THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE
AND RURAL ECONOMIC INSECURITY:
THE CASE OF HONDURAS
CHARLES D. BROCKETT
University of the South
onduras is a very poor country. On standard measures of socioconomic development, Honduras typically ranks third from
the bottom among Latin American nations. Not surprisingly, the greatest concentrations of its poor are found in the rural areas. In the two
and one-half decades since socio-economic development became an
object of Honduran public policy and of international actors such as
the United States, there has been some improvement in the quality of
life for part of the rural population, but less than planned. A significant
portion of the peasantry has experienced increasing economic insecurity, in part because of a very high rate of population growth (3.4
percent) and because of the commercialization of agriculture.
Mixed results of the commercialization of Third World agriculture
have been addressed by a number of authors (e.g., de Janvry, 1981;
Feder, 1976; Griffin, 1978; Hewitt de Alcantara, 1976; Pearse, 1980). In
the context of Central America, Durham (1979:21-51) shows that land
scarcity in E1 Salvador has been the result not so much of population
growth as it has been the consequence of increasing land concentration
which occurred with the expansion of the production of export (cash)
crops. At the same time that per capita food production declined during 1950-1970, per capita land devoted to export crops actually increased. My own examination of the Guatemalan case revealed the
same results (Brockett, 1984: 480-87). From 1948-1952 to 1980-1981,
the per capita production of basic food crops declined seven percent
while the relative share of land devoted to export crops increased
ninety percent compared to the share devoted to basic food crops.
Several authors have described similar changes in contemporary
Honduras but the evidence has yet to be systematically evaluated. That
is the purpose of this study. Since the end of World War II, many
landowners have expanded and intensified their agricultural production, especially for export, in response to market incentives and governmental encouragement. While agricultural modernization and
export expansion often are justified as fundamental to the develop-
Brockett
83
mental process, it will be shown that in Honduras they have resulted in
not just increased export earnings, but also declining access for rural
people to land and food. At the same time that the relative share of
land planted in export crops increased, the per capita domesticallyproduced supply of food declined.
There is certainly much to commend an argument that in order to
improve living conditions, Honduras needs to diversify and expand its
exports, including agricultural exports (USAID, 1984: 1). An exportled growth model might be a viable one. However, when the contemporary success stories are examined--countries such as South Korea and
Taiwan which have combined economic growth with income distributions more equitably than most--what is clear is that the context is as
important as the model. Based on her extensive research, Adelman
(1980: 442-443) makes this point explicit:
The successful countries all followeda process in which the asset that was going
to be the major asset of production at each stage of development was redistributed before rather than after its productivity was improved. This asset was
redistributed either in terms of direct ownership or in terms of institutional
access to its productive utilization. Only after redistribution were policies undertaken to improve the productivity of the major asset. ~
The evidence from Honduras reinforces Adelman's conclusion, albeit as a negative example. When export agriculture is encouraged
under conditions of substantial inequality in the ownership of, and/or
access to, resources, especially land, then most of the rural poor are
unlikely to profit.
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HONDURAN AGRICULTURE
While Honduras has had a long experience with export agriculture, it
had relatively little effect on rural society until the post-1950 period
(Durham, 1979; Parsons, 1976; Pfeil, 1977; Ruhl, 1984; Volk, 1981).
The traditional export crops of Central America have been coffee and
bananas. The coffee boom of the late 1800s had substantial impact on
both rural and national class structures in Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Costa Rica, but it largely by-passed Honduras. Consequently, the appearance of agrarian capitalism and of both rural and urban bourgeoisie was retarded in this country. The rugged mountainous terrain
of Honduras is often too steep for successful agriculture (60.8 percent
of its surface area slopes at more than 40 percent), often lacks the soil
fertility found in the rest of the region (it lacks its neighbors' volcanic
84
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
ash), and usually impedes transportation between the highlands and
coastal ports (the capital, in the highlands, lacked an all-weather paved
road to the north coast until 1970).
Bananas, on the other hand, have dominated the Honduran economy since the beginning of this century. Not only have they been the
country's leading export (peaking at 88 pecent of exports during
1925-1939), but throughout this century the U.S. companies which
control the banana industry have played a leading role in politics, from
the financing of revolutions in the early years to bribing a government
(and indirectly toppling it) in the "Bananagate" scandal of the 1970s
(LeFeber, 1984: 44-46,207-208). Bananas in Honduras, however, are an
enclave economy. Grown on the north coast, the banana region has
been only loosely connected to the rest of the country, at least until
1954. 2 While foreign banana companies obtained concessions for over
one million areas of land by World War I, traditional land holding
patterns were little affected since malaria, remoteness, and plentiful
land elsewhere had kept the north coast relatively unpopulated until
the advent of the banana companies?
