Takfirism

This doctoral dissertation examines and describes how both the Imamat institutions and ordinary Ismailis are attempting to alleviate Islamophobia and, what I have termed, intra-umma dissonance in Canada. Through the promotion of pluralism (the Ismaili Pluralism Project) and religious literacy about Muslim diversity (the Muslim Literacy Project) they seek to foster pluralism in Canadian society by first alleviating fear of the Muslim, and Ismaili, ‘other’. Through various efforts, the Imamat institutions are attempting to standardize Muslim diversity as an alternative discourse to the current “that’s not Islam, this is Islam” response to anti-Muslim narratives, thereby creating space for minority Muslim representation; however, as will be presented throughout this thesis, ordinary Ismailis are not only actively getting involved in various Imamat-led initiatives, but are also contributing in their own unique ways, inspired by their faith, identity, and experience. I argue that, collectively, the Ismaili community’s inclusive response to anti-Muslim narratives stems from Ismaili identity and experience; being ‘othered’ by members of the umma due to their unique interpretation of the faith. Thus, through this inclusive collective response, Ismailis and their institutions not only aim to alleviate the othering of Muslims by non-Muslims, but the othering of Muslims by Muslims as well. Further, the Ismaili community is simultaneously standardizing and professionalizing their religious schooling system and offering other internal educational programming to strengthen Ismaili Muslim identity to withstand the effects of Islamophobia and intra-umma dissonance, to ensure that Ismailis are equipped with the tools necessary to become confident ambassadors of their faith in an increasingly multicultural world – part of an effort that I am calling the Ismaili Identity Project. All three of these projects together aim to bridge the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims and foster harmony amongst the diversity that exists within the Muslim umma. The research shows that the Ismaili community is attempting to create harmony between Muslims and non-Muslims by simultaneously creating unity, respect, and mutual understanding amongst Muslims themselves.

While the studies on al-Ghazālī’s thought are abundant, its unusual approach to the issue of khatm al-nubuwwa has not received the attention of researchers. Yet, in his Iqtiṣād, he seeks to answer this tricky issue: Is it possible to consider as an infidel a Muslim who does not believe in the sealing of prophethood? In this article, we will analyze al-Ghazālī’s response. Our aim will be to put his response into its historical context, taking into account the philosophical and religious attitude of the author. To this end, we will analyse, firstly, the context in which he tackles this issue in his Iqtiṣād. Secondly, we will examine how his opinion differs from the commonly accepted doctrine and then analyse how it provides a solid refutation of the idea that ijmā‘ and tawātur can be used as a conclusive proofs of a doctrine.

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Si les études sur la pensée d’al-Ghazālī sont abondantes, son approche singulière de la question du khatm al-nubuwwa n’a pas retenu l’attention des chercheurs. Or dans son Iqtiṣād, il s’attache à répondre à cette question épineuse : peut-on qualifier d’infidèle un musulman qui ne croit pas en la clôture de la prophétie ? Dans le présent article, nous analyserons la réponse d’al-Ghazālī. Notre objectif sera de replacer celle-ci dans son contexte historique, en tenant compte de l’attitude philosophico-religieuse de l’auteur. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons, en premier lieu, le contexte dans lequel il traite cette question dans son Iqtiṣād. En second lieu, nous examinerons comment son opinion diffère de la doctrine communément admise et, ensuite, en quoi celle-ci constitue une réfutation solide de l’idée que l’ijmā‘ et le tawātur puissent servir de preuves décisives en matière de doctrine.

Muslims have been the primary targets of Daesh's attacks since 2014 in different countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These attacks were based on its takfiri ideology. As Daesh official media and documents indicate, kufr (unbelief, infidelity) in Daesh's approach is not limited to non-Muslims (original disbelievers), but Muslims are the most significant parts of kuffar (unbelievers) in its view and defined as incidental disbelievers. Through studying Daesh's official documents and various Arabic, English, and Persian media productions, in an explanatory research, this article attempts to display Daesh's takfiri approach toward Muslims and explains its historical and ideological roots, difference with Al-Qaeda's takfiri approach, different approaches to takfir inside Daesh, main targets of Daesh's takfir, and the reasons behinds its takfiri view. This article displays that for Daesh, the Muslims are limited only to Sunni Muslims who are accepting and following its approach. Other Sunni and non-Sunni Muslims are thus kuffar. This study also shows that the assertion of takfir has become a method for Daesh to discredit its opponents, such as Shi'a Muslims and other Muslim groups.

