Issue 69, 2 nd Quarter 2013
Reorganizing
National Security
Transnational
Crime Threat
Sea Power
to Cyber Power
J O I N T
F O RC E
Q UA R T E R LY
Inside
Issue 69, 2nd Quarter 2013
JFQ Dialogue
Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz
2
From the Chairman
Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Forum
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley
Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Executive Assistant Ryan Heggs, J.D.
Design Amy Ellis and Chris Dunham
4
6
Executive Summary
Victory, Peace, and Justice: The Neglected Trinity
By Beatrice Heuser
U.S. Government Printing Office
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JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu
2nd Quarter, April 2013
ISSN 1070-0692
13
Organization Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions
By Anthony J. DiBella
20
Goldcorp Crowdsourcing: An Industry Best Practice for the Intelligence
Community? By Jesse Roy Wilson
25
Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault By Lindsay L. Rodman
Commentary
34
Confronting Transnational Organized Crime: Getting It Right to Forestall
a New National Security Threat
By Douglas M. Fraser and Renee P. Novakoff
39
42
Democracy Promotion in Oman By Diana M. Holland
49
Joint Communications Support Element: The Voice Heard ’Round the World
By Kirby E. Watson
56
Command and Control Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming
By Ronald C. Wilgenbusch and Alan Heisig
Restoring the “Unwritten Alliance”: Brazil-U.S. Relations
By Lawrence T. Brown
PUBLISHER
Features
64
72
78
84
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
An Interview with Samuel J. Locklear III
NATO’s Level of Ambition: Beyond Strategic Reach By Dean A. Nowowiejski
From Sea Power to Cyber Power: Learning from the Past to Craft a
Strategy for the Future By Kris E. Barcomb
The Future of U.S. Landpower: Special Operations Versatility,
Marine Corps Utility By Kevin D. Stringer and Katie M. Sizemore
PRESIDENT, NDU
MG Gregg F. Martin, USA
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Dwight D. Eisenhower
School for National Security and Resource Strategy
RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College
Brig Gen homas H. Deale, USAF Air Command and
Staf College
Col Mark Desens, USMC Marine Corps Command
and Staf College
LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC he Joint Staf
Ambassador James B. Foley National War College
Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College
Recall
92
Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC Marine Corps War College
The German Military Mission to Romania, 1940–1941 By Richard L. DiNardo
LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA he Joint Staf
ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command
Book Reviews
99
100
101
Maj Gen Joseph S. Ward, Jr., USAF Joint Forces
Staf College
The Generals Reviewed by Robert Bracknell
The Generals Reviewed by Alan L. Gropman
109
EDITORIAL BOARD
Richard K. Betts Columbia University
Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
The Next Wave Reviewed by George Michael
Eliot A. Cohen he Johns Hopkins University
COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College
Mark J. Conversino Air War College
Joint Doctrine
103
LTG David G. Perkins, USA U.S. Army Command and
General Staf College
Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University
Lead Turning the Fight: The Joint Operational Access
Concept and Joint Doctrine By Gregory Kreuder
Col homas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Oice of the Secretary of
Defense
Douglas N. Hime Naval War College
Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staf College
Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College
Redefining Information Operations By Carmine Cicalese
Col David Lapan, USMC he Joint Staf
Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) he Joint Staf
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staf College
homas L. McNaugher Georgetown University
Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College
James A. Schear Oice of the Secretary of Defense
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
ABOU T THE C OV ERS
Front cover: USS Laboon (DDG 58) arrives in Souda Bay,
Greece, to support maritime security operations and theater
security cooperation eforts in U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility (U.S. Navy/Paul Farley). Table of contents shows
(let to right) C-130 Hercules with 107th Airlit Wing shoots
live lares during night formation training mission (U.S.
Air Force/Ray Lloyd); Strike Soldier prepares for realistic
combat environments during weapon malfunction training session (U.S. Army/Joe Padula); lightning lashes on
horizon as USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) operates in
U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility (U.S. Navy/Greg Linderman); Marine and wife embrace during return ceremony
at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina
(U.S. Marine Corps/Stephen T. Stewart).
CONTRIBUTIONS
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from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration
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“Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information,
see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu.
Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University
Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf. JFQ is the
Chairman’s lagship joint military and security studies journal
designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and
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policy and strategy; eforts to combat terrorism; homeland security;
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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
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From the Chairman
Risky Business
How to Think about Risk
Ancient societies viewed life as subject
to arbitrary forces. The discovery of probability in the 16th century gave mankind a
sense of greater influence over events. Today,
we “make our own luck” by better understanding risk.
Risk is a relatively straightforward
concept. Simply, it is the probability and consequence of danger. It is not very likely that
we will be invaded soon, or that we will face a
mass nuclear attack, but the consequences of
either would be catastrophic—even existential. On the other hand, the probability that
terrorists will attack our interests somewhere
2
JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013
DOD (D. Myles Cullen)
T
here is risk in daring. As
asserted by Niccolò Machiavelli,
“Never was anything great
achieved without danger.”
Every day, the men and women of our Armed
Forces dare to be great. Every day, they take
risks to achieve something bigger and more
important than themselves. It is the risk they
willingly take that makes our nation great.
We owe our good fortune to more than
blind luck. Like no other profession, we pay
attention to risk. We study it, forecast it,
manage it, and seek to reduce it. We spend
endless hours—even years—wargaming
risk to our missions and to our forces. We
simulate attacks and disasters. We rehearse
responses to complex contingencies. We
develop strategies and plans for a wide range
of threats to our national security interests.
As much art as science, judging risk is
an essential skill for military professionals at
every echelon. Right now, a pilot is judging
risk as she climbs into a cockpit. An infantry
platoon is doing it while on patrol. A ship’s
captain is doing it while navigating in the
Arabian Gulf. In my role as Chairman, I
have a statutory responsibility to explain risk
to our senior civilian leaders, the President,
and Congress. I want to share some thoughts
about risk with you as well.
Chairman and Admiral Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, meet at USPACOM
Headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, May 2012
around the world is higher. The consequences—albeit horrific for those at the point
of attack—are relatively insignificant in terms
of national survival.
Probability and consequence are
not easily measured, and they do not paint
the whole picture. It is just as important to
think about how risk changes over time and
what opportunities might be available if we
accept risk. Cyber attacks, for example, are
becoming more frequent and more disruptive every day. Destructive cyber is a reality.
In today’s world, bits and bytes can be as
dangerous as bullets and bombs. At the same
time, advanced cyber tools are creating new
options for achieving military objectives.
Risk only exists in relation to something we value. At a basic level, we think
of the risk to our force—people and equipment—and to our mission. At a more strategic level, we think about risk as it relates
to our national security interests. Beyond
the survival of our nation, the health of the
global economic system is essential to our
way of life. Protecting Americans abroad is
a national expectation, while upholding our
values is part of our national identity. Reliable
allies also help to distribute risk.
What Risks Are Out There?
The risks to our national security interests are real. They are broad and run deep.
From a security standpoint, I see risk in the
context of a security paradox. To paraphrase
Charles Dickens, it is the best of times, it is
the worst of times.
We serve at a time that seems less
dangerous, but may be more so. By some
accounts, we are experiencing an evolutionary low point in human violence. Dickens
might call this a “season of Light” with low
risk. But less violence does not necessarily
mean less danger, particularly if both the
probability and consequences of aggression
are on the rise. We can hope for the light, but
those of us in the profession of arms have a
moral obligation to be ready in case we confront a “season of Darkness.”
Two trends are casting long shadows.
First, power in the international system is
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DOD (D. Myles Cullen)
Chairman observes Afghan commandos during demonstration at Camp Moorehead, Afghanistan, April 2012
shifting below and beyond the nation-state,
spawning more actors who are more connected and more capable of doing harm.
While hostile regimes such as those in Iran
and North Korea get the most attention—
and deservedly so—the security stage has
become much more crowded with violent
nonstate actors.
At the same time, advanced technologies are proliferating horizontally and
vertically. Highly accurate ballistic missiles
wielded by middleweight militaries lurk in
every theater. Bombs made of homemade
explosives can mangle our toughest mineresistant vehicles. A cyber attack from a
lone malevolent marauder could disrupt
broad sectors of our economy. In many
ways, the homeland is no longer the sanctuary it once was.
These mutually reinforcing trends
ensure an uncertain future that will not
mirror the past. They argue for a more competitive security environment that does not
follow yesterday’s rules. They call for us to
think differently and prepare differently for
the dangers we may face.
How to Deal with Risk
Our responsibilities do not end with
anticipating risk. We are expected to take
actions to reduce and mitigate risk. Among
the many ways to mitigate risk, some of the
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
most effective include having a sound strategy and a ready force with reliable partners.
A solvent strategy keeps our ends, ways,
and means in balance. It guards against
ambitions that exceed abilities. With our
means reduced, we have no choice but to
carefully and deliberately prioritize our ends
and seek new ways to achieve them. I have
been hosting a series of strategic seminars
with our senior defense leaders to do just this.
The result has been a better sense of where
to invest our resources and how to integrate
capabilities to meet an uncertain future.
We also buy down risk through readiness. A hollow force invites danger. A ready
joint force deters threats, assures allies, and
can respond quickly to defeat aggression.
This is why the Joint Chiefs and I are committed to making sure we sustain the best
led, trained, and equipped military on the
planet. At the same time, we must make
some tough tradeoffs to build the joint force
we will need by 2020.
We can also share risk. We must
continue to look to others to help us deal
with threats before they mature. I have made
strategy the centerpiece of my dialogues with
our pivotal partners. Our allies and partners
can bring to bear the kind of additional capability and credibility required to make our
strategies work. Of course, we also need our
partners to stand up to their responsibilities
and be ready with relevant capabilities and
adequate capacity.
Leading All the Way
Leadership is our best insurance
against risk. By developing leaders today, we
prepare for a turbulent tomorrow. The kinds
of leaders we need are those able to adapt to
a shifting security landscape. They do not
just react to change; they lead it. They do not
just manage risk; they embrace it to generate
opportunity. By taking calculated risks, we
illuminate the path to greatness. Whether we
take that path depends on leadership.
We are and will remain the greatest
fighting force on the planet. Be alert to risk,
but dare to be great! JFQ
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
3
S
enior military leaders, primarily
U.S. Army generals and their
individual abilities to lead, were
recently examined by the awardwinning journalist Tom Ricks. Some leaders,
in Ricks’s view, were highly successful, others
not so much. I believe that the one critical
trait all great military leaders share is that
of continuous study and mental development. Great American captains—ones most
of us would call geniuses—worked hard to
strengthen their mental muscles: Washington, Dewey, Pershing, Marshall, Eisenhower,
Nimitz, Arnold, Bradley, Vandegrift, and
more. My personal favorite of the World
War II generation is George S. Patton, Jr. As
the man who would literally write military
fighting doctrine and history simultaneously during the campaigns of World War II,
General Patton was a voracious reader of a
wide range of works.
According to one of his biographers,
between the wars, Patton had read or was
acquainted with the concepts “of nearly every
significant writing on mobile warfare that
had been produced in English,” regardless
of the advocating writer’s subject, including
works on infantry, cavalry, air, or mechanization. By the time he would enter into combat
in World War II, Patton was without doubt
“America’s most effective advocate of a daring
armor doctrine.”1 Given that it took Patton
three tries to complete a military academy
education (once at Virginia Military Institute
and twice at West Point), due in part to his
dyslexia, we have to respect Patton’s sheer
force of will and determination to learn all he
could about his profession.
In 1935, as a lieutenant colonel at the
age of 50, Patton was found by his wife,
Beatrice, weeping one evening as he was
reading about past heroic commanders, all
younger than himself. But study on he did.
Many can remember George C. Scott’s portrayal of Patton in the 1970 film that won an
impressive seven Academy Awards, including
Best Picture. In one memorable scene, one
of Scott’s lines says it all: As Patton surveys
the positive results of the battle in progress
between Allied forces and the Nazi army in
4
JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013
northern Africa, he proclaims, “Rommel, you
magnificent bastard, I read your book!”
The Rommel book in question was
actually about infantry tactics in World
War I, and Patton, in his memoirs, refers
to reading it during the Saar Campaign of
November 1944—far after the portrayed cinematic moment. But the point about reading
and study is made just as well by the fact that
Patton continued to think, read, and assess
his progress, never satisfied with what he
knew at the moment—even while engaged in
the ultimate test of his leadership in combat.
In the flying business, pilots rightly believe
that death quickly follows the moment
one stops learning. Joint Force Quarterly is
constantly searching for new ideas as well as
reminders of past events that may yield a path
to future successes for our readers.
Every platform in the expanding media
needs two basic ingredients to succeed:
authors and readers. Based on the increasing
amount of submissions I have been receiving in recent months, JFQ has a growing
source of new and interesting ideas to publish
each quarter. Also, on the reader side, our
last edition, JFQ 68, set another record for
online viewers. While popular media continue to suggest that platforms such as print
magazines are failing, the truth is likely less
pessimistic. JFQ continues to thrive in both
printed and online forms, and while we are
considering ways to update the look of the
journal in coming months, the one thing we
will continue to do is provide a voice for the
best ideas to inform, promote, and improve
the joint force.
In line with the theme of study as a
means to improve the mind, this edition’s
Forum presents an intellectually challenging set of articles that should assist anyone
seeking to find new insights to consider for
the future of the military. Professor Beatrice
Heuser offers an interesting discussion on
a forgotten set of beliefs regarding what
should follow war. She suggests that these
beliefs date from before Napoleon and that
Clausewitz overlooked them. But they were
rediscovered by B.H. Liddell-Hart after
World War I: the trinity of victory, peace,
and justice. As our national security require-
U.S. Army
Executive Summary
General George S. Patton, Jr., USA
ments have evolved to encompass a wider
interagency effort, cultures have clashed,
and reaching shared solutions has been difficult for leaders and organizations. Anthony
DiBella suggests that part of the problem is
a lack of understanding about how organizations operate and that a more thorough
understanding of the cultural differences
of these groups could lead to more effective
cooperation. In another avenue of discovery
for organizational improvement, crowdsourcing has been an increasing focus of how
organizations might seek to better operations, especially in industry if not government. Jesse Roy Wilson presents a corporate
case study that provides an important lesson
that could improve the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Next, with the recent headlines
of sexual misconduct in basic training,
Lindsay Rodman argues that Department
of Defense leadership has good intentions to
deal with these delicate but serious matters.
She suggests that policy may not always be
guided by available facts and analysis.
Our Commentary brings updates
on regional and communications issues
from how transnational organized crime
should be confronted to whether years of
permissive environment operations have
dulled our ability to communicate in future
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n d u p res s .ndu.edu
NDU
combat. Former U.S. Southern Command
Commander General Douglas Fraser, USAF
(Ret.), and Renee Novakoff recommend
the development of analysts who can better
interpret a mix of traditional intelligence, law
enforcement information, and open source
data to deal with transnational organized
criminal activities. In her essay from the 2012
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Article contest, Diana Holland believes
that U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the
Gulf region of Southwest Asia should start
with Oman, as conditions there are right for
a peaceful evolution to a more liberal form
of government. Lawrence Brown, in his 2012
Secretary of Defense National Security Essay,
argues for a rapid reversal of the continuing
rift between the United States and Brazil.
Next, one of the long-established joint organizations, the Joint Communications Support
Element (JSCE), has a storied if unheralded
service record dating back some 50 years.
With first-hand experience leading this unit,
Kirby Watson outlines the broad range of
missions that JCSE is ready to support with
leading-edge joint communications capability. Even with our best efforts to keep military
communications robust and technologically
up to date, however, Ronald Wilgenbusch
and Alan Heisig demonstrate that the U.S.
military’s overreliance on commercial communications has created severe vulnerabilities in future combat, especially from an old
foe of the Cold War era, jamming.
In Features, we present an interview
and an interesting mix of articles that include
a discussion of the U.S. “pivot” to the AsiaPacific, recommendations for the future of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
suggestions on how to leverage Alfred Thayer
Mahan for cyber strategy, insights into how
to create U.S. joint landpower, and rethinking
how to properly locate and neutralize individual strategic enemies. As we consider how
best to execute a rebalancing of our military
assets into the Pacific, Admiral Samuel J.
Locklear, USN, commander of U.S. Pacific
Command, sits down with JFQ to discuss his
views on how his command will response.
Next, looking at NATO’s Strategic Concept,
entitled Smart Defense, Dean Nowowiejski
First class of the Army Industrial College, June 1924
cautions that the means to meet Alliance
ends may require a lowering of expectations
going forward because of an all-encompassing
austere budget environment. In a truly joint
thinking article, Kris Barcomb channels
Mahan and describes a “tailored expansionist
strategy for cyberspace” that leads to better
economic and physical security for the United
States. Seeing an opportunity to leverage the
likely future security environment to meet
an enduring requirement for engagement
with land forces, Kevin Stringer and Katie
Sizemore recommend a mix of U.S. special
operations forces, primarily from the U.S.
Army and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
(MAGTFs), that would allow mission accomplishment with fewer troops—the expected
constraint going forward.
In an impressive primary document–
based historical case study from World War
II, Richard DiNardo takes us to Romania
as the Germans worked with local forces in
preparation for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of Russia. In this Recall article,
we see security assistance, of a very different
kind, playing out with many of the same
issues modern efforts still face.
In the Doctrine section, Carmine Cicalese, former director of the Joint Command
and Control Information Operations School
at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk,
helps us understand the important differences between strategic communications and
information operations, as well as finding
a path to achieving success in military
decisionmaking supported by these efforts.
Rounding out this edition are a joint doctrine
update and three well-written and engaging
book reviews.
As an editor and educator along with
our NDU Press team, I am “zeroed in” on
delivering the highest quality content every
way possible, so that my battle buddies,
shipmates, and wingmen on joint professional military education faculties around the
world have the intellectual ammunition they
need to develop critically thinking, adaptive
leaders for the 21st-century joint force. Let us
know how we are doing. JFQ
—William T. Eliason, Editor
NOTE
1
Roger H. Nye, The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader
(Garden City Park, NY: Avery, 1993), 129.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
5
Patrick Gruban
Norwegian Room,
United Nations Security
Council Chamber in
New York
Victory, Peace, and Justice
The Neglected Trinity
By B e a t r i c e H e u s e r
he irst aim in war is to win, the second is to prevent defeat, the third is to shorten it,
and the fourth and most important, which must never be lost to sight, is to make a just
and durable peace.
—Sir Maurice Hankey1
S
Professor Beatrice Heuser is a
Historian and Political Scientist.
She holds a chair of International
Relations at the University of
Reading, United Kingdom, and is the
author of The Evolution of Strategy:
Thinking War from Antiquity to
the Present (Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
6
JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013
ince the U.S. Armed Forces handed out medals to their troops stationed in Germany to
celebrate their “victory” in the Cold War, “victories” have eluded the liberal democracies,
and their experiences with violent conflicts have been frustrating. We have seen ephemeral,
short-lived, or fruitless victories in the first Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia,
the Iraq War, and Afghanistan. After George W. Bush famously and rather prematurely proclaimed that
the U.S. mission in Iraq was “accomplished” and the press hailed that as a victory, first General David
Petraeus and then President Barack Obama have thankfully tended to avoid the term. There has recently
been a wave of publications seeking to bring greater clarity to the concept of victory.2 It has been defined
by some of Carl von Clausewitz’s followers as success in imposing one’s will upon the enemy and by
others as the restoration of the status quo ante bellum (which, given the losses incurred by all sides in war,
is never entirely possible).3
Unsatisfactory attempts have been made to introduce criteria of success according to a complex
cost-gains calculus.4 William Martel has rightly identified the need to distinguish between victory and
the outcome of the employment of force through strategy.5 Colin Gray has presented persuasive definitions of decisive military victory, while carefully distinguishing the result of a military campaign from
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HEUSER
the possible overall achievements on a political level: “decisive [military] victory . . . is
hard to translate into desired political effect.”6
We are struggling with the concept of what
victory in general means, as the new status
quo or state of affairs (or the restored prewar
state) has so often proved short lived: when
is victory a meaningful concept? In search
of an answer, it is worth enquiring as to how
victory was seen in the past, what one might
retain from past views for the present, and
which views have led to dead ends.
Victory as Imposition of One’s Will
on the Enemy
Ever since Napoleon (and his interpreters, among them especially Clausewitz), we
have lost sight of a crucial truth that thinkers
before Napoleon’s wars fully understood:
namely, that victory alone is rarely of much
value if it does not bring peace with justice.7
Military victory for its own sake was and is
important to the generals and their armed
forces, who can think of it as their contribution to fulfilling their side’s strategic aims.
In that respect, as Aristotle commented,
“The end of the medical art is health, that of
shipbuilding a vessel, that of military science
victory, that of economics wealth.” Greek
and Roman generals were celebrated for their
victories, but contemporaries were well aware
that the effects of military victories were
often of short-lived benefit. As such, they
might not lead lastingly to that essential and
only legitimate overall purpose of war, which
Aristotle identified as “peace.”8
There are cases when the evil that one
confronts is so great, and the leadership
of the other side is so thoroughly wicked,
that the Clausewitzian definition of war as
“imposing one’s will upon the enemy” should
indeed be applied unconditionally. To conclude a war, peace must be sought by all the
belligerents, and, at the very least, this means
that the mind of a bellicose adversary must
be changed through some means—whether
by violence or persuasion, even if the latter
does not amount to imposing one’s will upon
the enemy fully. To change an enemy’s mind,
one may need to deprive him of the hope that
he might achieve his own aims more easily,
faster, at less cost by using violence.
A military victory of the decisive sort,
as defined again by Colin Gray as depriving
the enemy of any hope of reversing his defeat
in the near future, is certainly a particularly
useful way to make him reconsider his course
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of action; indeed, it may be the only way.
Nothing of what is argued herein should
suggest that the defeat of enemy forces as
a means of persuading the enemy to cease
fighting is seen as insignificant. The shock
of military defeat is certainly a huge factor in
decisionmaking on any side, for which there
may well be no substitute, to borrow General
Douglas MacArthur’s claim. But often it
takes more, and sometimes it takes less,
than a military victory. In World War I, for
instance, the German Heeresleitung managed
to hide the Allies’ military victory from the
German population because the Allies did
not follow up their success in war by occupation of the defeated enemy country.
The Allies did not repeat their mistake
in World War II. In that second great conflagration, few took issue with Germany’s
unconditional surrender—the practical
application in its extreme form of the call to
impose one’s will upon the adversary—as
the war aim of the Allies, and few have questioned the wisdom of this approach since.9
There is a weighty argument, however, about
whether Japan might have admitted defeat
earlier had the clause of unconditional surrender been dropped, and had the Japanese
population not been led to believe that this
might involve the removal of their emperor.10
Either way, crucially, World War II
was an extreme case of conflict, as it pitted
civilizations believing in the essential human
right to life against regimes and their followers who believed mankind could be divided
into humans and subhumans, of whom the
recognize some legitimacy in many of them,
and the need to address all of them in some
nonviolent fashion, through reforms, good
governance, education, and investment.
They can hardly be resolved through an
unconditional imposition of one’s will upon
the discontented side.
The Trinity of Victory, Peace, and
Justice
Let us return to Aristotle’s definition of
peace as the only legitimate war aim. According to the professed ethics of European
societies from Antiquity to the French Revolution, the establishment of a better peace was
self-evidently seen as the purpose of going to
war. We find this argument articulated not
only by Aristotle and pagan Roman thinkers
but also by one of the fathers of the Roman
Church, by East Roman or Byzantine thinkers such as Emperor Leo VI the Wise, and by
Western Europeans in the Middle Ages and
early modern times, from Christine de Pizan
to the many authors of the 16th to 18th centuries who wrote about war. Military victory
might be the preferred way to peace, but not
the only one. Peace, harmonious order, and
the kosmos were recognized as the overarching aims. How this was to be achieved—
through negotiations, through the Byzantine
equivalent of check-book diplomacy and
soft power, through deterrence, coercion, or
actual war—depended on circumstances.
But is peace alone a suitable aim? The
peace of the graveyard—that is, the annihilation of the entire enemy population—was
the peace of the graveyard—the annihilation of the entire
enemy population—was rarely articulated as an acceptable aim
latter could be eliminated or exploited to
death with impunity. Confrontations with
such extremely evil adversaries as Nazi
Germany and Imperial Japan are the exception, not the norm. Most belligerents today
do not aim at the enslavement of an enemy
population, let alone its eradication, as the
Germans did under Adolf Hitler. Instead,
most wars arise from differences in purpose
and aim on a less than existential level. They
are conflicts about the distribution of wealth,
resources, and territory, about a variance
in status of different ethnic or religious
groups, and about the right to determine
one’s own way of life. It is difficult not to
rarely articulated as an acceptable aim by
those writing on warfare. A second factor
had to be present: not only peace, but also
peace with justice. Justice, however, has
many facets.
Admittedly, most arguments in Antiquity about military victory focused on how
to merit and achieve it (piety and virtus
were seen as the foremost conditions) rather
than on its purpose.11 But already the late
Roman Republic saw the transformation of
the notion that pious behavior was necessary to gain the support of the gods for one’s
military enterprise into a distinct notion
that a war must fulfil a certain number of
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
7
conditions to be lawful. This would later be
called just war, bellum iustum, and it had
to fulfil several criteria with regard to its
causes, purpose, and conduct to be defined
as such. The criteria that later came to constitute just war theory can be traced back to
pre-Christian, Roman Republican concepts
of a proper or orderly way to conduct a
war, most of which can already be found in
Cicero’s and Varro’s writings:
■■ The war has a just cause (self-defense
or defense of another).
■■ It has the only just aim of the pursuit
of peace.
■■ It is the last resort.
■■ It is conducted after a formal declaration of war.
■■ It is carried out with moderation
(which is often referred to as the concept of
proportionality).
■■ Balancing the consequences of not
going to war or going to war in advance of
doing so, it must seem reasonable to assume
that the destruction and suffering caused will
not outweigh the evil that is fought.12
Pagan Roman just war theory was
adapted to Christianity by Augustine of
Hippo around 400 CE. He added the need
for legitimate authority (God, or his representative on Earth, the Emperor—later
taken to mean a legitimate government).13
Augustine’s writings on just war, scattered
over several parts of his work, were codified
by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century and
gained general acceptance in international
law. Thus, we find that in 1945, the United
Nations (UN) Charter only allows defensive
war (chapter VII.51), or action authorized
by the UN Security Council in protection
of international peace and security (chapter
VII). In 2004, the UN High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, in its document “A More Secure World: our shared
responsibility,” listed criteria of legitimacy
for authorization of military intervention by
the United Nations: the seriousness of the
threat, the proper purpose, it is the last resort,
it is conducted with proportional means, and
the foreseeable balance of the consequences
favors going to war over living with the
consequences of inaction. This last criterion
could be termed the choice of the lesser evil,
or justice with moderation. Justice cannot be
divorced from the peace; if it is, the peace will
be worthless.
8
JFQ / issue 69, 2 nd quarter 2013
The pursuit of justice according to classical and later European authors, then, has
several facets. The first is the restoration of a
just state of affairs, the status quo before the
war, or, if the status quo ante was not just, a
just settlement of the dispute. In the absence
of an international, mutually recognized
court of justice to settle a dispute between
two or more parties, this has often taken the
form of war. Already Christine de Pizan,
writing around 1400, tried to introduce an
arbitration authority—composed of other
princes and personalities of the highest
moral authority—to settle disputes between
princes. Many thinkers after her deplored
the absence of such an authority, or a court of
justice. Immanuel Kant, in his 1795 Eternal
Peace, noted that war might serve to decide
a quarrel but would not necessarily decide
in favor of justice: “The field of battle is the
only tribunal before which states plead their
cause; but victory, by gaining the suit, does
not decide in favour of the cause. Though
the treaty of peace puts an end to the present
war, it does not abolish a state of war (a state
where continually new pretences for war are
found).”14 As the Prussian General August
Rühle von Lilienstern put it in 1813, “War is
the means of settling through chance and the
use of force the quarrels of the peoples. Or: it
is the pursuit of peace or for a legal agreement
by States with violent means.”15
Contemporary observers have often
noted, however, that not all parties have
always sought such a just settlement of a
quarrel, or indeed peace. Shortly after the
final defeat of Napoleon, Rühle remarked,
“Victory . . . is not always the necessary condition of conquest or of peace, and peace is
not always the necessary result of victory and
conquest.” He added, “Victory and conquest
are often causes of the continuation, the
renewal and the multiplication of war.” In
full cognizance of the old just war tradition,
which had been dangerously challenged by
Napoleon, Rühle conceded that it should in
theory be the case “that one only wages war
for [the sake of] peace, and that one should
only wage war, in order afterwards to build it
the more firmly and intensively on the lawful
understanding between States.” Napoleon’s
initiatives had shown, however, that wars
were not always like this in reality. At times:
a warring State only concludes peace for the
sake of the next war, [contexts] in which it
regards peace as a convenient and irreplace-
Jacques-Louis David, Samuel H. Kress Collection, National Gallery of Art
FORUM | Victory, Peace, and Justice
The Emperor Napoleon in His Study at the Tuileries,
1812
able period of calm, in order to continue
thereafter the struggle that has been decided
upon the more forcefully and completely.
There are other contexts . . . in which a State
derives some substantial, or perhaps only
imaginary, gains from the continuation of
war. In such cases, war is by no means waged
for the sake of peace, as this would be a
quite undesired event, but for the sake of the
hoped-for gains, to be achieved through war.
Such wars include those that are waged for
passion and personal interests of individual
military men or officials, of the army—in
short, because of some subordinate interest,
but not the general welfare of the State.16
Such wars do not, however, qualify as
just wars; the problem arising from a victory
of the party pursuing it in such a spirit lies in
the unlikelihood that the defeated party will
accept the outcome of the war.
Second, just war theory holds that one
must fight the adversary only until the just
cause is served. A rare example of a Greek
who took an interest in this, Polybius in the
second century BCE, opined, “[G]ood men
should not make war on wrongdoers with the
object of destroying and exterminating them,
but with that of correcting and reforming
their errors”—or, to use a slightly different
translation, “undoing their erroneous acts.”17
ndup res s . ndu. edu
HEUSER
In a more practical vein, Machiavelli warned
his Prince that “Victories are never so overwhelming that the conqueror does not have
to show some scruples, especially regarding
justice.”18 Other writers went further and
advocated justice tempered by clemency.
Machiavelli’s contemporary Giacomo di
Porcia wrote in 1530, “the duty and office of
any political leader, after the battle is won
and victory achieved, [is] to save lives [of
those] who have not been excessively cruel
and overly resistant. For what would be less
gentle, indeed more like to the cruel and
fiercely brutal beasts, than to handle your
enemy without any mercy and meekness?
Undoubtedly a leader acting thus will kindle
the minds of men against him.”19 Machiavelli’s French admirer, nobleman Raymond
de Beccarie de Pavie, Baron de Fourquevaux,
appealed to nobler sentiments: “The true
office of the conqueror is to pardon and to
have pity upon the conquered.”20 Toward the
end of the 16th century, Englishman Matthew
Sutcliffe exhorted his readers to remember
that “In the execution of wars . . . no cruelty
should be used.” He urged “moderation even
in the execution of justice, not only in the
other actions of war.” For to “keep our conquest, there are two principal means which
are necessary; force and justice.”21 About
half a century later, French philosopher and
mathematician Blaise Pascal mused that
“justice without force is powerless; force
without justice is tyrannical. Justice without
force is opposed, for there will always be
villains. Force without justice is decried.
One must therefore bring justice and force
together, making what is just strong and what
is strong just.”22
Just before the publication of Pascal’s
Thoughts, his countryman Paul Hay du
Chastelet admonished Louis XIV that the
victor “has to preserve a generous humanity
for the vanquished, to have compassion with
them, to comfort them in their disgrace, and
through good treatment, sweeten their rude
misfortune.”23 If we consider the most successful pacification of two defeated enemies
in the 20th century, Germany and Japan, it is
precisely this recipe that worked: Marshall
Plan aid for the Germans and reconstruction
aid for the Japanese ensured that both nations
had a vested interest in peace and stability
through their new-found prosperity.
Third, the administration of justice
is often identified with the punishment of
the “guilty” party (usually defined as the
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
aggressor, but who the aggressor is, and who
the just defender or liberator is, are often
uncertain in longstanding territorial disputes—think only of the Malvinas/Falklands
issue). De facto, the party that calls for punishment is the victorious one, and punishment is meted out to the defeated side once
fighting has come to an end. As General
Curtis LeMay, responsible for the firebombing of Tokyo, remarked, “I suppose if I had
lost the war, I would have been tried as a war
criminal.”24 Polybius did not see punishment
as such as a just war aim, postulating that
good men should “extend to those whom
they think guilty the mercy and deliverance
they offer to the innocent.”25 Others argued
that the enforcement of justice—punishment
for war crimes—can only reasonably take
place in a symbolic form, or at any rate selectively, against the leading decisionmakers
responsible for these crimes. As the Spanish
diplomat and soldier Don Bernardino de
Mendoza noted in 1595, one cannot “punish
a multitude”26—or if one does, he either has
to kill them all, or else the multitude will
persuade themselves that this punishment is
unjust, and the result, in many historic cases,
has been the rise of revanchism.
