Brentano on Time-Consciousness Guillaume Fréchette 1. The Reception of Brentano’s Account For many years, the importance and significance of Brentano’s conception of timeconsciousness in contemporary philosophy was closely tied with Husserl’s adaptation of this conception in his own lectures on time-consciousness. These lectures, which Husserl held in Göttingen in 1904-05, were edited in the 1920s by the brilliant phenomenologist Edith Stein and are the source of many of the central ideas of transcendental phenomenology. In April 1926, Stein’s work was then taken over by Martin Heidegger, a young careerist who, after spending some years as Husserl’s assistant in Freiburg, took over many of Husserl’s ideas and published a volume on being and time that would convince Husserl to choose him as his successor.i Soon enough, and thanks to the publication of Husserl’s lectures, “Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness” became the heading of a supposedly surpassed and defective theory, which was to be replaced subsequently by transcendental phenomenology and its heirs in Freiburg and later in France.ii This brief and quite tragic history of the reception of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness has meanwhile been rectified to some extent by a number of works that offer a less biased picture of Brentano’s various conceptions of timeconsciousness.iii The picture remains incomplete, however, without a consideration of the motivations behind the different conceptions advocated by Brentano. By taking Brentano’s metaphysical views into account as his background motivation, it is possible to draw a comprehensive picture of the different conceptions he defended and to get around the uneasy division of his works into early and ‘mature’ views, which has often been taken as a starting point for assessing the importance of reism (see CHAP. 15) at the expense of the rest of his works.iv While such divisions may be historically justified, they 1 tend to hide the forest behind the trees. For this reason, I will first start with a description of the forest (§§2-3) to finish with a classification of the trees (§4). 2. The Background Motivation Brentano’s first (and last) answer to the question ‘What is there?’ was the following: there are substances, which are also called things, or beings.v In his early 1867 lectures on metaphysics from the Würzburg period (henceforth Metaphysics),vi a substance and its accidents are taken to be only metaphysically separable. A thing, like the cup of coffee on my desk, is a being (Seiendes) that is fully determined by the relation holding between the underlying substance and the totality of its accidents. It is called a substance to mark a distinction from its metaphysical parts, but “the substance together with its accidents is one single being (Seiendes), … it constitutes with them a unitary whole (einheitliches Ganzes)” (Metaphysics, p. 31793, §195).vii “The metaphysical parts are posited as particular things only through a fiction of the mind” (Metaphysics, p. 31972, §478). There are different sorts of accidents: Brentano considers spatial and temporal accidents of substance as absolute accidents, which means that a substance, properly speaking, cannot lose spatial or temporal properties. It is always at a place and at a time. Now if location and duration are accidents, what about the species of these accidents, namely time and space? Brentano considers both time and space to be continua (see CHAP. 16). Here too, he follows Aristotle in conceiving of continuity as an attribute applying to the quantity of substance. The water in the glass on my desk has a certain spatial quantity (it occupies some place in the glass), and this spatial quantity is a continuum. In Brentano’s view, continua are not composed of discrete atoms and as such are potentially infinitely divisible. In that sense, the divisions of a continuum, the boundaries, only exist potentially, since the existence of the parts of the continuum depends on the existence of the continuum as a whole.viii The case of time is dealt with analogously to space in the Metaphysics. As in the case of spatial boundaries (e.g. a point on a line), Brentano rejects the idea that temporal boundaries have any kind of reality. They rather are to be called fictions cum fundamentum in rei. Taking such fictions seriously would lead to a vicious regress: 2 admitting boundaries as realities would call for further boundaries to mark the separation between boundaries as realities, etc. Boundaries are simply metaphysical parts of the whole of which they are the boundaries. In the Metaphysics, Brentano considers time and space to be two different kinds of continua: space is a perfect continuum or reality (fertige Wirklichkeit), since all parts of the spatial extension are real. Time is often characterized as an imperfect continuum (unfertige Wirklichkeit), in which only the now-point of a given duration is real. Therefore, in the strict sense of ‘real’, Brentano is a presentist with regard to time, but still sees time as an unreal continuum. 