Logical and Epistemological
Considerations in Law*
RANHILIO C. AQUINO
Evidence and Proof
The two following propositions are distinct:
a) X murdered Y.
b) It has been proved that X murdered Y.
How close the two will be to each other depends on the methods of
proof. Proving, in law, is mediated by the rules of evidence that
determine what testamentary or documentary evidence will be admitted as probative.
I will first attempt to show that the distinction is not peculiar to
law and that for most of our purposes "X did Y" will be the same as "It
has been proved that X did Y". Put in another way, the distinction is so
pervasive that for most purposes it adds nothing to the way things get
known.
i. Magellan reached the Philippines in March of 1521.
None of us in this generation was around to witness the event, but
few, except incorrigible skeptics, will deny its truth. Most ofus then are
content that it has been proven to our satisfaction that Magellan
reached in the Philippines in March of 1521. Because we accept the
methods used in establishing this historical datum as reasonable and
because we find no reason for doubting the assertion, that it has been
* This article is a continuation of the Philosophy of Law published in the
previous issue of Philippiniana Sacra, Vol. XXVIII, no.84 (1993) 429-465.
• Philippiniana Sacra, Vol. XXIX, No.135 (1994) 81-98
82 RANHILIO C. AQUINO
proved that Magellan came at the time claimed means that Magellan
came at the time claimed. Of course, the proviso is always operative:
provided that there is nothing wrong with our data-gathering techniques and the evidence we have. This proviso however is operative in
all historical assertions that we do not find it necessary to explicitate
it. It seems moreover to be the way human knowledge works.
ii.Juanito came to my office this morning.
If I personally saw and dealt with Juanito, there would seem to be
little reason to preface the proposition with "It has been proved that...",
but the fact is that such a preface would still be justified. Russell points
out that we have actually made an inference from the "data" (translated
into our language: evidence) available. Some ofthepresumptions would
be: (1) That my senses were not defective; (2) That I correctly associated
the person! saw with the name I remembered; (3) That Juanito has no
perfect look-alike with whom I could have mistaken Juanito. Thus
considered, which frequently occurs in history, and do not seem to be
that different. A final example will make things even clearer.
iii.Brutus murdered Caesar.
Prescinding from the consideration that "murder" has to be legally
defined so that the presence of its elements can be verified, this
proposition will demand that the eye-witness accounts are accurate,
that the witnesses are trustworthy, etc. — in summary, that the
evidence is sound and acceptable. I am therefore trying to make the
point that statements at law such as (iii) are not considerably different
from statements in other domains, such as (i) and (ii). In short, the bulk
of statements we make (except, perhaps, the so-called "protocol statements," reports of immediate experience) all admit of the preface: "it
has been proved that...". This being so, we do not find it necessary to
point out that all that we say depends on the evidence we have.
The evidence acceptable at law is that which meets the stringent
requirements of the law on evidence. The rules on the admissibility of
evidence are fashioned to allow the judicial process to get at the truth
as well as to uphold certain identified public policies. Take the following
example: Just after a bank heist, a man caught running out of the
building is brought to the police station. After some questions by the
police, he confesses that his complicity. It is very well possible that he
was in fact an accomplice, so that the proposition "X did Y" would be
evidenced by his confession. The exclusionary rules however do not
allow the courts to take cognizance of his testimony of his confession
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was not made with the assistance of counsel of choice. Intervening then
is a public policy consideration built into the law on the admissibility
of evidence — the policy that confessions should be made by a person
fully cognizant of his rights and guarantees. I wish to call attention to
the fact that the policy-decision embodied in this exclusionary rule is
itself a step in the direction of getting at the truth. With good reason,
it is feared that over-zealous law enforcement officers may exercise less
than friendly means of persuasion to make a suspect say what would
lead to the "solution" of a crime. That the exclusionary rule has as one
of its results that true statements are also rejected from consideration
is the price our society is willing to pay to enforce its policy-decision.
