Papers by Evan Keeling
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2024
It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capa... more It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia. Phantasia, usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for perception first: phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia, and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance.
The volumes published in the series Beiträge zur Altertumskunde comprise monographs, collective v... more The volumes published in the series Beiträge zur Altertumskunde comprise monographs, collective volumes, editions, translations and commentaries on various topics from the fi elds of Greek and Latin Philology, Ancient History, Archeology, Ancient Philosophy as well as Classical Reception Studies. The series thus offers indispensable research tools for a wide range of disciplines related to Ancient Studies.
Rhizomata, 2023
This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras’ measure doctrine (M) and t... more This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras’ measure doctrine (M) and the self-refutation argument (SRA). First, I argue that the relevant interpretation of (M) has it that every individual human being determines all her own truths, including the truth of (M) itself. I then turn to what I take to be the most important move in the SRA: that Protagoras recognises not only that his opponents disagree with him about the truth of (M), but also that they hold that (M) is false simpliciter . By recognising that his opponents do not make the relativising concession he makes for them, he is forced to accept that (M) is false. I go on to argue that several other defenders of the SRA end up with a regress which is difficult to end and might not favour anti-Protagoreans. On my reading, by recognising what his opponents believe, Protagoras is barred from adding qualifiers, and the possible regress doesn’t get off the ground. I conclude with brief discussions of how Protagoras might try to avoid the result of the SRA and the argument’s role in this part of the Theaetetus.
History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2022
Aristotle’s theory of perception is complicated by the fact that he recognizes three kinds of per... more Aristotle’s theory of perception is complicated by the fact that he recognizes three kinds of perceptible object: special, common, and incidental, all of which have different levels of reliability. Focusing on De Anima 3.3, 428b17–25, this paper discusses why these three sorts of perception are true and false. It argues that perceptions of special objects can be false because of the blind-spot phenomenon and that common objects are typically perceived as predicated of an incidental object. This helps explain why perceptions of common objects are the most error prone. The paper ends with a suggestion about the importance of predicational perception for Aristotle’s epistemology.
Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux, 2021
(From Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereu... more (From Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux)
This paper discusses a table-turning argument from Aristotle's Protrepticus. I argue that it successfully refutes an extreme anti-philosophy position and make some suggestions about the argument's place in the Protrepticus as a whole.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2020
Plato's Theaetetus discusses and ultimately rejects Protagoras's famous claim that "man is the me... more Plato's Theaetetus discusses and ultimately rejects Protagoras's famous claim that "man is the measure of all things." The most famous of Plato's arguments is the Self-Refutation Argument. But he offers a number of other arguments as well, including one that I call the 'Future Argument.' This argument, which appears at Theaetetus 178a−179b, is quite different from the earlier Self-Refutation Argument. I argue that it is directed mainly at a part of the Protagorean view not addressed before , namely, that all beliefs concerning one's own future sensible qualities are true. This part of the view is found to be inconsistent with Protagoras's own conception of wisdom as expertise and with his own pretenses at expertise in teaching.
Psychology and Ontology in Plato, 2019
This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks d... more This paper is a test case for the claim, made famous by Myles Burnyeat, that the ancient Greeks did not recognize subjective truth or knowledge. After a brief discussion of the issue in Sextus Empiricus, I then turn to Plato's discussion of Protagorean views in the Theaetetus. In at least two passages, it seems that Plato attributes to Protagoras the view that our subjective experiences constitute truth and knowledge, without reference to any outside world of objects. I argue that these passages have been misunderstood and that on the correct reading, they do not say anything about subjective knowledge. I then try out what I take to be the correct reading of the passages. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of causes in Greek epistemology.
Ancient Philosophy, 2015
Towards the beginning of the self-refutation argument, at 171a1-6, Socrates reaches the conclusio... more Towards the beginning of the self-refutation argument, at 171a1-6, Socrates reaches the conclusion that even if Protagoras believes his Truth, it is still more false than true. This conclusion is puzzling in that it is unclear why it should worry a Protagorean. I argue that the passage presents a genuine dilemma between Protagoras’ claims that we can judge only of our own private worlds and that cities have collective judgements.
Apeiron, 2012
In this essay I argue that the central problem of Aristotle's Metaphysics H (VIII) 6 is the unity... more In this essay I argue that the central problem of Aristotle's Metaphysics H (VIII) 6 is the unity of forms and that he solves this problem in just the way he solves the problem of the unity of compositesby hylomorphism. I also discuss the matterform relationship in H 6, arguing that they have a correlative nature as the matter of the form and the form of the matter.
Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 2013
In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all ... more In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle's arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle's arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, and (b) import another of Protagoras' views, namely the claim that there are always two logoi opposed to one another.
Co-edited Books by Evan Keeling
Springer, 2019
This edited volume brings together contributions from prominent scholars to discuss new approache... more This edited volume brings together contributions from prominent scholars to discuss new approaches to Plato's philosophy, especially in the burgeoning fields of Platonic ontology and psychology. Topics such as the relationship between mind, soul and emotions, as well as the connection between ontology and ethics are discussed through the analyses of dialogues from Plato's middle and late periods, such as the Republic, Symposium, Theaetetus, Timaeus and Laws. These works are being increasingly studied both as precursors for Aristotelian philosophy and in their own right, and the analyses included in this volume reveal some new interpretations of topics such as Plato's attitude towards artistic imagination and the possibility of speaking of a teleology in Plato. Focusing on hot topics in the area, Psychology and Ontology in Plato provides a good sense of what is happening in Platonic scholarship worldwide and will be of interest to academic researchers and teachers interested in ancient philosophy, ontology and philosophical psychology.
De Gruyter, 2021
Volume of essays in honor of Daniel Devereux. The volume explores the themes of love, friendship... more Volume of essays in honor of Daniel Devereux. The volume explores the themes of love, friendship, and wisdom in Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicureans. 391 in the Series Beiträge zur Altertumskunde.
Book Reviews by Evan Keeling
Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2022
Full review here: https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2022/2022.08.20/
The Classical Review, 2021
with approval by such an audience requires that one (also) appear to endorse such views (see p. 1... more with approval by such an audience requires that one (also) appear to endorse such views (see p. 161 with 154). Socrates and his ethic are a voice in the wilderness. B. relies heavily on subtle dramatic and literary detail in weaving his exegesis. He gives the impression of being more excited by an interesting interpretative possibility than fastidiously concerned with nailing things down. This can sometimes result in intriguing but under-motivated interpretations (e.g. his claim that Glaucon and Adeimantus remain firmly entrenched in the pleonectic ethic despite their approval of Socrates' defence of justice in the dialogue at pp. 21-2). B. is at his best when the interpretative scope is narrow and textually focused. In these contexts he is a maestro at unpacking the possible interpretative implications of literary and dramatic detail (e.g. his enlightening discussion of Socrates' interpretation of the vexed 'willingly' line of Simonides' ode at pp. 88-94). The book is written in a lively style and is infused with humour and wit. B.'s delight in hunting down the subtle twists and turns of Platonic drama and wringing out their every interpretative drop is palpable.
Uploads
Papers by Evan Keeling
This paper discusses a table-turning argument from Aristotle's Protrepticus. I argue that it successfully refutes an extreme anti-philosophy position and make some suggestions about the argument's place in the Protrepticus as a whole.
Co-edited Books by Evan Keeling
Book Reviews by Evan Keeling
This paper discusses a table-turning argument from Aristotle's Protrepticus. I argue that it successfully refutes an extreme anti-philosophy position and make some suggestions about the argument's place in the Protrepticus as a whole.