Dr. Alexander KOROLEV is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. His research interests include international relations theory and comparative politics with special reference to China and Russia.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Aug 28, 2024
Many assessments of the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have emphasized Vladimir Putin’s... more Many assessments of the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have emphasized Vladimir Putin’s individual characteristics, such as his early career as a KGB officer, imperial ambitions towards Ukraine, or belief in Ukraine’s cultural affinity to Russia. This article argues that the invasion can be better explained by offensive geopolitical rationality. Putin got a few things about the war in Ukraine wrong; however, from a geopolitical standpoint, he also got a few things right. These include the limits of the West’s support for Ukraine, the willingness of other non-Western countries to cooperate with Russia, and the limited impact of Western sanctions on Russia. In turn, this makes Russia difficult for the West to handle but also encourages the development of a more nuanced and potentially effective response that takes geopolitics into consideration.
For more than two decades, Australia successfully balanced its economic ties with China, its most... more For more than two decades, Australia successfully balanced its economic ties with China, its most significant economic partner, and its security alliance with the United States, its core ally. That era has ended. As US-China tensions escalate, Canberra faces difficult choices between the two great powers. The signing of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) security pact in 2021 and other measures perceived as anti-China alignments signal that Canberra has abandoned its hedging strategy, siding with Washington against Beijing. This article critically examines this foreign policy shift from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. By placing Australia's situation in a comparative context, it argues that for a middle power, unequivocally siding with one great power against another is a risky geopolitical move that could further intensify great-power rivalry.
European Journal of International Security , Sep 20, 2024
Despite being ubiquitously used, the concept of alignment remains inchoate. Existing literature o... more Despite being ubiquitously used, the concept of alignment remains inchoate. Existing literature offers more than 30 interpretations of the term and very few attempts to develop an objective indicators-based metric of alignment. This state of the field makes assessments of the degree to which states are aligned problematic. This article systematises the theoretical knowledge about alliances, alignments, strategic partnerships, and other forms of cooperation and draws on some empirical observations to develop a ‘stadial model of alignment formation’ (SMAF). The model conceptualises, operationalises, measures, and explains interstate alignment with greater precision and consistency. It also includes the explanatory factors in the form of the three balances – the balance of power, the balance of threat, and the balance of interest – and connections between them located along the stages of alignment formation. As such, the SMAF framework gauges the relative scale and depth of strategic alignments and can facilitate comparative analysis.
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2024
As tensions between the US and China continue to grow and efforts to ‘friend-shore’ supply chains... more As tensions between the US and China continue to grow and efforts to ‘friend-shore’ supply chains gather pace, Australia is being forced to make a difficult choice when it comes to the future of its critical minerals strategy.
For almost two decades, Canberra hedged its economic and security bets between China – its most s... more For almost two decades, Canberra hedged its economic and security bets between China – its most significant economic partner – and the United States – its core security ally – rather successfully, with Australian policymakers announcing that the country would not have to choose between the two great powers and that there are ways to maintain a tight alliance with the US while enhancing friendship and cooperation with China. However, Australia-China relations started to deteriorate in the mid-2010s, with Canberra effectively giving up on hedging by signing in 2021 the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) security pact and undertaking other steps that have been widely received as unequivocally joining the US’s effort to contain China. This article explores Australia’s foreign policy transformation by conceptualising it as a transition from hedging to balancing against China. It develops a theoretical argument about why an essential middle power might decide to give up on hedging and start balancing. It argues that the end of hedging in Australia’s China policy is a result of disappearing structural uncertainty and systemic permissiveness on which hedging, as a pattern of smaller power behaviour, is premised. As such, the article contributes to the knowledge about hedging by highlighting the limitations of smaller power hedging.
The western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine was supposed to help the latter by punishing... more The western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine was supposed to help the latter by punishing the former. That strategy isn't working. Punishing Russia economically is suring up Putin's position domestically, NATO's expansion is strengthening the China-Russia alignment, and military assistance to Ukraine without direct NATO involvement is merely protracting the war, with no clear end in sight. Given the geopolitical deadlock, the only viable option would be for the West to broker a neutrality status for Ukraine. It will be a difficult deal, with lots of costly compromises, but at this point it's the only geopolitical solution available.
