Susan Haack

This paper will attempt a methodological configuration to link the natural sciences (evolutionary theory & neurology) to literature (lullabies and poetry, specifically). It uses findings in neuroscience and animal neurology as well as the theories of evolution by natural selection in examining patterns in lullabies, and connects these to poetry. As one will never find a ‘metaphor gene’, nor do genes even code for behaviors –coding instead for traits- is it possible to even locate overlaps between the disciplines of natural science and literature? This study believes so. It seeks to build on the existing philosophical and theoretical ground of current natural science in order to establish a dialogue with current cultural and literary theories.

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.

Minor dissertation on Charles S. Peirce's account of truth, his view of science and it's possible implications por ethics.

ÍNDICE

Tabla de abreviaturas…………………………………………….. vii
Introducción………………………………………………………. ix

Capítulo I. Verdad e hipótesis verdaderas en Peirce…………… 1
1. Peirce y la Teoría del Conocimiento……………………….. 2
2. Quién es Charles S. Peirce…………………………………. 16
3. Qué es el pragmatismo……………………………………... 25
4. Qué es una hipótesis verdadera…………………………….. 38

Capítulo II. La vida científica y la verdad………………………. 65
1. Ciencia, creencias e investigación en Peirce……………….. 66
2. La concepción peirceana de la verdad……………………... 105
3. La ampliación de la razonabilidad…………………………. 161

Capítulo III. La ética según Peirce………………………………. 165
1. ¿Qué es una ética pragmatista?........................................... 172
2. La ética como ciencia normativa…………………………... 182
3. Aprendida o instintiva: ética y moral………………………. 199
4. Consecuencias para una ética del intelecto………………… 223

Conclusiones………………………………………………………. 229
Bibliografía………………………………………………………... 239

Los doce ensayos recopilados en esta obra son parte del trabajo filosófico de Susan Haack -en epistemología, metafísica y en cuestiones del lenguaje, la lógica, la ciencia, la ética y la sociedad- que tienen algún impacto en la teoría del derecho en general o en el derecho probatorio en particular. Los primeros cinco ensayos se refieren a una amplia gama de temas filosóficos jurídicamente relevantes, los últimos seis a aspectos sobre el derecho probatorio estadounidense que regula la prueba científica.

The editors of «The Hedgehog Review» offered Rorty’s lecture “Universalist Grandeur and Analytic Philosophy” as the centerpiece of a symposium on “The Business of Philosophy” along with "the responses of three contemporary philosophers who, for different reasons, take issue with Rorty’s position”. Haack's reply under the title “Pining Away in the Midst of Plenty” deserves a careful reading.
In order to make sense of Haack’s critique of Rorty’s reading of the history of 20th century philosophy, I divided my contribution into four sections: 1) Rorty and Peirce: How Rorty discovers and abandons Peirce; 2) Haack and Peirce: How Haack discovers Peirce and learns from him; 3) Rorty and Haack: The two pragmatisms; 4) Haack’s pragmatism as a multi-faceted philosophy.

Frente a la tesis del agotamiento de la filosofía analítica, el trabajo de Susan Haack muestra un proceso de profunda transformación en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En lugar de considerar la tradición analítica como una abrupta ruptura con el pragmatismo clásico, el resurgimiento del pragmatismo de las últimas décadas avala, por el contrario, la continuidad entre ambos movimientos. En este proceso el trabajo de Susan Haack tiene un papel decisivo. Esta colaboración en torno al pragmatismo de Susan Haack está organizada en tres secciones: 1) El desarrollo pragmatista en la biografía de Haack; 2) las dos versiones rivales del pragmatismo; y 3) el futuro del pragmatismo.

Abstract: Faced with the thesis of the exhaustion of analytic philosophy, the work of Susan Haack shows a process of deep transformation within analytical philosophy. Instead of considering the analytic tradition as an abrupt breakdown with classical pragmatism, the resurgence of pragmatism in the last decades endorses , on the contrary, the continuity between both movements. In this process Susan Haack's work has a decisive role. This paper around the pragmatism of Susan Haack is organized into three sections: 1) The pragmatist development in Haack's biography; 2) the two rival versions of pragmatism; and 3) the future of pragmatism.

