- Campion College at the University of Regina
3737 Wascana Parkway
Regina, SK
S4S 0A2 Canada - 1 306 359 1214
Robert Piercey
Campion College at the University of Regina, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Hermeneutics, Pragmatism, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of History, and 19 morePhenomenology, Paul Ricoeur, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel, Richard Rorty, John Dewey, William James, Philip Kitcher, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Literature & Philosophy, Reading, Narrative, Stephen Mulhall, Historiography of philosophy, Robert Brandom, Wittgensteinian Ethics, and Mark Beviredit
Reading as a Philosophical Practice asks why reading—everyday reading for pleasure—matters so profoundly to so many people. Its answer is that reading is an implicitly philosophical activity. To passionate readers, it is a way of working... more
Reading as a Philosophical Practice asks why reading—everyday reading for pleasure—matters so profoundly to so many people. Its answer is that reading is an implicitly philosophical activity. To passionate readers, it is a way of working through, and taking a stand on, certain fundamental questions about who and what we are, how we should live, and how we relate to other things. The book examines the lessons that the activity of reading seems to teach about selfhood, morality, and ontology, and it tries to clarify the sometimes paradoxical claims that serious readers have made about it. To do so, it proposes an original theoretical framework based on Virginia Woolf’s notion of the common reader and Alasdair MacIntyre’s conception of practice. It also asks whether reading can continue to play this role as paper is replaced by electronic screens.
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In this book Robert Piercey asks how it is possible to do philosophy by studying the thinkers of the past. He develops his answer through readings of Martin Heidegger, Richard Rorty, Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre and other... more
In this book Robert Piercey asks how it is possible to do philosophy by studying the thinkers of the past. He develops his answer through readings of Martin Heidegger, Richard Rorty, Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre and other historically-minded philosophers. Piercey shows that what is distinctive about these figures is a concern with philosophical pictures - extremely general conceptions of what the world is like - rather than specific theories. He offers a comprehensive and illuminating exploration of the way in which these thinkers use narrative to evaluate and criticise these pictures. The result is a powerful and original account of how philosophers use the past.
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Continental philosophy has traditionally seen philosophy as historical, claiming that there are no new beginnings in the discipline, and that we must revisit the work of earlier thinkers again and again. Yet, continental philosophers... more
Continental philosophy has traditionally seen philosophy as historical, claiming that there are no new beginnings in the discipline, and that we must revisit the work of earlier thinkers again and again. Yet, continental philosophers rarely argue explicitly for their view of philosophy's past, and the discussions of the topic that exist tend to be riddled with confusion.
Here, Robert Piercey asks why, and explores what the continental tradition must do to come to terms with this crisis. Piercey traces the confusion about history back to Hegel, who he argues sends a mixed message about historical thinking, one that is later adopted by Heidegger and then passed on to his successors. In addition to telling the story of this crisis, Piercey offers an account of historical thinking that does not lead to the difficulties that currently plague the continental tradition.
The result is a highly original look at the development of continental thought and the nature of philosophy's historical turn.
Here, Robert Piercey asks why, and explores what the continental tradition must do to come to terms with this crisis. Piercey traces the confusion about history back to Hegel, who he argues sends a mixed message about historical thinking, one that is later adopted by Heidegger and then passed on to his successors. In addition to telling the story of this crisis, Piercey offers an account of historical thinking that does not lead to the difficulties that currently plague the continental tradition.
The result is a highly original look at the development of continental thought and the nature of philosophy's historical turn.
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Jukka Mikkonen argues that the cognitive benefits of narrative should be explained in terms of understanding rather than knowledge. An apparent consequence of Mikkonen’s view is that “plot-based” conceptions of narrative are less... more
Jukka Mikkonen argues that the cognitive benefits of narrative should be explained in terms of understanding rather than knowledge. An apparent consequence of Mikkonen’s view is that “plot-based” conceptions of narrative are less interesting than has long been supposed. I argue that, although the concept of understanding does indeed outperform the concept of knowledge in this area, it would be a mistake to conclude that knowledge of plots is unimportant. Doing so ignores the distinctive kind of understanding gained from trying to shape events into an orderly plot but failing to do so.
