Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19 and Securitized Lockdown in Nigeria in Early
2020
Albert Chuma Okoli Elias Chukwuemeka Ngwu
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown on the Nigerian populace from the
standpoint of how the socio-positional backgrounds of people accounted for their differential
vulnerabilities in that regard. By way of a qualitative analysis that relied mainly on a desk study,
the paper posits that the lockdown was over-securitized and anti-people, considering the gale of
police brutality and violation of human rights that attended the process. The paper makes a case
for a moderately de-securitized lockdown regime that is implemented based on incentivized
moral suasion rather than coercion.
Keywords: COVID-19, Lockdown, Pandemic, Public Health, Securitization.
Introduction
In December 2019, a disease outbreak was recorded in Wuhan city of China. It was a rapidly
onset epidemic that came to be known as COVID-19. Caused by a novel virus designated as
SARS-CoV-2, the disease was declared a "Public Health Emergency of international concern" by
the World Health Organization (WHO) on January 30, 2020 (WHO, 2020a). This was a sequel to
the rising international spread of the disease, due largely to human circulation enabled by the
global aviation industry.
On March 11, 2020, WHO redefined the hitherto localized epidemic as a pandemic, following its
alarming spread and incidence across the world (UNODC, 2020). Various countries began to
impose various emergency lockdown measures to mitigate the pandemic, ranging from partial to
total shutdown of non-essential economic activities. Regarding enforcement, approaches varied
from liberalized to draconian modalities, with the authoritarian regimes more inclined to the
latter (Sefa-nyarko, 2020). The common feature of the lockdown in various jurisdictions has
variedly been the tendency to securitize (Nunes, 2020). During the securitization process,
governments in different countries have sought to respond to the exigencies of the pandemic
Federal University Lafia, Nasarawa State, Nigeria. Email: okochu007@yahoo.com
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria. Email: elias.ngwu@unn.edu.ng
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
through extraconventional norms of statecraft (Henrieder & Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). By so doing, the
procedures of normal policy intervention have often been sidelined, while extreme contingency
measures have been widely resorted to (Sears, 2020).
Following the first reported case of Covid-19 in Nigeria in February 2020, the Federal
Government announced a stringent lockdown regime whose initial phase took effect on March
30, 2022. Among other measures, the lockdown was characterized by restriction of public
movement and gatherings, prohibition of mass meetings, compulsory wearing of protective nose
masks, and closure of schools, markets, and other public arenas. The police enforced the
lockdown measures in conjunction with other internal security agencies and specialized task
forces. The enforcement of the lockdown witnessed manifest militarization of law enforcement
as the police and her allied forces capitalized on the exigencies of the moment to brutalize and
victimize the populace under the pretext of Covid-19 containment (Aborisade, 2021). In effect,
within the first month of the lockdown enforcement, Nigeria had recorded more police brutalities
and human rights violations than Covis-19 cases (Aborisade, 2021).
While a lot has been written on the socio-politico-epidemiological dimensions of COVID-19
(Bisson, Schmauder & Claes, 2020; Bar-Siman, 2020; Figus, 2020), only a little has been
documented concerning the material dialectics of its securitized processes. Although COVID-19
fatality has been no respecter of social positions or backgrounds, there is no gainsaying the fact
that the masses have been far much more vulnerable. This study proffers a political economy
analysis of COVID-19's securitization in Nigeria to ascertain how people's socio-positional
backgrounds account for their differential vulnerabilities to the impact of its lockdown. What
was the character of the COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria? What were the essential consequences
of its securitization? Did anybody gain at the expense of others in the process? Who were the
gainers, losers, and victims? The remainder of the paper is organized into a number of broad
thematic areas. Next are background issues, including the paper's purpose, methods, focus,
propositions, and frame of reference. This is followed by briefly considering the literature review
and analytical framework. Then comes a segment discussing COVID-19 and the political
economy of securitization. The last section is the conclusion with recommendations.
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
Research Methodology
The purpose of the paper is to interrogate the COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria in early 2020
against the backdrop of its differential impact on the populace. Specifically, the paper seeks to
engage a set of analytical posers:
i.
What has been the nature and character of the COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria?
ii.
Have the costs and benefits of the securitized lockdown been equitably shared?
iii.
Who are the gainers, losers, and victims of the process?
In seeking to answer these questions, the paper adopted an exploratory analysis anchored on
insights from a desk study. The desk-based insights were systematized against the postulates of
securitization theory to proffer a theoretically grounded narrative capable of engendering and
informing future empirical inquiries on the relevant aspects of the subject matter. The paper
follows the logic of qualitative analysis, whose thrust is prosecuted thematically in line with the
objectives. It is expected that the insights and submissions from the analysis would serve as a
veritable prima facie premise for more rigorous evidence-based research on the subject matter.