3. Two Options on Time-Consciousness With this metaphysical setting in place, we are now in a position to give an account of our perception of time. If time is a continuum, of which only the now-point is real, then trivially, any object purportedly extending over time (e.g. a melody, Socrates) is perceivable as such only from the perspective of its now-point. And since the perception of duration is by definition the perception of something with temporal extension, there can’t be a perception of time in a strict analogical sense to spatial perception. In seeing time as a continuum only in a special sense (as an ‘imperfect continuum’), Brentano is bound to say that temporal objects like melodies are continua, though imperfect ones. Not only are they different from the sum of the single tones, but, strictly speaking, they are irrealia. Since a perception is always accompanied by consciousness of this perception for Brentano, and since consciousness in general (and time-consciousness in particular) is itself part of the general structure of the world⎯as an accident or metaphysical part of the soul⎯time-consciousness (with its bearer) must be a temporal continuum in the same relevant (non-real, or ‘imperfect’) sense, which is to say real only at the now-point. In other words, if time is a continuum in the relevant sense, then there must be a time-consciousness that is (with its bearer) a temporal continuum in the same relevant, ‘imperfect’ sense, for the concept of time-consciousness to be intelligible at all. This reflection seems to be at the origin of a fundamental assumption of Brentano’s conception of the mind, namely that consciousness, both in its synchronic and diachronic forms, is characterized by unity. In its synchronic form, it is the unity of 3 the act with the content or the unity of different acts and contents at a time; in its diachronic form, it is the unity of different acts and contents through time. Applied to the latter case, the assumption of unity could be formulated as follows: Unity of Time-Consciousness (UTC): our experience of succession is a unitary phenomenon and not a succession of experiences. Following UTC, but also taking into consideration the point mentioned above, namely that consciousness is real only at its now-point, a retentional conception of timeconsciousness recommends itself. Brentano has two main options at his disposal when it comes to accounting for UTC: 1: The properties of temporal consciousness are grounded in the perceived properties of time itself; 2:The perceived properties of time are grounded in the properties of temporal consciousness. Following (1), the non-real continuity of the time-continuum itself (in its relevant sense) is what makes our time-consciousness seem to be the perception of something that is temporally extended. Therefore, temporal properties are special properties of objects in the time continuum. Time-consciousness is unextended and the unity of our experience of succession comes from the non-real continuity of the time-continuum itself. Following (2), the relevant sense of non-real continuity describes a special temporal property of our acts, often called ‘original association’ (in the sense of innate associative link), which allows some of them to ‘reach back’ in the direction of the past or to anticipate something to come. Under this description, the unity of our experience of succession comes from the original association. These two options are analogous to the options at Brentano’s disposal concerning intentionality and the nature of intentional objects:ix 1: The special way of being contained in mental phenomena is what makes these phenomena intentional. 2: The special kind of directedness or reference of mental phenomena is what makes them intentional. 4 In the case of both time-consciousness and intentionality, type-1 solutions involve the treatment of non-real continuity as a ‘being in the sense of the true’, which is the sense of being involved for instance in true attributions to entia irrealia:x in this case, both realia and irrealia are beings, although in different senses. Type-2 solutions allow only for real continua and attribute the relevant sense of non-real continuity to a feature of the perception of continuity. Finally, it is important to note that type-1 and type-2 conceptions are not necessarily exclusive: one might want to say that temporal properties are special properties of objects in the time continuum and that these play an important role in our perception of change, without necessarily excluding the fact that our perception has built-in retentional and anticipative features that also play a role in our perception of time. In most of the numerous versions of his theory of time-consciousness, Brentano adopts this alternative. 