Except for the banana export industry on the north coast, until after
World War I agriculture in Honduras was of the traditional Latin
American style. Most landholdings were worked by families living at
the subsistence level. Much of the land, however, was held in larger
units which used the land inefficiently, leaving it fallow, grazing it with
cattle, or employing sharecroppers. Honduras was unique in one respect, though, and that was the large amount of land that was outside of
private ownership. As late as 1965-1966, 12.5 percent of the land in
farms was nationally owned and another 21 percent was ejidal (community owned) land (Fonck, 1972: 30).
Market incentives and government encouragement after 1950 had a
profound effect on this traditional rural society. Following World War
I1, escalating cotton prices prompted larger farmers throughout Central America to convert land to this new export crop. Within Honduras, the construction of the Pan American Highway through the
southern part of the country, along with the construction of connecting
highways to Tegucigalpa in the interior and San Pedro Sula in the north
coast region, more effectively integrated the country, broadening the
internal market and better linking agricultural producers to international markets.
Beginning at about the same time, the government of Honduras
began to encourage the diversification of commercial agricultural production as part of its plans for economic development and as necessary
Brockett
85
Table !. Major Commodity Exports, 1960-64 to 1980-81
Product
19601964
19651969+
Bananas
45%
47%
38%
24%
28%
Coffee
16
13
15
28
25
Beef
3
3
7
6
7
Cotton
2
3
1
2
2
Sugar
.
.
.
.
19701974
19751979
19801981
1
1
4
TOTAL
66%
66%
62%
61%
66%
Wood
ii
9
14
8
3
Minerals
6
5
7
7
6
Tobacco
1
1
1
2
2
84%
81%
84%
78%
77%
Overall
Total
SOURCES:
F i r s t f i v e c o m m o d i t i e s t h r o u g h 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 9 , W e e k s (1985:
77); b o t t o m t h r e e a n d 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 for all c o m m o d i t i e s , U n i t e d
N a t i o n s , Y e a r b o o k of I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a d e S t a t i s t i c s
(various
years).
+1968-1969
f o r wood,
minerals,
tobacco.
for the expansion and diversification of export earnings. In order to do
so new institutions had to be developed. Prior to the postwar period,
the Honduran government had few responsibilities and little capacity
for action. With assistance from international advisers, in the early
years of this period state capacity was expanded with the implementation of an income tax and the establishment of a Central Bank, a
National Development Bank, and the Agriculture Ministry. Through
the activities of these institutions the Honduran government has been
credited with the creation of an agrarian bourgeoisie within the country (Posas and del Cid, 1981: 87). The growth of this class and its
commercial agricultural activities have been further assisted by financial and technical assistance from international actors, including the
United States, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and private capital. 4
In response to such incentives and encouragements, land planted in
coffee, cotton, and sugar and land devoted to cattle raising greatly
expanded. Export earnings increased and diversified, as demonstrated
86
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
in Table 1. While the five major agricultural commodities constituted
two-thirds of total commodity exports in both the early 1960s and early
1980s, the relative shares of the five have significantly altered. Bananas,
once 88 percent of export earnings, had fallen to 45 percent in 1960-64
and down to 28 percent in 1980-1981. On the other hand, over the last
two decades the share of coffee has increased from 16 percent to 25
percent, beef from 3 to 7 percent and, sugar from 0 to 4 percent. Cotton
has been less successful. Its share of export earnings reached three
percent in the 1965-1969 period but then fell, due to falling world
prices, insect damage, and the disruption of the 1969 war with El
Salvador (Blutstein, 1971:147): lately, though, it has partially recovered.
Unlike the spread of banana production in earlier days, the expansion
of the cultivation of these new crops has had major consequences for
agrarian society in Honduras.
IMPACT OF COMMERCIALIZATION
While the expansion of commercial export agriculture has been beneficial in some respects, it has been claimed by several scholars that in
Honduras it also led to the conversion of land from food to export
production, to land concentration and landlessness, and to rural unemployment and under-employment. The following sections evaluate the
relevant evidence from the recent Honduran experience.
Export Crops and Food Supply
Clearly there has been a tremendous expansion in the amount of
land in Honduras devoted to the production of export crops. As Table
2 indicates, over the three decades ending in 1983 land under export
crop cultivation almost doubled. Meanwhile the amount of land devoted to the production of Honduras' four major food crops (beans,
corn, rice, and sorghum) increased by only 22 percent. Consequently,
the relative share of land allocated to export crops increased from 36
percent of food crops around 1950 to 55 percent in the early 1980s--an
increase of about 53 percent. The most notable growth occurred in the
amount of land devoted to coffee (especially up to the early 1970s) and
in sugar (especially since the mid-1970s)?
This rapid expansion of export crop production has had a pronounced effect o n food crop production in at least four ways. First,
land was directly converted from the cultivation of food to export
crops. There are a number of descriptive accounts of this process.
