Kurdish diaspora

The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) translated as the ‘Kurdistan Workers Party’ is a terrorist organization
situated in the South East region of Turkey and its bordering neighbors. The PKK is recognized by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) , the United States of America and
many other European countries as a terrorist. The PKK which was established by the currently
imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1974 possesses a Marxist-Leninist ideology, but the communist
ideology of the organization has always been secondary compared to its nationalist aims (Chalk, 2013).
With its leader captured in 1999, the group has gone through various name changes include Kongra-Gel
between 2003-2005. This case study will be examining the PKK terrorist organization within four main
headings, these being a brief history of the group and its political goals, its organizational structure and
tactics, its finances coming from drug trafficking and extortion, and finally how effective the Turkish
government strategy has been against the PKK. The PKK in this case study is accepted to being a terrorist
organization due to it threatening the territorial integrity of Turkey both in terms of the civilian
population in the South-East region of Turkey and also governmental structures as well. We contend
that an intervention towards the PKK entities threatening the reconciliation process should have been
made earlier by the Turkish government as this would have cleared terrorist entities and the
reconciliation process would have been prolonged greatly. We also content that greater psychological
support needs to be given for teenage PKK sympathizers as this would put a stop to the idea of terrorism
within their minds and also would break the recruiting of militias for the organization

This chapter focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish response to the rapid and devastating advance of ISIS. Of course, the Iraqi Kurdish response to the ISIS advance has been a multifaceted, complex, and evolving one that includes military strategy, pragmatic politics, and aspirations of independence. Leaving aside the fact that the ISIS advance has granted the Iraqi Kurds unprecedented access to Iraq’s rich oil reserves and the fact that the initial Kurdish reaction was to ramp up their rhetoric toward complete secession from Iraq, this chapter focuses on two further dimensions of the Iraqi Kurdish response. Firstly, it documents the Iraqi Kurdish seizure of the so-called “disputed territories,” especially
Kirkuk, and their stated intent to hold a referendum on the future of these
regions (effectively to force a resolution to Article 140 of the constitution). Secondly, the chapter documents the Iraqi Kurdish use of the ISIS advance as leverage to enhance Kurdish relations dramatically with the US and Europe via direct military support (including airstrikes and weapons supply) and to become the key launchpad
in the fight against ISIS planned for 2015. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the efficacy and wisdom of the Kurdish strategy of leveraging the ISIS onslaught to advance their own interests.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, gerek kuruluşunda ve gerekse günümüzde yaşadığı önemli çözülüş sürecinde, çeteleşme biçiminde kuruluşlara gitmekte ve içindeki engelleri olduğu kadar karşısındaki hedeflerini de düşürmek için bu yöntemi kullan-makta da epey ustalaştığı görülmektedir. Mustafa Kemal hareketinin kendisi, dönemin Osmanlı nizamında bir çete ha-reketi olarak ortaya çıkar ve bu o zaman açıkça da söylenir. İttihat Terakkicilik ta-mamen bir çete sistemi altında çalışır. Hele oluşturduğu TeĢkilatı Mahsusa yani o dönemin MĠT‟i, dünyada örneği az görülen ve hatta belki de ilk örneği sayıla-bilecek bir Ģekilde, devletin içinde ama gizli bir çete olarak kendisini örgütlen-dirir. Özellikle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nu dağılış sürecinde ayakta tutmanın temel yöntemi, Teşkilatı Mahsusa‟nın çeteleşme tarzıdır. İmparatorluğun kurtulamayacağı anlaşılınca, aynı çeteler Anadolu‟ya yayılırlar. Kuva-i Milliye adı altındaki teşkilat-lanmalarda oldukça etkilidirler. Mustafa Kemal başlangıçta bunları oldukça kullanır. Örneğin Çerkez Ethem‟in hareketi de, Teşkilatı Mahsusa‟nın bir üyesi olması itiba-rıyla son tahlilde çetedir. Ama eğilimi padişah yanlısı isyancılardan değil, özellikle Bolşevik etkilenmeden ötürü Anadolu İhtilali yönündedir. Ve buna benzer Efeler hareketi de tipik bir çete hareketi olarak anlaşılır. Zaten o zaman ismi de odur.