At this point it is possible to summarize our position thus far. What
is proved in court (or before any similar forum or within legal processes)
is what the laws allow to be proved and in the manner the law permits.
The rules that determine what evidence may be introduced, what
weight is to be given the evidence and the manner it is introduced are
themselves embodiments of accrued convictions as to how best to reach
the truth as well as policies society seeks to uphold.
I used the term "truth" above. I am bound to give an account of it
in this present context. To say that "It is true that X did Y" is to say that
"X did Y." Tarski then points out that the proposition "Brutus killed
Caesar" is true if Brutus did kill Caesar. It seems then that in this
context, we land four-square on a correspondence theory of truth. The
only difficulty, though, is that in many cases, what statements are
purported to correspond to will be some past event: that X did Y, that
X sold Z to A, that X negotiated B to C, that X wrote F to G. We have
developed some procedures for determining the veracity of historical or
past assertions. We rely on memory and have developed certain tests
to determine whether memory is reliable or not. In this regard, it will
not be irrelevant to point out that the Statute of Frauds as it applies to
transactions in real property, for example, takes account precisely of
the vulnerability of recollection, hence the requirement for a written,
public document. The forensic sciences have sufficiently developed to
enable us to say when a pistol was last fired. We count on the mass of
testimony available: we would be very careful about reaching a
conclusion on the basis of only one witnesses' account, while we are
more easily persuaded when several witnesses tell a consistent story.
As is evident, ignoring the solemn prohibition against a lawyer's
tampering with the evidence, be it through coaching a witness to
narrate what in fact never took place or the blatant destruction of
evidence, frustrates the very ends of evidence-taking. In the end, public
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84 RANHILIO C. AQUINO
distrust of the legal profession and frustration over the judicial process
boomerang against the lawyer himself! There is a direct relation
between the canons ofjudicial ethics and the ends of investigation and
litigation.
Let us take us our example the hearsay rule. I will use some leads
from Allen and Kuhns to explain my point. (Allen and Kuhns: An
Analytical Approach to Evidence, 298, 299). It will be well however to
remember that a full discussion of the rule belongs to an Evidence class.
Non-hearsay:
Maria sees Jimmy
run away from the store.
> Maria declares: "Jimmy ran away
from the store."
Event: Jimmy ran away from the store.
Hearsay:
Maria sees Jimmy run
away from the store.
> Maria declares: "Jimmy ran
away from the store."
Juan believes he understood Maria
correctly when she said she saw
Jimmy run away from the store.
Juan declares: "Maria said that she
saw Jimmy run away from the
store."
> EVENT (?)
There is no denying the fact that the result of the rather circuitous
path of hearsay testimony is true (there are in fact celebrated exceptions to the hearsay rule), but the rule against the acceptance of the
hearsay testimony illustrated above embodies society's decision that it
would not like to take the risks involved in going by such a route (e.g.,
vague recollections, inaccurately transmitted information, misperceptions, etc.).
Some operative rules rest on assumptions about human nature
that !Jear critical examination. Under certain limited circumstances, a
witness may be impeached by eliciting from her, at cross-examination,
for example, an admission of former conviction of dishonesty, perjury
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or crimes of moral turpitude. The assumption is that a witness who has
proved untrustworthy in the past to warrant the conviction meted
against her cannot be relied on in the present cast at which she testifies.
Is this a good assumption? Logically, there is no necessity that
falsehood in the past should lead to falsehood in the present. But
rationality is more than the rules of logic, and we seem to be persuaded
that there is some consistency about human behavior that makes us
wary of those who have proved untrustworthy in the past. The many
safeguards against the misuse of the rule make it clear though that the
law itself has reservations about its use, for there are so many
circumstances that may adequately explain prevarication in the past
without justifying a presumption that the witness is once more lying.
This is not the only instance that the evaluation of evidence
involves some assumption about human nature and behavior.