4. Five Variations From this perspective, it seems that Brentano’s whole philosophical development between 1862 and 1917 evolves around the relation between these two main conceptions of reality (or to put it in Brentano’s words, of continuity) and around different possible combinations of the two. As far as time-consciousness is concerned, this is at least partly confirmed by the autobiographical reconstruction of the evolution sketched by Brentano in his directives on how to lecture on time-consciousness, sent to Marty in 1895: My opinion is that it would be best for you to: (a) develop the old view, (b) point out the objections to it, in particular the objection that heterogeneous elements are supposed to form a continuum. Also, that there would be less difference between a non-thing and a thing than there would be between two non-things; indeed there would be infinitesimally little difference between them! Then, (c) you could speak about the earlier view I once entertained, independently of Mill, but in agreement with him, and show why it had to appear untenable (according to it, time was not a continuum at all). Then (d) how, in spite of this, I revived it, but with considerable modifications. (e) The way for the revival was paved by the view, at which I arrived quite independently of these considerations, that every sensation is bound up with an apprehension of that which is sensed. (Irrevocably; this does not even cease to apply with the knowledge that the 5 phenomenon is not real. Comparisons with higher and lower desires. This holds true also of proteraesthesis). (Kraus 1930: 7/1976: 228) Following Brentano’s personal reconstruction, it seems that his conception of time consciousness between 1867 and 1895 is composed of three basic theories: 1) the ‘earlier’ view (c): continuum of modes of judgment (1867–1868) 2) the ‘old’ view (a): continuum of modified objects (1869–1893) 3) the ‘new’ view (d, e): continuum of modes of judgment (1893–1905) After 1905, Brentano defended two further views: 4) the penultimate view: continuum of modes of presentations (1905–1915) 5) the last view: continuum of oblique modes of presentations (1915–1917) 4.1. View 1: The ‘Earlier’ View (1867) The ‘earlier’ view, according to which time-consciousness is a matter of the attitude or mode of the act of judgment, is exclusively a type-2 account. In the Metaphysics, the view is developed in the context of a discussion of truth as correspondence. Brentano rejects the idea that truth is adaequatio rei et intellectus, on the grounds that one may express true judgments that are not about a reality, but he still believes that truth is a kind of correspondence, though in a “very improper sense.” In his view, a judgment is true “when it acknowledges (zustimmt) a presentation which corresponds to the thing, or when it rejects (verwirft) a presentation which doesn’t correspond to it” (Metaphysics, p. 31951, §395). According to him, true judgments expressed by tensed sentences, such as “Napoleon existed 200 years ago,” are also true for the same reason, but with the following proviso: “if time were a perfect reality like space etc., a reality would correspond to the presentation” (Metaphysics, p. 31952, §398). This conditional formulation is what Brentano calls “a different mode of acknowledgement (Zustimmung)” (Ibid.) and doesn’t involve any type-1 consideration. It technically offers a type-2 explanation, since judgments are acts of the mind, but it is also complemented by a basic account of what will later (around 1872) be labeled the ‘original association,’ and which explicitly accounts for UTC: following Aquinas’ view that “the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another”,xi Brentano adds: 6 Our presenting presents succession simultaneously, but [it presents it] as being successive. ‘Being presented simultaneously’ and ‘being presented as simultaneous’ are to be distinguished. Our sensory presentation has a temporal depth (zeitliche Tiefe), so to speak. Without this wonderful device, through which the teleology of the soul shows itself on a par with the teleology of nature, we wouldn’t have any presentation of movement, melody, etc. and [we wouldn’t have] any presentation of time at all. As a further consequence, we wouldn’t have any memory. (Metaphysics, p. 31804, §257) In short, the ‘earlier’ view sees time-consciousness as constituted by a modality of our judgings, and as supported by the temporal depth of our presentings, without recourse to any type-1 explanation.xii The rejection of such an explanation is particularly clear in the Metaphysics when Brentano discusses the reistic paraphrase strategy to which he will revert almost 40 years later, although with a restriction concerning tensed sentences: [I]n the case of ‘a dog is thought-of’, I cannot say … ‘a thought-of-dog is’, but I can say ‘a thinker-of-a-dog is’. Is such a paraphrase (Übersetzung) also possible for past things? It does not seem so, for if I say ‘a n-times-later-thing is’, this relation is an ens rationis… (Metaphysics, p. 31952, §398.) In other words, judgments expressed in tensed sentences, in contrast with all other judgments seemingly about entia rationis, cannot even be paraphrased in a sentence directly about a substance and indirectly about an ens rationis. This distinction will be cast later in terms of modo recto/modo obliquo (see next section). 