Papers by Michael Buttrey
Religious Studies and Theology, Dec 18, 2020
This article evaluates Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach for its treatment of disability an... more This article evaluates Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach for its treatment of disability and philosophical grounding. A summary of Nussbaum’s claims on how her theory includes people with disabilities is followed by Eva Kittay’s demonstration that in Nussbaum’s approach exclusion results from the ambiguous role of human dignity. The argument then shows that Jean Porter’s appeals to virtue and human nature provide stronger philosophical grounding for making judgments about human flourishing than Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism, insufficient to account for her theory of capabilities. While Porter’s account of human nature does not escape Shane Clifton and Hans Reinders’ concerns about the exclusion of people with disabilities from the human ideal, her and John Berkman’s recovery of Thomistic ideas of infused virtue and grace do provide a more inclusive concept of the human telos.
Toronto Journal of Theology, 2015
Toronto Journal of Theology, 2014
Speaking of Dying is dedicated to the memory of Janet Goldsmith, the student, daughter, and siste... more Speaking of Dying is dedicated to the memory of Janet Goldsmith, the student, daughter, and sister of authors Fred Craddock, Dale Goldsmith, and Joy Goldsmith. As they explain, Janet’s premature death while pastoring a church unable to discuss or even admit that she was dying challenged them, and after hearing similar stories about other churches, they realized there was a need to recover a theology of dying akin to the pre-modern tradition of the art of dying. As they put it, ‘‘We do not claim novelty; rather, we offer reminders of the gospel resources available to the dying’’ (xviii). The authors begin by presenting their study of ten churches where a pastor died while leading their congregation. What they found was a consistent tendency to avoid, deny, or even actively conceal the pastors’ terminal illness, often by continuing their preaching responsibilities as long as possible, while refusing to discuss how to care for a dying pastor. Almost all of the churches suffered as a result, losing members, churning through subsequent pastors, and in several cases splitting into factions or multiple congregations. But the greatest failure the authors saw was the inability to consider death and dying in the context of the Christian tradition. From their interviews with staff and congregants in all ten churches, they were surprised that ‘‘not one word was spoken . . . that could be construed as carrying any apparently Christian faith connection’’ (22). Instead, the subject of dying was kept away from the public face of the church and discussed solely in medical and bureaucratic terms, if at all. The authors focus on the death of pastors only to illustrate the Church’s more general failure to address dying. They argue the Church has conflated trust in the promise of medicine to overcome illness and suffering with a peculiarly Christian triumphalism that refuses to accept any defeat, including the presumed failure of death. Thus, a Christian theology of dying is needed, and a theology of dying, not of death, because the key questions are not about heaven, hell, and the afterlife, but ‘‘what we experience before death’’ (54). To construct this theology, the authors turn first to the story of how Jesus lived and died. For example, they highlight how Jesus’s life was lived in anticipation of dying, with all four Gospels foreshadowing his death early on. Yet like many Christians today, Peter’s instinctive response to the prospect of death was denial. Jesus, in contrast, did not indulge in denial but openly lamented his rejection by his people and by God. Such observations may appear basic, but the authors contend that the churches they examined lacked any instinct to see the life of Jesus as an example for Christian dying. In later chapters they reflect on the meaning of baptism and the Eucharist for the practice of dying; the power of Jesus’s last words on the cross, and the importance of preaching on dying in the regular life of the Church, not just at funerals. Particularly striking is the catholicity of the list of witnesses whose lives and deaths they commend to modern Christians, ranging from Ignatius of Antioch and Julian of Norwich to Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Flannery O’Connor. Finally, the authors close with an acronym, TABLE, summarizing their practical suggestions to promote Talk, Awareness, the Body of Christ, Listening Deeply, and the Eucharist. Speaking of Dying is an accessible, nuanced, and rich book on a vital but neglected subject. Its Christological approach makes it a fitting companion to recent works on dying by established theologians like Vigen Guroian, John Swinton, and Allen Verhey. If the book has a weakness, it is perhaps the writing, which occasionally drifts into the bureaucratic language the authors criticize. Also, as a work of constructive theology, it may not be suitable to introduce during a crisis. Still, I would recommend Speaking of Dying to any student, pastor, or church that wishes to begin a deeper conversation about the art of dying well.
Toronto Journal of Theology, 2015
Religions
The three authors of this article explore the intersection of moral enhancement, ethics, and Chri... more The three authors of this article explore the intersection of moral enhancement, ethics, and Christianity. Trothen reviews the meaning and potential of moral enhancements, considering some of the risks and limitations. Trothen identifies three broad ethical questions, which all three authors agree upon, that arise from a Christian theological perspective: what it means to be human, choice, and social justice. Trothen concludes that respect for human dignity and social justice requires rejecting a reductive view of moral improvement as purely biochemical. Buttrey then argues that biomedical moral enhancement (BME) is simply one in a series of attempts to morally improve human beings and can be compared to other efforts such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. He argues that BME cannot be simultaneously more reliable than moral education in virtue and no more restrictive of human freedom. He concludes by suggesting that tensions between BME and Thomistic virtue are even stronger due to...