Moreover, the story of the witnesses for the defense as to how
Bernardino Macambra was wounded, namely, that Sabasido
accidentally hit him while he was pursuing the appellant after the
latter had wounded him twice is unbelievable. No man with two
bolo wounds through his body, one through the abdominal region
and the other through the thorax, could possibly run in pursuit of
another. Those wounds were necessarily so fatal as to cause
instantaneous death. (People v. Balotol, 84 Phil. 289).
The Court found it unbelievable that a man mortally wounded
should run in pursuit of another. The point I am illustrating is that in
the appreciation of evidence, beliefs as to what constitute normal
human conduct come to bear in the evaluation. While there is no doubt
that many of these beliefs are well-founded, they do stand in need of
critical examination, for it is a truism that in more than just rare cases,
"truth is stranger than fiction," and the very problem is that it is not
always easy to say that what we have at bar is one of the instances so
rare as to be more easily consigned to fiction, and yet true. We tend to
be careless about the use of the modifier "normal." Underlying our
notion of "normalcy" is the uncritical belief that there is some identifiable "human nature" with fixed properties, qualities and propensities
against which allegations are checked. The trouble though with this
assumption is that what is established as "normal" or "natural" is not
the result of some privileged insight into human nature as it is a
statisticalpronouneement about frequencies. In other words, to say that
behavior z is normal is to say that in the normal-distribution curve, it
will be the behavior of the population found at the center and around
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the center of the curve. Witness how the Court, in the following case,
not only calls on its supposed familiarity with human nature but on
sociological observations as well.
The attitude ofutter indifference shown by Nunez in connection
with the matter of the alleged kidnapping of his daughter is so
unnatural, so contrary to the well-known strength and closeness
of the family ties of the Filipinos that we hardly believe the
accuracy of this story of the kidnapping, and that appellant
voluntarily left her home for the City of Cavite to join the
Japanese. (People v. Nunez, 85 Phil. 448).
Is this reliance on supposed familiarity with sociological facts and
with "human nature" a short-coming of law? Not quite, for we do know
some things about the way we, Filipinos, live, as well as about being
human. At the same time, however, there must be sensitivity and
openness to the possibility that the person whose actuations seem to be
at variance with sociological patterns or conceptions of human nature
does not in fact fall within the range of the statistical average. Needless
to say, an attitude of uncritical confidence in one's perceptions of nature
and of normal behavior are incompatible with judicial diligence in the
search of truth. We do recognize legal procedure in regard to the
presentation, admission and evaluation of evidence as a rational
procedure:
a) we can give an account of why we accept one piece of evidence
and reject the other;
b) we have reasons for giving weight to one testimony and
discounting another;
c)there are some policies we seek to uphold which are enshrined
in our rules on evidence, and
d)we allow criticism of our processes, for this is what the appeal
process is all about.
It will serve no purpose to insist that the current state of the law
is such as to rule out all error. On the whole, however, the restrictions
such as are found in the exclusionary rules serve to protect the party
who stands to suffer from mistakes of the legal process. There is, for one
thing, the requirement that for conviction to issue in a criminal case,
the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
This brings our discussion to "standards of proof." There are
generally three standards: (a) preponderance of evidence; (b) clear and
convincing proof; (c) proof beyond reasonable doubt.
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The first standard is that used in most civil actions. McCormick on
Evidence says of it that it is "proof which leads the jury [the trier of fact]
to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence." (Cleary: 1984). Since it is suggested that the proof
depends on the "probability" the trier of fact finds, it would seem to rest
on a subjective evaluation about which we can say hardly anything.
Using Popper's formula for "verisimilitude," I propose that we be less
cabalistic about "preponderance," and conceive it thus:
P (h) = E (a) - E (n)
which simply means that the preponderance (P) of any legal hypothesis
(h) is to the difference between affirming evidence (Ea) and negating
evidence (En). I would be the first to reject a purely quantitative
treatment of preponderance, but I likewise reject as unnecessary an
inquiry into the recesses of the mind of the trier of fact to determine
when and under what circumstances there is preponderance. Obviously 0 preponderance is no preponderance at all, and the acceptance
of evidence as affirming as well as negating will depend on a number
of qualitative and probative considerations, the general principles of
which I have already discussed above.