4.2. View 2: The ‘Old’ View (1869–1893) The ‘old’ view stipulates that time-consciousness is a matter of the content of the mental act; I hear past sounds as past-things: the ontological modification of the content (type1) is paired with what Brentano calls the original association (type-2), according to which there are no pure sensations in reality, but these are always coupled with phantasy, which gives us the impression that we hear the ‘past sound’, or that we hear a melody. In 1873, Brentano used the following picture to illustrate this conception:xiii 7 In this schema, the horizontal line a, b, c, d represents a series of sounds on the timecontinuum. The vertical lines represent time-consciousness; while hearing the tone b, the tone a is part of the content b in a modified way, that is, through retention, a process for which Brentano also uses the expression “original association.” It is important to stress that the contents in retention (a, a b, a b c on the vertical lines) are not proper sound contents: already in the logic lectures of 1869-70 and 187071, Brentano describes these contents as sounds “in obliquo”, abandoning the exception made in the ‘earlier’ view (1) about the applicability of the in recto/in obliquo distinction for the objects of judgments expressed by tensed sentences.xiv According to the ‘old’ view (2), past sounds, like painted fish, are not real sounds or fish; rather, they are sounds in a modified way, and their status in the presentations of the contents b, c, d of the vertical line is the status of a part in a modified way. In the 69-70 and 70-71 logic lectures, Brentano did not add any further element to this type-1 explanation, probably because his first concern there was to revise the solution proposed in 1867 for the truth of judgments about the past. It is in the Psychology lectures of 72-73 that he supplements view (2) with a type-2 explanation in addition to the type-1 explanation, in order to account for the psychological process underlying the presentation of contents in obliquo. The basic idea behind the concept of “original association”⎯as discussed in the Psychology lectures of 72-73⎯is that of a “persistence (Fortbestand) of the presentations through a continual modification of their temporal determination” (Brentano Ps 62, p. 54007).xv When hearing a sequence of tones a, b and c, my presentation of a “persists” through time (notably ‘through’ the further presentations of b and c) thanks to an original (i.e. innate) association of each presentation of the ‘now’ point with past and future presentations. According to Brentano, original association as a psychological process is genetically determined by the central and fundamental law of genetic psychology, namely the law of habit (Gesetz der Gewohnheit): “once a mental phenomenon occurs, the occurrence of the same or of a similar phenomenon in the same 8 or similar conditions is thereby prepared” (Ibid., p. 54001).xvi In other words, the occurrence of a mental phenomenon ‘leaves a dispositional trace’ (see Brentano 1874: 86; Ps 53, p. 53071). The ‘original’ association therefore is the process that links successive presentations on the basis of their dispositional trace. On the level of type-1 explanation, we have said that the contents of the vertical lines⎯the lines bound together by original association⎯are parts of the presentations on the horizontal line only in a modified way. On the level of type-2 explanation, this means that we only have the dispositional trace of the presentations, not the presentations themselves; and since they are not presentations, judgments, or acts of love and hate, they also are not conscious.xvii A last important feature of view (2) is the possibility of inner proteraesthesis, which is the original association proper to inner consciousness. Besides the fact that my hearing of c also contains a and b as tones in a modified way, a similar phenomenon would occur in inner consciousness: since all mental acts are conscious, my consciousness of hearing c, which accompanies the hearing, would also reach back to my consciousness of hearing a and b. Proteraesthesis of a and b in the presentation of c and inner proteraesthesis of the consciousness of hearing a and b in the consciousness of hearing c would be “inseparable from one another and so, from the standpoint of real separability, they are not different parts… [I]t seems to be so e.g. in the tones of a melody” (Brentano, EL 74, p. 12850a). The time-consciousness schema offered by Brentano in one of his lectures looks like this: Italicized expressions designate the inner proteraesthesis (formed by the lower triangle), while non-italicized