Jamileh Kadivar

Since its inception, Daesh has been regarded as a powerful actor by pundits, journalists, and politicians. This paper’s primary aim is to show how, and by what cultural means, Daesh became so powerful, and to study what lies behind its non-coercive power. This paper is part of an ongoing research project designed to study the different aspects of Daesh’s power. Drawing on Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic power,’ and Bourdieu’s ‘cultural capital’, the research explains what it is in Daesh’s cultural power that creates consent. In doing so, this study examines the various English and Arabic content of Daesh’s official media and the documents it has released since June 2014. Additionally, data has been collected from 19 semi-structured expert interviews together with other secondary sources. The findings of the study show that Daesh’s power goes beyond its coercive power. This research acknowledges that Daesh’s ideology is central to its power and is present in all aspects of the Khilafah’s activities, including in its multi-faceted power (i.e., its cultural, media, political and economic power).

This paper, as a part of an on-going research project, examines Daesh's media (2014-2017) and seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how Daesh spreads its messages. It focuses on the importance of media as one of the main factors behind Daesh’s power. It also demonstrates that in order to export a powerful self-image to the outside world, Daesh considers media a significant part of Jihad, and consequently perceives the media war as equally, or even more important than the military war.  In this process, Daesh relies on its own media to spread its content, while mainstream media enthusiastically release the news relevant to Daesh. Besides studying Daesh’s media, this paper highlights the importance of ‘message’ for Daesh: to present itself as a powerful and a victorious actor, while seeking to portray a weak and coward-like picture of its enemies to the outside world. This paper also examines the group’s communication strategy.

https://www.arabmediasociety.com/daesh-and-the-power-of-media-and-message/

Muslims have been the primary targets of Daesh's attacks since 2014 in different countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These attacks were based on its takfiri ideology. As Daesh official media and documents indicate, kufr (unbelief, infidelity) in Daesh's approach is not limited to non-Muslims (original disbelievers), but Muslims are the most significant parts of kuffar (unbelievers) in its view and defined as incidental disbelievers. Through studying Daesh's official documents and various Arabic, English, and Persian media productions, in an explanatory research, this article attempts to display Daesh's takfiri approach toward Muslims and explains its historical and ideological roots, difference with Al-Qaeda's takfiri approach, different approaches to takfir inside Daesh, main targets of Daesh's takfir, and the reasons behinds its takfiri view. This article displays that for Daesh, the Muslims are limited only to Sunni Muslims who are accepting and following its approach. Other Sunni and non-Sunni Muslims are thus kuffar. This study also shows that the assertion of takfir has become a method for Daesh to discredit its opponents, such as Shi'a Muslims and other Muslim groups.

The importance of the Internet and social media in politics has been demonstrated in previous years, when terms such as ‘Twitter revolution’ and ‘Facebook revolution’ were used repeatedly for several movements, and now new terms such as ‘digital threat’ and ‘digital Jihad’ are being used by many in similar fashion. In the age of the Internet, the advantages often associated with the democratizing effect of the Internet are creating an atmosphere for different users, such as Daesh. Global propaganda is an important part of Daesh’s activities, and radicalization is one of the realities of our era. Although the impact of the Internet and social media on processes of people’s radicalization remains a highly contested subject and has been one of the most controversial topics during the last decade, the main question is whether the Internet is the main factor in the radicalization of civilians, considering that some politicians and pundits have been discussing this issue over the past few years, or it is more of a communication tool, facilitator and catalyst, pushing people towards radicalization. In this article, I discuss two different approaches to the relationship between technology (online activities in different platforms) and radicalization. This article is part of an ongoing research project.

International Journal of Digital Television, Volume 8 Issue 3, November 2017.
DOI: 10.1386/jdtv.8.3.403_1

Human history has witnessed varied surveillance and counter-surveillance activities from time immemorial. Human beings could not surveille others effectively and accurately without the technology of their era. Technology is a tool that can empower both people and governments. The outcomes are different based on the users’ intentions and aims. 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu noted that ‘If you know both yourself and your enemy, you can win numerous (literally, "a hundred") battles without jeopardy’. His words still ring true. To be a good surveiller and counter-surveiller it is essential to know both sides, and in order to be good at these activities access to technology is vital. There is no doubt that knowledge is power, and without technology to access the information, it is impossible to be powerful. As we become more expert at technology, we will learn what makes surveillance and counter-surveillance more effective, and will be more powerful.

“Surveillance” is one of the most important aspects of living in the convergent media environment. This essay illustrates government surveillance and counter-surveillance during the Iranian Green Movement (2009) on social and mobile media.  The Green Movement refers to a non-violent movement that arose after the disputed presidential election on June 2009. After that Iran was facing its most serious political crisis since the 1979 revolution. Claims of vote fraud triggered massive street protests. Many took to the streets with “Green” signs, chanting slogans such as ‘the government lied’, and ‘where is my vote?’ 

There is no doubt that social and mobile media has played an important role in Iran’s contemporary politics. According to Internet World Stats (IWS) Internet users in 2009 account for approximately 48.5 per cent of the population of Iran. In 2009, Iran had 30.2 million mobile phone users (Freedom House), and 72 cellular subscriptions for every 100 people (World Bank). Today, while Iran has the 19th-largest population in the world, its blogosphere holds the third spot in terms of number of users, just behind the United States and China (Beth Elson et al.). In this essay the use of social and mobile media (technology) is not debated, but the extent of this use, and who, why and how it is used, is clearly scrutinised.

