Practical Philosophy

La tesis central del trabajo de Hugo E. Herrera, ganador del Quinto Concurso de Ensayo en Humanidades Contemporáneas convocado por el Instituto de Humanidades de la Universidad Diego Portales, el Goethe -Institut Santiago y el suplemento “Artes y Letras” de El Mercurio, es que la moderna comprensión científica de la naturaleza ha determinado que se nos cierre o dificulte el paso hacia la dimensión de lo trascendente en la que, de existir, se ubicaría Dios y el principio de sentido de la existencia. El autor, en su crítica a la ciencia moderna en tanto ideología, hace un uso elegante de algunas formulaciones que provienen del último Husserl, del joven Heidegger y del joven Habermas. El ensayo tiene el mérito de reponer una inquietud de nuestra situación actual, es decir, la sensación de que el ser humano se encuentra en una jaula de hierro, como diría Max Weber, conformada por leyes científicas que él mismo ha hecho posible y de la cual no puede salir: en el fondo, la experiencia de la enajenación.

Die Erforschung des historischen und systematischen Kontextes von Kants Philosophie weist bis auf den heutigen Tag signifikante Lücken auf. Dies gilt umso mehr für unser Verständnis der Bedeutung der gegenüber Kants Philosophie erhobenen Einwände und Kritikpunkte sowohl für die verschiedenen Entwicklungsphasen seiner Philosophie wie für ihre Rezeption und Darstellung in späteren Jahrhunderten. Die im vorliegenden Band versammelten Beiträge wollen einen Beitrag zur Schließung dieser Lücken leisten. Sie gehen auf Vorträge zurück, die auf dem VII. Multilateralen Kant-Kolloquium zum Thema „Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his critics – Kant et ses critiques“ gehalten worden sind, das vom 28.-30. April 2017 an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg stattfand.

I hope to indicate how Stoic counsel may serve just as effectively today as it did nearly two thousand years ago in Rome. With respect to fundamentals, the human condition has not changed a great deal during the millennia separating our times from Roman antiquity. We must still make our way within a world that lies almost entirely beyond our control. We must still face death, deprivation, and bodily frailty, as well as events and persons that do not to conform to our hopes and expectations. We are still relatively small, and the world is still large and mostly heedless of our concerns as we pass through. Stoic counsel provides a useful template for contending with the many vicissitudes and challenges of the human condition.

Autant une forte demande sociale est adressée à la philosophie, en particulier dans sa dimension pratique, autant il faut interroger les conditions sous lesquelles elle peut y répondre. Revient-il au philosophe d'énoncer des normes et des valeurs comme on le lui demande ? Cette conférence a été prononcée aux Lundis de la philosophie, organisés par Francis Wolff à l'École Normale Supérieure, le 03 décembre 2012, http://www.ens.fr/actualites/agenda/article/les-lundis-de-la-philosophie-2015

El así llamado «regreso de la filosofía práctica», empezado en 1960 por H. G. Gadamer con su Wahrheit und Methode, ha provocado a menudo confusión entre la auténtica filosofía práctica de Aristóteles y la virtud que él llama phronêsis o sabiduría. En efecto, éstas representan dos formas de conocimiento muy diferentes. La sabiduría es la virtud de la razón práctica que consiste en la habilidad de deliberar correctamente, es decir en la habilidad de identificar la acción más adecuada para realizar un buen fin. Al revés, la filosofía práctica es una ciencia, o sea un hábito de razón teórica, a pesar de ser una ciencia práctica, que tiene su fin en la buena acción y tiene un nivel de rigor inferior a aquello de las ciencias teóricas. La filosofía práctica es la ciencia del supremo bien para el hombre, es decir la felicidad —el pleno florecimiento de todas las capacidades humanas—, la cual se determina por medio de la discusión dialéctica con las tesis de varios filósofos.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

The so called «revival of practical philosophy», started in 1960 by H.G. Gadamer with his Wahrheit und Methode, has often provoked a confusion between the authentic practical philosophy of Aristotle and the virtue he calls phronêsis or wisdom. Actually, they represent two forms of knowledge very different. Wisdom is the virtue of practical reason which consists in the ability of correctly deliberate, that is in the ability of individuating the action more suitable for realizing a good end. On the contrary, practical philosophy is a science, that is an habit of theoretical reason, even if it is a practical science, which has its end in the good action and has a degree of rigour inferior to that of theoretical sciences. Practical philosophy is the science of the supreme good for man, that is happiness —the full flourishing of all human capabilities —, which is determined by means of a dialectical discussion with the thesis of the various philosophers.