expressions designate the proteraesthesis (formed by the 9 upper triangle).xviii The idea of inner proteraesthesis is discussed in particular in the lectures on descriptive psychology of 1890/91, as an option on view (2), but a mention in Stumpf (1919: 136/1976: 38) indicates that it was taken into account as early as 1872.xix Its objective seems to be the following: where proteraesthesis explains the unity of temporal perception (how the contents a, b, c, and d, are united in consciousness at a time), inner proteraesthesis aims to explain how we experience this unity as such (and not as a succession of sounds). A few years later, Brentano explicitly rejected this idea (see for instance Brentano 1976: 109ff.),xx but at least three central ideas developed by his students⎯Meinong’s theory of the self-evidence of memory (Meinong 1886), his higher-order objects given in inner perception (Meinong 1899), and Ehrenfels’ Gestalt qualities (Ehrenfels 1890)⎯are based on the idea of inner proteraesthesis. 4.3. View 3: The ‘New’ View (1893–1905) The ‘new’ view is considered an expansion of (c), and according to it the intuition of time is the intuition of a special mode of judgment.xxi Here, the modification is not a modification of the content, as in (c), but of the attitude of acknowledgement in judgments. The result is that time-consciousness is considered a limited continuum of acknowledgements of the same object (Kraus 1930: 20/1976: 237). The new view is mentioned in a letter from Brentano to Marty from November 23rd, 1893. As Marty puts it, “with the blind belief encountered in external intuition and with the evident kind in inner intuition there is connected a continuum of judgments which judge the intuited content to be more and more past and temporally removed” (Kraus 1976: 227) (type-2). The ‘new’ view is structurally analogous to the ‘old’ view (2), with the exception that the continuum on the vertical lines is a continuum of modes of acknowledgement, rather than a continuum of modified objects. The intuition behind the view is that sensory presentations (e.g. of sounds) and proteraestheses of these presentations are always bound up with a blind belief in the existence of the presented objects. An important consequence of this view is that when hearing c now, the continuum in the proteraesthesis (on the vertical line c, b, a) is a continuum of modes of judgments about the same object (the sound c). Curiously enough, the ‘new’ view (3) is very similar to the view presented in Husserl 1928, a view that Husserl presented precisely as an improvement of Brentano’s ‘old’ view (2)!xxii 10 4.4. View 4: The Temporal Modalities of Presentation View (1905–1915) The ‘new view’ was defended between 1893 and 1905. Between 1903 and 1905, Brentano became doubtful of his earlier classification of acts. In a short research manuscript from 1903 (Brentano 1987c), reflecting upon his conception of sensations, he came to the conclusion that “what we usually consider a presenting which is free from any judicative character, is in fact a judgment” (Brentano 1987c: 28). In other words, even the most basic presentations have the same kind of modalities that we find in judgments.xxiii In a letter to Marty from 1905, he accepts the consequences of this view for his conception of time-consciousness: I must say that when I return from Aristotle to myself and I characterize the presentation as a particular fundamental class, I do acknowledge in this class 1) the temporal modes as modes of presenting, and 2) attributions (analogous to the reconstruction through phantasy). The expression ‘presenting’ is not bad. It would be better however to say ‘thinking’. (Brentano 1977: 122–3). This conclusion about the consequences of his new conception of the class of presentations is sometimes seen as marking a fourth view, according to which temporal modalities are already present at the level of presentations (type-2). However, since presentations are thought to involve acknowledgement after 1903, view (4) should only be considered a specification of view (3): according to this specification, temporal modalities are not only modes of acknowledgement, but also modes of presentation. The case of temporal desires, emotions, and wills illustrates this well: I can wish that something should have happened or that it will happen, “without forming the least judgment as to whether the wish can or cannot be fulfilled” (Brentano 1976: 23/1988: 12). 