Religious Studies and Theology, 2020
Together with Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has pioneered the capabilities approach, a model of hu... more Together with Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has pioneered the capabilities approach, a model of human flourishing that has been influential in political philosophy, public policy, and development economics. In contrast to models that measure development in terms of Gross Domestic Product or individual satisfaction, the capabilities approach proposes a heterogeneous list of abilities and freedoms required for human dignity. In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum argues her approach is more inclusive of people with disabilities than John Rawls’ social contract theory. She also questions if disability scholar Eva Kittay’s ethic of care undermines societal responsibility to develop the capability for independence among people with disabilities. In response, Kittay has raised concerns about the ambiguous role of human dignity as both a universal quality and a criterion for selecting capabilities in Nussbaum’s approach. In this paper, I consider the relationship between Nussbaum’s treatment of disability and the philosophical justification of her theory. First, I revisit the debate between Nussbaum and Kittay to argue Kittay’s concerns cannot be addressed without revising Nussbaum’s intuitive methodology. Next, I draw on the criticisms of philosopher John Clark and theologian Jean Porter to question how Nussbaum justifies her theory and its universal appeal. Clark and Porter both probe whether Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism is sufficient to account for her chosen capabilities in light of religious and cultural pluralism and claims for the value of cruelty or aggression. Finally, I conclude by highlighting Porter’s recovery of virtue and human nature in the Thomistic natural law tradition as elements that could credibly ground an alternative model of human flourishing, while also considering the risks concepts of virtue and human nature carry for the inclusion and status of people with disabilities.
History of the Human Sciences
The Hoffman Report scandal demonstrates that ethics is not objective and ahistorical, contradicti... more The Hoffman Report scandal demonstrates that ethics is not objective and ahistorical, contradicting the comforting progressive story about ethics many students receive. This modern-day ethical failure illustrates some of the weaknesses of the current ethics code: it is rule-based, emphasizes punishments for noncompliance, and assumes a rational actor who can make tricky ethical decisions using a cost–benefit analysis. This rational emphasis translates into pedagogy: the cure for unethical behavior is more education. Yet such an approach seems unlikely to foster ethical behavior in the real world, either for students or for mature scientists. This article argues for an alternative ethical system and a different way of teaching ethical behavior. Virtue ethics emphasizes the development of ethical habits and traits through regular practice and reflection. We show how virtue ethics complements a feminist approach to science, in which scientists are encouraged to reflect on their own bia...
Religions, 2022
The three authors of this article explore the intersection of moral enhancement, ethics, and Chri... more The three authors of this article explore the intersection of moral enhancement, ethics, and Christianity. Trothen reviews the meaning and potential of moral enhancements, considering some of the risks and limitations. Trothen identifies three broad ethical questions, which all three authors agree upon, that arise from a Christian theological perspective: what it means to be human, choice, and social justice. Trothen concludes that respect for human dignity and social justice requires rejecting a reductive view of moral improvement as purely biochemical. Buttrey then argues that biomedical moral enhancement (BME) is simply one in a series of attempts to morally improve human beings and can be compared to other efforts such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. He argues that BME cannot be simultaneously more reliable than moral education in virtue and no more restrictive of human freedom. He concludes by suggesting that tensions between BME and Thomistic virtue are even stronger due to Christian conceptions of martyrdom and radical self-denial. Finally, McQueen argues that Christianity emphasizes the common good and social justice as essential for human flourishing. Building on the foundation established by Trothen and Buttrey, McQueen insists that accurate cognitive knowledge is needed to make good conscience decisions, but emphasizes that right human action also requires the exercise of the will, which can be undermined by AI, automation, and perhaps also BME. She concludes by encouraging further attention to the true nature of human agency, human freedom, and wisdom in debates over AI and biomedical enhancement. The authors conclude that BMEs, if they become medically safe, may be theologically justifiable and helpful as a supplement to moral improvement.
Religious Studies and Theology, 2020
This article evaluates Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach for its treatment of disability an... more This article evaluates Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach for its treatment of disability and philosophical grounding. A summary of Nussbaum’s claims on how her theory includes people with disabilities is followed by Eva Kittay’s demonstration that in Nussbaum’s approach exclusion results from the ambiguous role of human dignity. The argument then shows that Jean Porter’s appeals to virtue and human nature provide stronger philosophical grounding for making judgments about human flourishing than Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism, insufficient to account for her theory of capabilities. While Porter’s account of human nature does not escape Shane Clifton and Hans Reinders’ concerns about the exclusion of people with disabilities from the human ideal, her and John Berkman’s recovery of Thomistic ideas of infused virtue and grace do provide a more inclusive concept of the human telos.