Brockett
87
Table 2. Agricultural Land Use: Changes in Area Devoted to Export Crops
Relative to Food Crops, 1948-52 to 1981-83
1948-
1961-
1971-
1974-
1981-
Crop
1952
1965
1973
1976
1983
Change
Beans
50 a
73
71
70
74
48%
Corn
283
275
297
333
337
19
Rice
ii
9
14
18
23
109
Sorghum
57
42
31
53
56
-2
401
399
413
474
490
Bananas
57
42
50
50
Coffee
63
83
107
Ii0
121
92
Cotton
1
7
5
7
7
600
22
33
53
49
93
323
143
165
215
216
271
90%
36
41
52
46
55
53%
TOTAL
FOOD
Sugar
TOTAL
EXPORT
EXPORT
as
of f o o d
SOURCE:
50 b
22%
-12
%
FAO.
Production Yearbook
( v a r i o u s years)
a F i g u r e s a r e for a r e a h a r v e s t e d in i000 h e c t a r e s .
M a n y a r e e s t i m a t e s b y e i t h e r c o u n t r y o r FAO, e s p e c i a l l y
bData not available;
figures from latest year available.
1983.
Indeed, some have referred to it as an "enclosure movement" as large
landowners pushed subsistence farmers off of desired land through
coercion (Parsons, 1976:11-15). Sometimes the coercion was monetary;
Parsons (1976:15) cited rents altered from sacks of grain to cash, as well
as the rapid jacking up of cash prices. Sometimes the coercion was
physical; Durham (1979: 122) gives the example of another study that
describes two haciendas that added 22,000 hectares to their holdings
through force. Second, new land was opened up for cultivation--30
percent more from 1948-1952 to 1981-1983. Much of this land could
have been devoted to the production of food for the growing population; instead, 65 percent went to the four export crops (see Table 4).
Third, peasants desiring to buy their own land have had to face not just
decreasing supply but also its inevitable companion, higher prices.
88
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
They faced not only the competition of other farmers, large and small,
but also urban business and professional people who were attracted to
agriculture by the new profit-making possibilities (Parsons, 1976: 14).
Finally, mention should be made of the vast holdings of the banana
companies. It is true that they were obtained earlier in the century
largely without disturbing landholding patterns. Yet, as land started to
become scarce in the last several decades, their holdings were "plainly
needed by, but inaccessible to, a rural population that had quadrupled
since 1900" (Durham, 1979: 177). The banana company holdings in
1971 were estimated to be around 200,000 hectares (494,000 acres);
that is, about one-half of the total area planted at that time in the four
basic food crops.
A more precise picture of the impact of the rapid expansion of export
crop production on food supply is provided by the following two tables.
As Table 3 indicates, the area devoted to the four basic food crops has
increased, as have yields and total production. But the fact is that this
increase in production has not kept pace with population growth.
While Table 4 shows that total production of the four basic food crops
had increased by 115 percent in the three decades since about 1950, ,the
population of Honduras had increased by 183 percent to 1983. Consequently, the per capita production of the basic food crops actually
declined across the three decades by 21 percent to 1981-1983.
Table 3. Changesin Production,Area and Yield for Major Crops, 1962-65 to
1981-82
Production
Food
Yield
Crops
beans
corn
rice
sorghum
TOTAL
-
FOOD
Export
6%
66
236
14
4%
24
144
40
- 10%
35
2
23
49%
25%
13%
Crops
bananas
coffee
cotton
sugar
TOTAL
Area
50
159
55
374
EXPORTS
SOURCE:
FAO.
19
43
0
179
185%
Production
88
137
66
31
62%
Yearbook,
1970,
1983
53%
(1971,
1984)
Brockett
89
Table 4. Change in Food Supply? 1948-52 to 1981-83
19481952
Crop
beans
19521956
19611965
19711973
19741976
19811983
Change
22
22
48
47
32
45
corn
205
204
298
331
363
487
138
rice
18
18
ii
15
28
39
117
sorghum
47
48
51
43
49
56
19
Total
Production
292
292
408
436
472
627
115%
Production
per
capita b
203
180
200
159
154
160
-21%
SOURCE:
FAO.
Production
Yearbook
105%
(various y e a r s ) .
a.
D o m e s t i c p r o d u c t i o n of f o u r m a j o r food c r o p s r e p o r t e d in
m e t r i c tons.
M a n y a r e e s t i m a t e s , by e i t h e r c o u n t r y or
FAO, e s p e c i a l l y for 1983.
b.
Kilograms
per capita.