Fourth, writing about postwar justice,
Sutcliffe, Mendoza, and others after them
argued that one must prevent injustice at
the lowest level, such as attacks on individuals, but also pillaging and other ordinary
crimes or iniquities that violate local
Tiepolo and Corrado Giaquinto. Even the
French revolutionaries initially shared these
war aims of bringing peace and justice; they
saw the populations of Europe as oppressed
by tyrannies and thus as brethren awaiting liberation, and they believed they were
fighting only against their oppressors, not
against the populations.27
The Trinity Neglected by the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian Paradigm
Military writings between the time
of Napoleon’s wars and World War II, by
contrast, were dominated by the pursuit of
victory for its own sake, victory divorced
from the political settlement of a fundamentally political conflict, victory not as a
reward for a just cause or for piety but due
only to strength or at best cunning and
underpinned by the Social Darwinist notion
that the fitter nation deserved to prevail.
Both the admirers and the enemies of Napoleon were blinded by his military victories.
This was true especially of Clausewitz, who,
casting all moral dimensions aside, formulated his famous tenet that “to impose our
will on the enemy is” the “object” of war: “To
secure that object we must render the enemy
powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim
of warfare.”
Clausewitz thus reduced the meaning
of victory to narrow military conditions:
“1. The enemy’s greater loss of material
strength; 2. His loss of morale; 3. His open
just war theory holds that one must fight the adversary
only until the just cause is served
customs. Effectively, they called for “good
governance,” good administration, and the
maintenance of law and order. The prevention of arbitrary arrests, assaults, theft, and
arbitrary settlements of local disputes is
part of the rule of law and justice. It stands
to reason that the administration of justice
is essential to a lasting peace.
Incorporating some or all of these
dimensions of justice, it was a commonplace to see peace and justice as linked or
in need of linking before Napoleon ravaged
Europe. Allegories placing the two next
to each other, depicted as beautiful goddesses draped in silks and often engaged
in conversation or embracing, grace paintings throughout Europe, such as those of
admission of the above by giving up his
intentions.”28 Clausewitz knew full well
that he was taking warfare out of its greater
political context when he stated this, as he
wrote elsewhere: “In war the result is never
final . . . even the ultimate outcome of a war
is not always to be regarded as final. The
defeated state often considers the outcome
merely as a transitory evil.”29 Beyond this,
Clausewitz deliberately omitted consideration of the trinity of victory, peace, and
justice from On War. Only a few writers in
the ensuing age, dominated by the imperative of the pursuit of victory at all costs,
fully grasped Napoleon’s greatest shortcoming as a strategist: his inability to build a
lasting peace.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
9
Santi di Tito, Palazzo Vecchio
FORUM | Victory, Peace, and Justice
without victory, there is no survival.”32
Confronted with Hitler’s genocidal ideology and his military machinery of willing
executioners, the Allies in World War II had
no choice but to adhere to the NapoleonicClausewitzian paradigm.
Victory vs. Survival
Machiavelli, 16th century
In the subsequent age, which was dominated by the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian paradigm, enemies were expected to surrender
unconditionally, and summary punishments
were imposed upon the vanquished nation by
the victor in 1871 as in 1919. The result was
rarely a lasting peace, as B.H. Liddell Hart
noted in 1939: “The more intent you appear
to impose a peace entirely of your own choosing, by conquest . . . the more cause you will
provide for an ultimate attempt to reverse the
settlement achieved by war.”30
It dawned on Liddell Hart that “Victory
is not an end in itself,” as he noted in December 1936.31 In his own extensive reading, he
rediscovered the thinking of sages who wrote
prior to the age dominated by the Napole-
10
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
onic-Clausewitzian paradigm. World War
II, which to the minds of many Britons was
due at least in part to the irredentism that the
peace settlement after World War I created
in Germany, was still an extreme example
of the adherence to the paradigm, with its
imposition of unconditional surrender, as
we have seen. Indeed, a superficial reading
of Winston Churchill’s famous “blood, toil,
tears, and sweat” speech of 1940 to the House
of Commons—with its emphasis on “victory;
victory at all costs, victory in spite of all
terror, victory, however long and hard the
road may be”—seems quite in keeping with
the paradigm. Nevertheless, even Churchill
conceded that in this total war, the ulterior
aim was the survival of Great Britain, “for
The war raised a new question,
however: what if military victory and survival
became mutually incompatible? A year after
the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
Bernard Brodie asserted, “If the [nuclear]
aggressor state must fear retaliation,” that
is, if there is a nuclear exchange, “no victory,
even if guaranteed in advance—which it
never is—would be worth the price.”33 He
famously noted, “Thus far the chief purpose
of our military establishment has been to win
wars. From now on its chief purpose must
be to avert them.”34 Faced with the specter
of total nuclear war, strategists to the west,
and later also to the east, of the Iron Curtain
began to debate whether war continued to
be a rational choice—whether it could be
the extension of a rational policy to another
domain.35 Against this background, Liddell
Hart’s rediscovery of earlier thinking about
the relative value of victory and his skepticism about the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian
paradigm were increasingly shared by others.
Doubts persist as to whether nuclear
war could ever again be a rational choice, and
victory is increasingly seen as a nonsensical
concept in the context of a nuclear war. Significantly, in the Cold War, both the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and eventually
the Warsaw Treaty Organization abandoned
victory as a war aim.36 Nevertheless, wars on
a lower scale promised to continue; anybody
who doubted this was disabused of their
optimism by the Korean War, which erupted
in 1950. And such wars have generally been
fought with the aim of winning them, in
pursuit of victory. Indeed, the Korean War
experience led to General MacArthur’s
already mentioned claim that there was “no
substitute for victory” for wars in general.
Yet even in less than total wars, the
concept of victory is now seen as problematic
in the light of the difficulties of turning
military victory into lasting success. In “small
wars,” limited wars, low-intensity conflicts,
wars of national liberation, or whatever term
one chooses, victory was difficult to obtain
let alone maintain long before the watershed
of 1989/1991. Victory, or the translation of a
ndup res s . ndu. edu
HEUSER
military success into a lasting and favorable
political settlement, had been elusive also in
less than total major wars since 1945 including the Arab-Israeli wars, not to mention the
many small clashes—small from a Western
the context of the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian
paradigm, from peace and justice. In the
words of a particularly eminent and influential British defense civil servant, Sir Maurice
(later Lord) Hankey, “It must always be kept
small wars proved particularly difficult for armed forces
that were good at major campaigns in which overwhelming
firepower promised success
perspective—in which victory eluded the
major powers involved, from the successive
Indochina wars and Algeria to U.S. involvement in Somalia.
Already during the Cold War, Alexander Atkinson noted that Chinese Communism under Mao Tse-tung was not seeking
victory through the classical means of war.37
No wonder that, after the experience of
Vietnam, American strategists and military
instructors long shunned the subject of small
wars. They had proved particularly difficult
for high-tech armed forces that were good
at major campaigns in which overwhelming
firepower promised success.
A counterfactual question deserves
pondering: if nuclear weapons had not been
invented, would we have been pushed to
reevaluate the concept of “victory”? Counterfactual questions in history defy final
answers, especially if they try to focus on
single variables. What is clear is that, with
or without nuclear weapons, there continue
to be those who doubt that humanity can
exist without war. Yet critics of war as a
means of settling disputes go back at least to
pre-Augustinian Christian authors, and individual intellectuals have sought to develop
concepts to eliminate war. Nuclear weapons
made the pursuit of this aim more pressing
than ever before, even to those who recognize
that enduring human passions will continue
to work against rational, let alone humane,
solutions to conflicts.
Conclusions
As long as war continues to exist, and as
long as states upholding the UN’s restrictive
rulings on war encounter situations where
they see the inescapable need to resort to
warfare, there will be the question of how to
define war aims in such a context. The works
cited at the beginning of this article fell short
of a helpful definition of war aims by divorcing victory, which they continued to see in
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in mind that after a war we have sooner
or later to live with our enemies in amity.”
Unless one has genocidal aims—which by
definition no state upholding today’s international law can espouse—there are few wars
where this consideration need not play a part.
Hankey’s logical conclusion from this
statement was cited at the beginning of this
article: the most important aim in any war
must be “to make a just and durable peace.”
Victory is nothing if it does not lead to such
a peace, and such justice must be seen as
reasonable by both sides to make it durable.
Hankey added: “Emotionalism of all kinds,
hate, revenge, punishment and anything
that handicaps the nation in achieving these
four aims [of the pursuit of justice] are out
of place.”38 The main obstacle to a just and
durable peace consists of these all-too-human
emotions, in addition to unpardonable collective selfishness, otherwise known as nationalism, chauvinism, or the arrogance and condescension that often underlie religious wars.
Hatred, lust for revenge, and chauvinism in
turn all too easily become untameable factors
in democracies, as World War I and the interwar years illustrated, and as we find in the
rampant nationalism that characterizes interstate relations on the Indian subcontinent.
All this has practical implications,
many of which find their echo in current
debates about how to achieve “sustainable
security.” It may well be unhelpful to gloat
over one’s own success or victory. How different would relations with the Russian Federation be today if the West had not gloated over
its “victory” in the Cold War and distributed
medals for it, but instead celebrated the joint
escape of East and West from the constant
threat of World War III as a nuclear doomsday? Emphasizing postconflict reconciliation
is thus likely to be a better model in many
instances than continuing to humiliate the
defeated party. That this model would not
extend to defeated National Socialism (or to
equally wicked regimes) stands to reason,
but as noted, not all adversaries are so utterly
evil. Where at all possible, a war must not
be conducted in an unforgivable way: the
laws of war (ius in bello) must be carefully
observed even if it means, as many generals
have complained, “fighting with one hand
tied behind one’s back.” While this option is
hardly available to small states, it certainly is
to the world’s only superpower. It secures the
moral high ground, which is crucial for the
perception of justice, an essential prerequisite
for a lasting peace. JFQ
NOTES
1
Maurice Hankey, Politics: Trials and Errors
(Chicago: H. Regnery, 1950), 26f.
2
See, for example, Jan Angstrom and Isabelle
Duyvesteyn, eds., Understanding Victory and
Defeat in Contemporary War (London: Routledge,
2007); Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,”
Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008), 25–36;
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, “Essence
of Victory: Winning and Losing International
Crises,” Security Studies 13, no. 2 (2004), 350–381;
Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing
to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in
International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006).
3
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).
4
Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military
Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 4–6.
5
William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 293.
6
Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving
Decisive Victory (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2002), 18.
7
Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory from
Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
8
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 2011), X.7.
9
Hankey, 25 and following. He was critical of
the imposition of unconditional surrender terms
for Germany and Italy.
10
For the Japanese problem, see Rufus Miles,
“Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million
American Lives Saved,” International Security 10,
no. 2 (Fall 1985); Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to
Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an
American Myth (New York: Knopf, 1995); Dennis
Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996).
11
François Helm, La Théologie de la Victoire
de Constantin à Théodose (Paris: Beauchesne,
1992), 20–26.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
11
FORUM | Victory, Peace, and Justice
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Forum 280
Russia Still Matters:
Strategic Challenges and
Opportunities for the
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By John W. Parker and
Michael Kofman
Russia’s recent
authoritarian turn
and Putin’s pandering to anti-American
sentiment have highlighted the obstacles
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will be a lower priority for both nations
in the next 4 years. Nevertheless, as a key
United Nations member, a still formidable military and nuclear power, and new
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“Russia still matters,” and the authors
find and explore a set of mutual interests
and concerns that necessitate pragmatic
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cooperation will be needed on such
topics as the rise of China, security and
development in the Arctic, and bilateral
trade and development. In all these
areas, the authors point out opportunities for the United States to advance its
strategic goals.
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
12
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
12
William Charles Korfmacher, “Cicero and
the bellum iustum,” Classical Bulletin 48, no. 4
(February 1972), 49–52; Silvia Clavadetscher-Thürlemann, “Polemon Dikaios und Bellum Iustum:
Versuch einer Ideengeschichte” (M.S. Ph.D. diss.,
University of Zurich, 1985), 127–130.
13
John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the
Theory of Just War (London: Continuum, 2006).
14
Immanuel Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden (Koenigsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795).
15
August Rühle von Lilienstern, “Vom
Kriege,” in Apologie des Krieges, 2nd ed. (1818; repr.
Vienna: Age d’homme-Karolinger, 1984).
16
August Rühle von Lilienstern, Handbuch
für den Offizier zur Belehrung im Frieden und zum
Gebrauch im Felde, vol. I, in The Strategy Makers,
trans. and ed. Beatrice Heuser, 171–190 (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC Clio/Praeger, 2010).
17
Polybius, The Histories, V.11, trans. W.R.
Paton, F.W. Walbank, and Christian Habicht
(Boston: Harvard University, 2011), 35.
18
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans.
George Bull (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin,
1961), 122.
19
Giacomo di Porcia, “Clarissimi viri . . . de re
militaris liber,” in The preceptes of Warre set forth
by James the Erle of Purlilia, trans. Peter Betham
(London: E. Whytchurche, 1544), chap. 66.
20
Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Seigneur de
Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le faict de la Guerre
extraictes des livres de Polybe, Frontin, Végèce, Cornazan, Machiavelle, in The Strategy Makers, 47.
21
Matthew Sutcliffe, “The Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes,” in The Strategy Makers,
69, 80.
22
Blaise Pascal, Pensées sur la Réligion et
d’autres sujets, published posthumously (Paris: G.
Desprez, 1669), item 103–298 (author’s translation).
The author is grateful to David Yost for having
drawn his attention to this and for his comments
on the article.
23
Paul Hay du Chastelet, “Traite de la Guerre,
ou Politique militaire, ” in The Strategy Makers, 111.
24
See “People & Events: General Curtis E.
LeMay (1906–1990),” American Experience,
available at <www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/
peopleevents/pandeAMEX61.html>.
25
Polybius, The Histories, V.11, 35.
26
Don Bernardino de Mendoza, “Theórica y
prática de guerra,” in The Strategy Makers, 97.
27
Marc Belissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt
national, 1713–1795 (Paris: Kimé, 1998).
28
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and
ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 75, 234.
29
Ibid., 80.
30
B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War
(London: Faber & Faber, 1944), 177.
31
Ibid., 47.
32
Emphasis added. The audio for this
speech is available at <www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xjuiMuvHojQ>.
33
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon:
Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 75.
34
Ibid., 76.
35
Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz
(London: Pimlico, 2002), 143–160.
36
Beatrice Heuser, “Victory in a Nuclear War?
A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and
Strategies,” Contemporary European History 7, no.
3 (November 1998), 311–328.
37
Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the
General Theory of Strategy (Sydney: Law Book
Company of Australasia, 1981). See also Richard
Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What Is Victory in
War? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).
38
Hankey.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
U.S. Air Force (Allen Stokes)
Senior Airman practices rifle fighting
techniques during Security Forces Combat
Readiness Training
ORGANIZATION THEORIES
Perspectives on Changing
National Security Institutions
By a n t H o n y J . D i B e l l a
Dr. Anthony J. DiBella is a Visiting Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior at the
College of William and Mary.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
13
FORUM | Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions
T
he study of national defense and
international security has long
been a core concern of political
scientists. International and
interstate security issues fall within a political
context of trends, public pressures, and global
interests. It is thus not surprising that when
it comes to the development and advocacy
of particular defense or security strategies,
the loudest, or at least the greatest number of
voices come from political scientists and not
from physicists, linguists, or cultural anthropologists. Yet as has been argued elsewhere,
the conduct of national security is more
about organization science; it is through the
institutions of national security that strategies are ultimately implemented and either
succeed or fail.1
It is one thing to conceive and articulate
a defense strategy or an approach to homeland security; it is quite another to implement
strategy through a complex web of national
and international security institutions and
organizations. While the Department of
Defense (DOD) may not be a business, as
some would suggest, it is an organization; but
unfortunately, business theory and organization theory are too often equated with one
another.2 Organization theory is about how
people every day come together to work for
some mutual purpose that in the process
creates private or public good.
Much as there is more than one theory
or school of thought to explain economic
systems, so too with organizations. One pertinent aspect of my years of teaching military
officers at a war college and civilian institutions of higher learning is their singular view
of what organizations are. Perhaps this is due
to the uniformity of thinking that military
training tends to foster, but I suspect it also
derives from a rather dated view of what organizations are and how they are best managed.
The focus of this article, then, is to explain
that organizations may be conceived of in a
variety of ways and that this diversity constitutes part of the difficulty in managing institutions of national security. Besides describing
various forms or perspectives of organization
theory, this article also considers the implications for successfully implementing new
defense strategies, especially in a globally
networked world. This capacity is essential
as defense leaders continue to confront new
global realities and defense challenges.
The genesis and pressures to alter
and adapt defense institutions come from
14
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
both internal and external sources. Internal
pressures are often caused from budgetary
constraints and shifts in prevailing doctrine
as advocated by different political parties.
External pressures have come from the effects
of globalization and the resultant rise in
terrorism or, as Samuel Huntington would
claim, the “clash of civilizations.”3 From
Organizations as Machines. For
thousands of years, the human species made
its livelihood outside the context of formal
organizations. Pre-agrarian and agrarian
societies were based on self-sufficiency and
independence. As civilization evolved, more
and more people earned their livelihoods
from and through formal organizations that
there is no one model of organizations, nor is there a universal
formula for running effective organizations
the buzzword of transformation during the
administration of George W. Bush (as articulated most clearly by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld) to the call for reform just
prior to and now during the administration of
President Barack Obama, there always seems
to be pressure on the defense establishment to
respond to new circumstances. This is probably why General Martin Dempsey explained
the latest push for reallocating defense expenditures as indicating the need for the military
to act more like “a learning organization.”4
To understand that concept requires some
minimal notion of how organizations have
been conceived. This article endeavors to shed
light on such perspectives and help formulate
thoughts about how DOD strategies, regardless of content, can be better implemented
through processes of organizational change.
Organization Theories and
Perspectives
If leading organizations effectively was
a matter of mechanics or science, there would
never be a weapons-procurement project that
went over budget, friendly fire accidents, or a
company that went out of business. All of us
have ideas about how organizations operate
and how they should function; there is no one
theory or model of organizations, nor is there
a universal formula for running or commanding effective organizations.
How mental images guide us was
elegantly examined by Kenneth Boulding
in The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society
(1956). More recently, Gareth Morgan used
images and metaphors to describe a range of
ways in which people think about organizations—as machines, organisms, cultures,
brains, and political systems.5 Each reflects
a way to understand organizations and has
implications for how we think organizations
can be changed or transformed.
were seen as means to some goal or end much
like tools or instruments. Individuals were
assigned specific roles or tasks, and the organization was looked at in terms of how these
pieces fit together like a machine.
Many early practices to manage formal
organizations originated in the military.
Inspired by the legions of the Roman army
and the mechanical inventions of his time,
Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740–1786)
is considered to have developed the modern
mechanistic army. This army is characterized by a rigid hierarchical structure and the
standardization of personnel and regulations.
The individual soldier (worker) had no identity apart from his particular role and was
subservient to the whole.
As machines require parts to function
and fit together, organizations need jobs to
be done and coordinated. The function of
management is to identify all those jobs and
ensure that people carry out their duties
as assigned. This orientation led to the
notion of “command and control.” Taken
to its extreme, supervisors direct or control
workers to behave in specific ways. Contributing to this orientation was Frederick
Taylor, considered the father of what came to
be known as scientific management. Taylor
thought that work should be studied and that
workers should merely follow what science
dictated they do to maximize efficiency.6 In
stable environments where organizational
goals and the means to achieve them are
unambiguous or remain unchanged over
time, efficiency derives from the routinization of work. However, the advantages of
this mechanistic approach to production
dissipate when new environmental demands
emerge (as in different stakeholder or adversarial challenges).
Viewing organizations as machines
means focusing on how well all the parts are
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DIBELLA
functioning. Are lines of responsibility and
communications clear and controlled? Are
rules and procedures followed? Do workers
(soldiers, sailors) know their jobs and are
they trained to do them? While reform may
suggest changes in how the machine operates,
transformation may imply shifts in what the
machine produces.
Organizations as Organisms. A
second metaphor for organizations relates to
what most of us know best as a functioning,
organic system: the human body. Its focal
point is not goals or a mission but needs
and metabolism. To maintain a functioning
body, we need certain inputs (water, food,
affection), and we need to adapt to our environment (if only to avoid getting too hot or
too cold). Organisms are systems comprised
of various parts, each of which may belong
to subsystems (for example, the heart and
spleen are parts of the body’s circulatory
system), and there are interdependencies
within and between subsystems. A failure
in one subsystem is apt to lead to failure in
another. Effectiveness is achieved through
the proper coordination and balance among
efficient subsystems.
As the environment changes, organizations adapt and the rate of change in the
internal organizational environment needs
to match the rate of change in the external
environment.7 In effect, internal design must
match external complexity. For example,
special operations forces are easier to deploy
and more adaptive to theater conditions than
larger conventional forces.
Even as the external environment constrains the growth of certain organizations,
it may similarly generate certain opportunities.8 For example, the development of the
Internet has spawned a new generation of
organizations (Amazon, Google, FaceBook,
YouTube) based on entirely new business
models. Of course, these developments
created new threats to our national security
and provided new tools for our adversaries,
but they have also given new life to military
forces that deal with asymmetric threats and
counterinsurgencies.
If we view national security organizations as organisms, then we need to acknowledge their subsystems and their needs, the
relationships among them, and the processes
that make the whole system work. Consideration should be given to how tightly or
loosely coupled the subsystems (for example,
military Services and combatant commands)
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are, their (inter)dependence, and degree of
differentiation. Transforming or reforming
the national security sector would suggest
changing the composition of its subsystems
and/or the relationships among them.9
Organizations as Political Systems. All
citizens in a democratic society have rights
to participate in the decisions that affect
them. What happens to those civic rights
when individuals enter the portal of their
workplaces? If individuals had the same set
of needs and wants, answering that question
would be easy. Unfortunately, the larger the
organization, the more it is apt to employ
individuals with different backgrounds,
educational levels, and financial needs.
The result is conflict between competing
needs and wants, from the manner in which
compensation is determined to the processes
whereby work is assigned.
In organizations, power and influence
come from a variety of sources and may be
vested in groups of individuals more than
with individuals per se. In some situations,
groups with shared interests form alliances
or participate in coalitions to expand their
influence even further. Labor unions, for
example, are a traditional way for individuals to assert their civic rights through the
power of numbers. However powerful
groups form, intergroup conflict may
promote helpful competition or destructive
adversarial relationships.
over civil-military (civ-mil) relations is based,
in part, on the issue of power and politics.
Transformation suggests change in that
relationship, but constitutional concerns constrain that possibility. If the current distribution of power within the national security
system is the cause and consequence of our
failure to reform or evolve that system, then
how can its key stakeholders produce the
reforms that are being advocated today?10
Organizations as Cultures. While
culture was traditionally used to explain
differences between whole societies, it has
also become a helpful construct to explain
why every organization is different in some
way. As organizations accrue experience and
resolve problems, they develop distinctive
ways of doing things. As cultures, organizations offer their members a framework for
shared meaning and the development of
common action. Culture provides stability
and comfort and can be a pathway or barrier
to change. Strong or rigid cultures are less apt
to respond effectively to internal or external
challenges. On the other hand, changes that
are consistent with dominant assumptions or
organizational values are readily accepted.
Culture as a system of meaning establishes boundaries between those who share
in the culture and those who do not. In that
sense, culture can be a source of differentiation or integration between those inside,
outside, or within the organization.11 An
the larger the organization, the more it is apt to employ
individuals with different backgrounds
Power can be used to gain control of
vital resources, set policy, determine organizational mission, and control technology.
Whether such control is directed toward
institutional or personal purposes will
depend on the ethical values of those with
power, the extent to which personal and institutional goals and objectives are aligned, and
the presence of checks and balances embodied in formalized rules and regulations. If
power is too diffuse, an organization faces
the risk that no one has enough influence to
make major decisions or get things done.
Transforming or reforming the national
security sector as a system of power suggests
altering the relative importance of its different constituencies or the processes whereby
decisions are made. The perpetual dialogue
organization needs mechanisms to acculturate new members and sustain itself when
members leave. For example, boot camp is a
defining experience for military personnel
since it transforms a raw recruit into a carrier
of a Service’s core culture.
If we view national security as a constellation of distinct cultures represented
by the differences between (and within)
military Services and civilian agencies, then
culture may be more of a force for fragmentation than integration. Yet if national
security professionals, military and civilian,
share some aspects of culture, reform can be
expedited if it is predicated on those shared
values. One key is understanding the valence
of values that promote commonality of
interests among stakeholders versus those
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FORUM | Perspectives on Changing National Security Institutions
that make them different. For example, all
Americans value individual freedom even
though they differ about how such freedom
can be ensured.
Organizations as Brains. Cognitive
functioning is an essential element in making
good decisions. In organizations, all sorts of
decisions need to be made, from the choice of
hiring criteria to selecting work assignments
to developing strategy. Organizations are
systems in which vast amounts of information and knowledge are processed and used
for a variety of purposes, not just decisionmaking. With the advent of computerized
information systems, contemporary organizations have an expanded capacity to process
and store knowledge. Yet choices still have to
be made about what knowledge needs to be
acquired or is worth retaining. Another issue
pertains to who will have access to what institutional knowledge and how that knowledge
is made available.
The metaphor of the brain implies
one central repository for knowledge and
information processing. However, holography suggests that brain functioning can
occur at multiple nodes or locations.12 In
effect, knowledge and the capacity to process
it can be replicated at different locations.
Organizations may have a central office or
headquarters, but if knowledge and knowledge processing is replicated elsewhere, then
decisions can be made closest to where their
impact will be felt. Information exchange has
been characterized as having the properties
of “stickiness” in that barriers to knowledge
flow and application can constrain the effectiveness of any system.13
If we view the national security system
as a collective brain, then its capabilities
would be represented by the information,
knowledge, and intelligence it acquires,
retains, disseminates, and uses. Transformation suggests changes in any one of these
processes or in the nature of the information itself. For example, today’s asymmetric
threats could be responded to more effectively if knowledge processing was handled
on a more localized basis with less dependence on the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency. An interagency approach
would consider how information processing
could best be coordinated across a diverse set
of organizational actors.14
16
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Other Views of What Organizations
Are (or Should Be)
Much as human experience evolves, so
too does the nature of organizations and our
perceptions of them. The following section
outlines some of the latest thinking about
what organizations are or need to become.
Organizations as Chaords. When
VISA International was established in the
1970s, it searched for a business model that
would help it operate in a diverse, fast-paced
environment in over 200 countries. Dee
Hock, its founder, coined the term chaordic
(chaos + order) to refer to any complex, selforganizing, self-governing, adaptive, nonlinear system.15 Hock believed that VISA needed
to be a chaordic organization, a system that
balanced the need for both flexibility and
stability. Effective organizational performance requires mechanisms to build a shared
culture while allowing for adaptation to local
circumstances and shifting environmental
demands. The breadth of U.S. national
security operations and the mix of functional
(military Services and civilian agencies) and
geographic units (regional combatant commands) reflects characteristics of chaords.
Organizations as Learning Systems.
In an article published in the Harvard Business Review in 1988, Arie DeGeus, former
chairman of Royal Dutch Shell, made the
claim that a company’s ability to learn may
be its own sustainable competitive advantage.
This insight was followed soon thereafter by
Peter Senge’s breakthrough book The Fifth
Discipline, and the search for the learning
organization was on.16 However, subsequent
research has suggested that all organizations,
including the military, are learning systems.17
This view suggests that transformation
requires changing learning capabilities to
meet current security challenges. Of course,
time marches on, and now we are much more
apt to hear about “learning cultures” than
“learning organizations.” That may make
General Dempsey’s statement a bit dated, but
it is certainly more contemporary than other
views of what DOD is or should become. The
need for continuous learning is also a capacity fundamental to counterinsurgency, as
often expressed by General David Petraeus,
its key architect.18
Organizations as Networks. In classical theory, organizations are configured
and designed with particular attention to the
vertical relationships between operational
units (line functions) and administrative
units (staff functions). In contrast, today’s
networked organizations focus on horizontal
relationships and independent action. By
emphasizing the latter, organizational architects enable decisionmaking at the periphery
(cells or nodes) of an organization by
deemphasizing the power of a central office
whose chief focus becomes coordination
rather than control.19
Transforming our national security
system as a network would require changing the number or nature of nodes in that
network and the relationships between
them.20 That sort of transformation has
already been promoted in the private sector.21
The term network-centric warfare encapsulates this view within military operations.22
Each of the brief depictions presented
so far offers one way to understand national
security organizations, and each has implications for transformation or reform in the
national security sector and how it can be
expedited. Table 1 lists each of the eight
metaphors and their associated goal or focal
point. For example, the key issue or concern
in a machine is efficiency, while for an organism it is stability.
Table 1. Organizational Theory Images
Image
Goal/Focus
Machine
Achieving maximum eficiency
Organism
Maintaining stability
Political System
Gaining control
Culture
Propagating values
Brain
Storing and accessing knowledge
Chaord
Balancing integration and differentiation
Learning Organization
Self-realization
Network
Distributed resources and command
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DIBELLA
The Challenge of Ongoing Change in
Military Affairs
A major dilemma for DOD is that
it is faced with managing a continuous
process to integrate new technologies, all
the way from the slingshot of Biblical days
to the drone aircraft of today. That process
often requires fundamental changes in how
military personnel think about and execute
strategy. Even as the technology of battle
evolves, and with it the organizational
structures that support it, so does the role
of the military in society. With the recent
trend toward democratization, especially in
the Middle East, the challenge of reform is
not a matter of simply integrating new technologies but adapting the military to the
current environment of political realities. In
discussing the prerequisites for democracy
today, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
acknowledge the historical revolution in
military affairs in Multitude.23 In doing
so, they point out that military reform is
guided by historical theories of war and
battle, but there is a shortage of theory or
guiding principles when considering how
to manage the military’s evolving role in
today’s democratic societies.24
This shortcoming is exacerbated by the
capacity to see and understand organizations
in the multiple ways already described. When
it comes to changing organizations, individuals also have different views about what
change is, whether it is classified as transformational, incremental, or reform, and how it
can be managed or achieved. Theories on the
processes of organizational change have been
characterized as four types: lifecycle, evolution, dialectic, and teleology.25 Table 2 shows
how various characteristics of the theories
described above match up against these four
types of change theory.
Lifecycle theories focus on stage
development based on changes caused
by organic growth. Whether prompted
by external or environmental change or
internal factors, change is an inevitable
outcome of time and experience. Change
processes are linear and irreversible.
Change may also be framed as teleology guided by a desirable result, outcome,
or purpose. How an entity moves or
changes and progresses toward that result
is not preordained through some prescriptive set of steps. Goals may shift over time
prompting new periods of change, reform,
or transformation.
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Table 2. Types of Images with Characteristics
Type
Image
Lever
Progress
Evolution
- Machine
Adaptation
Cumulative
Growth over time
Linear stages
- Brain
Lifecycle
- Organism
- Culture
Dialectic
- Political
System
Conlict
Synthesis
Teleology
- Chaord
Collaboration
Movement toward
- Learning
Organization
goal
- Network
One commonly understood change
process is evolution. Much as it has been used
to describe the development of species, it can
be used to classify organizational change.
The evolutionary cycle of change is precipitated by the competition for resources and
the adaptation between internal and external
characteristics. Change is cumulative and
progressive as organizations become more
adapted and less adaptable.
A fourth and final type of change
theory is dialectic based on the Hegelian
notion of ongoing conflict between thesis
and antithesis leading to synthesis. As the
relative power of organizational actors shifts
and arguments for one thesis or another
win out, the opportunity for change arises.
Conflict resolution begets change, but the
outcome may lead to worsening rather than
improved performance.
Implications
Changing or reforming our national
security apparatus is an imposing challenge
given this theoretical potpourri. On the one
hand, there are theories about what organizations are, and on the other there is a typology
about how and why organizations change.
Yet as shown in table 2, there is some correspondence between the two. For example,
for organisms and cultures, change is linear
and prompted by developmental growth that
is characteristic of lifecycle theories.
Developing implications from these
theoretical orientations for implementing
change might best proceed via a series of
questions. First, when you think of some
branch of the military, what images arise
in your mind and how do those images
shape your thinking about one Service
versus another? If military organizations
are cultures, then how do the protocols in
the military reflect fundamental cultural
assumptions? The role of DOD has been to
take action to deter our foes or, failing that,
to wage war against them. Nowadays, the
military is being asked to serve as “nationbuilders,” which can be viewed as transformational, compared to the image of the
military as a “warfighting machine.”
The closer a military command is to the
field of execution, the greater the concern for
efficiency and machine-like or mechanisticlike functioning. However, the greater the
role of the command in the development of
strategy, the more organic-like its features
must be. Once a war starts, it is impossible to
know what course it will take and what the
results will be. That need, to acknowledge
how ambiguity will always be an element of
military operations, is what Robert NcNamara conveyed with his “fog of war” metaphor.26 Unfortunately, at the highest levels of
strategy formulation, the drive to eliminate
uncertainty can lead to incorrect inferences.
Winning wars may take precision to
put ordnance on a target with fixed GPS
coordinates, but many demands placed on
our national security apparatus require
working with and within a shifting environment. Organic rather than mechanistic
metaphors or images would seem better
suited for these challenges. That perhaps is
one of the key reasons for the introduction of
network-centric warfare into the battlespace.
What remains to be seen is how such an
approach can mesh with or within traditional
command and control structures.