Conceptual Exposition: COVID-19, Securitization, Lockdown
Certain concepts are key to our discussion on the gainers, losers, and victims of the COVID-19
pandemic in Nigeria. These are COVID-19, political economy, securitization as well as
lockdown. In this section, we attempt to clarify the conceptual undergrowth around these terms.
COVID-19
COVID-19 is an acronym for Corona Virus Infectious Disease-2019. It is the variant of the
-CoV-2; formerly
called 2019-
4
Officials reported the first human cases of COVID-19 in Wuhan City,
Hubei Province, China, in December 2019. It was then reported to the WHO on December 31,
2019. On January 30, 2020, the WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global health
emergency, and on March 11, 2020, the agency declared it a global pandemic 5. The WHO
explained that most people infected with the COVID-19 virus would usually experience mild to
moderate respiratory illness and recover without requiring special treatment. However, older
4
5
(https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2500114-overview).
(https://emedicine.medscape.com/article/2500114-overview)
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
people and those with underlying medical problems like cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic
respiratory disease, and cancer were more likely to develop a serious illness if infected by the
virus (WHO, 2020b).
Chinese officials traced some of the earliest known cases to a wholesale food market in Wuhan.
Many initial patients were stall owners, market employees, or regular visitors to this market. The
market was closed on January 1, 2020. There were, however, some of the initial cases that did
not have apparent links to the market in Wuhan. This fact triggered speculations about the
possible suppression of information on the actual origin of the disease by the Chinese authorities.
Intense speculation and outright accusations that COVID-19 may have had more clandestine
origins ensued. While some suggested that the virus may have accidentally leaked from a
Chinese laboratory, the Wuhan Institute of Virology administered by the Chinese Academy of
Sciences, others of conspiracy persuasion believed the virus was engineered to spread among
humans as part of a bioweaponry program. The latest thinking gained traction following its
vociferous propagation by the United States president, Donald Trump. However, upon further
inquiries, scientists appear to be united around the view that the virus has a natural animal origin
and was not a manipulated or constructed virus (Hjelmgaard, 2020). The United States
intelligence community has also supported this view (see Seldin, Jeff, 2020).
The latter school of thought recalled that many similar viruses are found in wild bats, so it seems
likely that the origin of this one is probably via an intermediate host. An earlier variant of the
Coronavirus, SARS-CoV-1, was the cause of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
outbreak in 2003, while yet another variant was also responsible for the emergence of the Middle
East respiratory syndrome, or MERS-CoV that was first identified in Saudi Arabia in 2012. 6
Both SARS and MERS were known to have originated from bats. Without strong counterfactual
evidence, scientists are persuaded that COVID-19 also has its ecological origin in bat
populations. It has nonetheless been clarified that since there is usually limited close contact
between humans and bats, the transmission of the virus to humans may likely have occurred
through another animal species, one that is more likely to be handled by humans. This
6
(https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-(mers-cov).
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
intermediate animal host or zoonotic source could be a domestic animal, a wild animal, or a
domesticated wild animal and, as of yet, has not been identified (WHO, 2020b).
Meanwhile, despite advances in medical science, the Coronavirus is continuing its spread
worldwide, with about 11 million confirmed cases in 188 countries. More than half a million
people have lost their lives. According to figures collated by Johns Hopkins University, the US
accounts for about 25% of the global total of cases. It also has the world's highest death toll,
followed by Brazil and the UK. In China, where the virus erupted, the official death toll is some
4,600 from about 85,000 confirmed cases, although critics have questioned whether the country's
official numbers can be trusted. South Africa and Egypt have seen the largest outbreaks so far in
Africa with 408,052 cases/6,093 deaths, and 90,413 cases/4,480 deaths, respectively, while
Nigeria currently ranks third with 38,344 cases/813 deaths.
Source:https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases
Securitization theory is multi-sectoral. It considers five security sectors: military, economic,
political, societal, and environmental (Buzan et al., 1998). A potential security threat can be
framed within one or more sectors. In Blair's speech, for instance, he framed Saddam's regime as
a military and societal threat. This was achieved through his reference to weapons of mass
destruction and the incompatibility of Iraq's human rights infringements with the British values
of 'freedom, democracy and tolerance' (The Guardian, 2003). Securitization theory has been
subject to debate, discussion, and critiques over the years (Williams, 2003; Howell & Richter,
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
2019), which has led to the emergence of second-generation securitization theory to address the
critiques as well as provide new insights.