A more accurate estimate of the supply of basic food, but for a far
shorter period of time, is possible using data supplied to the U.S. Department of Agriculture by its Honduran attache. Table 5 shows estimates of the actual available supply of the same four food crops by
taking into account exports, livestock feed use, and stocks on hand at
the beginning of the year. The results are the same as the ones presented
in the previous table and probably worse. From 1976 to 1981, the
domestic supply per capita decreased by five percent while a slight
increase is indicated for that period on the previous table (although the
endpoints are not exactly the same).
Until the 1970s, Honduras was an exporter of corn and beans, in
fact, the leading exporter in Central America of these two products
(Fonck, 1972: 12). While it would be a mistake to describe it as selfsufficient in those commodities (as some writers did) since most of the
population was malnourished, such exports did contribute to foreign
exchange earnings. Since then, the situation has often been reversed.
Not only have wheat imports been increasing (Honduras produces only
a minor amount of its wheat), but in several years since the mid-1970s
90
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
Table 5. Change in Net Supply of Basic Food Crops, 1976-81
Change
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Domestic
supply a
348
314
476
402
403
400
15%
Domestic
supply/
per
capita b
iii
95
138
113
109
105
-5%
Total.
supply c
417
446
570
539
557
512
23%
Total
supply
per
capita b
133
134
166
151
151
134
1%
SOURCE:
Calculated from USDA/FAS.
Attache Report:
(Sept. ii,
1978, Sept. 12, 1980, Aug. 31, 1981).
Honduras
aAnnual production for four crops (beans, corn, rice,
sorghum) plus estimated stocks on hand at beginning of the
year minus exports and livestock feed use; reported in metric
tons.
bKilograms
per capita.
CDomestic supply plus imports of those four crops plus wheat;
reported in kilograms.
more corn has been imported than exported. When imports of these
five food crops are taken into account, the total supply per capita
increases only one percent from 1976 to 1981. Imported food, though,
is not comparable to that which is domestically produced. What a rural
family would be able to produce for itself if it had access to land, it
might not have the income to purchase in the marketplace.
Paralleling these trends for food crops are those for beef production
and export. The two are linked; the descriptive accounts almost always
identify the desire to fence off new lands for cattle raising as a primary
motive for the Honduran "enclosure movement." Cattle raising traditionally has been a primary activity in rural Honduras, but the nature
of this endeavor has changed in recent decades. At one time about 80
percent of the cattle were raised by farmers whose herds averaged less
than 50 heads. The relatively unimportant exports were often live animals. Cattle were usually sold by the head rather than by weight,
thereby minimizing incentive for quality improvement (Blutstein,
1971: 149; Bakken, 1965: 155).
Brockett
91
Expanding markets for beef domestically, and especially internationally, have significantly changed the cattle industry throughout Central America (Shane, 1980). Since 1969, the majority of the cattle
extracted in Honduras have been for the export market and virtually
all have been slaughtered first (Slutzky, 1979a: 113). As demand increased and sales came to be based on slaughtered weight, ranchers had
the incentive to expand their holdings and to improve their grazing
practices.
The results of these trends are indicated in Table 6 which shows that
Honduras has replicated the "Central American" pattern to the extreme. While beef production (as measured by weight) has more than
Table 6. Beef Production, Exports and Supply, 1961-64 to 1980-81
19611964
19691971
19751977
19781979
19801981
33
45.3
44.5
51
113%
12.9
18.4
22.6
26.2
563%
219%
Change
Honduras
production
exports
24
3.95
exports/prod.
16%
39%
41%
51%
51%
prod. p e r
capita
11.2
12.9
14.4
12.5
13.5
21%
9.4
7.9
8.6
6.2
6.6
-30%
supply p e r
capita
Central A m e r i c a
exports/prod.
15%
32%
34%
37%
29%
93%
prod. p e r
capita
12.4
13.9
15.3
16.2
14
13%
supply per
capita
10.6
9.4
I0.i
10.2
9.9
-7%
SOURCES A N D U N I T S OF MEASUREMENT:
Production:
FAO, P r o d u c t i o n Y e a r b o o k (various years):
m e t r i c tons of beef and b u f f a l o meat from indigenous
a n i m a l s - - s o m e are e s t i m a t e s by country or FAO.
Exports:
U n i t e d Nations, Y e a r b o o k of International Trade
S t a t i s t i c s (various years):
m e t r i c tons of b o v i n e meat,
fresh frozen also, for G u a t e m a l a and Costa Rica, m e a t tinned
n.e.s, or prepared.
Exports/prod.:
e x p o r t s as a p e r c e n t a g e of production.
P r o d u c t i o n and supply per capita: kilograms.
is b a s e d on p r o d u c t i o n m i n u s exports.