Introducción En este ensayo voy a presentar una teoría de la creencia que ha caracterizado la epistemología pragmatista en contradistinción a la epistemología contemporánea. La creencia suele entenderse como el contenido de una proposición, y, por lo tanto, la epistemología contemporánea se ha concentrado en establecer cómo una proposición es sostenida de manera confiable por un individuo. Muy distinto es el enfoque pragmatista, que se enfoca de manera dinámica en la creencia como un hábito que en determinado momento se puede expresar como una proposición, pero cuya característica principal son las disposiciones a la acción o la proyección de dicho hábito en el mundo de la experiencia. Para Dewey, por ejemplo, la lógica es una teoría de la indagación que permite determinar situaciones que vienen a nosotros de manera indeterminada, y a través del pensamiento nuestros conceptos son como instrumentos para la determinación de las situaciones. Así también la epistemología en la tradición pragmatista se tratará sobre todo de una teoría del dinamismo del conocimiento ante el dinamismo de la experiencia, no estableciendo una dicotomía en la que están desconexos, sino una transición. Antes de proseguir me gustaría hacer una importante aclaración: agradezco a Vincent Colapietro que de manera personal me haya puntualizado que es difícil hablar de una "epistemología" en el pragmatismo, puesto que la "epistemología" en cuanto disciplina está marcada por una actitud de resolución ante el escepticismo, buscando una serie de certezas para la creencia que se alejan de la experiencia común, caso que preocupa al pragmatista. Sin embargo, consciente de dicha aporta he decidido conservar el término "epistemología", pues a pesar de que la epistemología tradicional y contemporánea en efecto estén determinados de dicha manera, el pragmatismo nos ofrece una teoría completa y adecuada del conocimiento, y me parece que el concepto clásico de "episteme" de los griegos es en efecto compatible con la teoría del conocimiento pragmatista. VI Coloquio Internacional de Filosofía del Conocimiento Las búsquedas de la filosofía en la contemporaneidad La actualidad del pragmatismo La Plata, 28 al 31 de agosto de 2018

Susan Haack, “The World According to Innocent Realism: The One and the Many, the Real and the Imaginary, the Natural and the Social.”

Abstract: Prof. Haack articulates her signature metaphysical theory, Innocent Realism. The world of Innocent Realism is rich and varied, but also integrated: it is a pluralistic universe of natural stuff, things, phenomena, kinds, and laws overlaid, in “our” part of the world, by our thoughts, dreams, etc., by our social institutions, rules, and laws, and by a vast array of human artifacts, physical, intellectual, and imaginative.

If this paper interests yu, you might also want to look at "Brave New World" (in press) and "The Real, the Fictional, and the Fake" (2013)

POWERPOINTS TO ACCOMPANY THIS PAPER ARE AVAILABLE IN THE SECTION LABELED “SELECTED PRESENTATIONS” BELOW (UNDER “MORE”). A LINK TO A YOUTUBE VIDEO OF HAACK GIVING THIS PRESENTATION CAN BE FOUND UNDER “LINKS” IN THAT SECTION

Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse Steve Fuller's use of the term «post-truth»-especially, the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy.

En la mayoría de los sistemas jurídicos contemporáneos, la relación de causalidad cumple una función central en los juicios de atribución de responsabilidad. Los juristas, por su parte, suelen advertir inmediatamente, y sin necesidad de mayores indagaciones, que un buen abordaje de este tema supone tomar posición en discusiones filosóficas complejas. Es aquí donde un libro de filosofía del derecho, y no de filosofía general, dedicado al estudio de la relación de causalidad constituye un aporte fundamental que enriquece el esquema conceptual de los juristas con el resultado de la reflexión filosófica. Este libro ocupa ese espacio intermedio en el cual los teóricos se han sentido incomodados por las exigencias pragmáticas y los operadores jurídicos a veces han sentido entorpecida su labor por consideraciones teóricas. Por esta razón, es una buena muestra de lo que puede avanzarse cuando se concilian ambos intereses.
Las contribuciones que componen este volumen fueron escritas por autores de diversas latitudes, que desarrollan distintas líneas de investigación. Debido a ello, las perspectivas desde las que se ha tratado el tema son también diversas. El lector encontrará estudios referidos a la propia naturaleza del nexo de causalidad, a su estructura lógica, a sus relaciones con la atribución de responsabilidad y a los problemas epistemológicos que suscita su prueba, entre otras cuestiones. Sin duda, las discusiones aquí contenidas serán de interés para académicos, operadores del derecho, teóricos del derecho y filósofos en general.

En este artículo, defiendo que las creencias religiosas pueden ser pragmáticamente racionales. Una creencia religiosa es pragmáticamente racional si es consistente con una ética de las virtudes, como la de Martha Nussbaum, al margen de si tal creencia tiene evidencia o justificación como soporte epistémico. Para lograr tal objetivo, primero, analizaré algunas tesis pragmatistas y anti-evidencialistas de William James y Richard Rorty. En segundo lugar, analizaré el evidencialismo de William Clifford y Susan Haack. Luego, argumentaré que, aunque los argumentos evidencialistas son más fuertes que los anti-evidencialistas, es posible satisfacer las demandas de ambas posiciones. En particular, sostendré que la diferencia pragmática relevante descansa en garantizar que la creencia religiosa no implique daño moral. Finalmente, argumentaré que, para satisfacer las demandas evidencialistas y anti-evidencialistas, es necesario establecer un marco moral para cualquier cuerpo de creencias religioso

This chapter is intended to provide a philosophical analysis of Fear and Trembling in the light of the debate around the Ethics of Belief. In addition, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s purpose in writing this work was not to defend what appears to be its manifest argument, that true Christian faith involves accepting Abraham as an exemplar, but rather that the argument can be read as an explicit attempt to show why we should reject him. To this end, we will discuss how the work relates to the debate between William Kingdom Clifford and William James making reference as well to developments in the debate since then, especially the work of the contemporary philosopher Susan Haack. Moreover, we will also consider some surrounding factors that affect the reading of the text today.