4.5. View 5: The Final View (1915–1917) Finally, a fifth and final view could be isolated from Brentano’s late manuscripts on time, according to which temporal modalities such as past or future are not modes of presentation in general, but aspects specifically of the oblique mode of presentation, while the presentation of the present is in recto. This view is formulated in a dictation from 1915, which was edited by Kraus in 1925: 11 It seems certain that we can never think of anything without thinking of something as present, that is to say, however, as on a boundary line which exists as the connecting point of an otherwise non-existent continuum or as providing its beginning or its end. So along with the idea of the present, we also get those of the past and future in modo obliquo as that the boundary of which is formed by the present. (Brentano 1973a: 326) This last view (5) comes back to the point discussed in the earlier view (1) and, in some way, closes the loop from views (1) to (5). First, view (5), like view (1), is based on modes of judgments and rejects irrealia, and with them any kind of special temporal properties of objects. The basic explanation is therefore in both cases a type-2 explanation. However, view (5) differs importantly from view (1) in two respects: it also allows for temporal modes of presentations, but, more importantly, the late Brentano changed his mind on the inapplicability of the in recto/in obliquo distinction to the objects of judgments expressed by tensed sentences. In the case of “Napoleon existed 200 years ago”, the paraphrase should be read as “There is a thing that is 200 years later than Napoleon”, in which Napoleon’s past existence is acknowledged in modo obliquo, and this on the basis of the acknowledgement of this thing (i.e. a thinker of Napoleon) in modo recto. In the case of the hearing of a series of sounds, the main difference from the interpretation of the schema proposed in view (2) is that the presentation contents on the vertical lines are not determined by their special ontological features, but by their relations to a sound heard as present: When hearing c now, I perceive: i) the tone itself, c; ii) something that stands apart from it as earlier (b) and iii) something that stands apart from it as later (d). When I now hear d, c is no longer present, but something standing apart from c as later is perceived as such. In other words, I cannot hear d now (as part of the tone series, in modo recto) without presenting (in modo obliquo) something standing apart from c as later.xxiv On this view (5), the psychological process of original association is given a pure type-2 explanation, without imposing upon it a type-1 explanation, as was the case in view (2). 5. Closing the Loop 12 The five views discussed above seem to suggest that the development of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness directly depends on what seems to him to be the best metaphysical account of time itself. Views (1) and (2) consider time to be some kind of continuum and were abandoned precisely for this reason: in the late 1860s and early 1870s, Brentano rejected the idea of a “continuum in an improper or imperfect sense” (view 1), and in the early 1890s he rejected the idea of a “continuum of real and unreal moments” (view 2). This rejection of a conception of time as a special kind of continuum also called for the rejection of all type-1 solutions to the problem of timeconsciousness.xxv Views (3) to (5) may be seen as a succession of attempts to offer a type-2 solution that would match his conception of the fundamental classes of mental phenomena. 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(1928), Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Zeitbewußtseins, ed. M. Heidegger, Halle, Max Niemeyer. 14 Kraus, O. (1930), “Zur Phänomenognosie des Zeitbewußtseins: Aus dem Briefwechsel Franz Brentanos mit Anton Marty, nebst einem Vorlesungsbruchstück über Brentanos Zeitlehre aus dem Jahre 1895, nebst Einleitung und Anmerkungen veröffentlicht von Oskar Kraus”, Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie vol. 75, 1930, pp. 1-22. Kraus, O. (1976), “Toward a Phenomenognosy of Time-Consciousness”, in L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Brentano, London, Duckworth, pp. 224-239. Meinong, A. (1886) «Zur erkentnißstheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses», Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, vol. 10, n° 1, pp. 7-33 ; reprinted in Meinong A., Gesamtausgabe, Bd II, Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, Graz, Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1970, pp. 185-209. Meinong, A. (1899), Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniß zur inneren Wahrnehmung'. Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, 21 (1899), p. 182-272., Gesamtausgabe, Bd II, Abhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, Graz, Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1970, p. 377-480. Meinong, A. (1978), “On Objects of Higher-Order and Their Relationship to Internal Perception”, in M.-L. Schubert Kalsi (ed.), Alexius Meinong. On Objects of HigherOrder and Husserl’s Phenomenology, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 137-207 (Engl. Translation of Meinong 1899 by M.