Supply per capita
92
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
doubled over the two decades after 1960, exports expanded much more
rapidly, growing from 16 percent of production in the early 1960s to 51
percent by the late 1970s. Consequently, beef has become an important
earner of foreign exchange; its contribution to export earnings increased from three to seven percent across the two decades to the early
1980s, moving it into third place among commodity exports (see Table
l). By the late 1970s, Honduras had become the fourth leading exporter
of beef to the United States among Latin American nations (Shane,
1980: 77). With both population and beef exports expanding rapidly,
the per capita supply for domestic consumption, consequently, has
declined. As measured by the evidence presented here, this decline has
been 30 percent for the two decades up to the early 1980s. 6
Ironically, t.hroughout much of the late 1970s Honduras had a meat
"surplus" (USDA/FAS, 1980). Access to the United Slates market is
restricted by a quota system that was established in response to pressures from the U.S. cattle industry (Shane, 1980: 101-104). The Honduran domestic price is controlled and largely determined by external
demand (World Bank, 1978: Annex 12, Appendix 1:6). The U.S. quota
is invariably filled, but demand in Honduras is often insufficient at
prevailing prices to absorb the rest. 7 In other words, not only was land
converted from domestic food production to cattle raising, a controversial practice in itself, but this conversion went beyond what was necessary to meet market demands) A final, and tong-lasting, consequence
of this conversion to cattle raising is the rapid exhaustion of soil fertility where tropical forests have been cleared (Shane, 1980: 21-27).
A stark demonstration of Honduras' insufficient food supply is
provided by the available data on consumption rates. Table 7 shows
that the daily per capita consumption of calories and proteins has
increased over the last two decades (by 9 and 2.2 percent, respectively)
but not at all since 1969-1971 for calories and with a three percent
decline for proteins. Furthermore, average daily caloric intake in
t979-1981 was still six percent below the FAO/WHO recommendation
for Hondurans. Since this is an average figure, then clearly many consume less than this, some far less. One study has estimated that in 1973,
60 percent of the Honduran population consumed at least ten percent
less than the daily recommended caloric requirement (Reutlinger and
Alderman, 1980: Appendix Table 2A). 9 The situation is worse for people in rural areas, especially children. In 1978 it was estimated that 64
percent of the rural population was unable to meet minimum dietary
needs; for rural children under the age of five the corresponding figure
was 90 percent (Morris, 1984:22, 24). Studies in the early 1970s found
Brockett
93
Table 7. Daily Food Consumption: Calories and Protein Per Capita, 1964-66 to
1979-81
19641966
19691971
19741976
19791981
1959
51.0
2132
53.8
2074
50.5
2135
52.1
9.0%
2.2%
2127
57.1
2128
58.8
2242
57.8
2254
57.7
6.0%
1.1%
3341
102.8
3497
105.7
3641
105.6
9.0%
2.7%
Production
Yearbook,
Change
Honduras
calories
proteins
Central
America
calories
proteins
United
States
calories
proteins
SOURCE:
FAO.
3513
105.8
1983
(1984).
the third highest rate of moderate and severe malnutrition in the hemisphere among children under the age of five in Honduras, after Haiti
and Guatemala. Other studies suggest that the prevalence of malnutrition among such children increased by 80 percent in Honduras from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, paralleling trends throughout Central
America (IDB, 1978: 138, 141).
A microcosmic view of these trends is provided by Boyer's (1982:
226-234) field research in the Southern highlands. Among the families
that he studied, two-thirds commonly could not produce enough to
meet their needs. Even with other income sources considered, in the
good crop year of 1978, 40 percent of families failed to cover their
nutritional needs while the corresponding figure was about 52 percent
in the relatively poor crop year of 1976. In a separate survey of 71
households in 1978, 89 percent indicated that they went more than
three months without corn while the corresponding figure for beans,
the primary source of protein, was 44 perent. Boyer estimates the minimal amount of land needed to provide an adequate diet (with a threeyear fallow cycle) to be about 7.2 hectares; mean land access in his
survey was only about 2.6 hectares.
Access to L a n d and Income
For many farmers the expansion of commercial agriculture has
meant an increase in their income and their standard of living; this
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
94
Table 8. Change in the Distribution of Farmland, 1952-74
Farm size
in hectares
Under
1
% of
1
-
5
farms
1952
% of
area
% of
1974
farms
% of
area
i0
--
17
1
47
8
47
8
5
-
i0
18
8
15
8
I0
-
50
21
27
18
28
50
-
i00
3
Ii
2
12
i00
-
500
2
18
2
22
500
.3
28
.2
22
Over
SOURCE:
Calculated
from
Ruhl
(1984:50).
includes many small and medium size farmers who grow much of the
coffee crop (Blutstein, 1970: 145; Molina Chocano, 1983). On the other
hand, the expansion of commercial agriculture has undermined the
economic condition of many other rural people as it has limited their
access not only to food, as documented above, but also to land, employment, and income.