ازدادت خلال العقدين الأخیرين حركة التيارات التکفیریة في منطقة غرب آسيا مما أدّی إلي تعرض اموال و انفس المسلمين ـــ الي الخطر.
و یذكر أن هذه المجموعات المتطرّفة تتمتّع بالدعم  المالي والفقهی  من قبل الوهابية و السلفية التكفيرية بعد إضفاء الطابع المؤسسي على العنف في هذة المنطقة. و عمدت هذة المجموعات الي ممارسة العنف و تصويب سهامها الی معارضيها في الرأي و خاصة الإمامية إمّا  بشكل عمدي او لوجود خطا في نظرتها حيث الأولويات الاستراتيجية الخاصة بها. و إن کثیرا ممن ینتحلون صفة رجال الدين  يقومون باستغلال جهل عوام الناس فيقومون بإصدار الفتاوی التي يحللّون فيها دماءالمسلمين و اموالهم بشكل عام و شيعة أهل البیت (ع) بشكل خاص.
و في نفس الوقت، تقوم مجموعة من هولاء بإثارة الشبهات وتسليط الضوء عليها  حول مذهب أهل البيت (ع) ممّا یؤدّي إلى إشعال نار الفرقة بين المسلمين. لذلك فمن الواجب على كل مسلم غيور ان يكون واعيا و ملتفتا لحركة هولاء والسعی للوقوف بوجه إثاره هذه التهم و الشبهات في الوقت و تقديم الأجوبة علی جميع الشبهات التي تثير هنا و هناك. و كان الهدف من تأليف هذاالكتاب هو إلقاءالضوء علی  الشبهات التي تثار حول الشيعة والاجابة عليها. وقام الكتاب بالردّ علي 60 شبهة أثيرت حول مذهب اهل البيت (ع) حيث اعتمد الكتاب في الاجوبة علي موقع آية الله العظمي الشيخ مكارم شيرازي. نأمل ان يستفيد منه الأساتذه و الباحثون و طلاب الحقيقة.. و هي خطوة قصيرة لأجل التقريب بين المذاهب الاسلامية.

La propagande de Daesh veut à tout prix donner l'impression que son projet politico-religieux du califat s'inspire des préceptes coraniques et de la voie prophétique. Pour ce faire, l'organisation terroriste met en place un dispositif discursif à connotation religieuse qu'elle déploie principalement dans ses publications écrites (Dabiq et Dar al Islam notamment). L'analyse de ce discours révèle la récurrence d'une orientation takfīriste (excommunicatrice) qui rejette toute forme d'altérité : mécréants, apostats, idolâtres, etc., et légitime son extermination. En s'appuyant sur une double approche critique, à la fois sociologique et exégétique, la présente contribution envisage d'étudier cette orientation, ses origines idéologiques, ses mécanismes et ses objectifs. L'approche socio-sémiotique se proposera de décoder le discours takfīriste daeshien pour comprendre les principes de domination, de différenciation et de hiérarchisation sociale 1 qui le structurent. L'approche exégétique vise de son côté à démonter les mécanismes de décontextualisation/recontextualisation des référents scripturaires ou historiques convoqués par Daesh afin de légitimer ou motiver ses actions violentes. Abstract. The propaganda of Daesh definitely wants to give the impression that his political-religious project of the caliphate is inspired by the Qur'anic precepts and the prophetic way. To do this, the terrorist organization sets up a discursive device with a religious connotation that it deploys mainly in its written publications

ISIS is the latest evolutionary stage of violence-oriented takfīrī-based mobilization that denotes a religiously inspired socio-political ideology that has spawned a militant organisation with a sustained, distinct, and largely unique set of millenarian beliefs and violent practices. This set of religious and political beliefs has gained traction in the context of existing national and international violent conflicts and, as such, has been conveyed through a range of violent and extraordinary forms of othering. Its particular violence-centred religious orientation is takfrist political project that is based on the fusion of narrow, Khārijite-like political strategy and selective, Salafi-inspired, principles of violent othering. In the end, what emerges from this inimitable set of religious, ideological, strategic, and contextual fusions is a worldview driven by the cosmic struggle between perceived believers (ISIS members) and all others.