Where charges of fraud and undue influence are leveled and in
certain actions related to wills as well as in suits for the specific performance of oral contracts, it "clear and convincing" evidence that has been
required, at least under American jurisprudence. Jurisprudence yields
a variety of adjectives by which the courts have sought to render more
intelligible this standard: "clear, convincing and satisfactory; clear,
cogent and convincing; clear, unequivocal, satisfactory and convincing." It is suggested that the trier of fact bear in mind that to meet this
standard, he must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is
"highly probable." One will observe that this attempt at imposing a
more stringent requirement is in proportion to the gravity of the
matters litigated by such a standard. If the plaintiff then should
advance a hypothesis, A, and the defendant, her own, B, "clear and
convincing" evidence would, for me, meet the following requirements:
a) a hypothesis incorporates and explains all the facts admitted
into evidence;
b) it is able to explain also the facts that its rival hypothesis
explains;
c) it is able to answer the questions unanswered by its rival
hypothesis.
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It does not seek to answer all questions that may be reasonaly
raised, for then it would be tantamount to "proof beyond reasonable
doubt". What it does though is explain all that is to be explained and all
that a rival hypothesis cannot explain. It is my hope that putting the
matter this way will take the standard farther away from the vagaries
of subjective feelings of security!
We now come to the most demanding of standards, that required
in order to convict: proof beyond reasonable doubt. Justice Moreno has
done us service by compiling some of the more explicit formulations of
our Supreme Court in his Philippine Law Dictionary.
It simply means such proof, to the satisfaction of the court,
keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It
is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even
though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than
the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty — a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (U.S. v.
Reyes, 3 Phil. 6).
What the citation points to is the relation between the standard
and the presumption of the innocence of the accused. The "undefinable"
element appears to be "reasonable" for it does recur in the definition or
in the description itself. To say that doubt is reasonable when an
alternate hypothesis can be entertained is not to be very helpful, for the
question can very well be asked as to which hypotheses can be
"reasonably" entertained. In the widely-publicized "Aquino-Galman
double murder trial", the conclusion of the Fact-Finding Commission
through its General Counsel, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, was
given great consideration that the trajectory of the bullet that ended
Senator Aquino's life could be reasonably explained only by a shot fired
from behind him while he was on the way down the service stairs —
effectively identifying the murderer as one of the soldiers who had
escorted him. So many hypotheses can, of course, be advanced, and a
cartoonist suggested that Galman fired at Aquino from a parachute.
This is the kind of hypothesis that would be unreasonable. But our
problem returns: Why unreasonable? One answer will be that there is
absolutely no evidence to support such a hypothesis.
Since the courts have used the terms of traditional philosophy, it
will be good to review traditional definitions. Doubt was often defined
as a state of mind resulting from the apparently equal weight of
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arguments for and against a proposition, resulting in a suspension of
judgment. Certitude for its part was characterized by a firm assent
based on grounds known to be true. "Moral certitude" dealt with the
normal course of events, and it seems to be this kind of certitude that
has been associated with the standard of proof under consideration. A
child is morally certain, for example, that his mother will keep her
promise. Errant mothers are of course a possibility, but they normally
are not. This is what the Supreme Court reiterated in People v. Peralta
(G.R. No.-25831).
That degree of proof which produces in the mind of an
unprejudiced person moral certainty or moral conviction that the
accused did commit the offense charged.
It does not mean such degree ofproofasexcludingthe possibility
of error or mistake. It is sufficient if it produces absolute or moral
certainty required by law. Moral certainty springs from such
proof as will satisfy the judgment and conscience of the trial judge,
as a reasonable man, that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged.
