- Uppsala, Sweden
Sebastián Reyes Molina
Uppsala University, Department of Philosophy, Graduate Student
- Constitutional Law, Philosophy Of Law, Criminal Law, Derecho constitucional, Criminal Law Criminal Procedure Law, Constitutional Theory, and 28 moreCriminal litigation, Human Rights, Political Philosophy, International Law, Criminal Procedure, Legal Reasoning, Reasonable Doubt, Presumption of Innocence, Presunción De Inocencia, Procesal Penal, Education, Concepto de Constitución, Nueva Constitución, Constitución de 1980, Cambio constitucional, H.L.A. Hart, Theory of Law, Jurisprudence, Teoría General Del Derecho, Legal Theory, Legal Realism, Legal Philosophy, Legal interpretation, Legisprudence, Legal positivism, Scandinavian Studies, Filosofía del Derecho, and Hans Kelsenedit
Resumen En este artículo presento las bases para una teoría intrasistémica del activismo judicial. El postulado central de esta teoría sostiene que el activismo judicial puede ser explicado por la combinación de elementos estructurales de... more
Resumen En este artículo presento las bases para una teoría intrasistémica del activismo judicial. El postulado central de esta teoría sostiene que el activismo judicial puede ser explicado por la combinación de elementos estructurales de los sistemas jurídicos tales como sus propiedades formales o lógicas y los códigos interpretativos que contienen más de una directiva interpretativa. Bajo esta tesis, el juez activista pueda revestir su decisión con una cuota de legalidad en el sentido de que, a pesar de que la decisión es un reflejo de sus preferencias, se encuentra fundamentada en disposiciones normativas. SUMARIO: I. Introducción. II. Tesis extrasistémica del activismo judicial. III. Códigos interpretativos. IV. Cláusula de no-redundancia y ausencia de metadisposiciones sintácticas. V. Tesis intrasistémica del activismo judicial. VI. Conclusión. VII. Bibliografía.
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In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant's claim... more
In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant's claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its claims are either mistaken or at a minimum deeply misleading, especially when it comes to standard of proof rules (SPRs) that contain indeterminate formulas, as is typical. As against specificationism, we argue that SPRs are best understood as rules that confer competence to decide whether a given standard has been metaccording to whatever vague or inchoate interpretation (if any) of the rule in question triers of fact implicitly or explicitly employ. We call this the competence-norm approach.
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Resumen La dificultad contramayoritaria es una de las principales críticas al control judicial de constitucionalidad de las le-yes. Esta crítica es analizada desde la teoría del derecho a la luz de la distinción disposición/norma. El... more
Resumen La dificultad contramayoritaria es una de las principales críticas al control judicial de constitucionalidad de las le-yes. Esta crítica es analizada desde la teoría del derecho a la luz de la distinción disposición/norma. El argumento central de este artículo es el siguiente: cuando el control de constitucionalidad tiene como efecto declarar inaplica-ble una ley a un caso concreto, el argumento de la dificul-tad contramayoritaria no es aplicable.
Palabras claves: Control judicial de las leyes; dificultad contramayoritaria; interpretación jurídica; escepticismo ante las reglas; indeterminación del derecho.
Abstract The counter-majoritarian difficulty is one of the main objections against judicial review. In this paper, this objection is analyzed from the standpoint of the norm formulation/norm distinction. By stressing the distinction between norm formulations and norms, I claim that when judicial review prevents the application of a norm to an individual case the counter-majoritarian difficulty objection does not hold.
Palabras claves: Control judicial de las leyes; dificultad contramayoritaria; interpretación jurídica; escepticismo ante las reglas; indeterminación del derecho.
Abstract The counter-majoritarian difficulty is one of the main objections against judicial review. In this paper, this objection is analyzed from the standpoint of the norm formulation/norm distinction. By stressing the distinction between norm formulations and norms, I claim that when judicial review prevents the application of a norm to an individual case the counter-majoritarian difficulty objection does not hold.