In many contexts, social media has been considered as a group of tools that facilitates people's access to freedom and democracy. But this view is challengeable. In this study, two different aspects of social media are examined. The first aspect examines social media’s use by protesters in two completely different contexts—Iran and the UK. The second aspect, on the other hand, investigates how the two governments, who have very different approaches to governance, exploited social media in an attempt to control the two protests. The main question addressed in this study is: “What are the differences and similarities between government surveillance of social media and mobile communications during Iran’s Green Movement (2009) and the UK riots (2011)?” The findings of this study suggest that social media and mobile phone communications were both important to protesters. Furthermore, this research illustrates that governments monitor the protesters on social and mobile media in different ways, and justify their actions by mainly saying that they do so in order to protect public order and national interests.

چکیده

در این مقاله نویسنده با عنایت به قرآن و احادیث به عنوان دو منبع اصلی فقه و شریعت اسلامی به بررسی سنگسار در اسلام پرداخته، با توجه به واکنش های شدید حقوق بشری در قبال اجرای این حکم ( و احکام مشابه) در ایران، در صدد پاسخگویی به این پرسش آمده که آیا می توان در شرایط فعلی به گونه ای عمل کرد که ضمن حفظ موازین شرعی ، با اجرای احکام جایگزین یا عدم اجرای این احکام، مانع وهن اسلام و مسلمانان شد؟

به این منظور ، ضمن بررسی ریشه های قرانی و روایی بحث سنگسار، با نگاهی به زمینه های تاریخی- دینی آن ، با استفتا از مراجع عظام و بررسی نظرات صاحب نظران ، به طیف متنوعی ازنقطه نظرات ارزشمند در این رابطه، از عدم اجازه سنگسار و عدم اجرای حکم در عصر غیبت تا عدم امکان توقف اجرای حکم به عنوان حکم الهی دست یافته است.

پژوهش های فقه و حقوق اسلامی » بهار 1388، سال پنجم - شماره 15
(26 صفحه - از 135 تا 160)

This essay addresses the issue of “visibility”, as one of the most important aspects of living in the convergent media environment. The main argument of this essay is to clarify the difference between “visibility” in surveillance of governments and counter-surveillance of people.
The essay is structured as follows: After a short description of visibility in the new era and its relationship with privacy, it is explained surveillance, counter-surveillance and finally their ties with visibility and the different aspects of visibility in these two areas.

This essay reviews Paolo Gerbaudo’s book (Tweets and the Streets) and is structured as follows: the first section discussed the background of the author of the book. Then, his perspective regarding the role of social media in social movements is compared to other scholars in the field. Next, a summary of the key points explained in the book is provided, and the final section presents some last thoughts on the book.

This chapter will discuss why women are not currently allowed to work as judges in Iran. Opposition to women working as judges is rooted in a particular reading and interpretation of the majority of the ulema (religious authorities) and jurists. Throughout much of the history of Iran, despite the dynamism of Shi’a fiqh and the concept of ijtihad, women have been denied the ability to practise and work as judges. Very few Shi’a jurists have had the courage to interpret women’s issues according to the dynamic of fiqh, which could lead to a new interpretation of laws and regulations according to time and place and entitle women to these positions.
This is a chapter 7 of 'Women, Power and Politics in 21st Century Iran' (2012). pp107-120.

This chapter  examines the position of women within the institution of the executive and its related organisations in Iran. These positions include the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, deputy president, cabinet ministers and regional and local governors. I will also analyse the obstacles to women’s entry into these positions and their struggle to change male-centred readings of Islamic laws and regulations.

Daesh and the Power of Digital Media



Why is Daesh so successful? What kind of theories and methodologies do we need to answer such a question? Do the media matter for Daesh’s achievement? These are the main questions that this paper attempts to address.

Theories about ideology/hegemony and power/dominance have to be applied to explain some of the aspects of Daesh’s phenomenon. In this regard, I want to study different dimensions of Daesh’s power, including cultural power. Moreover, the relationship between rulers and ruled in the case of Daesh will be studied. The main object of this paper, is studying the relationship between Daesh's media, ideology and power. I see power, as a multi-dimensional, dynamic and relational reality and try to demystify different dimensions of Daesh’s power, and emphasise that the non-coercive aspects of Daesh’s power are as important as its coercive aspects.

I will borrow some concepts from Gramsci and Bourdieu as theoretical framework. For Bourdieu power stands at the heart of social life and the field of power is the most important field for him. I will use Bourdieu’s capital theory, because he expanded idea of power beyond the economic sphere and into domain of culture in detail. Furthermore, to discover how Daesh's rulers/intellectuals through ideology work on ruled/citizen’s mind and hearth and create “consent” to domination and coercion, which is shaped and manufactured in civil society, Gramsci's division between civil society and political society (hegemony and coercion) provides a fruitful theoretical framework for this study. This framework assists to analyse how Daesh’s hegemonic institutions in civil society (such as schools, mosques, and media) tie up citizens to the ruling power by consent, and not by coercion. However, I will focus on Daesh's (digital) media in this study.

In order to study how Daesh uses digital media to spread its ideology, it is essential that I first discuss ideology and its roles, then explain role of digital media in political changes, and how digital/social media have been used by other similar groups in the past, and finally examine Daesh’s nature and the main dimensions of its power. These studies help to find the gaps in the literature better.

Literatures demonstrate that it is a question about the role of digital media in political change among scholars. Some discuss about twitter and Facebook revolution, digital threat and social media war, but others doubt that technology causes political change, and say it only mediates it. However, in the age of the Internet, the benefits of the Internet and digital media democratisation are preparing the atmosphere for many users, including groups such as Daesh.

This paper will follow the qualitative research tradition. For data collecting, it will be conducted using the Desk research method and interview. I also use critical discourse analysis for data analysing and discuss Fairclough and Wodak approaches. By CDA, this research tries to reveal structure of Daesh's power and deconstruct its covert “ideology” that is “hidden” in different written and spoken texts.