Will the PKK return to its original Manifesto endorsing a 'national liberation struggle' for a greater Kurdistan given Kurdish territorial gains beyond the watchtowers and the barbed wire in Rojava and the quasi-independent Kurdistan region of Iraq? Five young men wearing flared trousers and fitting shirts, in keeping with the fashions of the mid 1970s, walk side by side smoking cigarettes and discussing the goals of the Turkish left. Among them is Abdullah Öcalan, Apo, not yet envisioned as group 'leader'. (Apo the Kurdish abbreviation of the longer name Abdullah, like Memo for Mehmet and Hemo for Hamit). It did not mean 'Uncle' as some said much later.

The Internet and its applications, such as social media, have revolutionized the way stateless diasporas communicate transnationally. This new virtual, deterritorialized conversation between diasporic individuals contributes to building (digital) social networks which constitute resources and opportunities for diasporas, central to social and geographical mobility. This paper explores the role of the Internet in connecting dias-poras without a home nation-state, encouraging subordinated people to participate in civic society and creating a collective source of digital social capital in the dias-pora. I argue that the Internet, particularly social media, contributes to the growth of social networks, social capital and the community's cultural and political participation within and across nation-state borders.

Keywords diaspora – social capital – the Internet – Kurds – Kurdistan

Discussion about Kurdish independence both inside and outside
Kurdistan too often remains limited to the moral argument: Do the
Kurds deserve independence? Is it not their right? It may be, but
that is not what this monograph is about. Whether or not the Kurds
win independence is ultimately a question for the Kurds. What the
current debate misses, however, is that, if the Kurds achieve their
national aspiration, it will not be the end of the story but rather its
beginning. Seldom, however, does this discussion occur in Kurdistan,
let alone in the West.

Disgusted with ISIS, some Kurds turned away from Islam following the fall of Mosul in 2014. Many became atheists, while others sought comfort in Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism, according to converts, was the “original” religion of the Kurds before they embraced Islam. In 2015, two Zoroastrian centers opened in Sulaimani, both of which are recognized by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Notably, neither has tried to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it is currently and has been historically practiced in Iran and South Asia. Instead, they have created their own versions of Zoroastrianism, which is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal. Kurdish Zoroastrians argue that the reason Kurds are “backward” is Islam. They seek to rectify the present situation through a Kurdish “authenticated” and “original” form of Zoroastrianism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these two centers, the present article examines this new religious movement in Sulaimani, an important city in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. It analyses the rise and distinctiveness of Kurdish Zoroastrianism looking at how Zoroastrian Kurds articulate their views on Islam, women’s rights, human rights, and Kurdish independence.

ئەم نووسینە خوێندنەوەیەكە لەبەر ڕۆشنایی
(ڕەخنەی ڕەخنە( سەبارەت بە بەرجەستەبوونی
ئایدۆلۆجیا لەناو ڕەخنەی ئەدەبیی كورديی و، جۆر
و مەترسییەكانی لەناو كاروانی ئەدەبیاتی كوردی
و هێڵە گشتییەكانی پشت ئەو بەرجەستەبوونە و
كاریگەرییەكەی بەسەر كزبوونی دەنگی ڕەخنەوە
دەخاتە بەر نەشتەری لێكۆڵینەوە.

Within the walls of an unremarkable two-story storefront in a strip mall in suburban Toronto, a distinct alternative practice of radical politics and life is taking place. In fact, what would appear to be an extension of the Kurdish social movement, as it is understood, is being practiced against a backdrop of the refugee experience within the metropolitan city limits of Toronto. This practice of what is arguably feminist anarchism has identified itself in recent years by the title "Democratic Confederalism". Democratic Confederalism in its feminist anarchist framework reflects an understanding of what is known within the Marxist tradition as "the commons". This paper seeks to show that the Kurdish Community Centre has, over nearly three decades, evolved for its members within Toronto into a space that attempts to practice this radical feminist politics mirroring our understanding of "the commons". However, as with many leftist social movements, struggles with the glaring divide between theory and praxis across space and time mark the centre's main concerns. Limited by the diasporic experience, these Kurdish refugees are faced with trying to navigate their anti-state Kurdish revolutionary struggle within a nation that has provided them refuge. This paper will explore what is understood as "komal" (community) and how these community centres have come to represent the Kurdish social movement in diasporic spaces through refugee lived experiences-particularly that of the Kurdish woman's. Their radical feminist politics, which have been most prominently articulated in the movement through armed struggle against oppression in urban and rural spaces, can only be reflected in a Canadian setting by the TKCC working to form solidarity with various other oppressed groups who share similar politics-a variety of third world, women-of-color feminism that is about critique and spaces of coalition building unlike that of second wave white feminists. Traditionally the movement's feminist project claims to be that of disidenfication. Contrastingly, in Canada where their identification as Kurds and as refugees is an organizing epistemology, pushing policy by lobbying the Canadian government becomes essential.