Lockdown
A lockdown is required for people to stay where they are, usually due to specific risks to
themselves or others if they can move freely. During epidemics, lockdowns can limit movements
or activities in a community while allowing most organizations to function normally or limit
movements or activities such that only organizations supplying basic needs and services can
function (Dineros & Dipasupil, 2020).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the term lockdown was used for actions related to
mass quarantines or stay-at-home orders (Resnick, March 10, 2020). By early April 2020, 3.9
billion people worldwide were under some form of lockdown. This is more than half the world's
population (Euronews, April 3, 2020; Business Insider. March 28, 2020). By late April, around
300 million people were under lockdown in nations of Europe, while around 200 million people
were under lockdown in Latin America (Statista, April 23, 2020). In Nigeria, President
Muhammadu Buhari, on March 30, 2020, announced a total lockdown of two states (Lagos and
Ogun) and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The three locations are home to almost 30
political capital, respectively. The lockdown was subsequently reinforced and extended to the
thirty-six states of the federation and Abuja, with inter-state travels restricted to foods and
medical supplies from April to July 2020, when the lockdown was relaxed. However, several
social and economic sectors remained shut, including schools at all levels, while many others
remained restricted.
Perspectives on Public Health and Securitization: Literature Review
During the Cold War, security threats were framed essentially around the risks posed by the
spiraling arms race and the possibility of a Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) through direct
or proxy confrontation between the world's superpowers. With the cessation of the cold war,
however, concerns shifted to threats posed by asymmetric warfare waged by "global
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
in Marshal, 2010, p.10) as well as "the myriad challenges posed by infectious disease in a
globalized environment" (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p.447). This led to the rechannelling of
energy in both intellectual and policy circles towards the reconceptualization of security to
include threats of non-military nature, with greater stress placed on human security.
This paradigm shift was brought into bold relief by the 1994 UNDP Annual Report, New
Dimensions of Human Security. The report identified seven fields of human security: economic,
health, food, health, environment, personal, and community (Gómez & Gasper, 2013). The
report further decoupled health security as encompassing infectious diseases in the developing
world as well as lifestyle diseases in the developed world. It also suggested that common
vulnerabilities in both worlds included an unequal distribution of resources to combat disease as
well as unequal access to health services, often resulting in higher rates of infant mortality, the
easier spread of infectious diseases, and lower life expectancies (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010).
eas it created a set of baseline parameters
for non-
identified as sec
Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p.448).
The first attempt to further clarify the inseparability of health challenges and security threats was
subsequently provided by (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde), collectively known as the Copenhagen
School. They suggested that the course of threat identification, the process by which a health
issue becomes 'securitized', could be broken down into several phases (Buzan et al., 1998).
According to them, the first phase of securitization requires an actor to identify an existential
threat to their existence. The second involves accepting the issue by a target audience (usually
civil society) convinced of its existential threat potential. This acceptance comes with a third
phase shift whereby an emergency (extra-budgetary) reallocates resources to combat the threat.
The Copenhagen School holds that once the threat is successfully resolved, the issue is desecuritized to the extent that, if still present, it simply becomes part of the general policy
environment with a reallocation of resources back to earlier priorities (Yuk-ping & Thomas,
2010, p.448).
For these scholars, security is not an objective condition but the outcome of a 'securitizing'
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
an urgent threat to a given referent object (Wishnick, 2010). An issue is, therefore, successfully
securitized when an audience agrees that an existential threat exists to a shared value (Buzan et
al., 1998, p. 31). Conversely, actors may downplay the existence of an existential security threat
or 'desecuritize' a
Several scholars concede that health challenges, whether from infectious diseases or biohazards,
represent a clear and distinct form of security threat that requires extraordinary measures or
special organizations to address appropriately. Pirates and Runci (2000, pp. 176 93) commented
that,
Viruses, bacteria, and various kinds of plants and animals have never
respected national borders...Now there is growing concern over the impact of
increasing globalization on the potential development and spread of new and
resurgent diseases across increasingly porous borders.
Similarly, works by Garrett (1995) and Oldstone (1998) have charted the various types of
diseases that have crossed national borders in the past and present, as well as the types of statesociety responses that have accompanied each outbreak. In the virology and bio-medical fields,
there is a large array of literature on diseases and their impact on the well-being of people (see
Clause al., 1994; Guan et al., 1996; Brown, 2001; Tumpeyet al., 2002; Vallat, 2004; Choi et al.,
2005 in (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p.449). Furthermore, in the specific field of security studies,
Fidler (20
variety, was a neglected aspect of international relations. Singh (2019) notes that the concept of
national security was known in terms of war or conflict until the current era of globalization,
which has led to increased connectivity through the various corners of the world, with faster and
easy traffic and communication. It has also given birth to an increased volume of trade and
traffic flowing around the world and, in the process, led to the rise of global 'microbial traffic',
which confronts the globalization of health as well as disease. Singh further notes that "microbial
risks have been globalized along with commerce, the corresponding health and protective
measures, for the most part, have not" (Singh, 2019, p.11).