This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India ... more This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China's official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime's official media outlets would speak of China-India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia-India-China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China's security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
This article attempts to advance the neoclassical realist framework by elaborating on the interac... more This article attempts to advance the neoclassical realist framework by elaborating on the interaction between system-level and unit-level factors in the formation of states’ behavior. With an empirical focus on post-Cold War China–Russia relations, which represent the ambivalent combination of a consistently growing strategic entente and a simultaneous reluctance to form a full-fledged political-military alliance, this study establishes two major unit-level factors – differing economic models and negative historical memories – that create hurdles for alliance formation between the two countries. However, under greater systemic pressure from the US-led unipolarity, China’s and Russia’s state leaders have not only increased bilateral military-to-military cooperation but have begun to actively implement policies to deliberately transform, if not remove, the existing non-systemic hurdles. Therefore, the neoclassical realist framework can be understood and further tested as a dynamic int...
China is still claiming neutrality when it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As that positio... more China is still claiming neutrality when it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As that position is becoming increasingly unconvincing, the US is putting pressure on China to choose sides, threatening with economic sanctions if it continues its tacit support of Russia. But the deeper, structural, geopolitical factors in play mean that China’s alliance with Russia is here to stay. The US seems unwilling to recognise this, but does so at its peril.
Given the dynamic rise of China’s economic and political might it is essential to consider the ef... more Given the dynamic rise of China’s economic and political might it is essential to consider the effect demographic factors might have on the country’s foreign policy. Could the demographics be a potential driving force for China’s expansion or a restraint to Beijing’s foreign policy ambitions?
ERN: Government Expenditures & Health (Topic), 2011
Russian Abstract: С 2002 г. в сфере здравоохранения в Китае наблюдается переход от чрезмерной мар... more Russian Abstract: С 2002 г. в сфере здравоохранения в Китае наблюдается переход от чрезмерной маркетизации к новым формам государственного регулирования, предпринимаются попытки вновь сделать предоставление медико-санитарных услуг общественно финансируемой отраслью. Поиски оптимальной модели медицинского обеспечения представлены как процесс развития четырех независимых систем страхового охвата населения: базовой медицинской страховки для городских работников, новой кооперационной схемы медицинского страхования сельских жителей, системы страхования городских жителей и базовой схемы медицинского страхования для трудовых мигрантов; с их последующей интеграцией во всеобщий страховой план, принятый в марте 2009 г. По прошествии нескольких десятилетий рыночных реформ китайское руководство старается вновь включиться в управление здравоохранением и сделать его эффективным инструментом институционального строительства.English Abstract: Transition used to be seen as a unidirectional process: ...
Russia’s policies regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are more complex than they might se... more Russia’s policies regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are more complex than they might seem. Moscow’s official posi on presents Russia as an extra‐regional actor with no stakes in the dispute. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia “had never been a par cipant of the South China Sea disputes” and considers it “a ma er of principle not to side with any party.” However, behind the façade of formal disengagement are Russia’s military build‐up in the Asia‐Pacific region, and the mul ‐billion dollar arms and energy deals with the rival claimants. These factors reveal that even though Moscow may not have direct territorial claims in the SCS, it has strategic goals, interests, and ac ons that have direct bearing on how the SCS dispute evolves.
Russian Abstract: Обзор 26-го Международного симпозиума Ассоциации китайских политических исследо... more Russian Abstract: Обзор 26-го Международного симпозиума Ассоциации китайских политических исследований в Сан-Хосе.English Abstract: Review of the 26th International Symposium of the Association of Chinese Political Studies at San Jose.