The book introduces Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s philosophy of action into the mainstream of contemporary action-theoretical debates. Piotr Makowski shows that Kotarbiński–Alfred Tarski’s teacher and one of the most important philosophers of the renowned Lvov-Warsaw school—proposed a groundbreaking, original, and (in at least a few respects) still fresh perspective in action theorizing. The book examines and develops Kotarbiński’s ideas in the context of the most recent discussions in the philosophy of action. The main idea behind Kotarbiński’s action theory—and thus, behind this book—is the significance of the philosophical investigations of the general conditions of effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of intentional actions. Makowski presents and reinterprets Kotarbiński’s views on these dimensions of our activities and sheds new light on the most important areas of action theory.

In diesem Essay soll die praktische Philosophie von Jürgen Habermas, dessen Diskursethik vor allem in der modernen deutschen Unternehmensethik eine große Rolle spielt, vorgestellt und in Verhältnis zu seinen Überlegungen zur Diskurstheorie der Wahrheit und zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns gesetzt werden.

In reply to critics who summarily dismiss Nishida's philosophy as weakened on the historical front by excessive attention to the mind and interiority, in this essay I provide textual proof of a major shift in Nishida's late work based on the attept to overcome the dichotomy between the "within" and the "without". This is accomplished by applying a "dialectic of the historical world" to the mutual self-expression of the world and the things that make it up, including but not restricted to conscious subjects. I see here the core of Nishida's complementary ideas of praxis and poiesis, and from there discuss the revised notions of politics, technology, morality and history. I conclude by displacing a blanket rejection of Nishida's view of history with a particular critique aimed at an overly abstract and optimistic tendency that kept Nishida from recognizing the darker side of technology and the relationships of humans to their natural and social world.

Die Philosophie viel über Rache geschrieben und dabei wenig über den Begriff der Rache gesagt. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich, einen Begriff der Rache zu entwickeln, der weniger täterzentriert und mehr rächerzentriert ist, um das Phänomen der Rache zu mehr zu machen als dem Musterbeispiel einer falschen Handlung.

The concept of rigor plays a key role in mathematics. On the one hand, from a conceptual point of view, our understanding of mathematics relies heavily on the concept of 'rigorous proof', which alone is able to establish a theorem. On the other hand, rigor is a crucial notion in the historical evolution of mathematics. The so-called 'arithmetization of analysis' shaped the history of twentieth-century mathematics. This whole movement is often described as an improvement of mathematical rigor. However, at first sight, and despite its importance, rigor appears as a puzzling concept. As opposed to concepts such as truth, proof, theorem, etc. rigor has no meta-mathematical definition. It thus appears that rigor does not seem to be a purely logical notion. Hence, rigor exemplifies a key concept that plays a great role in the history of mathematics, without being itself a merely technical notion. The goal of this Dissertation is accordingly to enhance our understanding of such puzzling concept.

In the first part,  I study the available conceptions of rigor. I address in particular Bolzano's, the 'intuitionistic' as well as the 'formalist' conceptions of rigor, and I show that none of these conceptions is able to provide a necessary and sufficient condition that matches with the concept of rigor in use in current mathematical practice. In the second and third part, I establish a new framework that aims at gaining a positive understanding of the concept. Such framework is built upon a practical and sociological conception of mathematics.

This work is my 2nd year of Master dissertion.

Foucault’nun düşüncesini bir bütün içinde kavramanın konforlu bir yolu olmadığı, bu düşünce herhangi bir rahatlatıcı birlik imgesinin kendisine dayatılmasını kategorik olarak reddettiği için, dönemselleştirme fikri Foucault okumalarının adeta bir standardı haline gelmiştir. Bu genel kabule göre Foucault’nun düşünce yolculuğu üç ana döneme ayrılır ve etik ile ilişkilendirilen üçüncü döneminde Foucault, politik kaygılardan uzaklaşmak, estetikçiliğe düşmek ve dolayısıyla mutlak bir bireyciliğe gark olmakla itham edilir. Gelgelelim, eğer Foucaultcu bir etikten söz edilecekse, bu etiğin derinden politik olduğu ve Foucault düşüncesinin “ahlak”, “estetik”, “politika” gibi alanların kabul edilen özerkliklerini iptal ederek işlediği gösterilmelidir. Şu halde, bu makalenin asli amacının, Foucaultcu etiği ahlak, estetik ve politika ile ilişkisinde ele almak olduğu söylenebilir. Foucaultcu güzergâhın yol işaretleri titizlikle izlendiğinde, bu minvalde oluşturulan bir etiğin içerisinde -geleneksel anlamıyla etikten farklı olarak- barındırdığı politik içerimler görünür hale gelecektir.