The ownership of land in Honduras is highly concentrated, although
not as badly as in the neighboring countries of E1 Salvador and
Guatemala. ~~ As revealed by Honduran agricultural censuses, the
structure of land concentration changed little from 1952 to 1974 (see
Table 8). In 1952, five percent of the farmers held 57 percent of the
land; in 1974, four percent held 56 percent of the land. Conversely,
only 16 percent of the land belonged to 75 percent (smallest) farmers in
1952 and 79 percent in 1974. The most significant change is an increase
in the smallest farm category (under one hectare) from 10 percent of all
farmers to 17 percent in 1974.H Alongside this increase in the prevalence of the microfinca has been a rise in landlessness. After discounting the (relatively) highly paid workers in the banana industry, Ruhl
(1984: 49) estimates the percentage of landless among rural families to
have increased from 10 in 1952 to 32 in 1974. Consequently, a majority
of rural families (51 percent) are classified as landless or near-landless.
Small and large farmers differ not only in the amount of land they
have but also in the security of their tenancy. The 1965-1966 agri-
Brockett
95
cultural census found that the probability of land ownership steadily
increased with farm size; only 14 percent of the smallest farmers (under
1.4 hectares) owned their land while 94 percent of the largest (over 609
hectares) were owners. Ownership b~ya majority was not reached until
the over 34.9 hectare category. On the other hand, 44 percent of the
farms under 3.4 hectares were rented (47 percent of all farmers were in
this category) while less than 10 percent of the farms over this size were
rented. Rental agreements were usually verbal and for less than a year
(Fonck, 1972: 30-31). More recently, USAID estimates that only one
percent of farmers have fee simple property titles while three-quarters
of farmers have insecure tenacy (USAID, 1982: 1).
As commercial agriculture has spread throughout the countryside,
renters have found themselves vulnerable and often dispossessed of the
farms they had operated. But they have not been alone. As previously
indicated, Honduras is unique in the preservation of its public lands-ejidal and otherwise (about 33 percent of all farms in 1974). There
often have been disputes, however, about who enjoys legitimate access
to such lands. Especially in the first years of commercialization, small
farmers found themselves pushed off of public lands (Parsons, 1976:15;
Fonck, 1972:30).
While small farmers tend to intensively utilize their land, '2 large
farmers--who control most of the land--tend to underutilize it, even
with the spread of commercial agriculture. In 1952, farmers with less
than 10 hectares cultivated about 56 percent of their land, while farmers with over 50 hectares cultivated only seven percent of theirs (Durham; 1969: 127); those with four hectares or less had about 74 percent
under cultivation (Honduras, 1954: 38). More recent data demonstrates the same patterns. A World Bank report on proposed irrigation
projects gives data on land distribution and land use patterns for areas
under consideration. Most of the land is in holdings over 10 hectares in
size. Land in pasture for the project areas ranges from 41 to 71 percent
with a 56 percent average, ~3 while land devoted to corn and beans
ranges from only seven to 46 with a 25 percent average. It should be
noted that these are usually good agricultural lands--good soil and
certainly more level than most of the country (World Bank, 1978:
Annex 8). 14
Since the majority of rural families in Honduras are landless or nearlandless, it is not surprising that income distribution is highly skewed.
A clear demonstration of the relationship between access to land and
income is provided by USAID estimates using 1974 Honduran data
(Torres, 1979: 16-17). Landless rural families (34.5 percent of all rural
96
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
families) had an estimated per capita income of $50; families with less
than one hectare of land (9.8 percent) had an estimated per capita
income of $63; and families with one to 35 hectares (48.1 percent) had
an estimated per capita income of $135.
Data on income trends are incomplete and somewhat at odds with
the other findings reported in this study. Data compiled by Molina
Chocano (1983: 77) show the income share of the bottom one-third of
the rural population to have increased from 8.1 percent in 1967-1968 to
13.1 percent in 1978-1979. On the other hand, he still finds 57 percent
of families nationwide to live in "extreme poverty" and 68 percent of
rural families (which constitute 80 percent of all those in extreme
poverty). A USAID yardstick indicates that 85 percent of those on
farms under 20 hectares live below the "poverty line" and 67 percent of
those with farms in the 20 to 35 hectares class.
Peasant Mobilization and Agrarian Reform
In response to the "enclosure movement" and land pressures discussed above, in the 1960s Honduran peasants organized and asserted
themselves to a degree unparalleled in Central America to that point
(Anderson, 1981; Morris, 1984; Parsons, 1976; Pearson, 1980; Pfeil,
1977; Ruhl, 1984; Volk, 1981)?5 Their major tactic was to stage land
invasions. In the early 1960s their usual target was the unoccupied
lands owned by the fruit companies, but, as the decade advanced and as
land pressures intensified, land held by domestic interests became the
more frequent target. Most contentious were lands which peasants
claimed were public but which had been taken over by more powerful
interests. In the late 1960s the government's agrarian reform agency
began to adjudicate such conflicts in favor of the peasantry. The results
were electrifying in peasant communities and prompted further mobilization. By the end of the decade, major peasant organizations claimed
a total membership of some 90,000 families.
