An important philosophical tradition treats the deliverances of one’s own internal faculties as analogous to the deliverances of external sources of testimony. Pushing back against this tradition in the special case of the deliverances of... more
An important philosophical tradition treats the deliverances of one’s own internal faculties as analogous to the deliverances of external sources of testimony. Pushing back against this tradition in the special case of the deliverances of one’s own memory, I aim to highlight the broader interaction between an internal (or first-person) and an external (or third-person) perspective that one might adopt towards one’s own states of mind. According to what I call the ‘diary model’ of memory, one’s memory ordinarily serves as a means for one’s present self to gain evidence about one’s past states of mind, much as testimony from another person can provide one with evidence about that person’s states of mind. I reject the diary model’s analogy between memory and testimony from one’s former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences.
In the face of growing anti-democratic hate movements across Europe such as Pegida in Germany and an alarming surge in racist attacks against people of colour, Black people and refugees, mainstream political theory remains strikingly... more
In the face of growing anti-democratic hate movements across Europe such as Pegida in Germany and an alarming surge in racist attacks against people of colour, Black people and refugees, mainstream political theory remains strikingly silent. Likewise, by misinterpreting racism as a thing of the past or as misguided individual prejudices, political theory has largely ignored the reality of everyday racism that operates under the radar of these hypervisualized and mediatised outbursts of hate speech and organized violence.
The silence of political theory suggests that classical concepts of multiculturalism, republicanism, recognition and justice might be inadequate to tackle the banality of racism in Europe‘s postcolonial and post-fascist societies. Based on this assumption, the workshop aims to widen the field of political theory’s hegemonic canon and concepts. Which theoretical strands and marginalized forms of knowledge are necessary to establish political theory as a ‚race‘ critical theory? Which concepts enable political theory to both grasp and critique racist habits, practices, discourses and institutions in democratic societies? How can political theory confront the legacies and continuities of European colonialisms and racisms that reverberate epistemologically within its own discipline? And finally, what is the responsibility of politically and ethically engaged academics in the light of an ever increasing racism?
This two-day interdisciplinary workshop will gather scholars working in the fields of political theory, legal theory, sociology and philosophy to share their different theoretical perspectives on racism in its interdependency with classism, sexism, homo- and trans*phobia. Besides individual papers, a roundtable discussion will highlight their engagement with bridging the gap between a ‚race‘ critical theory and an anti-racist political practice.
The article addresses the question of the respect owed to believers and their faiths and states that a demand for respect for the person of the believer does not imply a demand for respect for their faith. However, being 'respect'... more
The article addresses the question of the respect owed to believers and their faiths and states that a demand for respect for the person of the believer does not imply a demand for respect for their faith. However, being 'respect' a complex and ambiguous notion, the article studies some arguments that go in the direction of justifying the move from respect for persons to respect for their beliefs. According to Habermas, there is a respect citizens of a democracy owe each other that requires taking each other's opinions seriously, including their religiously motivated opinions. What is more, Habermas claims that we all have something to learn from each other. The articles argues against this line of thought and states there is no obligation to respect anything about people's moral claims except their right to make them. The article argues against Habermas's approach by showing its epistemological and ontological inconsistency and concludes that respect for persons...
The article addresses the question of the respect owed to believers and their faiths and states that a demand for respect for the person of the believer does not imply a demand for respect for their faith. However, being 'respect'... more
The article addresses the question of the respect owed to believers and their faiths and states that a demand for respect for the person of the believer does not imply a demand for respect for their faith. However, being 'respect' a complex and ambiguous notion, the article studies some arguments that go in the direction of justifying the move from respect for persons to respect for their beliefs. According to Habermas, there is a respect citizens of a democracy owe each other that requires taking each other's opinions seriously, including their religiously motivated opinions. What is more, Habermas claims that we all have something to learn from each other. The articles argues against this line of thought and states there is no obligation to respect anything about people's moral claims except their right to make them. The article argues against Habermas's approach by showing its epistemological and ontological inconsistency and concludes that respect for persons...
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes for a Moral Psychology of Fiction By Katherine Tullmann Adviser: Dr. Jesse Prinz The goal of my dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of our psychological engagements with fiction. While... more
Problems, Puzzles, and Paradoxes for a Moral Psychology of Fiction By Katherine Tullmann
Adviser: Dr. Jesse Prinz The goal of my dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of our psychological engagements with fiction. While many aestheticians have written on issues concerning art and ethics, only a few have addressed the ways in which works of fiction offer problems for general accounts of morality, let alone how we go about making moral judgments about fictions in the first place. My dissertation fills that gap. I argue that the first challenge in explaining our interactions with fiction arises from functional and inferential arguments that entail that our mental states about fictional entities are non-genuine. This means that our mental states during our engagements with fiction are different in kind from typical beliefs, emotions, desires, etc. that we have in real-life contexts. I call this position the Distinct Attitude View (DAV). In its place, I propose a common-sense, standard attitude view (SAV): the idea that our psychological interactions with non-real entities can be explained in terms of the intentional content of those states as opposed to a distinct type of mental state. In expanding the SAV, I develop several independent accounts of social cognition, emotions, and moral judgments. I also show how the SAV can dissolve standard problems in the philosophy and psychology of aesthetic experience: the paradox of fiction, the problem of imaginative existence, and the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, amongst others.
Analyzing the Principles of Anti-Ethics and how their applications would've shaped our world differently. Specifically, I would be researching into Kantian and neo-Aristotelian ethics. I will compare and contrast how today's ethics... more
Analyzing the Principles of Anti-Ethics and how their applications would've shaped our world differently. Specifically, I would be researching into Kantian and neo-Aristotelian ethics. I will compare and contrast how today's ethics systems have led to the creation of certain technologies and compare that to a world that followed anti-ethics principles.
The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer (2013) argues that it is impossible... more
The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer (2013) argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can't fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer's arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer's argument for why we can't believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer's positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can't believe the error theory.