El presente trabajo ofrece, por primera vez, un estudio completo y unitario de las funciones que la facultad del juicio desempeña en el sistema ético de Kant. Esta perspectiva permite resolver algunas aporías inherentes a la aplicación de la ley moral, así como advertir la relevancia que la especificidad de lo práctico posee en la filosofía crítica. Para ello, se comienza con el examen de la libertad en su sentido práctico-trascendental y se aclaran algunos conceptos básicos de la teoría kantiana de la acción, como los de causalidad, principio práctico y máxima. En este marco aparecen con su sentido propio las tres funciones básicas de la facultad práctica del juicio: la Típica en la constitución del objeto de la razón práctica y la doctrina sobre las categorías de la libertad; el enjuiciamiento de la máxima en el sistema de los deberes de virtud y la conciencia moral como la facultad práctica del juicio que se juzga a sí misma.

***

Diese Arbeit bietet zum ersten Mal eine einheitliche und vollständige Darstellung der Rollen, die die Urteilskraft in Kants ethischem System spielt. Diese Perspektive ermöglicht es, einige Aporien der Anwendung des moralischen Gesetzes zu lösen und die Relevanz der Eigentümlichkeit des Praktischen für die Transzendentalphilosophie zu begreifen. Deshalb beginnt diese Arbeit mit der Analyse der Freiheit in ihrer transzendental-praktischen Bedeutung und mit der Erklärung einiger Grundbegriffe der kantischen Handlungstheorie, wie Kausalität, praktisches Prinzip und Maxime. In diesem Rahmen zeigen sich die drei grundlegenden Rollen der praktischen Urteilskraft in ihrem eigentlichen Sinne: die Typik in der Konstitution des Objekts der praktischen Vernunft und die Lehre über die Kategorien der Freiheit; die Beurteilung der Maxime im System der Tugendpflichten und das moralische Gewissen als die sich selbst richtende praktische Urteilskraft.

Le propos de cet article est de traverser des différentes interprétations sur la même incarnation historique du chef, c’est-à-dire Périclès, en la réinsérant dans la culture politique démocratique du V siècle de la πόλις. En particulier, on vérifiera dans le Gorgias de Platon, l’Ethique à Nicomaque d’Aristote et La guerre du Péloponnèse de Thucydide comment des lectures contrastantes de Périclès ont été développées et comment elles sont reliées à des systèmes philosophiques divergents.

  La première étape sera donc Platon, où l'on retrouve une critique de la figure charismatique considérée dans un contexte de réflexion sur le rapport entre rhétorique et politique. Spécifiquement, Périclès est employé comme exemple négatif par Socrate pendant le dialogue avec Callicles, avec lequel Socrate veut disputer sur la tâche du vrai πολιτικός. La critique formulée de Périclès est celle selon laquelle il n’aurait pas amélioré ses citoyens, mais, au contraire, ceux-ci seraient devenus pires pendant son gouvernement. 
  Directement en lien avec Platon et son Gorgias on trouve la « réponse » aristotélicienne, dans l’Ethique à Nicomaque. L'on y retrouve encore la figure de Périclès, mais cette fois il est vu positivement; en fait, le Stagirite parle de lui comme du prototype de la φρόνησις (prudence). Périclès représente, dans ce cadre, l’exemple du parfait homme politique, qui est exactement opposé à l’image de l’analyse de Platon. Il est donc l’incarnation la plus représentative de la rationalité pratique dans le contexte relationnel de la πόλις, où il s’agit toujours (comme chez Platon, voir La République) de l’εὐδαιμονία, bonheur. Evidemment, pour comprendre cette différence de lecture il faut montrer la distance entre la philosophie platonicienne et la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne: il est clair que les deux philosophes veulent utiliser une figure charismatique exemplaire pour exprimer le « mouvement de la pensée » à la base de leurs théories politiques. 
  A coté de ces analyses on a aussi un document qui provient d’une discipline différente mais du même milieu historique et culturel : La guerre du Péloponnèse. Dans ce cas, avec Thucydide, on a une image clairement positive, qui célèbre Périclès comme la manifestation la plus haute de la polis grecque pendant l’apogée de l’action d’idéologisation. En effet, l’historien a été estimé à l’origine de la représentation idéalisée du stratège, dont il valorise l’autorité morale et l’habilité politique. 