Of "moral certainty," Sanguineti says:
Moral certitude: corresponds to the free conduct of man that is
not accessible to direct experience and is known on the basis of
certain generalizations that regard human custom...It is less firm
that the preceding forms of certitude (metaphysical, physical and
mathematical) because it admits of exceptions, but is at the same
time one of the foundations of human co-existence. (Sanguineti:
1983, translation from the Italian mine)
Proof beyond reasonable doubt must therefore deal with the
following:
act;
b) our generalizations based on familiarity, our conceptions of the
regular, the customary, the usual;
c)the rejection of "ad hoc" hypotheses, i.e., explanations conjured
to meet a particular objection but oblivious of other factors and
unsupported by evidence;
d) the presumption of innocence in favor the of the accused.
a) our expectations about how people
Negatively, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" requires that where
some explanation is advanced that competes with that of the prosecution,
in favor of the accused, and is supported by evidence (that is, more than
"ad hoc") that is not effectively rebutted, conviction must not follow. It
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RA/sTHILIO C. AQUINO
should be remembered that since society has maintained as its policy
a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, the strength of the
prosecution's hypothesis is not to be gauged by the weakness of the
accused's defense!
The Concept of Mind and Law
Art. 1305 of the Civil Code defines a contract.
A contract isameeting of minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service.
The term "intention of the parties" frequently occurs in contract
law considerations. In discussing the development of English tort law,
Fleming observes that a remarkable contribution of the nineteenth
century was the incorporation of the doctrine "noliability without fault"
in the determination of tort culpability with the consequent erosion of
the prevailing notion of "strict liability" (liability even without fault).
Fleming then opines:
This image of loss adjudication under the aegis of the law of
torts was therefore critically balanced on two central a 9-sumpt ions,
first an identification in large measure of legal responsibility with
moral blameworthiness...
The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines commences with a
definition of felonies. It provides:
Art. 3: Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit but also by
means of fault.
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful acts result from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Commentators remark that essential to a felony is a "voluntary act
or omission" (1 Aquino: The Revised Penal Code 33). A decision penned
by Mr. Justice Jackson contains important passages for our purposes
that bear citation.
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from
concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand,
was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early
root in American soil. ..The unanimity with which courts have
adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious
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to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion
of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.
(Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952),
cited in Robinson, Fundamentals of Criminal Law: 1988).
Justice Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code
admits: "Nothing is so difficult to discover than intent as a mental act."
Of course, I do not intend to "de-criminalize" thereby what law students
are taught to be "mala prohibita" — criminal, because prohibited, lack
of criminal intent notwithstanding, but the awkwardness of such
provisions of special laws supported only by some overriding social or
political concern indicates that criminal intent is still the "conditio sine
qua non" for crime, in the primary sense.
It then becomes obvious that a discussion on the concept of "mind"
is indispensable towards an intelligent grasp of the law. In contemporary times, Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations (and in his
Blue and Brown Books, all published posthumously) and Ryle, with The
Concept ofMind have significantly contributed towards a philosophical
clarification of what we mean by "mind." Both are convinced that the
search for occult processes taking place in some unseen, empirically
unreachable component of human personality is misleading and mislead. The belief that the "mind" is something parallel to the body but,
unlike the latter, intangible, is a vestige of Cartesian dualism and
ultimately a misunderstanding of the whole concept of "mind." Both
find in the quality of performances or acts that which is called "mind."
I shall explain.
A.
1. A parrot squawks: "Good morning."
2. Peter says: "Good morning."
B.
