Bjørn Torgrim T Ramberg
University of Oslo, CSMN, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy Of Language, Philosophy of Agency, Pragmatism, Richard Rorty, and 11 moreDonald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, NeoPragmatism, American Pragmatism, Metaphilosophy, John McDowell, Naturalism, American Philosophy, Pragmatics, Pragmatism (Philosophy), and Robert Brandomedit
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... in-Publication Data Reflections and replies : essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge / edited by Martin I lalm and B jorn Ramberg. p. cm. ... vii Contributors ix Introduction xi 1 Burge, Descartes, and Us 1 Calvin Normore 2... more
... in-Publication Data Reflections and replies : essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge / edited by Martin I lalm and B jorn Ramberg. p. cm. ... vii Contributors ix Introduction xi 1 Burge, Descartes, and Us 1 Calvin Normore 2 Anti-Individualism and Scepticism 15 Barry Stroud 3 When ...
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The problem I want to raise in this paper will not be a problem for anyone who does not share both the following concerns or prejudices. The first is that we should take a materialist, extensional approach to linguistic meaning,... more
The problem I want to raise in this paper will not be a problem for anyone who does not share both the following concerns or prejudices. The first is that we should take a materialist, extensional approach to linguistic meaning, specifically, the approach that is suggested by the work of Donald Davidson. The second is that social analysis must be emancipatory, and that this requires the conceptual possibility of postulating social structures that are in some sense hidden by discourse. The problem I want to address lies in a possible conflict between these concerns, both of which I will clarify, though not justify (except in so far as we take their compatibility to be apart of their respective justifications). The problem is this: Does the methodological core of Davidson's semantics—the principle of charity—permit interpretation informed by a concept of ideological concealment?As with many of our philosophical problems, the existence of this one is quite precarious. We can avoid ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Dialogue
Is Richard Rorty a philosophical quietist? We consider different stances Rorty has assumed toward philosophy, arguing that on the face of it there is no conflict between them. However, Rorty's extensive writing on the topic of truth... more
Is Richard Rorty a philosophical quietist? We consider different stances Rorty has assumed toward philosophy, arguing that on the face of it there is no conflict between them. However, Rorty's extensive writing on the topic of truth suggests a tension between Rorty's own recommendation of "benign neglect" of metaphysics and his actual philosophical practice. The topic of truth actually serves Rorty's philosophical purposes well, allowing him to change the direction of conversation from a concern with the nature of concepts to a direct concern with human practice. The switch Rorty envisions is captured in the emblematic figure of the ironist, and we consider the ironist variety of quietism accordingly. For Rorty, we conclude, quietism is a contingent, conditional, strategic stance. Rorty's aim is to change the direction of a strand of philosophical conversation, not to free us from philosophical illusion or to bring philosophy to an end.
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In this chapter we focus on Rorty’s core commitments with respect to language, and consider their role in Rorty’s stormy relations to mainstream analytic philosophy. Further, we bring out key features of Rorty’s position by tracing his... more
In this chapter we focus on Rorty’s core commitments with respect to language, and consider their role in Rorty’s stormy relations to mainstream analytic philosophy. Further, we bring out key features of Rorty’s position by tracing his engagement with Wittgenstein, Sellars, Quine, Davidson, and Kuhn.
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This paper suggests that a main concern of James Tartaglia's Philosophy in a Meaningless Life is human freedom, and the ways in which it may be served (and hampered) by philosophy. Initial remarks about freedom and nihilism are followed... more
This paper suggests that a main concern of James Tartaglia's Philosophy in a Meaningless Life is human freedom, and the ways in which it may be served (and hampered) by philosophy. Initial remarks about freedom and nihilism are followed (in Section II) by brief methodological considerations. Section III offers a reading of the idea of transcendence as Tartaglia deploys it, while Section IV makes use of a comparison with Richard Rorty's understanding of the relation between philosophy and freedom in order to locate what is distinctive about Tartaglia's approach. Finally, in Section V, it is suggested that freedom, in Tartaglia's system of nihilism, is essentially a feature of finitude.
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Pragmatic Naturalists must grapple with a tension between the urge to be sweeping in their meta-philosophical critique and the wish to be relevant to the practice of the discipline. In this chapter I consider three self-declared pragmatic... more
Pragmatic Naturalists must grapple with a tension between the urge to be sweeping in their meta-philosophical critique and the wish to be relevant to the practice of the discipline. In this chapter I consider three self-declared pragmatic naturalists, Richard Rorty, Philip Kitcher, and Huw Price, all of whom have made it their business to offer reform-inducing critiques of philosophy. With Wittgenstein as a common reference point, I consider their positions with respect to the challenges brought on by the attempt to offer radical diagnoses without sacrificing practice-directed authority. The lesson, I suggest, is that meta-philosophy is not the engine of philosophical reform. Rather, in so far as philosophy is a proper subject of reformist ambition at all, this ambition should be couched in ethical and political terms, addressing institutional forms and norms of practice.