  On veut donc aborder trois différentes lectures de la même période (l’apothéose de la démocratie athénienne) et du même sujet (Périclès) afin de vérifier comment le phénomène du charisme dans le cadre de la culture classique a été pensé et contextualisé . La question du charisme au niveau politique doit en fait être toujours située dans deux discours plus amples : celui du lien entre gouvernants et gouvernés et le problème de l’optique dans laquelle on peut penser le gouvernement (le Bien platonicien ou l’immanence de l’excellence aristotélicienne, par exemple).

Moral particularism is often conceived as the view that there are no moral principles.
However, its most fêted accounts focus almost exclusively on rules regarding actions
and their features. Such action-centred particularism, I argue, is compatible with
generalism at the level of character traits. The resulting view is a form of particularist
virtue ethics. This endorses directives of the form ‘be X’ but rejects any implication
that the relevant x-ness must therefore always count in favour of an action.

Hem Spinoza hem de Nietzsche yalnızca içkin düşüncenin içine gizlenmiş aşkınlık tortularını temizlemekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda aşkınlığın arkasında yatan tipolojiyi de ortaya çıkarırlar. Bu, içkinlik düşüncesinin aslen pratik bir disiplin olduğunun en güçlü kanıtlarından biridir (Opus magnum’una “Ontoloji” değil “Etika” adını veren Spinoza’yı hatırlayalım). Her iki düşünür de “Kim aşkınlığı ister?” sorusunu –farklı formülasyonlarla- sorarak ahlaki dünya görüşünün ardında yatan varoluş üslubunu yaşamın gözünden bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutar.  Spinoza açısından aşkınlığı arzulayan ahlaki üçlü köle, rahip ve tiran olarak belirlenirken; Nietzsche güçsüz, kölece bir varoluş tipinin, “değerlerin değerini değiştirerek”,  yaşamı yasa ve yasak kavramları ile kıskaca alan aşkınlığı icat ettiğinden söz eder. Nasıl isimlendirilirse isimlendirilsinler, aşkınlıkla ilişkilendirilen tiplerin ortak noktası kederdir. Bunlar, kendi iktidarları için kedere ihtiyaç duyan; ölüme benzeyen yaşamlarının zehri ile -bilerek ya da bilmeyerek- dünyadan öç almaya çalışan tiplerdir. Spinoza tüm yaşamı boyunca bu tip bir varoluşun taşıyıcısı olan modus’lardan uzak durmuşken, Nietzsche daha örgütlü bir düzenlemeye göz kırparak içkinliğin büyük politikasına işaret eder: Güçlüleri güçsüzlere karşı korumak gerekir.

In this chapter, I criticize some common approaches to conceptualizing property, and I propose instead a more normatively attuned, historically situated framework for thinking about what it means to call something mine. Whereas many legal theorists are busy constructing elaborate doctrines for justifying the absolute supremacy of property rights (and, consequently, normalizing the status quo distribution of wealth), I am more interested in understanding the social bonds, normative expectations, and material constraints produced in property relations. I do this with the help of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, each of whom placed property in relation to the development and denial of human freedom. But first, I discuss my shirt.

This paper focuses on one of the major criticisms made to Aristotle's virtue ethics, namely that it lacks explicit moral action guidance. The same criticism has been addressed to later developments of virtue ethics. There have been several attempts to overcome this objection and to demonstrate that modern theories of virtue ethics do provide principles of right action. In this paper, I discuss mainly two such major attempts: the exemplarist approach and the virtue rules approach. My aim is to examine whether, if applied to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, these two approaches can provide a convincing answer to the criticism that Aristotle’s ethics does not offer explicit moral action guidance .