-L. Schubert Kalsi. Ricoeur, P. (1988), Time and Narrative, vol. 3, English translation by K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Ricoeur, P. (1985), Temps et récit. Volume 3: le temps raconté, Paris, Seuil, 1985. Ryle, G. (1976), “Disgusted Grandfather of Phenomenology”, in Times Higher Education Supplement, September 10, 1976, p. 15. Sauer, W. (2013) “Being as the True. From Aristotle to Brentano”, in D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds), Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam: Rodopi, p. 193-225. 15 Stumpf, C. (1919), “Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano”, in O. Kraus (ed.), Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, Munich, Beck, p. 87-149. Stumpf, C. (1976), “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano”, in L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Brentano, London, Duckworth, pp. 10-46. Volpi, F. (1989), “The Experience of Temporal Objects and the Constitution of Timeconsciousness by Brentano”, The Object and its Identity: Supplements of Topoi 4. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 127-140. Archive materials Brentano, F. Ps 62: Psychologie 1872/73, Archives of the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (MA). Brentano, F. Ps 53: Drittes Buch: Von den Vorstellungen (s.d.), Archives of the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (MA). Brentano, F. EL 74: Psychognosie. 2-stündig [1890-91], Archives of the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (MA). Marty, A. Br 7/1: F. Brentano, Logik Kollegien [Deduktive und inductive Logik] [Logic Lectures of Franz Brentano: Summer Semester 1869-70 and 1870-71 (Deductive and inductive Logic), abridged as Logic Lectures 1869/70]. Archives of Anton Marty, Franz-Brentano Archiv, Graz. Marty, A. IIIg č 46: Deskriptive Psychologie. in Lesefrüchte. Název O. Krause, výpisy z různých autorů, Rukopis, 1. složka, s.d in Archiv akademie věd České Republiky Praha, Osobní fond Antona Marty. After succeeding Husserl in his position at Freiburg, Heidegger published Husserl’s lectures, mostly using Stein’s editorial work, as Husserl 1928. i In 1930, Brentano’s faithful disciple Oskar Kraus reacted to the publication of Husserl 1928 by publishing a short but insightful précis of Brentano’s conceptions of time-consciousness (Kraus 1930). The 1976 English translation of Kraus 1930 made Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness available to a wider audience. Besides Ryle 1976 however, few philosophers became aware of this translation. On the ii 16 French reception of Brentano’s conception of time-consciousness, see for instance Gilson 1955: 154-8, Derrida 1973: 64, Derrida 1990: 114/2003: 58 and Ricoeur 1988: 36, 38, 272. See for instance Chisholm 1981, Albertazzi 1990/91, Chrudzimski 1998/99 and 2005 (see also Chrudzimski 2004: 157–64, 200-1, 204–7), Huemer 2002/03, Fugali 2004, Borsato 2009, Volpi 1989, De Warren 2009: 50–87. On Brentano’s accounts in connection with Broad, see Dainton 2000 and elsewhere. iii From the 1920s onwards, Kraus, Kastil, and Mayer-Hillebrand played a major role in orienting the scholarship on Brentano almost exclusively around reism, and in presenting it as a break with the earlier works. See especially Brentano 1930/1966b, 1954, 1959, 1966a, on both the editorial and ideological aspects. iv The late Brentano has a particular view of the relation between substance and accident, the latter being then conceived of as a whole, while the former is considered as a part of the latter. Therefore, “accidents” should be added as part of the last answer, insofar as they are constituted by substances (their parts). v The Metaphysics is still unpublished. M96 from Brentano’s Nachlass at Harvard is the main document of the first 1867 lectures. When quoting this document, I refer to the draft edition of Baumgartner et al. (Brentano forthcoming–1). All translations of these quotes and of other quotes from works that are still unavailable in English or unpublished are my own. vi Here and elsewhere, all quotations from original manuscripts and from German editions are my translations. vii See Aristotle, Physics, V, 3. Brentano agrees with Aristotle’s answer to Zeno’s paradox. See Metaphysics, p. 31774 (§123). The account of boundaries in the Metaphysics will be developed further in the late manuscripts on time, space, and continuum, published in Brentano (1976/1989). viii I discuss this alternative since it may also be found in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint in Fréchette (2013). ix Brentano discusses this distinction between being in the sense of true and being in the sense of the categories in many places in his works: it has a central place in Brentano (1975a)[1862] (esp. 1975a, 25f.; 1862, p. 37f) but also in the Metaphysics and in many later texts published in Brentano (1966b) [1930]. For a detailed discussion of being in the sense of the true in Brentano and Aristotle, see Sauer (2013). x Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Quaestio 85, reply to the objection 1 (transl. by the fathers of the English Dominican Province). Brentano refers to this passage in the Metaphysics, p. 31804, §257. xi