Uncovering The Past Towards the Future, Uniting Experiences
and Values.
Kurdistan in Western and Eastern Research Tradition.
24-26.10.2016
Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Collegium Maius, Jagiellońska Street 15,
Michał Bobrzyński Conference Hall, Kazimierz The Great Conference Hall

The Legacy of Iraq critically reflects on the abject failure of the 2003 intervention to turn Iraq into a liberal democracy, underpinned by free-market capitalism, its citizens free to live in peace and prosperity. It argues that mistakes made by the coalition and the Iraqi political elite set a sequence of events in motion that have had devastating consequences for Iraq, the Middle East and for the rest of the world.

Today, as the nation faces perhaps its greatest challenge in the wake of the devastating advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and another US-led coalition undertakes renewed military action in Iraq, understanding the complex and difficult legacies of the 2003 war could not be more urgent. Ignoring the legacies of the Iraq war and denying their connection to contemporary events could means that vital lessons are ignored and the same mistakes made again.

The main objective of this research is to fill the gap of Public Management studies with regards to the Kurds’ issues and in particular, the position and efforts of Fedkom, in the context of transnationalism and diaspora, concerning the main discourses of self-rule, specifically in the Kurdish regions of Iraq. Additionally, due to the absence of studies about the functions of Kurdish diaspora organizations in the Netherlands, this research will particularly be interesting to conclude whether Fedkom, the largest Kurdish diaspora organization in the Netherlands, has been able to realize their desire in participating in the reform and empowerment of the Kurdish Region through the possibilities they have in their host countries according to their objectives.

In this interview, Dr Kendal Nezan, the director of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, reflects on the development of the Kurdish diaspora, the current state of affairs concerning Kurdish movements in Europe and the past and present of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, first established in 1983. Nezan notes that the institute has been successful in creating a non-partisan public space open for Kurds from all corners of the world as well as to others interested in Kurdish history, language, culture and politics. Furthermore, the institute has been an important platform to raise awareness about the Kurdish cause in Europe. The continued functioning of the institute remains essential and, according to Nezan, not least for the second generation diaspora to be able to engage for the Kurdish cause. To this end, the institute has been negatively affected by the austerity policies of the French authorities and launched a donation campaign to draw contributions to ensure that it can continue to operate as an independent institute.

This chapter seeks to re-interpret Iraqi politics after the US-led intervention of 2003 by examining the alternative discourses of democracy emanating from within Re-Colonial Iraq. It details the complex public sphere of the post-Saddam era and points to the inclusive nature of the positive developments that have occurred across the nation since 2003. The first part discusses the post-Saddam media landscape which has played a positive role in covering the nation’s difficult transition to democracy. The second part of this chapter documents and examines the Iraqi people’s exercise of their democratic right to protest and the influence these protests have had on the politics of the post-Saddam era. The chapter concludes that Iraqi citizens who play an active role in their own governance and participate in democratic mechanisms such as elections and mass demonstrations are helping to create a more robust democracy.

L’étude du « façonnage organisationnel » du militantisme et l’observation des interactions entre l’institution et les individus engagés puis désengagés gagnent à se fonder sur les trajectoires mili-tantes. Ainsi, à partir de l’analyse de quatre trajectoires biographiques de militants s’étant engagés au sein du Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), l’objectif de cet article est d’observer les processus qui conduisent au désengagement, et les dynamiques qui permettent au contraire le maintien de l’enga-gement dans une organisation radicale quand celle-ci entre en crise. Après analyse de la diversité des attitudes qui ont suivi l’arrestation du chef du PKK Öcalan, l’article propose de lier ces attitudes aux condi-tions sociales de possibilité de l’engagement, puis aux modalités de l’engagement et à la construction sociale de l’attachement à l’institution. Il est alors possible de voir, en creux, quelles négociations lient l’individu et l’institution, et dans quelle mesure les désengagements sont aussi une conséquence des effets différenciés des dispositifs disciplinaires sur certains groupes ou individus.