This chapter aims at fostering a novel conceptual framework to address the issue of experiencing the everyday, with a focus on our aesthetic preferences and choices in daily life and their practical implications. Given the persistent weaknesses in the theoretical foundation of the sub-discipline called Everyday Aesthetics (hereafter, EA), a philosophical reflection is crucial for such endeavor. I propose an approach in line with practical philosophy, that is, by starting with a reflective examination of questions and assumptions that are prior to any possible application.
In the first part I critically review the recent everyday aesthetics literature, arguing: 1) that the attempts for a better theoretical grounding still are impeded by shortcomings rooted in inappropriate conceptualizations of its key-targets, the everyday, the aesthetic experience, and the experiencing self; and 2) that it is possible to improve the analytical framework for approaching everyday aesthetic life by clarifying EA’s underpinning assumptions and open questions, such as the problems of the unity of the self and the continuity of experience. My contention is that such an improved framework can be provided by conceiving of EA as a practical aesthetics in the tradition of practical philosophy. This claim is then supported in the second part by means of concepts and arguments held by this tradition, especially its version revisited by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his philosophical hermeneutics, followed in the third part by some insights on the characteristics of experience, life, and life-world provided by a sociological phenomenology (Georg Simmel, Alfred Schutz). In the concluding part I briefly illustrate how such a practical account provides new ways of conceptualizing in this research area, in particular the study of everyday life decisions and actions prompted by our aesthetic preferences and taste.

W artykule podjęta jest próba intuicyjnej syntetycznej interpretacji sokratejskiej maieutyki w duchu psychologii homeryckiej. Bazując na tej interpretacji, opracowano ćwiczenie uświadomionego mówienia, które zostało włączone do zajęć akademickich: Jak praktycznie wykorzystać własną głupotę?-doradztwo filozoficzne w warsztacie psychologa, prowadzonych na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim i w Szkole Wyższej Psychologii Społecznej w latach 2004-2012. Na gruncie akademickim były to pierwsze w Polsce seminaria poświęcone doradztwu filozoficznemu. Podczas ćwiczeń studenci byli proszeni o zapisywanie swoich obserwacji. Niektóre ćwiczenia były filmowane. W ten sposób zo-stał zebrany bardzo ciekawy materiał, który może być podstawą do dalszych poszukiwań teoretycznych i empirycznych. W artykule krótko przedstawiam, czym jest uświadomione mówienie, prezentuję zapiski z ćwiczeń studentów oraz wskazuję na krótki materiał filmowy. słowa kluczowe: psychologia homerycka, dusze nie-cielesne (thymos i nous), dusze cielesne (dusza-serce kradié; dusza-przepona fren), metoda maieutyczna, sztuka uświadomionego mówienia, uobecnienie siebie, ćwiczenia duchowe 1. Wprowadzenie. 2. Psychologia homerycka: 2.1. Dusze cielesne: kradié i fren; 2.2. Dusze nie-cielesne: thymos i nous, 3. Relacja między sercem i umysłem. 4. Uświadomione mówienie jako uobecnienie siebie. 5. ćwiczenia duchowe-relacje osób ćwiczących. 6. Zarys dalszych badań. 7. Zakończenie.

To say that interology is a way of life is to say that it is a practical philosophy, an ethics. This way of life is characterized by dialogue, communitas, life-enhancing relationality, productive tension, mode switching at opportune intervals, the primacy of leisure, frontiersmanship, liminality, readiness for rapture, playfulness, creativity, the sensation of freedom, and, if one is truly awakened, the capacity for unconditional bliss. The last phrase is a big claim reserved for buddhas, immortals, sages, yogis, and the like. In the final analysis, this understanding of interology is vitalistic in nature. It is preoccupied with autopoiesis, sees life itself as an artistic medium, and treats every instance of doing and non-doing as an opportunity for self-fashioning. Life starts to give off a different aura when one lives this way. Eventually, happiness becomes endogenous, and a species of inalienable spiritual triumphalism (not the vulgar stripe displayed by philistines, nor the type held in contempt by LU Xun 鲁迅) takes over, so much so that one becomes "unswayable by the eight winds," as the Zen expression has it. The Stoic-minded Kenneth Burke would use "heads I win, tails you lose" to characterize this attitude toward life. Spiritual self-sufficiency by no means implies isolationism, since one is always already thrown into relations. It is rather a matter of managing to get vital nourishment wherever one is thrown, and involves an intuitive, prudential praxis of selection and deselection, prehension and negative prehension, affectability and imperturbability, engagement and disengagement.