Ensuring national security today
requires interagency operations, or what has
been referred to as a whole-of-government
approach.27 Reform requires not only changing
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individual organizations but also changing
a network of organizations and the relationships between them. That requirement is
bound to be difficult when our network of
national security organizations seems like
an organized anarchy.28 As suggested by
change theories based on teleology, progress
can be made by slow movement toward the
are decentralized or embedded in a network
structure?31 As J.M. Kreighbaum suggests,
DOD needs to free itself from policies that
reinforce mechanistic metaphors or images of
its organization.32
When civilians enter the military,
they are trained (some might say socialized)
to execute orders and not ask questions.
the change process should not be to reach development stages
but to enable incremental steps
whole-of-government approach currently
advocated. The change process should not
be to reach development stages but to enable
incremental steps.
For example, it is one thing for the U.S.
Army to support a battalion or brigade in a
specific theater of war, but it is quite another
to manage a joint command or an organization based at the Pentagon or nested in a
coalition. The more diverse the set of organizations involved in some coalition, the more
difficult it is to coordinate them. However,
the ease of using common images to compare
and contrast organizations demonstrates
that organizations do have a lot in common.
Perhaps when Arthur Cebrowski explained
transformation in terms of changes in beliefs,
attitudes, and cognition, he referred to the
ability to work with different types of organizations simultaneously.29
In a speech at the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, former Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated that “in order to
succeed in the asymmetric battlefields of the
21st century—the dominant combat environment in the decades to come, in my view—
our Army will require leaders of uncommon
agility, resourcefulness, and imagination;
leaders willing and able to think and act
creatively and decisively in a different kind of
world, in a different kind of conflict than we
have prepared for the last six decades.”30
Metaphoric thinking is a way to
promote creativity and understand national
security organizations (and those of our
adversaries) from multiple perspectives.
This is not to promote or advocate for any
one perspective but to incorporate multiple
perspectives into our mental models. If
our generals view (and treat) our military
Services as machines, how can we effectively
respond to asymmetric threats and adversaries whose command and control functions
18
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Execution is expedited when assumptions
are not challenged or tested, and that is a
good thing when one is facing an adversary
ready to kill him. The training that military personnel receive to standardize their
responses to combat situations creates a
uniformity of mental models and constrains
seeing the world from multiple perspectives.
Uniformity of thinking is more justifiable at
the tactical level, but at the strategic or flag
officer level, it is counterproductive. If all staff
officers within a command think alike, their
commander has to work with redundancy.
The question remains as to what images
will best fit national security organizations in
an age that contains both evolving asymmetric threats and the potential for traditional
threats. Do we shift from a machine to a
network or do we alter the properties of the
machine? Either way generates change, but
one could argue that only the former represents true transformation. The larger question is how we make such a transformation.
Given the political context of our national
security apparatus, a dialectic framing of the
task ahead seems appropriate. That means
enlarging our capacity to resolve conflict.
While the Project on National Security
Reform provided a vision of where we need to
go, the challenge remains how to get there.33
In our pluralistic society governed by a political system comprised of checks and balances,
radical and discontinuous change is highly
unlikely. Perhaps military transformation
sounds too daunting a task so we no longer
hear of it. Although reforming national security seems more palatable and less challenging, it remains on the periphery.
The key takeaway from this article
should be a recognition that much as there
is more than one mindset about warfare and
how to beat the enemy (as typified by the
classical thinkers Carl von Clausewitz and
Lao Tzu), so too are there multiple ways to
think about organizations. To what extent are
military and national security leaders aware
of the organizational images they carry and
their implications? What models, paradigms,
or theories do they hold with regard to how
such organizations are changed? When
senior DOD managers think about and run
their operations like a military machine, it
should not come as a surprise when they do
not operate that way. The bureaucratic nature
of a public organization such as the Pentagon
provides a sharp contrast with command and
control operations in the field of battle.
Both the opacity and multiplicity of
organization theory contribute to the challenge of working in an interagency or joint
environment. It is best to recognize that in
those contexts military leaders and civilian
managers will have diverse and potentially
contradictory views about what organizations
are and how they can be changed. Many of
us are barely aware of our own theories much
less those held by our counterparts who lead
other organizations in an interagency or joint
context. JFQ
The author thanks Dr. J. Douglas Orton for
his comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of this article.
NOTES
1
Steven Kelman, “Organization Studies and
Public Administration,” in The Academy of Management Annals, ed. James P. Walsh and Arthur
Brief, 225–267 (New York: Routledge, 2007); James
D. Orton with Christopher J. Lamb, “Interagency
National Security Teams: Can Social Science Contribute?” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011), 47–64.
2
Milan Vego, “Is the Conduct of War a Business?” Joint Force Quarterly 59 (4th Quarter 2010),
57–65.
3
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2007).
4
Interview on Face the Nation, January 8,
2012.
5
Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1986); Creative Organization Theory: A Resourcebook (Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, 1989); and Imaginization: New Mindsets
for Seeing, Organizing, and Managing (Newbury
Park, CA: Sage, 1997).
6
Frederick E. Taylor, Principles of Scientific
Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1911).
ndup res s . ndu. edu
DIBELLA
7
Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch,
Organization and Environment (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967).
8
For information on the field of population
ecology, see Michael T. Hannan and John H.
Freeman, “The Population Ecology of Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977),
929–964.
9
James R. Locher, “National Security Reform:
A Prerequisite for Successful Complex Operations,” PRISM 1, no. 1 (December 2009), 77–86.
10
Ibid.
11
Donna Winslow, “Military Organization
and Culture from Three Perspectives: The Case
of Army,” in Social Sciences and the Military: An
Interdisciplinary Overview, ed. Giuseppe Caforio,
67–88 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
12
Ken Wilber, ed., The Holographic Paradigm
and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the Leading Edge
of Science (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 1982).
13
Gabriel Szulanski and Rossella Cappetta,
“Stickiness: Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Predicting Difficulties in the Transfer of Knowledge
within Organizations,” in The Blackwell Handbook
of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, ed. Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie
A. Lyles, 513–534 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
14
Locher.
15
Dee Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age (San
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000).
16
See Arie P. DeGeus, “Planning as Learning,”
Harvard Business Review, March–April, 1988,
70–74; and Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The
Art and Practice of the Learning Organization
(New York: Doubleday, 1990).
17
Anthony J. DiBella, “Can the Army Become
a Learning Organization? A Question Re-Examined,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010),
117–122.
18
Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
19
Marc S. Gerstein, “From Machine Bureaucracies to Networked Organizations: An Architectural Journey,” in Organizational Architecture,
ed. David A. Nadler, 11–38 (San Francisco: JosseyBass, 1992).
20
Erik J. de Waard and Joseph Soeters, “How
the Military Can Profit from Management and
Organization Science,” in Social Sciences and
the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview, ed.
Giuseppe Caforio, 181–196 (New York: Routledge,
2007).
21
C.K. Prahalad and H. Bhattacharyya,
“Twenty Hubs and No HQ,” strategy+business
enews, February 26, 2008, 1–6, available at <www.
strategy-business.com/article/08102?pg=all>.
22
David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and
Frederick P. Stein, Network-centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd
ed. (Washington, DC: DoD C4ISR Cooperative
Research Program, 2000).
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
23
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire
(New York: Penguin, 2004).
24
Ibid., 47.
25
Andrew H. van de Ven and Marshall Scott
Poole, “Explaining Development and Change in
Organizations,” Academy of Management Review
20 (1995), 510–540.
26
James G. Blight, The Fog of War: Lessons
from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
27
Locher.
28
Michael D. Cohen and James G. March,
Leadership and Ambiguity, 2nd ed. (Boston:
Harvard Business School, 1986).
29
Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Transforming Transformation,” Transformation Trends (Arlington,
VA: Office of Force Transformation, April 19,
2004).
30
Robert M. Gates, speech delivered at the U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, NY, April 21, 2008.
31
Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters,
“Managing Militarily,” Armed Forces & Society 35
(2009), 307–322.
32
Jay M. Kreighbaum, Busting DoD Bureaucracy: Creating Fundamental Change by Leveraging
Concepts and Practices from the Private Sector
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002).
33
Project on National Security Reform
(PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC:
PNSR, December 2008).
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Perspectives, No. 13
The New NATO
Policy Guidelines on
Counterterrorism:
Analysis,
Assessments, and
Actions
By Stefano
Santamato with
Marie-Theres
Beumler
On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time
in its history, invoked the Article 5 collective
defense clause after terrorist attacks on the
United States. In the 11 years since, NATO used
a pragmatic approach to fight terrorism, but the
impact of this approach was mitigated by the lack
of an agreed policy defining NATO’s rightful
place among counterterrorism actors. It was not
until May 2012 that NATO agreed on a policy to
define its role and mandate in countering terrorism. In this study, the authors review the evolution of the terrorist threat, NATO’s response,
and the new policy guidelines themselves, which
focus on NATO’s strengths of intelligencesharing, capacity-building, special operations,
training, and technology. But the guidelines
are only a necessary first step. The challenge is
to define an Action Plan to implement them.
Toward this end, the authors recommend six
cross-cutting proposals: apply net assessment,
develop counterterrorism strategic communications, establish a homeland security constituency
in NATO, promote a border security initiative,
develop a “functional” counterterrorism partnership framework, and contribute to the Global
Counterterrorism Forum.
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
19
FORUM | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community
President Obama departs evening campaign
rally in Dubuque, Iowa, November 3, 2012
The White House (Pete Souza)
GOLDCORP CROWDSOURCING
An Industry Best Practice for the
Intelligence Community?
By J e s s e r o y W i l s o n
Jesse Roy Wilson is a Defense Intelligence Agency Senior Intelligence Officer with U.S.
Central Command in Tampa, Florida. He is currently working on a Master’s degree at the
National Intelligence University in Washington, DC.
20
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndup res s . ndu. edu
WILSON
A
growing number of businesses
use crowdsourcing—that is,
they outsource tasks to people
outside the organization1—in
a way that harnesses the capabilities and
knowledge of external individuals on a mass
scale to create innovative solutions. This
article describes how Goldcorp, Incorporated, an international gold-mining company
on the brink of collapse, used crowdsourcing
via the Internet to turn its business around.
The article then explores some challenges and
successes behind crowdsourcing initiatives
and offers crowdsourcing as an approach
with applicability for the Intelligence Community (IC).
McEwen wondered if he could use the same
model with the gold mine.
Back at Goldcorp, McEwen pitched his
idea to take “all of our geology, all the data we
have that goes back to 1948, and put it into
a file and share it with the world . . . [and]
ask the world to tell us where we’re going to
find the next six million ounces of gold.”4 He
experienced some resistance. For example,
the information that McEwen wanted to
Goldcorp
make public was proprietary. A mining
company had never made this information
public before.5 Second, the geologists were
concerned how the message would reflect
on their reputations, which essentially told
everyone—including their competitors—that
they were unable to find the gold. Nevertheless, McEwen prevailed, and in March 2000
he launched the “Goldcorp Challenge,” the
world’s first Internet gold rush.6
The idea was simple. The company
posted its entire repository of information
on the 55,000-acre Red Lake property on its
Web site and offered $575,000 to participants
with the best methods and estimates. More
than 1,000 participants from 50 countries
registered for the challenge with submissions
coming from graduate students, consultants,
mathematicians, physicists, and military
officers. “There were capabilities I had never
seen before in the industry,” stated McEwen.
Contestants identified 110 potential sites, half
of which were new to the company, and 80
percent of them yielded substantial quantities
of gold, eventually totaling 8 million ounces.
The company estimates that the challenge
saved 3 years of exploration time, and in 2001
revenues increased 170 percent, cash flow
grew 1,180 percent, and profits soared from
$2 million to $52 million.7
The company awarded the top four
“virtual explorers” a shared prize of $325,000,
and 25 semifinalists prizes totaled $250,000.8
As Wikinomics ends its story about Goldcorp:
In Wikinomics, Don Tapscott, a
Canadian business executive and one of
Thinkers50’s most influential management
thinkers, works with coauthor Anthony D.
Williams to describe how Goldcorp turned
its struggling 1950s gold-mining company
into a multimillion dollar success.2 Headquartered in Vancouver, British Columbia,
Goldcorp employs 14,000 people who operate
10 mines in Canada, the United States,
Mexico, and Central and South America. In
the 1990s, the company was struggling with
high production costs, debt, and strikes. The
new chief executive officer, Rob McEwen,
was new to the gold-mining business, serving
previously as a young mutual fund manager
at Merrill Lynch.3 Goldcorp analysts projected the death of a 50-year-old mine in Red
Lake, Ontario. Without discovery of new gold
deposits, the company seemed likely to go
down with it.
McEwen held an emergency meeting
with his geologists and made the decision
to send them with $10 million to find gold
on the Red Lake property. Weeks later, the
geologists returned with good news. They
had discovered gold deposits; however, they
were unable to estimate the value and determine the exact location of the gold. During a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology conference in 1999, McEwen listened intently to
a presentation on the production of the Linux
computer operating system using volunteer
software developers to “crowdsource” its
development over the Internet. The company’s chief architect and software engineer,
Linus Torvalds, disclosed the company’s software code publically so anonymous developers could review it and make improvements.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
and capability. In doing so he stumbled successfully into the future of innovation, business, and how wealth and just about everything else will be created. Welcome to the new
world of wikinomics where collaboration on
a mass scale is set to change every institution
in society.9
Like Goldcorp, the Intelligence Community could embrace crowdsourcing
the company posted its entire repository of
information on its Web site and offered $575,000 to
participants with the best methods
McEwen . . . realized the uniquely qualified
minds to make new discoveries were probably
outside the boundaries of his organization,
and by sharing some intellectual property he
could harness the power of collective genius
to tap into the knowledge and expertise
outside of its boundaries when appropriate. To explore this possibility, we need to
understand how crowdsourcing works and
its benefits and risks.
Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing is a portmanteau that
refers to outsourcing tasks from within an
organization to people outside the organization.10 The term originated in 2006 from a
Wired magazine article in which Jeff Howe
modified the term outsourcing to describe a
business model using the Internet workforce
without the need for a traditional outsourcing company.11 A variety of other terms are
used to describe similar activity, such as open
access, open innovation, open source, and
collective intelligence. Over the last decade,
a number of successful companies have
incorporated this approach. Proctor and
Gamble uses crowdsourcing to support up to
50 percent of its innovations, helping produce
such products as Mr. Clean Magic Eraser and
Pringles Prints.12 Other examples include
Affinnova, Amazon, Bell Canada’s I.D.ah!,
Delicious, Dell’s IdeaStorm, Digg, Goldcorp,
Google, IBM, InnoCentive, Kimberly Clark,
Kraft, LG Electronics, ManyEyes, Marketocracy, Reckitt Benckiser, Salesforce.com’s Idea
Exchange, Swivel, Threadless, and Unilever.13
A key difference, however, between crowdsourcing and open innovation in general is
that crowdsourcing typically uses some kind
of incentive or reward for the work.14
The most well-known crowdsourcing
Web site is Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.15
The site gives businesses and developers
access to 250,000 on-demand workers.
Requestors post jobs and workers choose
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
21
U.S. Coast Guard (Ayla Kelley)
FORUM | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community
Admiral Thad Allen provides a briefing to the Unified Area Command in New Orleans in response to BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
the jobs they want for the money offered.
One highly cited example was the attempt
to use Mechanical Turk to find the crash
site of American entrepreneur and aviator
Steve Fossett, who went missing in his plane
between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and
the Nevada desert. Although the effort did
not find the crash site, an estimated 50,000
people looked for Fossett’s plane by reviewing two million snapshots of commercial
imagery covering 17,000 square miles.16
Wikipedia, the world’s largest encyclopedia,
is another example of crowdsourcing. It has
over four million articles (and growing)
produced, edited, and reviewed by volunteers. Their reward is simply the satisfaction
that their work is instantly available to the
world. Tara Behrend, an organizational
sciences professor at The George Washington University, states that one unrealized
benefit of using crowdsourcing over the
Internet for research is the potential to
reach a wider and more diverse audience to
solve a common research challenge.17
There is a growing interest in harnessing crowds to tap the collective intelligence
of the masses, experts and nonexperts alike,
to forecast events. Known as prediction
markets, these initiatives typically pose
time-bound questions or statements (for
example, Barack Obama’s 2012 reelection)
to users in a market, allowing individuals to
buy and sell contracts based on what they
believe will happen.18 The idea of dilettantes
beating experts in certain situations has
some merit. Phillip Tetlock, a professor
22
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
at the University of California Berkeley,
used his seminal Expert Political Judgment
to publish 20 years of research on human
prediction capabilities, using more than
20,000 forecasts. His research concludes
that experts have no more forecasting skill
than nonexperts. The best forecasters were
moderate along the ideological spectrum,
skeptical of grand schemes, and more likely
to consider contradictory evidence and
hypotheses and hedge on their probabilities
when making bets.19
Challenges
The director of innovation and policy
at the European branch of RAND, Joanna
Chataway, stated, “We have seen plenty of
anecdotal evidence that crowdsourcing can
work, but there has been little research into
how and where it works best.”20 Indeed, organizations must use caution when launching
crowdsourcing initiatives to ensure that they
do not harm the image of the company and
that they strike the right balance between
diversity and expertise, offer the right incentives, and determine up front who has intellectual rights over the information.21
For example, the coach of a Finnish
soccer club crowdsourced the recruitment
of players and game tactics to the team’s
fans via cell phone voting.22 The season
ended in disaster and the owners fired the
coach. James Euchner, a vice president at
Goodyear, argues that many online crowdsourcing initiatives are underdeveloped and
unsuccessful.23 For instance, during the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, public
and private parties launched Web sites and
wikis to garner ideas from the public about
how to stop the oil flowing from the sea
floor. Volunteers submitted approximately
20,000 suggestions on the United States
Deepwater Horizon Unified Command Web
site.24 However, as Euchner points out, most
of the submissions were “notional” and
lacked real potential. Moreover, it required
vast resources to weed through all the
information.
Although there are challenges to
crowdsourcing, there are certain conditions
that make success more likely. As we saw
with Goldcorp and Mechanical Turk, given
the right circumstances, companies can
accomplish more by opening their work to
the masses than relying only on company
workers. In The Wisdom of Crowds, James
Surowiecki provides four conditions that
enable the aggregate decisions of large groups
to make better judgments than experts:
■■ diversity
of opinion
(avoids groupthink)
■■ decentralization (so individuals can
draw on local and tacit knowledge)
■■ aggregation (using a mechanism to
turn individual information into collective
judgments).25
■■ independence
The Finnish soccer fans, for example, likely
lacked the diversity of opinion and tacit
knowledge required to determine recruitment or game tactics.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
WILSON
Like Goldcorp, the Intelligence Community (IC) deals with sensitive information
and challenging problems. IC assessments
establish what is known, unknown, and
where developments might be heading. The
IC continues to monitor traditional issues
such as the capabilities and intentions of
nation-states, but it is now responsible for
assessing a growing number of nontraditional topics, such as health threats, resource
scarcity, and even global climate change.26
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for Analysis and National Intelligence Council (NIC) Chairman Thomas
Fingar points to the expanding issues in IC
threat assessments as evidence of the expanding agenda.27 For example, the IC’s 1996
Annual Threat Assessment covered China,
North Korea, Russia, Iran, a few unstable
states, terrorism, proliferation, narcotics,
crime, and economics.28 In 2012, however, the
threat assessment included all of the above
intelligence topics plus an extended list of
unstable nations, countries in our own hemisphere (Mexico, Cuba, and Haiti), the Arab
Spring, tense relationships between countries
in various regions, space, water security,
health threats, and natural disasters.29
Two trends make crowdsourcing via
the Internet an attractive option for the IC.
First, as exemplified by NIC assessments on
global trends,30 many of the new intelligence
topics (and their sources, methods, and
judgments) are unclassified and less sensitive
than traditional political and military related
topics. Thus, classification restrictions are
minimal. Second, the required knowledge
and expertise on these issues are not typically
available through the traditional intelligence
disciplines (human, signals, and geospatial)
and exist outside the IC in academia, nongovernmental organizations, and business.
In 2007, the DNI published a directive
on analytic outreach, defined as the “open,
overt, and deliberate act of an IC analyst
engaging with an individual outside the IC
to explore ideas and alternative perspectives,
gain new insights, generate new knowledge,
or obtain new information.”31 Acknowledging the need for the IC to expand its knowledge base and share burdens, the new policy
directs analysts to tap outside expertise, IC
elements to establish an analytic outreach
coordinator, and the IC to use outside experts
whenever possible. The preparation of the
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
2008 NIC report Global Trends 2025 included
American and non-American contributions
through conferences, commissioned studies,
and for the first time through a special Web
site to allow comments on drafts.32
Embracing expertise wherever it resides
is an increasing requirement. Just in the
last year, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency launched a crowdsourcing challenge to build an amphibious tank,
offering $1 million.33 However, the IC has not
attempted a crowdsourcing effort of its own.
Building on the DNI directive on analytic
outreach and the work of Global Trends
2025, the IC could conduct a pilot program
and crowdsource an intelligence problem to
the world over the Internet. It could identify
existing outreach initiatives and establish a
framework to clear certain intelligence topics
for public crowdsourcing initiatives. Like
Goldcorp, the DNI or NIC would review
agency proposals and host the Internet site to
pose intelligence challenges with some type
of incentive or reward. Contestants would
register so the IC could establish contacts and
address any counterintelligence concerns.
Goldcorp and a growing number of
business industries have successfully harnessed the power of crowdsourcing to enlarge
their pool of talent and create innovative
solutions. The DNI directive and NIC report
are a step in the right direction. Globalization
will likely continue to drive economic, political, and social tension, thus it is only natural
for decisionmakers to have more questions
on more issues and to direct those questions
to the IC. Given the right circumstances
and intelligence issues, the IC can adopt this
industry best practice to take advantage of
the talent, expertise, and knowledge available
across the globe to solve some of the most
perplexing problems related to U.S. national
security, generating additional capacity to
deliver decision advantage to the Nation’s
policymakers. JFQ
NOTES
1
Adapted from Clare Sansom, “The Power of
Many,” Nature Biotechnology 29, no. 3 (2011), 201.
A portmanteau is a combination of two or more
words into one new word.
2
Unless referenced otherwise, this section
relies on Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams,
Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes
Everything (New York: Penguin Group, 2010),
7–10.
3
Linda Tischler, “He Struck Gold on the
Net (Really),” Fast Company, May 31, 2002,
available at <www.fastcompany.com/44917/
he-struck-gold-net-really>.
4
Tapscott and Williams, 8.
5
Goldcorp, Inc., “Announcement: Fast
Company Selects Goldcorp as a Fast 50 Champion
of Innovation,” February 18, 2002, available at
<www.robmcewen.com/award/pdf/4.pdf>.
6
Ibid.
7
See Wikinvest, “Goldcorp,” available at <www.wikinvest.com/stock/
Wikimedia Commons (Chuhern Hwang)
Applicability to the Intelligence
Community
Ritter Range of Sierra Nevada Mountains in California,
site of Steve Fossett’s plane crash
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
23
FORUM | Crowdsourcing for the Intelligence Community
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Forum 279
By E. Richard Downes
August 2012
Strategic Forum
National Defense
University
About the Author
Dr. E. Richard Downes,
Lt Col,
USAF (Ret.), is an
Independent
Researcher who
has previously
served as a Brazil
Desk Oficer on
the Joint Staff
and Associate Dean
of Academics at
the Center for
Hemispheric Defense
Studies.
Key Points
◆■ As Brazil’s power
and international standing grow,
so does the
importance to the
United States of
a close relationship
with Brazil.
◆■ Among emerging
powers,
politically and culturally Brazil is
the closest to the United
States. For this
South American
neighbor, defense
technology has
become a critical
aspect of strategic
reorientation
and force modernizatio
U.S. defense technology,n. Sharing
including
know-how, would
strengthen U.S.Brazil relations.
◆■ The two nations
have taken initial
steps to strengthen
defense relations, including
the 2010
Cooperation Agreement Defense
irst U.S.-Brazil Defense and the
Cooperation Dialogue.
◆■ Full implementat
ion of 2010 agreements, pursuit of
a shared vision of
deeper defense
cooperation, and
development of
a bilateral plan to
advance the transfer
of defense
technology (and
know-how) based
on Brazil’s National
Defense Strategy can improve
defense collaboration and provide
each country with
important beneits.
Trust, Engagemen
t,
Technology Trans and
fer:
Underpinnings for
U.S.-Brazil
Defense Cooperatio
n
by E. Richard Downes
O
n the eve of the January
1, 2011, inauguration
of Brazilian President
Dilma Roussef, the
State Department
noted that the United
“is committed to deepening
States
our relationship on
eral, regional and
a wide range of bilatglobal issues with
Brazil’s government
and people.” President
Roussef herself declared
shortly thereafter,
“We will preserve
relationship with the
and deepen the
United States.” During
President Barack Obama’s
2011 visit to Brazil,
March
both leaders cited “the
progress achieved on
2010” and stated their
defense issues in
commitment to “follow
up on the established
this area, primarily
dialogue in
on new opportunities
for cooperation.” While
cal commitments are
these rhetoriimportant, will they
lead to greater cooperation
issues and improve
on defense
U.S.-Brazil ties?
he established dialogue
on defense is part
of a movement toward
U.S.-Brazil defense
greater
cooperation. On April
12, 2010, U.S. Defense
Robert Gates and
Secretary
Brazil’s Defense Minister
Nelson Jobim initialed
Defense Cooperation
the irst
Agreement between
the two nations in
endorsed multiple
over 25 years. It
interactions already
under way between
it also broadened
both militaries, but
the scope of potential
cooperation. he agreement
cooperation related
endorsed
to defense technology
including research
(R&D), logistics support,
and development
technology security,
military systems and
acquisition of defense
equipment,
products and services,
and the sharing of
defense technology
operational and
experiences. he agreement
also called for the
of commercial initiatives
“facilitation
related to defense
matters” and cooperation
mentation and development
on “impleof programs and
projects on defense
applications.” In November
technology
2010, Gates and Jobim
signed a second accord,
a
As Brazil’s power and
international standing
grow, so does the importance to the United States of a close relationship
with Brazil. Among emerging powers, Brazil
is politically and culturally the closest to the
United States. For this South American neighbor, defense technology has become a critical
aspect of strategic reorientation and force
modernization. According to author E. Richard
Downes, sharing U.S. defense technology,
including know-how, would strengthen U.S.Brazil relations.
The two nations have taken initial steps to
strengthen defense relations, including the 2010
Defense Cooperation Agreement and the first
U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Dialogue. Full
implementation of 2010 agreements, pursuit
of a shared vision of deeper defense cooperation, and development of a bilateral plan to
advance the transfer of defense technology (and
knowhow) based on Brazil’s National Defense
Strategy can improve defense collaboration and
provide each country with important benefits.
www.ndu.edu/inss
SF No. 279
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
24
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
1
CENTER FOR STRATEg
IC RESEARC H
Trust, Engagement, and
Technology Transfer:
Underpinnings for
U.S.-Brazil Defense
Cooperation
Goldcorp_%28GG%29/Data/Gross_Profit/1999/
Q4>; and Goldcorp, Inc.
8
“US$575,000 Goldcorp Challenge Awards
World’s First 6 Million Ounce Internet Gold Rush
Yields High Grade Results!” 2001 Prospectors
and Developers Association of Canada Conference, Toronto, Canada, Infomine.com, March 12,
2001, available at <www.infomine.com/index/pr/
Pa065434.PDF>.
9
Tapscott and Williams, 10.
10
Adapted from Sansom.
11
Jeff Howe, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,”
Wired (June 2006), available at <www.wired.com/
wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html>.
12
Paul Sloane, “The Brave New World of Open
Innovation,” Strategic Direction 27, no. 5 (2011), 3.
13
List adapted from Sloane; and Eric
Bonabeau, “Decisions 2.0: The Power of Collective
Intelligence,” MIT Sloan Management Review 50,
no. 2 (Winter 2009), 46.
14
Sansom.
15
Tara S. Behrend et al., “The Viability of
Crowdsourcing for Survey Research,” Behavior
Research Methods 43, no. 3 (2011), 802.
16
See Steve Friess, “50,000 Volunteers Join
Distributed Search for Steve Fossett,” Wired,
September 11, 2007, available at <www.wired.
com/software/webservices/news/2007/09/
distributed_search>.
17
Behrend et al.
18
See, for example, Intrade, available at <www.
intrade.com/v4/home/>. For background on
examples in business that have predicted circumstances accurately, see Aleksandar Ivanov, “Using
Prediction Markets to Harness Collective Wisdom
for Forecasting,” Journal of Business Forecasting
(Fall 2009), 9–14.
19
Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment:
How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005), chapters 2–3, 5.
20
Sansom.
21
Bonabeau.
22
Ibid.
23
James A. Euchner, “The Limits of Crowds,”
Research Technology Management 53, no. 5 (2010),
7–8.
24
Ibid., 7.
25
James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds:
Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How
Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies,
Societies, and Nations (New York: Doubleday,
2004).
26
For example, compare Director of Central
Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
by the Director of Central Intelligence, John M.
Deutch,” February 22, 1996, available at <www.cia.
gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1996/
dci_speech_022296.html>, with Director of
National Intelligence, “Unclassified Statement for
the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment
of the US IC for the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence,” February 2, 2012, available
at <www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Testimonies/20120202_testimony_wta.pdf>.
27
Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2011), 27.
28
Director of Central Intelligence.
29
Director of National Intelligence.
30
See, for example, National Intelligence
Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
World (Washington, DC: NIC, November 2008),
available at <www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Global%20Trends_2025%20Report.pdf>.
31
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Directive
Number 205: Analytic Outreach,” July 16, 2008, 1,
available at <www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/
ICD_205.pdf>.
32
Fingar, 56.
33
Spencer Ackerman, “DARPA Offers a
Million Dollars for Crowdsourced Amphibious
Tank,” Wired.co.uk, October 3, 2012, available
at <www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-10/03/
darpa-swimming-tank-contest>.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
U.S. Marine Corps (Tyler J. Bolken)
Marine Corps Drill Instructors train enlistees currently part of delayed
entry program in Arrowhead Meadows Park, Chandler, Arizona
Fostering Constructive Dialogue
on Military Sexual Assault
By l i n D s a y l . r o D m a n
A
t a press conference in January
2012, Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta stated that he
estimates there were 19,000
sexual assaults in the military in 2011.1 That
number is derived from a statement in the
Department of Defense (DOD) Annual
Report on Sexual Assault in the Military,
Fiscal Year 2010.2 The report does not actually explain its methodology for arriving at
the number, but it does state the number is
based on data from the Defense Manpower
Data Center 2010 Workplace and Gender
Relations Survey.3 Perhaps more importantly,
the report does not refer to 19,000 sexual
assaults, but rather 19,000 reports by individuals of unwanted sexual contact.
The Defense Manpower Data Center
2010 survey never uses the number 19,000.
Rather, the document relays the results
Captain Lindsay L. Rodman, USMC, is a Judge Advocate currently stationed at Judge Advocate Division,
Headquarters Marine Corps.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
of a survey of 10,029 Active-duty female
Servicemembers and 14,000 Active-duty
male Servicemembers. The survey itself is
forthright and explicit about the numbers it
produces and its methodology. The sample
size and sample composition necessarily
make extrapolation military-wide problematic. The sample was clearly weighted
toward female responses, and the definition
of unwanted sexual contact did not align at
all with the colloquial understanding or any
statutory or legal definition of sexual assault.
Nevertheless, the number 19,000 arose as
an extrapolation from the numbers in this
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
25
FORUM | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault
sampling, and this number has pervaded the
media discussion ever since.4 Most practitioners of justice and criminal investigators
throughout the military should agree that
the figure cited by Secretary Panetta is unrealistically high.
Inconsistent definitions and an inability to delve into problem definition and
problem framing have plagued discussions of
sexual misconduct in the military since the
days of the Tailhook scandal.5 Now, renewed
pressure on military commanders has been
sparked by an uptick in media attention
resulting from Secretary Panetta’s statement
as well as a new documentary6 and a lawsuit
filed against DOD and Navy leadership.7
Civilian and uniformed military leadership has tended to react to inflammatory
stories and inflated numbers without taking
a thoughtful, deliberate, and measured
approach to the problem. Attention to these
matters comes from a genuine desire to make
change for the better, but it is not always
guided by rational and well-founded information. In more recent months, Members of
Congress have petitioned DOD to acquiesce
to a human rights inquiry, provide relevant
testimony, and most recently to establish a
commission to review this problem. While
further study is often warranted, there has
frequently been a rush to find a solution
without properly defining the problem.
Over time, due in part to political
pressure, DOD has attacked this sophisticated problem, framed in the wrong way,
by simplistically overprosecuting. Current
leadership struggles under public pressure
to address sexual assault numbers by implementing increasingly draconian policies
and sending more military Servicemembers
accused of sexual assault through the courtmartial process. Secretary Panetta stated
during his January 18 press conference that
the reason prosecutions are not successful
is due in part to insufficient evidence and
“aggressiveness” from prosecutors. As a
result, DOD leadership has become increasingly frustrated by the lack of results. By
seeking to prosecute anyone accused of
sexual assault without understanding the
source of the underlying problem, leaders
are actually contributing to the same cycle
of acquittals they seek to avoid. Criminal
prosecution is not the answer to resolving
many of these reports. Overprosecution
only perpetuates the problem because con-
26
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
victions are simply not achievable in many
of these cases.