Didaskalia, 2015
Noted political theologian William Cavanaugh’s work challenges the modern compartmentalization of... more Noted political theologian William Cavanaugh’s work challenges the modern compartmentalization of religion and politics and advocates a greater role for the church in post-secular public life. Critics of his genealogical and ecclesiological agenda argue that Cavanaugh’s work harbours an illiberal understanding of politics and a triumphalist view of the church. In this essay we collectively explore this tension by contrasting these two aspects of Cavanaugh’s writings – the critical and the constructive – with the work of two different scholars: Lithuanian-French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas, and Canadian Catholic philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan. Michael Buttrey summarizes Cavanaugh’s critique of the modern concept of religion as a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon in The Myth of Religious Violence, connecting Cavanaugh’s critique to his efforts in Migrations of the Holy to free the church from captivity to the secular imagination of modernity. Drawing upon Lévinas’ ethics and political philosophy, Matthew Eaton suggests that violence in the political order exists regardless of who holds power, as politics and ethics are fundamentally irreconcilable notions. While justice may be achieved in a limited sense, Lévinas questions whether it is possible to discuss politics under the heading of ethics. While appreciative of certain aspects of Cavanaugh’s critique of modernity, Nicholas Olkovich argues that Cavanaugh’s genealogical propensities lead, in the limit case, to anthropological and soteriological positions that are in tension with Catholic teaching on natural law and the universality of God’s grace. Olkovich appeals to the transcultural dimensions of human knowing, choosing and religious experiencing that lie at the center of Lonergan’s transposition of Aquinas’ notions of nature and grace to offer an alternative reading of the relationship between the church and liberal democracy. Our extended discussion will close with a response by Buttrey to Eaton and Olkovich’s critiques.
Toronto Journal of Theology, 2015
In this response to Gerald McKenny’s “Evolution, Biotechnology, and the Normative Significance of... more In this response to Gerald McKenny’s “Evolution, Biotechnology, and the Normative Significance of Created Order,” John Berkman and Michael Buttrey suggest that McKenny has not adequately substantiated his claim that O’Donovan’s account of “created order” raises no in-principle objection to genetically “enhancing” children. Berkman and Buttrey frame an alternative reading of O’Donovan in light of O’Donovan’s emphasis on “ordered love” as the task of Christian ethics, and his resolutely Trinitarian theology of created order. Contending contra McKenny that created order inheres in human persons and not only human nature abstractly understood, Berkman and Buttrey argue that for O’Donovan an ineliminable aspect of ordered love of God and neighbour is respecting the primordial teleological order of human persons, especially parents’ rightly ordered love of the children entrusted to their care. In summary, Berkman and Buttrey conclude that unless McKenny puts O’Donovan’s account of created order in its Trinitarian context and connects it with O’Donovan’s rich account of ordered love, McKenny cannot make his case that O’Donovan’s account of created order raises no inherent moral objections to genetically enhancing our children.
Crux, 2010
Christian communities regularly celebrate new pregnancies, births, baptisms, and dedications toge... more Christian communities regularly celebrate new pregnancies, births, baptisms, and dedications together. But when prospective parents enter the obstetrician’s office, the ultrasound room, the genetic counselling clinic, or the abortion facility, they do so alone. In these environments, their church community and tradition is present to them only through the prayers of friends and family and through whatever good habits of memory, thought, imagination, and action they can recall under stress. For those who desire to worship God faithfully in the strange land of modern medicine, it is crucial that their communities help them inculcate the practices they need to be followers of Christ, even at times of crisis. One such crisis is when doctors recommend a genetic test or reveal there has been an “unexpected” result, and couples face decisions about prenatal screening, preimplantation screening, and genetic selection. In this paper, I propose six elements for a moral theology of reproductive genetic screening. A comprehensive moral theology is necessary, I argue, because mainstream Christian ethics too often considers screening only in terms of abortion and personhood. These discussions typically do not expose how demand for genetic screening is produced by our description of the world, our understanding of the purpose of children and the scope of suffering, and our fundamental vision of who we are and what we desire. My thesis is that these questions are best considered through the traditions of Christian theology and worship. To defend my claim, I will define genetic screening and why it is a concern, criticize a popular Christian bioethical analysis of screening (James C. Peterson’s Genetic Turning Points), and outline a more theological approach to genetic screening, one rooted in the shared practices of the church.
Presentations by Michael Buttrey
Sexual violence is a pervasive problem in higher education, including at Protestant seminaries an... more Sexual violence is a pervasive problem in higher education, including at Protestant seminaries and undergraduate institutions. Although governments have required post-secondary administrators to develop policies for responding to sexual assault and harassment, allegations of current and historic sexual violence continue to surface. Recent research on sexual assault and harassment has identified institutional norms and practices that determine how seriously allegations are treated in churches, higher education, and the workplace. However, there is limited research on how these institutional norms intersect with particular theological stances to hinder survivors of sexual violence in Christian higher education.