This thesis aims to contribute to a broader understanding of spill-over of homeland conflicts to the host country by diaspora groups and analyses how the repercussions of the Kurdish question in Turkey are reflected in the interactions between second-generation Turks and Kurds in Sweden and Germany. It is argued that the on-going conflict adversely affects the relationship between the two ethnic groups, but that the tensions and conflict dynamics are not an exact reflection of the situation in the homeland, and instead take a different form in each hostland. The contentions between the groups and their grievances are dependent on several factors that are rooted in the hostland and directly or indirectly affect how these groups establish contact with one another. These include: the profile of the migrants; the size of the ethnic communities; the ratio of one ethnic community to another in the hostland; the political and discursive opportunity structures in the hostland; and the relations between the homeland and the hostland. The second generation were selected as the sample group in this thesis as they offer a clearer picture of the host country impact, as well as the persistence of conflict dynamics in the diaspora spaces.

The arguments that this thesis makes are based largely on field research, which included interviews with academics, politicians, migrant organisation leaders, as well as first- and second-generation diaspora members. Sweden and Germany were selected on the grounds that both have significant populations of non-European migrants and in particular because they have Turkish and Kurdish populations that show different diasporic tendencies, thus making them relevant cases for comparison. The comparison of their approaches to migrant incorporation; multiculturalism as a formal state policy; the corporatist structures that they have developed with migrant organisations; the profile of the migrants they have received; and, their approach to the Kurdish question in Turkey, sheds light on the varying dynamics of conflict-import to a host country by diaspora groups.

For two years Kurdish peshmerga, the forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, have been fighting Islamic State on the hills and plains around Mosul. Since reconquering Sinjar city in the fall of 2015, frontlines have inched closer to the Iraqi capital of ISIS. However politics and the progress of the Iraqi army have hampered a final push for the liberation of the city. As forces close in towards the end of 2016 it is clear that this final battle for the city could determine the future of Iraq and will be key to Kurds determining their future. This strains relations between Baghdad and Erbil and also concerns regional powers such as Turkey and Iran.

*This article was written for presentation at a Rudaw conference in October, 2016; it has the drawback of being written before the Mosul offensive began on October 17 and does not take it into account.

This article examines the writings of the emigré Iraqi-Kurdish poet Buland al-Haydari (1926-1996) and thus explores components of his identity as reflected in themes and motifs of his poetry, in light of the fact that Iraqis belong to a variety of ethnicities, religions and sects. This article will also address the question of whether the poet's self-perception was transformed from a complex hybrid identity with Muslim, Christian, and other influences but excluding Kurdish elements, to a "new" Kurdish identity, as an outcome of the Iraqi chemical attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. The assumption is that although the Halabja incident was the point at which the poet began to relate to his Kurdish origins, he was still loyal to Baghdad, to Iraq and to Arab culture, rather than solely emphasising his Kurdish identity. The article will examine the thematic and aesthetic effects of the tragedy in Halabja on al-Haydari's poetry in Arabic, focusing on different forms of identity as reflected in the poetry of this political activist.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of Kurdish community organisations in preserving identity among the Kurdish diaspora in London. This study contributes to the discussion on ethnic community organisations and analyse the functions of social network theory among Kurdish community organisations in London. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of ethnic community organisations addressing the specific needs of these Kurdish communities, encouraging their cultural, social and diasporic identity. This study is grounded on a qualitative research design within case study approach. In-depth semi-structured interview employed for data collection. The findings of this study indicated that Kurdish community organizations are places for socialisation, friendship settings, an exercise in ethnic identity awareness and counselling.

As violent conflicts become increasingly intra-state rather than inter-state, international migration has rendered them increasingly transnational, as protagonists from each side find themselves in new countries of residence. In spite of leaving their homeland, the grievances and grudges that existed between them are not forgotten and can be passed to the next generation.

This book explores the extension of homeland conflicts into transnational space amongst diaspora groups, with particular attention to the interactions between second-generation migrants. Comparative in approach, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts focuses on the tensions that exist between Kurdish and Turkish populations in Sweden and Germany, examining the effects of hostland policies and politics on the construction, shaping or elimination of homeland conflicts.