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
Altman (2003) demonstrated how political and social structures inhibit responses to the threat of
HIV/AIDS, while Whitman (2000) highlighted how the modern international political system,
with its preoccupation with sovereignty, inhibits transnational responses to such outbreaks.
Whitman noted that without a more flexible system, virulent pathogens could transcend national
boundaries far more quickly than could be the case (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p. 449). Also,
McMurray and Smith (2001) considered the impact globalization had on the health and wellbeing of societies as they moved up the economic development ladder and became more
enmeshed in global trade and human interaction processes. Drawing on three case studies, the
authors showed how globalization erodes state borders and creates new transnational health
challenges. Price-Smith (2002) then illustrated how these challenges could have a profound
impact on the stability and prosperity of states, while Brower and Chalk (2003) extended the
work on the threats of infectious diseases, with specific reference to HIV/AIDS and public policy
responses by United States government agencies. Cumulatively, these studies highlight the need
to develop strong linkages between sub-state, state, and international agencies when addressing
the security threat of infectious diseases and other bio-hazards.
Caballero-Anthony (2006), in her exploration of the link between securitization and public health
goods in Asia, suggested that by applying a securitization approach to preventing infectious
disease outbreaks, securitizing actors would have a greater capacity both within and across
countries to deal with pandemic consequences. Similarly, in his study on natural plagues and
bi
securitization are outbreaks of infectious diseases
specifically those that inspire a level of dread
disproportionate to their ability to cause illness and death
whether arising as a result of a
natural process or human agency. Chan, Støre, and Kouchner (2008, p.498) observed that
'pandemics, emerging diseases, and bioterrorism are readily understood as direct threats to
national and global security. Davies (2008, p. 298) informed that during the 1990s, 'awareness of
the threat that infectious disease outbreaks could pose to their citizens' health and their countries'
economic and political stability encouraged western governments to develop responses in
national security terms.' As a result, ' health challenges now feature in national security
strategies, appear regularly on the agenda of meetings of leading economic powers, affect the
bilateral and regional political relationships between developed and developing countries, and
influence strategies for United Nations reform. Moreover, even though health has long been a
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
p.687). Fidler (2003) found that 'the linking of public health and national security raises deeper
theoretical issues and controversies about world politics in the global era.'
Other scholars (Aradau, 2004, pp.392-3; Vuori, 2008, p.66) have also noted that the Copenhagen
School's literature, rooted in European democracies, tends to equate desecuritization with the
restoration of democracy after the exceptional politics of a securitization period. They countered
that even the logic of securitization itself is non-democratic since, by definition, framing an issue
as a security threat implies an exceptional situation and may involve exclusionary practices.
Desecuritization also is problematic since a return to 'everydayness' implies reaffirming preexisting hierarchies of power (Aradau, 2004, p. 400), which typically exclude certain groups
from decision-making (Hansen, 2000, p.287; Wilkinson, 2007, p. 12). Some other scholars have
called attention to the social context of securitization, particularly the relationship between the
securitizing actor and the audience (Williams, 2003, p.525; Stritzel, 2007, p.364). This is
especially significant in authoritarian regimes, where it cannot be easy to distinguish between
regular and special politics (Stritzel, 2007; Vuori, 2008). Moreover, such regimes have greater
control over the securitization process because the opposition is suppressed (Vuori p. 2008), and
political speech is restricted through censorship, threats of imprisonment, and other sanctions
(Wilkinson, 2007).
Other studies seek to broaden responses to national leaders' public health challenges beyond
securitization. They instead examine a more comprehensive range of practices and interventions
in response to public health threats, a field they term 'biosecurity'. In their project on biosecurity,
Collier and Lakoff (2008) distinguish between the preparedness required to address potential
health threats affecting national security, crisis responses to emerging pathogens, and the steps
needed to respond to risks linked to technology and industrialization, such as health risks in the
food industry.
Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p.448). Yuk-ping and Thomas (2010) argued that in
conceptualizing a rational-actor model - where policy-makers logically respond to threats
because they threaten human existence, the securitization model ignores real-world situations
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
where, for domestic reasons, securitizing actors can deliberately choose not to securitize an
existential health threat or may securitize the threat via a speech act but choose not to allocate
emergency resources to resolve it. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the model, located
within a state structure, is also vague about how it can be applied in international organizations
or across state borders. Yuk-ping and Thomas (2010) insist that in identifying and resolving
health threats, understanding the implications of these political distortions on emergency
responses is critical since, according to them, "non-medical considerations frequently shape the
process of securitizing health threats (such as diseases); even where there is recognition of the
threat facing the state or society" (Yuk-ping & Thomas, 2010, p.448). In sum, Yuk-ping and
Thomas framed their skepticism about the applicability of the securitization model of the
Copenhagen School around three contextual concerns, namely: the problem of identification of a
health security threat; the governance of the response to the health threat, and the
desecuritization of the health threat; as well as the implications for the securitization of health
threats across national borders.
Also, the Paris School, involving sociologists inspired by Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault,
(Wishnick, 2010, p.456). Didier Bigo, who played a crucial role in developing the Paris School's
research agenda, views securitization as "a mode of governmentality, structured by 'habitus' of
security professionals" (Wishnick, 2010, p.457). In contrast to the rule of princes in days past,
Foucault saw present-day governmentality as embodying more than sovereignty over territory;
For Bigo, securitization is not an
exceptional speech act; rather, "it stems from a range of routinized administrative practices such
as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical analysis, secrecy and management of fear"
(Bigo, 2002, p.73). Big f
The effort by the Paris School to reframe securitization goes a long way toward addressing some
of the criticisms of the narrowness of the Copenhagen School's approach. However, several
contradictory elements remain nonetheless. One problem associated with their position is that
while, in Foucault's terms, "governmentality is necessary to address the challenges of biopower,
infectious diseases themselves may undermine state capacity" (Price-Smith, 2002, p.1; Price-
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
Smith, 2009, pp.204-6). Moreover, even when the state can address public health risks, a type of
security dilemma may be created in that the practices employed to ensure security and reassure
the population (such as quarantines or wearing face masks during a pandemic) may also create
panic (CASE Collective, 2006, p.461). It is also contended that using the language of risk rather
than security may not eliminate problems of stigmatization, as some groups are identified as 'at
risk' or presenting 'risk factors' (Elbe, 2008, pp. 190-3). Nonetheless, the critique of securitization
from risk theorists and the Paris School provides an opportunity to conceptualize responses to
infectious diseases more broadly as practices and modes of governmentality rather than purely
speech acts (Elbe, 2009).
In response to the numerous criticisms against securitization, second-generation securitization
theory has emerged, "expanding securitization theory to address these critiques while providing
new insights" (Eves & Thedham, 2020, p.1). According to Eves and Thedham, three such
expansions include securitization dilemmas, macro-securitizations, and strands of securitization.
Applying these new insights to the analysis of the securitization of COVID-19 in the UK, Eves
and Thedham explored the recurring securitization dilemma between public health and the
economy, the macrosecuritization of COVID-19 between March 16th and 20th, as well as the
applicability of the strands concept in studying the continuation of lockdown measures.
Concerning the securitization dilemma, it was noted that the UK government, in reviewing its
lockdown measures every three weeks (Kuenssberg, 2020), faced a securitization dilemma in the
days leading up to each three-week deadline. The dilemma was in the form of choice between
continuing the lockdown to protect public health or easing lockdown measures to prevent further
negative economic impact. According to Eves and Thedham, this represents the societal sector in
conflict with the economic sector. On the one hand, if lockdown measures were eased too early,
the chance of the second wave of COVID-19 cases and deaths was more likely (BBC News,
2020c). On the other, the predicted economic impact of the lockdown was substantial, affecting
the funding of services such as schools and the NHS (Strauss, 2020). In the end, concern about
public health trumped that of the economy. Eves and Thedham argued that by resolving the
securitization dilemma in favor of public health, COVID-19 had been macro-securitized over the
economy, which "explains why the government's references to economic security are heavily
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
contextualized within the context of the pandemic" (BBC News, 2020a in Eves and Thedham,
2020, p.2). They contrasted this with the USA, where the Trump administration appeared to
favor protecting the economy over public health, as evidenced by his declaration that 'we cannot
let the cure be worse than the problem' (Haberman & Sanger, 2020). Finally, Eves and Thedham
delineated the various strands of the securitization of the pandemic in the UK, taking as their
point of departure "the Prime Minister's rhetoric" in the week commencing March 16 , 2020 (p.3).
-19 securitization, Eves and
Also, applying second-g
Thedham showcased the potential of such approaches outside Western liberal democracies.