Clear-cut accusations against perpetrators that can be proven in court because an
investigation yielded admissible and persuasive evidence will almost always result in a
guilty plea. Savvy defense attorneys understand when the cards are stacked against the
accused,8 and they will likely advise their
clients to accept a plea negotiation. The difficult cases that cause consternation are the
closer calls.
and setting realistic expectations, as well as
providing counseling and resources to accusers. We should not be revictimizing victims
by convincing them that the criminal justice
system is an appropriate forum for adjudication, requiring them to undergo scrutiny and
multiple rounds of interviews, testimony, and
cross examination only to result in acquittals
that appear to be referenda on the victim’s
credibility, integrity, and character.
For better or worse, commanders have
attempted to accommodate public pressure to
sound bites and platitudes have detracted
from the ability to engage in thoughtful conversation
about the actual problem
There are many meritorious and prosecutable accusations of sexual assault in the
military. However, this issue has not been
treated carefully or with precision. Sound
bites and platitudes have detracted from the
ability to engage in thoughtful conversation
about the actual problem and have therefore
prevented thoughtful proposals for solutions.
This article aims to illuminate where the
conversation has faltered.
The problem plaguing the military is
the desire—from commentators, the media,
Congress, and even military leadership—for
this situation to be a zero-sum game. Either
the victim is telling the truth, in which case a
conviction should be obtained, or the victim
is lying. If a conviction is not obtained, the
victim will often complain that he or she was
not heard, was not taken seriously, or was
made out to be a liar.
Military justice practitioners often see
victims who experience real trauma as the
result of a sexual encounter, but who would
never be able to achieve a conviction in any
criminal justice system against the person
with whom they had sex. A traumatic sexual
encounter may not necessarily be a criminal sexual assault. The inability to obtain
a conviction in many of these cases is not
the fault of the commander, prosecutor, or
military justice system. Rather, it is a problem
of expectation and misunderstanding about
the capabilities of a criminal justice system.
Instead of blaming the military for not taking
these allegations seriously,9 we should be
fostering a more constructive conversation
about prosecutorial discretion, alternative
accountability measures where appropriate,
prosecute in these cases. The accusation that
commanders do not take these cases seriously
is completely unfounded. The truth is quite
the opposite; commanders feel hamstrung
to prosecute sexual assaults to the fullest,
regardless of the possibility of success at trial.
Political pressure from victims’ rights groups
have created an environment in which Servicemembers are no longer presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is a constitutional travesty.
Public complaints that the military does not
take sexual assault seriously have prompted
overprosecution in cases that would likely not
go to trial in the civilian world. This creates
a vicious cycle of acquittals in the courtmartial system, continuing to compound an
optics problem in the military.
Empirically, we have more victims
than we have criminally convicted offenders. This result is actually an appropriate
outcome. There are sexual encounters that
result in trauma and produce victims, yet
at the same time do not rise to the level
of criminality or provability that a rape
or sexual assault charge in a felony court
would require for conviction.
This article proposes a new lens
through which to view sexual misconduct
allegations. Civilian colleges and universities
have dealt with sexual misconduct allegations
for as long as the military has, and there are
lessons to be learned from their experiences
and practices. After explaining the problem
with a prosecution-focused approach, this
article proposes a new approach to understanding how we can have victims in cases
where convictions are inappropriate.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
RODMAN
U.S. Marines with Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment,
conduct census patrol in Sangin, Afghanistan, January 2011
U.S. Marine Corps (Dexter S. Saulisbury)
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
27
FORUM | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault
Nonprosecutable Sexual Assault
Allegations
Consider the following hypothetical:
two Marines, one male and one female, drink
to the point of intoxication at a party. They
retire to a barracks room and proceed to
have sex. The next day, the female Marine
reports a sexual assault. There are no helpful
witnesses. The male Marine explains that he
believed the sex was consensual.
The criminal justice system—both the
civilian and military systems—would most
likely not produce a criminal conviction, nor
should we want it to. Constitutionally, the
she could only have blacked out—her point
of intoxication would not have been enough
for her to pass out.13 PFC Lamb and Pvt
Peterson acknowledged that they had sex
but stated that it was consensual. Given the
victim’s memory lapse, there is no way to
know whether the sex was consensual. Both
cases resulted in convictions at the trial
level, but the Navy–Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the convictions
based on the toxicology evidence.
Many attorneys interpret Lamb and
Peterson to create a black out/pass out distinction in courts-martial. The previous
finders of fact will often find reasonable doubt if
they can only consider an incomplete story
accused may only be convicted of a crime if
it has been proven, beyond any reasonable
doubt, that he or she committed a crime.
There is often (but certainly not always)
inherent reasonable doubt in a “he-said-shesaid” scenario. Alcohol contributes to reasonable doubt by making stories less plausible. If
we encourage conviction in that case without
more facts, we are infringing on the constitutional rights of the accused.
This hypothetical is not far from the
prototypical sexual assault allegation in the
military. Many cases also involve memory
loss. In most instances, the victim is female
and the accused is male. The female victim
will often report that she does not remember
what happened, or that she only remembers
snippets of the sexual encounter. In those
cases, convictions are even more difficult to
obtain because the finders of fact (a panel of
Servicemembers or a military judge10) will
often find reasonable doubt if they can only
consider an incomplete story.
Recent case law out of the military
appellate courts suggests that even if a
conviction is obtained where the victim
suffers a memory lapse, the case could be
overturned on appeal. In United States v.
Lamb11 and United States v. Peterson,12 two
companion cases, a female Marine private
first class (PFC) was invited to drink with
two male Marines, PFC Lamb and Private
(Pvt) Peterson. Both male Marines had sex
with her. The next morning, the victim
stated that she passed out and was then
sexually assaulted by both PFC Lamb and
Pvt Peterson. Her blood draw showed that
28
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
version of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ)14 defined aggravated
sexual assault as a sexual act committed
against the victim by placing the victim in
fear, causing bodily harm, or committing the
act while the victim was “substantially incapacitated.” Anecdotally, substantial incapacitation is the most frequently charged type of
aggravated sexual assault. (Rape, by contrast,
is defined in most cases as a sexual act by
force. But it can also be charged for rendering
the victim unconscious, personally administering a drug or intoxicant causing substantial incapacitation, causing grievous bodily
harm, or placing the victim in fear of death,
grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.15) If the
victim can remember bits of the night, as the
victim could in Lamb and Peterson, biologically she was likely not completely passed out.
Where a victim has blacked out rather than
passed out, a reasonable possibility exists that
she had enough capacity to consent at the
time of the sexual act. That possibility would
preclude conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that leads to acquittals, or in these
two cases, reversal by the appellate court.
Analogy to the College and University
Setting
Colleges and universities face a similar
problem of difficult-to-prosecute sexual
assault allegations. Rarely, if ever, are college
students held criminally accountable for
sexual assault. The most cited sexual assault
statistics from colleges and universities are 15
to 20 years old, but they typically state that
between one in four and one in six college
women are sexually assaulted during their
tenure in school.16
The Duke Lacrosse scandal of 2006
is instructive on this point. It was an
attempted civilian prosecution of college
students for rape in a he-said-she-said scenario. Part of the reason the case achieved
so much notoriety was its uniqueness. Aside
from the Duke case, prosecutors rarely
attempt to achieve a conviction in a civilian
court in cases arising from this context.
Moreover, in the Duke case, prosecutor
Michael Nifong eventually lost his bar
license for prosecutorial misconduct due to
his overreaching as the case fell apart.17
Most civilian prosecutors are ethical
and understand the limitations of the criminal justice system and thus routinely decline
to prosecute these cases. Instead, colleges
and universities have developed a variety
of administrative forums and procedures
for addressing these matters. Alternative
dispute resolution, disciplinary boards, and
honor boards are just a few of the standard
answers to this problem. Higher education
institutions have learned over time that the
criminal justice system cannot provide a
solution for the standard he-said-she-said
sexual assault allegation.
In a typical college setting, the 18- to
24-year-old cohort lives together in dormitories in a culture that includes a high
incidence of alcohol-facilitated sexual
encounters. Similarly, enlisted Servicemembers live in barracks with access to alcohol,
and I posit that they tend to drink and have
sex with a frequency comparable to their
civilian counterparts.
There are no solid statistics for the
military or civilian sectors regarding the
prevalence of sexual encounters on the
whole (consensual or nonconsensual) or
sexual assaults among this age cohort.18
Because there is no way to obtain accurate
data on how much sex there is or how
many sexual assaults there are in either
the college/university setting or military
setting, we cannot know whether the military number is greater or lesser than the
civilian number. Anecdotally, it seems clear
that there are high numbers of victims in
both communities who are traumatized by
sexual encounters that they do not believe
were consensual. A fair argument could be
made that we should hold Servicemembers
to a higher standard than we do college
students; however, it would be unwise to
ndup res s . ndu. edu
RODMAN
ignore the experience of these institutions, their similar demographics, and the
similar problems they face. Therefore, best
practices should be shared between the two
communities to provide a more holistic
approach to fighting this problem.
Training, Education, and Resources
The military has drastically increased
its education and training about sexual
assault. Servicemembers are taught to report
any sexual encounter in which they feel
they were taken advantage of. Specifically,
the military teaches women to consider
any sexual encounter or contact to which
they believed that they did not consent as
“rape.”19 That is not necessarily a bad thing:
no woman should be subjected to any sexual
contact to which she does not feel she consented. However, the training can be misleading because the term rape is a legal term
that implies that a conviction for rape could
or should result from that encounter.
Training and education are
immensely valuable. However, they have to
be nuanced enough to distinguish between
“rape” or “sexual assault” and “sexual
misconduct.” Sexual misconduct, as used
in this article, includes any sexual conduct
in which the victim does not believe she
consented, regardless of what can be
proven in court. Sexual assault, on the
other hand, is often colloquially discussed
as the conduct captured in sections (a) and
(c) of the 2008 version of Article 120 of
the UCMJ: “Rape and Aggravated Sexual
Assault.”20 As a legal term, sexual assault
is not clearly defined in the 2008 version
of Article 120, but it did become a specific,
technical term under the newest 2012 revision.21 There may be offensive conduct (for
example, unwanted touching) that does
not rise to the colloquial understanding of
“sexual assault” that might otherwise be
properly discussed as sexual misconduct or
possibly sexual harassment. Statistics can
be misunderstood or inflated by misusing
the terminology. Even within DOD, different offices use other definitions of sexual
assault that do not align with the statutory
landscape. Training within the military—
for both leaders and subordinates—about
rape, sexual assault, and sexual misconduct is misguided if it does not capture
these nuances.
The military has also created institutions and resources for victims of sexual
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
assault that are unparalleled in civilian
society. Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Offices exist in DOD and at each
Service and department. These offices coordinate the provision of education and training. They also ensure that every command
has a Uniformed Victim Advocate and access
to civilian victim advocates who are available
as resources for any Servicemember who
claims to be the victim of a sexual assault,
regardless of whether that allegation can be
substantiated. Counselors are provided to
victims, and victims can avail themselves of
additional mental health resources if they
so choose. In addition, Secretary Panetta
universalized a policy in his January 2012
press conference that was already in place in
some Services including the Marine Corps:
all reporting victims will be allowed expedited transfer away from their units. The
existence of these resources is immensely
important and helps foster a community that
encourages healing and provides resources
for anyone who is victimized by a sexual
encounter. Provision of these services does
not and should not hinge on whether the
military justice system will produce a conviction in a certain case.
The military also has “restricted
reporting,” an opportunity for a victim
to avail himself or herself of resources
without prompting an investigation or
Quick Primer on the Military Justice
System
The military justice system differs from
the civilian criminal justice system in a few
significant ways. A court-martial trial itself
looks remarkably like a civilian trial, with
the exception that the jury is replaced by a
panel of Servicemembers. The major procedural differences between courts-martial
and civilian trials reside in pretrial and posttrial processes.
Unlike in the civilian world, the
prosecutor does not own the criminal case;
the commanding officer of the accused
Servicemember owns the case. It is up to
the commander to determine what forum is
appropriate for addressing the misconduct;
that is, whether to choose administrative
punishment of some kind, a misdemeanortype “special court-martial,” or a felony-type
“general court-martial.”23
Rape or sexual assault prosecutions are
appropriately tried at a general court-martial.
To refer a case to a general court-martial, the
charges must be vetted by an impartial officer
who is either a judge advocate or field-grade
officer.24 In practice, these investigations,
codified in Article 32 of the UCMJ, are
almost always conducted by a judge advocate so legal expertise can be applied to the
analysis.25 These investigations are intended
to provide a hedge against prosecutorial
to refer a case to a general court-martial, the charges
must be vetted by an impartial officer
prosecution. However, it is difficult for
a Servicemember to submit a restricted
report without making a mistake that
would convert the submission to an “unrestricted report,” that is, one that prompts
investigation. Restricted reporting can
only be communicated to a chaplain,
medical professional, or victim advocate or
counselor.22 Consequently, when a Marine
confides in his or her best friend about a
sexual encounter, that friend is obligated
under military order to disclose the
communication to the command. Many
investigations begin when a roommate
reports on behalf of another Servicemember. While that is beneficial in some cases,
in other cases it forces the victim into a
role he or she has not chosen and does not
want, that of an accuser.
misconduct and overreaching, much like the
grand jury system in Federal criminal courts.
After thoroughly investigating the
misconduct, the Article 32 investigating
officer will write a report providing recommendations to the commander about how
to dispose of the case. Typically, the first
commanding general in the accused’s chain
of command has the authority to convene
a general court-martial. The commanding
general will only decide on how to proceed
after receiving advice from his or her staff
judge advocate (SJA), a judge advocate
assigned to the commanding general’s staff
as a legal advisor.26
Despite this robust vetting process,
commanding officers and commanding generals often neglect to heed the advice of their
legal advisors—the prosecutor, the Article 32
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29
FORUM | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault
officer, and/or the SJA—and push forward
on sexual assault cases that lack merit at trial.
They do so because they fear they will be perceived as taking the accusations lightly.
Facts Drive Outcomes
The problem in these cases is the facts.
They often cannot be developed fully enough
to achieve proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
as illustrated above by the alcohol-induced
he-said-she-said hypothetical. When a
prosecutor does not have good facts, conviction cannot be the expectation. Nor should
we want there to be a conviction in many of
“taken into account” during the process. In
2012, Article 120 was revised again, but it
does not appear that the revision will renew
focus on the victim or address these concerns. Rather, some commentators believe
that the focus on the offender is even stronger
in the new version.28
Using Tort Law “Negligence” to
Understand the Problem
The disconnect between a victim’s
trauma resulting from a sexual experience
and the inability to obtain a conviction is
a large contributor to the perception of a
if the finder of fact believes it is possible
that the accused reasonably believed the victim consented,
an acquittal must result
those cases. That would require a standard
below the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, creating an exception in criminal law
for sexual assault cases in direct contravention of the Constitution.
Some victims have expressed frustration at the inability of commands to obtain
convictions, or even to pursue investigations in their cases. Some of this criticism
unfairly targets processes that are necessarily not victim-focused. Criminal investigations are focused on the accused. If the
investigating law enforcement agency can
identify the accused, its job is to investigate
impartially to provide whatever evidence
it can to the commander so he or she can
decide whether to prosecute. By law, victims
are kept informed of the progress of the
investigation, and their preference is considered, but it will never be dispositive, nor
should it be.
Similarly, prosecutions themselves
should not be victim-focused. The military
sexual assault statute, Article 120 of the
UCMJ, underwent substantial revision in
2008. The revision was intended in part to
take the focus away from the victim in order
to protect him or her.27 The question before
the trier of fact is based on whether she was
forced by the accused, and not whether she
consented. The ironic consequence of that
revision is that what was going through the
victim’s head at the time, or her subsequent
trauma, is irrelevant to the question of guilt.
Perhaps in part for that reason, victims can
often believe that they were not “heard” or
30
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
“sexual assault problem” in the military.
The problem is actually in large part a tort
problem. However, the tort paradigm is
inherently problematic for addressing sexual
assault. Therefore, despite being analytically
more appropriate, both the military and
civilian worlds have been reluctant to discuss
sexual assault with tort terminology.
A tort is a harm inflicted by one party
against another. Torts are the subject of
civil lawsuits. When one party believes that
another has behaved negligently or recklessly with regard for another, and harm
is inflicted, the harmed party can sue and
collect in court for the value of the harm. In
cases where a sexual assault allegation might
not result in a conviction, the complaint may
have resulted from a harm inflicted by a Servicemember, perhaps due to lack of due care
(negligence) or even recklessness regarding
the victim’s desire to participate or level of
intoxication. Nevertheless, it may not achieve
the level of criminality or intent required for
a rape or sexual assault conviction.
If consent is an issue at trial (that is,
where the accused argues that the victim
consented, not that sex did not occur), a
sexual assault conviction can be achieved
only where the government has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim
did not consent or that the accused was not
reasonably mistaken that he or she consented.29 In other words, if the finder of fact
at court-martial believes it is possible that
the accused reasonably believed the victim
consented (even if she did not),30 an acquit-
tal must result. Again, this is appropriate;
the Constitution demands it, and the penalties for a guilty finding are severe.
In reports of sexual assault, we often
see victims who were harmed through
negligence or recklessness. In an aggravated
sexual assault case that hinges on substantial
incapacitation, even if the victim cannot
show that she was passed out beyond a
reasonable doubt, it may be that she was
intoxicated enough that the accused was
reckless or negligent in pursuing sex with
her. The accused may have acted in a way that
does not meet the level of care that we want
Servicemembers to have for one another,
but perhaps the accused was not malicious.
A tort outlook may be a more appropriate
framework with which to approach analysis
of sexual misconduct.
By using the negligence framework,
we can capture the category of cases that
involve a victim who believes he or she was
taken advantage of, but where a prosecutor
cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt
at trial that there was force (rape) or substantial incapacitation (aggravated sexual
assault) under the 2008 statutory framework. If the accused caused harm to the
victim, the harm is still real. The accused
may even have done something morally
wrong under the circumstances. But it may
not have been a crime.
A Negligence Discussion Only Begins
to Frame the Problem
The problem with using the tort paradigm is that it drives seemingly unacceptable
solution sets. The necessary consequence
of using tort language is that it suggests
lawsuits are the answer. Neither military
leaders nor victim advocates are likely to
accept an argument that we should encourage Servicemembers to sue each other over
harms that result from sexual encounters.31
The hope in introducing this paradigm is not
to encourage lawsuits but merely to reframe
the analysis.
The criminal law framework used to
address sexual assault allegations in the
military continues to be ill-equipped to
handle many cases. Colleges and universities appear to have abandoned criminal law
as a tool for this reason, except in the most
clear-cut circumstances. Instead, these
institutions pursue a host of alternative
adjudicative tools to address the problem.
No one argues that these solutions in col-
ndup res s . ndu. edu
RODMAN
leges and universities have eliminated the
problem. However, the solution imposed on
the military—encouragement to prosecute
questionable cases and be more “aggressive”—has our leadership going in the
wrong direction entirely. For those who
believe that the military does not prosecute
to the fullest, going farther down the path
of pursuing more prosecutions in more
cases will not achieve the desired outcome
of more convictions. It may end up doing
more harm than good by failing to manage
the expectations of victims and forcing
them through a frustrating process.
Recent Developments
Aside from encouraging more prosecution, recent developments in law and policy
may change the landscape somewhat in
sexual assault cases. First, Congress passed
a revision to Article 120 of the UCMJ that
became effective on June 28, 2012. One major
change in the new statute is that the accused
will face a “knew or should have known”
standard about whether the victim was incapacitated. Results from cases arising under
these statutes should just be starting to come
in as this article is published. Nevertheless,
legal analysts have begun to consider the 2012
revision, and some point out that the shouldhave-known standard applied in incapacitation sexual assault cases actually appears to
create a negligence (or possibly recklessness)
standard, leading to the belief that the landscape will change with application of the new
law. However, the new law merely requires
the government to prove that the accused
knew or should have known that the victim
was incapacitated, whereas the old law did
not have a knowledge requirement. Under the
old statute, the finders of fact were charged
with determining whether they believed
the victim was substantially incapacitated
regardless of what the accused understood.
Therefore, although the change looks like
it embraces “negligence,” the new approach
actually may make conviction even harder
by requiring the government to prove more
than before; moreover, it does not address the
overarching problems with the old statute.
The new Article 120 will not capture those
cases in which the accused’s general decisionmaking lacks due care for the perspective of
the victim.
Another significant change to Article
120 is the revocation of the affirmative
defense of consent, which created an unneces-
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
sarily complicated legal landscape. The term
substantially incapacitated has also been
replaced with “asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring,”
or situations in which a drug or intoxicant
renders the victim incapable of consenting.
Although these changes will move the inquiry
further away from a victim-focused question
of consent, questions of force or incapacitation and consent will always be inextricably
intertwined. Finally, the definition of sexual
assault will include a broader definition of
sexual conduct and sexual acts, thus potentially enabling more prosecutions in cases that
do not involve sexual intercourse (and potentially making it a target for constitutional
overbreadth challenges).
These changes help tidy up the language of an unwieldy and complicated
statute, but they will likely not affect many
of the problematic scenarios discussed
above. The issue boils down to proving,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that the victim
did not consent or did not have the capacity
to consent, especially in cases where alcohol
and memory lapses are involved. The new
revision may allow more convictions at the
margins (though it may result in fewer as
well), but it is not likely to be a panacea.
commanders, hopefully this will result in a
culture where the decision not to prosecute in
certain cases comes with credibility and faces
less criticism.
General Martin Dempsey published his
Strategic Direction to the Joint Force on Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response on April
30, 2012. Although the document highlights
the importance of this matter to the highest
ranking leaders within the military, it does
not present new or novel approaches to the
issue. It merely recommits the joint force to
existing programs and policies.
Within the Marine Corps specifically,
the commandant spent the spring and early
summer of 2012 on a “Heritage” tour, asking
Marines to honor their traditions, behave
morally, and hold each other accountable for
their missteps. In his brief, the commandant
described the distrust that Members of Congress and the public have in commanders,
manifested to him directly, and their skepticism that Marine Corps leadership takes
these issues seriously. This lack of faith in the
genuine efforts of leadership has the potential
to drive bad policy outcomes.
The commandant also cited a “sexual
assault” statistic of 343 reports in 2011,
though he defined “sexual assault” to include
the issue boils down to proving, beyond all
reasonable doubt, that the victim did not consent or
did not have the capacity to consent
Another major policy development
was the release by Panetta of a Secretary of
Defense Memorandum on April 20, 2012,
that withholds disposition authority of
sexual assault cases to the O-6 level. This
memorandum requires some commanding officers, who would otherwise have the
authority to decide whether to prosecute
certain cases, to obtain the decision from
their higher headquarters. Most sexual
assault case disposition decisions are made at
the flag-officer level, so this memorandum
may not affect that decisionmaking process
greatly. However, it indicates that the senior
levels of DOD leadership continue not to
trust the commanders making disposition
decisions. The hope is that by elevating the
rank of those empowered to decide, the decisions will carry more weight with outside
observers. Therefore, despite the lack of faith
that this policy change exhibits in lower-level
everything from unwanted touching to forcible sexual intercourse, as well as allegations
that were later unsubstantiated. This figure,
despite being derived from an overly broad
definition of “sexual assault,” also serves to
contextualize how problematic the 19,000
extrapolation is. Any sexual assault is one
sexual assault too many, but if the goal is to
have a targeted and productive discussion
about the actual problem in order to derive
corresponding solutions, the discourse has
certainly not gotten there yet.
The commandant has decided to reorganize the Marine Corps legal community
to facilitate better oversight, supervision, and
mentorship. With the creation of Regional
Trial Counsel Offices, the Marine Corps will
have a vastly improved means of surging
capability and expertise to strategic and
complex cases, especially sexual assault cases,
wherever they arise. The new construct gives
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
31
FORUM | Fostering Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault
the Marine Corps flexibility and a better
ability to pair the appropriate experience
and ability level with the appropriate case.
However, what these initiatives cannot do is
change the facts or the law: prosecution of
many sexual assault cases will continue to be
an uphill battle.
Conclusion
The next step in addressing this
problem is to embrace the existence of a gray
area. To approach the problem constructively,
we must acknowledge that a report from a
victim will not achieve a conviction every
time. Certain cases produce victims through
sexual encounters that lead to trauma due to
nonconsent or uncertainty about consent.
Sometimes those same cases should not or
cannot result in criminal convictions, either
due to evidentiary issues or just the level
of certainty—proof beyond a reasonable
doubt—required to achieve a conviction.
Even in a straightforward blackout case in
which a woman consented while intoxicated
to the point of memory loss, but not to the
point that she passed out or was otherwise
incapacitated, there could easily be trauma.
It is likely terrifying to wake up next to
someone without knowing how one got there
and whether that person is trustworthy. It
may require therapy and support for a victim
to come to terms with what happened under
those circumstances. In many of those cases,
however, no crime occurred or no crime can
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We
should still encourage those victims to avail
themselves of every resource. They should
have advocates and therapists and be able to
move away from the source of their trauma.
However, commanders should not be criticized for their inability to obtain convictions,
or even their decision not to prosecute in
many of those cases.
A sophisticated understanding of
the capacities of criminal law, including its
strengths and weaknesses, will hopefully help
bring the conversation about the military
“sexual assault problem” away from blaming
commanders for not taking the problem
seriously because they are not obtaining convictions. If we perpetuate the cycle of unsuccessful prosecutions, no one wins. Victims
are dragged through a process that can only
traumatize them more without achieving
their desired endstate: accountability for
the harm done to them. At the same time,
the accused has to endure a highly stressful
32
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
court-martial process and is made out to be
a pariah when he or she may not have done
anything criminal.
We do not need to deny the victimization or trauma of the accuser in order to
acknowledge that prosecution is inappropriate in many instances. Using a negligence
paradigm, perhaps both military and civilian
leadership can come to appreciate that there
are many instances in which a sexual assault
allegation is made but no conviction would
result: the gray area. In those cases, much
like in civil cases, despite the unlikelihood of
successful prosecution, there is a clear, articulable harm that results to a victim. Embracing
that gray area should help shift the focus of
the conversation away from the current selfperpetuating cycle of encouraging further
prosecution to address a frustrating conviction rate. Colleges, universities, and civilian
prosecutors routinely decline prosecution in
these gray area cases. Yet civilian leadership
seems to expect military commanders to
approach this common problem differently.
The military is being asked to be better
than society at large, which the military
should strive to be. However, the expectations associated with such a request must be
reasonable and achievable. As we strive to
be better, we should focus on ensuring that
victims are provided with treatment and
resources, managing expectations about the
capacity of the criminal justice system, and
limiting criticism of military commanders
who genuinely care, but cannot achieve convictions in many cases. JFQ
NOTES
1
Department of Defense (DOD) News Briefing with Secretary Leon Panetta from the Pentagon, Washington, DC, January 18, 2012, available
at <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=4959>.
2
Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington, DC: DOD,
March 2011), 97, available at <www.sapr.mil/index.
php/annual-reports>.
3
Defense Manpower Data Center, Workplace
and Gender Relations Survey of the Active Duty
Members (Washington, DC: DOD, March 2011),
available at <www.sapr.mil/index.php/research>.
4
For the numbers to work out according
to their math, this extrapolation necessarily
requires that half of those victims (up to about
10,000) would be male, which anecdotally seems
questionable.
5
In 1991, at an event at the Las Vegas Hilton
attended by the naval aviation community, 83
female and 7 male military Servicemembers were
groped, sexually harassed, and sexually assaulted
by as many as 100 other Sailors and Marines.
When reported, the event turned into a scandal
and forced the military to confront questions
about a culture of hostility toward women in the
military in the media and in multiple congressional hearings.
6
The Invisible War, produced by Kirby Dick
and Amy Ziering, has screened at various film
festivals. The Web site for the film is <http://
invisiblewarmovie.com/>.
7
The complaint was filed in Federal district
court in Washington, DC, and is on file with
the author and available at <http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/TODAY/Sections/Today%20
People/2012/03%20-%20March/Klay%20complaint.pdf>.
8
In the military justice system, the term
accused is used where the term defendant is
usually used in the civilian justice system.
9
See, for example, The New York Times editorial “Sexual Violence and the Military,” March 8,
2012, available at <www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/
opinion/sexual-violence-and-the-military.html>.
10
“Members panels” in the military justice
system take the place of a civilian “jury.”
11
United States v. Lamb, 2010 CCA LEXIS 334
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010).
12
United States v. Peterson, 2010 CCA LEXIS
336 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010).
13
The term black out refers to an alcoholinduced memory lapse, whereas pass out refers
to loss of consciousness. Often the person who
either blacks out or passes out would not be able to
discern the difference. Other witnesses or evidence
would be necessary to make the distinction.
14
10 U.S.C. § 920 has been amended. The new
changes went into effect on June 28, 2012. The
Lamb and Peterson cases were tried under the
2008 version of the statute.
15
10 U.S.C. § 920 (2008). 10 U.S.C. § 925
(Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice [UCMJ]) also criminalizes forcible sodomy,
another type of sexual assault. For simplicity’s
sake, I refer mainly to Article 120 cases, but Article
125 cases face similar hurdles to Article 120 cases.
16
See National Institute for Justice (NIJ), The
Campus Sexual Assault Study, NIJ Grant No.
2004-WG-BX-0010, October 2007; One in Four,
a list of sexual assault statistics compiled with
citations, is available at <www.oneinfourusa.org/
statistics.php>.
17
“Nifong Will Be Disbarred for Ethics Violations,” Associated Press, June 18, 2007, available at
<http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/19264396/>.
18
Even the Federal Government has trouble
achieving reliable statistics on this question. In The
Sexual Victimization of College Women (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, December 2000),
ndup res s . ndu. edu
RODMAN
Bonnie S. Fisher, Francis T. Cullen, and Michael
G. Turner describe the problem of achieving
reliable numbers. The study attempts to measure
the problem and arrives at roughly 35 instances
of sexual assault per 1,000 college women. Study
available at <www.nij.gov/pubs-sum/182369.htm>.
19
This statement is based on my own anecdotal experiences at various trainings and during
interactions with victims in my capacity as a judge
advocate.
20
10 U.S.C. § 920 (a)-(d) (2008).
21
What used to be called “aggravated sexual
assault” is now simply called “sexual assault,” thus
simplifying the terminology.
22
Deputy Secretary of Defense Directive-Type
Memorandum, Confidentiality Policy for Victims
of Sexual Assault (JTF-SAPR-009), March 16,
2005.
23
Misdemeanor-type crimes and uniquely
military offenses are typically tried in special
courts-martial. Administrative punishment could
be the result of a summary court-martial or nonjudicial punishment.
24
10 U.S.C. § 832 and Manual for CourtsMartial United States (Washington, DC: DOD,
2008), Rule for Courts-Martial 405.
25
In the Army, by contrast, line officers (as
opposed to judge advocates) often serve as Article
32 investigating officers.
26
10 U.S.C. § 834.
27
See James G. Clark, “‘A Camel Is a Horse
Designed by Committee’: Resolving Constitutional
Defects in Uniform Code of Military Justice
Article 120’s Consent and Mistake of Fact as to
Consent Defenses,” The Army Lawyer, July 2011, 3.
28
James G. Clark, “2012 UCMJ Article
120, effective 28 June 2012,” 2012 Emerging
Issues 6423, available at <www.jagcnet.army.
mil/852577C1004877F2/0/CD7859AC835EC
94A85257A2B004F57D4/$file/2012_Emerging_Issues_6423__Clark_on_2012_UCMJ_
Article_120.pdf>.
29
10 U.S.C. § 920 (r) & (t)(14)-(16).
30
Throughout this article, I use male and
female pronouns in reference to both the accused
and the victim. However, “he or she” can be cumbersome and distract from the meaning within a
given sentence. In those cases, I default to the most
common scenario: a male accused and a female
victim. I do not mean to exclude any cases in this
discussion, and I apologize for the exclusion and
the oversimplification where it occurs.
31
See, for example, The National Crime
Victim Bar Association, Helping Crime
Victims Pursue Civil Justice, available at
<www.victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/
national-crime-victim-bar-association/case-law>.
NEW
from NDU Press
for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs
Institute for National Strategic Studies
China Strategic Perspectives, No. 5
Managing Sino-U.S. Air and Naval
Interactions: Cold War Lessons and New
Avenues of Approach
By Mark E. Redden and Phillip C. Saunders
The United States and China have a
complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous relationship where substantial areas of cooperation
coexist with ongoing strategic tensions and suspicions. One manifestation involves disputes
and incidents when U.S. and Chinese military
forces interact within China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Three high-profile
incidents over the last decade have involved aggressive maneuvers by Chinese
military and/or paramilitary forces operating in close proximity to deter U.S.
surveillance and military survey platforms from conducting their missions. Why
do these incidents continue to occur despite mechanisms designed to prevent such
dangerous encounters? Could new or different procedures or policies help avoid
future incidents?
According to authors Mark Redden and Phillip Saunders, if U.S. policymakers
seek a change in Chinese behavior, they need to understand the underlying Chinese
policy calculus, how it may change over time, and potential means of influencing
that calculus. U.S. policymakers have several broad avenues of approach to alter
the Chinese policy calculus and thereby influence Chinese behavior, but given
the importance that China places on sovereignty, no single option is likely to be
sufficient. A mixed approach, particularly one that influences a larger number of
Chinese decisionmakers, may maximize the probability of success. Cooperative
approaches require time for the benefits of cooperation to accrue and for normative
arguments to be heard and heeded, both in China and internationally.
Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at
ndupress.ndu.edu
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
33
U.S. Coast Guardsmen unload
$36 million worth of confiscated
cocaine and marijuana, St.
Petersburg, Florida
DOD (Matthew Bash)
Confronting Transnational Organized Crime
Getting It Right to Forestall a New
National Security Threat
By D o u g l a s m . F r a s e r a n d r e n e e P . n o v a k o F F
General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF (Ret.), was the Commander of U.S. Southern Command from 2009 to 2012.
Renee P. Novakoff is a Senior Defense Intelligence Analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance at U.S. Southern Command.
34
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndupres s . ndu. edu
FRASER and NOVAKOFF
S
ecurity threats to the United
States are evolving. For most
of the 20th century and before,
threats were state-on-state. Since
9/11, however, threats to the homeland have
grown to include terrorism and transnational
organized crime (TOC) groups and networks. These networks represent a different
danger than we experienced during the Cold
War. This is not a force-on-force threat but
rather something more insidious. These
borderless groups infiltrate levers of power to
create spaces from which to carry out their
activities unimpeded. Currently, these groups
are destabilizing friendly governments not by
direct means but through behind-the-scenes
attempts to gain political space to develop
their illegal businesses. These groups also
have ties in the United States, endangering
our citizens and our economic infrastructure.
The scale of their enterprises, the impact they
have on legal economies, and their prospective continued growth argue for sustained
national and international attention and
resources as a tier-one security threat.1
To understand and counter these
threats, the U.S. Government must work
across bureaucratic lines, which will take new
organizational constructs and relationships
that are not wedded to parochial border
norms. In addition, the Intelligence Community will be the first line of defense. To fully
understand the motivations and vulnerabilities of these TOC networks, the Intelligence
Community will need to develop analysts
who can assess a sophisticated mix of opensource, law enforcement, and traditional
intelligence. The United States will need to
deploy a new type of intelligence professional
who is able to work across organizational
and geographic boundaries and is willing to
share information. This analyst must be an
integrator who can work in the collection
and analytical worlds and communicate with
counterparts in all parts of government, academia, and partner nations.
Background
Over the past 10 years, TOC networks
have grown in importance and influence
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In Brazil, for example, the Red Commandos have woven a complex network
in which different illegal factions have the
power to intimidate, interact, and control
entire sectors of cities such as Rio de Janeiro
and São Paulo.2 These groups not only
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
affect security at the local level, but also
have the ability to compromise national
security. According to Moisés Naím, “Today
more than ever, these structures have the
capacity to operate on a global scale, connecting remote places of the planet and the
most cosmopolitan cities, above all, with
accumulated political power. Never have
criminals been so global, so rich, or had so
much political influence.”3
All indicators show that TOC networks
will continue to grow, and, in the worst cases,
they will work with or will corrupt government institutions to form alliances to gain
space to do business. Virtually all criminal
cartels and gangs organize in networks
connected by violent crime of all types. To
survive and prosper, these thugs have become
highly intelligent and ruthless. This is affecting societies throughout the Western Hemisphere. In nearly every country in the region,
populations state that personal security is
their number one concern. Across the region,
murder rates are generally higher than 10
dwarfs defense budgets in the subregion
and allows significant criminal penetration
into governmental organizations, including security forces and judicial systems, as
well as legitimate financial networks. The
overall value to these criminal networks
from the cocaine trade alone is more than
the gross domestic product (GDP) of every
country in Latin America except Brazil. The
White House estimates in its 2011 Strategy
to Combat Transnational Organized Crime
that money-laundering accounts for $1.3
trillion to $3.3 trillion—or between 2 and
5 percent of the world’s GDP. Bribery from
TOC adds close to $1 trillion to that amount,
while drug-trafficking generates an estimated
$750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeited and
pirated goods add another $500 billion,
and illicit firearms sales generate from $170
billion to $320 billion.4 These total to some
$6.2 trillion—10 percent of the world’s GDP,
placing it behind only the United States
and the European Union, but well ahead
of China, in terms of global GDP ranking.
TOC networks will corrupt government institutions to form
alliances to gain space to do business
years ago. In addition, drug use is up—a sign
that regional drug-trafficking is increasing.
Moreover, the traffickers often pay middlemen in product as a way to increase their
customer base.
As the primary transshipment zone
for illicit trafficking to the United States,
Central America is an epicenter of TOC
activities. The problem is particularly acute
in the “Northern Tier” countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Belize,
where criminal networks exploit weak rule
of law, corrupt officials, and porous borders
to traffic in drugs, precursor chemicals,
weapons, people, and bulk cash. In all four
countries, gangs and other violent criminal
groups are contributing to escalating murder
rates and deteriorating citizen security. This
has overwhelmed civilian law enforcement
departments and court systems, many of
which were nascent to start with and are
characterized by pervasive corruption and
chronic underresourcing.
Challenges faced by these countries
are further exacerbated by the economic
power wielded by criminal groups. The
value of cocaine destined for North America
Other estimates of global criminal proceeds
range from a low of 4 percent to a high of 15
percent of global GDP.5
Analysts have described the situation in
several countries in Latin America as a criminal insurgency. Its effects on Central America
are clear. The murder rate is the highest in
the world. MS-13 and M18 gang members
routinely torture and intimidate citizens. The
homicide rates in El Salvador and Honduras
alone, where MS-13 operates extensively, are
82 and 66 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively—over 13 times the rate in the United
States.6 Gang leaders in Central American
prisons direct member activities inside the
United States. MS-13 operates throughout
Central America and in at least 40 U.S. states
according to a 2008 report from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.7 In October, the
Obama administration designated MS-13 as a
drug kingpin organization. The sanctioning
of MS-13 is the latest step in a 21st-century
arms race between sovereign governments
and violent nonstate networks empowered by
technology and globalization.8
TOC access to regional governments is
gaining momentum and leading to co-option
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
35
COMMENTARY | Confronting Transnational Organized Crime
in some states and weakening of governance
in others. The nexus in some states among
TOC networks and elements of government—including intelligence services and
personnel—and big business figures threatens
rule of law.9 New communications technologies have led to new criminal business models
of widely distributed, constantly shifting
networks of personal contacts and fleeting
alliances to produce, market, transport, and
distribute illegal goods—sometimes drugs,
sometimes human beings. These activities
are abetted by extortion, kidnapping, counterfeiting, and whatever else turns a profit.10
TOC networks insinuate themselves into
the political process through bribery and in
some cases have become alternate providers of
governance, security, and livelihoods to win
popular support. As an example, members
of Mexican cartels reside in Central America
and, according to former Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom, have influence over entire
departments there. Polls in Guatemala show
that a majority of citizens would exchange
less democracy for more security.11 Guatemala
City is experiencing record levels of violent
crime and at the same time a high-rise building construction boom, though with only a
25 percent occupancy rate, which is usually a
sign of large-scale money-laundering that can
only be successful with the support of government agents.12
A key to countering TOC groups is
understanding the smaller networks that
make up these larger groups. Transnational
criminal organizations can move anything,
and will for a price. Major crime groups
such as Mexican cartels or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia contract
with smaller, local criminal organizations
or “transportisters” that will move goods
from one country to the next. These are
that ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected
thousands of times each day. The actors
along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy both physical and
cyber spaces, and use highly developed institutions including the global financial system,
as well as ancient smuggling routes and
methods.13 They are middlemen who have
little loyalty to one group and often have no
illusion of developing their organization into
a major trafficking network. They make a
living by moving goods and ensure that they
and their families are safe from the TOC
group, who may threaten to kill those who
do not assist them.
Effect on the United States
For the United States, these networks
challenge national welfare, not necessarily
national security. Strong U.S. law enforcement efforts and effective policing have
kept gangs and cartels from having the
same effect they do in other countries in the
hemisphere, but their influence is growing.
Latin American gangs with connections
to the United States are primarily MS-13
(estimated at 6,000 to 10,000 U.S. members)
and the 18th Street Gang (estimated at 30,000
U.S. members), with up to 70,000 for both
in Central America (primarily El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala), where they challenge local authorities for control of streets
and towns.
Pushing Back on TOC
The 2010 National Security Strategy
acknowledges the challenge these organizations pose and that combating transnational
criminal and trafficking networks requires a
“multidimensional strategy that safeguards
citizens, breaks the financial strength of
criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts
the actors along the pipeline form and dissolve
alliances quicky, occupy both physical and cyber spaces,
and use highly developed institutions
important elements of the TOC network but
little is known about them. These franchises
operate in, and control, specific geographic
territories that allow them to function in a
relatively safe environment. These pipelines,
or chains of networks, are adaptive and able
to move a multiplicity of illicit products
(cocaine, weapons, humans, and bulk cash)
36
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
illicit trafficking networks, defeats transnational criminal organizations, fights
government corruption, strengthens the
rule of law, bolsters judicial systems, and
improves transparency.”14 The solution to
transnational crime in this hemisphere lies
in helping improve Latin America’s domestic
institutions and coordination across these
institutions—ranging from law enforcement
and judicial sectors to education and health—
that improve opportunities for young people.
Understanding the varied political landscape
(the human terrain) of the hemisphere is also
important as geopolitical fragility opens the
way for gangs and cartels to further destabilize civil life.
More than any other problem the
United States faces, this particular challenge
blurs the line among U.S. institutions. The
size, scope, and reach of TOC networks
far surpass the ability of any one agency
or nation to confront this threat alone. In
Central America, increasing military involvement in domestic security is a reality, at least
until the TOC threat is degraded and the
capabilities of civilian police institutions are
expanded. This will not happen overnight,
and it will not happen in isolation. This effort
requires the commitment of Latin American
governments and their societies. It requires
their commitment to build the capacity of
their law enforcement, judicial, and penal
organizations. It requires their commitment
to the use of their militaries only as a security
bridge as they develop other institutional
capacities. It requires their commitment to
address endemic corruption throughout
their societies. And it requires their commitment to engage regional and international
institutions to enhance coordination and
cooperation—supporting the development of
national and regional security plans, enhancing regional defense and security institutions,
and improving human rights training.
Furthermore, it takes concerted collaboration and sustained commitment by
the United States and the international
community—both governmental and nongovernmental organizations—to address this
complex problem and help support regional
governments in building strong, capable,
and accountable institutions. Innovative
approaches, creative public-private collaborations, and synchronization of efforts
among numerous U.S. Federal agencies—the
Department of State, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Department of
Homeland Security—will be necessary to
create a cooperative national and international network that is stronger and more
resilient than any criminal network. Key to
success will be information-sharing within
the U.S. interagency community, partner
ndupres s . ndu. edu
DOD (Michael De Nyse)
FRASER and NOVAKOFF
Servicemembers secure crew of drug-smuggling vessel in Gulf of Aden
nations, and finally among other countries
in question.
A Way Ahead
Interagency focus and organization
are needed for the United States to have
the greatest chance at pushing back TOC
network gains in the hemisphere. To succeed,
partner nation capacity must match or at
least keep pace with national and regional
campaigns to arrest TOC leaders and dismantle their networks. Building capacity
has a military dimension, but is far more
dependent on other branches of the U.S.
Government—the Departments of State and
Justice, for example. Capacity of police forces
must be supported by investigative and judicial capacity and competency. The judicial
branches must be led by uncorrupted and
effective legislative and executive branches.
Democratic partner nation capacity development is dependent on the support of the
partner nation population. These reforms are
not the domain of the Department of Defense
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
(DOD), and they require extensive investments of time and effort.
In an effective strategy to combat illicit
trafficking, all approaches have relevance.
The disruption line of effort should be balanced against partner nation capacity. If
the social services and effective local law
enforcement can only fill a small vacuum,
then we should only target a small area.
Operations that create a vacuum in TOC
operations and businesses should be paired
with aggressive non–law enforcement
engagement and social services in a coordinated fashion. This type of coordination
requires agencies beyond law enforcement
and DOD, from both the country itself and
from international contributors.
With the exception of the first mission set
(detection and monitoring), helping partner
nations build and sustain their security
capacity is a key component of all DOD
counter-TOC efforts:
■■ detection
DOD Role in Countering TOC
and monitoring
training
■■ counternarcotics support
■■ defense equipment (Foreign Military
Financing/Foreign Military Sales)
■■ defense training (International Military Education and Training)
■■ defense institution-building
■■ human rights training
■■ multinational training exercises
■■ defense engagement
■■ TOC network analysis and
information-sharing.
DOD plays a small but important supporting role in countering TOC networks; it
brings unique capabilities in support of U.S.
and partner nation law enforcement. Its role
in countering TOC networks generally falls
into the following supporting lines of effort.
The role of helping partner nations
build capacity cannot be overstated. But this
role will only succeed when it supports each
regional partner’s commitment and investment to build its institutional capacity. The
■■ counternarcotics
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
37
COMMENTARY | Confronting Transnational Organized Crime
main effort for the U.S. interagency community should be to help build and sustain
partner nation capacity across law enforcement, military support to law enforcement in the counternarcotics mission, the
judiciary, and social organizations. There
organized criminal networks in the Western
Hemisphere, the United States will face an
asymmetric security threat in the homeland
in the next several years. Left unchecked,
TOC networks will continue to infiltrate
governments, businesses, and financial
the WISRD environment brings a more
holistic approach to understanding TOC activities and
supports decisionmakers in developing strategies
are significant capacity problems that could
be addressed by military engagement and
cooperation that could have substantial
short- to mid-term impacts in creating
conditions for deeper reform and progress.
These would include improving border
security and partner nation military capacity to support law enforcement in disrupting
and interdicting movement and transfer of
illicit products.
Finally, one of the continuing important roles of the U.S. military in supporting
the effort to counter TOC networks is intelligence analysis and information-sharing
throughout the region. U.S. Southern Command’s Whole-of-Society Information
Sharing for Regional Display (WISRD)
program was developed to create a wholeof-society, enterprise process capability that
provides participating organizations with
a comprehensive common visualization of
the TOC environment to satisfy a range of
agency information requirements and allows
information-sharing across U.S. agencies
and partner nations. The WISRD model
provides the fidelity via a three-dimensional
spatial and temporal visualization that can
be tailored to enable users to intuitively
analyze complex data and formulate better
conclusions. WISRD not only promotes the
“responsibility to share” within the U.S. interagency community, but also allows users to
reach out and share information with nontraditional whole-of-society partners to include
the academic and business communities. The
WISRD environment brings a more holistic
approach to understanding TOC activities
and supports decisionmakers in developing
strategies to combat the complicated and
fluid TOC problem set.
Outlook
Without a concerted U.S. interagency
effort to counter the threat of transnational
38
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
institutions, increasing the difficulty of
countering these insidious organizations
before they reach more robustly into the
Nation. Information-sharing both in the
United States and among its partner nations
will be a key facet of countering these groups.
Stovepiping information helps the enemy.
We must develop a new prism from which
to confront this new type of enemy, which
has no boundaries. WISRD is the first step,
and it must be followed up by increased
information-sharing between the interagencies and partner nations so the TOC environment can be mapped. Then we can have the
same common operational picture to support
actions against TOC networks in order to
gain the advantage. JFQ
NOTES
1
Douglas Farah, Transnational Organized
Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in
Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National
Security Priority (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, August 2012).
2
Juan Carlos Garzón, Mafia & Co.: The
Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2008), 11.
3
Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global
Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005).
4
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to
National Security (Washington, DC: The White
House, July 2011), available at <www.whitehouse.
gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime>.
5
Farah; for details, see Estimating Illicit
Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes
(Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, October 2011), available at <www.unodc.
org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_
financial_flows_2011_web.pdf>. On the higher
end, in a speech to Interpol in Singapore in 2009,
U.S. Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden
cited 15 percent of world gross domestic product
as the total annual turnover of transnational
organized crime networks. See Josh Meyer, “U.S.
attorney general calls for global effort to fight
organized crime,” Los Angeles Times, October
13, 2009, available at <articles.latimes.com/
print/2009/oct/13/nation/na-crime13>.
6
Isabella Bennett and Stewart M. Patrick,
“CFR: Sanctions on MS-13: Not Enough but a
Good First Step,” Council on Foreign Relations
Blog, October 27, 2012, available at <http://blogs.
cfr.org/patrick/2012/10/26/sanctions-on-ms13-not-enough-but-a-good-first-step/>.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime.
10
Robert Killebrew, “Criminal Insurgency in
the Americas and Beyond,” PRISM 2, no. 3 (June
2011), available at <www.ndu.edu/press/criminalinsurgency.html>.
11
Dinorah Azpuru, Political Culture of
Democracy in Guatemala, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times, IX Study
of Democratic Culture of Guatemalans, Vanderbilt
University, May 2011, available at <www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/2010-political-cultureEnglish.pdf>.
12
Robert Killebrew and Jennifer Beranl, Crime
Wars: Gangs, Cartels, and U.S. National Security
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security, September 2010), available at <www.cnas.
org/node/5022>.
13
Farah.
14
National Security Strategy (Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2010), 49, available
at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
Democracy Promotion in Oman
By D i a n a m . H o l l a n D
C
ooperation with and support from the strategically positioned Persian Gulf states
of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are
critical to America’s stated national interests: security, prosperity, human rights
values, and international order.1 In the Gulf region, Iranian hegemonic ambitions,
piracy, and violent extremism pose threats to those interests. The United States has spent billions on military assistance and foreign aid programs in the past decade to ensure the stability
and cooperation of Gulf governments. Nonetheless, as the “Arab Awakening” demonstrated
in 2011, some of these governments face significant internal opposition and could be at risk. If
these states devolve into chaos, or if anti-American regimes come to power, the United States
could face greater challenges in the region.
Colonel Diana M. Holland, USA, is Commander of the 130th Engineer Brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
Al-Shamikh, one of three Kahreef-class Corvettes
under construction for Royal Navy of Oman at
Portsmouth, England
Wikipedia
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
39
COMMENTARY | Democracy Promotion in Oman
One way to sustain stable and friendly
governments in the Gulf is to increase
democracy promotion programs designed
to encourage timely and peaceful transitions
to more representative forms of government.2 In fact, the 2010 National Security
Strategy contends that the United States must
promote democracy because governments
that respect democratic values “are more
just, peaceful and legitimate” and ultimately
protect America’s national interests.3 The
United States does not currently have many
democracy promotion programs in the Gulf,
but if a threat to stability is internal dissatisfaction with autocratic governments, then
stronger efforts toward reform supported by
the United States could foster a more peaceful
political transformation. This process should
begin with the Sultanate of Oman because
many of its citizens desire reform and are
willing to work with the existing government
of the 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran,
as well as more recent combat operations in
the region. The two countries signed a Free
Trade Agreement in 2006, which assists with
economic diversification in preparation for
the depletion of Oman’s oil reserves in the
next 15 years. In 2010, the United States
provided Oman $1.5 million and $8.9 million
under the International Military Education
and Training and Foreign Military Financing programs, respectively. Oman aligns
with American positions on the Arab-Israeli
conflict more frequently than other Arab
states do.6 The United States and Oman are
strong friends, and through this relationship
America can encourage substantive reforms
in that Gulf state.
To appreciate the potential for change
in Oman, it is important to understand its
recent history. Discussions about modern
Oman focus on Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al
Oman has unique potential for democratic
development and could serve as a model of reform
for the other Gulf states
to that end.4 Furthermore, Oman has unique
potential for democratic development and
could serve as a model of reform for the other
Gulf states.
Foreign policy discourse about the
Middle East and American national security
interests there often neglects Oman. The
omission is surprising considering the state’s
geographical position vis-à-vis Iran, the Strait
of Hormuz, and the Arabian Peninsula. One
reason for the neglect is that the Gulf region,
aside from its role in exporting oil, is overshadowed by the dysfunction of the rest of
the Middle East. Regional policymakers and
commentators devote much of their attention to palpable tension or outright conflict
between Israel and its neighbors, the Palestinian refugee problem, and Iranian nuclear
ambitions. Moreover, the other Gulf countries
eclipse Oman because the former have large
oil reserves, host major U.S. military headquarters, and control substantial financial
assets. Finally, the Omanis themselves downplay their ties with the United States in order
to maintain a close relationship with Iran.5
Though the U.S.-Omani relationship is
inconspicuous, the two countries cooperate
in many areas. Oman authorized the use of
its military facilities by U.S. forces in support
40
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Said and the remarkable transformation of
the country during his rule. Sultan Qaboos
replaced his father in 1970 following a
palace coup. The new sultan immediately
confronted and ultimately defeated a 14-year
insurgency. He then turned his attention to
economic and social development, as well
as national unification. He enacted policies
that improved infrastructure, education,
and health care for all Omanis. In the 1990s,
Qaboos instituted significant political
reforms. He created a bicameral legislature
under the Basic Law in 1996. Omanis elect
the members of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Assembly), and the sultan appoints
members of the Majlis al-Dawla (State
Assembly). Women also gained additional
rights under Qaboos including the right to
vote in 2003.7 Compared to their neighbors,
Omanis enjoy considerable religious toleration and economic interaction with the
outside world. The country is relatively safe
even without the trappings of a police state.
It also attracts tourists, who can freely and
independently traverse most of the country.
Ibadism is the dominant form of
Islam in Oman, and its effect on development is important in any assessment of the
country’s potential for political reform.
Ibadism encourages leaders to make decisions through consultation and consensus.
It stresses moderation and toleration
toward fellow members of Omani society,
as well as foreigners and those of different
belief systems. Finally, Ibadism dictates
that communities choose leaders through
elections. These tenets are deeply rooted in
the Omani conscience and over time have
established conditions conducive to democratic principles.8
Despite Oman’s potential receptiveness to liberalization, U.S. policies toward
the Sultanate, like those toward the rest of
the Gulf, normally focus on security and
defense capabilities rather than governance.
Yet the dearth of democracy programs in
this region is also due to the extraordinary
wealth of the oil monarchies. They are not
dependent on American aid and, therefore,
the United States cannot use financial
incentives to leverage them to accept
democracy promotion programs.9 However,
Oman is not as wealthy as the other Gulf
states and faces economic uncertainty
because of its dwindling oil reserves.10 Thus,
economic incentives might be more effective in achieving political change in Oman
than in the other member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council.
The major entities that employ such
programs in the Middle East are the U.S.
Agency for International Development
(USAID), the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) and its affiliates,11 and
the Department of State’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). A survey of
these U.S.-sponsored democracy programs
confirms that Oman is largely overlooked;
the United States provides negligible support
and incentives to Oman through these
organizations. USAID does not allocate any
funding toward governance.12 NED and its
affiliates have little engagement in Oman,
especially when compared to their efforts in
other parts of the region. One of the affiliates, the International Republican Institute,
sponsors a single program that provides
training in legislative procedures. The other
NED affiliate with the mission to train and
educate citizens on democratic principles is
the National Democratic Institute; however,
it has no ongoing programs in Oman.13
Finally, MEPI sponsors 17 programs in
Oman, but they generally focus on economic
development and opportunities made possible by the 2006 Free Trade Agreement.14
ndupres s . ndu. edu
HOLLAND
Even if U.S. policymakers decide to
increase democracy programs, it is important to ask whether Oman wants such
attention. Clearly, the Omani people, and
especially the younger generation, desire
reform. The citizens participate in elections
in large numbers, the Shura continuously
presses for more legislative authority, and
protesters in early 2011 articulated the
desire for change within the existing institutions.15 Additionally, although the sultan
is personally popular, there is concern that
he is over 70 years old, has no children,
and has not announced an heir.16 Upon his
death, there will certainly be questions surrounding future reforms. If Qaboos’s successor is not viewed as legitimate, or does
not demonstrate the intent to reform the
government, the opposition could become
more aggressive.
The sultan himself has stated in numerous forums throughout his reign that Oman
must become more democratic, though
at its own pace and according to its own
traditions.17 Within those guidelines, future
democracy promotion programs should be
specifically designed to encourage gradual
adjustments rather than dramatic transformation. Programs must be inconspicuous
and not associated with the U.S. Government
because of Oman’s relationship with Iran and
the danger of antagonizing radical groups
in the region. This means that private, nongovernmental organizations such as NED,
rather than USAID or MEPI, should sponsor
democracy promotion in Oman.18
Steady reform in Oman could stabilize
the country and serve as a model for other
Gulf states that face potent opposition forces.
The Sultanate’s history suggests that it has
unique potential for democratic reform, and
recent events confirm that its citizens desire
it. Furthermore, Oman is in a position to
positively impact U.S. interests in the region.
With these considerations in mind, American policymakers should designate Oman as
a priority recipient of democracy promotion
efforts. Ultimately, if such programs are
successful, the region may avoid a violent
“Gulf Awakening” and, in turn, deliver the
additional benefit of preserving America’s
national interests. JFQ
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
NOTES
1
National Security Strategy (Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2010), 17.
2
There are several definitions of democracy
promotion. Because the definition of the concept is
not the focus of the argument, the author uses Peter
Burnell’s simplified description: “a wide range of
largely non-coercive attempts to spread democracy
. . . a kind of political intervention in the domestic
affairs . . . to affect the distribution of power.”
See Peter Burnell, Promoting Democracy Abroad
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
2011), 1–2.
3
National Security Strategy, 37.
4
Kenneth Katzman, Oman: Reform, Security,
and U.S. Policy, RS21534 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2011),
summary.
5
Ibid., 11–12.
6
Ibid., 7–15. For example, Oman did not
end diplomatic relations with Egypt after the
latter concluded the 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
Sultan Qaboos hosted working groups to support
the Madrid Peace Process. Israel is allowed to
participate in the Desalination Research Center
located in Oman. Finally, Oman expressed interest
in renewing trade ties with Israel if the latter would
halt settlement construction in the West Bank.
7
Additionally, the sultan has appointed 14
women to the Majlis al-Dawla since its founding. See Marc Valeri, “Liberalization from
Above: Political Reforms and Sultanism in
Oman,” in Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi
Khalaf and Giacoko Luciani, 189–193 (Dubai:
Gulf Research Center, 2006). Omanis elected
one woman to the Majlis al-Shura in October
2011. See “Omani Elections Leaves Questions Unanswered,” The Financial Times,
October 17, 2011, available at <www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/33e00b18-f893-11e0-ad8f-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1dQnSF7hM>.
8
Hussein Ghubash, Oman—The Islamic
Democratic Tradition, trans. Mary Turton (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 2–3, 200–203.
9
Tom Pierre Najem, “Good Governance,” in
Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies, ed. Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington, 14 (New York: Routledge, 2003).
10
Ranked 78th of the 226 countries in the
world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP),
Oman is the poorest of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. Bahrain has a lower
GDP than Oman, but it has one-third of Oman’s
population and therefore a much higher GDP
per capita. Oman’s GDP per capita ranks in last
place along with Saudi Arabia, but the latter’s
overall GDP is nine times that of Oman and the
wealth greatly empowers the Saudi ruling family.
See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The
World Factbook (Washington, DC: CIA, 2012),
available at <www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/>.
11
The National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) has four affiliates: the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute,
the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), and the Center for International
Private Enterprise (CIPE). Each is aligned with
a political party or major U.S. interest group and
promotes reform in other countries in accordance
with the agendas of those parties and interests.
ACILS (now termed the Solidarity Center), for
instance, conducts training and education on
unions and labor; CIPE designs programs that
facilitate small business.
12
U.S. Agency for International Development,
“Middle East Countries,” available at <http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/countries/
index.html>.
13
International Republican Institute, “Gulf
Program Overview,” Washington, DC, 2010, 1;
National Democratic Institute, “Where we work,”
available at <www.ndi.org/wherewework>.
14
Middle East Partnership Initiative, “Oman
Country Profile,” March 20, 2010, available at
<www.abudabi.mepi.state.gov/currentprojectsby
countryoman.html>.
15
Reform groups consist mostly of younger
Omanis, many of whom are unemployed and
largely motivated by the country’s economic conditions. The unemployment rate was last measured
at 15 percent in 2004. The overall GCC average is
4.2 percent. See Elizabeth Broomhall, “Bahrain
and Oman have highest Gulf unemployment
rates,” Arabian Business, July 7, 2011, available at
<www.arabianbusiness.com/bahrain-oman-havehighest-gulf-unemployment-rates-409116.html>;
and Angus McDowall, “Protests in Oman Sputter,”
The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2011.
16
Katzman, 2–3. The sultan has established a
succession process. The “Ruling Family Council”
will meet to designate a successor within 3 days of
Qaboos’s death. If it fails to select someone, it will
unseal a letter left by Qaboos in which he names
the next sultan. This process is controversial in
Oman because it contradicts the Ibadi idea of consensus and election. See Valeri, 192–193.
17
Joseph A. Kéchichian, “A Vision of Oman:
State of the Sultanate Speeches by Qaboos bin
Said, 1970–2006,” Middle East Policy 15 (Fall
2008), 17; Judith Miller, “Creating Modern Oman:
An Interview with Sultan Qaboos,” Foreign
Affairs 76 (May–June 1997), 14.
18
Madeleine K. Albright and Vin Weber,
cochairs, In Support of Arab Democracy: Why
and How, Independent Task Force Report No. 54
(Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations,
2005), 4–9.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
41
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus learns
about Brazilian riverine operations at
Estacao Naval Riverine Base, Manaus
U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien)
RESTORING THE “UNWRITTEN ALLIANCE”
Brazil-U.S. Relations
By l a W r e n c e t . B r o W n
T
he primary challenge the
United States faces in the 21st
century, according to historian
and diplomat Joseph Nye, “is
not one of decline but what to do in light of
the realization that even the largest country
cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without
the help of others.”1 Acknowledging Brazil
as a genuine partner is problematic for
American leaders since the United States
exercised tremendous unilateral influence in
South American affairs throughout the 19th
and 20th centuries. Today, U.S. hubris lingers
in relations with Brazil. This residual attitude prompts some U.S. leaders to consider
any Brazilian disregard for U.S. interests
as an affront. Instead of regarding Brazil’s
42
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
economic growth as a challenge to U.S.
hegemony, U.S. leaders should commend it as
a regional achievement. Additionally, some
current perceptions of the two countries’
strategic interests as continuing to diverge are
historically shortsighted. Such a view affirms
a U.S. failure to adapt long-range diplomatic
strategies to match the global rise of many
countries. Undeniably, the United States
needs Brazil—now and in the future.
Economically, Brazil is becoming the
most important country to the United States
in the Western Hemisphere. It will become
the fifth largest world economy by 2015,
while Canada will be eleventh and Mexico
fifteenth.2 Moreover, “By the end of 2009,
Brazil’s economy represented forty percent
of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of
Latin America and the Caribbean, and fiftyfive percent of the GDP of South America
alone.”3 Brazil will host both the 2014 World
Cup and the 2016 Olympics; accordingly, it is
investing billions of dollars in infrastructure
and security improvements throughout the
country. Additionally, a new oil field has
been discovered off the coast near Rio de
Janeiro. The find has drawn great interest
from the United States, which is seeking oil
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, USA, is the Director of Operations for the Office of the Defense
Representative–Pakistan.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
BROWN
autonomy from the Middle East. This offshore oil field and others will double Brazil’s
output of petroleum by 2020.4
Former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton proclaimed a “new 21st Century
reality—that GDP matters more than
military might.”5 Her pronouncement
reprioritized economics to the forefront
of U.S. foreign policy. She cited Brazil and
India as examples of 21st-century economic
success.6 As U.S. foreign policy focuses
more on economics, the U.S. relationship
with Brazil assumes greater importance. If
economics has become the primary interest
in U.S. foreign policy, then failure to build
a stronger strategic partnership with Brazil
will be a huge opportunity lost for substantial
economic trade and growth. Already Brazil
has concluded Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUR) free trade agreements with
Israel, along with a separate trade arrangement with Egypt.7 Additionally, Brazil has
entered into special trading agreements
with South Africa and India, which are also
rapidly growing global economies.8 The
European Union and various other countries
have recognized Brazil’s rise and future economic potential. They, too, plan to make the
most of what Brazil’s economy has to offer.
Tides of History
The United States so far has not
viewed its bilateral relationship with Brazil
through the lens of history. Brazil’s recent
economic growth should not be regarded
as a miracle of a Third World country.
Rather, its rise represents the reemergence
of a global economic and diplomatic player
from the early to mid-20th century. At that
time, the United States supported Brazil’s
preeminence in South America. President
Theodore Roosevelt even hoped that Brazil
would be the responsible party for supporting the Monroe Doctrine within the region.9
Approximately 20 years later, Brazil became
one of the original members of the League
of Nations and committed the only Latin
American ground forces to the Allied cause
in World War II, deploying an entire division
to Europe. Unfortunately, Brazil’s rise to
preeminence in South America was interrupted by authoritarian military rule that
sapped its international credibility for over
two decades. Only now has Brazil regained
its capability and potential for regional
and global leadership. As before, there is a
window of opportunity for Washington to
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
redefine the U.S.-Brazil strategic relationship
and restore the “Unwritten Alliance”10 that
was initially established by Secretary of State
Elihu Root, whose work toward greater panAmerican understanding contributed to his
receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1912.
leadership through the Monroe Doctrine
and Rio Treaty—and receiving much dissent
along the way. Now it is Brazil that is criticized for both taking action and not taking
enough action. But Brazil has the wherewithal to successfully manage this transition.
