In this paper, I shed some light on Meinong's motivations for the theory of objects. I argue that... more In this paper, I shed some light on Meinong's motivations for the theory of objects. I argue that one of its basic principles, the principle of indifference, is driven by an intuition common to many Austrian philosophers, which is that something must first be somehow pre-given in order to simply address the issue of its being or non-being. Meinong's way of spelling out this intuition, I suggest, is to show that there are homeless objects, that is, objects that are not dealt with by any of the existing sciences. Therefore, the indispensability of the theory of objects lies in the plausibility of the thesis that there are such homeless objects. I analyse and evaluate two Meinongian arguments supporting this thesis, I explain how Meinong came to believe that they support the indispensability of the theory of objects, and I stress some advantages of this account over Brentano's intentionality thesis.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. 19, 2022
Like many Austro-German philosophers, Adolf Reinach believed that one should admit a further cate... more Like many Austro-German philosophers, Adolf Reinach believed that one should admit a further category of entity other than objects-namely, states of affairs-in order to account, for instance, for the relation of ground and consequence, probabilities and positivity or negativity. He argued further that such entities enjoy the mode of being of subsistence and should not be confused with propositions or meanings, which are exclusively ideal entities, because some states of affairs are real. Some states of affairs are also said to contain one single member; if this is the case, it is hard to see how they are distinct from the objects or processes they contain and how such one-membered states of affairs may fulfil the roles they were meant to. Prima facie, it seems difficult to reconcile all these features. In this paper, I argue that the central intuitions underlying Reinach's account may be captured by a modest account of states of affairs based on his conception of one-membered states of affairs, which is compatible with his view that there are timeless ideal states of affairs, but which does not commit to them.
Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion and Sociality. I. Vendrell-Ferran (ed.), 2023
In this study, I discuss two main accounts of character traits within the phenomenological tradit... more In this study, I discuss two main accounts of character traits within the phenomenological tradition: the so-called Austrian and Bavarian accounts. I present the first account with Franz Brentano's views on character traits as dispositions (Sections 2 and 3) and the second account with Else Voigtländer's characterology, in which character traits are states of one's person accessible through self-feelings (Selbstgefühle) (Section 4). I conclude with an evaluation of these views (Section 5), stressing their respective problems.
How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In... more How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following paper, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the paper by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2020
Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective —... more Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective —to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects— and both called their respective research programs ‘descriptive psychology’, they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research. In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer disagreement to this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context.
Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence (Vienna Circle Institute), 2019
In many respects, Mach’s arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian p... more In many respects, Mach’s arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian philosophy, paving the way for young philosophers and scientists like Hahn and Neurath and preparing the soil for the Vienna Circle. While this understanding of Mach’s contribution to the development of Viennese philosophy seems correct to an important extent, it leaves aside the role of Brentano and his school in this development. I argue that the Brentanian and Machian moments of Austrian philosophy are jointed. I propose a description of the nature of these joints based on institutional, methodological, and philosophical aspects of these phases, and suggest a diagnosis that supports what I take to be the right carving between these two moments.
A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, 2019
The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular ... more The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular stream within the larger historical‐philosophical complex of Austro‐German philosophy. As the “grandfather of phenomenology” resp. the “disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,” but also as the key figure on the “Anglo‐Austrian Analytic Axis”, Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth‐century philosophy. This chapter focuses mainly on his place in nineteenth‐century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl. Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system. By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology.
Table of contents:
§1. Historical Background. Brentano and 19th-century European philosophy
§1.1. Aristotle’s heir
§1.2. Brentano and his school
§1.3. Husserl
§2. Some General Principles of Brentano’s Philosophy
§2.1. Principle (a): Philosophy as a science
§2.2. Principle (b): Anti-Kantianism
§2.3. Principle (c): Empiricism
§2.4. Principle (d): The mereological nature of substance §2.5. Principle (e): The correctness principle
§3. The Phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl
§3.1. Phenomenology, Phenomena, and Experiences §3.2. Description and its tools
i) exactness
ii) examples
iii) eidetic variations
§3.3. Intentionality
i) the basic theory of intentionality
ii) the enhanced theory
iii) the reistic version
iv) Husserl’s account of intentionality
§3.4. Consciousness
§3.5. Emotions and values
§3.6. Psychologism and anti-psychologism
Introduction to the special issue of Brentano Studien XVI (2018), "The Brentano Centennial" (ed. ... more Introduction to the special issue of Brentano Studien XVI (2018), "The Brentano Centennial" (ed. Fisette and Fréchette)
Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory ... more Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano’s conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the standard view – the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given – but that also makes his account more palatable for a naïve understanding of perception as openness to and awareness of the world.
The IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications, 2017
It has usually been maintained that Brentano’s theory of intentionality never actually distinguis... more It has usually been maintained that Brentano’s theory of intentionality never actually distinguished between the content of an act and its object, and that the distinction was introduced by Meinong and Höfler (1890), then more systematically by Twardowski (1894), and later by Husserl (1900/1). Taking the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as a reference point, it may indeed seem that Brentano’s theory of intentionality offers little room for a distinction between content and object. Intentionality is introduced there as a mark of mental phenomena, in contrast with physical phenomena. The latter are signs of an outer reality. They are not physical in the proper sense of the word: rather, they are the content of mental phe- nomena and they lack intentionality. In this context, a distinction between content and object seems superfluous, since the mark of the mental is determined with- out any reference to the objects of outer reality. This is the basic idea behind the “non-distinction” view. Recent research on Brentano’s lecture manuscripts from the 1870s and 1880s, however, has shown that Brentano discussed the distinction between content and object at length in the very lectures that were attended by Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski. Attributing to Brentano the non-distinction view of content and object of presentations (as has often been done), and the corresponding thesis that intentionality is a relation with an internal, mental entity no longer seems to be historically accurate; it also imposes strict limitations on the intentionality thesis which are not even necessitated by Brentano’s own positions. One of these limitations is the so-called “methodological phenomenalism” sometimes attributed to Brentano (see Simons 1995, xvii; Crane 2006), according to which science, and philosophical investigations as well, can only study phenomena; this view can only hold if one also maintains the non-distinction view. The non-distinction view also makes Brentano’s philosophy quite unattractive for any theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference. These limitations on Brentano’s concept of intentionality are particularly difficult to maintain when one considers his lectures on logic from the late 1860s and early 1870s, in which he clearly states and develops the distinction between content and object; moreover, his lecture notes on descriptive psychology from the mid- and late-1880s also basically follow the same concern, as did his logic lecture notes from the Vienna period. One finds in these documents an explicit concern with the distinction itself and its application in a more general theory of intentionality. I discuss these lectures and the quotes themselves in section 3. Before that, in section 2, I suggest that Brentano’s own conception of philosophy speaks in favour of a more general reading of the intentionality thesis than the one suggested by Dale Jacquette’s “immanent intentionality” and by the sympathizers of the Chisholmian reconstruction of Brentano.
Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two different philosophical traditions, at least ... more Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two different philosophical traditions, at least historically – that is, in terms of reconstructing the more or less recent history of a discipline by trying to answer the question, “How did we get here from there?”. Philosophical traditions are shaped by various factors, which play a more or less important role depending on the context in which the traditions developed. In the following paper, I argue that the diagnosis of a divide between these traditions is suboptimal and suggest that the impression of a divide is at least partly the result of the opposition between realist and anti-realist insights in both traditions.
Portuguese translation by Evandro O. Brito and Joedson Marcos Silva of "Brentano's Thesis (Revisi... more Portuguese translation by Evandro O. Brito and Joedson Marcos Silva of "Brentano's Thesis (Revisited)", in Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013, pp. 91-120.
Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or e... more Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or even incommensurable with most of the conception of intuitions defended in analytical philosophy. In this paper, I reject this view. Starting with what I consider to be a relatively neutral phenomenological account of intuition, I first present the main features of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intuition, showing the structural similarities and differences between these two views. After confronting them, I finally come back to what unites the two views in order to outline a map of the problem of intuition in which both traditions, the analytical and the phenomenological, appear as two complementary takes on one and the same problem.
Resumo: Em todas as críticas feitas por Franz Brentano contra a filosofia do século XIX, seja na ... more Resumo: Em todas as críticas feitas por Franz Brentano contra a filosofia do século XIX, seja na Psicologia a partir de um ponto de vista empírico, seja em seus últimos escritos, indubitavelmente Kant ocupa o lugar de honra. Na visão de Brentano, Kant não apenas postulou os juízos sintéticos a priori sem qualquer justificação, mas também instigou a fase de decadência que caracterizou a filosofia alemã na primeira metade do século XIX. Além dessas afirmações polêmicas, que frequentemente atraem a atenção, é importante colocar as coisas em perspectiva e investigar como essas críticas são interpretadas e quais são as suas origens. No presente artigo, eu vou me concentrar mais especificamente na recepção da psicologia kantiana por Brentano e seus alunos. Certamente, a rejeição brentaniana da psicologia de Kant acompanha sua total rejeição dos juízos sintéticos a priori. O que eu quero sugerir aqui é que, no caso específico da psicologia, a hostil recepção da filosofia kantiana na escola de Brentano se deve, principalmente, a uma combinação de dois fatores. O primeiro é a rejeição kantiana da psicologia na teoria do conhecimento. O segundo, que é correlativo ao primeiro fator, é a rejeição brentaniana da tese de Kant acerca da impossibilidade da psicologia se tornar uma ciência. No que se segue, eu investigo detalhadamente esses dois fatores, utilizando como estudo de caso a posição defendida por Carl Stumpf na Psicologia e Teoria do Conhecimento. Este trabalho merece ser discutido em sua totalidade: Stumpf (1848-1936) não foi apenas um dos alunos mais brilhantes e influentes de Brentano, mas seu ensaio também desempenhou um importante papel na escola de Brentano, oferecendo uma das raras confrontações impressas com as posições kantianas e neokantianas sobre a psicologia.
In the following paper, I discuss Fisette’s reconstruction of Brentano’s view, according to whic... more In the following paper, I discuss Fisette’s reconstruction of Brentano’s view, according to which Brentano’s conception of consciousness and of its unity is based on the presupposition that consciousness has a bearer, i.e. the soul. First, I identify Fisette’s real target (sect.1) and challenge his conception of the mental agent as central to Brentano’s account (sect. 2 and 3). In section 4, I formulate some doubts about the sources used by Fisette, and, in section 5, I propose another reading of the relation between the unity of consciousness and the mental agent in the late Brentano.
in Historische Analysen theoretischer und empirischer Psychologie (A. Stock, H.-P. Brauns et U. Wolfradt eds.), Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 91-106.
Dass die deskriptive Psychologie zu den Entwicklungen aus Brentanos Wiener Periode gehört, ist ei... more Dass die deskriptive Psychologie zu den Entwicklungen aus Brentanos Wiener Periode gehört, ist eine weitverbreitete Meinung in der Rezeption des Aschaf- fenburger Philosophen. Mein Anliegen im folgenden Aufsatz ist es, diese An- sicht kritisch zu untersuchen. Anhand einer Neubewertung der relevanten Text- stellen aus der Psychologie von 1874 und einer kritischen Untersuchung der spä- teren Quellen und rückblickenden Bemerkungen einiger Schüler und Enkelschü- ler Brentanos möchte ich einige Belege für die These anbieten, dass Brentano über die Unterscheidung zwischen deskriptiver und genetischer Richtung der Psychologie schon als junger Professor in Würzburg verfügte.
in C. Niveleau (ed.), Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano. Paris, Démopolis., 2014
Dans le récit de son autobiographie, datée de 1916, Meinong reconstruit son parcours philosophiqu... more Dans le récit de son autobiographie, datée de 1916, Meinong reconstruit son parcours philosophique en laissant bien entendre au lecteur qu’il n’est pas le produit d’une école de pensée mais plutôt que son développement académique a été largement indépendant. Contrairement à Husserl, Stumpf, Marty, et bien d’autres, Meinong nie que l’influence de Brentano ait joué quelque rôle dans sa décision de se consacrer à la philosophie vers la fin de 1874.
Meinong considère également que l’importance qu’il accorde à l’expérimentation en psychologie et en théorie de la connaissance ne découle pas de la psychologie empirique de Brentano, mais trouve son fondement dans sa théorie des relations, à l’origine de la Gegenstandstheorie.
