This claim has gained salience particularly after the rise of ISIS.  Since then two Zoroastrian centers, both of which are recognized by the KRG, have opened in Sulaimani.  Neither is trying to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it has been practiced in Iran and South Asia.  Instead, they are creating their own version of Kurdish Zoroastrianism.  Their Zoroastrianism is one devoid of historical baggage, cumbersome laws, and detailed scripture.  Instead, it is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal.  In short, it constitutes an “invented tradition” in the sense Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have described the phenomenon.  This invented tradition emphasizes two issues:  ethnic identity which is linked to a re-imagined past and a generic feminism which is juxtaposed with conservative Islamic gender norms.  As such, it constitutes an imagined ideal, a claim to progress and innate liberalism.
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these centers and interviews with the directors and their followers, the proposed paper will examine this new religious movement in contemporary Kurdistan.  Particularly, it aims to answer the following questions:  Why are secular and (at least nominally) Muslim Kurds converting to Zoroastrianism?  What are the roots of their ideology?  What ages and socio-economic classes does the movement attract?  How do they relate to various political parties?  How do the two centers relate to each other?  Finally, this paper explores what this movement means in a context wherein minorities continue to be persecuted.

كانت حالة الثورة التي شهدتها المنطقة العربية، دافعا وراء توجه العراق نحو تطوير سياسة خارجية واضحة إزاء هذه الحالة، ربما هي الأوضح منذ سقوط نظام صدام حسين. والسياسة الخارجية لأي دولة من المفترض أن تعبر عن مصالح الدولة، وأن تسعى إلى تحقيقها أو الحفاظ عليها، وفق ما تراه النخبة الحاكمة. ومتابعة السياسة الخارجية للعراق تجاه تحركات الشعوب العربية، يسترعي الانتباه إلى عدد من الإشكاليات التي ستؤثر على مستقبل علاقات العراق مع الدول العربية، خصوصا الدول الخليجية التي لاتزال لديها حساسية ما تجاه الانفتاح على العراق، نتيجة تخوفها من انتقال النموذج العراقي إليها، والذي سمح للشيعة بالوصول إلى السلطة، وذلك في الوقت التي تعاني فيه من مشاكل خاصة بإدارة علاقاتها مع المكون الشيعي في مجتمعاتها.

رغم أهمية الانتخابات البرلمانية التي عقدت في العراق في 30 أبريل 2014، في تحديد مستقبل العراق خلال السنوات الخمس المقبلة، إلا أن حجم التغيير الذي يمكن أن تحدثه في بنية السلطة في العراق يظل محدودا، وتحكمه متغيرات خاصة بقدرة نوري المالكي على أن يحتفظ بالتوازن الذي استطاع أن يحققه طوال فترة ولايته الماضية بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران من ناحية، وأن يحتفظ بشبكة تحالفات تضمن التجديد له لولاية ثالثة، من خلال تبنيه مشروع سياسي، ما يدفع القوى الشيعية التي أوصلته للسلطة من قبل، لدعم التجديد له لولاية جديدة، وهي تحديدا التيار الصدري وعمار الحكيم، وربما يكون هذا المشروع، مرتبط باستعادة الأمن ومكافحة الإرهاب، لاسيما وأن الجماعات الإرهابية في الأنبار، خاصة داعش، استعادت نشاطها بصورة ملحوظة طوال الأشهر الستة السابقة على الانتخابات.

تُشير التطورات التي تقع في منطقة المشرق إلى استعدادها للانجرار إلى صراعٍ سني-شيعي، تنطلق شرارته من العراق وسوريا، وتمتد تأثيراته إلى باقي إقليم الشرق الأوسط؛ حيث يُشير الحكم الغيابي الصادر بالإعدام ضد طارق الهاشمي، نائب رئيس الوزراء العراقي، والذي هو أحد قيادات الحزب الإسلامي العراقي الذي ينتمي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين؛ إلى إصرار حكومة رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي على تصعيد صراعها مع منافسيها السنة في العراق، في ضوء موقفهم من الصراع الدائر في سوريا.