Rutger Claassen is Professor of Political Philosophy and Economic Ethics. His aim is to understand the ideas that we use when we shape our social, political and economic world. He takes philosophy to have a practical and emancipatory purpose. Reflection can help to clarify the challenges our societies face, and the possible pathways to a better future for all. Philosophy is a collective endeavour, and strongly connected to other disciplines in academia. Every day, Rutger is proud to be a member of a wonderful group of collogues at the Ethics Institute of Utrecht University, the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, as well as the interdisciplinary network Institutions for Open Societies. Make sure to visit their websites as well! Wherever possible, Rutger Claassen connects to citizens, policymakers and businessmen. He hopes to make them benefit from philosophical analysis, as well as to learn from them. Interested? Contact him at r.j.g.claassen@uu.nl
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY , 2022
Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the
corporation argue ab... more Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure of the market. However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy. This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status.
Authors critical of corporate power focus almost exclusively on one solution: bringing it under d... more Authors critical of corporate power focus almost exclusively on one solution: bringing it under democratic control. However important this is, there are at least two other options, which are rarely discussed: reducing powerful firms’ size and influence, or accepting corporate power as a necessary evil. This article provides a comparative perspective for evaluating all three options. It argues that the trade-offs we face in responding to corporate power have a trilemmatic structure. The pure strategies of accepting powerful firms, breaking them up, or rendering them more accountable are each incompatible with one of three important values: power balance, economies of scale, and minimizing agency costs, respectively. While the latter two concepts are purely economic and efficiency-based, the value of power balance can be grounded in a variety of reasons. Different normative interpretations of power balance are discussed, along with their implications for policy choices within the trilemma.
In this paper we argue that liberal-egalitarian theorists of justice should take power, especiall... more In this paper we argue that liberal-egalitarian theorists of justice should take power, especially economic power, seriously and make it explicit. We argue that many theories of justice have left power implicit, relying on what we call the “primacy of politics” model as a background assumption. However, this model does not suffice to capture the power relations of today’s globalized world, in which the power of nation states has been reduced and material inequality has sky-rocketed. We suggest replacing it by a “political economy” model that emphasizes the possibility of self-reinforcing cycles. Doing so has direct implications for how to theorize justice, not only on the non-ideal, but also on the ideal level.
Hobbes Meets the Modern Business Corporation, 2020
Political theory today has expanded its scope to debate business corporations, conceiving of them... more Political theory today has expanded its scope to debate business corporations, conceiving of them as political actors, not (just) private actors in the market place. This article shows the continuing relevance of Thomas Hobbes's work for this debate. Hobbes is commonly treated as a defender of the so-called concession theory, which traces the legitimacy of corporations to their being chartered by sovereign state authorities for public purposes. This theory is widely judged to be anachronistic for contemporary business corporations, because these can now be freely formed, on the basis of private initiative. However, a close reading of the crucial passages in Hobbes's work reveals a more subtle view, which rejects this private/public dualism. Hobbes's reflections on the companies of merchants of his day provide room for business corporations' pursuit of private purposes, while keeping them embedded in a public framework of authority. Moreover, by criticizing the monopoly status of these companies, he opens up a way to integrate market failure arguments from modern economics into concession theory. The "neo-Hobbesian concession theory" emerging from this analysis shows how concession theory can accommodate private initiative and economic analysis, and thus be a relevant position in the debate about the modern business corporation.
Society expects companies to operate in light of the legitimate interests of citizens, consumers,... more Society expects companies to operate in light of the legitimate interests of citizens, consumers, the environment and communities. However, those interests often lose out to the company's pursuit of profit. This could change with the implementation of a corporate social audit, in which (large) companies are cyclically assessed on the basis of selected criteria of societal value. In brief: • An audit creates a form of accountability of companies in relation to society, and thereby renews their license to operate. • Those who, according to the audit, perform above average, will receive a financial premium, those who perform poorly will receive a fine. • Such a system generates a competition, by which companies are rewarded if they operate on the basis of societal value.
Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment... more Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment, local communities, and others. Firms sometimes have felt they could best discharge such responsibilities by cooperating with other firms. This, however, is suspect from the point of view of a purely economic interpretation of competition law, since interfirm agreements may raise prices and thus lower welfare for consumers. Should competition law remain focused on competition enhancing economic welfare, or be reformed to allow for acts of cooperation that are socially beneficial? To answer this question, the article provides a philosophical reevaluation of the deep-seated view that firms are merely private actors. It argues that demands of political legitimacy should also be addressed at firms cooperating together, and that standard views of democratic accountability should be broadened, introducing a model of delegated, sequential decision making which allows regulatory agencies and parliaments to control interfirm agreements.