Comment doit-on comprendre la reconstruction autobiographique de Meinong ? Dans un premier temps, nous retraçons les caractéristiques principales et les présupposés de la psychologie empirique brentanienne telle que défendue dans les années 1874 – 1878 à Vienne (la Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique ainsi que les cours de Brentano suivis par Meinong de 1875 à 1878) afin d’établir un portrait de la philosophie brentanienne telle que Meinong la connaissait à l’époque. Dans un deuxième temps, nous identifions les éléments qui, dans les premiers travaux de Meinong, ont directement contribué à l’élaboration de la théorie de l’objet, en nous penchant plus particulièrement sur ‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, ‘Über die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes’, ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’, comme le suggère Meinong , mais aussi en tenant compte des travaux du laboratoire de psychologie expérimentale lors de ses dix premières années d’existence. Ce qui ressort de cette comparaison des travaux de Meinong et de ceux issus des recherches du laboratoire est la thèse, appuyée tant psychologiquement qu’ontologiquement, de la perceptibilité des relations en tant qu’objets d’ordre supérieur. Dans un troisième temps, nous analyserons les conséquences de cette thèse sur le programme poursuivi par Meinong et son école
in Fisette, D., and R. Martinelli (eds.), Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint: Essays on Carl Stumpf, Amsterdam, Rodopi, pp. 263-292., 2014
From the point of view of Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of abstraction in the Logical... more From the point of view of Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of abstraction in the Logical Investigations, it seems that Brentano and most of his students would have endorsed the presupposition of Locke’s theory of abstraction, which Husserl labels as the ‘psychological hypostatization of the general’. For Husserl himself, but also for most of his followers, the motivation behind this critique is that the descriptive psychology of the School of Brentano leads to psychologism if one doesn’t accept Platonic ideal objects.
In the following article, I argue that Husserl’s critique doesn’t do justice to the accounts of abstraction developed in the school of Brentano. I take here the particular case of Carl Stumpf, showing that not only does Husserl’s accusation miss its target, but also that it attribute indirectly to Stumpf a position that he didn’t defend. I suggest that even before the Logical Investigations, Stumpf formulated the basis of an account of abstraction in terms of generalization, an account which will later turn out to be in many ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical Investigations, and which provide a viable alternative both to Platonism and to Empiricism, thereby calling for a reassessment of the positions on abstraction in the School of Brentano.
In this paper, I shed some light on Meinong's motivations for the theory of objects. I argue that... more In this paper, I shed some light on Meinong's motivations for the theory of objects. I argue that one of its basic principles, the principle of indifference, is driven by an intuition common to many Austrian philosophers, which is that something must first be somehow pre-given in order to simply address the issue of its being or non-being. Meinong's way of spelling out this intuition, I suggest, is to show that there are homeless objects, that is, objects that are not dealt with by any of the existing sciences. Therefore, the indispensability of the theory of objects lies in the plausibility of the thesis that there are such homeless objects. I analyse and evaluate two Meinongian arguments supporting this thesis, I explain how Meinong came to believe that they support the indispensability of the theory of objects, and I stress some advantages of this account over Brentano's intentionality thesis.
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. 19, 2022
Like many Austro-German philosophers, Adolf Reinach believed that one should admit a further cate... more Like many Austro-German philosophers, Adolf Reinach believed that one should admit a further category of entity other than objects-namely, states of affairs-in order to account, for instance, for the relation of ground and consequence, probabilities and positivity or negativity. He argued further that such entities enjoy the mode of being of subsistence and should not be confused with propositions or meanings, which are exclusively ideal entities, because some states of affairs are real. Some states of affairs are also said to contain one single member; if this is the case, it is hard to see how they are distinct from the objects or processes they contain and how such one-membered states of affairs may fulfil the roles they were meant to. Prima facie, it seems difficult to reconcile all these features. In this paper, I argue that the central intuitions underlying Reinach's account may be captured by a modest account of states of affairs based on his conception of one-membered states of affairs, which is compatible with his view that there are timeless ideal states of affairs, but which does not commit to them.
Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion and Sociality. I. Vendrell-Ferran (ed.), 2023
In this study, I discuss two main accounts of character traits within the phenomenological tradit... more In this study, I discuss two main accounts of character traits within the phenomenological tradition: the so-called Austrian and Bavarian accounts. I present the first account with Franz Brentano's views on character traits as dispositions (Sections 2 and 3) and the second account with Else Voigtländer's characterology, in which character traits are states of one's person accessible through self-feelings (Selbstgefühle) (Section 4). I conclude with an evaluation of these views (Section 5), stressing their respective problems.
How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In... more How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following paper, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the paper, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the paper by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2020
Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective —... more Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective —to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects— and both called their respective research programs ‘descriptive psychology’, they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research. In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer disagreement to this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context.
Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence (Vienna Circle Institute), 2019
In many respects, Mach’s arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian p... more In many respects, Mach’s arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian philosophy, paving the way for young philosophers and scientists like Hahn and Neurath and preparing the soil for the Vienna Circle. While this understanding of Mach’s contribution to the development of Viennese philosophy seems correct to an important extent, it leaves aside the role of Brentano and his school in this development. I argue that the Brentanian and Machian moments of Austrian philosophy are jointed. I propose a description of the nature of these joints based on institutional, methodological, and philosophical aspects of these phases, and suggest a diagnosis that supports what I take to be the right carving between these two moments.
A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, 2019
The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular ... more The development of phenomenology in nineteenth‐century German philosophy is that of a particular stream within the larger historical‐philosophical complex of Austro‐German philosophy. As the “grandfather of phenomenology” resp. the “disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,” but also as the key figure on the “Anglo‐Austrian Analytic Axis”, Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth‐century philosophy. This chapter focuses mainly on his place in nineteenth‐century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl. Despite the variety of stances which Brentano expressed on ontology, metaphysics, and psychology over the course of his career, the five general principles remain central to his whole philosophy throughout: they have an important place in what could be called Brentano's philosophical worldview or system. By extension, they also are essential to his conception of phenomenology.
Table of contents:
§1. Historical Background. Brentano and 19th-century European philosophy
§1.1. Aristotle’s heir
§1.2. Brentano and his school
§1.3. Husserl
§2. Some General Principles of Brentano’s Philosophy
§2.1. Principle (a): Philosophy as a science
§2.2. Principle (b): Anti-Kantianism
§2.3. Principle (c): Empiricism
§2.4. Principle (d): The mereological nature of substance §2.5. Principle (e): The correctness principle
§3. The Phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl
§3.1. Phenomenology, Phenomena, and Experiences §3.2. Description and its tools
i) exactness
ii) examples
iii) eidetic variations
§3.3. Intentionality
i) the basic theory of intentionality
ii) the enhanced theory
iii) the reistic version
iv) Husserl’s account of intentionality
§3.4. Consciousness
§3.5. Emotions and values
§3.6. Psychologism and anti-psychologism
Introduction to the special issue of Brentano Studien XVI (2018), "The Brentano Centennial" (ed. ... more Introduction to the special issue of Brentano Studien XVI (2018), "The Brentano Centennial" (ed. Fisette and Fréchette)
Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory ... more Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano’s conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the standard view – the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given – but that also makes his account more palatable for a naïve understanding of perception as openness to and awareness of the world.
The IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications, 2017
It has usually been maintained that Brentano’s theory of intentionality never actually distinguis... more It has usually been maintained that Brentano’s theory of intentionality never actually distinguished between the content of an act and its object, and that the distinction was introduced by Meinong and Höfler (1890), then more systematically by Twardowski (1894), and later by Husserl (1900/1). Taking the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint as a reference point, it may indeed seem that Brentano’s theory of intentionality offers little room for a distinction between content and object. Intentionality is introduced there as a mark of mental phenomena, in contrast with physical phenomena. The latter are signs of an outer reality. They are not physical in the proper sense of the word: rather, they are the content of mental phe- nomena and they lack intentionality. In this context, a distinction between content and object seems superfluous, since the mark of the mental is determined with- out any reference to the objects of outer reality. This is the basic idea behind the “non-distinction” view. Recent research on Brentano’s lecture manuscripts from the 1870s and 1880s, however, has shown that Brentano discussed the distinction between content and object at length in the very lectures that were attended by Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski. Attributing to Brentano the non-distinction view of content and object of presentations (as has often been done), and the corresponding thesis that intentionality is a relation with an internal, mental entity no longer seems to be historically accurate; it also imposes strict limitations on the intentionality thesis which are not even necessitated by Brentano’s own positions. One of these limitations is the so-called “methodological phenomenalism” sometimes attributed to Brentano (see Simons 1995, xvii; Crane 2006), according to which science, and philosophical investigations as well, can only study phenomena; this view can only hold if one also maintains the non-distinction view. The non-distinction view also makes Brentano’s philosophy quite unattractive for any theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference. These limitations on Brentano’s concept of intentionality are particularly difficult to maintain when one considers his lectures on logic from the late 1860s and early 1870s, in which he clearly states and develops the distinction between content and object; moreover, his lecture notes on descriptive psychology from the mid- and late-1880s also basically follow the same concern, as did his logic lecture notes from the Vienna period. One finds in these documents an explicit concern with the distinction itself and its application in a more general theory of intentionality. I discuss these lectures and the quotes themselves in section 3. Before that, in section 2, I suggest that Brentano’s own conception of philosophy speaks in favour of a more general reading of the intentionality thesis than the one suggested by Dale Jacquette’s “immanent intentionality” and by the sympathizers of the Chisholmian reconstruction of Brentano.
Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two different philosophical traditions, at least ... more Analytic philosophy and phenomenology represent two different philosophical traditions, at least historically – that is, in terms of reconstructing the more or less recent history of a discipline by trying to answer the question, “How did we get here from there?”. Philosophical traditions are shaped by various factors, which play a more or less important role depending on the context in which the traditions developed. In the following paper, I argue that the diagnosis of a divide between these traditions is suboptimal and suggest that the impression of a divide is at least partly the result of the opposition between realist and anti-realist insights in both traditions.
Portuguese translation by Evandro O. Brito and Joedson Marcos Silva of "Brentano's Thesis (Revisi... more Portuguese translation by Evandro O. Brito and Joedson Marcos Silva of "Brentano's Thesis (Revisited)", in Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013, pp. 91-120.
Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or e... more Phenomenological accounts of intuition are often considered as significantly different from, or even incommensurable with most of the conception of intuitions defended in analytical philosophy. In this paper, I reject this view. Starting with what I consider to be a relatively neutral phenomenological account of intuition, I first present the main features of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intuition, showing the structural similarities and differences between these two views. After confronting them, I finally come back to what unites the two views in order to outline a map of the problem of intuition in which both traditions, the analytical and the phenomenological, appear as two complementary takes on one and the same problem.
Resumo: Em todas as críticas feitas por Franz Brentano contra a filosofia do século XIX, seja na ... more Resumo: Em todas as críticas feitas por Franz Brentano contra a filosofia do século XIX, seja na Psicologia a partir de um ponto de vista empírico, seja em seus últimos escritos, indubitavelmente Kant ocupa o lugar de honra. Na visão de Brentano, Kant não apenas postulou os juízos sintéticos a priori sem qualquer justificação, mas também instigou a fase de decadência que caracterizou a filosofia alemã na primeira metade do século XIX. Além dessas afirmações polêmicas, que frequentemente atraem a atenção, é importante colocar as coisas em perspectiva e investigar como essas críticas são interpretadas e quais são as suas origens. No presente artigo, eu vou me concentrar mais especificamente na recepção da psicologia kantiana por Brentano e seus alunos. Certamente, a rejeição brentaniana da psicologia de Kant acompanha sua total rejeição dos juízos sintéticos a priori. O que eu quero sugerir aqui é que, no caso específico da psicologia, a hostil recepção da filosofia kantiana na escola de Brentano se deve, principalmente, a uma combinação de dois fatores. O primeiro é a rejeição kantiana da psicologia na teoria do conhecimento. O segundo, que é correlativo ao primeiro fator, é a rejeição brentaniana da tese de Kant acerca da impossibilidade da psicologia se tornar uma ciência. No que se segue, eu investigo detalhadamente esses dois fatores, utilizando como estudo de caso a posição defendida por Carl Stumpf na Psicologia e Teoria do Conhecimento. Este trabalho merece ser discutido em sua totalidade: Stumpf (1848-1936) não foi apenas um dos alunos mais brilhantes e influentes de Brentano, mas seu ensaio também desempenhou um importante papel na escola de Brentano, oferecendo uma das raras confrontações impressas com as posições kantianas e neokantianas sobre a psicologia.
In the following paper, I discuss Fisette’s reconstruction of Brentano’s view, according to whic... more In the following paper, I discuss Fisette’s reconstruction of Brentano’s view, according to which Brentano’s conception of consciousness and of its unity is based on the presupposition that consciousness has a bearer, i.e. the soul. First, I identify Fisette’s real target (sect.1) and challenge his conception of the mental agent as central to Brentano’s account (sect. 2 and 3). In section 4, I formulate some doubts about the sources used by Fisette, and, in section 5, I propose another reading of the relation between the unity of consciousness and the mental agent in the late Brentano.
in Historische Analysen theoretischer und empirischer Psychologie (A. Stock, H.-P. Brauns et U. Wolfradt eds.), Frankfurt, Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 91-106.