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In this paper, I develop an account of legal indeterminacy called the ‘systemic indeterminacy’ thesis. This thesis claims that legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion are the results of features of the structure of typical rational... more
In this paper, I develop an account of legal indeterminacy called the ‘systemic indeterminacy’ thesis. This thesis claims that legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion are the results of features of the structure of typical rational legal systems such as interpretative codes with a plurality of interpretative directives, the non-redundancy clause, and the non-liquet rule. Since typical rational legal systems do not have redundant rules – what I call the ‘non-redundancy’ clause - a plurality of interpretative directives will yield a plurality of interpretative results. Due to the non-liquet rule judges are obligated to choose among the different interpreta-tive results provided by the interpretative code. Thus, by building a the-sis on legal indeterminacy as the consequence of having a plurality of interpretative directives that necessarily yield different results, I proceed to provide an account of discretion as a necessary feature of legal adjudication. Whilst traditional accounts of legal indeterminacy have focused on features of natural language or the combination of different legal materials to explain this phenomenon, the systemic indeterminacy ac-count places emphasis on structural aspects of western legal systems that make both indeterminacy and judicial discretion a necessary element of legal systems. The systemic indeterminacy account provides the theoretical basis for a thesis on judicial discretion as a necessary feature of adjudication. The practical consequences of chapter two are twofold. First, typical rational legal systems are necessarily indeterminate. That is, several norms can be derived from each norm formulation contained in said system. Second, courts will necessarily exercise discretion when interpreting the law. Discretion is a choice that the courts make regarding the use of the interpretative code. That is, courts choose, among the different interpretative directives, the one that will be applied to interpret the first-order norm formulation.
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Desde la teoría del derecho, los trabajos sobre interpretación jurídica han sido monopolizados por el estudio de la actividad de los jueces. Esto ha llevado a que los demás operadores jurídicos hayan pasado a un segun- do plano en la... more
Desde la teoría del derecho, los trabajos sobre interpretación jurídica han sido monopolizados por el estudio de la actividad de los jueces. Esto ha llevado a que los demás operadores jurídicos hayan pasado a un segun- do plano en la teoría de la interpretación. Este trabajo pretende explorar el rol que la interpretación de los abogados juega en la interpretación de los jueces y por ende en el proceso de formación del derecho. La tesis central de este ensayo es la siguiente: la interpretación de los abogados sirve como parámetros de corrección jurídica de la actividad interpretativa de los jueces.
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abstract This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo's second-order proof rules thesis. The first criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the interpretation of standards of proof rules because they confuse matters... more
abstract This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo's second-order proof rules thesis. The first criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the interpretation of standards of proof rules because they confuse matters of legal interpretation with matters of epistemology. The second criticism states that second order proof rules are affected by the same indeterminacy problems they are designed to resolve, thereby rendering them unsuitable for the task they are purposely designed for. The third criticism renders pardo's proposal redundant. a reconceptualization of second-order proof rules is offered.
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En el ámbito del derecho probatorio la relación entre derecho y verdad ha sido un debate abandonado en los últimos treinta años. Se ha aceptado que existe una conexión entre ambos la cual se traduciría en que el derecho es un medio de... more
En el ámbito del derecho probatorio la relación entre derecho y verdad ha sido un debate abandonado en los últimos treinta años. Se ha aceptado que existe una conexión entre ambos la cual se traduciría en que el derecho es un medio de averiguación de la verdad de los hechos ale- gados. La tesis reconstruida en este trabajo ha sido presentada por el profesor jordi ferrer quien justi ca la relación entre derecho y verdad en términos de necesidad para que el derecho pueda motivar la conducta de los ciudadanos. A esta tesis la denomino la teoría de la cláusula estructural de la verdad. En este trabajo se presenta una reconstrucción de esta teoría, dos objeciones a las que se debe enfrentar y cinco posibles interpretaciones de la relación entre derecho y verdad.
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Book Review: Understanding the Nature of Law: A Case for Conceptual Explanation, Michael Giudice
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The following paper aims to present the discussion regarding the standards of proof from a perspective of the fact-finding decision’s legitimacy. It develops the idea that under today’s understanding of the standards of proofs, the judges... more
The following paper aims to present the discussion regarding the standards of proof from a perspective of the fact-finding decision’s legitimacy. It develops the idea that under today’s understanding of the standards of proofs, the judges can be viewed as moral hazards within a trial regarding their fact finding task.