Brazil’s rise represents the reemergence of a global economic
and diplomatic player from the early to mid-20th century
Consistent Player
Today, Brazil sees itself as a regional
leader. Its strategy is not to disrupt or disturb
any multilateral organizations, despite its
growing power, “but to adapt them and
employ [its strengths] as platforms to advance
Brazilian interests.”11 This strategy nests
nicely with two of President Dilma Rousseff’s areas for action: “diversifying relations
by forging stronger economic and political
ties with other nations of the developing
world; and supporting multilateralism by
pushing for the democratization of global
governance.”12 Brazil has recently proved its
unfaltering pursuit of these goals, and this
commitment has not been lost on the other
11 South American countries. In view of Brazil’s significant economic progress, its neighbors acknowledge that Brazil is now a serious
global player and economic powerhouse.
Proximity to Brazil will not only benefit these
South American countries, but also position
regional relations to eliminate the need to
look elsewhere for economic support.
Historically, Brazil has already exercised
leadership in conflict disputes between other
countries in the region. In 1942, it played a
key role in resolving the Ecuador-Peru war.
Brazil arbitrated a peace settlement between
them again in 1995.13 Likewise, it has shared
hydroelectric power with its neighbors and
entered into cooperative security agreements,
brokered distribution of fresh water, and
managed regional environmental programs.
However, Brazil’s government has had difficulty with indigenous minority groups. For
example, it is constantly challenged to persuade the Amazon aboriginals that they will
benefit from certain regional infrastructure
projects. Still, through protracted negotiations, it has generally compensated displaced
and dispossessed peoples. Essentially, Brazil is
growing into its role as the regional leader.
The United States once held this difficult position in South America, exercising
History is on its side. Brazil has remained at
peace with its neighbors for nearly 150 years.
No other emerging power in the world enjoys
this kind of accomplishment.
Brazil’s Defense Minister Celso
Amorim has recently stated that his government’s goal is to transform South America
into a true “Peace Zone.”14 Brazil has largely
accomplished this goal. The United States
should actively support Brazil’s ongoing
objective of a continental Peace Zone. Such
U.S. support would help convince the majority of Brazilians and Latin Americans that
the primary U.S. interest is not to pursue
imperial power and resource domination, but
to promote international trade, investment,
and security. Indeed, greater leadership roles
for responsible countries in the global system
actually strengthen U.S. worldwide interests
and U.S. domestic security.15
Understanding Motivation
The United States, however, must
do a better job understanding how Brazil
approaches diplomacy and difficult problems. In terms of interests versus values,
Brazil emphasizes its constitutional values
more than at any other time in its history.
Self-determination, nonintervention,
defense of peace, peaceful settlement of
conflicts, repudiation of terrorism and
racism, cooperation among peoples for
the progress of mankind, and granting of
political asylum are among the salient constitutional values that Brazil uses to shape
its international relations today.16 Out of
these, the peaceful settlement of disputes is
highlighted in the preamble of its constitution. Indeed, it is the singular driving force
behind Brazil’s foreign policy.
For example, Brazil has been exhibiting
its constitutional values of nonintervention
and peaceful settlement of conflicts when
dealing with truculent Iran. As a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
43
U.S. Army (Kaye Richey)
COMMENTARY | Brazil-U.S. Relations
USSOUTHCOM director, at Conference of Directors of Peacekeeping Operations, discusses opportunities for cooperation
Council (UNSC), Brazil voted against
implementing sanctions on Iran in 2010. In
its minority vote with Turkey, Brazil claimed
that “sanctions will most probably lead to the
suffering of the people of Iran and will play
in the hands of those, on all sides, that do not
want dialogue to prevail. Past experiences in
the U.N., notably the case of Iraq, show that
the spiral of sanctions, threats and isolation
can result in tragic consequences.”17 In this
case, Brazil acted according to its core principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes.
In addition, along with Turkey, Brazilians did
not believe they were allowed enough time
to culminate their tentative agreement with
Iran. Brasília’s principal complaint was the
perceived rush to sanctions.
Likewise, Brazil’s abstention the
following year on UNSCR 1973, which
authorized UN member states to take
all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya, also
demonstrated Brazil’s consistent pursuit
of peaceful diplomacy. Explaining Brazil’s
abstention, Ambassador Maria Luiza
44
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Ribeiro Viotti argued that “No military
action alone would succeed in ending the
conflict. Protecting civilians, ensuring
lasting settlement and addressing the legitimate demands of Libyan citizens demanded
a political process.”18 The ambassador was
somewhat prophetic: the militias that overthrew Muammar Qadhafi with assistance
from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over a year ago are now the overlords
of cities and towns across Libya, while the
fledgling police and military are too weak
to control them. Libya watchers and international media note that the recent surge of
militant violence against foreign diplomats,
military, and police officers demonstrates
a largely lawless Libya with little stability
or security.19 Again, Brazil’s vote affirmed
its value of nonintervention and peaceful
settlement of conflicts.
This common thread of values is
woven throughout Brazilian diplomacy.
Along with 137 other countries, Brazil
recently supported a UN General Assembly
vote condemning Syrian leaders’ ongoing
violations on their citizens’ human rights.
It also supported an Arab League plan for
a political transition in Syria.20 Brazil’s
support, which moved from an earlier
abstention in December 2011 on a similar
resolution, still focuses on a peaceful political transition, not a violent one. Whether
it is resolving a border conflict in South
America, dealing with the erratic Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela, or negotiating with
the radical Islamic regime in Iran, Brazil has
shown itself consistent in word and deed to
its core constitutional values. It is a responsible and rational actor in its foreign policy
and regional relations.
Diplomatic Recommendations
Several proposals would set the U.S.Brazil relationship on a positive path for the
next 20 years. They would also allay Brazil’s
historic concerns for sovereignty and reciprocity. Implementation of these recommendations would garner immediate reciprocal
benefits from the Brazilian government and
lay the groundwork for future bilateral coop-
ndupres s . ndu. edu
BROWN
eration both regionally and globally. Stronger
U.S.-Brazil relations would bolster homeland,
regional, and international security.
First, Washington needs to formally
endorse Brasilia’s bid for a permanent seat
on the UNSC. The United States extended
this support to India. Brazil’s nominal GDP
is projected to grow to the fifth largest in the
world by 2015 while India’s will grow only to
ninth largest, immediately behind Russia.21
India’s GDP may surpass Brazil’s in the
future based on the purchasing power parity
(PPP) methodology, but once PPP GDP is
adjusted per capita, Brazil will remain ahead
of India in 2015.22 Furthermore, “Unlike
India, [Brazil] has no insurgents, no ethnic
and religious conflicts nor hostile neighbors.”23 It is problematic that India, which
has yet to resolve its conflict in Kashmir
and Jammu with Pakistan, should receive a
permanent UNSC seat before Brazil.24 Any
future UN political agreement regarding
Kashmir would be severely limited by an
Indian veto on the UNSC if this proposed
agreement is not in New Delhi’s best interest. Other permanent members of the
UNSC—France, the United Kingdom,
and Russia—all affirmed their support for
Brazil’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat.25
China, however, remains uncommitted to
both Brazil and India. Vociferous against
Japan’s candidacy for a permanent UNSC
seat, China has remained silent with regard to
India. It is unlikely that China would support
India’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat due
to its growing strategic partnership with the
United States to counter China’s military rise.
Also, China does not want to jeopardize its
growing friendship with Pakistan. If Beijing
does eventually support Brasilia’s bid to the
Security Council, Washington would remain
the last holdout. In March 2011, President
Barack Obama endorsed the concept of an
equal partnership.26 But to be equal partners,
Brazil and the United States should be seated
side by side on the UNSC as permanent
members. Failure to endorse Brazil’s bid to
occupy a permanent seat would confirm
Brazil’s lingering suspicions that “the United
States commitment to a mature relationship
between equals is largely rhetorical.”27
Second, at the earliest opportunity, the
U.S. President should advance Brazil’s position in the National Security Strategy (NSS)
from secondary to one of primary interest.
Informed by this higher priority, Brazil’s
leaders would be assured of U.S. intentions to
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
improve bilateral relations and cooperation
across a wide range of security and economic
issues throughout the world, particularly in
South America. This reprioritization would
also lend legitimacy to President Obama’s
pledge to treat Brazil as an equal partner,
not a junior one. The NSS declares: “We are
working to build deeper and more effective
partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia, as
well as increasingly influential nations such
as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia.”28 This
statement clearly delineates two groupings
of nations. First, it lists China, India, and
Russia as key centers of influence. Next, it
lists Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia as
increasingly influential nations. Both China
and Russia already occupy permanent seats
on the UNSC affirming that they are key
centers of influence.
Listing Brazil in the NSS as only an
“increasingly influential nation” after considering the evidence of its economic power
is unsound. Regardless, designating India a
“key center of influence” is consistent with
U.S. support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Furthermore, the
United States and India are already strategic
partners because of shared concerns over a
potentially hostile China. However, there are
enormous differences in security, diplomatic,
economic, and democratic contributions to
international order between South Africa
and Indonesia, on one hand, and Brazil on
the other. The strategic designation of Brazil
as an increasingly influential nation and not
a “key center of influence” supports former
U.S. Ambassador Luigi Einaudi’s view that
“Washington’s identification of Brazil with
Latin America and the Third World hampers
its appreciation of Brazil’s importance to the
United States.”29
Consider this: South Africa’s and Indonesia’s economies are respectively the 28th and
18th in the world. Significantly larger, Brazil
hosts the world’s seventh largest economy.30
Acknowledging Brazil’s global status in the
NSS would foster a stronger relationship.
It would place Brazil on equal ground with
other major global players such as China and
Russia. And it would require Congress, the
Department of State, and the Department of
Defense to give greater attention to our new
equal partner to the south.
Interestingly, the 2011 U.S. National
Military Strategy (NMS) actually supports
South American regional structures and
implies Brazil’s leadership: “We welcome
efforts by Brazil and our other regional
partners to establish economic and security
mechanisms, such as the South American
Defense Council (SADC).” The SADC is
a suborganization of the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR).31 It was
modeled after the European Union, whose
long-term goals of continental integration are
similar. Another regional South American
organization not mentioned in the NMS is
MERCOSUR, in which Brazil has become the
natural leader due to its expansive economy.
Through these organizations, Brazil has
exercised regional leadership by addressing
regional problems “without having to turn
to extra-regional powers, such as the United
States.”32 In the NSS, President Obama
specifically cited Brazil’s exceptional role
in Latin America: “We welcome Brazil’s
leadership and seek to move beyond dated
North-South divisions to pursue progress on
bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues.”33
These policy statements clearly indicate that
the United States prefers to work with any
organization, sovereign or multilateral, that
is proactively working to solve problems.
UNASUR, MERCOSUR, and even the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States are potential U.S. partners for
hemispheric and regional progress. President
Obama has welcomed Brazil’s leadership
in these organizations in executive policy
documents, but his statements have not been
matched by specific actions.
Appointing a U.S. Ambassador to
UNASUR, as Washington already does for the
European Union and Organization of American States, is one measure that would immediately demonstrate practical U.S. support
for regional “economic and security mechanisms,” as stated in the NSS. There are several
benefits for the United States. Latin American
multilateral institutions such as UNASUR
provide an alternative to Hugo Chavez’s
version of Bolivarianism within the region,
which is a definite concern of the United
States. Instead of criticizing the policies of
the Venezuelan regime directly, Brazil has
decided to use its own example of establishing
generally good relations throughout the world
to encourage Chavez to act more rationally
than he would if confronted directly about his
radical tendencies. This approach has apparently worked.34 By participating as an active
observer in regional organizations, and by
establishing formal diplomatic relations with
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
45
COMMENTARY | Brazil-U.S. Relations
UNASUR, the United States would do much
to extinguish any lingering doubts about the
“Colossus of the North.”35
Brasilia’s regional activism enables
Washington to focus its diminishing foreign
aid budget on the unstable parts of the
developing world. These proposed diplomatic
initiatives are good faith measures crafted to
lay the groundwork for greater friendship.
They should allay Brazilian concerns regarding sovereignty and reciprocity. Additionally, more positive U.S.-Brazil relations will
facilitate future bilateral cooperation on
economic and defense measures regionally
and throughout the world.
Military Recommendations
Strengthened military relations naturally flow from improved diplomatic relations. As regional leaders, the United States
and Brazil can focus their combined security
efforts and resources against common
threats to both nations—and to the entire
Western Hemisphere. Intelligence-sharing
during the upcoming World Cup and
Olympic games, coordinated counterterrorism measures in the Tri-Border Area (TBA,
the name given to the area surrounding the
border shared among Brazil, Argentina, and
Paraguay), and disrupting narco-trafficking
between South America and Africa are
among the more pressing cooperation
initiatives that can bring greater security
to both countries and to the hemisphere.
Close security and defense cooperation in
the future, absent the historic shadow of U.S.
tance has provided Underwater Explosive,
Critical Incident, and Special Events Management, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and related equipment training.”36
Both the 2006 World Cup in Germany and
the South African event transpired successfully with low-key U.S. security assistance.
There were no terrorist attacks despite
ongoing large-scale operations against terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time.
When President Obama visited Brazil in
2011, one of the agreements resulting was
a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the United States and Brazil concerning world sporting events cooperation.
Security was one of the MOU’s six focus areas
of cooperation. This MOU is foundational for
the U.S. Departments of State and Defense
to provide any future support desired by the
Brazilian government.37
One of the great strengths of the United
States resides in its intelligence databases,
whose holdings and effectiveness have grown
substantially since 9/11. For the 2014 World
Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil, an
intelligence-sharing mechanism would help
deter terrorism threats. Successful physical or
virtual sharing could continue afterward to
address other regional security threats, such
as drug-trafficking and organized crime. Of
course, extending temporary intelligencesharing after the events may be problematic
due to Brazilian memory of its authoritarian
past, when the military regime collected
intelligence to deter internal dissent.38 U.S.
officials have the next 4 years to convince
close security and defense cooperation would help in
reestablishing the Unwritten Alliance dynamic
imperialism, would help in reestablishing
the Unwritten Alliance dynamic between the
United States and Brazil that flourished in
the first half of the 20th century.
When Brazil hosts the World Cup and
Olympics, it will be in the U.S. national interest to assist its efforts in countering terrorism,
curbing drug-trafficking, and reducing international crime. The United States provided
similar support to South Africa during the
World Cup in 2010, assisting in preventing
devastating terrorist attacks on that world
stage. South African security services benefited from security grants and extensive
training: “Specifically, Anti-Terrorism Assis-
46
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
the Brazilian government of its benign
intentions. With less than 2 years before the
opening kick of 2014 World Cup, beta testing
of this provisional intelligence-sharing
arrangement should begin immediately to
track terrorist threats likely to originate in
the Tri-Border Area.
Exposed Southern Flank
The United States has long worried
about the Tri-Border Area. In these border
towns, laws are minimally enforced, money
is laundered, and weapons, drugs, and
people are trafficked. Organized crime and
Islamic extremism have thrived there due to
a lack of effective law enforcement from the
three border nations.39 Concerns increased
after 9/11 that al Qaeda could transit porous
borders, perhaps through Mexico, to attack
U.S. interests in North America.40 Today, as
the specter of war with Iran rises because of
its purported pursuit of nuclear weapons,
the concern has moved from attacks by
al Qaeda to attacks by Hizballah and its
patron Iran. As recently as October 2011,
Iran was accused of authorizing and financing an assassination attempt against the
Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United
States and contemplating further attacks
in Argentina.41 Successful terrorist attacks
against Argentina were carried out in 1992
and 1994 by a Hizballah militant organization supported by Iran. Terrorists exploited
the TBA during each operation.42 The most
telling evidence of potential terrorist attacks
out of the TBA surfaced during a Hizballah militiaman’s interview by Spanish
television station Telemundo. The militant
stated emphatically that if the United States
attacked Iran, Hizballah would conduct
retaliatory attacks inside the United
States.43 Counterterrorism expert Edward
Luttwak described the TBA as Hizballah’s
most important base outside Lebanon, from
which they have already supported terrorist
attacks: “The northern region of Argentina,
the eastern region of Paraguay and even
Brazil are large terrains, and they have an
organized training and recruitment camp
for terrorists.”44
The historical evidence of terrorist
activity emanating from the TBA is chilling. If the current crisis with Iran is not
resolved by the time of the World Cup and
Olympics, the Brazilian government will
need substantial help in preventing terrorist attacks aimed at disrupting the games
and attracting a global audience. Even now,
Hizballah terrorists may be inclined to
strike at Israeli or American targets in the
Western Hemisphere in retaliation for a
recent UNSC resolution that placed additional sanctions on Iran. Hizballah attacked
its targets in Argentina for lesser reasons
in 1992 and 1994. This is why intelligencesharing with Brazil must start now. The last
time the United States held a 3+1 Group
Meeting (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
the United States) on TBA security was
in 2004.45 This group should reconvene
at the earliest opportunity to assess the
current terrorist threat within the TBA and
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BROWN
determine the probabilities of Hizballah
becoming operational if Iran is attacked.
Nevertheless, collaborative intelligence
initiatives must extend to the World Cup
and Olympic timeframes if Iran continues
to violate UNSC resolutions concerning its
nuclear program. It is in both countries’
national interests to prevent attacks against
their homelands. Certainly, Brazil does not
want its territory used as a springboard for
attacks within the region. Full cooperation
in this security arena would assist in preventing the unthinkable until the Iran crisis
over dual-use nuclear material is resolved.
Narco-terrorist Connection
Cooperation in breaking the Brazil–
West Africa narcotics connection is another
area where national interests converge. In
2009, Brazil became the primary embarkation point for South American cocaine
headed for West Africa, where “there is
evidence by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
[Administration] . . . that Latin American
traffickers are collaborating with [al Qaeda]
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Hezbollah to smuggle cocaine to Europe.”46 The
executive director of the UN Office on Drugs
and Crime also confirmed that terrorists
from Africa used money from drug-trafficking to resource operations, purchase equipment, and provide salaries for their ranks.47 It
is common knowledge that the United States
conducts counterterrorist operations against
AQIM and seeks to stop any funding derived
from the transshipment of cocaine from
Latin America. Although Brazil itself does
not produce significant amounts of cocaine,
it does have 10,500 miles of mostly unsecured
coastline. In addition, three of the world’s top
producers of cocaine border Brazil: Bolivia,
Colombia, and Peru. Brazil has invested
more heavily in enforcing its borders since its
economic boom, but the United States could
assist by continuing the same intelligencesharing mechanism that has been proposed
for the World Cup and Olympics. Additionally, Brazil’s unmanned aerial surveillance
program is currently in its infancy; it could
benefit from the experience and systems of
the mature U.S. programs. Building on the
predicted intelligence successes of the World
Cup and Olympics, this cooperation could
expand to neighboring countries. Eventually,
it could evolve into a hemispheric security
network serving the national interests of all
participating nations.
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Brazil’s Initiative for Cooperation
Conclusion
The last area of convergence and
cooperation is not American, but Brazilian.
Brasília is as interested as Washington in a
stronger relationship. Former foreign minister Celso Amorin, who is now the defense
minister, recognized that there is enormous
potential for structured cooperation between
Brazil and the United States in areas of the
world such as Africa, where there is great
need for development and stability.48 Minister Amorin has cited the trilateral cooperation agreement among Brazil, GuineaBissau, and the United States as an example
of productive cooperation. This was a first of
its kind agreement for the United States and
Brazil in Africa.
These trilateral agreements make
strategic sense because bilateral agreements between the United States and
relatively poor countries usually elicit
criticism that the world’s only superpower
is engaging in exploitive neocolonialism.
Having itself been a Portuguese colony,
Brazil is viewed as a moderating influence on perceived expansive U.S. foreign
policy. It is also considered a friendly
observer to the Non-Aligned Movement
of 120 countries that are distrustful of
superpower diplomacy.49 Plainly spoken, if
Brazil is part of a U.S. agreement with an
impoverished country, that country feels
more comfortable making an agreement
with the United States because Brazil, a
guarantor of U.S. intentions, is part of
it. Brazil welcomes this role because it
enhances its position as a regional and
world leader, establishes a singularly
special diplomatic relationship with
the United States, and fulfills two of its
foreign policy action areas. 50 And its role
as a third-party broker does not end with
Africa or other poor regions. Brazil sees
itself as a viable broker for peace as evidenced by its last-ditch diplomatic effort
with Iran, which attempted to resolve the
uranium-processing crisis.
Minister Amorin shared his idea to
expand trilateral frameworks with Secretary of State Clinton during President Rousseff’s inauguration. Although Secretary
Clinton seemed open to it at the time, there
is no evidence of further action. One hopes
this was not an opportunity missed with
Brazil. It aligns impeccably with President
Obama’s pursuit of more partnerships and
greater burdensharing.
With the war in Iraq over and the war
in Afghanistan winding down, the United
States has the opportunity to reassess its
global strategic interests. U.S. leaders must
carefully scrutinize Brazil’s potential as a
long-term strategic partner. A new era of
security cooperation with Brazil supports
the interests of both nations and strengthens
the Western Hemisphere. Collaboration on
World Cup and Olympic security is vital to
the whole world. Many hemispheric homelands are at risk if war breaks out with Iran
for whatever reason. Also, drug lords moving
narcotics from South America to Europe
through Africa represent new relationships
of convenience that provide funds for AQIM
and other terrorists that further converge
U.S.-Brazil interests. As Brazil grows, so will
its security concerns. It has become a responsible international player that is seeking
greater diplomatic and security cooperation
with the United States. It is willing to help
secure the hemispheric and global commons
to ensure freedom, stability, and prosperity.51
However, the United States, acknowledging
its domineering past in this region, must
give a little to gain a lot. Only then can the
Unwritten Alliance be restored. JFQ
NOTES
1
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American
Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,”
Foreign Affairs 89, no. 6 (November–December
2010), 2–12.
2
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF
Data Mapper,” September 2011, available at
<www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php>.
3
James K. Rose, “BRIC in the Backyard:
Brazil’s Economic Rise and What It Means for
the United States,” Issue Paper, U.S. Army War
College, July 2011, CSL-2, available at <www.csl.
army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP14_11.pdf>.
4
Roberto Setubal, “The Opportunities and
Challenges for President Dilma Rouseff,” Americas Quarterly, no. 2 (Spring 2011), 63–64.
5
Leslie H. Gelb, “Hillary Hits the Mark,” The
Daily Beast, October 14, 2011, available at <www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/14/hillaryclinton-speech-to-economic-club-of-new-york-abrilliant-moment.html>.
6
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Economic Statecraft,” October 14, 2011, available at <www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175552.htm>.
7
Rose, CSL-3.
8
“Trade between India, Brazil and South
Africa set to grow to $25 bn by 2015,” The
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
47
COMMENTARY | Brazil-U.S. Relations
Economic Times, October 19, 2011, available
at <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.
com/2011-10-19/news/30297859_1_trade-ministers-trade-data-southern-african-customs-union>.
9
E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance:
Rio-Branco and Brazilian American Relations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 172.
10
See Elihu Root, Speeches Incident to the
Visit of Secretary Root to South America: July 4
to September 30, 1906 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 61. Unwritten
Alliance is a term derived from Secretary of State
Root’s speech given to the Federal Senate of Brazil
in Rio de Janeiro on August 6, 1906. This term
was used to describe the strong diplomatic relationship between the two countries from 1906 to
1942, when a formal alliance was signed between
the countries: “Let us know each other better; let
us aid each other in the great work of advancing
civilization; let the United States of North America
and the United States of Brazil join hands, not
in formal written treaties of alliance, but in the
universal sympathy and confidence and esteem
of their peoples—join hands to help humanity
forward along the paths we have been so happy as
to tread.”
11
Samuel W. Bodman and James D. Wolfensohn, chairs, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil
Relations (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign
Relations, July 2011), 46.
12
Peter J. Meyer, Brazil-U.S. Relations,
RL33456 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, October 2012), 11.
13
Luigi R. Einaudi, Brazil and the United
States: The Need for Strategic Engagement, INSS
Strategic Forum 266 (Washington DC: NDU
Press, March 2011), 7.
14
Celso Amorim, “Reflections on Brazil’s
Global Rise,” Americas Quarterly, no. 2 (Spring
2011), 50–55.
15
Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. to China and
Brazil: Take Up the White Man’s Burden,” The
American Interest, November 9, 2011, available at <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/
wrm/2011/11/09/us-to-china-and-brazil-take-upthe-white-mans-burden/>.
16
Constitution of the Federative Republic of
Brazil, 3rd ed. (Brasília: Documentation and Information Center, 2010), Title I, Article 4.
17
Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, “Security
Council Explanation of vote—Resolution on
Iran,” June 9, 2010, available at <www.un.int/
brazil/speech/10d-mlrv-csnu-explanation-voteiran-0906.html>.
18
United Nations, SC/10200, “Security
Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya,
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect
Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” February 16, 2012, available at <www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>.
19
Mathieu Galtier, “Militias are taking over
in post-Gadhafi Libya,” USA Today, January 3,
48
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
2013, available at <www.usatoday.com/story/news/
world/2013/01/03/libya-militias/1802523/>.
20
United Nations, GA/11207/Rev.1*, “General
Assembly Adopts Resolution Strongly Condemning ‘widespread and systematic’ Human Rights
Violations by the Syrian authorities,” February
16, 2012, available at <www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2012/ga11207.doc.htm>.
21
IMF.
22
Purchasing power parity (PPP) determines
relative size of the economy based on adjusted
parity of currencies for all goods and services in
a year. It is most useful in discussing measures
of gross domestic product (GDP) and individual
relative incomes and costs, but usually not optimal
in discussing entire nations’ GDPs as it relates
to international trade. For example, PPP GDP
will appropriately explain whether an American,
Chinese, or Brazilian can afford food and housing
right in his own domestic market since it accounts
for trade inside the country as well. Nominal GDP
explains how much value an economy produces
as agreed upon by the current world market (for
example, U.S. produces x, China produces y, and
Brazil produces z). Nominal GDP is the preferred
measurement when discussing international trade
relative to other countries.
23
“Leaders: Brazil takes off,” The Economist,
November 14, 2009, 15.
24
“India–Kashmir (1947–first combat
deaths),” Ploughshares, March 31, 2011,
available at <www.ploughshares.ca/content/
india-kashmir-1947-first-combat-deaths>.
25
Bodman and Wolfensohn, 47.
26
“Remarks by the President to the People of
Brazil in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,” March 20, 2011,
available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/03/20/remarks-president-peoplebrazil-rio-de-janeiro-brazil>.
27
Bodman and Wolfensohn, 48.
28
National Security Strategy (Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2010), 3.
29
Einaudi, 1.
30
IMF.
31
“What Is the South American Defense
Council?” Just the Facts, June 9, 2010, available at <http://justf.org/blog/2010/06/09/
what-south-american-defense-council>.
32
Meyer, 13.
33
National Security Strategy, 44.
34
Bodman and Wolfensohn, 55.
35
Thomas P. Anderson, Politics in Central
America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988), 225.
36
Jana Winter, “U.S. Helps South Africa
Beef up Security for World Cup After Al Qaeda
Threats,” Fox News, April 9, 2010, available at
<www.foxnews.com/world/2010/04/09/helpssouth-africa-beef-security-world-cup-al-qaedathreats/>.
37
U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum
of Understanding between the U.S. and Brazil
on Cooperation to Support the Organization of
Major Global Sporting Events,” March 19, 2011,
available at <www.state.gov/documents/organization/158857.pdf>.
38
“World Briefing, The Americas; Brazil:
Suspensions for Domestic Spying,” The New York
Times, September 2, 2008.
39
Glenn Curtis, Terrorist and Organized
Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of
South America (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, July 2003, revised December 2010).
40
Mark S. Steinitz, “Middle East Terrorist
Activity in Latin America,” Policy Papers on the
Americas 14, Study 7, July 2003.
41
Richard Esposito and Brain Ross, “Iran
‘Directed’ Washington, DC, Terror Plot, U.S.
Says,” ABC News, October 11, 2011, available
at <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/us-irantied-terror-plot-washington-dc-disrupted/
story?id=14711933#>.
42
William R. Long, “Islamic Jihad Says
It Bombed Embassy; Toll 21,” Los Angeles
Times, March 19, 1992, available at <http://
articles.latimes.com/1992-03-19/news/
mn-5905_1_islamic-jihad>.
43
Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, “Hezbollah builds a Western base,” MSNBC.com, May
9, 2007, available at <www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/17874369/ns/world_news-americas/t/hezbollahbuilds-western-base/#.TzgJ1pikdCo>.
44
Ibid.
45
U.S. Department of State, “Communique
of the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security,”
December 6, 2004, available at <www.state.gov/p/
wha/rls/70992.htm>.
46
Nancy Brune, “The Brazil-Africa Narco
Nexus,” Americas Quarterly, no. 3 (Fall 2011),
59–62.
47
Antonio Maria Costa, “Africa Under
Attack,” United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, December 8, 2009, available at <www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/200908-12-africa-under-attack.html>.
48
Amorim, 55.
49
“Profile: Non-Aligned Movement,” BBC
News, August 7, 2009, available at <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2798187.stm>.
50
Meyer, 11.
51
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 2012), 3, available
at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
JCSE
JCSE members ensure rapid connectivity to
multiple users accessing network and deploying
assets during operational exercise
Joint Communications Support Element
The Voice Heard ’Round the World
By k i r B y e . W a t s o n
I
n early January 2010, a catastrophic 7.0-magnitude earthquake rippled through Port-au-Prince, Haiti,
affecting more than 3 million people and resulting in one of the worst natural disasters in history. More
than 250,000 homes and buildings were destroyed including the Presidential Palace, National Assembly
building, and headquarters of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Additionally, the earthquake knocked out communications systems and electrical networks that were essential to respond to the various
needs of Haitian citizens during this time of extreme devastation.
Enter the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), which arrived in Haiti within 24 hours of the
earthquake and provided the first joint and secure communication capabilities in the country. JCSE communications equipment enabled the Haitian government to communicate with the U.S. President, Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Department of State to identify the way ahead for relief operations. In
Colonel Kirby E. Watson, USA, is Commander of the Joint Communications Support Element at MacDill Air Force Base.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
49
COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World
addition, JCSE provided the initial secure
voice, network, and video-teleconference
capabilities for Joint Task Force (JTF)–Haiti
commander, Lieutenant General Ken Keen,
USA, and his staff. Without JCSE’s ability
to provide these essential communications
in 2011, both the JECC and its subordinate
commands were reassigned to U.S. Transportation Command.
Despite JCSE’s continuous evolution
over the last 50 years, the essence of the
original CSE mission has remained at the
JCSE’s persistent focus on expeditionary,
joint communications support has taken it all over
the world to assist in some of the most highly publicized
U.S. military operations of the last half century
capabilities in the time period immediately
following the earthquake, it is possible that
U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts may not
have been as successful.
This article demonstrates that communications during a disaster relief operation is
only one of the many mission sets that JCSE
is prepared to support. With over 50 years of
joint communications experience across the
full spectrum of military operations, JCSE
has earned the designation of the “Voice
Heard ’Round the World.”
The Establishment of JCSE
JCSE, a subordinate command of
the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
(JECC), was originally established at
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, in 1961 as
the Communications Support Element (CSE)
under the now disestablished U.S. Strike
Command (USSTRICOM). With just over
400 Air Force and Army personnel assigned,
the CSE was established to serve as a quick
response communications unit during crisis
and contingency operations. In 1972, the
Navy and Marine Corps joined the CSE, and
it was appropriately redesignated as JCSE.
Operational control was transferred to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff while U.S. Readiness
Command (USREDCOM) gained responsibility for administrative and logistical
support. At the deactivation of USREDCOM
in 1987, administrative control of JCSE
was reassigned to U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) where it remained until
1998 when it transferred to U.S. Atlantic
Command (which transitioned to U.S. Joint
Forces Command [USJFCOM] in 1999)
along with operational control. In 2008, the
JECC was established and JCSE became one
of its three subordinate commands. Following the disestablishment of USJFCOM
50
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
forefront. JCSE’s persistent focus on expeditionary, joint communications support has
taken it all over the world to assist in some
of the most highly publicized U.S. military
operations of the last half century.
Ever-changing Mission
When JCSE was initially stood up
in 1961, each branch of the Armed Forces
already maintained its own signal/communications units. However, those resources were
typically predesignated for specific mission
sets and therefore could not meet the demand
for joint or multi-Service crisis operations.
JCSE was established to fill this gap as a dedicated communications resource for shortnotice contingency operations. Additionally,
as a multi-Service and eventually a fully joint
unit, JCSE had the unique ability to enable
commanders to communicate across multiService platforms and leverage the most efficient means of communication to accomplish
the mission.
Within the first two decades of its
existence, JCSE’s two original Active-duty
squadrons—the 1st and 2nd Joint Communications Squadrons (JCS)—employed their
expertise to a variety of military operations including:
■■ Support to the commander of JTF-Leo
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
1964. JCSE established the initial communications connectivity from JTF-Leo to the commander of USSTRICOM.
■■ The international peacekeeping force
organized to counter the rebel invasion of
southern Zaire in 1978. JCSE provided a
communications link for the former Military
Airlift Command between Zaire and Corsica.1
■■ The evacuation of U.S. citizens from
Nicaragua under the fall of the Somoza gov-
ernment in June of 1979. Within 14 hours,
JCSE had provided secure communications to
USS Wainwright and USS Saipan in the vicinity of the Panama Canal.
As word of the element’s capabilities spread throughout the Department of
Defense (DOD), the demand for JCSE
increased exponentially. Additionally, in
the mid-1980s, JCSE adjusted its mission to
provide concurrent joint communications
support to more than one commander. Specifically, this included direct JCSE support
to two JTFs and two joint special operations
task forces simultaneously. For JCSE to
provide communications to multiple, simultaneous missions, two Air National Guard
units—the 224th and 290th Joint Communications Support Squadrons—were aligned to
the JCSE mission.