Dass die deskriptive Psychologie zu den Entwicklungen aus Brentanos Wiener Periode gehört, ist ei... more Dass die deskriptive Psychologie zu den Entwicklungen aus Brentanos Wiener Periode gehört, ist eine weitverbreitete Meinung in der Rezeption des Aschaf- fenburger Philosophen. Mein Anliegen im folgenden Aufsatz ist es, diese An- sicht kritisch zu untersuchen. Anhand einer Neubewertung der relevanten Text- stellen aus der Psychologie von 1874 und einer kritischen Untersuchung der spä- teren Quellen und rückblickenden Bemerkungen einiger Schüler und Enkelschü- ler Brentanos möchte ich einige Belege für die These anbieten, dass Brentano über die Unterscheidung zwischen deskriptiver und genetischer Richtung der Psychologie schon als junger Professor in Würzburg verfügte.
in C. Niveleau (ed.), Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le programme de Brentano. Paris, Démopolis., 2014
Dans le récit de son autobiographie, datée de 1916, Meinong reconstruit son parcours philosophiqu... more Dans le récit de son autobiographie, datée de 1916, Meinong reconstruit son parcours philosophique en laissant bien entendre au lecteur qu’il n’est pas le produit d’une école de pensée mais plutôt que son développement académique a été largement indépendant. Contrairement à Husserl, Stumpf, Marty, et bien d’autres, Meinong nie que l’influence de Brentano ait joué quelque rôle dans sa décision de se consacrer à la philosophie vers la fin de 1874.
Meinong considère également que l’importance qu’il accorde à l’expérimentation en psychologie et en théorie de la connaissance ne découle pas de la psychologie empirique de Brentano, mais trouve son fondement dans sa théorie des relations, à l’origine de la Gegenstandstheorie.
Comment doit-on comprendre la reconstruction autobiographique de Meinong ? Dans un premier temps, nous retraçons les caractéristiques principales et les présupposés de la psychologie empirique brentanienne telle que défendue dans les années 1874 – 1878 à Vienne (la Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique ainsi que les cours de Brentano suivis par Meinong de 1875 à 1878) afin d’établir un portrait de la philosophie brentanienne telle que Meinong la connaissait à l’époque. Dans un deuxième temps, nous identifions les éléments qui, dans les premiers travaux de Meinong, ont directement contribué à l’élaboration de la théorie de l’objet, en nous penchant plus particulièrement sur ‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, ‘Über die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes’, ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’, comme le suggère Meinong , mais aussi en tenant compte des travaux du laboratoire de psychologie expérimentale lors de ses dix premières années d’existence. Ce qui ressort de cette comparaison des travaux de Meinong et de ceux issus des recherches du laboratoire est la thèse, appuyée tant psychologiquement qu’ontologiquement, de la perceptibilité des relations en tant qu’objets d’ordre supérieur. Dans un troisième temps, nous analyserons les conséquences de cette thèse sur le programme poursuivi par Meinong et son école
in Fisette, D., and R. Martinelli (eds.), Philosophy from an Empirical Standpoint: Essays on Carl Stumpf, Amsterdam, Rodopi, pp. 263-292., 2014
From the point of view of Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of abstraction in the Logical... more From the point of view of Husserl’s critique of empiricist theories of abstraction in the Logical Investigations, it seems that Brentano and most of his students would have endorsed the presupposition of Locke’s theory of abstraction, which Husserl labels as the ‘psychological hypostatization of the general’. For Husserl himself, but also for most of his followers, the motivation behind this critique is that the descriptive psychology of the School of Brentano leads to psychologism if one doesn’t accept Platonic ideal objects.
In the following article, I argue that Husserl’s critique doesn’t do justice to the accounts of abstraction developed in the school of Brentano. I take here the particular case of Carl Stumpf, showing that not only does Husserl’s accusation miss its target, but also that it attribute indirectly to Stumpf a position that he didn’t defend. I suggest that even before the Logical Investigations, Stumpf formulated the basis of an account of abstraction in terms of generalization, an account which will later turn out to be in many ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical Investigations, and which provide a viable alternative both to Platonism and to Empiricism, thereby calling for a reassessment of the positions on abstraction in the School of Brentano.
Ce deuxieme et dernier tome des Essais et conferences de Franz Brentano comporte dix-neuf textes ... more Ce deuxieme et dernier tome des Essais et conferences de Franz Brentano comporte dix-neuf textes qui, pour la plupart, paraissent pour la premiere fois en traduction francaise. Précédés d'une introduction sur les principes et la structure de la philosophie de Brentano, ils sont regroupés en fonction de leur position dans l'une des deux branches-mères de la philosophie théorique de Brentano, a savoir la métaphysique et la psychologie, ou dans l'une des trois branches pratiques de cette dernière, a savoir la logique, l'éthique et l'esthétique. Les textes sur la metaphysique portent sur la position de cette derniere par rapport aux sciences naturelles, tandis que les textes en psychologie sont principalement des recherches individuelles en psychologie des sens developpées du point de vue de la psychologie descriptive. Les textes sur la logique, l'éthique et l'esthétique proposent non seulement des applications de la psychologie descriptive au domaine du jugement, de la connaissance morale et des émotions déclenchées par les représentations du beau, mais aussi des développements de la psychologie génétique dans le domaine de l'esthétique ainsi que des réflexions politiques et sociales du point de vue descriptif.
Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes o... more Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes of Austrian philosophy. This collection contributes to assessing the specificity of his theses in relation with other Austrian philosophers. Although strongly inspired by his master, Franz Brentano, Marty developed his own theory of intentionality, understood as a sui generis relation of similarity. Moreover, he established a comprehensive philosophy of language, or "semasiology", based on descriptive psychology, and in which the utterer’s meaning plays a central role, anticipating Grice’s pragmatic semantics. The present volume, including sixteen articles by scholars in the field of the history of Austrian philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, aims at exposing some of Marty’s most important contributions in philosophy of mind and language, but also in other fields of research such as ontology and metaphysics. As archive material, the volume contains the edition of a correspondence between Marty and Hans Cornelius on similarity. This book will interest scholars in the fields of the history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians of phenomenology, and, more broadly, contemporary theoretical philosophers.