Through 1975 peasant organizations and their urban allies (labor
unions, intellectuals, and students) enjoyed substantial influence in
national politics. Their "hunger march" on December 4, 1972 was
partially responsible for bringing a populist military leader to power
(Gen. Oswaldo Lopez Arellano) and for his promulgation of an agrarian reform, first by decree at the end of 1972 and then through legislation in 1975. The zenith of peasant power and populist reformism,
however, passed quickly as intense opposition from large landowners
Brockett
97
mounted and as more conservative forces came to dominate within the
military.
Even at the time of the passage of the 1975 agrarian reform law the
reform pace was already diminishing. By the end of 1980, the number
of families benefited and the amount of land awarded were only about
one-sixth the stated goal of the law. While the reform pace did quicken
once again under the civilian government of Roberto Suazo C6rdova
(1982-1985), the results were less than those of the early reform period,
not sufficient to keep pace with the rapidly increasing rural population.
As a result, in the mid-1980s Honduras had more landless families than
before the beginning of the reform process in late 1972 (Brockett, forthcoming-b; Ruhl, 1984, 1985).
What is most significant about the reform program for this study is
its connection to commercial agriculture. Reform land was commonly
allocated to groups, not to individuals. In many cases, the groups were
in turn part of much larger projects, most notably the 30,000 + hectares Bajo Agu/m project. Favored by international lenders, including
the United States, the World Bank, and the InterAmerican Development Bank, these projects have been valued by Honduran officials for
their commercial potential (Posas, 1979; Slutzky, 1979b). First, these
projects have been preferred over other reforms. While they have about
one-quarter of the reform beneficiaries, in 1978 they received almost
three-quarters of the relevant government spending (Posas, 1979). Secondly, the production of basic foods has been discouraged on these
projects; instead, government officials encourage the cultivation of
commercial crops, especially those with export promise. These projects
are seen as generators of capital which then can be used to promote
further agricultural development.
Clearly there have been certain benefits derived from these enterprises. For example, project members enjoy certain benefits when they
are commercially successful. Some benefits also accrue to the government when export earnings and foreign exchange are increased; and
certainly both national and international agribusinesses share a large
portion of the benefit. In almost all cases, the reform projects sell their
produce to commercial enterprises which process and export them.
Often these are well established multinational firms such as Castle &
Cook, United Brands, and, more recently, Mitsubishi. Honduran
scholars (Posas, 1979; Slutzky, 1979b) have pointed out how propitious
reform projects' commercial production has been for the multinationals operating in Honduras. Since the early 1950s, they have been
threatened by increasing labor militancy and, since the early 1960s, by
98
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
land expropriations (and, in fact, they have experienced several significant expropriations since). At least in part for these reasons, the multinationals have been switching from direct production on their own
lands to contract buying from domestic producers. Now freed from the
risks of labor conflict and bad weather, agribusiness has been provided
by reform projects with a guaranteed supply, backed by the Honduran
government, and partially financed by international donors.
CONCLUSION
At the same time that the policy of the Honduran government toward the reform sector has been to favor the production of commercial
export crops over food crops, insufficient access to food is a growing
problem for an increasing number of rural families. As demonstrated
above, over the three decades to the early 1980s, the relative share of
land devoted to the major export crops increased from 36 to 55 percent
of the land cultivated in major food crops. Meanwhile, per capita domestic production of the basic food crops dropped by 21 percent and
domestic beef supply declined by 30 percent. Similarly, the program of
land redistribution, even though inadequate, came to an end in the late
1970s while the number of landless and near-landless families has continued to increase. These trends are obviously related; for a rural population, diminishing access to land eventually results in less access to
food, income, and employment (unless accompanied by comparable
countervailing developments). More fundamentally, it has been demonstrated by this study that the commercialization of agriculture, especially export agriculture, has been responsible in Honduras (along
with a rapidly expanding population), for increasing economic insecurity in the countryside.
The Honduran case is not unique but is instead a common pattern
exhibited by all of the Central American countries, as well as the rest of
Latin America (Grindle, 1986). A larger study now nearing completion
(Brockett, forthcoming-a) demonstrates that the increase in the share
of land allocated to export crops relative to food crops in Honduras
from 1948 to 1983 is just under the average experienced by the region as
a whole (31 compared to 37 percent), while the decline in per capita
domestically-produced food supply has been slightly worse than for
Central America (19 compared to 17 percent). What is unique about
Honduras is the timing of this transformation. In the other countries of
the region these trends have halted or reversed due to a variety of
political and economic constraints. Since the commercialization of
Brockett
99
agriculture began later in Honduras, these trends had yet to run their
course. As one example, the percentage of beef production exported
continued to climb into the 1980s in Honduras while this was no longer
true for its neighbors.