Вестник Московского Университета. Серия XXV. Международные отношения и мировая политика, 2021
С о времени распада СССР отношения между Китаем и Россией демонстрируют устойчивую позитивную дин... more С о времени распада СССР отношения между Китаем и Россией демонстрируют устойчивую позитивную динамику, по многим параметрам приближаясь к стратегическому союзу. При этом большинство попыток выявления причин этого сближения, как правило, ограничиваются указанием на продолжающееся ухудшение отношений этих стран с Западом, прежде всего США. Однако такой подход представляется недостаточным, поскольку не позволяет в полной мере выявить детерминанты российско-китайского сближения и оценить устойчивость данной тенденции. В представленной статье на основе современных наработок в теории формирования стратегических межгосударственных союзов предпринята попытка дать комплексную оценку причин формирования и эволюции отношений Российской Федерации и КНР, связав их с общей логикой развития системы международных отношений в постбиполярный период. Для этого автор предлагает опереться на эпистемологический потенциал трех основных подходов к объяснению причин формирования стратегических союзов, представленных концепциями «баланса сил», «баланса угроз» и «баланса интересов». При этом предлагается проанализировать российско-китайское взаимодействие не только с точки зрения изменений внутри каждого из этих балансов по отдельности, но и с позиции их взаимного переплетения и взаимного влияния. Подобный подход позволил показать, что после окончания холодной войны динамика изменений в рамках всех трех балансов объективно способствует более тесному стратегическому сотрудничеству Китая и России, в основе которого лежит комплекс представлений о США как главном источнике угроз национальной безопасности двух стран и о многополярности как оптимальном принципе организации системы международных отношений. Проведенный анализ позволяет говорить о том, что как минимум в среднесрочной перспективе динамика и общее направление российско-китайских отношений в сторону укрепления двусторонней координации не только сохранятся, но и, с большой долей вероятности, получат новый импульс к оформлению в качестве полноценного союза. [Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a significant and consistent progress on a number of issues advancing to the strategic alliance. However, the existing explanations of such progress have rarely gone beyond simple recognition of the continuous deterioration of relations between these countries and the West, particularly the United States. However, such explanations seem insufficient since they do not reveal the key determinants of the Russian-Chinese alignment and cannot help assess the sustainability of this trend. In order to provide a comprehensive and methodologically consistent assessment of the main drivers of the China-Russia relations within the framework of the post-Cold War international system evolution, this paper draws on the latest findings in the theory of international alliances. To this end, the author harnesses the epistemological potential of the three main approaches to the root causes of interstate strategic alliances, namely the ‘balance of power’, the ‘balance of threat’ and the ‘balance of interests’. The paper examines the Russian-Chinese cooperation both within the framework of each of these three balances separately and in their interrelatedness and interdependence. The author shows that trend towards a closer strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the post-Cold War period stemmed from the inner dynamics of all of these balances. This strategic alignment is based on a complex of shared views on the United States as the main source of threats for national security and the commitment of both states to the idea of a multipolar world. The author concludes that not only will the trend towards strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation continue, at least in the medium term, but it can receive a new impetus to evolve into a full-fledged alliance.]
Explores the current state and future implications of China-Russia cooperation in the area of str... more Explores the current state and future implications of China-Russia cooperation in the area of strategic arms, such as missile attack early warning systems.
This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India ... more This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China-India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia-India-China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Aug 28, 2024
Many assessments of the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have emphasized Vladimir Putin’s... more Many assessments of the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have emphasized Vladimir Putin’s individual characteristics, such as his early career as a KGB officer, imperial ambitions towards Ukraine, or belief in Ukraine’s cultural affinity to Russia. This article argues that the invasion can be better explained by offensive geopolitical rationality. Putin got a few things about the war in Ukraine wrong; however, from a geopolitical standpoint, he also got a few things right. These include the limits of the West’s support for Ukraine, the willingness of other non-Western countries to cooperate with Russia, and the limited impact of Western sanctions on Russia. In turn, this makes Russia difficult for the West to handle but also encourages the development of a more nuanced and potentially effective response that takes geopolitics into consideration.
For more than two decades, Australia successfully balanced its economic ties with China, its most... more For more than two decades, Australia successfully balanced its economic ties with China, its most significant economic partner, and its security alliance with the United States, its core ally. That era has ended. As US-China tensions escalate, Canberra faces difficult choices between the two great powers. The signing of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) security pact in 2021 and other measures perceived as anti-China alignments signal that Canberra has abandoned its hedging strategy, siding with Washington against Beijing. This article critically examines this foreign policy shift from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. By placing Australia's situation in a comparative context, it argues that for a middle power, unequivocally siding with one great power against another is a risky geopolitical move that could further intensify great-power rivalry.
European Journal of International Security , Sep 20, 2024
Despite being ubiquitously used, the concept of alignment remains inchoate. Existing literature o... more Despite being ubiquitously used, the concept of alignment remains inchoate. Existing literature offers more than 30 interpretations of the term and very few attempts to develop an objective indicators-based metric of alignment. This state of the field makes assessments of the degree to which states are aligned problematic. This article systematises the theoretical knowledge about alliances, alignments, strategic partnerships, and other forms of cooperation and draws on some empirical observations to develop a ‘stadial model of alignment formation’ (SMAF). The model conceptualises, operationalises, measures, and explains interstate alignment with greater precision and consistency. It also includes the explanatory factors in the form of the three balances – the balance of power, the balance of threat, and the balance of interest – and connections between them located along the stages of alignment formation. As such, the SMAF framework gauges the relative scale and depth of strategic alignments and can facilitate comparative analysis.