This contribution offers an introduction to the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Mar... more This contribution offers an introduction to the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Market Economy'. It places the Special Issue against the background of the debate on free markets versus social protection in the European Union and the inclusion of the notion of 'social market economy' in the Treaty on European Union. It sketches the meaning and development of the social market economy concept, and introduces the key questions underlying this Special Issue and the contributions included in it.
This article offers a synthesis of and conclusion to the contributions included in the Special Is... more This article offers a synthesis of and conclusion to the contributions included in the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Market Economy'. Based on different understandings of citizenship in the European Union and the roles of the EU and its member states in providing social protection arrangements, it develops a typology of four models of the EU's role in social protection. It then discusses the contributions to this Special Issue in light of this typology and draws a number of overarching conclusions.
This contribution asks how to approach the question of whether the European Union should – replac... more This contribution asks how to approach the question of whether the European Union should – replacing or supplementing member states – also be a locus of social justice‐based duties to provide welfare state services. The contribution scrutinizes two important theories of global justice (cosmopolitan and relational theories) and finds that their normative assumptions hinder them from adequately addressing this question. A new theory is proposed, inspired by Immanuel Kant's political philosophy. The core idea is that social justice requires public authorities to protect citizens against private forms of coercion; and that the level (national, European, global) at which such authority needs to be exercised depends on which arrangement best protects citizens' rights to independence. The paper outlines several duties of global justice to give specificity to this general principle, and then applies them to the case of integrating European welfare states.
Capability theorists disagree on how to determine, for normative purposes, which capabilities are... more Capability theorists disagree on how to determine, for normative purposes, which capabilities are to be treated as basic, with Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen taking opposite views. This paper will scrutinize this list debate. It has two aims. First, it argues that some distinction between basic and non-basic capabilities is an inherent commitment of capability theories, but that there are many more options for responding to the capability-selection problem than a procedure of democratic deliberation (Sen) or a philosophical criterion of neo-Aristotelian flourishing (Nussbaum). A whole range of possible procedures and philosophical criteria could be combined with the capability metric. Second, it responds to a forceful challenge raised by Ian Crater, who argues that capability theorists should not endorse the selection of specific capabilities as basic (either democratically or philosophically) at all. In his view this will always have paternalistic implications; instead he proposes that the maximization of 'capability as such' should be the goal. In response I distinguish wellbeing-based and autonomy-based capability theories, and argue that while Carter's challenge is valid against the former, it fails against the latter.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 2018
Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French politica... more Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French political theory, known as ‘solidarism’. Solidarism recognises private property as legitimate, but at the same time argues that the collective nature of economic production gives rise to a claim to social property. It is social property that should underlie the case for social justice and social rights, not the standard liberal claims to individual autonomy. This paper provides an appraisal of Kohn’s recovery of solidarism, taking as its main theme the relation between property and social justice. The paper first offers a typology of four theories of justice (right- and left-libertarianism, luck and relational egalitarianism) and discusses the relation of each of these to the concept of property. Then it argues that solidarism is akin to left-libertarianism in the way it formulates justice as a claim to social property. Finally, it argues that solidarists cannot escape grounding their theory in a non-property based fundamental principle, which makes the theory much less distinctive from egalitarian theories of justice than may appear at first sight.
Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing 'structural ... more Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing 'structural injustice' and social relations marred by 'domination'. These authors provide conceptual tools for focusing on concrete economic structures and re-focus the debate about justice onto questions of power. In this article we build on their work, but we argue that a positive notion of economic agency is needed as a criterion for what makes economic structures dominating and potentially unjust. We propose a notion of economic agency, which we relate to a more general notion of autonomous agency to create a dual-level account. Domination in the economic sphere happens where individuals are deprived of their economic agency, to the extent that such agency is necessary to lead an autonomous life in general. Using the example of creditor-debtor relations we argue for the usefulness of this theoretical framework. Finally, we define injustices in terms of threshold levels of economic agency, the latter being spelled out in terms of a set of capabilities. This proposal overcomes the artificial boundaries between those theorizing 'justice' and those theorizing 'power' when analyzing the economic domain.