Recalling that securitization theory has been criticized for being too western-centric, they insist
that second-generation ideas can be applied outside of western-liberal democracies to explore all
nation's COVID-19 securitizations, "thereby unlocking a vast range of potential research on
COVID-19 as a global security issue" (p.3). Eves and Thedham further noted that similar to the
UK, Serbia's securitization dilemma seemed to have been resolved in favor of public health.
s claim, we turn in the subsequent sections to examine
Nigeria's COVID-19 securitization situation with particular reference to the national lockdown
experience.
COVID-19 Lockdown and Political Economy of Securitization
Essentially, securitization is, more often than not, an exercise in service of vested interests.
the essence of securitization is to protect and perpetuate the dominant elites' economic, political,
and idiosyncratic interests (Okoli, 2016).
Ideally, the securitization process starts with identifying a 'common existential threat' that needs
to be dealt with urgently. Then the threat is defined and framed as a 'public emergency' requiring
expeditious and exceptionalist government attention. The framing is done by the mainstream
populist narratives strategically designed to sway favorable sentiments in the direction of an
intended policy or action. The whole securitization process is often a mere simulation intended to
provide a justification, rationalization, and legitimacy for an exceptionalist undertaking (Okoli,
2016).
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
From all indications, COVID-19 has presented a veritable context and pretext for the
securitization of public health and health security. According to Nunes (2020, p.2):
COVID-19 confirms the dynamic of securitization of global health. The
pandemic has been framed in the context of a threat to people's lives and the
regular functioning of societies. It was not just about (the) securitization of
the disease, which for the majority of infected individuals is either
asymptomatic or shows moderate symptoms.
While the imposition of COVID-19 lockdown may be justified as a rational and necessary
measure, it is pertinent to note that such a measure has come with dire complications and
consequences that have left people wondering if it is not becoming more harmful than the
disease it is meant to contain (Eves & Thedham, 2020).
In the case of Nigeria, the securitization process, instantiated by militarized protocols such as
curfews, roadblocks, armored patrol, and
civil restrictions, was contradictory and
counterproductive. Under the pretext of a public health emergency, which the authorities framed
as a dire existential threat, the government marshaled out restrictive regulations and orders that
circumscribed free association and movement. The enforcement of these measures became
somewhat worrisome because of the level of excesses, highhandedness, and abuse demonstrated
by those charged with the task. In trying to enforce the lockdown regime, the enforcers assumed
the posture of warriors seeking to effectuate some garrison command (cf. Aborisade, 2021). The
police and other security agencies became disproportionately militarized and arbitrary,
conducting their duties with utmost impunity. There were arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention,
brutality, and extra-judicial killings on the part of the police. In effect, the enforcement of the
lockdown yielded contradictory outcomes that discredited, if not negated, its avowed intentions.
Essentially, the contradictions of the lockdown were evidenced in the following trilemma:
i.
the conflicting priority as to whether to safeguard the economy instead of public
health or vice versa;
ii.
the competitive attention either to save human lives or to protect livelihoods;
iii.
the tension between (human) security and civil liberty.
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
Since Nigeria is primarily an informal economy where people earn a living based on daily
income (Human Rights Watch, 2020), shutting down the economy to save lives meant
aggravated household livelihood crises and strangulated the national economy, the socioeconomic costs of this scenario were more detrimental than the COVID-19 fatality. It is
conceivable that more Nigerians died of hunger, poverty, and associated maladies than the
pandemic.
In addition to its socio-economic complications, the COVID-19 lockdown came with massive
human rights violations. Its enforcement has been characterized by human rights abuses such as
police/ military brutality, material extortions, and extra-judicial killings. Nigeria's Human Rights
Commission (NHRC, 2020) report indicates that 18 persons had been killed by public security
operatives involved in enforcing the national lockdown policy as of mid-April 2020. At the time,
only 8 deaths had been recorded from COVID-19 complications in Nigeria. The NHRC also
reported receiving and documenting "105 complaints of incidents of human rights violations
perpetuated by security forces" in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states and Abuja, the capital (Aljazeera,
April 16, 2020, para.2).
It is apparent from the foregoing that the COVID-19 lockdown in Nigeria was obtained at huge
social and economic costs. However, these costs have been primarily borne by the poor and
vulnerable masses who enjoyed little or no succor from the government. As De (2020, para.16)
puts it, "major cost has been distributed to (a) large section of (the) population generally ignored
by bureaucracy, while benefits are incurred by a small influential group of people." The
implication of this is that the lockdown process has reproduced and/or reinforced structural
inequality by creating gainers, losers, and victims (Craze & Brusserich-Acceti, 2020; Roelen,
2020; Dubla-Noriss, 2020), So who are these social categories and how has the lockdown
process impacted them? It is to the unraveling of this crucial question that we now turn our
attention to.
COVID-19 Lockdown and Differential Impacts: Gainers, Losers, and Victims
Widespread disease outbreaks and containments have always had socio-epidemiological
dynamics (Okoli, 2014). Although the COVID-19 pandemic is no respecter of social stratum,
gender, or age, its lockdown procedures have disproportionately victimized effects on the poor
and vulnerable populace (Oladimeji, Atiba, Mbkkazi & Hyera, 2020). In effect, the lockdown
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
measures tend to have benefited the elites at the expense of the masses. According to Craze and
Invernizz-Acceti, 2020, para.2):
Despite rhetoric about
self-isolate is overwhelmingly correlated to income. While the (upper and
middle-class) professionals congratulate themselves for staying inside, their
isolation depends on a class of workers who often labor without essential
equipment or while ill (brackets are authors').
The situation in Nigeria is such that the lockdown has produced its gainers, losers, and victims.
Among the gainers are the privileged few in government, industry, civil society, and public
bureaucracy. They are the elites who have all it takes to effectively cope with the lockdown:
handsome savings, good housing, insurance, and access to protective equipment. This category
includes public functionaries and security operatives who have exploited the lockdown process
for profiteers. While some top government officials expropriated the process through rentseeking as well as elite capture of palliatives and dedicated funds, their opportunistic
counterparts in the public security sector were involved in extorting the public for personal gains
(BBC, 2020).
The losers of the lockdown process include the poor and subaltern populace, the unemployed, the
displaced, the homeless, and the wider informal sector of the economy. The urban poor who
d
destitution, leading to their inability to pay for basic provisions and public utilities (UNODC,
2020). For the homeless, for instance, staying at home has been extremely difficult, if not
impossible. As Faniran (2020, p.2) puts it:
For Nigeria's homeless, 'staying at home is impossible. The outbreak of
COVID-19, with its consequential containment measures, has resulted in a
situation where many find themselves in a dilemma. For the homeless
population, street children, destitute, people living with disabilities, and
beggars: How do they stay at home when there are no shelters, and many live
in transient places? How do they practice hand hygiene, physical distancing,
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
and other recommended protocols for coronavirus protection? How do they
contact the CDC should they fall ill? Their precarious living conditions make
them more vulnerable to respiratory illnesses and to COVID-19.
The economy's informal sector had borne the more significant brunt of the devastating impact of
the lockdown. Although the sector accounts for more than fifty percent of the entire national
workforce (Human Rights Watch, 2020), most of the players therein can barely boast of a living
income, let alone the luxury of savings, insurance packages, and credit facilities. Their existential
para.5). Besides, the labor market has been in dire crisis as no jobs are being created while
existing ones are significantly being lost or under-remunerated as a result of circumstantial wage
cuts (see Brussevish, Dabla-Norris & Khalid, 2020). Generally, the lockdown had a heavy toll on
the livelihoods of the poor individuals and households, who merely endured and survived the
lockdown experience with little or no government support.
Aside from the gainers and losers highlighted above, the lockdown process equally produced
victims. These include those that were physically victimized or dehumanized by the lockdown
process. There were police/military brutality cases, sometimes leading to the loss of lives (see
Table 1). As of mid-March 2020, a total of 18 persons have been killed by security operatives
enforcing the lockdown (UNHRC, 2020). In the same vein, there have also been a series of
extortions and human rights abuses. The UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) reported
high levels of extortion and brutality by security forces in many African countries, including
Nigeria, in what has been described as "a toxic lockdown culture" (UNHRC, 2020). According
to the report, "Those who cannot pay bribes, poor people, are taken to mandatory quarantine
centers although there is no indication that they have come into contact with someone testing
positive to COVID" (Aljazeera, April 28, 2020, para.8). Also, the Nigerian Association of
Resident Doctors, which represents about 18,000 physicians in the country also reported
incidents of extortion, beatings and arbitrary detention of its members even in the course of their
duties (Olurounbi, 2020). In addition to exassets, and properties had been destroyed. A case in point was the hotel in Port Harcourt (in
Rivers State) that was demolished in May 2020 over alleged nonlockdown directive.
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
Table 1: Select Cases of Extra-judicial Killings during the Initial Phase of COVID-19
Lockdown in Nigeria
Date
Incidents
April 14, 2020 Police killed two persons in the New Tyre Market area of Nkpor in
Idemmili Local Government Area of Anambra State
April 15, 2020 A commercial vehicle driver named Amobi Igwe was killed by an
officer of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) at
Umuikea, along Aba Express Way, Isialangwa Local Government
Area of Abia State
April 17, 2020 Drunken police personnel, not on official duty, killed one Ifeanyi
Arunsi in Ebem Ohafia Local Government Area of Abia State
April 17, 2020 A tricycle driver died as a result of alleged torture by the police at the
Estate Police Station in Iwoji, Obi Akpor Local Government Area of
Rivers State
April 23, 2020 Female police personnel was shot dead on duty by her colleague
while trying to enforce the COVID-19 order; it was a case of
unprofessional use of arm
Source: Social Action (2020)7.
Besides, frontline health workers are barely equipped with the requisite tools to protect
themselves from being infected by the raging virus. As victims of circumstance, some of them
contracted the virus, while some have died of or with the virus. Segments of medics in some
states in Nigeria embarked on strike to protest their predicament on the frontlines as well as
demand incentives and protection. Added to the list of victims were those who could neither feed
themselves nor their households nor can they access basic medicare as a result of the effects of
the pandemic on their livelihoods.
Generally, the COVID-19 crisis has incidentally turned a cash cow for the privileged few in
public roles and offices, some of whom have expropriated its mitigation to advance their selfregarding interests. This awry outcome depicts the phen
Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, Purnamasari, & Wai-Poi, 2019)
http://saction.org/human-rights-violations-during-covid-19-lockdown-in-nigeria/
Alatas,
Albert C. Okoli, Elias C. Ngwu, Of Gainers, Losers, and Victims: COVID-19...
programs designed to support the poor and vulnerable often end up being high-jacked and
expropriated by the dominant elites (see Box 1).
Box1: Indications of Elite Capture of COVID-19 Mitigation in Nigeria
1.5 billion Naira (equivalent to 38,781,735 USD) was spent by the staff of the
Niger Delta Development Commission on themselves as COVID-19
relief/palliative
13.5 billion Naira (equivalent to 349,035,615) was to be spent on a homestead
school feeding program amid the COVID-19 crisis by the Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development
2.6 of over 90 million poor Nigerians were to benefit from the first phase of the
cash transfer (of N 20,000; equivalent to 51.72 USD) intervention scheme
designed to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 lockdown
National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD) proceeded on an indefinite
strike over unpaid hazards, operational allowances, and the dearth of Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) amid the COVID-19 crisis.
COVID-19 relief materials/palliatives meant for vulnerable populations (the poor,
the internally displaced, the aged, etc.) have often been diverted and
misappropriated by government officials and their cohorts in the operational chain.
Source:
Conclusion and Recommendations
The COVID-19 pandemic presented humanity with an unprecedented public health cum human
security challenge. The lockdowns were characterized by exceptionalist measures designed to
restrict and regulate human circulations and contacts to check the pandemic's incidences. The
need to mitigate the crisis informed the adoption of varying patterns of securitized national
lockdown measures across the world.
The implementation of these lockdown regimes has been largely problematic. In Nigeria, the
lockdown process was locked in a securitization dilemma: being at a fix reconciling public health
and economic exigencies; or choosing between safeguarding life and protecting livelihoods.
There was also a conflict of priority between security and liberty. Essentially, the country's
enforcement of the national lockdown was largely contradictory and counterproductive. It
progressed with huge costs to the poor and vulnerable populace. While the masses were groaning
agonizingly under the excruciating burden of the lockdown, the privileged elites and their
institutional agents in the public bureaucracy, more or less, aggrandized themselves by
expropriating the gains and spoils of the process. So even if the imposition of the lockdown had
PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2022
been rational and justifiable based on the referent threat, its enforcement was significantly
subjective, iniquitous, inefficient, and hazardous. So, if the pandemic had posed a fatal threat to
health security in Nigeria, its arbitrary and securitized lockdown measures proved to be equally
mortal in effect.
Going forward, there is a need to moderately de-securitize the lockdown processes and other
emergency response mechanisms by shifting emphasis from militarized coercion to moral
suasion. Rather than clamping down on the civil populace in the guise of enforcing an
equipped, and incentivized in a manner that would enable them to assume personal responsibility
for fighting the pandemic effectively. An efficient palliative regime should be instituted to
alleviate the people's suffering in the process. More importantly, care must be taken to ensure
that the palliatives reach the intended targets seamlessly. If a lockdown becomes a desideratum,
then such a measure should be pragmatically conceived and implemented, considering its costs
and benefits. Furthermore, for such measures to be progressive and worthwhile, they must be
sensitive to social justice, equity, and good conscience demands.
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