Our panel argues that diverse theological and institutional norms converge to enable gaslighting, victim blaming, and other practices of evasion in Protestant post-secondary institutions. As case studies, we will consider three institutions in two Protestant faith traditions: Anglican/Episcopal and Anabaptist/Mennonite. We will first identify how Anglican traditions of civil religion hierarchical power and Mennonite ideals of egalitarianism, peace, and separatism might justify norms of submission, loyalty, and pacification. We will then compare the responses to sexual misconduct by three institutions in these Protestant traditions as illustrating these norms and practices in action. Finally, we will offer recommendations for how staff and students can challenge destructive norms in Protestant higher education and push for practices of accountability that better support survivors of sexual violence.
The purpose of this event was to assist participants in thinking theologically and ethically abou... more The purpose of this event was to assist participants in thinking theologically and ethically about how gene-editing technology (esp. CRISPR) is challenging our understanding of what it means to be human, and how humans act as stewards of God’s creation. In the past 10 years, CRISPR technology has made a reality of human gene editing as well as creating novel genetically modified plants and animals. Applications include human health, human enhancement, food source enhancement, pest elimination, and the creation of innovative biological weapons. Using both an ethical and theological lens, our panel will guide our conversation on the potential risks and benefits of this new technology.
The past century has seen a great proliferation of ethics codes, not just for physicians and psyc... more The past century has seen a great proliferation of ethics codes, not just for physicians and psychologists but also for accountants, dentists, educators, engineers, journalists, lawyers, librarians, nurses, and politicians. Meanwhile, a variety of contemporary philosophers have criticized the view of ethics presupposed by many such codes. In her influential 1958 paper “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Elizabeth Anscombe argued that popular moral concepts of obligation and duty are survivals from a religious conception of ethics as law that has largely collapsed, making the special moral senses of “ought” or “should” unintelligible.
More recently, Candace Vogler has argued that even under objective theories of good and value, true ethical statements do not provide all rational agents with compelling reasons to act virtuously instead of viciously. Rather, Vogler agrees with Bernard Williams that reasons for acting, moral or otherwise, must connect with an agent’s “subjective motivational set” to have any guiding force. But if so, then to do constructive moral philosophy we need to follow Anscombe in recovering non-legal conceptions of ethics and investigating their moral psychology.
In my paper, I will draw on the work of Julia Annas, Rosalind Hursthouse, and other neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers to illustrate how virtue and virtuous action can be encouraged without implying ethics primarily consists of detailed rules or procedures for right action. I will then make some concrete suggestions for how the insights of virtue ethics may be applied to ethical training in professions like psychology.
In October 2016, The Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto released the first advertisement in th... more In October 2016, The Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto released the first advertisement in their new fundraising campaign. Titled “Anthem” and set to Donny Daydream’s “Undeniable,” the video presents a stirring montage of children donning face paint and combative outfits before they enter battlefields and boxing rings. The campaign garnered significant attention – and controversy: while many praised the message of empowerment, others were concerned about the implications for children with chronic and congenital diseases that are not easily cured, or conditions such as deafness and autism whose disease status is contested. Another common concern was the potential implication that children who die have been defeated, or even are losers. As Globe and Mail Health Columnist André Picard wrote, “After all, who doesn’t want to back a winner?” But to date, few have questioned the openly militant imagery used in the video, which places children on the front lines beside medieval knights and colonial soldiers, in the ring with boxers and wrestlers, and in the fantastical worlds of anime and superhero characters.
In our panel, we will develop a critique of battle imagery in healthcare and explore alternative models for understanding children and disease. In developing this critique, we will discuss the moral lives of children and potential conflicts in imagining children in warfare, even as a metaphor. We will consider whether fighting imagery in sports and superhero stories is significantly different than military metaphors. In order to accomplish this, we will consider the experiences of sick children and their ability to conceptualize and understand their lives and disease, drawing on available empirical research to consider the impact of this battle metaphor on the children. Finally, throughout our discussion we will draw on insights from theological discussions of war, pacifism, and martyrdom in the Christian tradition.
Philosophers from Plato to Hume have held the rational faculties blameless for moral error, charg... more Philosophers from Plato to Hume have held the rational faculties blameless for moral error, charging the emotions with clouding the intellect, enslaving reason, and inciting wrongdoing. A similar perspective can also be found in some Catholic theology, such as D.M Prümmer’s classic manual of moral theology and the influential “New Natural Law” theory developed by Germain Grisez in collaboration with philosophers John Finnis and Joseph Boyle. Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle claim that “to be morally good is precisely to be completely reasonable,” and submit that immoral choices are made possible through the influence of irrational emotions. However, contemporary Thomists such as Nicholas Lombardo, Robert Pasnau, Servais Pinckaers, and Michael Sherwin have argued Thomas Aquinas held a different view of what we call emotions, a modern category that overlaps with Aquinas’ passions. For Aquinas, the passions “have a natural aptitude to obey reason” and are only one of three possible causes of sin; the will also influences reason and is responsible for intemperance and malice, and reason itself can be ignorant.