Over the next few years, JCSE solidified
its position and value within DOD during
various noteworthy operations such as:
■■ Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm: JCSE provided the communications
between the in-theater forces and the commander of USCENTCOM.
■■ Operation Restore Hope: JCSE provided a package capable of supporting a JTF
with satellite communications, secure voice,
facsimile, and telephone.2
■■ Operation Support Hope: JCSE provided essential communications support to
the JTF headquartered in Entebbe, Uganda.3
Within the past 10 years, JCSE’s
primary focus has been on operations in the
USCENTCOM area of responsibility following the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent
war on terror. JCSE members were deployed
within weeks of 9/11 and were actively
involved in operations in Afghanistan barely
2 months later. JCSE troopers were some of
the first military responders to arrive in Iraq
to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in March
of 2003 and have since maintained a continuous presence in the country throughout
that operation (March 2003—August 2010)
and the duration of the follow-on mission,
Operation New Dawn (September 2010–
December 2011). Over 2,000 JCSE members
have rotated through Iraq in support of these
operations, and as U.S. troops withdrew from
Iraq following the completion of New Dawn
on December 15, 2011, the final three JCSE
members in Iraq deployed to home station,
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JCSE
WATSON
JCSE team sets up Deployable Joint Command and Control system
thus ending JCSE’s uninterrupted support to
a mission that spanned almost 9 years. Additionally, since March of 2002, JCSE has provided continuous communications to joint
and special operations forces units in various
locations throughout Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and elsewhere for multiple missions stemming from Operation Enduring Freedom.
In March 2005, JCSE was tasked as a
global joint force command, control, communications, and computer (C4) enabler.
Reorganizing existing resources to add
another Active-duty squadron (3rd JCS), JCSE
was postured to support this new role. The 4th
JCS, an Army Reserve squadron, was added
in 2006 to bring additional strategic depth
and flexibility supporting the successful
execution of the JCSE mission.
In 2008, the JECC was established to
provide rapidly deployable, mission-tailored
joint capability packages to combatant commanders in order to facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Global Response Force execution, and bridge
joint operational requirements. Currently
commanded by Rear Admiral Scott Stearney,
USN, the JECC offers a highly skilled team
that rapidly increases joint force command
and control capability at the operational level
of a newly formed joint force headquarters. In
addition to JCSE, the JECC also gained two
other subordinate commands upon its establishment: the Joint Public Affairs Support
Element and Joint Planning Support Element.
Additionally, in 2008, the Secretary of
Defense tasked JCSE with the maintenance
and operation of the Deployable Joint
Command and Control (DJC2) systems for
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM),
U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa
Command. The DJC2, an integrated
command and control headquarters system,
can provide unclassified/classified network
access to a full JTF of up to 1,500 users. If
a full JTF is not needed, the versatile DJC2
system can be broken down into reduced
portions to provide communications to
small mobile missions or midsize JTFs.
These condensed packages have the same
functionality as the full DJC2, only on a
smaller scale. To support the aforementioned
geographic combatant commands, JCSE
maintains direct support detachments of 16
members, each responsible for the maintenance and employment of the DJC2 at their
respective command headquarters. When
additional support is needed, JCSE can
deploy a surge team of 10 members, who are
also trained on the DJC2 system and can fall
in on the detachments for extra assistance.
Since being tasked with the DJC2 mission
set, each of the combatant commands’ DJC2
system has been used during both Chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff’s exercises and realworld operations.
Most recently, USPACOM deployed its
DJC2 system and detachment to Yokota Air
Base in support of Operation Tomodachi, the
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
51
COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World
humanitarian assistance operation following
the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and
subsequent nuclear disaster in Japan. Once
notified, it took the JCSE team approximately
72 hours to forward deploy and have the
DJC2 system set up and fully operational.
The communications provided to the joint
force commander, which included unclassified and classified network access and videoteleconferencing, was critical to ensuring the
military units could communicate quickly
and effectively during relief efforts.
Revolutionizing Military
Communications
Early in its history, JCSE began
working with industry to develop joint
solutions. This practice—along with JCSE’s
ability to rapidly test, integrate, and field
the latest communication technologies—led
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a JCSE
modernization program equitably funded by
each Service. JCSE’s modernization program
integrates emerging technology into certified systems to fill gaps in joint force C4.
JCSE partners with commercial industry
to integrate, test, and certify C4 systems
based on commercial off-the-shelf technology and equipment. After obtaining formal
One of the major contributing factors
in this significant reduction of both manpower and equipment was JCSE’s initiation
of the “Everything over Internet Protocol”
(EoIP) communications architecture. Legacy
communications systems used circuit-based
networks that required serial cabling and
consumed large amounts of valuable bandwidth dedicated to specific communication
services. The EoIP architecture sends communication services over IP satellite modems
that allocate bandwidth as required, resulting
in a pool of available bandwidth and increasing user flexibility to change between communications services on demand.
JCSE’s transition to EoIP technology,
led by the operational and technical vision
of Colonel Thomas Hopkins, USA, the JCSE
commander from 2004 to 2007, enabled
the element to radically condense its communications packages into smaller and more
deployable entities that were increasingly cost
efficient and resulted in a more effective and
flexible network for joint forces.
An additional advantage of the EoIP
technology is the ability for JCSE to tailor
its communications packages to a fluid,
developing mission. During the initial formation of a JTF, JCSE normally deploys a
from small, mobile team missions to full-sized JTFs,
JCSE can deploy assets rapidly and scale support
to provide the necessary capabilities
Joint Staff interoperability and information
assurance certification, JCSE’s lightweight
and highly mobile systems are completely
interoperable with Service communications
equipment and capabilities.
Over time, this modernization program
has enabled JCSE to create communication
packages that are consistently smaller, lighter,
and faster than previous iterations. The goal
is not only to make the equipment more reliable and efficient, but also to reduce the size
and footprint of the equipment, as well as the
personnel needed to move and operate communications packages. For instance, 40 years
ago, a communications package servicing
20 users weighed more than 30,000 pounds
and required a C-130 aircraft to transport.
Today, a comparable package can fit into four
airline checkable cases and weighs less than
300 pounds.
52
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
small package that supports just five users.
However, as the JTF increases operational
capability and additional forces begin arriving, JCSE can scale that same basic package
to support up to 1,500 users without any
interruption to service.
JCSE’s rapid integration of this technology was particularly important during the
disaster relief operations following the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
The destruction of the storm left the Gulf
coast without much of its communications
infrastructure, and it was imperative that
senior military leaders, who were challenged
by the intermittent operations of land/cellular
phone lines and commercial Internet, had the
ability to communicate quickly and reliably.
JCSE took this opportunity to employ
an innovative EoIP communications package
to support Lieutenant General Russel L.
Honoré, USA (Ret.), the JTF-Katrina commander. A small executive communications
kit was designed specifically for the mission
to provide 24/7 access to secure/nonsecure
voice, data, and Internet via the EoIP architecture. The kit, which Honoré took with him
wherever he traveled, allowed him to sustain
command and control of the numerous agencies supporting the relief efforts.
JCSE uses a bottom-up approach in
designing, testing, fielding, and sustaining
its capabilities. This approach is focused on
small unit deployments at the tactical edge
for proof of concept while planning for scalability to larger size deployments and operations up to a JTF headquarters. This approach
also emphasizes the on-scene commander as
primary mission support.
JCSE uses its unique strengths to rapidly
field sustainable, certified solutions meeting
joint force requirements. It does this by:
■■ building on the vast amount of knowledge and experience in planning, executing,
and supporting joint force missions
■■ collaborating within the joint C4 community to identify requirements unique to the
dynamic tactical environment
■■ leveraging JCSE ability to field solutions through the acquisition process.
As JCSE’s mission expanded over the
past few years, DOD has entrusted the management and employment of various communications assets to the element. As the
leader in global C4 capabilities, it was only
fitting that JCSE have a major role in these
evolving technologies.
In partnership with the Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA), JCSE
maintains the Defense Information Systems
Network–Tactical Edge (DISN-TE), a global
enterprise network capable of supporting all
combatant commands. This network was
established to integrate, manage, and control
a wide variety of communications interfaces
between the network and deployed tactical satellite C4 assets. DISN-TE is an EoIP
enhancement of the existing Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP)/Teleport reachback
service consistent with the overall structure
of the Global Information Grid (GIG) architecture and GIG master plan as formulated
by DISA. DISN-TE encompasses telecommunications collection and distribution points
that provide deployed warfighters with multiband, multimedia, and worldwide access.
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JCSE
WATSON
Soldiers establish connectivity after airborne jump during combined tactical warfighting training
The system provides extended connectivity
via multiple military and commercial satellite
communications frequencies and increases
overall capability. Along with DISA, JCSE
operates eight DISN-TE sites around the
world and therefore can provide the deployed
warfighter with a level of support that is
unmatched elsewhere in DOD.
Responsibility for Unique Missions
The current national security
environment has increased the number
of “no-notice” JTFs that are needed to
support a wide range of operational and
humanitarian missions. Although these
operations feature a wide variety of forces,
organizations, and mission sets, they share
a common need for rapid deployment of
communications capabilities to establish
effective command and control in the
shortest time possible.
Since the JCSE mission set spans theater
strategic, operational, and tactical levels,
it needs to be flexible enough to respond
to whatever mission it is tasked with. JCSE
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has succeeded in this arena by developing a
versatile concept of operations that can be
applied across the full spectrum of military
operations. From small, mobile team missions to full-sized JTFs, JCSE can deploy
assets rapidly and scale support to provide
the necessary capabilities.
Additionally, as part of the Global
Response Force, JCSE is the premier source
for a joint force commander’s immediate
and early entry C4 capability. In compliance
with the guidelines outlined in the Global
Response Force Execute Order, JCSE maintains an alert-postured force that can deploy
and have its communications packages fully
operational within hours of notification for
an emerging requirement.4
Delivering Capabilities to the Joint
Force
All JCSE operations are performed
within the context of ensuring reliable
and secure delivery of both capability and
readiness across the full spectrum of military operations in multiple domains. On a
daily basis, JCSE executes three essential
“no fail” tasks:
■■ operate, secure, and manage a global
network supporting distributed operations
(conventional forces) and global pursuit
(special operations forces)
■■ understand operational and technical
requirements across geographic combatant commands and U.S. Special Operations
Command to deliver near-ubiquitous communications and services in all combatant
command theaters
■■ prepare technically and tactically taskorganized teams across the full spectrum of
operations in ground, maritime, air, and cyber
warfighting domains.
Within the framework of these three
persistent tasks, JCSE has pursued several initiatives aimed at setting conditions for success
in the future joint operational environment.
JCSE’s primary focus areas for future operations are enabling joint force mobility and
conducting joint cyber operations.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
53
COMMENTARY | The Voice Heard ‘Round the World
Enabling Joint Force Mobility. A
current focus of JSCE is to develop, test, and
field capabilities to enhance joint force mobility. Mobility applies to both the physical and
electronic components of the ground, maritime, and air domains.
With regards to physical components,
JCSE enables mobility through its reliable,
secure, and lightweight communications
equipment packages. These commercial
is designed to minimize the time required
to transfer the equipment between different
UAV platforms. JACS V3 also provides reachback capability to a tactical operations center
through an embedded Ku-band radio. JACC/
CP provides the joint force with in-flight/
enroute secure voice and data communications on board C-130 and C-17 aircraft.
JACC/CP supports a command and control
element of up to 14 people.
JCSE’s stellar reputation allows it to seek out only the best
network and system administrators, satellite and field radio
operators, and data network specialists from each Service
off-the-shelf systems are easily transported
and activated at the deployed location. The
systems, designed to be displaced with little
effort and minimal service disruption, have
a sufficiently small footprint allowing for
the use of commercial transportation as
much as possible.
Ensuring mobility for electronic components includes having the ability to support
distributed and maneuver element operations
while maintaining access to required information. JCSE can provide mobility for both
physical and electronic components throughout the ground, maritime, and air domains.
In the ground domain, JCSE enables
joint force mobility through its small,
lightweight, and scalable communications
packages. The Initial Entry Package (IEP),
Early Entry Package (EEP), and Joint Mobility Package provide secure and nonsecure
voice, video, and data to small mobile teams
operating worldwide. The IEP and EEP can
be rapidly scaled to meet force surge requirements from small dismounted teams up to
an advance echelon joint headquarters of
40 users. GIG services are extended to the
deployed location through connection to
JCSE’s DISN-TE gateways located at selected
STEP locations.
In the airborne domain, JCSE enables
mobility through its Joint Airborne Communications System (JACS) and Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command
Post (JACC/CP). JACS provides an airborne
radio relay connection for VHF and UHF
communications range extension and relay.
JACS Version 2 operates from either a C-12
or C-130 airframe. JACS Version 3 (V3)
increases operational flexibility by operating
from an unmanned aerial vehicle. JACS V3
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
In the maritime domain, mobility is
enabled by a maritime variant of JCSE’s lightweight communications kit. The maritime
variant provides connectivity and services to
an embarked JTF headquarters. As a platform
agnostic system, the maritime variant is a
critical component of JCSE’s integrated architecture for supporting distributed operations
in the maritime domain and helps meet joint
force requirements for:
■■ aerial layer networking to an extended
range of maritime communications
■■ increased intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance receipt and dissemination
throughout the operating area
■■ connectivity to the supported geographic combatant command headquarters
■■ information exchange with special
operations forces
■■ information exchange with coalition
partners
■■ reachback to national-level intelligence assets in the continental United States
■■ network operations covering all combined JTF operations and network nodes
■■ enroute planning and communications capability.
Conducting Joint Cyber Operations.
JCSE’s joint cyber operations take place in
an operating environment where threats
to mission accomplishment are growing
in both complexity and frequency. Threats
to cyber assets can be internal or external
and caused by natural or manmade events.
Adversaries have demonstrated an ability
and willingness to use cyberspace to deny,
degrade, or disrupt friendly force communications and information flows.
JCSE applies operational art to the
cyber domain by following four principles:
■■ define the cyber battlespace to identify
the joint area of influence and area of interest
■■ comprehend friendly networks to
baseline network performance and behavior
to support anomaly detection
■■ train the force through an integrated
training curriculum, including both industryand military-focused education, knowledge,
and experience
■■ link cyberspace to intelligence and
operational activities by integrating cyber
intelligence support into mission planning
and operational processes.
Value Beyond the Battlefield
Part of what makes JCSE stand out
from other communications units is the 24/7
reachback support it provides. In addition
to its world-class communications equipment, JCSE ensures reliable communications
through its Joint Network Operations Center
(JNOC), maintained from its headquarters at
MacDill Air Force Base. The JNOC employs,
operates, and defends the DISN-TE enterprise
24/7, while providing assured network availability, information protection, and delivery
across the full spectrum of operations. Moreover, it provides the only military-specific
communication network using EoIP technology. Essentially, the JNOC is JCSE’s heartbeat
for real-time situational awareness.
In addition to the JCSE communications packages that were deployed to support
JTF-Haiti, the value of the JNOC was
validated during this operation. The JNOC
worked diligently with USSOUTHCOM,
DISA, and JTF–Global Network Operations
to establish a common operation picture as
well as a network operations management
capability for JTF-Haiti. This capability,
known as the Joint Network Operations
Control Center (JNCC), essentially provided full network situational awareness by
monitoring networks from all the Services
supporting JTF-Haiti with a specific focus
on maintaining information assurance and
network defense. The use of the JNCC was
the first time that this level of coordination
and visibility had been available during a
large-scale operation and was critical to the
mission’s success.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
WATSON
Key to Continued Success
JCSE’s success is a direct result of
the combined efforts of its highly trained,
dedicated, and professional members. Fortunately, JCSE’s stellar reputation allows it to
seek out only the best network and system
administrators, satellite and field radio
operators, and data network specialists from
each Service. For those personnel in a communications specialty, a position at JCSE is
a desirable stepping stone that often leads to
key assignments when they return to their
respective Services.
With an ever-increasing operational
tempo, JCSE’s Servicemembers, especially
noncommissioned officers (NCOs), have
taken on more responsibility and an
enhanced leadership role. JCSE NCOs participate in planning and operational support
at a level that previously would have been
reserved for more senior personnel. NCOs
and junior enlisted personnel at JCSE pass
through a screening process to ensure they
are up to the task. They receive technical and
leadership training from Service schools, as
well as additional training from industry.
Continual emphasis is placed on planning,
training, and execution at the team level.
JCSE NCOs have exceptional flexibility in
identifying those areas in which their teams
need additional training and then designing
those training programs.
Additionally, JCSE offers an opportunity for enlisted personnel to earn joint
experience. A troop may work with or for
NCOs from each branch of the Armed
Forces, contributing to a well-rounded and
comprehensive understanding of the various
communication capabilities of each Service.
This thorough joint expertise is not only a
fundamental benefit during JCSE deployments, but it is also a knowledge base that
troops can employ during future assignments
with their own Services.
A position within JCSE is rewarding
because of the opportunity for members
to excel and hone their skills. JCSE affords
members the freedom to identify areas in
which they may want to gain additional
knowledge and then fully supports them in
their endeavors. Regardless of the member’s
Service branch or position in the element,
JCSE leadership encourages cross-training,
initiative, ambition, and invention and vows
never to hinder or deter a member who
shows passion for furthering his knowledge
and training.
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The element’s unique position allows
it to leverage all Service schools. Troops
assigned to JCSE can expect to have opportunities to attend the airborne and air assault
schools, along with pathfinder, survival,
evasion, resistance, escape training, mountain warfare training, and various Service
technical schools. JCSE members train extensively on commercial telecommunications
systems and obtain civilian certifications on
operation and protection measures for hardware and software.
Former JCSE members have taken
such pride in their time and experiences that
they founded the JCSE Veterans Association
in 2001. With over 300 members currently,
the association connects members of JCSE
and its squadrons, both past and present. In
addition to maintaining a detailed account
of JCSE’s history, the organization supports
current Servicemembers and their families
through scholarship programs and fundraising events.
The Joint Communications Support
Element is regarded as the center of excellence in joint military communications. Its
communication/equipment packages are
cutting edge, its services are extremely reliable, its members are the most highly skilled,
and its performance is flawless. JCSE’s
exceptional communication technology and
service already has or soon will impact every
single member of the Armed Forces. As technology advances at an increasingly rapid pace
in the next few years, JCSE will be sure to
remain at the forefront to lead the charge as
the Voice Heard 'Round the World. JFQ
NOTES
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Forum 278
Offshore Control: A
Proposed Strategy for
an Unlikely Conflict
By T.X. Hammes
This paper is the start
of what the author
hopes will be a deep,
wide-ranging discussion of potential
strategies for a
conflict with China. While such a conflict is
undesirable and highly unlikely, it is driving
many of the Pentagon’s investment decisions
today. Under a proposed strategy of “Offshore
Control,” the United States would work with
Asia-Pacific nations to interdict China’s energy
and raw material imports and industrial
exports, while protecting our partners. This
strategy would have several advantages: it would
slow a crisis down, reducing escalatory pressure
on decisionmakers; align U.S. strategic requirements with the resources available; take advantage of Pacific geography to provide strategic,
operational, and tactical advantages for U.S.
forces; provide a way for the conflict to end that
is consistent with previous Communist Chinese
behavior; and finally, provide for conflict resolution that does not require an unobtainable
“decisive” victory.
1
Military Airlift Command was inactivated
in June of 1992, and its remaining personnel and
resources were reassigned to the Air Mobility
Command.
2
Operation Restore Hope was the 1992 U.S.led intervention into Somalia to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations.
3
Operation Support Hope was the 1994 U.S.
military effort to provide humanitarian assistance
to refugees of the Rwandan genocide.
4
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Global Response Force Executive Order Mod 2
DTG:272126Z September 2012 (SECRET).
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
55
Command and Control Vulnerabilities to
Communications Jamming
By r o n a l D c . W i l g e n B u s c H and a l a n H e i s i g
I
f the United States ever has to face a peer adversary in a no-holds-barred fight, we will
encounter a serious operational obstacle. The way we command and control our forces is
highly vulnerable to disastrous disruption. Modern operations have become dependent
on high-capacity communications, and this vulnerability could cause our forces to
sustain a serious mauling or, perhaps, not to prevail.
Why is this? The ability to provide the information required for successful high-impact/
low-committed asset warfare has developed an overwhelming reliance on unprotected communications satellites. There is an increasing public awareness of these vulnerabilities and the
relative ease by which jamming can foil our methods of highly effective warfare. In this article,
jamming is defined as electronically rendering a circuit or network unusable by disrupting it
so it cannot be effectively used as a means of communication for purposes of command and
control. Such an attack could be directed against any portion of the communications system
and be of extended duration or else just long enough to lose crypto synchronization. Jamming
is at the discretion of the enemy. It does not have to be constant or dependent on large fixed
sites. It is often difficult to immediately distinguish jamming from other information flow
disruptions caused by systemic disturbances such as cryptographic resets, system management
changes, and natural phenomena.
U.S. Air Force maintenance technicians conduct
pre-flight checks on RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned
aerial vehicle
DOD (Andy M. Kim)
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
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WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG
While we have placed an appropriate emphasis on cyber warfare, we have
neglected the less sophisticated threat of
jamming. At some point prior to or during
combat, an adversary might decide spoofing,
intrusion, and exploitation of our networks
are insufficient. The adversary could try to
shut our networks down.
Then what? If our networks are
jammed, commanders in the field, at sea,
and in the air would not be able to employ
their forces adequately. Our warfighters are
dependent on these links to coordinate joint
information, make reports, request supplies,
coordinate land, sea, and air operations, and
evacuate wounded. Clever application of
jamming might go undiagnosed for a long
period. Most likely, initial attribution would
be to equipment malfunction, crypto problems, or operator error. This dependency is a
significant vulnerability—one that can only
get worse unless action is taken soon to direct
our communication paths toward more protected communications systems.
In 2010, Loren Thompson of the
Lexington Institute published an article
pointing out this gap in future warfighting
capability.1 He stated that 80 to 90 percent of
all military transmission travels on vulnerable commercial satellite communications
channels and that only 1 percent of defense
communications is protected against even
modest jamming. He asserts that the “only
satellite constellation the military is currently
building that can provide protection against
the full array of potential communications
threats is the Advanced Extremely High
Frequency (AEHF) system. . . . The feasible,
affordable answer is not to begin a new
program, but to start incrementally evolving
AEHF towards a more robust capability.” His
assessment recognizes the persistent historic
demand for greater capacity through satellite
communications links.
In January 2012, the Department
of Defense (DOD) released its Strategic
Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Rear Admiral Ronald C. Wilgenbusch, USN
(Ret.), is a Consultant in Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C4I). During his career, he served as an Electronic
Technician, Surface Warfare Officer, and Acquisition
Professional. Captain Alan Heisig, USN (Ret.), is
also a Consultant in C4I. He commanded several
surface ships and amphibious squadrons.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Defense. The guidance states, “we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to
future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass
destruction; operating in anti-access [and
area-denial (A2/AD)2] environments; and
prevailing in all domains, including cyber.”3
We have taken great strides along these lines,
but are we fully prepared?
The space-enabled communications
systems used by the U.S. military are the
most omnipresent information infrastructure
to deployed forces. The military depends
largely on commercial broadcast satellite
systems architectures. In some cases, it leases
capacity from the same operators of satellite
systems that commercial organizations use.
These systems are virtually unprotected
against jamming, which is probably the
cheapest, most readily available, and most
likely form of denying or degrading the reliability of information flow.
Communications networks are decisive in all aspects of U.S. global military
responsibilities. Commander of U.S. Pacific
Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, highlighted this issue: “we still have to be able to
operate the networks that allow us to produce
combat power . . . so one of my priority jobs
is to ensure those [command] networks will
survive when they have to survive.”4
Why So Critical?
Since the 1980s, the U.S. military’s
approach to conventional operations has
become more dependent on access to spacebased systems—particularly long-haul
satellite communications and the precision
navigation and timing information provided
by the Global Positioning System (GPS)
constellation. For this reason, the military
has invested heavily in developing battle
networks to detect, identify, and track targets
with sufficient timely precision to enable
them to be struck. Intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems reflect how
dependent U.S. forces have become on access
to the orbital and cyber dimensions of the
global commons.5
In concert with the move toward precision munitions, U.S. warfighting doctrine
has become inseparably joint at all levels of
the Services. Joint coordination between
widely dispersed forces is only possible by
assured information flows. Moreover, all Services have an increasing realization of their
dependencies on protected communications.
The protection of information and ability to
maintain freedom of maneuver in space is
essential to Army success;6 the highly mobile
Army of the future requires communications
on the move with networked operations.
It depends on the availability of highbandwidth, reliable, protected satellite communications to achieve this goal.7 The Air
Force is hotly debating the methodologies to
ensure space capabilities, including protected
communications, at a balanced cost and risk.8
The Navy has reorganized its entire information apparatus to focus on information
dominance as a key element of its future. The
Joint Staff has reestablished its J6 Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber Directorate due to the increased
importance of and dependence on assured
information technology and networks.
The dependence on information flows
(communications) of all kinds has produced
superior combat efficiencies and effectiveness. Today’s Army uses significantly smaller
and dispersed units to operationally control
battlespace areas than in prior warfighting constructs. The shift to strategic small
units is possible, in part, because of the
significantly increased lethality of smaller
units enabled by the use of ISR and precision
weapons. This precision, however, depends
largely on reliable communications. This
overall change in operational concepts has
become a fundamental shift in military
thinking. The Army is starting to build
around the platoon level and the Marine
Corps around the squad. Special operations
forces build around the team. This shift
exponentially expands the need for high
bandwidth information, particularly ISR.
The ability to provide the required
voluminous information has so far developed a strong reliance on unprotected satellites including the ability to use unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and beyond-lineof-sight capabilities for over-the-horizon
control and real-time communication. This
has led to an increasingly widespread public
discussion of the vulnerabilities of using
unprotected satellite communications.9 The
ubiquitous use of unprotected commercial
wideband satellite communications leads
to a false sense of comfort and assurance of
availability, which is deceptively dangerous.
Jamming is the enemy’s side of asymmetric
information warfare.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
57
U.S. Air Force (Raymond McKoy)
COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming
Air Force cadets defend their network during National Security Agency’s Cyber Defense Exercise at U.S.
Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs
Potential adversaries have a variety of
options to accomplish disruption including
physical destruction of satellites and ground
stations, cyber, and jamming. Jamming is an
important element of any communicationsdenial plan. It is cheap to obtain and simple
to operate. It can effectively be used surgically or in broadly based attacks. The absence
of planning and programmatic actions to
protect against a jamming threat is worrisome given the likelihood of its use.
Jamming and Antiaccess/Area Denial
A principal priority of the Strategic
Defense Guidance is to project power
despite A2/AD challenges.10 The recent
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan do not
provide experience against an adversary
employing significant communicationsdenial methods. Information access
was assured in those conflicts. Potential
adversaries in other areas of the world have
studied U.S. force enablers for two decades.
They realize how dependent we are on
assured communications. They understand
that the best way to confront U.S. military
power is to prevent it from deploying.
China, for example, has sent clear signals
of its intent through a variety of activities including a naval buildup, submarine
deployments, ballistic missiles capable of
targeting aircraft carriers, cyber activities,
and an antisatellite demonstration. There
can be no question that jamming capabili-
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ties would play a significant part in any A2/
AD campaign.
The ability to counter area-denial
activities depends in many ways on reliable
satellite communications capabilities. Such
capabilities exist today in China11 and, by
extension, any surrogate or client regimes
with area-denial agendas. U.S. forces must be
able to operate in this challenging environment. The obvious counter to jamming is
to protect communications for operational
forces. The necessity for protected communications is not limited to A2/AD scenarios. A
striking example is the strong reliance by the
Intelligence Community on UAVs for tactically relevant information supporting ground
troops. These vehicles require wideband satellite communications systems for over-thehorizon control and real-time information
dissemination. Future tactical forces will rely
on robust and reliable information systems.
They are at huge risk to jammers.
China and Russia have well-documented satellite jamming capabilities. Some
versions of militarily effective jammers are
even commercially available.12 The proliferation of jamming technology has led to an
increasing utilization of strategic and tactical
jamming.13 Satellite jamming, in particular,
is proliferating. Military jamming equipment
can be purchased on the Internet by anyone,
including nonstate actors. The attraction of
this economical, highly effective capability to
disrupt vastly superior forces is an ominous
reality. The omnipresent capability by widely
divergent players almost guarantees that
jamming source attribution will be a problem
even after detection is accomplished.
In February 2012, the United Nations
International Telecommunications Union
hosted the World Radiocommunications
Conference in Geneva. In recognition of the
upswing of satellite jamming in 2011, the
union issued a change to its regulations and a
call to all nations to stop international interference with satellite telecommunications.14
Moreover, recent incidents illustrating the
need for action were the jamming of satellite operators EUTELSAT, NILESAT, and
ARABSAT.15 Jamming has occurred from a
variety of locations recently across the globe.
Interference with satellite television broadcasting has come from Indonesia,16 Cuba,17
Ethiopia,18 Libya,19 and Syria.20 Additionally, in the case of Libya, the use of tactical
jamming of satellite telephones was reported
during the course of combat operations.21
The proliferation of jamming does not
have to depend on land-based fixed or mobile
facilities. China is not tied to castoff Soviet
naval designs. The People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) has small, fast, and capable
craft with good seakeeping capabilities such
as the Houbei missile attack craft. Even a
cursory look at the craft’s superstructure
shows that attention is paid to shipboard
electronics. The superstructure could be
equipped with powerful jammers and operated collaboratively far from U.S. forces. This
could seriously complicate U.S. naval or air
power projection. The PLAN continues to
field these state-of-the-art, ocean-capable,
wave-piercing aluminum hull SWATH craft.
According to in-country open sources, by
February of 2011, the PLAN had fielded over
80 type 22 Houbei-class fast attack craft, and
the number is growing.22 The question is no
longer who has jamming capabilities but,
rather, have we prepared to operate effectively
when it happens. At present, the answer is a
resounding no.
Causes and Actions
Historically, protected communications
were viewed as the realm of strategic existential threats to the Nation. The underlying
principle of U.S. protected communications
continued to have its raison d’être linked to
nuclear communications survivability and
essential, highest-level command and control.
The approach was heavily focused on getting
ndupres s . ndu. edu
DOD
WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG
Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70), equipped with Aegis integrated
weapons system, launches RIM-161 Standard Missile
through a small number of human-to-human
messages on which dispersed forces could
execute preplanned objectives. This focused
view kept protected communications capability development geared toward the “Armageddon” context and did not significantly
influence tactical requirements.
During Operation Desert Storm in
1991, laser-guided bombs, Tomahawk landattack missiles (TLAMs), and the GPS-aided
conventional air-launched cruise missiles
demonstrated that U.S. forces had the capability to hit almost any target whose location
could be pinpointed. For this reason, the U.S.
military has invested heavily in developing
battle networks to detect, identify, and track
targets with sufficient timely precision to
enable target strikes. ISR systems such as the
RQ-4 Global Hawk, GPS constellation, and
photoreconnaissance satellites reflect how
dependent U.S. forces have become on access
to the orbital and cyber dimensions of the
global commons.23 The preplanned targeting
initially envisioned for these types of precision weapons incrementally has given way to
a need for real-time responsiveness.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Desert Storm also highlighted the
inadequacy of the existing satellite communications architecture. The starkest reality
was the inability to transmit large data files
to tactical forces. The air tasking order (a
daily compilation of all joint and coalition
aircraft planning and execution) was unable
to reach the significant airpower resident
on Navy carriers. The reprogramming of
TLAMs, laser-guided bombs, joint direct
attack munition, and other precision munitions took exceedingly long times to transmit
and overwhelmed the beyond-line-of-sight
systems of the day.
The vulnerability of unprotected broadband communications went unchallenged in
the last two decades. Recent conflicts have
not been fought against major adversaries
with comparable capabilities.24 The U.S. military was able to accomplish its ends cheaply
by taking advantage of a commercial overbuilding of satellite communications capacity
in the late part of the last century and the
early years of this one. That convenient
resource is no longer available. Market developments have made commercial leasing a
much more expensive alternative. Moreover,
commercial communications satellites retain
their inherent jamming vulnerabilities.
Realization and Acceptance of the
Requirement
The paucity of protected communications below the highest levels of requirements
of nuclear command and control is starting
to wend its way into the thinking of military
leadership. A 2010 Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)–sponsored wargame, with
over 60 Active-duty troops and civilian representatives from each of the Services, tried
to grapple specifically with the loss of assured
satellite communications. The players made
several key comments as they became aware
of the impact of threats to existing warfighting doctrine. The consensus among participants was that “significant risk” to mission
success occurred when protected beyondline-of-sight communications were limited to
existing capabilities. In the presence of even
modest jamming capability, participant reaction was to revert to Cold War–era doctrine
and tactics.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
59
COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming
U.S. Soldiers set up tactical satellite communication system in Shekhabad
Valley, Wardak Province, Afghanistan
U.S. Army (Russell Gilchrest)
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WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG
Those reactions were immediately frustrated by a lack of available older systems;
the infrastructure to accomplish those
doctrines and tactics no longer exists. The
combat functions of planning, command
and control, movement and maneuver,
intelligence, fires, force protection, logistics/
personnel support, and special operations
were all significantly or critically degraded.
