Kristian Lopez

ABSTRACT We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single- or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, leads to inefficiency with or without resale possibility. Our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to the no resale case. However, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment. Preventing resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format.

This document presents a theoretical simple frame to analyze the role of the level and the uncertainty of the revenue as determinants of the demand of telephony fixes in terms of access and use. Especially it appears as an increase of the uncertainty in the revenue discourages the access and the use of the service of telephony on the part of the home. In addition, like example, an exercise of simulation develops for a population of homes which have equal preferences but are affected on a distribution of the income.

Luego de alcanzar un pico histórico en 1986, el salario mínimo sufrió una caída estrepitosa, junto con el nivel medio de las remuneraciones, hasta inicios de los noventas. Sin embargo, desde mediados de los noventas se ha incrementado considerablemente, acercándose al nivel promedio de las remuneraciones tanto de trabajadores no calificados como de informales. Este estudio describe el marco institucional