In this paper, I draw on recent scholarship to contrast Grisez et al’s understanding of moral error with that of Thomas Aquinas. First, I argue Aquinas’s theological confidence in created human nature allowed him to depart from prior philosophy and develop a positive anthropology of embodied emotion. Next, I contend that despite appeals to Aquinas, New Natural Law neglects key details of his understanding of the will and the passions, leading them to an unnecessary dichotomy between moral reason and immoral emotion. Finally, I illustrate how Aquinas’s emphasis on the perfection of the passions through the cultivation of moral skills or virtues offers a more constructive, practical, and applicable moral pedagogy than that found in the moral manuals and continued in New Natural Law.
Apart from popular television portrayals (e.g. Dr. McCoy in “Star Trek”), the emotional doctor is... more Apart from popular television portrayals (e.g. Dr. McCoy in “Star Trek”), the emotional doctor is rarely celebrated. Medical professionals often speak of their craft in passionate terms, but medical texts typically promote the ideal of detached, objective, scientific medicine, and even works dealing specifically with emotion focus on the dangers of becoming “enmeshed” in patient emotions (Zabarenko and Zabarenko, 1978) and dispense advice on medical emotional “management.” (Sotile and Sotile, 2002) But in recent years bioethicists (Callahan, 1988), neurologists (Dimasio, 1994), and philosophers (Nussbaum, 2002) have argued that the emotions are essential for rational thought, and their insights have begun to appear in discussions of clinical reasoning or “how doctors think.” (Montgomery, 2006; Groopman, 2007) Yet considerable work remains to overcome an influential philosophical tradition stretching from Plato to Hume that regards the emotions as purely negative forces responsible for clouding the intellect, enslaving reason, and producing error.
Here the Christian tradition, in particular the medieval theology of Thomas Aquinas, is a surprisingly valuable source. In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas develops a nuanced account of practical reasoning that includes a positive role for what we call emotions, a modern category that overlaps with Aquinas’ passions. Against Plato, Aquinas holds that the body, including its passions, is essential to human flourishing; against the Stoics, he argues the passions are not intrinsically evil; and against Aristotle, the theological doctor insists the passions work through reason, not around or in spite of it. (Pasnau, 2002) Aquinas’ ability to depart from past philosophical positions was enabled by an underlying theological confidence in the goodness of created human nature. In his understanding, passions like love or anger are active appetites that move human beings to engage the world by driving attention to particular sensible objects. Human flourishing is therefore achieved not by reason simply suppressing the passions, which would result in complete detachment, but by cultivating their natural openness to reason through the development of intellectual and moral skills. (Lombardo, 2011) These skills, better known as virtues, perfect the passions by ensuring they are true to reality, in harmony with reason, and responsive to the will.
In this paper, I summarize Aquinas’s understanding of emotion and bring it into conversation with questions of bioethics, philosophy, and medical sociology. First, I argue that Aquinas’s positive appraisal of bodily passions offers a needed corrective to the latent mind/body dualism encouraged by modern medical science, technology, and training. Second, I demonstrate how Aquinas’s view of the passions can underwrite Sidney Callahan’s claims that emotional detachment is as problematic as excessive emotion and the emotions are necessary for accurate bioethical reasoning. Finally, I conclude by showing how Aquinas’s account of practical reason provides the content needed to fill out Jerome Groopman and Kathryn Montgomery’s interest in a role for emotion in clinical decision making.
Together with Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has pioneered the capabilities approach, a model of hu... more Together with Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has pioneered the capabilities approach, a model of human flourishing that has been influential in political philosophy, public policy, and development economics. In contrast to models that measure development in terms of Gross Domestic Product or individual satisfaction, the capabilities approach proposes a heterogeneous list of abilities and freedoms required for human dignity. In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum argues her approach is more inclusive of people with disabilities than John Rawls’ social contract theory. She also questions if disability scholar Eva Kittay’s ethic of care undermines societal responsibility to develop the capability for independence among people with disabilities. In response, Kittay has raised concerns about the ambiguous role of human dignity as both a universal quality and a criterion for selecting capabilities in Nussbaum’s approach.
