My primary areas of research are epistemology, argumentation theory, and ancient philosophy. I'm currently working on a philosophical commentary on Epictetus' Enchiridion.
<jats:p>If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason c... more <jats:p>If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason can't just be any old reason. You've got to rationally hold it as a good reason. In order to do so, you must have another reason. And that reason needs another. And so a regress of reasons ensues. This is a rough-and-ready picture of the epistemic regress problem. Epistemic infinitism is the view that justifying reasons are infinite, and so it is a particular solution to the regress problem. Consider, also, that justification comes in degrees – some beliefs are better justified than others. Moreover, it seems that people can know things better than others. Call this the gradability phenomenon. Epistemic infinitism is the view that for someone to be justified maximally is for that person to have an infinite series of supporting reasons.</jats:p> <jats:p>Epistemic infinitisms admit of a wide variety. Differences between versions of infinitism arise according to two factors for the view: one dialectical, the other ecumenical. The dialectical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of what philosophical problems or questions they answer. Infinitisms are designed to either provide models for how to solve the epistemic regress problem or address the phenomenon of the gradability of justification and knowledge. Infinitisms will differ depending on which issue they are designed to address, and an infinitism designed to address one issue may not be the same as one designed to address another. The ecumenical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of how consistent the view is with other competing theories about how to address the regress problem and the gradability phenomenon. With the regress problem, infinitism's main competitor theories are foundationalism, the view that there are basic beliefs for which there is no need for further reason, and coherentism, the view that justifying reasons come in large mutually supporting packages. For the most part, infinitism is taken to be a form of noncoherentist antifoundationalism about justification, because the infinitist holds that reasons must be infinitely long chains of nonrepeating reasons. However, there are versions of infinitism consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism faces a variety of challenges, and two of particular importance are whether infinitism is actually a form of scepticism and whether infinitism is a complete theory of justification.</jats:p>
Self-evident warrants are self-backed and thus knowable a priori. Warrants licencing inferring a ... more Self-evident warrants are self-backed and thus knowable a priori. Warrants licencing inferring a moral conclusion from a morally relevant premise are paradigm examples. Such warrants are defeasible, for example where there is a conflict of duties. Evidence for them involves moral intuition. Moral realism argues for the objectivity of such intuition and of defeasible a priori warrants. Warrant strength depends on how many rebuttals may be brought against a warrant and their plausibility.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, 2010
“Our species started to become homo religiosus as we gradually awoke to the axiological depth str... more “Our species started to become homo religiosus as we gradually awoke to the axiological depth structures and dynamics of our natural environment. . . . We became homo religiosus more decisively about 50,000 years ago with the crucial neurological changes that gave birth to modern human beings. We will remain homo religiosus even if the statistically and historically dominant supernatural and myth-laden forms of religion eventually decline at the hands of its currently subordinate religious naturalist symbiotic partner. . . . We are homo religiosus not because of what we do in religious groups or in our spiritual solitude but because of who we are in evolutionary and axiological perspective.” (218)
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or s... more This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2022
Diogenes’s exchange with Cicermos the Olympic pankratist is unusual in that it is both a dialecti... more Diogenes’s exchange with Cicermos the Olympic pankratist is unusual in that it is both a dialectical exchange and is successful in changing Cicermos’s mind. Most Cynic rhetoric is physical or gestural and more often alienates than convinces. The puzzling difference is explained by the rhetorical choices Diogenes makes with his uniquely receptive audience.
itself is. In fact, Aristotle seems to think that many cases of understanding do not involve this... more itself is. In fact, Aristotle seems to think that many cases of understanding do not involve this process of dematerialization. The essential feature of nous is that it grasps the essences that makes things what they are, whether these essences need clarification and separation or already are just what they are. This book offers a number of insightful discussions on Aristotle and the way that he uses likeness and measure to explain what our cognitive powers do. However, by failing to engage more holistically with Aristotle's cosmology and with relevant material from Aristotle's biological works and his first philosophy, Kelsey presents an interpretation of Aristotle on cognition that is too subjective and too centered on human knowers.
<jats:p>If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason c... more <jats:p>If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason can't just be any old reason. You've got to rationally hold it as a good reason. In order to do so, you must have another reason. And that reason needs another. And so a regress of reasons ensues. This is a rough-and-ready picture of the epistemic regress problem. Epistemic infinitism is the view that justifying reasons are infinite, and so it is a particular solution to the regress problem. Consider, also, that justification comes in degrees – some beliefs are better justified than others. Moreover, it seems that people can know things better than others. Call this the gradability phenomenon. Epistemic infinitism is the view that for someone to be justified maximally is for that person to have an infinite series of supporting reasons.</jats:p> <jats:p>Epistemic infinitisms admit of a wide variety. Differences between versions of infinitism arise according to two factors for the view: one dialectical, the other ecumenical. The dialectical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of what philosophical problems or questions they answer. Infinitisms are designed to either provide models for how to solve the epistemic regress problem or address the phenomenon of the gradability of justification and knowledge. Infinitisms will differ depending on which issue they are designed to address, and an infinitism designed to address one issue may not be the same as one designed to address another. The ecumenical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of how consistent the view is with other competing theories about how to address the regress problem and the gradability phenomenon. With the regress problem, infinitism's main competitor theories are foundationalism, the view that there are basic beliefs for which there is no need for further reason, and coherentism, the view that justifying reasons come in large mutually supporting packages. For the most part, infinitism is taken to be a form of noncoherentist antifoundationalism about justification, because the infinitist holds that reasons must be infinitely long chains of nonrepeating reasons. However, there are versions of infinitism consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism faces a variety of challenges, and two of particular importance are whether infinitism is actually a form of scepticism and whether infinitism is a complete theory of justification.</jats:p>
Self-evident warrants are self-backed and thus knowable a priori. Warrants licencing inferring a ... more Self-evident warrants are self-backed and thus knowable a priori. Warrants licencing inferring a moral conclusion from a morally relevant premise are paradigm examples. Such warrants are defeasible, for example where there is a conflict of duties. Evidence for them involves moral intuition. Moral realism argues for the objectivity of such intuition and of defeasible a priori warrants. Warrant strength depends on how many rebuttals may be brought against a warrant and their plausibility.