Chicago-style source citations:
Poljarevic, Emin, ”Theology of Violence-oriented Takfirism as a Political Theory: The Case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)” in Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements, ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carole M. Cusack (Leiden: Brill, 2021): 485-512.

The usage of excommunication goes back to the early history of Islam for the extreme Kharijite sect declared for the first time all other Muslims who did not agree with them as apostates and killed them brutally in the 7th century. The extreme mentality of the Kharijites has been witnessed in various extreme sects throughout Islamic history. More recently, Justice and Development Party (the AKP), the political Islamists of Turkey, has been using the concept of takfir (excommunication) against its opponents. In this essay, we will examine the concepts of faith (īmān) and disbelief (kufr) and then attempt to analyze the ruling AKP " s usage of excommunication (takfīr) on the basis of primary Islamic sources. The essay will seek the relation between the takfir and extremism as well as its connection with violence and terrorism by examining the ideology of the ruling AKP in Turkey.

My name is Ghulam Rasool Dehlvi, an Alim (classical Islamic scholar) and a well-versed English-Arabic-Urdu-Persian writer and translator with strong background in socio-religious and cultural studies. I would like to consider doing a PhD under the supervision of a well-versed scholar. I have already done an empirical research on my topic/theme.

Throughout years of my academic and journalistic experience, I have developed expertise and empirical research experience in ideology, politics, and culture in the Muslim world. I acquired an empirical knowledge of the impact of ideology over peace, conflict and radicalization.

I am posting my CV along with this so that one could get a better idea of my academic interests and my writing work. I see my academic and journalistic work as closely linked to my quest for promoting peace, inter-community understanding and critiquing hate-driven understandings of Islam that are creating such havoc across the world today.

The article sheds light on programs and measures against Islamist-extremist messages both by governmental and non-governmental institutions in Germany. The “German way” for the most part is characterized through its renouncement of counter-terrorist narration through campaigns. Instead, decentralized, horizontal and “value-based” forms of strategic communication are being established. Therefore, German governmental as well as non-governmental institutions are currently developing educational programs in order to not only debunk extremist myths but rather to enable youngsters to critically reflect on mechanisms of ideologically charged communication. Although the field of practices is multi-branched and diverse, we will make an effort to concisely map areas of action, structures of sponsorship and (educational) measures concerning Islamism in Germany. The educational material ‘Salam Online’ which was developed and produced by staff and students of the religious education department o...

You have proposed to impose a moratorium on Muslim immigration that included a clause, a time limit. In fact, you made an invitation, which I interpreted as a challenge. Below you can find my extensive answer: five introductory sections, followed by seven analytical ones, two advisory ones and a conclusion.

Since its inception, Daesh has been regarded as a powerful actor by pundits, journalists, and politicians. This paper’s primary aim is to show how, and by what cultural means, Daesh became so powerful, and to study what lies behind its non-coercive power. This paper is part of an ongoing research project designed to study the different aspects of Daesh’s power. Drawing on Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic power,’ and Bourdieu’s ‘cultural capital’, the research explains what it is in Daesh’s cultural power that creates consent. In doing so, this study examines the various English and Arabic content of Daesh’s official media and the documents it has released since June 2014. Additionally, data has been collected from 19 semi-structured expert interviews together with other secondary sources. The findings of the study show that Daesh’s power goes beyond its coercive power. This research acknowledges that Daesh’s ideology is central to its power and is present in all aspects of the Khilafah’s activities, including in its multi-faceted power (i.e., its cultural, media, political and economic power).