ABSTRACT. Should society intervene to intervene with adults who engage in the same risky behavior... more ABSTRACT. Should society intervene to intervene with adults who engage in the same risky behavior? The problem is well illustrated by the legal case of the 13-year-old Dutch girl Laura Dekker, who set out in 2009 to become the youngest person ever to sail around the world alone, succeeding in January 2012. In this paper we use her case as a point of entry for discussing the fundamental question of how to demarcate childhood from adulthood. After summarizing the case, we identify a ‘demarcation dilemma’ that frames much of the public and expert debate. On the one hand, it seems morally imperative ‘to treat like alike’, which means that both children and adults should be allowed to undertake all actions for which they have the relevant competences. On the other hand, requiring proportional treatment of children and adults seems to neglect the special nature of childhood as a distinct stage in life that ends at a specific age. We introduce the notion of a ‘regime of childhood’ to deal with this problem. This regime includes several dimensions, including the limited liability for children, the supervisory responsibilities of parents, the role of age-based thresholds, and the overarching purpose of childhood as a context for developing autonomy. We argue that, all things considered, there are good reasons not to shift to a regime that offers individual children the option of qualifying for adulthood on the basis of age-neutral criteria."
The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. ... more The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum-approach is too perfectionist and the Sen-approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non-perfectionist capability theory of justice. It presents a two-level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices.
Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify ... more Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify state regulation of the economy. This article explores the concept of externalities from a philosophical perspective. It criticizes the utilitarian nature of economic analyses of externalities, showing how they cannot take into account values like freedom and justice. It then develops the analogy between the concept of externalities and the 'harm principle' in political philosophy. It argues that the harm principle points to the need for a theory of basic interests to judge when a harm is imposed. Similarly, externality analyses should use such a theory of basic interests as the basis for judgments about legitimate state intervention. This proposal is defended against objections, and illustrated with a case study of the US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act, which shows how the judicial reasoning implicitly interprets externalities in terms of basic interests.
European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarchin... more European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarching purpose (which is supported by economic theory) leaves little place for safeguarding non-economic values, such as sustainability. This makes it difficult to allow cooperation between companies to contribute to such non-economic goals. In this article we explore whether it is possible to establish a different normative framework, in which such goals can be taken into account and can be balanced against the economic goal of consumer welfare. To answer this question, we take four steps. First, we discuss current EU competition law and the difficulty of fitting non-economic goals into the dominant interpretation of that law. Second, we propose a different normative framework, based on the capability approach advanced by philosopher Martha Nussbaum and economist Amartya Sen. Third, we argue that there are good principled reasons to incorporate non-economic goals into competition law. Fourth, we apply both the capability approach and the consumer welfare approach to three (illustrative) cases in which non-economic goals are at stake. Overall, we argue that the capability framework, although not without difficulties of its own, may provide a more legitimate theory for the interpretation of European competition law
The recent student and staff protests in Amsterdam and at other Dutch universities have brought t... more The recent student and staff protests in Amsterdam and at other Dutch universities have brought to light fundamental disagreements about the future of the Dutch university. Many students and staff members of Dutch universities have argued in recent discussions that the level of democratic decision-making about central policy issues in universities should be increased. But what can democracy mean in the context of the contemporary university system? In this contribution we will first briefly sketch the public role of the university. Then we put forward our main claim. The Dutch university currently suffers from a triple democratic deficit: in the relation between society and the university, in the relation between university administration and the academic community, and in the relation between the academic community and society. We can only make progress by considering these three problems of democratic legitimation in their mutual relations.
:There has been a remarkable shift in the relation between market and state responsibilities for ... more :There has been a remarkable shift in the relation between market and state responsibilities for public services like health care and education. While these services continue to be financed publicly, they are now often provided through the market. The main argument for this new institutional division of labor is economic: while (public) ends stay the same, (private) means are more efficient. Markets function as ‘mere means’ under the continued responsibility of the state. This paper investigates and rejects currently existing egalitarian liberal theories about this division of labor and it presents and defends a new theory of marketization, in which social rights and democratic decision-making occupy center-stage.
Human Rights and Sustainability Moral responsibilities for the future, 2017
This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to th... more This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to the question of ecological obligations to future generations. It is argued that we can extend capability protection to future generations, but this leaves open which resources such a theory is to leave to future generations. The chapter argues that the influential views of Rawls and Solow, that these resources should be conceived in terms of ‘total capital’, cannot be accepted by a capability approach, because of their assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital. It is proposed that a CTJ best fits with a combination of two ecological approaches: the ecological space approach and Herman Daly’s resource rules.
The global financial crisis raises ethical as much as financial questions. During the crisis, muc... more The global financial crisis raises ethical as much as financial questions. During the crisis, much public anger was centered on the imbalance between those profiting from excessive risk-taking in good times (banks) and those suffering the costs of that behavior in bad times (taxpayers). This phenomenon will be analyzes in terms of ethical theory in this paper. The focus is on both sides of the state–bank relationship and contains two central questions. First, do states have a moral obligation to bail out banks? Second, do banks have a moral obligation to prevent states from having to bail them out? The paper develops a rights-based framework to answer these questions. The first question is answered affirmatively. The second question is more difficult. A ‘standard argument’ about insurance holds that moral hazard is not a moral, but a purely economic problem, which can be solved through economic means. This would lead to the conclusion that banks do not have a moral obligation to prevent bailouts. I will criticize this standard argument and show that we have to think differently about moral hazard. The crux is that moral hazard arises between states and banks in the context not dictated by normal economic contracting, but best characterized as a social contract. As a consequence banks do have obligations to honor the terms of that social contract. The final part discusses how we can think about the justification of the implicit terms of the social contract in the run up to the financial crisis.
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY , 2022
Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the
corporation argue ab... more Corporations wield power in today’s economies, and political theories of the corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure of the market. However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy. This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status.
Authors critical of corporate power focus almost exclusively on one solution: bringing it under d... more Authors critical of corporate power focus almost exclusively on one solution: bringing it under democratic control. However important this is, there are at least two other options, which are rarely discussed: reducing powerful firms’ size and influence, or accepting corporate power as a necessary evil. This article provides a comparative perspective for evaluating all three options. It argues that the trade-offs we face in responding to corporate power have a trilemmatic structure. The pure strategies of accepting powerful firms, breaking them up, or rendering them more accountable are each incompatible with one of three important values: power balance, economies of scale, and minimizing agency costs, respectively. While the latter two concepts are purely economic and efficiency-based, the value of power balance can be grounded in a variety of reasons. Different normative interpretations of power balance are discussed, along with their implications for policy choices within the trilemma.
In this paper we argue that liberal-egalitarian theorists of justice should take power, especiall... more In this paper we argue that liberal-egalitarian theorists of justice should take power, especially economic power, seriously and make it explicit. We argue that many theories of justice have left power implicit, relying on what we call the “primacy of politics” model as a background assumption. However, this model does not suffice to capture the power relations of today’s globalized world, in which the power of nation states has been reduced and material inequality has sky-rocketed. We suggest replacing it by a “political economy” model that emphasizes the possibility of self-reinforcing cycles. Doing so has direct implications for how to theorize justice, not only on the non-ideal, but also on the ideal level.
Hobbes Meets the Modern Business Corporation, 2020
Political theory today has expanded its scope to debate business corporations, conceiving of them... more Political theory today has expanded its scope to debate business corporations, conceiving of them as political actors, not (just) private actors in the market place. This article shows the continuing relevance of Thomas Hobbes's work for this debate. Hobbes is commonly treated as a defender of the so-called concession theory, which traces the legitimacy of corporations to their being chartered by sovereign state authorities for public purposes. This theory is widely judged to be anachronistic for contemporary business corporations, because these can now be freely formed, on the basis of private initiative. However, a close reading of the crucial passages in Hobbes's work reveals a more subtle view, which rejects this private/public dualism. Hobbes's reflections on the companies of merchants of his day provide room for business corporations' pursuit of private purposes, while keeping them embedded in a public framework of authority. Moreover, by criticizing the monopoly status of these companies, he opens up a way to integrate market failure arguments from modern economics into concession theory. The "neo-Hobbesian concession theory" emerging from this analysis shows how concession theory can accommodate private initiative and economic analysis, and thus be a relevant position in the debate about the modern business corporation.
Society expects companies to operate in light of the legitimate interests of citizens, consumers,... more Society expects companies to operate in light of the legitimate interests of citizens, consumers, the environment and communities. However, those interests often lose out to the company's pursuit of profit. This could change with the implementation of a corporate social audit, in which (large) companies are cyclically assessed on the basis of selected criteria of societal value. In brief: • An audit creates a form of accountability of companies in relation to society, and thereby renews their license to operate. • Those who, according to the audit, perform above average, will receive a financial premium, those who perform poorly will receive a fine. • Such a system generates a competition, by which companies are rewarded if they operate on the basis of societal value.
Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment... more Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment, local communities, and others. Firms sometimes have felt they could best discharge such responsibilities by cooperating with other firms. This, however, is suspect from the point of view of a purely economic interpretation of competition law, since interfirm agreements may raise prices and thus lower welfare for consumers. Should competition law remain focused on competition enhancing economic welfare, or be reformed to allow for acts of cooperation that are socially beneficial? To answer this question, the article provides a philosophical reevaluation of the deep-seated view that firms are merely private actors. It argues that demands of political legitimacy should also be addressed at firms cooperating together, and that standard views of democratic accountability should be broadened, introducing a model of delegated, sequential decision making which allows regulatory agencies and parliaments to control interfirm agreements.
This contribution offers an introduction to the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Mar... more This contribution offers an introduction to the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Market Economy'. It places the Special Issue against the background of the debate on free markets versus social protection in the European Union and the inclusion of the notion of 'social market economy' in the Treaty on European Union. It sketches the meaning and development of the social market economy concept, and introduces the key questions underlying this Special Issue and the contributions included in it.
This article offers a synthesis of and conclusion to the contributions included in the Special Is... more This article offers a synthesis of and conclusion to the contributions included in the Special Issue 'Rethinking the European Social Market Economy'. Based on different understandings of citizenship in the European Union and the roles of the EU and its member states in providing social protection arrangements, it develops a typology of four models of the EU's role in social protection. It then discusses the contributions to this Special Issue in light of this typology and draws a number of overarching conclusions.
This contribution asks how to approach the question of whether the European Union should – replac... more This contribution asks how to approach the question of whether the European Union should – replacing or supplementing member states – also be a locus of social justice‐based duties to provide welfare state services. The contribution scrutinizes two important theories of global justice (cosmopolitan and relational theories) and finds that their normative assumptions hinder them from adequately addressing this question. A new theory is proposed, inspired by Immanuel Kant's political philosophy. The core idea is that social justice requires public authorities to protect citizens against private forms of coercion; and that the level (national, European, global) at which such authority needs to be exercised depends on which arrangement best protects citizens' rights to independence. The paper outlines several duties of global justice to give specificity to this general principle, and then applies them to the case of integrating European welfare states.
Capability theorists disagree on how to determine, for normative purposes, which capabilities are... more Capability theorists disagree on how to determine, for normative purposes, which capabilities are to be treated as basic, with Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen taking opposite views. This paper will scrutinize this list debate. It has two aims. First, it argues that some distinction between basic and non-basic capabilities is an inherent commitment of capability theories, but that there are many more options for responding to the capability-selection problem than a procedure of democratic deliberation (Sen) or a philosophical criterion of neo-Aristotelian flourishing (Nussbaum). A whole range of possible procedures and philosophical criteria could be combined with the capability metric. Second, it responds to a forceful challenge raised by Ian Crater, who argues that capability theorists should not endorse the selection of specific capabilities as basic (either democratically or philosophically) at all. In his view this will always have paternalistic implications; instead he proposes that the maximization of 'capability as such' should be the goal. In response I distinguish wellbeing-based and autonomy-based capability theories, and argue that while Carter's challenge is valid against the former, it fails against the latter.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 2018
Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French politica... more Margaret Kohn argues for a reappraisal of early twentieth-century left-republican French political theory, known as ‘solidarism’. Solidarism recognises private property as legitimate, but at the same time argues that the collective nature of economic production gives rise to a claim to social property. It is social property that should underlie the case for social justice and social rights, not the standard liberal claims to individual autonomy. This paper provides an appraisal of Kohn’s recovery of solidarism, taking as its main theme the relation between property and social justice. The paper first offers a typology of four theories of justice (right- and left-libertarianism, luck and relational egalitarianism) and discusses the relation of each of these to the concept of property. Then it argues that solidarism is akin to left-libertarianism in the way it formulates justice as a claim to social property. Finally, it argues that solidarists cannot escape grounding their theory in a non-property based fundamental principle, which makes the theory much less distinctive from egalitarian theories of justice than may appear at first sight.
Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing 'structural ... more Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing 'structural injustice' and social relations marred by 'domination'. These authors provide conceptual tools for focusing on concrete economic structures and re-focus the debate about justice onto questions of power. In this article we build on their work, but we argue that a positive notion of economic agency is needed as a criterion for what makes economic structures dominating and potentially unjust. We propose a notion of economic agency, which we relate to a more general notion of autonomous agency to create a dual-level account. Domination in the economic sphere happens where individuals are deprived of their economic agency, to the extent that such agency is necessary to lead an autonomous life in general. Using the example of creditor-debtor relations we argue for the usefulness of this theoretical framework. Finally, we define injustices in terms of threshold levels of economic agency, the latter being spelled out in terms of a set of capabilities. This proposal overcomes the artificial boundaries between those theorizing 'justice' and those theorizing 'power' when analyzing the economic domain.