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2024
As tensions between the US and China continue to grow and efforts to ‘friend-shore’ supply chains... more As tensions between the US and China continue to grow and efforts to ‘friend-shore’ supply chains gather pace, Australia is being forced to make a difficult choice when it comes to the future of its critical minerals strategy.
For almost two decades, Canberra hedged its economic and security bets between China – its most s... more For almost two decades, Canberra hedged its economic and security bets between China – its most significant economic partner – and the United States – its core security ally – rather successfully, with Australian policymakers announcing that the country would not have to choose between the two great powers and that there are ways to maintain a tight alliance with the US while enhancing friendship and cooperation with China. However, Australia-China relations started to deteriorate in the mid-2010s, with Canberra effectively giving up on hedging by signing in 2021 the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) security pact and undertaking other steps that have been widely received as unequivocally joining the US’s effort to contain China. This article explores Australia’s foreign policy transformation by conceptualising it as a transition from hedging to balancing against China. It develops a theoretical argument about why an essential middle power might decide to give up on hedging and start balancing. It argues that the end of hedging in Australia’s China policy is a result of disappearing structural uncertainty and systemic permissiveness on which hedging, as a pattern of smaller power behaviour, is premised. As such, the article contributes to the knowledge about hedging by highlighting the limitations of smaller power hedging.
The western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine was supposed to help the latter by punishing... more The western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine was supposed to help the latter by punishing the former. That strategy isn't working. Punishing Russia economically is suring up Putin's position domestically, NATO's expansion is strengthening the China-Russia alignment, and military assistance to Ukraine without direct NATO involvement is merely protracting the war, with no clear end in sight. Given the geopolitical deadlock, the only viable option would be for the West to broker a neutrality status for Ukraine. It will be a difficult deal, with lots of costly compromises, but at this point it's the only geopolitical solution available.
This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India ... more This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China's official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime's official media outlets would speak of China-India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia-India-China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China's security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
This article attempts to advance the neoclassical realist framework by elaborating on the interac... more This article attempts to advance the neoclassical realist framework by elaborating on the interaction between system-level and unit-level factors in the formation of states’ behavior. With an empirical focus on post-Cold War China–Russia relations, which represent the ambivalent combination of a consistently growing strategic entente and a simultaneous reluctance to form a full-fledged political-military alliance, this study establishes two major unit-level factors – differing economic models and negative historical memories – that create hurdles for alliance formation between the two countries. However, under greater systemic pressure from the US-led unipolarity, China’s and Russia’s state leaders have not only increased bilateral military-to-military cooperation but have begun to actively implement policies to deliberately transform, if not remove, the existing non-systemic hurdles. Therefore, the neoclassical realist framework can be understood and further tested as a dynamic int...
China is still claiming neutrality when it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As that positio... more China is still claiming neutrality when it comes to Russia’s war against Ukraine. As that position is becoming increasingly unconvincing, the US is putting pressure on China to choose sides, threatening with economic sanctions if it continues its tacit support of Russia. But the deeper, structural, geopolitical factors in play mean that China’s alliance with Russia is here to stay. The US seems unwilling to recognise this, but does so at its peril.
Given the dynamic rise of China’s economic and political might it is essential to consider the ef... more Given the dynamic rise of China’s economic and political might it is essential to consider the effect demographic factors might have on the country’s foreign policy. Could the demographics be a potential driving force for China’s expansion or a restraint to Beijing’s foreign policy ambitions?
ERN: Government Expenditures & Health (Topic), 2011
Russian Abstract: С 2002 г. в сфере здравоохранения в Китае наблюдается переход от чрезмерной мар... more Russian Abstract: С 2002 г. в сфере здравоохранения в Китае наблюдается переход от чрезмерной маркетизации к новым формам государственного регулирования, предпринимаются попытки вновь сделать предоставление медико-санитарных услуг общественно финансируемой отраслью. Поиски оптимальной модели медицинского обеспечения представлены как процесс развития четырех независимых систем страхового охвата населения: базовой медицинской страховки для городских работников, новой кооперационной схемы медицинского страхования сельских жителей, системы страхования городских жителей и базовой схемы медицинского страхования для трудовых мигрантов; с их последующей интеграцией во всеобщий страховой план, принятый в марте 2009 г. По прошествии нескольких десятилетий рыночных реформ китайское руководство старается вновь включиться в управление здравоохранением и сделать его эффективным инструментом институционального строительства.English Abstract: Transition used to be seen as a unidirectional process: ...