Described by one reader as "delightfully direct," this memoir is illuminating both about Haack's career, and her philosophical development.
This reprint is remarkable both for having appeared only three weeks after the original, but also for the introduction by Robert Hanna (whom Haack has never met). "Susan Haack is not only a real philosopher-by which I mean an authentic, serious philosopher-she is also an all-around brilliant real philosopher, and a truly independent thinker. Indeed, she is arguably the greatest living philosopher, whether inside or outside the professional academy. And among other truly independent thinkers alive today, only Noam Chomsky seems to me comparable to her.

Haack classifies Spengler's views on the end of science as what she terms annihilationist in that he forecasts the absolute termination of scientific activity as opposed to its completion or culmination. She also argues that in addition to his externalist argument that Western science, as cultural product, cannot survive the demise of Western Culture, Spengler also puts forward an internalist argument that science, regardless of the imminent demise of Western Culture, is in terminal decline as evidenced by its diminishing returns. I argue against Haack that Spengler's argument for the diminishing returns of modern science is in fact an externalist one, in that he locates the sources of science's current decline outside the discipline of science itself, attributing them to a change in cultural attitude towards scientific endeavours. I further argue that Spengler's prediction of the imminent end of science was directed specifically at pure science, and that he in fact held that applied science would continue to develop. I also take issue with Haack's suggestion that Spengler's views on science were outmoded at the time that he wrote them.

I will look in this paper at the use in contemporary epistemology of so-called Agrippa's trilemma-three of the five modes of Agrippa that can be jointly thought of as an argument for the conclusion that no justified belief can exist. According to the argument, all alleged justification must either constitute a vicious circle, or end in unjustified assumptions, or constitute an infinite chain. Since the third option is an impossibility and the first two options contradict the initial assumption that there was a justification, no justification for a belief can exist. Each premise of the argument has been contested in contemporary epistemology. The choice of which premise has to be rejected however was the subject of much debate and, in fact, different theories of justification characterize themselves starting from their choice in this respect. I will focus on foundationalism and coherentism, respectively the rejection of the idea that there can be no starting points (foundations) for a justificatory process and the rejection of the idea that all circularity must be vicious. I will differentiate different forms of these views. I will argue first that coherentism needs to accept that all beliefs have some sort of default justification to be motivated independently. Then I will argue that the two most prominent forms of foundationalism (dogmatism and disjunctivism) both need to accept some form of circularity. Finally I will look at a hybrid view, Haack's "foundherentism", and I will argue that it has the potential to solve the problems previously highlighted, combining the strengths of the other two views, and thus offering a solution to the trilemma.

El objetivo de esta obra es triple: i) presentar al lector las traducciones al castellano de los textos más relevantes de las distintas teorías de la verdad desarrolladas en el siglo XX y principios del siglo XXI; ii) exponerlas de manera organizada en siete grupos bien definidos: teorías de la correspondencia, pro-oracionales, fenomenológicas, hermenéuticas, coherenciales, pragmatistas e intersubjetivas; iii) poner de relieve mediante dicha división la idea de que la verdad es un concepto multifacético y que, por tanto, una adecuada aproximación a su problemática ha de incluir las diversas perspectivas que comprende. Palabras clave: correspondentismo, pro-oracionalismo, fenomenología, hermenéutica, pragmatismo, intersubjetivismo.

The article analyzes the metaphysical ideas of Su- san Haack, and explains the characteristics of the innocent re- alism of the British author. The basic assumptions of Haack’s metaphysics, which rests on Peirce’s synechism, naturalism and pluralism, are reviewed in eight theses, T1-T8. The importance that, for Haack’s system, has the Pragmatist Maxim is empha- sized, as well as the importance of conceptual analysis, which leads Haack to denounce inconsistencies and ambiguities in the philosophical systems with which she argues, essentially other types of pragmatism, including Rortian “cynicism”, radical sci- entism, classical analytical philosophy and idealism.

