I work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. My background is in the philosophy of memory, of perception and of affective states. I have published several articles and monographs on the general theory of emotions (The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge 2012), on the nature of shame (In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, Oxford 2011) and on memory. I am currently developing my views regarding emotions elicited by fiction, feelings of familiarity as well as the involvement of the self in emotions. Address: Université de Genève
Département de philosophie
2, rue de Candolle
1211 Genève 4
Switzerland
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences
Campus Biotech
9, Chemin des Mines
1202 Genève
Switzerland
A. Garcia, M. Gunnemyr and J. Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality and Social Reality. Essays Dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2023
The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revision... more The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revisionary understanding of emotional values. §2 introduces the distinction between enablers and favourers and how it is pressed into service by Toni to reply to this worry. While I agree that the reply is attractive, since casting emotions in the role of enablers chimes well with how we pre-theoretically understand the relations between emotions and values, I observe that doing so requires that we tackle two connected issues. First, how do emotions function as value enablers? Second, is the resulting picture compatible with the FA analysis? The rest of the discussion is structured around these issues. §3 looks at the role of emotions within the FA analysis so as to specify the kind of enabling role they can play. On this backdrop, I explore in §4 a contrast between how belief relates to truth and how emotions relate to values, a contrast which helps uncover what we are after. A first reaction to this contrast, according to which emotions are value enablers by allowing us to access values, which differ from truth, is examined in §5. I argue that this idea cannot do justice to the key insight of the FA analysis. §6 defends an alternative idea, according to which emotions are enablers in virtue of their attitudinal shapes.
Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la ... more Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quelles sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme lorsque l’on ressent à la fois de l’amour et de la haine ? Réunissant dix contributions rédigées pour l’occasion, Les ombres de l’âme propose des éléments de réponses originaux à ces questions. Ce faisant, cet ouvrage jette les bases d’une philosophie des émotions négatives.
This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it... more This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the 'paradox of fiction'), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather "quasi-emotions". Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences between 'real' and 'fictional' emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then...
Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur do... more Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitude...
Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, l... more Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotion... more We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, that is, that (a) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings ( specificity), and that (b) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling ( constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against specificity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action readiness.
In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. W... more In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries.
Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of sha... more Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of shame D. Emotions and morality E. The structure of the book Part One: Two Dogmas About Shame Chapter I. The Social Emotion Chapter II. The Ugly Emotion Part Two: The Nature Of Shame Chapter III. Shame, values and the self Chapter IV. Shame revealed Part Three: Revisiting the Dogmas Chapter V. Socialism with Modesty Chapter VI. Shame's Fragile Beauty Part Four: Shame in the Public Domain Chapter VII. Shame, Crime, and Punishment Chapter VIII. Shame, Legislation, and Subordination
Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla col... more Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla collera, all'odio, alla gelosia o al disprezzo. Simili emozioni sono spesso considerate negative. Ma cosa sono le emozioni negative e come si distinguono da quelle positive? Più in generale, che cosa implicano per la nostra comprensione delle emozioni? Quali sono concretamente i loro effetti sui nostri pensieri e sulla nostra vita? E come analizzare l'ambivalenza affettiva, quando si provano allo stesso tempo amore e odio, felicità e pena? Riunendo i contributi su questo tema di importanti studiosi, "Le ombre dell'anima" propone originali risposte a tali interrogativi e getta le basi per una filosofia delle emozioni negative e della complessità dei sentimenti.
A. Garcia, M. Gunnemyr and J. Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality and Social Reality. Essays Dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2023
The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revision... more The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revisionary understanding of emotional values. §2 introduces the distinction between enablers and favourers and how it is pressed into service by Toni to reply to this worry. While I agree that the reply is attractive, since casting emotions in the role of enablers chimes well with how we pre-theoretically understand the relations between emotions and values, I observe that doing so requires that we tackle two connected issues. First, how do emotions function as value enablers? Second, is the resulting picture compatible with the FA analysis? The rest of the discussion is structured around these issues. §3 looks at the role of emotions within the FA analysis so as to specify the kind of enabling role they can play. On this backdrop, I explore in §4 a contrast between how belief relates to truth and how emotions relate to values, a contrast which helps uncover what we are after. A first reaction to this contrast, according to which emotions are value enablers by allowing us to access values, which differ from truth, is examined in §5. I argue that this idea cannot do justice to the key insight of the FA analysis. §6 defends an alternative idea, according to which emotions are enablers in virtue of their attitudinal shapes.
Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la ... more Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quelles sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme lorsque l’on ressent à la fois de l’amour et de la haine ? Réunissant dix contributions rédigées pour l’occasion, Les ombres de l’âme propose des éléments de réponses originaux à ces questions. Ce faisant, cet ouvrage jette les bases d’une philosophie des émotions négatives.
This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it... more This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional charact... more Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the 'paradox of fiction'), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather "quasi-emotions". Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences between 'real' and 'fictional' emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then...
Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur do... more Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitude...
Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, l... more Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotion... more We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, that is, that (a) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings ( specificity), and that (b) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling ( constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against specificity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action readiness.
In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. W... more In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries.
Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of sha... more Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of shame D. Emotions and morality E. The structure of the book Part One: Two Dogmas About Shame Chapter I. The Social Emotion Chapter II. The Ugly Emotion Part Two: The Nature Of Shame Chapter III. Shame, values and the self Chapter IV. Shame revealed Part Three: Revisiting the Dogmas Chapter V. Socialism with Modesty Chapter VI. Shame's Fragile Beauty Part Four: Shame in the Public Domain Chapter VII. Shame, Crime, and Punishment Chapter VIII. Shame, Legislation, and Subordination
Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla col... more Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla collera, all'odio, alla gelosia o al disprezzo. Simili emozioni sono spesso considerate negative. Ma cosa sono le emozioni negative e come si distinguono da quelle positive? Più in generale, che cosa implicano per la nostra comprensione delle emozioni? Quali sono concretamente i loro effetti sui nostri pensieri e sulla nostra vita? E come analizzare l'ambivalenza affettiva, quando si provano allo stesso tempo amore e odio, felicità e pena? Riunendo i contributi su questo tema di importanti studiosi, "Le ombre dell'anima" propone originali risposte a tali interrogativi e getta le basi per una filosofia delle emozioni negative e della complessità dei sentimenti.
Are emotions kinds of events? Their being short-lived may suggest so. But emotions are perhaps ki... more Are emotions kinds of events? Their being short-lived may suggest so. But emotions are perhaps kinds of processes. Saying so would at least allow one to do justice to the idea that emotions have components or stages. Yet another possible position is that emotions are dispositions of some sort, suggesting a specific way of explaining their link with behaviour. The key motivation behind the volume is that investigating these basic ontological issues will positively contribute to current discussions about the emotions and have far-reaching effects on future research about them. The volume brings together leading researchers in the metaphysics of the mind and younger philosophers deeply engaged in ontological questions about the emotions.
"Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in discipli... more "Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications?
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
"The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of th... more "The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us?
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus c... more Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus contemporains en philosophie des émotions tout en s’appuyant sur les recherches empiriques les plus récentes au sujet de l’affect. Une fois exposée la manière dont les émotions se distinguent d’autres phénomènes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l’étude propose une élucidation originale du problème majeur auquel fait face aujourd’hui la philosophie des émotions : comment comprendre la spécificité de l’intentionnalité affective? A travers une discussion à la fois fouillée et didactique des théories contemporaines les plus abouties concernant les relations entre émotion et désir d’une part, et entre émotion et valeur d’autre part, les auteurs défendent l’idée selon laquelle le corps ressenti peut fonctionner comme présentation intentionnelle en première personne d’un monde de valeurs.
Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la ... more Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quels sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme quand on ressent à la fois de l’amour et de la haine ? Réunissant dix contributions rédigées pour l’occasion, Les ombres de l’âme propose des éléments de réponses originaux à ces questions. Ce faisant, cet ouvrage jette les bases d’une philosophie des émotions négatives.
Chapter 1 The Importance of Memory and the Status of Taxonomies
Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory
C... more Chapter 1 The Importance of Memory and the Status of Taxonomies
Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory
Chapter 3 The Language of Memory
Chapter 4 Perception, Reduction and Concepts
Chapter 5 The Object of Perception
Chapter 6 Memory and Reductionism
Chapter 7 Links between Perception, Memory and Beliefs acquired in the Past
Chapter 8 Memory Experiences, Judgements and Concepts
Chapter 9 The Object of Memory
Chapter 10 Memory Demonstratives
Chapter 11 The Epistemology of Memory
Le but de cette présentation est d’explorer la phénoménologie du souvenir. Après avoir introduit ... more Le but de cette présentation est d’explorer la phénoménologie du souvenir. Après avoir introduit la distinction entre contenu et attitude psychologique, je distinguerai deux groupes de questions. Premièrement, on peut s’intéresser à l’impact phénoménologique de différents types de contenus mnésiques. Comment ce dont nous nous souvenons contribue-t-il à la phénoménologie de la mémoire? Y a-t-il une phénoménologie du contenu exclusive au souvenir? Et peut-on expliquer les différences phénoménologiques entre perception, souvenir et imagination en termes de contenus? Deuxièmement, on peut s’intéresser à l’impact phénoménologique de l’attitude de se souvenir. Comment se souvenir, par contraste avec ce dont nous nous souvenons, contribue-t-il à la phénoménologie de la mémoire? Y a-t-il un ressenti propre à cette attitude? En essayant de répondre à ces questions, j’aborderai la phénoménologie cognitive, les limites de la représentation « par images » et un groupe d’impressions (feelings) métacognitives.
The aim of this talk is to explore what it is like to remember. After having introduced the disti... more The aim of this talk is to explore what it is like to remember. After having introduced the distinction between content and psychological attitude, I shall distinguish two groups of issues in the phenomenology of memory. First, one may enquire into the phenomenological impact of various memory contents. How does what one remembers contribute to phenomenology? Is there a phenomenology of content exclusive to memory? And can we explain the phenomenological differences between perceiving, imagining and remembering in terms of content? Second, one may enquire into the attitude of remembering and how it impacts on phenomenology. How does remembering itself, as opposed to what is remembered, contribute to phenomenology? Is there a feeling distinctive of remembering? Exploring the impact of memory contents and the attitude of remembering on consciousness will lead me to discuss cognitive phenomenology, the limits of imagistic representation and a variety of metacognitive feelings.
Résumé L’un des problèmes traditionnels auxquels fait face l’analyse des concepts de valeurs en t... more Résumé L’un des problèmes traditionnels auxquels fait face l’analyse des concepts de valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées provient de sa prétendue circularité. Il est tentant de comprendre le danger et le concept de danger en termes des conditions qui rendent la peur appropriée. Mais, n’en déplaise à Wiggins, cela ne saurait nous mener bien loin si les explanans émotionnels devaient être à leur tour compris en termes des valeurs en question. Ce problème se pose de manière particulièrement claire si l’on souscrit à la thèse selon laquelle les émotions ne sont rien d’autre que des jugements évaluatifs. Bien sûr, de nombreuses raisons ont été avancées pour rejeter cette dernière thèse et défendre l’idée selon laquelle les émotions ne dépendent pas de la maitrise des concepts évaluatifs pertinents. En première ligne parmi les approches souscrivant à cette idée, on rencontre la conception des émotions comme états perceptifs représentant les valeurs de manière non conceptuelle. On pourrait dès lors être tenté de conclure que le problème est réglé pour autant que les partisans des analyses des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées soient prêts à adopter une telle conception des émotions. Nous allons donner des raisons de penser qu’un tel optimisme n'est pas approprié. Les amis de l’analyse des concepts de valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées ne devraient pas emprunter cette voie, dans la mesure où une approche perceptive des émotions ne peut pas rendre compte de leurs rôles épistémique et phénoménologique. Sur la base de ce constat, nous présenterons une théorie qui possède les mêmes avantages fondamentaux qu’une approche perceptive sans pour autant souffrir de ces défauts. Selon cette théorie, la relation qu’entretiennent émotions et valeurs n’est pas d’ordre représentationnel, mais remonte à la nature attitudinale des émotions. Nous explorerons ensuite quelques conséquences de cette approche sur l’analyse des concepts évaluatifs en termes d’attitudes appropriées.
On rencontre régulièrement dans la littérature des remarques soulignant l’étroitesse des rapports... more On rencontre régulièrement dans la littérature des remarques soulignant l’étroitesse des rapports entre un sujet et ses émotions, remarques sans doute sous-tendues par certaines intuitions à ce propos. C. Calhoun (2004) observe ainsi que toute émotion possède une certaine « subjectivité biographique » et R. de Sousa (2007) insiste sur la présence de deux aspects au sein des émotions : elles seraient à la fois à propos du monde et à propos du sujet qui les ressent. Par ailleurs, on dit couramment de quelqu’un qui répond émotionnellement à un événement qu’il le « prend personnellement ». Ces remarques suggestives laissent entendre qu’une bonne compréhension des émotions doit tenir compte de leur rapport au moi.
Afin d’être digne d’intérêt, ce rapport doit dépasser le constat selon lequel l’occurrence d’une émotion exige la présence d’un sujet, constat qui s’applique à tout état mental. Les remarques précédentes n’ont pas pour fonction de rappeler ce truisme, mais celle de signaler l’existence d’un rapport plus étroit entre un sujet et ses émotions. Quel pourrait-il être? Puisqu’un trait fondamental des états psychologiques est leur intentionnalité, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’ils sont dirigés vers quelque chose, il convient de se tourner vers ce trait des émotions. Or, l’intentionnalité des émotions est complexe – quelque chose (objet particulier) s’y trouve évalué (objet formel) – et il existe pour cette raison différentes façons de comprendre le rapport entre émotions et moi. Une thèse ambitieuse situe ce rapport au niveau de l’intentionnalité des émotions, où il peut caractériser soit l’objet particulier, soit l’objet formel. Le caractère ambitieux de cette thèse provient du fait qu’elle considère que le rapport entre émotions et moi est réfléchi dans la nature même des émotions en tant que phénomènes psychologiques, nature au moins partiellement constituée par leur intentionnalité.
Mon exposé est structuré autour de l’examen de trois thèses de cette nature. J’examinerai d’abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacrerai ensuite à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. Je me tournerai enfin vers une thèse qui situe le rapport entre émotions et moi au niveau de l’objet formel. Elle soutient que toute émotion a pour objet formel une propriété évaluative relationnelle dont l’un des termes est le sujet qui la ressent. Je chercherai à montrer que ces trois thèses valent au mieux pour un sous-ensemble restreint d’émotions et qu’elles doivent parfois être remplacée par des thèses modestes quant au rapport entre émotions et moi, à savoir des thèses qui ne présupposent aucun rapport intentionnel entre les deux.
Abstract Conscience is typically approached through its function, which consists in regulating th... more Abstract Conscience is typically approached through its function, which consists in regulating the agent’s behaviour in circumstances which put (or merely seem to put) her moral standing at stake. This obviously calls for a specification of the psychological mechanisms underlying conscience and of their own moral credentials. Now, the emotions of shame and guilt have a claim to being essential parts of these mechanisms, and a distinctive trend within the contemporary literature consists in arguing that shame is a ‘less moral’ emotion than guilt. What sorts of criteria underlie such a claim? A first criterion has to do with differences in the kinds of actions typically promoted by these emotions. The action tendencies associated with shame are claimed to be less moral than those associated with guilt. Secondly, one may emphasize a distinction in the concepts that the subject deploys in the judgements underlying these emotions – only guilt, it is alleged, speaks to moral concepts such as that of responsibility for wrongdoing. Thirdly, it may be claimed that only guilt requires that the subject autonomously endorse the relevant judgement – for that reason, it stands in sharp contrast with shame, which is heteronomous. According to the fourth and last criterion, shame is essentially concerned with the subject’s social appearance or reputation, and only guilt constitutes a response to moral features of the relevant situation. On the basis of these criteria, a broad tendency in the literature attributes both a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt. Is this conclusion warranted? I shall argue that a close investigation of the areas covered by these criteria falls short of supporting it and shall develop further considerations suggesting a fundamental role for shame in conscience.