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, 2010
“Our species started to become homo religiosus as we gradually awoke to the axiological depth str... more “Our species started to become homo religiosus as we gradually awoke to the axiological depth structures and dynamics of our natural environment. . . . We became homo religiosus more decisively about 50,000 years ago with the crucial neurological changes that gave birth to modern human beings. We will remain homo religiosus even if the statistically and historically dominant supernatural and myth-laden forms of religion eventually decline at the hands of its currently subordinate religious naturalist symbiotic partner. . . . We are homo religiosus not because of what we do in religious groups or in our spiritual solitude but because of who we are in evolutionary and axiological perspective.” (218)
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or s... more This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2022
Diogenes’s exchange with Cicermos the Olympic pankratist is unusual in that it is both a dialecti... more Diogenes’s exchange with Cicermos the Olympic pankratist is unusual in that it is both a dialectical exchange and is successful in changing Cicermos’s mind. Most Cynic rhetoric is physical or gestural and more often alienates than convinces. The puzzling difference is explained by the rhetorical choices Diogenes makes with his uniquely receptive audience.
itself is. In fact, Aristotle seems to think that many cases of understanding do not involve this... more itself is. In fact, Aristotle seems to think that many cases of understanding do not involve this process of dematerialization. The essential feature of nous is that it grasps the essences that makes things what they are, whether these essences need clarification and separation or already are just what they are. This book offers a number of insightful discussions on Aristotle and the way that he uses likeness and measure to explain what our cognitive powers do. However, by failing to engage more holistically with Aristotle's cosmology and with relevant material from Aristotle's biological works and his first philosophy, Kelsey presents an interpretation of Aristotle on cognition that is too subjective and too centered on human knowers.
Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions, Apr 2014
We discuss the philosophical problems attendant to the justice of eternal punishments in Hell, pa... more We discuss the philosophical problems attendant to the justice of eternal punishments in Hell, particularly those portrayed in Dante’s Inferno. We conclude that, under Dante’s description, a unique version of the problem of Hell (and Heaven) can be posed.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 74, no. 2, Oct 2013
In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending... more In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism.
Review of Stephen Hetherington, What is Epistemology?, 2020
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019; FORMAT, ix + 139 pp., PRICE; 9781509529513 SCOTT AIKIN AND SUNG JU... more Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019; FORMAT, ix + 139 pp., PRICE; 9781509529513 SCOTT AIKIN AND SUNG JUN HAN Stephen Hetherington's What Is Epistemology? Is a brightly-written and accessible supplemental book for Epistemology courses. Hetherington's considerable knowledge of and insight into the field is given snappy and conversational presentation, and we believe it will be a useful tie-in book for introducing undergraduates to the discipline. What Is Epistemology? is six chapters long, with a short Preface and a useful section of suggested further readings at the end. Hetherington's program with the book is to introduce students to the idea of philosophizing about knowledge, make important distinctions about what the target concept is and isn't, show the appeal and limits of the traditional JTB analysis of knowledge, chart the stakes and prospects of answering skeptical challenges, and finally turning to apply these refined notions of knowledge and justification. A running theme of Hetherington's book is that knowledge has practical benefits, and possessing an accurate and well-considered concept of knowledge pays, too. In chapter 1, Hetherington introduces the conception of epistemology by giving an informative distinction between an epistemology as a theory of knowledge and being epistemological. An epistemology is "a collection of theses or beliefs" about knowledge (6), while being epistemological lies in "active questioning" of instances of knowledge (9). In chapter 2, three main topics in epistemology-who has knowledge, how knowledge comes to exist, and the forms of knowledge-are introduced. The Hetherington asks whether the brain, an extended mind, the world, a group, or an animal, can be a knower. Hether-ington then reviews seven sources of knowledge-perception, reason, memory, testimony, introspection, common sense, and intuition. Finally, Hetherington distinguishes two forms of knowledge-knowledge-that and knowledge-how-while giving a detailed list of the sub-categories of the former. In chapter 3, Hetherington investigates the standard conditions for knowledge-that-belief, truth, and justification-arriving at the traditional justified-true-belief model of knowledge. In chapter 4, Hetherington proceeds with some criticisms on the justified-true-belief model of knowledge. After engaging with Russell's stopped clock case, Gettier's cases, and Goldman's fake barns case, Hetherington serially modifies the definition of knowledge to be immune to the problems in such cases, which are falsity of evidence, overlooking significant truths, and luck.
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