In this paper, I consider the relationship between Nussbaum’s treatment of disability and the philosophical justification of her theory. First, I revisit the debate between Nussbaum and Kittay to argue Kittay’s concerns cannot be addressed without revising Nussbaum’s intuitive methodology. Next, I draw on the criticisms of philosopher John Clark and theologian Jean Porter to question how Nussbaum justifies her theory and its universal appeal. Clark and Porter both probe whether Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism is sufficient to account for her chosen capabilities in light of religious and cultural pluralism and claims for the value of cruelty or aggression. Finally, I conclude by highlighting Porter’s recovery of virtue and human nature in the Thomistic natural law tradition as elements that could credibly ground an alternative model of human flourishing, while also considering the risks concepts of virtue and human nature carry for the inclusion and status of people with disabilities.
Three recent works of theological anthropology consider the role of theology in understanding the... more Three recent works of theological anthropology consider the role of theology in understanding the nature and purpose of human existence. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s Alone in the World creates space for theology by advancing a “post-foundationalist” understanding of rationality as a middle way between arid modern foundationalism and unstable postmodern non-foundationalism. David Kelsey’s Eccentric Existence takes a more ad hoc approach, focusing on the nature of theology as a public practice that is governed by knowledge of God yet must meet other disciplines’ standards of excellence. Hans Reinders’ Receiving the Gift of Friendship argues for an unapologetically Trinitarian account of human identity as the only way to secure the humanity of people with profound disabilities unconditionally.
In this paper, I bring these authors into conversation to defend the authority of theology to make anthropological claims. Against van Huyssteen’s past characterization of Kelsey, I argue that Kelsey’s insistence on an explicitly theocentric anthropology does not lapse into “Wittgenstein Fideism,” but instead exhibits a clear concern to accommodate other disciplines without thereby subordinating theology to science or philosophy. For Kelsey, however, I propose his reliance on human DNA as the only satisfactory marker of humanity risks encouraging a programmatic understanding of human life that could exclude people with disabilities from full personhood, as Reinders warns. Finally, I contend Reinders’ approach does not necessarily endanger the kind of isolation identified by Kelsey and van Huyssteen, but should be supplemented by their more interdisciplinary strategies.
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Papers by Michael Buttrey
Presentations by Michael Buttrey
Our panel argues that diverse theological and institutional norms converge to enable gaslighting, victim blaming, and other practices of evasion in Protestant post-secondary institutions. As case studies, we will consider three institutions in two Protestant faith traditions: Anglican/Episcopal and Anabaptist/Mennonite. We will first identify how Anglican traditions of civil religion hierarchical power and Mennonite ideals of egalitarianism, peace, and separatism might justify norms of submission, loyalty, and pacification. We will then compare the responses to sexual misconduct by three institutions in these Protestant traditions as illustrating these norms and practices in action. Finally, we will offer recommendations for how staff and students can challenge destructive norms in Protestant higher education and push for practices of accountability that better support survivors of sexual violence.
More recently, Candace Vogler has argued that even under objective theories of good and value, true ethical statements do not provide all rational agents with compelling reasons to act virtuously instead of viciously. Rather, Vogler agrees with Bernard Williams that reasons for acting, moral or otherwise, must connect with an agent’s “subjective motivational set” to have any guiding force. But if so, then to do constructive moral philosophy we need to follow Anscombe in recovering non-legal conceptions of ethics and investigating their moral psychology.
In my paper, I will draw on the work of Julia Annas, Rosalind Hursthouse, and other neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers to illustrate how virtue and virtuous action can be encouraged without implying ethics primarily consists of detailed rules or procedures for right action. I will then make some concrete suggestions for how the insights of virtue ethics may be applied to ethical training in professions like psychology.
In our panel, we will develop a critique of battle imagery in healthcare and explore alternative models for understanding children and disease. In developing this critique, we will discuss the moral lives of children and potential conflicts in imagining children in warfare, even as a metaphor. We will consider whether fighting imagery in sports and superhero stories is significantly different than military metaphors. In order to accomplish this, we will consider the experiences of sick children and their ability to conceptualize and understand their lives and disease, drawing on available empirical research to consider the impact of this battle metaphor on the children. Finally, throughout our discussion we will draw on insights from theological discussions of war, pacifism, and martyrdom in the Christian tradition.
In this paper, I draw on recent scholarship to contrast Grisez et al’s understanding of moral error with that of Thomas Aquinas. First, I argue Aquinas’s theological confidence in created human nature allowed him to depart from prior philosophy and develop a positive anthropology of embodied emotion. Next, I contend that despite appeals to Aquinas, New Natural Law neglects key details of his understanding of the will and the passions, leading them to an unnecessary dichotomy between moral reason and immoral emotion. Finally, I illustrate how Aquinas’s emphasis on the perfection of the passions through the cultivation of moral skills or virtues offers a more constructive, practical, and applicable moral pedagogy than that found in the moral manuals and continued in New Natural Law.