Russia’s policies regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are more complex than they might se... more Russia’s policies regarding the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are more complex than they might seem. Moscow’s official posi on presents Russia as an extra‐regional actor with no stakes in the dispute. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Russia “had never been a par cipant of the South China Sea disputes” and considers it “a ma er of principle not to side with any party.” However, behind the façade of formal disengagement are Russia’s military build‐up in the Asia‐Pacific region, and the mul ‐billion dollar arms and energy deals with the rival claimants. These factors reveal that even though Moscow may not have direct territorial claims in the SCS, it has strategic goals, interests, and ac ons that have direct bearing on how the SCS dispute evolves.
Russian Abstract: Обзор 26-го Международного симпозиума Ассоциации китайских политических исследо... more Russian Abstract: Обзор 26-го Международного симпозиума Ассоциации китайских политических исследований в Сан-Хосе.English Abstract: Review of the 26th International Symposium of the Association of Chinese Political Studies at San Jose.
Вестник Московского Университета. Серия XXV. Международные отношения и мировая политика, 2021
С о времени распада СССР отношения между Китаем и Россией демонстрируют устойчивую позитивную дин... more С о времени распада СССР отношения между Китаем и Россией демонстрируют устойчивую позитивную динамику, по многим параметрам приближаясь к стратегическому союзу. При этом большинство попыток выявления причин этого сближения, как правило, ограничиваются указанием на продолжающееся ухудшение отношений этих стран с Западом, прежде всего США. Однако такой подход представляется недостаточным, поскольку не позволяет в полной мере выявить детерминанты российско-китайского сближения и оценить устойчивость данной тенденции. В представленной статье на основе современных наработок в теории формирования стратегических межгосударственных союзов предпринята попытка дать комплексную оценку причин формирования и эволюции отношений Российской Федерации и КНР, связав их с общей логикой развития системы международных отношений в постбиполярный период. Для этого автор предлагает опереться на эпистемологический потенциал трех основных подходов к объяснению причин формирования стратегических союзов, представленных концепциями «баланса сил», «баланса угроз» и «баланса интересов». При этом предлагается проанализировать российско-китайское взаимодействие не только с точки зрения изменений внутри каждого из этих балансов по отдельности, но и с позиции их взаимного переплетения и взаимного влияния. Подобный подход позволил показать, что после окончания холодной войны динамика изменений в рамках всех трех балансов объективно способствует более тесному стратегическому сотрудничеству Китая и России, в основе которого лежит комплекс представлений о США как главном источнике угроз национальной безопасности двух стран и о многополярности как оптимальном принципе организации системы международных отношений. Проведенный анализ позволяет говорить о том, что как минимум в среднесрочной перспективе динамика и общее направление российско-китайских отношений в сторону укрепления двусторонней координации не только сохранятся, но и, с большой долей вероятности, получат новый импульс к оформлению в качестве полноценного союза. [Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a significant and consistent progress on a number of issues advancing to the strategic alliance. However, the existing explanations of such progress have rarely gone beyond simple recognition of the continuous deterioration of relations between these countries and the West, particularly the United States. However, such explanations seem insufficient since they do not reveal the key determinants of the Russian-Chinese alignment and cannot help assess the sustainability of this trend. In order to provide a comprehensive and methodologically consistent assessment of the main drivers of the China-Russia relations within the framework of the post-Cold War international system evolution, this paper draws on the latest findings in the theory of international alliances. To this end, the author harnesses the epistemological potential of the three main approaches to the root causes of interstate strategic alliances, namely the ‘balance of power’, the ‘balance of threat’ and the ‘balance of interests’. The paper examines the Russian-Chinese cooperation both within the framework of each of these three balances separately and in their interrelatedness and interdependence. The author shows that trend towards a closer strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the post-Cold War period stemmed from the inner dynamics of all of these balances. This strategic alignment is based on a complex of shared views on the United States as the main source of threats for national security and the commitment of both states to the idea of a multipolar world. The author concludes that not only will the trend towards strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation continue, at least in the medium term, but it can receive a new impetus to evolve into a full-fledged alliance.]
Explores the current state and future implications of China-Russia cooperation in the area of str... more Explores the current state and future implications of China-Russia cooperation in the area of strategic arms, such as missile attack early warning systems.
This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India ... more This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China-India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia-India-China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.