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The following paper is a descriptive account of the various theses that conforms the discussion regarding the connection between truth and law. The analysis is from a rationalist tradition approach. The main conclusion is that, from this... more
The following paper is a descriptive account of the various theses that conforms the discussion regarding the connection between truth and law. The analysis is from a rationalist tradition approach. The main conclusion is that, from this approach, a judicial trial is an epistemological device that needs to be construed by only or at least the majority of "pieces" that leads to the ascertainment of truth.
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The standard of proof plays an important role in the adjudication task, because only if the standard is exceeded we can say that a statement of fact has been proven. Only then, we can determine if the presumption of innocence is defeated.... more
The standard of proof plays an important role in the adjudication task, because only if the standard is exceeded we can say that a statement of fact has been proven. Only then, we can determine if the presumption of innocence is defeated. This intellectual operation must be expressed by the judge in the sentence. The consequence of this duty is that the standard of proof has the utility to prevent a judge´s subjective decision at the time of the adjudication. And so, prevent a conviction based only in an arbitrary decision. Therefore in criminal law, a standard of proof, in a constitutional level, is a mechanism of protection of the presumption of innocence. Yet, in our legal system, this standard doesn’t fulfill that task.
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The conservative powers are regulated in article three of Chilean Organic Code of the Courts. Its brief mention has brought questions about the nature of these powers. In this paper I will review the different notions that the chilean... more
The conservative powers are regulated in article three of Chilean Organic Code of the Courts. Its brief mention has brought questions about the nature of these powers. In this paper I will review the different notions that the chilean doctrine has elaborated about this inquiry, and also, I will present how the courts understand the conservative powers. In base of this information I will elaborate a proposal about the nature of these powers and then draw some general conclusions about the possible consequences that this proposal could have in our legal system.
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Dear all I am pleased to invite you to attend the conference “Evidence, Disagreements & Rights” which will be held at the Grotius Hall, Department of Law, Uppsala University on August the 24th, 2017 (program below). The conference is... more
Dear all
I am pleased to invite you to attend the conference “Evidence, Disagreements & Rights” which will be held at the Grotius Hall, Department of Law, Uppsala University on August the 24th, 2017 (program below). The conference is organised by the Department of Philosophy in cooperation with the Department of Law. Brian Leiter (Chicago Law School), Alex Stein (Brooklyn Law School) and Christian Dalhman (Lund University) will be the keynote speakers. Torben Spaak (Stockholm University), Ellika Sevelin (Lund University) and Jakob v. H. Holtermann (University of Copenhagen) will act as discussants.
I am pleased to invite you to attend the conference “Evidence, Disagreements & Rights” which will be held at the Grotius Hall, Department of Law, Uppsala University on August the 24th, 2017 (program below). The conference is organised by the Department of Philosophy in cooperation with the Department of Law. Brian Leiter (Chicago Law School), Alex Stein (Brooklyn Law School) and Christian Dalhman (Lund University) will be the keynote speakers. Torben Spaak (Stockholm University), Ellika Sevelin (Lund University) and Jakob v. H. Holtermann (University of Copenhagen) will act as discussants.
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Conspectus of my Ph.D. dissertation.
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In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a... more
In discussions of standards of proof, a familiar perspective often emerges. According to what we call specificationism, standards of proof are legal rules that specify the quantum of evidence required to determine that a litigant's claim has been proven. In so doing, they allocate the risk of error among litigants (and potential litigants), minimizing the risk of certain types of error. Specificationism is meant as a description of the way the rules actually function. We argue, however, that its claims are either mistaken or at a minimum deeply misleading, especially when it comes to standard of proof rules (SPRs) that contain indeterminate formulas, as is typical. As against specificationism, we argue that SPRs are best understood as rules that confer competence to decide whether a given standard has been metaccording to whatever vague or inchoate interpretation (if any) of the rule in question triers of fact implicitly or explicitly employ. We call this the competence-norm approach.
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This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo’s second-order proof rules thesis. The rst criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the in- terpretation of standards of proof ru ...
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This paper puts forward three critiques of pardo’s second-order proof rules thesis. The rst criticism states that these rules are not suitable to guide the in- terpretation of standards of proof ru ...