Franz Brentano's impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considera... more Franz Brentano's impact on the philosophy of his time and on 20th-century philosophy is considerable. The "sharp dialectician" (Freud) and "genial master" (Husserl) influenced philosophers of various allegiances, being acknowledged not only as the "grandfather of phenomenology" (Ryle) but also as an analytic philosopher "in the best sense of this term" (Chisholm). The fourteen new essays gathered together in this volume give an insight in three core issues of Brentano's philosophy: consciousness (sect.1), intentionality (sect. 2) and ontology and metaphysics (sect. 3). Two further sections of the volume deal with the posterity of his philosophy: in section 4, the legacy of his account of sense perception and feeling is discussed, while the history of Brentano's unpublished manuscripts is discussed in section 5. This section also presents an edition of a manuscript from 1899 on relations, along with the letters from Brentano to Marty which discuss this manuscript. The last part of section 5 contains the text of a public lecture given by Brentano on the laws of inference.
Sont réunies dans cet ouvrage six études des principaux représentants de ce qu’il est convenu d’a... more Sont réunies dans cet ouvrage six études des principaux représentants de ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler « L’école de Brentano ». Les Souvenirs de Franz Brentano de Carl Stumpf et Edmund Husserl, décrivent sa vie et son activité philosophique de ses débuts à Würzbourg jusqu’à son couronnement à Vienne. Les quatre autres études sont des contributions importantes des étudiants de Brentano à la philosophie. L’étude d’Ehrenfels, Sur les qualités de forme, fondatrice de la psychologie de la forme, est aussi une référence incontournable pour Meinong, dont nous traduisons ici Sur les objets d’ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne, où il met en place les idées à la base de sa théorie de l’objet. La cinquième étude, Fonctions et formations de Twardowski, propose une analyse originale de la relation entre les actes (fonctions) et leurs contenus (formations). Enfin, Sur le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique d’Anton Marty, emblématique de la philosophie du langage brentanienne, vient clore cet ouvrage que nous avons introduit par « Le legs de Brentano », une étude présentant les grandes lignes du programme philosophique de Brentano, la généalogie de son « école » ainsi que quelques-uns des débats suscités par les textes reproduits ici.
Gibt es für jede Vorstellung einen Gegenstand, den sie vorstellt? Mit dieser Frage beschäftigt si... more Gibt es für jede Vorstellung einen Gegenstand, den sie vorstellt? Mit dieser Frage beschäftigt sich das vorliegende Buch, ausgehend von Bernard Bolzanos (1781-1848) Auffassung von gegenstandslosen Vorstellungen in der Wissenschaftslehre (1837). Diese Auffassung spielt eine wichtige Rolle in Bolzanos Philosophie der Logik und steht auch im Mittelpunkt der Wiederentdeckung Bolzanos in der österreichischen und deutschen Philosophie des späten 19. und des 20. Jahrhunderts.
Im ersten Teil wird untersucht, wie Bolzano für seine These argumentiert, im zweiten werden zweierlei Einwände gegen Bolzanos These diskutiert und kritisiert: Anhand einer Erörterung von Franz Exners (1802-1853) Kritik an Bolzano wird die Frage untersucht, wie man Bolzanos Prädikat "ist Gegenstand von" interpretieren sollte. Der zweite Einwand wurzelt in Kazimierz Twardowskis (1866-1938) intentionalistischer Strategie, wonach es immer einen Gegenstand gebe, den man sich vorstellt, wenn man eine Vorstellung habe. Mit Bezug auf Edmund Husserls (1859-1938) frühe Theorie der Intentionalität plädiert der Autor in der Folge dafür, dass eine intentionalistische Strategie zur Lösung dieses Problems sehr wohl mit Bolzanos Grundansichten vereinbar ist. Es zeigt sich nicht nur, dass Husserls Strategie mit Bolzanos Vorstellungstheorie kombinierbar ist, sondern auch, dass Bolzanos Vorstellungsbegriff eine zentrale Rolle in der Entwicklung der Phänomenologie spielt.
In the following paper, I discuss the various accounts of time-consciousness developed by Brentan... more In the following paper, I discuss the various accounts of time-consciousness developed by Brentano between 1867 and 1917, on the background of his metaphysical views. I propose a comprehensive picture of the different conceptions he defended which gets around the uneasy division of his works into early and ‘mature’ views, which has often been taken as a starting point for assessing the importance of reism at the expense of the rest of his works.
The FWF-funded project on Franz Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology at the University of Salzburg i... more The FWF-funded project on Franz Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology at the University of Salzburg is organizing a three-day conference on Descriptive Psychology and Philosophy of Mind.
Date: 18-20 October 2018
Place: University of Salzburg. On Thursday (18) and Friday (19), the venue is Toskanatrakt: Churfürststrasse 1, HS 203 (ground floor) On Saturday (20), the venue is Wallistrackt: Franziskanergasse 1, HS 301 (4th floor)
Everyone is welcome. We would however appreciate to receive an email from those who intend to attend, since places are limited. Please contact Hamid Taieb (Hamid.taieb@sbg.ac.at) to register.
Ce premier tome de Essais et conférences de Franz Brentano comporte seize études qui, pour la plu... more Ce premier tome de Essais et conférences de Franz Brentano comporte seize études qui, pour la plupart, paraissent pour la première fois en traduction française. Ces textes sont regroupés dans quatre sections qui portent respectivement sur l’état de la philosophie et ses principes, sa philosophie de l’histoire et sa théorie des quatre phases, ses réflexions sur les philosophes Auguste Comte, Plotin, Schelling et Thomas d’Aquin, et finalement son débat avec Édouard Zeller, l’auteur de La philosophie des Grecs, autour de l’interprétation de la philosophie d’Aristote. Ce volume comprend en outre une introduction substantielle visant à contextualiser chacune des contributions du philosophe viennois. Le deuxième tome comprend les essais et conférences de Brentano qui contiennent les autres éléments essentiels de son programme philosophique, à commencer par la métaphysique et la psychologie, qui en constituent les deux axes principaux, ainsi que des trois disciplines philosophiques par excellence pour Brentano, à savoir l’esthétique, la logique et l’éthique.
Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 2017
En hommage au centenaire de la mort du philosophe Franz Brentano, ce numéro thématique de la Revu... more En hommage au centenaire de la mort du philosophe Franz Brentano, ce numéro thématique de la Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger réunit des contributions témoignant de sa réception actuelle dans la philosophie contemporaine. Plusieurs facteurs déjà bien connus expliquent la richesse et la diversité de cette réception, que ce soit le rôle de regénérateur de la philosophie en Autriche attribué à Brentano , l’impact de son enseignement en Allemagne et en Autriche, l’influence tant philosophique qu’institutionnelle de ses héritiers, ou encore sa contribution fondatrice et directe aux deux courants principaux de la philosophie du 20ème siècle : la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique.