Post-Cold War China-Russia strategic cooperation has displayed significant development and become... more Post-Cold War China-Russia strategic cooperation has displayed significant development and become an increasingly important factor in contemporary international politics. However, there has been no theory-grounded framework and corresponding measurements that would allow an accurate and systematic assessment of the level of China-Russia alignment and its progress over time. How closely aligned are China and Russia? How to define and measure strategic alignments between states? This book bridges area studies and International Relations literature to develop a set of objective criteria to measure and explain the development of strategic alignment in post-Cold War China-Russia relations. It establishes that on a range of criteria, China-Russia alignment is moving towards a full-fledged alliance. It is solid and comprehensive and continues to show a consistent incremental upward trend. There are strong structural incentives for furthering the China-Russia alignment, and there is little that might hinder the effective functioning of a China-Russia alliance. The alignment framework developed in the book can be applied to other cases of interstate strategic cooperation to facilitate comparisons between different strategic alignments.
This thought-provoking book, edited by Jing Huang and Alexander Korolev, redefines the complex po... more This thought-provoking book, edited by Jing Huang and Alexander Korolev, redefines the complex political and economic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. Written by internationally recognized experts from Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, Norway and Singapore, it provides an in-depth analysis of international cooperation in the development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia. It explores the geo-economic and geopolitical standing of ‘Pacific Russia’, and examines both the factors that lie behind, and the mechanisms that allow its integration into Asia. The authors argue that such development is essential for diversifying Russia’s economy, but that this turn to Asia is still inconsistent and would benefit from being truly international and multilateral. The protracted crisis in relations between Russia and the West, they point out, has only made it more significant. This edited volume will appeal to political scientists, economists, scholars of development studies and international relations, and policy-makers.
A review of Michał Lubina, ed., Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable an... more A review of Michał Lubina, ed., Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful (Opladen, Berlin & Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2017), 325p. 50,47 € hardback
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Papers by Alexander Korolev
[Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a significant and consistent progress on a number of issues advancing to the strategic alliance. However, the existing explanations of such progress have rarely gone beyond simple recognition of the continuous deterioration of relations between these countries and the West, particularly the United States. However, such explanations seem insufficient since they do not reveal the key determinants of the Russian-Chinese alignment and cannot help assess the sustainability of this trend. In order to provide a comprehensive and methodologically consistent assessment of the main drivers of the China-Russia relations within the framework of the post-Cold War international system evolution, this paper draws on the latest findings in the theory of international alliances. To this end, the author harnesses the epistemological potential of the three main approaches to the root causes of interstate strategic alliances, namely the ‘balance of power’, the ‘balance of threat’ and the ‘balance of interests’. The paper examines the Russian-Chinese cooperation both within the framework of each of these three balances separately and in their interrelatedness and interdependence. The author shows that trend towards a closer strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the post-Cold War period stemmed from the inner dynamics of all of these balances. This strategic alignment is based on a complex of shared views on the United States as the main source of threats for national security and the commitment of both states to the idea of a multipolar world. The author concludes that not only will the trend towards strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation continue, at least in the medium term, but it can receive a new impetus to evolve into a full-fledged alliance.]
[Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China-Russia relations have demonstrated a significant and consistent progress on a number of issues advancing to the strategic alliance. However, the existing explanations of such progress have rarely gone beyond simple recognition of the continuous deterioration of relations between these countries and the West, particularly the United States. However, such explanations seem insufficient since they do not reveal the key determinants of the Russian-Chinese alignment and cannot help assess the sustainability of this trend. In order to provide a comprehensive and methodologically consistent assessment of the main drivers of the China-Russia relations within the framework of the post-Cold War international system evolution, this paper draws on the latest findings in the theory of international alliances. To this end, the author harnesses the epistemological potential of the three main approaches to the root causes of interstate strategic alliances, namely the ‘balance of power’, the ‘balance of threat’ and the ‘balance of interests’. The paper examines the Russian-Chinese cooperation both within the framework of each of these three balances separately and in their interrelatedness and interdependence. The author shows that trend towards a closer strategic cooperation between China and Russia in the post-Cold War period stemmed from the inner dynamics of all of these balances. This strategic alignment is based on a complex of shared views on the United States as the main source of threats for national security and the commitment of both states to the idea of a multipolar world. The author concludes that not only will the trend towards strengthening Russian-Chinese cooperation continue, at least in the medium term, but it can receive a new impetus to evolve into a full-fledged alliance.]