1. Karpov moves his "bishop" diagonally.
2. A child mimics his move and moves the b ishop diagonally.
What entitles us to say that the difference in both sets of cases is
a difference of intelligence, a difference of being "mindful"? What allows
us to deny "mind" of the parrot of affirm it of Peter? On what basis do
we say that Karpov's move is intelligent and that the child's move is
mindless? If "mind" is what we commonly take it to be — a substance
parallel to the body, yet immaterial, and therefore empirically
unverifiable — then it seems we have made some very bold claims that
we truly cannot substantiate. What must go though is this archaic,
quasi-mythical notion of mind, not the rather useful concept of "mind"
itself! To both Ryle and Wittgenstein, to say that Peter has a "mind" is
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RANHILIO C. AQUINO
to be able to say that he is able to perform in some manner certain
activities the parrot would be unable to perform. Peter, for one thing,
would be able to withhold greeting when encountering persons he takes
no pleasure in greeting. He would also be able to elaborate, to say
something more to persons he is congenial with. He is capable of
greeting in varied ways. All this, the parrot would not be able to do.
Similarly, in 2 of B, the child would not be able to do some of the things
Karpov would be able to do: criticize stupid moves, applaud good ones,
teach chess to others, execute the directions of a chess manual, etc. For
this reason, we say Karpov plays "mindfully" while the child moves the
pieces by chance. "Mind" then, by this account, is the ability to fulfill
certain hypothetical requirements such as the demands we made on
Peter and on Karpov. Obviously, we are duty-bound to spell out the
requirements we would like to see fulfilled (or least capable of being
fulfilled) so that we feel it proper to speak of "mind." In this light, too,
the whole debate that used to rage over whether animals had minds or
not can be very simply settled. If by "mind" we mean the abilities and
performances even of four year olds, then it should be obvious that some
animals do have minds, that they are intelligent. On the other hand,
if we become more stringent about our requirements for "mind,"
requiring, for example, the ability to arrive at absolutely novel plans
and to solve complex logical and mathematical problems, then practically all the animals will be excluded — but unfortunately also some
human beings! There is no need to bemoan our inability to "check the
mind"— for there is nothing inside to check. Whatever is to be checked
is susceptible of being checked, and "mind" becomes a matter of logical
definition.
Obviously, much ofjurisprudence still labors under the spell of the
Cartesian shadow, treating "intent" and "awareness" and "knowledge"
as the proceedings of some occult substance with the consequent
difficulty of determining whether these were present. It now becomes
the task of law to lay down the requirements that must be met that
allow for a finding of "intent" or "agreement". In the realm of contract
law, some very important strides have been made. The debate in this
area usually goes under the ribric of "the subjective versus the
objective theories of assent." It is said that the subjectivists looked to
the actual or subjective intentions of the parties (the mental affirmations). The objectivists, on the other hand, looked to the external or
objective appearance of the parties' intentions as manifested by their
actions. (1 Farnsworth on Contracts 168 et seq.) It will be noted that
even the objectivist position is stated in terms of the "mental act"
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theory. What is actually being proposed by the theory though is that
rather than embark on the futile task of finding out what transpired in
the mental recesses of the parties, it is far more profitable to find out
whether certain pre-determined requirements have been met. Examples provided by Farnsworth as well as by other noted authors in
contract law are enlightening. Whether one intends to be legally bound
or not is to be determined, among other ways, by investigating whether
one has signed a writing or not. Similarly, even where a party may have
signed a writing, if he states explicitly with the approval of the other
party that he does not intend to be bound by it, the courts will not hold
him bound. In this case the law has decided that "intention to be bound"
will be affirmed where: (i) a party has signed a writing and (ii) he has
not made any declaration about not being bound by it.
The task is certainly challenging, but the re-orientation holds
more promise than the unpromising challenge of having to investigate
"occult proceedings." Our courts, have in fact, moved in the direction of
laying down the "requirements" that must be met for a finding of
"intent." Words, coupled with subsequent behavior of a determined
kind, are most frequently employed. Let us make use of one decision of
our Supreme Court to illustrate the point. In People y. Samonte, the
issue was whether Samonte's conviction for murder should stand or
should be modified into a conviction for homicide. The Court called
attention to the two requirements for a finding of murder:
(1) "the employment of means, method or manner of execution
which would insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that no
opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate."
Note that the requirement points to a certain mode of behavior:
executing the act in such a way as to block retaliation from or defense
by the victim.
(2) "that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen."
The Court seems to have lapsed here into the language of Cartesian
dualism. Forced by the exigencies of the judicial process, however, it
identifies what must be present for a finding of "deliberate or conscious
choice." The Court itself said:
As in the case at bar, such deliberate and conscious choice was
held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse
of the moment. L..] The records of the case contain no evidence
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showing that the accused had, prior to the killing, resolved to
commit the same, nor is there proof that the shooting of the victim
was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution. He did not
know the deceased before the incident. (64 SCRA 319)
Actually the court succeeds in some measure in spelling out what
behavior will be called "intentional", "deliberate", "calculated". It will
take some time before judge, lawyers and litigants alike cast off the
Cartesian spell, but as the jurisprudence develops, we will see the
movement towards an "objective theory," a theory of mind, or intention,
that sees this in (not "through") the actions or omissions themselves.
Legal Reasoning
The neatness of the Aristotelian syllogism does not seem to do
justice to the reasoning process involved in the law, particularly in
adjudication. I find more helpful for our purposes the scheme, now wellknown, proposed by Stephen Toulmin. There are four principal terms
we must be familiar with: (a) Claims; (b) Grounds; (c) Warrant;
(d)Backing. (Toulmin, et. al.: 1984)
Broadly, a claim is an assertion put forward publicly for general
acceptance. Making a claim is presenting a well-defined position which
another or others are supposed to consider. Note that in a civil case, the
plaintiff advances a claim that rests on a cause of action. Should the
court agree with the plaintiff's position, the claim, supported by a recital
of facts and the arguments of law in its behalf becomes a "verdict" or a
'judgment", expressed in a decision or a resolution of the court. To argue
a claim then is to do whatever is needed to convert the bare demand of
one party into a binding resolution or decision, and the process may
include producing documentary evidence as well as oral testimony.
By grounds, we refer to the detailed assemblage of facts, observations data and previous conclusions as well as other specific information
a "claimant" relies on as the immediate support of his specific claim.
Ground:
Prosecutor's claim:
The police caught Juanito and his companions Juanito and company
have committed
loading carabaos into a truck that had been
cattle rustling.
parked at the middle of the field. Juanito
could not produce documents of title over
the carabaos.
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Judges as well as lawyers will be eager to find out how much
common ground is shared: how much both sides accept as true. These
will go under the title of "uncontroverted facts" in a decision. There are
cases where the facts will hardly be in dispute. Put in another way, the
common ground will be rather considerable. What may remain in
dispute though will be the law or laws applicable.
That stage of trial then at which the plaintiff in a civil case, or the
State, in a criminal case, presents its evidence is logically the stage of
laying the ground. Should the defense find that the evidence presented,
when conceded or accepted, do not really support a claim, they file what
is known as a Demurrer to Evidence — which is merely a formalized
manner of exclaiming: "Even granting all that you have introduced into
evidence, there is no case!". The Ballentine's Law Dictionary gives us
the definition of a Demurrer to Evidence (which, for simplicity, has been
abolished in U.S. jurisdictions as a matter of terminology, the fact being
that a demurrer is now treated as a motion for a directed verdict, asking
the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant).
demurrer to evidence. A method of taking a case from the jury,
beingan objection made by the defendant to the plaintiff's evidence
as a whole, which concedes the truth of all that the evidence tends
to establish in favor of the plaintiff, but that the facts thus
conceded do not establish in law a right to recover.
Where "G" from henceforth shall stand for Ground, "C" for Claim,
"W" for Warranty and "B" for Backing, please note the following
scheme:
Fi, F2...Fn-1, Fn.
all of which constitute Gl. Cl.
Fl, F2....Fn-1, Fn
which were used to establish Cl
that is now acceptedin turn serve as G2 1. C2.
This is a process advocates will often use to advance implausible
claims. They will attack the matter by breaking the process up into
steps, establish claims singly and use claims that are established as
grounds for further claims. The alert judge however will want to
examine the grounds that give rise to claims and how much the claims,
even if accepted, actually support further claims.