OR consultants aspire to provide their clients with good reasoning. OR methods are designed to support the process of developing good reasoning. Logic examines what counts as good reasoning. The aim of the paper is to investigate the foundations of OR in terms of the relationship between logic and the activities and methods of OR inquiry. The approach taken is: (i) to identify the types of activities that OR practitioners typically engage in during an OR project; (ii) to introduce some of the main areas of logical reasoning, particularly those relevant to OR practice such as deductive, inductive, modal, and informal logic; and (iii) to bring these two lines of thinking together in order to examine the relationship between logic and OR practice and methods. The key finding is that although the core activities and methods of gathering data, analysing it and developing models are logically well founded, the management of uncertainty in the line of argument could benefit from the insights and methods provided by logic. From this analysis, some practical suggestions are made to improve the process of OR, the development of the line of argument, and the honing of advice given to clients.

This programmatic paper argues that building a bridge between the two traditions of
systems thinking and practical philosophy is key to serving the cause of ethically
grounded, socially rational decision-making. A three-level framework of rational systems practice provides a starting point that 30 years after it was first outlined can still guide innovative research and professional practice.

In recent years, a renewed interest in Hegel’s Logic has led to important breakthroughs in our understanding of a number of Hegelian topics. Through a new interpretation of Hegel as a “logical constitutivist,” this essay seeks to challenge both Robert Pippin’s and John McDowell’s influential and important accounts of Hegel’s notion of freedom. Against Pippin’s claim that freedom in Hegel is a social and historical status “achieved” by certain living beings, I argue that Hegel’s logical account of freedom renders rational agency intelligible as a distinct form of life. Following an assessment of the status of the Logic as an account of intelligibility itself, I read Hegel’s logical concept of life as the primitive form of practical spontaneity and interpret his concept of knowing as the rational form of living self-maintenance. Yet in contrast to McDowell’s neo-Aristotelian critique of Pippin, I show that Hegel’s key idea of a “free genus” is more than a generic classification of free individuals: it seeks to account for the kind of living beings that collectively legislate their own normative constraints. In deducing the natural kind of specifically free beings (the “free genus”), Hegel achieves his logical ambition of demonstrating what must be true of both thought itself and certain living organisms for anything to be intelligible as what it is.

The Online Journal of Hegelian Studies (Revista Eletrônica de Estudos Hegelianos) will publish a special issue devoted to the topic of “The Practical Dimension of G.W.F. Hegel’s Logic”. We welcome contributions that explore the link between logic, political philosophy, practical philosophy and theory of action within Hegel’s philosophy.

Confirmed contributors: Angelica Nuzzo (CUNY); Paul Redding (SydUNI); Luca Illetterati (UNIPD)


The special issue aims to shed light on the practical meaning of Hegel’s logic and to address the issue of the role of logic in relation to the thinking activity on the categories, cultural forms, and social institutions of the present.

Leaving behind the opposition between metaphysical and anti-metaphysical, Aristotelian and post-Kantian interpretations that has predominantly characterised the debate on Hegel’s logic in the last thirty years, this special issue wants to challenge such an opposition and to promote the recent debate that finds in the logical categories the forms of a theory of action.


The following is a list of potential subjects that submissions are invited to address. It is also possible to tackle further related topics.



Hegel’s idea of cognition as alteration (Veränderung)
Relationship between criticism and speculation in Hegel’s logic
Comparison between the structure of thinking and the structure action in Hegel’s philosophy
Teleological models for freedom’s realisation in Hegel’s logic
Hegel’s dialectics of the crisis-moments of transformative processes
Hegel’s idea of immanent critique as self-realisation
Hegel’s idea of self-determining subjectivity from a logical and a practical point of view
Readings emphasising the practical meaning of Hegel’s logic within post-Hegelian philosophy


We accept texts in Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, English and German.

For more details, see the “Guidelines for Authors” section of the journal’s website:

http://ojs.hegelbrasil.org/index.php/reh/about/submissions#authorGuidelines


NEW DEADLINE for submission: August 21, 2022.

All papers will be double-blind refereed.

The issue will be published at the end of 2022.

For more information, please contact:

Giovanna Luciano: lucianogianna@gmail.com
http://ojs.hegelbrasil.org/index.php/reh/announcement/view/21
http://ojs.hegelbrasil.org/index.php/reh/announcement/view/26

Esta conferencia es a propósito de los atentados terroristas de París del 13 de noviembre de 2015. Se ocupa del temor como sentimiento que transforma el relieve de lo que se denomina "el ámbito de las luces", y lo enfrenta a la realidad de su propio carácter problemático, su relación con violenta con la alteridad y su posible destino.