ABSTRACT. Should society intervene to intervene with adults who engage in the same risky behavior... more ABSTRACT. Should society intervene to intervene with adults who engage in the same risky behavior? The problem is well illustrated by the legal case of the 13-year-old Dutch girl Laura Dekker, who set out in 2009 to become the youngest person ever to sail around the world alone, succeeding in January 2012. In this paper we use her case as a point of entry for discussing the fundamental question of how to demarcate childhood from adulthood. After summarizing the case, we identify a ‘demarcation dilemma’ that frames much of the public and expert debate. On the one hand, it seems morally imperative ‘to treat like alike’, which means that both children and adults should be allowed to undertake all actions for which they have the relevant competences. On the other hand, requiring proportional treatment of children and adults seems to neglect the special nature of childhood as a distinct stage in life that ends at a specific age. We introduce the notion of a ‘regime of childhood’ to deal with this problem. This regime includes several dimensions, including the limited liability for children, the supervisory responsibilities of parents, the role of age-based thresholds, and the overarching purpose of childhood as a context for developing autonomy. We argue that, all things considered, there are good reasons not to shift to a regime that offers individual children the option of qualifying for adulthood on the basis of age-neutral criteria."
The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. ... more The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum-approach is too perfectionist and the Sen-approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non-perfectionist capability theory of justice. It presents a two-level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices.
Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify ... more Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify state regulation of the economy. This article explores the concept of externalities from a philosophical perspective. It criticizes the utilitarian nature of economic analyses of externalities, showing how they cannot take into account values like freedom and justice. It then develops the analogy between the concept of externalities and the 'harm principle' in political philosophy. It argues that the harm principle points to the need for a theory of basic interests to judge when a harm is imposed. Similarly, externality analyses should use such a theory of basic interests as the basis for judgments about legitimate state intervention. This proposal is defended against objections, and illustrated with a case study of the US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act, which shows how the judicial reasoning implicitly interprets externalities in terms of basic interests.
European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarchin... more European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarching purpose (which is supported by economic theory) leaves little place for safeguarding non-economic values, such as sustainability. This makes it difficult to allow cooperation between companies to contribute to such non-economic goals. In this article we explore whether it is possible to establish a different normative framework, in which such goals can be taken into account and can be balanced against the economic goal of consumer welfare. To answer this question, we take four steps. First, we discuss current EU competition law and the difficulty of fitting non-economic goals into the dominant interpretation of that law. Second, we propose a different normative framework, based on the capability approach advanced by philosopher Martha Nussbaum and economist Amartya Sen. Third, we argue that there are good principled reasons to incorporate non-economic goals into competition law. Fourth, we apply both the capability approach and the consumer welfare approach to three (illustrative) cases in which non-economic goals are at stake. Overall, we argue that the capability framework, although not without difficulties of its own, may provide a more legitimate theory for the interpretation of European competition law
The recent student and staff protests in Amsterdam and at other Dutch universities have brought t... more The recent student and staff protests in Amsterdam and at other Dutch universities have brought to light fundamental disagreements about the future of the Dutch university. Many students and staff members of Dutch universities have argued in recent discussions that the level of democratic decision-making about central policy issues in universities should be increased. But what can democracy mean in the context of the contemporary university system? In this contribution we will first briefly sketch the public role of the university. Then we put forward our main claim. The Dutch university currently suffers from a triple democratic deficit: in the relation between society and the university, in the relation between university administration and the academic community, and in the relation between the academic community and society. We can only make progress by considering these three problems of democratic legitimation in their mutual relations.
:There has been a remarkable shift in the relation between market and state responsibilities for ... more :There has been a remarkable shift in the relation between market and state responsibilities for public services like health care and education. While these services continue to be financed publicly, they are now often provided through the market. The main argument for this new institutional division of labor is economic: while (public) ends stay the same, (private) means are more efficient. Markets function as ‘mere means’ under the continued responsibility of the state. This paper investigates and rejects currently existing egalitarian liberal theories about this division of labor and it presents and defends a new theory of marketization, in which social rights and democratic decision-making occupy center-stage.
Human Rights and Sustainability Moral responsibilities for the future, 2017
This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to th... more This chapter explores the possibility of extending Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach to the question of ecological obligations to future generations. It is argued that we can extend capability protection to future generations, but this leaves open which resources such a theory is to leave to future generations. The chapter argues that the influential views of Rawls and Solow, that these resources should be conceived in terms of ‘total capital’, cannot be accepted by a capability approach, because of their assumption of substitutability between natural and human-made capital. It is proposed that a CTJ best fits with a combination of two ecological approaches: the ecological space approach and Herman Daly’s resource rules.