Here the Christian tradition, in particular the medieval theology of Thomas Aquinas, is a surprisingly valuable source. In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas develops a nuanced account of practical reasoning that includes a positive role for what we call emotions, a modern category that overlaps with Aquinas’ passions. Against Plato, Aquinas holds that the body, including its passions, is essential to human flourishing; against the Stoics, he argues the passions are not intrinsically evil; and against Aristotle, the theological doctor insists the passions work through reason, not around or in spite of it. (Pasnau, 2002) Aquinas’ ability to depart from past philosophical positions was enabled by an underlying theological confidence in the goodness of created human nature. In his understanding, passions like love or anger are active appetites that move human beings to engage the world by driving attention to particular sensible objects. Human flourishing is therefore achieved not by reason simply suppressing the passions, which would result in complete detachment, but by cultivating their natural openness to reason through the development of intellectual and moral skills. (Lombardo, 2011) These skills, better known as virtues, perfect the passions by ensuring they are true to reality, in harmony with reason, and responsive to the will.
In this paper, I summarize Aquinas’s understanding of emotion and bring it into conversation with questions of bioethics, philosophy, and medical sociology. First, I argue that Aquinas’s positive appraisal of bodily passions offers a needed corrective to the latent mind/body dualism encouraged by modern medical science, technology, and training. Second, I demonstrate how Aquinas’s view of the passions can underwrite Sidney Callahan’s claims that emotional detachment is as problematic as excessive emotion and the emotions are necessary for accurate bioethical reasoning. Finally, I conclude by showing how Aquinas’s account of practical reason provides the content needed to fill out Jerome Groopman and Kathryn Montgomery’s interest in a role for emotion in clinical decision making.
In this paper, I consider the relationship between Nussbaum’s treatment of disability and the philosophical justification of her theory. First, I revisit the debate between Nussbaum and Kittay to argue Kittay’s concerns cannot be addressed without revising Nussbaum’s intuitive methodology. Next, I draw on the criticisms of philosopher John Clark and theologian Jean Porter to question how Nussbaum justifies her theory and its universal appeal. Clark and Porter both probe whether Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism is sufficient to account for her chosen capabilities in light of religious and cultural pluralism and claims for the value of cruelty or aggression. Finally, I conclude by highlighting Porter’s recovery of virtue and human nature in the Thomistic natural law tradition as elements that could credibly ground an alternative model of human flourishing, while also considering the risks concepts of virtue and human nature carry for the inclusion and status of people with disabilities.
In this paper, I bring these authors into conversation to defend the authority of theology to make anthropological claims. Against van Huyssteen’s past characterization of Kelsey, I argue that Kelsey’s insistence on an explicitly theocentric anthropology does not lapse into “Wittgenstein Fideism,” but instead exhibits a clear concern to accommodate other disciplines without thereby subordinating theology to science or philosophy. For Kelsey, however, I propose his reliance on human DNA as the only satisfactory marker of humanity risks encouraging a programmatic understanding of human life that could exclude people with disabilities from full personhood, as Reinders warns. Finally, I contend Reinders’ approach does not necessarily endanger the kind of isolation identified by Kelsey and van Huyssteen, but should be supplemented by their more interdisciplinary strategies.
Our panel argues that diverse theological and institutional norms converge to enable gaslighting, victim blaming, and other practices of evasion in Protestant post-secondary institutions. As case studies, we will consider three institutions in two Protestant faith traditions: Anglican/Episcopal and Anabaptist/Mennonite. We will first identify how Anglican traditions of civil religion hierarchical power and Mennonite ideals of egalitarianism, peace, and separatism might justify norms of submission, loyalty, and pacification. We will then compare the responses to sexual misconduct by three institutions in these Protestant traditions as illustrating these norms and practices in action. Finally, we will offer recommendations for how staff and students can challenge destructive norms in Protestant higher education and push for practices of accountability that better support survivors of sexual violence.
More recently, Candace Vogler has argued that even under objective theories of good and value, true ethical statements do not provide all rational agents with compelling reasons to act virtuously instead of viciously. Rather, Vogler agrees with Bernard Williams that reasons for acting, moral or otherwise, must connect with an agent’s “subjective motivational set” to have any guiding force. But if so, then to do constructive moral philosophy we need to follow Anscombe in recovering non-legal conceptions of ethics and investigating their moral psychology.
In my paper, I will draw on the work of Julia Annas, Rosalind Hursthouse, and other neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers to illustrate how virtue and virtuous action can be encouraged without implying ethics primarily consists of detailed rules or procedures for right action. I will then make some concrete suggestions for how the insights of virtue ethics may be applied to ethical training in professions like psychology.
In our panel, we will develop a critique of battle imagery in healthcare and explore alternative models for understanding children and disease. In developing this critique, we will discuss the moral lives of children and potential conflicts in imagining children in warfare, even as a metaphor. We will consider whether fighting imagery in sports and superhero stories is significantly different than military metaphors. In order to accomplish this, we will consider the experiences of sick children and their ability to conceptualize and understand their lives and disease, drawing on available empirical research to consider the impact of this battle metaphor on the children. Finally, throughout our discussion we will draw on insights from theological discussions of war, pacifism, and martyrdom in the Christian tradition.