Susan Haack answers questions from Richard Carrier about her life and work, the present state and future of philosophy, theism and atheism, etc. (Some readers will be amused by Dr. Carrier's questions about how to get more women into philosophy, and Prof. Haack's insistence that that's the wrong goal: we should be trying to ensure, rather, that a person's gender (or race) matter less to our assessment of the quality of their mind.)

Susan Haack criticises the US courts’ use of Karl Popper’s epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper’s epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper’s views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper’s views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims for it. The courts should not be concerned with reliability and, insofar as they use the term ‘reliability,’ it should be construed in a procedural rather than a substantive sense. Since Popper’s epistemology gives something like a characterisation of science at its best, the courts should continue to invoke Popper’s theories in their discrimination of acceptable testimony.

This paper was not published. It was a talk in these conference.
To cite it: "Criterios pragmatistas en Haack del cambio conceptual en la Ciencia," (Haack's Pragmatist Criteria of conceptual change). Jornadas sobre Revoluciones conceptuales: De las Ciencias Cognitivas a la Medicina, March 6th, 2009 Universidade da Coruña. Campus de Ferrol. A Coruña.

“Un argumento a favor de la existencia de (verdaderas) lógicas paraconsistentes”. En J. Alcolea et al. (eds.), Actas del VI Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España, Valencia, Universitat de València, 2004, pp. 102-106. ISBN: 978-84-370-7655-3 http://www.solofici.org/actas-de-congresos

Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not rely primarily on peer pressure, I draw on the work of C. S. Peirce. Peirce argued that, when we reason, we manipulate abstract diagrams in order to observe what results. Since some manipulations are barred by the self-same nature of the diagrams, I try to show that this qualitative incompatibility, which I dub “contrapiction,” is a good (non-social) reason to regard some reasoning as bad.

This paper provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a scientific theory is warranted depends, roughly, on one’s observations, on the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories, and on whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality or reasonableness might save foundherentism about scientific warrant and the image of science as a crossword puzzle, and draw some lessons for social epistemology generally by also applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.

The current state of crisis within the sciences prompted by the dissociation between scientific research and ethics, has often led to an image of the scientific enterprise as something that threatens us, our nature and our dignity as human beings. In response, this paper urges to recover the dimension of truth-seeking inherent in any scientific research, following the lines of Charles S. Peirce's thought (himself a professional scientist), so that this primarily human activity in which science consists can regain its place in the service of mankind.

Durante o último quarto de século, o veloz crescimento da internet e, em especial, das mídias sociais desequilibrou a balança de poder político. Hoje, uma enorme massa de atores privados e públicos, individuais e institucionais, é capaz de viralizar conteúdo. Dado que a veracidade desses conteúdos não é pré-condição para eficácia de sua propagação, o ecossistema informativo restou irreversivelmente alterado. Nesse contexto, o presente estudo pretende analisar o funcionamento da desinformação em redes epistêmicas e suas implicações sociais e políticas na era da hipercomunicação. O estudo adota o método hipotético-dedutivo e instrumentaliza a revisão bibliográfica especializada como ferramenta metodológica. Primeiramente, analisa-se a mecânica da desinformação em redes epistêmicas; depois, alguns desafios informativos, como pressão do establishment, efeitos da propaganda, câmaras de eco e polarização ideológica. Ao fim, realiza-se uma aproximação à epistemologia de Susan Haack e a sua defesa do senso comum crítico. O trabalho conclui que os mecanismos da desinformação não podem ser compreendidos unicamente com base na psicologia individual e nos vieses cognitivos, já que indivíduos perfeitamente racionais podem decidir comportar-se de forma irracional; por isso, o mero influxo de informações e evidências não soluciona o problema; a era da hipercomunicação magnificou distorções, já que mecanismos responsáveis por pequenos “desvios” nas redes de produção de conhecimento locais, quando colocados numa escala global de hiperconectividade, atingem proporções incontroláveis; o senso comum crítico de Haack constitui um parâmetro teórico adequado para compreender a falibilidade de algumas estratégias que buscam mitigar a desinformação.

Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse Steve Fuller’s use of the term «post-truth» – especially, the political connotations about epistemic democracy that he highlights. Instead, we offer a pragmatist defence of the truth and an alternative meaning of epistemic democracy.

Il volume collettivo Il pragmatismo. Dalle origini agli sviluppi contemporanei vede raccolti contributi specifici di diversi autori italiani nell’ambito di ricerca del pragmatismo, sia da un punto di vista storiografico, sia da uno prettamente teorico. Il collante principale dell’opera consiste nella volontà di articolare e prospettare l’intera esperienza della galassia pragmatista, indagandone in primo luogo le origini con una lettura attenta delle dinamiche sociali e culturali dell’America di fine ’800 e giungendo, nel tramite dei vari snodi teorici raccolti durante la storia dei suoi sviluppi, sino alle più urgenti e attuali prospettive teoriche dello scenario contemporaneo.