Diana Heney

The subject of this chapter is the engagement with ethics that permeates pragmatism. My tasks are to identify contributions that pragmatists have made to philosophical ethics, to identify some challenges that may be associated with taking a pragmatist ethics on board, and to gesture toward possible next steps for pragmatist ethics.

This is the penultimate draft; final version is out now in the Routledge Companion to Pragmatism, eds. Aikin and Talisse.

**penultimate draft - final version now out in the Yearbook Practical Philosophy in a Global Perspective/Jahrbuch Praktische Philosophie in globaler Perspektive**

One of the enduring themes of pragmatism is that truth is group work. Knowing better requires knowing together. In epistemological matters, there is no 'them' and 'us'-only us. But in our contemporary world, we stand in a strange moment with respect to knowledge communities: we have both incredible access to information about distant places and peoples, and the formation of epistemic bubbles, insular information silos within which agreement is prized and inquiry curtailed. For advocates of free and open inquiry, these may seem like dark days. In this paper, I have two purposes: to develop the epistemic basis for broadening our knowledge communities, and to consider what habits of mind and action a Peircean pragmatist form of cosmopolitanism can concretely recommend in our contemporary context. I argue that the normativity which most clearly transcends borders is epistemic normativity. The pervasive importance of epistemic norms in daily life is sufficiently widespread to demand universal concern for others as epistemic agents.

final version:
https://www.herder.de/jbprph/baende/archiv/2020/4-2020/a-peircean-argument-for-epistemic-cosmopolitanism/

**penultimate draft**

Hands are not for hitting. This is a familiar moral principle of a general kind. Parents say it firmly and laws encode it with relatively little grey area. But what (if anything) underwrites such a principle, and do we really need it? Enter the ongoing conversation between particularism and generalism in contemporary metaethics. What is this conversation really about? Mark Schroeder has characterized it as 'notoriously obscure' (Schroeder 2009, 568). Jamie Dreier has remarked that it is hard to even formulate the key positions without vagueness, 'in part because it has not been altogether clear in the contemporary dispute over particularism just what is at stake' (Dreier 2006, xxii). In this paper, I argue that what is at stake in this dispute are our deeply embedded practices of codification-our shared moral architecture. The paper proceeds as follows: I begin with preliminary sketches of the positions. I show that there are at least two possible ways of setting up the opposition between them, and suggest that we can make a non-arbitrary choice between those two frames. In Section 2, I consider the reasons-first frame, and argue that it leads to deadlock. In Section 3, I consider the practice-first frame, and argue that it is a more promising avenue forward-in fact, taking the practice-first frame offers a compelling set of reasons to accept generalism. In Section 4, I develop the idea of moral architecture.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the performance called for by being human is rational flourishing and a life that falls short of flourishing will fail to constitute a life lived in accordance with the norms governing human kind in virtue of its function. Against this constitutivist story, a puzzle arises: On Aristotle's criteria, it looks impossible for a person with a mental disorder to flourish. I consider whether this puzzle can be satisfactorily addressed without abandoning Aristotelian constitutivism. I regard this as a puzzle worthy of serious engagement because there is a tension between the adoption of Aristotelian virtue ethics as a normative backbone for applied ethics and the possibility that the theory would consign many, many people to being incapable of virtue or flourishing. I first set out the basic commitments of a constitutivist Aristotelian account and show how it generates the hypothesis that a person with mental disorder could never flourish. I then present two contemporary concepts of mental disorder-one from the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and one from philosopher George Graham's The Disordered Mind. I show that Graham's treatment of mental disorder supplies the basis for a compelling response to the puzzle for constitutivism. That response is rooted in his conceptualization of disorder as involving truncated rather than absent rationality. I suggest that Aristotle's discussion of death can be construed as supporting a second response. Finally, I discuss possible clinical implications under the auspices of caring constitutivism, which treats Aristotle's account of the human function as a basis from which ideals of rationality and recovery can be empathetically developed.

Abstract for  “C.I. Lewis: From Conceptual Pragmatism to Contemporary Metaethics"
Diana B. Heney (Fordham University)
Forthcoming in 'Contemporary Perspectives on C. I. Lewis: Pragmatism in Transition'
Eds. Peter Olen & Carl Sachs, Palgrave Macmillan

This volume will showcase the work of C.I. Lewis from a number of angles.  My contribution focuses on Lewis' classification as a pragmatist in the Kantian strand of American pragmatism and on the connections between his conceptual pragmatism and his value theory, the later of which I argue has contemporary currency.

In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all attitudes as revisable.  His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information, and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there cannot be any “direct profit in going behind common sense.” Our question is the following: alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common sense fit in? Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements are relatively infrequent.  In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct.  By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason.

This is the chapter sketch for my contribution to a recently released (2017) volume in the Routledge Studies in American Philosophy Series, titled *Pragmatism and Objectivity: Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher*, edited by Sami Pihlström. 