In this paper, I draw on recent scholarship to contrast Grisez et al’s understanding of moral error with that of Thomas Aquinas. First, I argue Aquinas’s theological confidence in created human nature allowed him to depart from prior philosophy and develop a positive anthropology of embodied emotion. Next, I contend that despite appeals to Aquinas, New Natural Law neglects key details of his understanding of the will and the passions, leading them to an unnecessary dichotomy between moral reason and immoral emotion. Finally, I illustrate how Aquinas’s emphasis on the perfection of the passions through the cultivation of moral skills or virtues offers a more constructive, practical, and applicable moral pedagogy than that found in the moral manuals and continued in New Natural Law.
Here the Christian tradition, in particular the medieval theology of Thomas Aquinas, is a surprisingly valuable source. In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas develops a nuanced account of practical reasoning that includes a positive role for what we call emotions, a modern category that overlaps with Aquinas’ passions. Against Plato, Aquinas holds that the body, including its passions, is essential to human flourishing; against the Stoics, he argues the passions are not intrinsically evil; and against Aristotle, the theological doctor insists the passions work through reason, not around or in spite of it. (Pasnau, 2002) Aquinas’ ability to depart from past philosophical positions was enabled by an underlying theological confidence in the goodness of created human nature. In his understanding, passions like love or anger are active appetites that move human beings to engage the world by driving attention to particular sensible objects. Human flourishing is therefore achieved not by reason simply suppressing the passions, which would result in complete detachment, but by cultivating their natural openness to reason through the development of intellectual and moral skills. (Lombardo, 2011) These skills, better known as virtues, perfect the passions by ensuring they are true to reality, in harmony with reason, and responsive to the will.
In this paper, I summarize Aquinas’s understanding of emotion and bring it into conversation with questions of bioethics, philosophy, and medical sociology. First, I argue that Aquinas’s positive appraisal of bodily passions offers a needed corrective to the latent mind/body dualism encouraged by modern medical science, technology, and training. Second, I demonstrate how Aquinas’s view of the passions can underwrite Sidney Callahan’s claims that emotional detachment is as problematic as excessive emotion and the emotions are necessary for accurate bioethical reasoning. Finally, I conclude by showing how Aquinas’s account of practical reason provides the content needed to fill out Jerome Groopman and Kathryn Montgomery’s interest in a role for emotion in clinical decision making.
In this paper, I consider the relationship between Nussbaum’s treatment of disability and the philosophical justification of her theory. First, I revisit the debate between Nussbaum and Kittay to argue Kittay’s concerns cannot be addressed without revising Nussbaum’s intuitive methodology. Next, I draw on the criticisms of philosopher John Clark and theologian Jean Porter to question how Nussbaum justifies her theory and its universal appeal. Clark and Porter both probe whether Nussbaum’s non-metaphysical liberalism is sufficient to account for her chosen capabilities in light of religious and cultural pluralism and claims for the value of cruelty or aggression. Finally, I conclude by highlighting Porter’s recovery of virtue and human nature in the Thomistic natural law tradition as elements that could credibly ground an alternative model of human flourishing, while also considering the risks concepts of virtue and human nature carry for the inclusion and status of people with disabilities.
In this paper, I bring these authors into conversation to defend the authority of theology to make anthropological claims. Against van Huyssteen’s past characterization of Kelsey, I argue that Kelsey’s insistence on an explicitly theocentric anthropology does not lapse into “Wittgenstein Fideism,” but instead exhibits a clear concern to accommodate other disciplines without thereby subordinating theology to science or philosophy. For Kelsey, however, I propose his reliance on human DNA as the only satisfactory marker of humanity risks encouraging a programmatic understanding of human life that could exclude people with disabilities from full personhood, as Reinders warns. Finally, I contend Reinders’ approach does not necessarily endanger the kind of isolation identified by Kelsey and van Huyssteen, but should be supplemented by their more interdisciplinary strategies.
In this paper, I bring Carl Elliott’s social analysis of the enhancement of children into conversation with Stanley Hauerwas and Hans Reinders’ reflections on disability and L’Arche, in order to examine shared questions about Western social pressures and the potential of ecclesial communities to embody resistive practices. I argue that the advocacy and friendship modelled by disability groups and L’Arche communities exposes and challenges the social construction of ableist norms in a way that contributes to the common good, while parents’ use of enhancement benefits their children at the cost of reinforcing stifling stereotypes on broader society. Finally, I suggest churches can learn from the practices of disability advocates and L’Arche how to ground human dignity and friendship not on contingent social norms, but on the nature of human existence as a gift from God.