Chrudzimski (2005: 49) suggests a different reading of what I call view (1), interpreting Metaphysics, p. 31952, §398 as a first step towards a type-1 solution. I doubt that the reduction of true judgments about the past to conditional judgments and the restricted conception of truth as correspondence would speak for such an interpretation. xii This schema is reproduced in Stumpf (1919), 136; 1976, 38. To my knowledge, we don’t find this schema in any of Brentano’s manuscripts. xiii xiv See Brentano, Logic lectures (1869/70), p. 24902 (classified as Marty, Br 7/1). More fully: “The original associations. A case which belongs here (phantasy) and probably the only case belonging here is the persistence of presentations under a continual modification of their temporal determination. Proof that we have here a case of association and in particular of original association. The more specific laws of this association still haven’t been studied. But it is certain that the associated presentation is less intense than the one to which it is associated. This explains the decrease of intensity which comes together with the temporal distance and proximity of the time length. A further consequence is that the associated temporal segment is sometimes longer, sometimes shorter. The length of the associated temporal segment is sometimes quite significant: discourse, melody. Some other conditions might also be at play here.” xv 17 Since Brentano (1874) contains only the first book and the first part of the second book of the six-book project of Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, the part of the second book dealing with the law of habit remained unpublished. An advanced draft of the chapter can be found in Brentano, Ps 53, p. 53070ff. Stumpf (1919: 135/1976: 37) says that this formula is the “most correct and most comprehensive” in Brentano’s psychology. xvi What I call here view (2) is view (3) in Chrudzimski 2005. Chrudzimski’s addition of a further view is due in part to his interpretation of view (1) as a combination of type-1 and type-2 explanation, but in part also to his inexact dating (1890/91) of the quotes given in Chrudzimski 2005: 47–8. These actually stem from the logic lectures of 1869/70, which suggests, against most interpretations, that Brentano’s acceptance of entia irrealia would have already begun in 1869 in Würzburg, and not in the 1880s in Vienna. xvii Interestingly we find the exact same passages of text and the exact same schema in one version of Marty’s lectures on descriptive psychology (Marty, IIIg č 46, p. 10). xviii The new edition of the lectures on descriptive psychology held by Brentano between 1887 and 1891 in Brentano forthcoming-2 will include these parts, which were left out of the short edition in Brentano 1982/1995. Huemer (2002/03) notes the mention in Stumpf 1919. xix Chisholm (1981: 12ff) overstates Brentano’s point in Brentano 1976 in stipulating that the denial of inner proteraesthesis is essential to his theory of time-consciousness. xx xxi At first glance, it might seem that view (3) comes back to view (1), considering time-consciousness as a continuum of modes of judgment. However, the similarity is superficial: judgements in view (1) are considered as predications, and the continuum holds merely on the basis of conditional formulations of tensed sentences. The predicative conception of judgements will be abandoned in the early 1870s. The continuum of modes of judgements involved in view (3) is simply a continuum of blind and evident judgings. xxii Where Brentano speaks of modes of acknowledgement, Husserl speaks of modifications of consciousness (Bewußtseinsmodifikationen). For a parallel between Husserl 1928 and Brentano’s ‘new’ view (3), see Kraus 1930: 18ff. This view is presented in the following way: “While I here unite presentation with judgment, I expressly emphasize that I withdraw nothing from what I have said in my earlier discussions of the fundamental classes of mental relations in opposition to the dominant view on the nature of judgment. I found myself obliged to correct my view not on the nature of judgment, but on the nature of presentation, a view which was too much influenced by the Tradition.” (Brentano 1987c: 30) xxiii Brentano explains this in the following way: “The presentation of the tone in modo obliquo will always include within itself something as present by way of a relation of later to earlier” (Brentano 1976: 157/1988: 94). xxiv A similar phenomenon occurring at about the same time is observable with regard to Brentano’s rejection of type-1 solutions for his conception of intentionality. xxv Many thanks to Wilhelm Baumgartner, Johannes Brandl, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Marcello Oreste Fiocco, and Uriah Kriegel for helpful comments. This paper has been written as part of the project “Franz Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology” funded by the Austrian Science Fund, project number P-27215. xxvi 18