The global financial crisis raises ethical as much as financial questions. During the crisis, muc... more The global financial crisis raises ethical as much as financial questions. During the crisis, much public anger was centered on the imbalance between those profiting from excessive risk-taking in good times (banks) and those suffering the costs of that behavior in bad times (taxpayers). This phenomenon will be analyzes in terms of ethical theory in this paper. The focus is on both sides of the state–bank relationship and contains two central questions. First, do states have a moral obligation to bail out banks? Second, do banks have a moral obligation to prevent states from having to bail them out? The paper develops a rights-based framework to answer these questions. The first question is answered affirmatively. The second question is more difficult. A ‘standard argument’ about insurance holds that moral hazard is not a moral, but a purely economic problem, which can be solved through economic means. This would lead to the conclusion that banks do not have a moral obligation to prevent bailouts. I will criticize this standard argument and show that we have to think differently about moral hazard. The crux is that moral hazard arises between states and banks in the context not dictated by normal economic contracting, but best characterized as a social contract. As a consequence banks do have obligations to honor the terms of that social contract. The final part discusses how we can think about the justification of the implicit terms of the social contract in the run up to the financial crisis.
Is political equality viable when a capitalist economy unequally distributes private property? Th... more Is political equality viable when a capitalist economy unequally distributes private property? This book examines the nexus between wealth and politics and asks how institutions and citizens should respond to it.
Theories of democracy and property have often ignored the ways in which the rich attempt to convert their wealth into political power, implicitly assuming that politics is isolated from economic forces. This book brings the moral and political links between wealth and power into clear focus. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part I analyses wealth and politics from the perspective of various political traditions, such as liberalism, republicanism, anarchism, and Marxism. Part II addresses the economic sphere, and looks at the political influence of corporations, philanthropists, and commons-based organisations. Finally, Part III turns to the political sphere and looks at the role of political parties and constitutions, and phenomena such as corruption and lobbying.
Wealth and Power: Philosophical Perspectives will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political philosophy, political science, economics, and law.
Internationale markten zijn de afgelopen decennia sterk
mondiaal ontwikkeld en veel bedrijven zij... more Internationale markten zijn de afgelopen decennia sterk mondiaal ontwikkeld en veel bedrijven zijn in deze geglobaliseerde context uitgegroeid tot belangrijke, quasi-politieke spelers. Deze stormachtige economische ontwikkelingen bieden kansen en welvaart aan velen, maar kennen ook schaduwzijden, van milieuschade tot belastingontwijking. In deze bundel verkennen de auteurs het idee van de ‘open samenleving’ om vat te krijgen op deze nieuwe realiteit. De open samenleving naar het ideaal van Popper, waarin mensen de vrijheid hebben om hun mening uit te drukken, initiatief te nemen en elkaar tegen te spreken, wordt gezien als de grondslag voor vrijheid, welvaart en vooruitgang. Deze bundel onderzoekt of de toegenomen openheid van markten de open samenleving als politiek ideaal dichterbij heeft gebracht. De auteurs werpen vanuit verschillende perspectieven een kritisch licht op de bedreigingen die voortvloeien uit mondiale markten en de toegenomen macht van ondernemingen. Ze stellen óók de vraag of het gedachtegoed van de open samenleving inspiratie kan bieden bij het tegengaan van die bedreigingen. Kunnen nieuwe vormen en interpretaties van ‘openheid’ worden gevonden, die tegenwicht bieden tegen de excessen van de vrijemarkteconomie?
Which goods should we be able to buy and sell on the market and, alternatively, which goods shoul... more Which goods should we be able to buy and sell on the market and, alternatively, which goods should remain sheltered from the market? For many goods in modern societies, this has proven to be a thorny question. Moreover, it is a question that cannot be answered by way of a theoretical shortcut, that is, by attributing certain general values (or disvalues) to the market and inferring from these general attributes that the market is (or isn’t) the best institution to govern the provision of a specific good. Therefore, in the first part of this work, three theoretical building blocks are proposed to frame the way we should handle the market question. First, a social theory is formulated which treats the market as one out of five main socio-economic modes of provision, the others being public provision, professional provision, informal provision and self-provision. Second, in choosing the best institutional framework for a specific good, it is argued that we should not restrict ourselves to the option of implementing one of these modes of provision only. Special attention should be paid to the option of ‘institutional pluralism’, i.e. instituting a market and a non-market alternative simultaneously for the same good. Both the attractions and the limits of such an institutional pluralism are discussed. Third, in making institutional choices about these modes of provision, we need a normative theory providing the moral criteria to guide our choices. Here a capability theory is proposed, which consists of three central principles, parallel to a distinction between three types of capabilities: those that are ‘immoral’, those that are ‘morally required’ and those that are merely ‘morally permissible’. The principles prescribe avoiding the realization of the immoral capabilities and promoting the realization of morally required and permissible capabilities. In the second part, this threefold framework is applied to three specific goods. These are security (protection against criminal threats), media (mass communication by media such as television, radio and the press) and care (caring activities provided on a structural basis to dependents such as care for children, chronically ill and elderly people). For each of these goods a capability analysis shows that the most appropriate institutional framework is institutional pluralism. In the case of security this is a pluralism of market and public provision, in the case of media a pluralism of market and professional provision and in the case of care a pluralism of market and informal provision. In the final chapter I investigate the conditions that have to be fulfilled for these institutionally pluralist arrangements to be stable, that is, to have a robust chance of survival. The main challenge to stability comes from the dynamic toward capital accumulation that is inherent in contemporary capitalism, and if left unchecked requires an ongoing conversion of non-market practices into markets. Two solutions are proposed to counter this threat: a general working time reduction which reduces capital accumulation and a strategy of publicly funded investment of accumulated capital in non-market parts of institutionally pluralist practices. show less
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Papers by Rutger Claassen
corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This
paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on
a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the
name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence
corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the
state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure of the market.