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One of the core principles of Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics is that interpretation culminates in application, or appropriation. But what exactly is an appropriation, and what makes some appropriations better than others? I try to shed light... more
One of the core principles of Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics is that interpretation culminates in application, or appropriation. But what exactly is an appropriation, and what makes some appropriations better than others? I try to shed light on these difficult matters by examining Ricoeur's own appropriation of Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of the narrative unity of a life, and by contrasting it with Richard Rorty's appropriation of the same notion. I argue that Ricoeur's appropriation is more successful than Rorty's, and that the best explanation of its success is that it respects a distinctive norm that governs the activity of appropriation. I conclude by describing this norm, which I call the principle of ultimate compatibility.
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Ricoeur’s readers usually assume they understand his view of Hegel, since he talks about Hegel often and likes to characterize various aspects of his work as “Hegelian.” What often goes unnoticed is that Ricoeur does not always use this... more
Ricoeur’s readers usually assume they understand his view of Hegel, since he talks about Hegel often and likes to characterize various aspects of his work as “Hegelian.” What often goes unnoticed is that Ricoeur does not always use this term in the same way. This chapter argues that Ricoeur uses the term “Hegelian” in three distinct senses: a methodological, an ontological, and a metaphilosophical sense. These senses overlap, but they are also in tension, and this fact greatly complicates the task of identifying Ricoeur’s attitude toward German Idealism—especially his claim in Time and Narrative that contemporary philosophers should “renounce Hegel.”
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This essay asks whether a pragmatist philosophy of history can make sense of the notion of historical facts. It is tempting to think it cannot, since pragmatists insist, as James puts it, that the trail of the human serpent is over... more
This essay asks whether a pragmatist philosophy of history can make sense of the notion of historical facts. It is tempting to think it cannot, since pragmatists insist, as James puts it, that the trail of the human serpent is over everything. Facts, by contrast, are typically thought of as something untouched by the human serpent, something impervious to what we think and do. I argue, however, that there is a way of understanding facts that is perfectly at home in pragmatist philosophy of history. Drawing on work by Robert Brandom, I propose that facts be interpreted inferentially. On this view, to call something a fact, or to say that the facts make my beliefs true, is simply a shorthand way of saying that a particular sort of relationship exists among certain sentences. I further show that this inferential understanding of facts is fully compatible with the distinctive features of historical inquiry. In particular, it is compatible with history’s irreducibly narrative character, and with the way different narratives can reveal radically different facts. Finally, I use this account of historical facts to respond to a classic criticism of pragmatism: the charge that pragmatism is narcissistic. I argue that pragmatism is narcissistic in only the minimal sense that it cannot countenance theory-neutral givens. But pragmatists can happily grant that there is more to truth than consensus, and that our claims are answerable to facts that everyone can get wrong.
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Martin Heidegger and Alasdair MacIntyre both claim that universities perform important philosophical functions. This essay reconstructs Heidegger’s and MacIntyre’s views of the university and argues that they have a common source, which I... more
Martin Heidegger and Alasdair MacIntyre both claim that universities perform important philosophical functions. This essay reconstructs Heidegger’s and MacIntyre’s views of the university and argues that they have a common source, which I call hermeneutics without historicism. Heidegger and MacIntyre are hermeneutical philosophers: philosophers who are sensitive to the ways in which thought is mediated by interpretation and conditioned by history and culture. But both of them reject the relativistic historicism sometimes associated with a hermeneutical approach to philosophy. This desire to have it both ways leads Heidegger and MacIntyre to attach tremendous importance to activities that take place in universities but nowhere else. The essay also asks whether MacIntyre’s defenders should be troubled by the similarities between his account of the function of the university and Heidegger’s. I argue that they should not, because, while Heidegger’s account of the university has obvious moral and political failings, these failings result not from non-historicist hermeneutics as such, but from specific features of Heidegger’s version of it.
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While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur's account of... more
While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur's account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate's importance and describe Ricoeur's reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur's middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition.