Huw Price

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the anti-representationalists' own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom.

I argue that Sellars's proximity to pragmatism has been occluded by ignoring how close he is to C. I. Lewis. I argue that C. I. Lewis' conceptualistic pragmatism should be understood as a pragmatist alternative to Dewey's emphasis on the organism-environment transaction. I then argue that Sellars's distinction between "signifying" and "picturing" is precisely the distinction that we need in order to reconcile Dewey and Lewis. Thus picturing, far from being the idea that bars pragmatists from accepting Sellars, is in fact a concept that pragmatists ought to embrace.

One of the most difficult concept in Sellars's philosophy of mind is what he called "picturing." I argue that Friedman's idea of "philosophy as meta-science" and argue that picturing is a meta-scientific concept in Friedman's sense: it is the meta-scientific anticipation of cognitive science. After showing how this makes sense of relevant Sellarsian texts I then turn to predictive processing in cognitive science and suggest that picturing is basically a proto-scientific anticipation of predictive processing.

This book argues that Sellars’ theory of intentionality can be understood as an advancement of a transcendental philosophical approach. It shows how Sellars develops his theory of intentionality through his engagement with the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant.

The book delivers a provocative reinterpretation of one of the most problematic and controversial concepts of Sellars' philosophy: the picturing-relation. Sellars' theory of intentionality addresses the question of how to reconcile two aspects that seem opposed: the non-relational theory of intellectual and linguistic content and a causal-transcendental theory of representation inspired by the philosophy of the early Wittgenstein. The author explains how both parts cohere in a transcendental account of finite knowledge. He claims that this can only be achieved by reading Sellars as committed to a transcendental methodology inspired by Kant. In a final step, he brings his interpretation to bear on the contemporary metaphilosophical debate on pragmatism and expressivism.

Intentionality in Sellars will be of interest to scholars of Sellars and Kant, as well as researchers working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy.

This paper discusses the status of metaphysical themes in recent pragmatism, primarily in the work of Robert Brandom and Huw Price. It examines the main points of difference between these two philosophers and recommends pathways for further development. The metaphysical statuses of naturalism and normativity are central concerns of the paper, and doubts are raised about accounting for phenomena associated with these dimensions in a straightforward way. It is suggested, however, that if the notion of a pragmatic metavocabulary is properly explicated it may provide the key for understanding the intermingling of naturalistic and normative aspects of intentionality, and claims regarding ontological commitment.

En el presente trabajo me ocuparé de abordar críticamente el debate entre Pascal Engel y Richard Rorty en torno a la importancia de la noción de verdad para la caracterización de la aserción. Se mostrarán las ventajas teóricas que tiene la posi-ción conversacionalista rortiana en su rechazo de la idea de la verdad como norma asertiva. Para ello, en primer lugar, haré una presentación del deflacionismo rortia-no. Luego presentaré la defensa engeliana de la idea de la verdad como norma, para, finalmente, mostrar que la misma es superable desde la posición conversacionalis-ta. A lo largo de la argumentación se cuestionarán a su vez algunos desarrollos de Akeel Bilgrami, Harry Frankfurt y Huw Price que podrían serle útiles a la posición de Engel.

In this work I will analyze the debate between Pascal Engel and Richard Rorty about the relevance of the notion of truth to the characterization of assertion. I will point out the theoretic advantages of Rortian conversationalism's refuse of the idea of truth as a norm of assertion. For that, first of all, I will make an analysis of Rortian deflationism. Then, I will make an reconstruction of Engel's defense of the normativity of truth. Finally, I will establish that that defense is overcome by con-versationalism. During the discussion I will criticize some theoretical developments by Akeel Bilgrami, Harry Frankfurt and Huw Price which could be useful to Engel's position.

Abstract for “Reality as Necessary Friction”
Diana B. Heney (Fordham University)
forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy
**please cite final version**

In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. 

This argument comes in three parts.  First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion.  Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target.  Finally, I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it.

Huw Price’s long-standing criticism of representationalism is partially mitigated by what he now calls “the new bifurcation thesis.”  Central to this thesis is his distinction between “i-representations” and “e-representations”.  He finds in Sellars’ distinction between “S-assertability” and “picturing” an anticipation of this distinction.  I argue here that while Price correctly claims that Sellars anticipates the new bifurcation thesis, he neglects the role that Sellars assigns to picturing.  I develop this aspect of Sellars’ thought by turning to Seibt’s interpretation of picturing, which she shows requires a distinction between high-grade, discursive and low-grade, biological normativity.  Hence the new bifurcation thesis is best understood as a bifurcation between kinds of normativity, and not just between kinds of representation.

Putnam's third stage, in which he espouses a “direct” or “natural” realism is to be differentiated from a prior “metaphysical realist” stage (stage 1), an “internal realist” stage (stage 2). In each stage Putnam's realism is accompanied by a complimentary theory of truth. Early Putnam (stage 1) believed truth (in this case understood in terms of a realist correspondence theory), could outstrip justification. Stage 2, Putnam abandoned “metaphysical realism” in favour of “internal realism” a view, which was underwritten by a verificationist conception of truth as the “idealized” form of the best we can strive for by way of justification. Stage 3 Putnam, overturns, yet again his prior realist commitments and his associated view on truth. This Putnam argues for direct, unmediated epistemic access to the world an access that can be appreciated through turning our attention to our “ordinary” epistemic practices. The change is accompanied by an equivalent shift in his views on truth. However it has become increasingly difficult to decipher the role that truth plays in Putnam's realism. Stage 3 Putnam's account of truth owes a great deal to both the later Wittgenstein and to his engagement with the classical pragmatists. From both Wittgenstein and the Pragmatists Putnam takes on an “ordinary” conception of truth as expressed in practice. From Wittgenstein, Putnam develops a quasi-quietistic approach to truth: we must surrender the requirement for a theory of truth in favour of an approach that looks at the roles it plays in our epistemic practices. In this regard Putnam intersects with the views of fellow neo-pragmatist Huw Price. Both philosophers share a focus on practice and quietism with respect to inflationary approaches to truth. However the differ on what Price refers to as a “deep tension within pragmatism” (Price, 2011: 67), the status, the value and the philosophical respectability of identifying truth with justification. Price delivers a role-functional (or genealogical) account of truth that keeps its focus on practice. For Price this focus is retained through questioning the plausibility and efficacy of “substantial” approaches to truth. We need to be able to investigate the role of truth without asking what it “actually” is. From a methodological perspective this is achieved through resisting the bait offered by a link between truth and justification; this link carries us inevitably back toward the substantive question. In this move Price marks his divergence from a great many other pragmatists both classical and contemporary. However Putnam refuses to sever the link between truth and justification. Stage 3 Putnam advocates an “ordinary” conception of truth and attributes to this ordinary conception a role for justification and a role for the intuition that truth can outstrip justification. For Price resisting the link between truth and justification is a feature of methodological hygiene, tasked with preventing re-inflation. Is Putnam's desire to keep the door open – no matter how narrowly – for a constructive account of truth (even if it is a “vulgar” or “ordinary one”) an option that can actually be exercised, or does it threaten the coherence of the approach?