However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power
between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be
classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy.
This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when
everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as
having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to
think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New
mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively
held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status.
• An audit creates a form of accountability of companies in relation to society, and thereby renews their license to operate.
• Those who, according to the audit, perform above average, will receive a financial premium, those who perform poorly will receive a fine.
• Such a system generates a competition, by which companies are rewarded if they operate on the basis of societal value.
corporation argue about the legitimacy conditions of corporate power. This
paper argues in favour of a double-fiduciary theory for corporations. Based on
a concession theory of markets, it sees all markets as authorized by states (in the
name of society), for the purpose of creating economic value, or wealth. Hence
corporations, as much as non-incorporated firms, have a fiduciary duty to the
state/society to create wealth, in the competitive structure of the market.
However, their pursuit of wealth often creates unbalanced relations of power
between corporations and their stakeholders, which can at some point be
classified as instances of domination. Therefore, corporations need to be subjected to a second fiduciary duty, i.e. not to dominate others in the economy.
This duty is also, in the final instance, owed to the state/society. In an era when
everyone can incorporate their business, states/societies can be interpreted as
having, through corporate law, mandated shareholders as ‘proximate beneficiaries’, to incentivize corporations to create wealth. Now states/societies need to
think about how to prevent corporations from dominating others. New
mechanisms of accountability towards stakeholders and/or citizens as proximate beneficiaries are needed. Only in this way can corporations be effectively
held to account for both of the fiduciary duties which characterize their normative status.
• An audit creates a form of accountability of companies in relation to society, and thereby renews their license to operate.
• Those who, according to the audit, perform above average, will receive a financial premium, those who perform poorly will receive a fine.
• Such a system generates a competition, by which companies are rewarded if they operate on the basis of societal value.
Theories of democracy and property have often ignored the ways in which the rich attempt to convert their wealth into political power, implicitly assuming that politics is isolated from economic forces. This book brings the moral and political links between wealth and power into clear focus. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part I analyses wealth and politics from the perspective of various political traditions, such as liberalism, republicanism, anarchism, and Marxism. Part II addresses the economic sphere, and looks at the political influence of corporations, philanthropists, and commons-based organisations. Finally, Part III turns to the political sphere and looks at the role of political parties and constitutions, and phenomena such as corruption and lobbying.
Wealth and Power: Philosophical Perspectives will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political philosophy, political science, economics, and law.
mondiaal ontwikkeld en veel bedrijven zijn in deze geglobaliseerde context uitgegroeid tot belangrijke, quasi-politieke
spelers. Deze stormachtige economische ontwikkelingen
bieden kansen en welvaart aan velen, maar kennen ook
schaduwzijden, van milieuschade tot belastingontwijking.
In deze bundel verkennen de auteurs het idee van de ‘open
samenleving’ om vat te krijgen op deze nieuwe realiteit.
De open samenleving naar het ideaal van Popper, waarin
mensen de vrijheid hebben om hun mening uit te drukken,
initiatief te nemen en elkaar tegen te spreken, wordt gezien
als de grondslag voor vrijheid, welvaart en vooruitgang.
Deze bundel onderzoekt of de toegenomen openheid van
markten de open samenleving als politiek ideaal dichterbij
heeft gebracht. De auteurs werpen vanuit verschillende
perspectieven een kritisch licht op de bedreigingen die
voortvloeien uit mondiale markten en de toegenomen
macht van ondernemingen. Ze stellen óók de vraag of het
gedachtegoed van de open samenleving inspiratie kan
bieden bij het tegengaan van die bedreigingen. Kunnen
nieuwe vormen en interpretaties van ‘openheid’ worden
gevonden, die tegenwicht bieden tegen de excessen van
de vrijemarkteconomie?