A warrant is a statement, or a set of statements indicating how the
facts on which parties agree are connected to the claim or conclusion
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being offered. The applicable "rule of law" serves as the warrant in legal
arguments. A warrant then is what allows me to make use of the
Grounds in support of the Claim. The structure then so far is:
Warrant
> Claim
Ground
In an example:
Ground: Juana and Julita did not reduce the sale of the piece of
land owned by Juana to Julita.
Claim: The courts will be unwilling to enforce the contract.
Warrant: The Statute of Frauds requires that all transactions
having to do with real property be reduced to writing in
a public document...
How well a lawyer makes out his case depends not only on the
factual evidence he can introduce (the grounds) but also on the
appropriate law he can argue to be applicable to his case (the warrant).
The choice of evidence to introduce, moreover, must be guided by the
warrant. It so often happens that lawyers labor at presenting evidence,
both oral and written, that have no place in the light of the rule of law
invoked. The claim, to be sustained in the verdict, must indeed be
warranted.
By backing is meant the set of generalizations making explicit the
body of experience relied on to establish the trustworthiness of the ways
of arguing applied in the particular case. What the "backing" responds
to is the demand for certainty that the warrant can be relied on to
establish the connection between the grounds and the claim. There is
need then for backing because warrants are not self-validating. Now,
this statement may pose a problem for those in the study of law, for is
not a statute that has withstood constitutional tests, not sufficient
backing for itself? I propose then to consider backing the assurance that
the warrant does warrant passing from the grounds to the claims. [Note
that different backings in support of the applicability of the warrant
may be introduced].
Backing
I.
Warranty
Ground
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Claim
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Backing: In the Barcelona Traction Case, decided in 1970 by the
International Court of Justice, Belgium was denied standing to represent its nationals-shareholders of a Canadian corporation.
Warranty: Under general principles of corporate law the nationality of a corporation is with the state of its incorporation, and under the
. doctrine of espousal, only the state of an aggrieved party may espouse
his claims internationally.
Ground: Although most of the shareholders of Company F are
Filipinos, it is of Panamanian registry. It is the company that was
defrauded by syndicate Z.
Claim: The Republic of the Philippines will not prostper in its bid
to bring the claims of Company F for adjudication before the I.C.J.
The backing "backs-up" the warranty, i.e., it shows the validity or
applicability of the warranty. This can be clearly done in more ways
than be merely by citing precedent.
Toulmin offers a model of the usual workings of Claim, Ground,
Warrant and Backing in cases at law.
Backing
Facts about the enactment and judicial history
of the relevant statutes and rulings.
These provide the foundation of —
Warrant
The statute or precedent operative
Claim
Ground
Facts about the present case.
Verdict in this case.
To state a cause of action, for example, is to show the appropriate
facts which, in the light of the warrant, grounded in or evidenced by the
backing, entitle the plaintiff to the relief he seeks. To decide a case is
be settled about the facts which are then examined in the light of the
relevant laws and principles, the applicability ofwhich is supported and
demonstrated by precedent or research into legislative history and
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RANIIELIO C. AQUINO
intent and either supporting a claim advanced by one of the parties or
denying or modifying it.
Observe how the same logical process is at work in what is usually
called "circumstantial evidence."
Ground
1
> Claim
Warrant
t
Backing
Ground: P's relatives and friends testified that he never left his
house all day, and that therefore never met with Q prior to the fatal
shooting.
Claim: Q's claim to self-defense must be rejected.
Warrant: For self-defense to be admissible as defense, it must be
shown that there was unlawful aggression.
Backing: In People v. Bunsol, 63 SCRA 248, the Court rejected
accused's claim of self-defense since it noted that the victim was shot in
the back of the leg, indicating that the victim was shot from behind,
rendering improbable the claim that the victim was the aggressor.
While the precedent may not seem to be directly related it does
indicate how the courts will treat "aggression."
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