In this talk, I shall explore different reasons why positive and negative emotions can be of non-... more In this talk, I shall explore different reasons why positive and negative emotions can be of non-instrumental prudential or personal value, i.e. contribute non-instrumentally to the well-being of the individual undergoing these emotions. To this end, my discussion will be premised on a value-based approach to the emotions and on an objectivist conception of well-being. I shall start by situating these two approaches in relation to the available alternatives, as well as by explaining how value-based approaches to the emotions apprehend the contrast between suffering and being pleased. Against this backdrop, I shall then explore some of the implications of this combination of approaches on how an individual’s emotions contribute to his or her well-being. I shall argue that it allows for a rich understanding of this contribution by concentrating on three distinct reasons why emotions can be of final, personal (dis-)value. These reasons respectively trace back to the emotions’ hedonic aspect, to their impact on motivation and to their relation to evaluative knowledge. In the process, I shall investigate how these reasons relate to the contrast between positive and negative emotions.
Uploads
The key motivation behind the volume is that investigating these basic ontological issues will positively contribute to current discussions about the emotions and have far-reaching effects on future research about them.
The volume brings together leading researchers in the metaphysics of the mind and younger philosophers deeply engaged in ontological questions about the emotions.
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory
Chapter 3 The Language of Memory
Chapter 4 Perception, Reduction and Concepts
Chapter 5 The Object of Perception
Chapter 6 Memory and Reductionism
Chapter 7 Links between Perception, Memory and Beliefs acquired in the Past
Chapter 8 Memory Experiences, Judgements and Concepts
Chapter 9 The Object of Memory
Chapter 10 Memory Demonstratives
Chapter 11 The Epistemology of Memory
Afin d’être digne d’intérêt, ce rapport doit dépasser le constat selon lequel l’occurrence d’une émotion exige la présence d’un sujet, constat qui s’applique à tout état mental. Les remarques précédentes n’ont pas pour fonction de rappeler ce truisme, mais celle de signaler l’existence d’un rapport plus étroit entre un sujet et ses émotions. Quel pourrait-il être? Puisqu’un trait fondamental des états psychologiques est leur intentionnalité, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’ils sont dirigés vers quelque chose, il convient de se tourner vers ce trait des émotions. Or, l’intentionnalité des émotions est complexe – quelque chose (objet particulier) s’y trouve évalué (objet formel) – et il existe pour cette raison différentes façons de comprendre le rapport entre émotions et moi. Une thèse ambitieuse situe ce rapport au niveau de l’intentionnalité des émotions, où il peut caractériser soit l’objet particulier, soit l’objet formel. Le caractère ambitieux de cette thèse provient du fait qu’elle considère que le rapport entre émotions et moi est réfléchi dans la nature même des émotions en tant que phénomènes psychologiques, nature au moins partiellement constituée par leur intentionnalité.
Mon exposé est structuré autour de l’examen de trois thèses de cette nature. J’examinerai d’abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacrerai ensuite à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. Je me tournerai enfin vers une thèse qui situe le rapport entre émotions et moi au niveau de l’objet formel. Elle soutient que toute émotion a pour objet formel une propriété évaluative relationnelle dont l’un des termes est le sujet qui la ressent. Je chercherai à montrer que ces trois thèses valent au mieux pour un sous-ensemble restreint d’émotions et qu’elles doivent parfois être remplacée par des thèses modestes quant au rapport entre émotions et moi, à savoir des thèses qui ne présupposent aucun rapport intentionnel entre les deux.