The volume description:

Pragmatism and Objectivity illuminates the nature of contemporary pragmatism against the background of Rescher’s work, resulting in a stronger grasp of the prospects and promises of this philosophical movement. The central insight of pragmatism is that we must start from where we find ourselves and deflate metaphysical theories of truth in favor of an account that reflects our actual practices of the concept. Pragmatism links truth and rationality to experience, success, and action. While crude versions of pragmatism state that truth is whatever works for a person or a community, Nicholas Rescher has been at the forefront of arguing for a more sophisticated pragmatist position. According to his position, we can illuminate a robust concept of truth by considering its links with inquiry, assertion, belief, and action. His brand of pragmatism is objective and organized around truth and inquiry, rather than other forms of pragmatism that are more subjective and lenient. The contingency and fallibility of knowledge and belief formation does not mean that our beliefs are simply what our community decides, or that truth and objectivity are spurious notions. Rescher offers the best chance of understanding how it is that beliefs can be the products of human inquiry yet aim at the truth nonetheless. The essays in this volume, written by established and up-and-coming scholars of pragmatism, touch on themes related to epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics.

Abstract for 'Toward a Pragmatist Metaethics'
Diana B. Heney (Fordham University)
Now out in the Routledge Studies in American Philosophy Series
Available for Preview: https://www.book2look.com/embed/9781317280354

In our current social landscape, moral questions—about economic disparity, disadvantaging biases, and scarcity—are rightly receiving attention with a sense of urgency. This book argues that classical pragmatism offers a compelling and useful account of our engagement with moral life.

The key arguments are first, that a broader reading of the pragmatist tradition than is usually attempted within the context of ethical theory is necessary; and second, that this broad reading offers resources that enable us to move forward in contemporary debates about truth and principles in moral life.

The first argument is made by demonstrating that there is an arc of theoretical unity that stretches from two key founders of pragmatism—Charles Sanders Peirce and William James—through the work of John Dewey and Clarence Irving Lewis.

The second argument is made by engaging with contemporary debates concerning the truth-status of the judgments and assertions made in ordinary moral discourse, as well as the role and nature of moral principles.

Abstract for “Reality as Necessary Friction”
Diana B. Heney (Fordham University)
forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
**please cite final version**

In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. 

This argument comes in three parts.  First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion.  Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target.  Finally, I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it.

My entry to Charles S. Peirce in His Own Words – The Peirce Quote Volume, eds. Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen.  Many excellent Peirce scholars contributed to the volume, which asked authors to choose, situate, and explain a favourite passage from Peirce's writings.  It's a unique resource, and I highly recommend it to any fans of American philosophy!

This is a link to the podcast that I did for the New Books in Philosophy channel of the New Books Network.  It's free and gives the gist of some main ideas from *Toward a Pragmatist Metaethics*.

Thanks to Robert Talisse and Carrie Figdor and the New Books folks, especially to Talisse for hosting the interview!

http://tinyurl.com/zxbraju

This is my public talk from the 2017 Young Philosophers Lecture Series at the Prindle Institute for Ethics at DePauw University.  This is essentially the transcript of the talk.  I'll link to the video when it's available.  The audience had *excellent* questions, and the whole event was a lot of fun.

This is the induction address from the 2017 Phi Sigma Tau ceremony at Fordham, which connects a few choice Peirce quotations with a reflection on the value of philosophy.  Since it was not a formal venue, this is essentially the transcript of the talk.  Six of my former students were inducted this year - very proud of them!

George Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith is the introduction to his systematic philosophy, developed in the Realms of Being. 2023 marked the centenary of the publication of SAF, and Martin Coleman and Glenn Tiller hae edited a new companion text - with 20 essays by Santayana scholars! - coming out in 2024. This is a short presentation of my essay from that volume.

The Peirce Society had a great session at the Central APA, organized by Richard Atkins and with new work presented by myself, Claudia Cristalli, and Michael Pope. This is a copy of the handout that I used, with a selection of passages where Peirce mentions virtue as well as a partial bibliography for work by Peirce scholars on what I framed as two candidates for virtue - self-control and concrete reasonableness.

The Charles S. Peirce Society recently hosted an author-meets-critics session on James Liszka's new book, *Charles S. Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences* (Routledge 2021). Also featured on the panel were Peirce scholars Rosa Mayorga and Aaron Wilson. This is a copy of my presentation slides.

This was a terrific panel with three colleagues - Pierre-Luc Dostie Proulx, Neil Williams, and Jessica Wright - at the European Pragmatism Conference, where we addressed the general topic of value theory in classical pragmatism.  My talk focused on C.I. Lewis.  Attached here are the paper abstract and the handout used for the talk.

My part of the symposium was a paper called 'Even in Solitary Meditation: Considering Private Judgment as Genuine Assertion'

Kenneth Boyd (Dalhousie) gave a paper titled 'Peirce on "Commonality"'; Andrew Howat (Cal State, Fullerton) gave a paper titled 'Hookway's Peirce on Convergence, Assertion and Truth'.

It was a productive session!  I've posted the handout used here, as the paper is under review.