The Laws of Interaction of the Natural Forces and Their Meaning in Metaphysics
This is a German ... more The Laws of Interaction of the Natural Forces and Their Meaning in Metaphysics
This is a German edition of a lecture on metaphysics given by Brentano in Vienna in 1879, dealing more particularly with the second law of thermodynamics and the cosmological argument
There are two central claims at the core of this book: first, that experience is as much about th... more There are two central claims at the core of this book: first, that experience is as much about the world as it is about itself; and second, that since we engage with the world in different ways, accounting for what is given in experience calls for an account of these different ways as well. The general argument, it seems to me, follows roughly four steps: 1. Traditional accounts of mental content fail to capture properly the phenomenological nature of what is given in experience. 2. Phenomenologically, what is given in experience (or the 'total mental content') has a twofold character: necessarily, it tells something about the world, but also about the experience itself. 3. By also relating to things and ordinary objects in the real world (and not just to sensory properties), this content requires a phenomenology other than the sensory phenomenology of, e.g., colors and sounds. Such a phenomenology-cognitive phenomenology-is also needed to account for our successful access to physical objects in perception and for what is given in our conscious thoughts. 4. Object perception and emotional attitudes are similar in at least one central respect: they are 'object-positing' experiences: in the former, we posit objects, and in the latter, we posit values. Here again, a distinct phenomenology-evaluative phenomenology-is needed to account for what is given in conscious emotions.
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Full text (self-archived): http://www.kkphil.com/uploads/4/3/2/5/43250729/frechette-originsphenomenology2019-selfarchive.pdf
Table of contents:
§1. Historical Background. Brentano and 19th-century European philosophy
§1.1. Aristotle’s heir
§1.2. Brentano and his school
§1.3. Husserl
§2. Some General Principles of Brentano’s Philosophy
§2.1. Principle (a): Philosophy as a science
§2.2. Principle (b): Anti-Kantianism
§2.3. Principle (c): Empiricism
§2.4. Principle (d): The mereological nature of substance §2.5. Principle (e): The correctness principle
§3. The Phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl
§3.1. Phenomenology, Phenomena, and Experiences §3.2. Description and its tools
i) exactness
ii) examples
iii) eidetic variations
§3.3. Intentionality
i) the basic theory of intentionality
ii) the enhanced theory
iii) the reistic version
iv) Husserl’s account of intentionality
§3.4. Consciousness
§3.5. Emotions and values
§3.6. Psychologism and anti-psychologism
Recent research on Brentano’s lecture manuscripts from the 1870s and 1880s, however, has shown that Brentano discussed the distinction between content and object at length in the very lectures that were attended by Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski. Attributing to Brentano the non-distinction view of content and object of presentations (as has often been done), and the corresponding thesis that intentionality is a relation with an internal, mental entity no longer seems to be historically accurate; it also imposes strict limitations on the intentionality thesis which are not even necessitated by Brentano’s own positions. One of these limitations is the so-called “methodological phenomenalism” sometimes attributed to Brentano (see Simons 1995, xvii; Crane 2006), according to which science, and philosophical investigations as well, can only study phenomena; this view can only hold if one also maintains the non-distinction view. The non-distinction view also makes Brentano’s philosophy quite unattractive for any theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference. These limitations on Brentano’s concept of intentionality are particularly difficult to maintain when one considers his lectures on logic from the late 1860s and early 1870s, in which he clearly states and develops the distinction between content and object; moreover, his lecture notes on descriptive psychology from the mid- and late-1880s also basically follow the same concern, as did his logic lecture notes from the Vienna period. One finds in these documents an explicit concern with the distinction itself and its application in a more general theory of intentionality.
I discuss these lectures and the quotes themselves in section 3. Before that, in section 2, I suggest that Brentano’s own conception of philosophy speaks in favour of a more general reading of the intentionality thesis than the one suggested by Dale Jacquette’s “immanent intentionality” and by the sympathizers of the Chisholmian reconstruction of Brentano.
In the following paper, I argue that the diagnosis of a divide between these traditions is suboptimal and suggest that the impression of a divide is at least partly the result of the opposition between realist and anti-realist insights in both traditions.
Meinong considère également que l’importance qu’il accorde à l’expérimentation en psychologie et en théorie de la connaissance ne découle pas de la psychologie empirique de Brentano, mais trouve son fondement dans sa théorie des relations, à l’origine de la Gegenstandstheorie.
Comment doit-on comprendre la reconstruction autobiographique de Meinong ? Dans un premier temps, nous retraçons les caractéristiques principales et les présupposés de la psychologie empirique brentanienne telle que défendue dans les années 1874 – 1878 à Vienne (la Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique ainsi que les cours de Brentano suivis par Meinong de 1875 à 1878) afin d’établir un portrait de la philosophie brentanienne telle que Meinong la connaissait à l’époque. Dans un deuxième temps, nous identifions les éléments qui, dans les premiers travaux de Meinong, ont directement contribué à l’élaboration de la théorie de l’objet, en nous penchant plus particulièrement sur ‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, ‘Über die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes’, ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’, comme le suggère Meinong , mais aussi en tenant compte des travaux du laboratoire de psychologie expérimentale lors de ses dix premières années d’existence. Ce qui ressort de cette comparaison des travaux de Meinong et de ceux issus des recherches du laboratoire est la thèse, appuyée tant psychologiquement qu’ontologiquement, de la perceptibilité des relations en tant qu’objets d’ordre supérieur. Dans un troisième temps, nous analyserons les conséquences de cette thèse sur le programme poursuivi par Meinong et son école
In the following article, I argue that Husserl’s critique doesn’t do justice to the accounts of abstraction developed in the school of Brentano. I take here the particular case of Carl Stumpf, showing that not only does Husserl’s accusation miss its target, but also that it attribute indirectly to Stumpf a position that he didn’t defend. I suggest that even before the Logical Investigations, Stumpf formulated the basis of an account of abstraction in terms of generalization, an account which will later turn out to be in many ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical Investigations, and which provide a viable alternative both to Platonism and to Empiricism, thereby calling for a reassessment of the positions on abstraction in the School of Brentano.