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This dissertation addresses the issues of the indeterminacy of law and judicial discretion in the decision of the quaestio facti. It is composed of four papers:In the first paper, I develop an acco ...
Research Interests: Law, Philosophy, Epistemology, Law of evidence, Legal Theory, and 15 morePhilosophy Of Law, Evidence, Legal interpretation, Legal Reasoning, General Jurisprudence, Filosofía, Filosofía del Derecho, Evidence Law, Juridik, Filosofi, Legal Evidence, Philosophy of Law, Law of Evidence and Proof, Interpretación jurídica, and Evidential Reasoning
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La dificultad contramayoritaria es una de las principales críticas al control judicial de constitucionalidad de las leyes. Esta crítica es analizada desde la teoría del derecho a la luz de la distinción disposición/norma. El argumento... more
La dificultad contramayoritaria es una de las principales críticas al control judicial de constitucionalidad de las leyes. Esta crítica es analizada desde la teoría del derecho a la luz de la distinción disposición/norma. El argumento central de este artículo es el siguiente: cuando el control de constitucionalidad tiene como efecto declarar inaplicable una ley a un caso concreto, el argumento de la dificultad contramayoritaria no es aplicable.
Research Interests: Sociology, Constitutional Law, Political Philosophy, Philosophy Of Law, Judicial review, and 11 moreDeliberative Democracy, Legal interpretation, Democracy, Filosofía Política, Derecho constitucional, Filosofía del Derecho, Democracia, Democracia Deliberativa, Doxa, Philosophy of Law, and Interpretación jurídica
The topic of ‘judicial discretion’ has been at the center of the debate on legal interpretation in the philosophy of law.1 In a general sense, ‘discretion’ here refers to the exercise of a judgment by a decision-maker due to the lack of... more
The topic of ‘judicial discretion’ has been at the center of the debate on legal interpretation in the philosophy of law.1 In a general sense, ‘discretion’ here refers to the exercise of a judgment by a decision-maker due to the lack of legal constraints affecting one’s ability to decide a case. The most fundamental question on this topic is ‘do judges have discretion when interpreting the law?’ There are three kinds of answers to this query. One kind of answer states that judges never have discretion.2 Another kind of answer states that judges always have discretion in interpretation.3 The third kind of answer states that judges sometimes have discretion when interpreting the law, and sometimes they do not.4
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En el ámbito del derecho probatorio la relación entre derecho y verdad ha sido un debate abandonado en los últimos treinta años. Se ha aceptado que existe una conexión entre ambos la cual se traduciría en que el derecho es un medio de... more
En el ámbito del derecho probatorio la relación entre derecho y verdad ha sido un debate abandonado en los últimos treinta años. Se ha aceptado que existe una conexión entre ambos la cual se traduciría en que el derecho es un medio de averiguación de la verdad de los hechos alegados. La tesis reconstruida en este trabajo ha sido presentada por el profesor Jordi Ferrer quien justifica la relación entre derecho y verdad en términos de necesidad para que el derecho pueda motivar la conducta de los ciudadanos. A esta tesis la denomino la teoría de la cláusula estructural de la verdad. En este trabajo se presenta una reconstrucción de esta teoría, dos objeciones a las que se debe enfrentar y cinco posibles interpretaciones de la relación entre derecho y verdad.
Research Interests: Law, Philosophy, Legal Theory, Truth, FACTS, and 11 moreLegal, Derecho, Verdad, Evidence Law, Juridik, Doxa, Filosofi, Derecho Probatorio, Proceso, Legal process, and Hechos
El presente trabajo tiene por objeto presentar la problemática de los estándares, desde la perspectiva de la legitimidad, de las decisiones sobre los hechos probados afectadas de errores epistémicos. Postula la idea de que, bajo la noción... more
El presente trabajo tiene por objeto presentar la problemática de los estándares, desde la perspectiva de la legitimidad, de las decisiones sobre los hechos probados afectadas de errores epistémicos. Postula la idea de que, bajo la noción imperante de los estándares de prueba que hoy se utilizan en los litigios, los jueces pueden ser vistos como “moral hazard” en su tarea de determinación de los hechos en el contexto de un juicio.