Drawing on extensive interview material with members of diasporic communities, this book sheds fresh light on the influences exercised on conflict dynamics by state policies on migrant incorporation and multiculturalism, as well as structures of migrant organisations. As such, it will be of interest to scholars of sociology, political science and international studies with interests in migration and diaspora, integration and transnational conflict.


Contents:  Foreword. Part I Importation of Homeland Conflicts to the Diaspora: Introduction; Theoretical approaches to diaspora politics; The Kurdish question at home and abroad. Part II Setting the Scene: Sweden and Germany as Host Countries: Migrant incorporation and multiculturalism in Sweden and Germany; Turkish-Kurdish question in Sweden and Germany. Part III Generational Continuation of Contentions Related to Homeland Conflicts: Interactions between Turkish and Kurdish second-generation in Sweden: negative peace and group competition; The impact of Swedish policies and politics on Turkish-Kurdish diaspora spaces; A replica of Turkey in Germany? Violent conflict, negative and positive peace; The impact of German policies and politics on Turkish-Kurdish interactions; Comparing two puzzles. Appendices; Index.

Despite the fact that the Islamic State has slowly built up its presence in Turkey over the past several years, countering the threat from Islamic State-linked terrorists appears to be low on Erdogan’s agenda. This is especially true when the Islamic State is helping Turkey by fighting against Kurdish groups in Syria, Turkey’s perceived primary enemy, as it has in northern Syria and western Iraq at various points throughout the conflict.

Erdogan’s continuing tolerance of Islamic State fighters on Turkish soil amounts to passive support and tacit approval. The danger posed by these fighters using Turkey as a staging ground could develop into a far more formidable threat than that currently posed by Kurdish terrorism. Tolerating the Islamic State in order to fight the Kurds is therefore a dangerous and myopic policy. It will further strain relations with the European Union and the United States on counterterrorism, cooperation, and visa-free travel. And when the Islamic State reaches a critical mass, it is likely to turn against its host, just as various militants once supported by Pakistan eventually turned their fury against the Pakistani state and its security forces.

When that day comes, harboring extremists will no longer remain viable for Erdogan and his supporters. But at that point it will be too late. Erdogan’s willingness to ignore the threat from the Islamic State may be what ultimately leads to his political demise.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/15/erdogans-fatal-blind-spot/#

This article examines the phenomenon of Iraqi Kurdish out-migration to the West between 1991 and 2003. It argues that migrants looked to the West and Westerners as potential patrons and were incited to migrate by their conceptualizations of patronage and clientage roles. Iraqi Kurdish migrants to the West constituted one of the largest flows of asylum-seeking clandestine migrants in the world by the late 1990s. European governments first accepted their asylum claims as “legitimate,” but later accused the migrants of being a “problem” and ceased granting asylum to most applicants. This article demonstrates how participants in the Iraqi Kurdish body politic posture themselves as clients and formulate the ideal roles of patrons in the migration process based on prior experience as clients of the state, tribal leaders, and other figures. Patronage and clientage roles provide both an interpretive frame and a motivator for the act of migrating.

Kürt çalışmaları konusunda önde gelen uzmanlardan biri olan saygın bir akademisyen 3-4 yıl önce bir Avrupa üniversitesinde verdiği seminerin sonunda biraz sinik tarzda sorulan şu soruyla karşılaştı: ‘Ne olacak bu PKK’nin hali? Geleceği var mı?’ Artık emeklilik yaşına da gelmiş olan yılların profesörünün ilk cümlesi pek de ‘akademik’ sayılmazdı doğrusu: ‘PKK is a miracle’ (‘PKK bir mucize’). Ardından da ‘PKK’nin hep baş aşağı gittiği düşünülen süreçlerin ardından bir çıkış yaptığını’ ekledi. Görev yaptığı sıradaki meşhur basını bilgilendirme toplantılarında Max Weber’den yaptığı alıntılar nedeni ile ‘entelektüel’ diye nitelendirilen eski Genelkurmay Başkanı İlker Başbuğ’dan da geçen yıl benzer bir açıklama geldi: ‘PKK şanslı bir örgüt bana göre. Çünkü konjonktürel şartlar hep lehine gerçekleşen ve istifade edebilen bir örgüt’.