Full text (self-archived): http://www.kkphil.com/uploads/4/3/2/5/43250729/frechette-originsphenomenology2019-selfarchive.pdf
Table of contents:
§1. Historical Background. Brentano and 19th-century European philosophy
§1.1. Aristotle’s heir
§1.2. Brentano and his school
§1.3. Husserl
§2. Some General Principles of Brentano’s Philosophy
§2.1. Principle (a): Philosophy as a science
§2.2. Principle (b): Anti-Kantianism
§2.3. Principle (c): Empiricism
§2.4. Principle (d): The mereological nature of substance §2.5. Principle (e): The correctness principle
§3. The Phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl
§3.1. Phenomenology, Phenomena, and Experiences §3.2. Description and its tools
i) exactness
ii) examples
iii) eidetic variations
§3.3. Intentionality
i) the basic theory of intentionality
ii) the enhanced theory
iii) the reistic version
iv) Husserl’s account of intentionality
§3.4. Consciousness
§3.5. Emotions and values
§3.6. Psychologism and anti-psychologism
Recent research on Brentano’s lecture manuscripts from the 1870s and 1880s, however, has shown that Brentano discussed the distinction between content and object at length in the very lectures that were attended by Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski. Attributing to Brentano the non-distinction view of content and object of presentations (as has often been done), and the corresponding thesis that intentionality is a relation with an internal, mental entity no longer seems to be historically accurate; it also imposes strict limitations on the intentionality thesis which are not even necessitated by Brentano’s own positions. One of these limitations is the so-called “methodological phenomenalism” sometimes attributed to Brentano (see Simons 1995, xvii; Crane 2006), according to which science, and philosophical investigations as well, can only study phenomena; this view can only hold if one also maintains the non-distinction view. The non-distinction view also makes Brentano’s philosophy quite unattractive for any theory of meaning based on the distinction between sense and reference. These limitations on Brentano’s concept of intentionality are particularly difficult to maintain when one considers his lectures on logic from the late 1860s and early 1870s, in which he clearly states and develops the distinction between content and object; moreover, his lecture notes on descriptive psychology from the mid- and late-1880s also basically follow the same concern, as did his logic lecture notes from the Vienna period. One finds in these documents an explicit concern with the distinction itself and its application in a more general theory of intentionality.
I discuss these lectures and the quotes themselves in section 3. Before that, in section 2, I suggest that Brentano’s own conception of philosophy speaks in favour of a more general reading of the intentionality thesis than the one suggested by Dale Jacquette’s “immanent intentionality” and by the sympathizers of the Chisholmian reconstruction of Brentano.
In the following paper, I argue that the diagnosis of a divide between these traditions is suboptimal and suggest that the impression of a divide is at least partly the result of the opposition between realist and anti-realist insights in both traditions.
Meinong considère également que l’importance qu’il accorde à l’expérimentation en psychologie et en théorie de la connaissance ne découle pas de la psychologie empirique de Brentano, mais trouve son fondement dans sa théorie des relations, à l’origine de la Gegenstandstheorie.
Comment doit-on comprendre la reconstruction autobiographique de Meinong ? Dans un premier temps, nous retraçons les caractéristiques principales et les présupposés de la psychologie empirique brentanienne telle que défendue dans les années 1874 – 1878 à Vienne (la Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique ainsi que les cours de Brentano suivis par Meinong de 1875 à 1878) afin d’établir un portrait de la philosophie brentanienne telle que Meinong la connaissait à l’époque. Dans un deuxième temps, nous identifions les éléments qui, dans les premiers travaux de Meinong, ont directement contribué à l’élaboration de la théorie de l’objet, en nous penchant plus particulièrement sur ‘Zur Psychologie der Komplexionen und Relationen’, ‘Über die Bedeutung des Weberschen Gesetzes’, ‘Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung’, comme le suggère Meinong , mais aussi en tenant compte des travaux du laboratoire de psychologie expérimentale lors de ses dix premières années d’existence. Ce qui ressort de cette comparaison des travaux de Meinong et de ceux issus des recherches du laboratoire est la thèse, appuyée tant psychologiquement qu’ontologiquement, de la perceptibilité des relations en tant qu’objets d’ordre supérieur. Dans un troisième temps, nous analyserons les conséquences de cette thèse sur le programme poursuivi par Meinong et son école
In the following article, I argue that Husserl’s critique doesn’t do justice to the accounts of abstraction developed in the school of Brentano. I take here the particular case of Carl Stumpf, showing that not only does Husserl’s accusation miss its target, but also that it attribute indirectly to Stumpf a position that he didn’t defend. I suggest that even before the Logical Investigations, Stumpf formulated the basis of an account of abstraction in terms of generalization, an account which will later turn out to be in many ways compatible with Husserl’s theory of Spezies in the Logical Investigations, and which provide a viable alternative both to Platonism and to Empiricism, thereby calling for a reassessment of the positions on abstraction in the School of Brentano.
Im ersten Teil wird untersucht, wie Bolzano für seine These argumentiert, im zweiten werden zweierlei Einwände gegen Bolzanos These diskutiert und kritisiert: Anhand einer Erörterung von Franz Exners (1802-1853) Kritik an Bolzano wird die Frage untersucht, wie man Bolzanos Prädikat "ist Gegenstand von" interpretieren sollte. Der zweite Einwand wurzelt in Kazimierz Twardowskis (1866-1938) intentionalistischer Strategie, wonach es immer einen Gegenstand gebe, den man sich vorstellt, wenn man eine Vorstellung habe. Mit Bezug auf Edmund Husserls (1859-1938) frühe Theorie der Intentionalität plädiert der Autor in der Folge dafür, dass eine intentionalistische Strategie zur Lösung dieses Problems sehr wohl mit Bolzanos Grundansichten vereinbar ist. Es zeigt sich nicht nur, dass Husserls Strategie mit Bolzanos Vorstellungstheorie kombinierbar ist, sondern auch, dass Bolzanos Vorstellungsbegriff eine zentrale Rolle in der Entwicklung der Phänomenologie spielt.
Date: 18-20 October 2018
Place: University of Salzburg.
On Thursday (18) and Friday (19), the venue is Toskanatrakt: Churfürststrasse 1, HS 203 (ground floor)
On Saturday (20), the venue is Wallistrackt: Franziskanergasse 1, HS 301 (4th floor)
Everyone is welcome.
We would however appreciate to receive an email from those who intend to attend, since places are limited. Please contact Hamid Taieb (Hamid.taieb@sbg.ac.at) to register.
This is a German edition of a lecture on metaphysics given by Brentano in Vienna in 1879, dealing more particularly with the second law of thermodynamics and the cosmological argument