The trends analyzed in this study have resulted from the interrelated
processes of the commercialization and internationalization of Honduran agriculture and the further implementation of the agro-export
development model. The resulting transformation of rural society has
benefited many farmers, including some small and medium farmers
(for example, coffee growers) but has undermined the economic security of many others. Extrapolating from the experience of other
countries in the region, the growth in the share of land allocated to
export crops should come to an end and per capita basic food production stabilize (at least temporarily). By this point, significant progress
will have been made in the modernization of agricultural production
and the diversification and expansion of agricultural exports. These are
important and necessary changes.~6 However, since this transformation
has taken place under conditions of gross socio-economic inequalities,
the resulting benefits have flown disproportionately to the already advantaged, thereby aggravating already existing inequalities.
The experience of other Central American countries, already further
down this path, ' warns that unless Honduras is able to discover a new
route for development, the resulting proliferation of landless rural
workers and underemployed migrants to urban areas will cause serious
social tensions at some point in the future.
NOTES
1. For some background on South Korea, see Adelman and Robinson ( 1978): on Taiwan, Clark
(1985) and Puchala and Stavely (1979).
2. In 1954 banana workers went on a prolonged strike which had important ramifications for
national politics (Anderson, 1981: MacCameron, 1983).
3. Symbolic of the relationship of these companies to the rest of the country is the story of the
railroads they did not develop. Much of their land was obtained free on the promise of
constructing badly needed railroads. Hondurans expected railroads that would serve the
interests of their country. Instead of linking the coast with major cities in the interior.
however, banana companies stopped with lowland railroads that served their needs instead
(Kepner and Soolhill, 1967).
4. For a more complete discussion of these developments see Brockett (forthcoming-b) and
Posas and del Cid (1981).
5. It should be noted that the distinction between the two types of crops is not as clean as this
table suggests. Honduras did not become self-sufficient in sugar until 1962 nor export sugar
until 1967. Furthermore, domestic demand increased rapidly (Blutstein, 1971: 147) and as
late as 1972, 75 percent of production went to the domestic market (World Bank, 1978:
Annex 12; 9). Cottonseed oil is also a source of cooking oil and margarine. On the other
hand, large quantities of both corn and sorghum are used as animal feed--28 percent and 48
100
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Studies in Comparative International Development/Spring 1987
percent respectively in 1982 (USDA/FAS, 1981 )--and therefore are indirectly related to the
export market. It should also be pointed out that the land held by banana companies is
much greater than that reported here. It has been their traditional (and controversial) practice to hold reserves substantially greater than the land actually planted (the figure reported
in this table).
This conclusion is reinforced by other studies. Using essentially the same starting point
(approximately 1960), the Central American Bank estimated per capita meat consumption
to have declined by 24 pecent by the mid-1960s (Fonck, 1972: 57); It had declined by 13
percent by 1972 (Morgan, 1973:6) and by 35 percent by 1975 (Slutzky, 1979a:114). Slutzky's
data are presented on an annual basis, thereby allowing a comparison with other studies; his
data for each period substantially agree with the others.
There is evidence that cattle are shipped clandestinely to Guatemala to take advantage ofits
higher beef prices. Similarly. the border with Nicaragua, at least prior to 1980, was also
porous (USDA/FAS, 1979: 1980).
In 1984, the U.S. government reduced the Honduran beef quota for that year, causing the
closing of seven meat exporter companies and the loss of jobs of some 3000 workers (Honduran Information Center. 1984: 8).
They also estimate that even with a high rate of economic growth through 1990, 41 percent
would still consume at least t0 percent less than recommended (Reutlinger and Alderman,
1980: Apendix Table 2A).
Ruhl (1984) gives an excellent comparison of land ownership and tenure patterns between
Honduras and El Salvador; for Guatemala see Brockett (1984).
At the other end of the scale, land held by the largest farms declined by 6 percent, most of
which shifted into the next largest category.
In fact, too much so: small farmers in Central America are forced to use the land too
intensively. Land scarcity leads to over-use of the land and, therefore, declining fertility and
environmental degradation characterized by erosion and deforestation.
The project proposals usually call for pasture land to be reduced to about 20 percent of the
total.
As population increases, at a certain point even the most equitable of land redistributions
will be unable to provide all rural families with sufficient land. One scholar belives that point
had already been passed in the late 1970s (Torres, 1979: 65).
For a more complete discussion, including the impact of both Honduran and United States
policies, see Brockett (forthcoming-b), and Posas, (1979).
For theoretical justification of the agro-export development model see Goldberg ( 1981 ) and
Hillman ( 1981 ).
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