Additionally, there were issues with force
structure, organization, training, and equipment. Essentially, the entire spectrum of
warfighting capability beyond preplanned
initial insertion and organic logistics was
significantly adversely affected. These risks
translated into longer engagement timelines,
increased casualties, and the need for a larger
force structure for each mission and reduced
multimission capability.25
The wargame specifically focused on
satellite jamming as the most mature and
economically available means to deny satellite capability. The issue of physical destruction of orbital assets was not addressed as it
had several military/political elements that
were deemed too expensive or carried a significantly disproportionate geopolitical risk.
The same denial effect is achieved by spot
jamming without the protagonist having to
develop physical methods of interfering with
space-related infrastructure.
Pinpointing the source of jamming is
not easy. Jammers can appear innocuous and
can be quite mobile. They can be intermittent
in operation. A jammer can physically appear
as some sort of commercial system, such
as a news uplink vehicle or normal receive
antenna on a fixed site.
We have many lessons to draw on that
point to a future where a large component of
beyond-the-horizon communications must
be protected. Given the huge advantages that
space communications provide, it makes
sense to protect the capability against the
inexpensive and ubiquitous development of
disruptive capability by potential adversaries.
The risk of not protecting it is an exponential
rise in force structure and cost coupled with
the plummeting warfighting effectiveness
of existing forces. Accordingly, DOD will
continue to work with domestic partners and
international allies and invest in advanced
capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace
and space.26 In the President’s words, “Going
forward, we will also remember the lessons
of history and avoid repeating the mistakes
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
of the past when our military was left illprepared for the future.”
Are There Options?
Optimists would say that the picture is
not so grim—that there are options. So what
might these options be if or when we encounter an enemy who wishes to shut down our
communications? How quickly can we turn
options into operational capabilities? Are
these really viable options that will keep our
forces fighting as they have trained?
The most frequently discussed option
is that we would “go old school.” Participants
in the previously mentioned DIA-sponsored
wargame suggested that they could still
accomplish their warfighting missions
by using old-school techniques such as
high-frequency (HF) radio links. But, on
examination, they came to realize that this
is not viable. The worldwide system of fixed
HF transmitters and antennas that was once
the mainstay of our HF communications
systems is gone. Even if it was still in place,
the skilled HF operators needed aboard ships
and ashore have been cashing retirement
checks for years.
There is a more basic issue. Our satellite links have enabled completely different
types of operational communications and
tactics and procedures that cannot be supported on HF. This includes high bandwidth
machine-to-machine data exchanges, video
teleconference, Web sites, chat, email, and
other mechanisms that in a large context
allow decisionmaking to be viable at low
levels in the chain of command. That is the
fundamental capability that enables quick,
adaptive, and effective warfighting that
exponentially multiplies smaller force capabilities. Yet going old school, reverting to
HF, was exactly the alternative a senior Navy
officer suggested as the course of action in
trying to overcome a potential jamming
threat at the 2012 Navy Information Technology Day briefing.
A second knee-jerk option is that we
would “shoot the jammer.” This is a nonstarter. Almost everyone has seen the massed
army of television trucks/vans wherever
and whenever some sensational news event
occurs. Imagine downtown Baghdad or
Kabul with the same number of trucks. Any
one of them could be a jammer. Which one
should be shot, and how long would it take
to sort them out? Even if the jammer was
working in the middle of an open desert in
enemy-controlled territory, it would still
be a tough target. The jammer could stand
out in the open just long enough to disrupt
the crypto set on the link/network. Then it
could go silent, move to another location, or
focus on another satellite link. As mentioned,
operators frequently confuse jamming
with equipment problems or a self-imposed
mistake. At best, locating and shooting the
jammer is a difficult targeting problem that
would certainly tax the intelligence and strike
assets assigned to other high-value targets.
A third option is that we would attempt
to reconstitute the satellite constellations by
rapidly replacing capability on orbit. This
usually implies a set of smaller satellites
already in storage. It also means the availability of a nearly immediate launch period
acceptable for military operations. However,
replacing one disrupted satellite with another
equally vulnerable to jamming hardly seems
to solve the problem. Furthermore, none of
the smaller satellites that have been proposed
has the capability to replace the types of satellites used today. At present, there are simply
not enough launch vehicles or launch sites
available to support such an alternative.
A fourth option might be to design an
entirely new satellite system with new features. This is theoretically feasible. However,
it is hard to envision what this solution
additionally offers in the sense of timeliness,
cost reduction, and operational improvement
over expanding the constellation of existing
protected communications satellites such as
advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF)
ones. The current and evolving technology
is understood and carries known programmatic risk. We can certainly improve and
expand the AEHF constellation much faster
than engage in multiple new technology
program starts.
A fifth option is centered on redundancy. In this alternative, even though most
communications links are not protected,
there are many of them. It is hard to imagine
an adversary who could take the entire infrastructure down simultaneously. High-level
DOD officials have suggested that an enemy
might be able to mount a jamming attack
that would leave operational forces with only
about 60 percent of our present capability.
But when was the last time we were using
only 60 percent of our satellite communications capacity?
We must further assume that an intelligent enemy would have at least determined
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
61
COMMENTARY | Vulnerabilities to Communications Jamming
Likelihood of Occurrence for Types of Communications Attack
Unsophisticated
and Cheap
Sophisticated
and Costly
User Requirement
Orbital Kinetic
Harder and Time
Consuming
Cyber
Jamming
Ease of Tactical Employment
our most critical links to operations in
progress. Those are likely to be the first to
go. More concerning is the fact that a swept
tone jammer could take out all our links, or
certainly more than DOD officials estimate.
The 60 percent figure appears unsupported
by analysis.
In any event, forces experiencing
jamming without prior training and a
management plan would create operational
chaos. Managing heavy jamming attacks in
this environment becomes an effort to plan
for gradual degradation of communications.
Operational concepts must be modified on
the fly as individual circuits are lost. Training
must also be conducted both to recognize
and counter jamming as it occurs. These
actions should be pursued. It appears at
present that little progress has been made
in this direction. The reality is that many
important circuits have no backup. For
example, many UAVs have only one form of
over-the-horizon communication available.
It would not be difficult for an adversary to
learn where to target his jamming efforts for
the greatest effect against UAVs.
It has been suggested that the present
military satellite communications system
is composed of too many and too large
satellites that are overly vulnerable, overly
complex, and unnecessarily costly. The
proposed solution is to develop and deploy
disaggregated system architecture to replace
present architectures.
There are two obvious problems with
this suggestion. First, it presupposes that
there is a disaggregated architecture that
62
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Easier and Quickly
Adaptable
would offer the same capability at a reduced
deployed cost. In order to make a disaggregated satellite constellation acceptable
from a cost standpoint, it would have to be
supported by math to show that it is less
expensive than the evolving current highly
effective and efficient systems. Second,
it is suggested that disaggregation would
reduce vulnerability, but in fact no amount
of disaggregation could offer protection
against effective jamming or ASAT attack.
Furthermore, simple logic would tell us that,
if it is known that an attack on our strategic
antijam main asset, AEHF, is tantamount to
an act of war, extending the use of that same
asset to provide secure coverage for both
tactical and strategic forces would make the
tactical support more secure simply by being
on the same strategic asset. On the other
hand, disaggregating the two missions on
different satellites would seem, from a logic
standpoint, to make the disaggregated tactical asset more vulnerable to attack. After all,
would jamming one of many tactical assets
be considered an act of war? Additionally,
a disaggregated architecture presents questions of technical risk and complexities not
yet answered.
Of course, there are other alternatives,
such as adding antijam capability to unprotected wideband systems. The properties of
transmission physics dictate that an increase
in antijam capability implies modifications
to the waveform that would, of necessity,
cause a reduction of the data rate. There are
no halfway measures. There is no point in
adding just a “little antijam.” We either defeat
the jamming capability or we do not. So we
have to be prepared to defeat the most likely
jamming threats.
One alternative put forth that seems to
offer potential is to supplement the existing
satellite system through the development of
the Aerial Layer Network (ALN). However,
like an entirely new satellite system, it is not
fully defined and has yet to be built. ALN is
a solution that might be able to take existing
satellite technology, scaled down in size but
not in capability, and have it ready for rapid
deployment to enable our forces to operate in
some scenarios in the face of jamming. This
involves engineering developments that carry
all the risks of any new start. By its nature, it
is best used in a permissive environment or
one with airspace dominance. This concept
seems ripe for use as a pseudosatellite augmentation to support a land area of operations or a battlegroup maneuvering at sea.
Dr. Thompson’s thesis of incrementally
expanding the capability of AEHF is not
sufficient; it should be matched with a realization that the EHF spectrum also contains
the capability to accommodate a wide variety
of high bandwidth requirements. This could
provide ground, maritime, and atmospheric
forces with the protected wideband capabilities that complement the mobile, highly integrated forces the U.S. military fields today
and will field tomorrow.
Conclusion
Jamming is a highly effective technique
that could cripple U.S. military operations,
and our potential adversaries know it and
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WILGENBUSCH and HEISIG
have the capability to employ it. We should
not underestimate what they might do. Realizing our current operational dependency on
reliable high data rate communications, and
considering the attractiveness and availability of jamming to potential adversaries, we
have only two choices. The first is to reduce
our dependency on communications—an
unlikely alternative for obvious reasons.
Doing so would reduce operational effectiveness and require a correspondingly larger
and more expensive force structure. It should
be obvious that the way we have learned to
fight over recent years simply will not allow a
reduction in the amount of communications
capacity we will need.
The second choice is to ensure that our
communications infrastructure is sufficiently
resilient to withstand the type of attack discussed herein. As one unnamed senior officer
put it, in our present situation and failing
to add more protected communications, we
could be “out of Schlitz by noon on the first
day of battle.” This is clearly not where we
ought to be. Increasing the capacity of protected communications is an essential part of
this latter alternative.
Failure to address the predictable
jamming threat could (will) lead to mission
degradation or failure. The time to act is now.
JFQ
NOTES
1
Loren B. Thompson, “Lack of Protected
Satellite Communications Could Mean Defeat for
Joint Force in Future War,” Lexington Institute
Early Warning Blog, April 14, 2010, available at
<www.lexingtoninstitute.org/lack-of-protectedsatellite-communications-could-mean-defeat-forjoint-force-in-future-war>.
2
Antiaccess/area denial is defined thusly:
“anti-access capabilities [are] ones that slow
deployment of friendly forces into a theater,
prevent them from operating from certain locations within that theater or cause them to operate
over longer distances than they would like. Areadenial efforts are those that reduce friendly forces’
freedom of action in the more narrow confines
of the area under the enemy’s direct control.”
See Phillip Dupree and Jordan Thomas, “Air-Sea
Battle: Clearing the Fog,” Armed Forces Journal
(June 2012), available at <www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/05/10318204>.
3
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 2012).
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
4
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN, U.S.
Pacific Command change of command address,
March 2012.
5
Barry D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution
in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011).
6
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (USTRADOC), The United States
Army Operating Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters Department of the Army, August 19, 2010), available at
<www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.
pdf>.
7
Warfighter Information Network–Tactical
Commanders Handbook, Version 1.6.
8
C. Robert Kehler, “Implementing the
National Security Space Strategy,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012), 18–26, available
at <www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/kehler.pdf>.
9
“Protecting [unmanned aerial vehicle]
satellite communications links also will be an
important challenge in the future,” stated Stuart
Linsky, vice president of communications systems
at Northrop Grumman. “Where it once took an
advanced nation state to jam U.S. military communications, new ubiquitous technologies now
expose unmanned systems to jamming and cyberattacks. ‘The ease with which the bad guys can do
bad things has gotten easier.’” See Henry Kenyon,
“New satellite capabilities target UAV needs:
Waveforms and spacecraft help support warfighter
mission requirements,” DefenseSystems.com,
March 15, 2012, available at <http://defensesystems.com/articles/2012/03/15/satellite-2012-uavsatellite-needs.aspx>.
10
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.
11
Andrew Erickson, “China Testing Ballistic
Missile ‘Carrier-Killer,’” Wired, March 29, 2010,
available at <www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/03/asbm_graphic_admiralwillardtestimony_chinese-article.png>.
12
Available at <http://jammerfactory.en.madein-china.com/product/DMcQoSlPCNWE/
China-100W-Military-Communications-JammersBackpack-Blockers.html>.
13
Electronic and information warfare
techniques including hacking into computer
networks and electronic jamming of satellite communications links are negation capabilities that
are becoming increasingly available to both state
and nonstate actors. A number of incidents of
electronically jammed media broadcasts have been
reported in recent years, including interruptions to
U.S. broadcasts to Iran, Kurdish news broadcasts,
and Chinese television (allegedly by the Falun
Gong). Iraq’s acquisition of Global Positioning
System (GPS)–jamming equipment for use against
U.S. GPS-guided munitions during Operation
Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggests that jamming
capabilities are proliferating; the equipment was
reportedly acquired commercially from a Russian
company. See Space Security 2007 (Waterloo, ON:
Project Ploughshares, August 2007), available at
<www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2007.pdf>.
14
“International Broadcasters Call for End of
Satellite Jamming,” Broadcasting Board of Governors, January 24, 2012, available at <www.bbg.
gov/press-release/international-broadcasters-callfor-end-of-satellite-jamming/>.
15
See David Klinger, “Satellite-jamming
becoming a big problem in the Middle East and
North Africa,” March 28, 2012, Arstechnica.com,
available at <http://arstechnica.com/science/
news/2012/03/satellite-jamming-becoming-a-bigproblem-in-the-middle-east.ars>.
16
Recent examples of satellite jamming
include Indonesia jamming a transponder on a
Chinese-owned satellite and Iran and Turkey
jamming satellite television broadcasts of dissidents. See “Space, today and the future,” available
at <www.dod.mil/pubs/spacechapter2.pdf>.
17
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Washington, DC, July 15, 2003.
18
“Ethiopia Jamming Eritrean Television,
Knock out own Satellite channel,” available
at <www.topix.com/forum/world/eritrea/
TKPS5MNR2DH67LOFM>.
19
Peter B. de Selding, “Libya Accused of
Jamming Satellite Signals,” Space.com, March 1,
2011, available at <www.space.com/11000-libyasatellite-jamming-accusations.html>.
20
The Obama administration asserts that the
Syrian government, with Iran’s help, is actively
jamming private communications and satellite
Arabic television networks in an aggressive
campaign to cut off antigovernment organizers from the outside. See “Officials: Obama
ramps up aid to Syrian opposition,” Associated Press, April 13, 2012, available at <www.
usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-04-13/
syria-un-annan/54258456/1>.
21
“Thuraya Accuses Libya of Jamming
Satellite Signals,” SpaceNews.com, February 25,
2011, available at <www.spacenews.com/satellite_
telecom/110225-thuraya-accuses-libya-jamming.
html>.
22
David Lague, “Insight: From a ferry,
a Chinese fast-attack boat,” Reuters, May
31, 2012, available at <www.reuters.com/
article/2012/05/31/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531?goback=.
gde_104677_member_120627756>.
23
Watts.
24
Ibid.
25
Verbal assessment comments from Protected Communications Wargame Outbrief, May
26–27, 2010.
26
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
63
FEATURES | Interview
KC-135 Stratotanker maintenance crew
prepares aircraft for departure to support
RIMPAC exercises
U.S. Air Force/Jacob N. Bailey
AN INTERVIEW WITH
Samuel J. Locklear III
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, is the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Camp
H.M. Smith, Hawaii. He was interviewed by Joint Force Quarterly’s William T. Eliason.
64
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndupres s . ndu. edu
LOCKLEAR
JFQ: President Barack Obama and other
officials have called for an increased focus on
your command’s area of responsibility [AOR]
in recent years. Can you describe what you
have called a “rebalance” of security strategy
and policy in terms of how this change in strategic focus will affect U.S. Pacific Command
[USPACOM]?
admiral locklear: The strategy that the
President put out last year could not have
been better timed. The strategy was a
byproduct of discussions we were all having
about what happens to the U.S. military—the
joint force—as we go forward into the future
after what we believe will be the conclusion
of more than 10 years of war in the Middle
East. Our forces have to be very much appreciated for the magnificent work they have
done there under some difficult challenges
and environments. To some degree it has
shaped our joint force in a way that might
not be the best for what we see as our emerging interests in the 21st century. So what this
rebalance represents is a hard look at where
the interests of the United States are and what
will concern our children and grandchildren
most in the future. Every vector pointed to
the Asia-Pacific and, in fact, the Indo-AsiaPacific in significant ways where not only
our security interests will be at stake but our
economic interests, too. That’s kind of where
this started. So I was lucky to come into this
job with that kind of guidance.
It is also fortuitous because of big decisions being made in our government about
the size of discretionary spending and the
future of defense spending. I have to leave
those decisions to the political leaders, who
are working on them as we speak. This
rebalance perspective will hopefully provide
the guideposts for decisions we make about
how we reshape the military into probably
a smaller but more lethal, more agile, more
technologically capable one best positioned to
support U.S. global interests, many of which
will be in the USPACOM area.
There are several aspects to this. One
is about employing new concepts regarding
improving our capabilities across a broad
spectrum of traditional and nontraditional
mission sets. It points out the need to
strengthen our alliances; we have only seven
treaty allies in the world, and five of those are
in the USPACOM AOR. We are also working
on building partnerships with key nations
such as India and Singapore. We are building
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
a partner relationship with China that some
people find surprising, but I believe it is in
our best interest to do so, especially from a
USPACOM perspective, in order to achieve
our desired endstate. Through the rebalance
Muslim countries. It also has the smallest
country in the world. It has 7 of the 10 largest
armies in the world. It has the largest navies
in the world. It also has the highest propensity for natural disaster.
the United States has significant interests in this
Indo-Asia-Pacific environment now and for the foreseeable
years and decades to come
we’ll be able to strengthen the security architecture and frameworks in this vast and complicated region, ultimately ensuring a security
environment that protects U.S. citizens and
U.S. interests, provides necessary support to
our allies and our partners, and withstands
any challenges we might face. For instance,
the USPACOM AOR is full of large natural
disasters; this year alone I think we are on
super typhoon number 26 or 27. The average
is about 16. We are seeing more of this type
of event, which will put large population
centers at risk. If those population centers are
at risk and cannot be managed by the security environment, they have a tendency to
make the environment unstable. As we move
forward on the scale of events that can occur,
the security environment must be able to
endure such shocks to the system, including
territorial disputes, nationalistic perspectives
from nations as they pursue their interests
at the expense of others (security interests),
or the security environment. Therefore, the
endstate is to create a future in this vast part
of the world that has the ability to ensure that
American interests are secure.
Interestingly, the USPACOM area—if
you consider only the Pacific Ocean—is the
largest object on the face of the Earth. If you
look at a map, you would not see it that way
because maps distort the true appearance of
the world. You could take every land mass in
the world, including Greenland and Antarctica, and put them in the Pacific Ocean and
still have room for another African continent
and another North American continent. I
don’t know if most people recognize that
fact. There are 3.6 billion people in the
USPACOM AOR. The area stretches from
the coast of California to the border between
India and Pakistan and running basically
north to south. In addition to a population
of 3.6 billion, the area has the world’s largest
economies. It has the world’s most populated
countries. It has the world’s most populous
The United States, as a Pacific nation,
has significant interests in this Indo-AsiaPacific environment now and for the foreseeable years and decades to come, so the strategy is designed to ensure that we can help
create a security environment that protects
these interests.
JFQ: Assuming there will be continuing pressures on the global economy and more reductions in the Federal budget, can you discuss
what measures you are considering in terms
of force structure and operations within your
command area of responsibility?
admiral locklear: I think we will have the
joint force, and our civilian leadership will
have a discussion in earnest over the next
year or so about what the future force structure should look like in the military. We are
already being affected by that to some degree
by continuing resolutions and sequestration,
but I don’t want to spend a lot of time on that
because I think they are near-term issues that
we will get through; on the other side, it will
be just another factor in determining what
our joint force will look like. But there are
several underlying aspects of the USPACOM
AOR that I think have to be recognized.
Because of its size, there remains a
tyranny of distance. In the cyber domain,
the space domain, and in some cases the
air domain, distance is not as significant
because the ability to move and transport
things globally has greatly increased during
my time in the military. But the tyranny of
distance still affects certain aspects of what
we do in this region, particularly concerning
maritime security. Because it entails the difficulties of moving and providing logistics
support of forces as they try to remain
forward, maritime security represents a huge
feature in our AOR, and it puts a premium
on forward presence. Moreover, I think it
will for some time to come. So whatever our
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
65
U.S. Pacific Command
FEATURES | Interview
Admiral Locklear visits People’s Republic of China
force structure will look like when we get
through this period—and I hope our next
Quadrennial Defense Review will address
some of these issues—there has to be an
understanding of the importance and significance in having a number of assets forward
in the Asia-Pacific: 1) to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the region, 2) to create the
ability to partner day-to-day with those allies
who mean the most to the United States, and
3) to provide a deterrent or calming perspective. Ask any nation in the USPACOM AOR
if it can imagine the Pacific without U.S.
military presence; I have yet to find one that
claims it would want to imagine such a scenario. So the value of that forward presence
and the type of assets that we put forward
will be important.
We are advocating in that forward
presence that these forces be the most
capable and the most highly trained. Because
of the growth of militaries and the investments we are seeing in military capabilities
in our AOR, some of the most highly technical capabilities will be developed in this
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
region and probably proliferated to other
regions of the world. Therefore, it is important that the assets we do put forward are the
best and that they keep pace with potential
threats. We must make sure that these forces
are capable when faced with a human disaster threat, a terrorist threat, a threat to the
maritime environment, or perhaps a destabilizing event in the region that would lead us
to conflict. They cover a lot of areas. It’s not
about ships and airplanes and submarines
and ground forces. It’s about cyber capabilities. It’s about space capabilities. It’s about
information operations.
If you take a realistic look at the rebalance, USPACOM military forces are only
one component of the effort. The rebalance
uses a whole-of-government approach. It
has to do with economic, diplomatic, and
law enforcement efforts, and drug and
counternarcotics trafficking and the flow of
human capital, among other issues. We want
to make sure that USPACOM forces, once we
come to the end of our decision cycles about
what our force is going to look like, will be
relevant to the current security challenges we
face in the region and those we expect to face
in the future.
JFQ: What steps have you taken in your
first year to orient your staff to account for
this rebalance proposition? Why were these
changes, if any, necessary, and what do you
hope to gain from the effort?
admiral locklear: Any time you receive
guidance from the Commander in Chief that
you should put a finer point on or refocus
your effort, it requires staffs to take a hard
look at what they do. To begin, we had to
educate ourselves on what we thought were
the compelling aspects of the rebalance to
ensure that USPACOM strategy was consistent with the President’s strategy.
We did a full review. We looked at the
emerging threats we would have to deal with
in the security environment in the region.
We looked at how we were structurally
organized to work more closely with our
partners from the interagency [community].
ndupres s . ndu. edu
And we made some moves to beef up our
staff’s capability and capacity to achieve that
by bringing in more interagency folks. I also
took a look at this staff, which has been historically made up of U.S. personnel only, and
we’re making some changes to bring a more
international perspective to the group. In the
coming months, I expect to see more general
and flag officers and staff officers from our
partners arriving who wish to participate.
I believe this broadens our perspective and
improves the quality of the way we think
through our role here in the Asia-Pacific. I’ve
taken a look at the internal workings of the
staff and, without getting into a lot of detail,
we need to make sure that it is manned and
equipped to be able to look across the AOR
and manage what we can from a [militaryto-military] perspective including the dayto-day shaping and security operations that
ensure we remain in a peaceful environment
rather than one of conflict.
From my perspective, peace in the
Asia-Pacific for decades to come will allow
the same things that happened in the last
60 years to happen for the nations in the
region to enjoy peace and prosperity. So
we’re going to make sure that we spend as
much time thinking and working on the
success piece as we do on the failure piece.
The failure piece would be if you have to
get into a conflict. But rest assured that if
somewhere down the road we find ourselves
in conflict, we will be properly organized
and equipped to be predominant.
JFQ: Given your recent efforts to engage with
the People’s Republic of China through activities such as the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific]
exercise, in what ways do you plan to reassure
allies and partners who might be concerned
about what they see China becoming?
admiral locklear: Personally, I think that
the invitation to RIMPAC for the Chinese
was overdue. In and of itself, the invitation
is a reassuring activity. When I consider
the USPACOM AOR and I speak to our
partners, they understand that the rise of
China will have an impact on the AOR. We
understand that, too. A nation can go from
being a prospective Third World country
to an economic superpower in just a few
decades without it having an impact on
the economic environment, social environment, or security environment. The
USPACOM community of nations in the
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
U.S. Pacific Command
LOCKLEAR
Admiral Locklear visits Republic of the Philippines
Indo-Asia-Pacific has an opportunity to
do what we can to help ensure that the rise
of China happens in a productive way in
which China emerges as a positive member
of a security environment or a positive contributor to the security environment rather
than a potential adversary.
Every country in the AOR recognizes
that it is not in their best interest for an
adversarial relationship to exist between
them and China or between the United States
and China. Therefore, we are looking not
only at RIMPAC but also across the spectrum
to determine how we encourage engagement
between our allies, partners, and ourselves
with China. RIMPAC is just another step in
this process.
We’ve had fits and starts over the years
regarding our relationship with China. Its
leadership, for instance, would not agree to
use the [military-to-military] relationship
as a first move toward security cooperation.
From my perspective, that decision was counterproductive for the security environment,
and from what I have observed over the last
year, we are making a lot of progress in not
allowing that to happen again. By working
with our allies and partners in building
a partnership with China, managing the
competition between two potential economic
superpowers—certainly powers that have a
global security impact—in a way that assures
success is important to all of us.
We have invited the Chinese to
RIMPAC. I hope they come. I hope they come
ready to participate fully and be integrated
into the great work that we do there. And I
expect that all the other partners who participate in RIMPAC will welcome the Chinese
just as we welcomed the Russians this past
year, which worked well. We hope that the
Chinese bring great ships to Pearl Harbor
and join in the festivities that are associated
with RIMPAC. It’s hard to build relationships
with people you don’t know. Having China
participate in what is easily the largest naval
exercise in the world—42 nations participated last year—instead of remaining outside
RIMPAC looking in can only be good.
JFQ: What are your thoughts about developments in the last year on the Korean Peninsula? Do you see an opportunity to return U.S.
forces in the Republic of Korea to levels seen
before 2001?
admiral locklear: Let me talk about
the developments first. I believe they will
continue to be quite disturbing, at least in
North Korea. North Korea continues to
pursue—even under the new leadership of
Supreme Commander Kim Jung-un—policies and activities that run counter to the
United Nations Security Council [UNSC]
resolutions, which, I think, most find reasonable. [North] Korea continues to prioritize
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
67
FEATURES | Interview
USS George Washington (CVN 73) steams through
South China Sea, July 2012
DOD/Paul Kelly
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndupres s . ndu. edu
LOCKLEAR
military spending—spending on nuclear
programs and ballistic missile systems to be
able to deliver them prior to the needs of its
underprivileged population. This continues
to be disturbing, and the road ahead of where
we are going with North Korea as it continues
to proliferate and continues to violate UNSC
resolutions will be important not only for the
United States and its allies and partners in
the region—as well as China and Russia—but
also the rest of the global community, especially now that it appears North Korea will be
continuing its path of nuclearization.
To address your question of what
the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance
will look like, let me first say that this alliance remains a cornerstone of U.S. security
perspectives in Asia and certainly on the
peninsula. We continue to grow that relationship, and the capabilities of the ROK military
continue to improve. Our connectivity
and ability to share information and work
together continue to improve, but it is not
without challenges. We will go through a
process here in probably the next year where
we will take a look again at how we feel about
the positioning of forces and agreements and
where we have them and how we are supporting the people on the peninsula. Do I anticipate a large change in U.S. force numbers on
the Korean Peninsula? No. If what we see in
North Korea today is what we see in the next
year or so, our number there will remain
consistent. Unfortunately, the North Korean
leadership gets a vote in all of this. If it votes
poorly, then it could certainly rapidly change
our view on how we would support the security situation on the peninsula.
[producing] tremendous weapons systems
and linking architectures and interoperability between Services. We would ask if we
can look at the emerging threat environment
using our long experience in USPACOM and
I would say that the cyber enterprise in general is underresourced based on the size and complexity of the problem
how we best can leverage the technologies
and capabilities we have specifically purchased to address these issues, which I refer
to as antiaccess/area-denial [A2/AD] threats.
And where you can, does it point you in the
direction of investments? You might need
to close those seams. Or does it point you
toward asymmetric advantages that you want
to improve to increase your overall asymmetric advantage?
This is important to USPACOM and all
of our components; we are briefed routinely
on the work being done in Washington, DC,
on A2/AD and ASB. We make suggestions to
them because, in the end, USPACOM forces
will be called on to be successful in a highend environment, should that day ever come.
Therefore, it is critical that we do all we can to
solve these problems and shortfalls with the
capabilities that we have already bought. No
matter how we might feel about the future,
the reality is that for the next several decades,
the force you see today will be about 80
percent of the force USPACOM will have. We
have got to make it work during an increasingly challenging environment.
JFQ: How do concepts in development such
as Air-Sea Battle affect your command’s
approach to planning and operations? Are you
able to assist in their development in a way to
leverage your unique environment?
JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly has featured a
series of articles on cyber operations and the
need to better integrate these operations into
the joint force commander’s command and
control. What is your assessment of the way
ahead for cyber operations for the joint force?
admiral locklear: First, I would applaud
the Navy’s and Air Force’s efforts on Air-Sea
Battle [ASB]. A lot of good work and thinking went into it. I believe we had an AirLand
Battle process several decades ago that
produced similar thinking. Unfortunately,
ASB has been misinterpreted, particularly by
some of our allies and partners, as a strategy
rather than a concept. I try to explain that
ASB is not a secret weapon. ASB is where
smart people in smart Services come together
where U.S. investments have been made in
admiral locklear: Cyber operations have
become a serious focus for us in the region.
This particular theater is important because
the tyranny of distance is heavily reliant on
cyber, space, and an assurance of access to
cyber and space. Not to consider these facts
in our planning would be remiss. Right now
I think we are a little behind, and we are
making steps as a joint force to catch up. I
was supportive of the creation of U.S. Cyber
Command and remain supportive of it. U.S.
Cyber Command, in conjunction with the
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
combatant commands, is working quickly to
establish the right supporting-supported relationships in this very dynamic environment.
We are patterning our exercises to make the
training realistic so we can put pressure on
ourselves to ensure that 1) we can maintain
access to our own networks should they ever
be attacked, and then we can defend those
networks, and 2) we start to look at other
networks and other architectures outside of
our own—how would we understand those
and leverage those if necessary during a conflict to our benefit? So we’ve got some work
to do. I would say that the cyber enterprise in
general is under-resourced based on the size
and complexity of the problem. I believe the
joint force will move to correct some of that.
I believe we are already moving in that direction. And I believe we now understand the
problem and we have a way ahead. We just
have to be fast enough to stay ahead of how
fast the cyber world is changing.
JFQ: You are a graduate of one of our joint
professional military education colleges, then
known as the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces [ICAF], now the Eisenhower School at
National Defense University. How well did
your joint education and experience prepare
you for joint assignments?
admiral locklear: I have been through a
fair amount of joint education over time,
and I can tell you that the experience I had at
ICAF was probably one of the most valuable
as it related to any ability I have as a strategic
thinker beyond the realm of joint warfare.
The ability as a graduate to contemplate the
intricacies and importance of understanding
economics, logistics, and all the other aspects
of national and international power that go
into how I make strategic decisions has paid
off multiple times. To answer your question,
my joint education was exactly what I needed
to aspire to be a combatant commander, particularly in the USPACOM AOR.
JFQ: How has jointness changed USPACOM
over the years, and do you see the possibility
that some day the commander might be from
another Service?
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
69
DOD/Keith Deviney
FEATURES | Interview
Ships and submarines participating in RIMPAC 2012 sail in formation around Hawaiian Islands, July 2012
admiral locklear: I won’t speculate on the
decisions of our civilian leaders because I
believe that the President and Secretary of
Defense are in a good position to evaluate
potential combatant commanders. My guess
is that any decisions will be made on the
personality and capability of the officers
who are available and not so much on the
uniform they wear. That said, when you look
at the history of this region, it represents a
significant maritime theater. A huge part of
what I do here includes a large component
of the maritime domain. I don’t think that
is going to change or that it is going to get
more complex. Furthermore, the allies and
partners in this region have a long historical
perspective that we, as Americans, sometimes
don’t possess. They have been comfortable,
I think, over time with USPACOM having a
maritime face—the face of an admiral—so it
could change and they would probably accept
it, but I would just say that they are comfortable with the current situation. This issue
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
would be in the calculus of the decision that
our civilian leadership would have to make if
they should decide to change the uniform of
the USPACOM commander.
JFQ: As USPACOM commander, can you
characterize your perspective of the Russian
Federation regarding the security environment
in the Asia-Pacific?
admiral locklear: From the USPACOM
perspective, we view Russia as a potential
security partner. I just had a chief of defense
conference that was held in Australia, and
Russia’s deputy minister of defense—who at
one time happened to be the Eastern Flank
Commander—attended and spent 4 or 5 days
with us and we had good discussions and
good dialogue. As I mentioned earlier, we just
had Russian ships participate in RIMPAC,
and that was quite successful. So I look at
Russia only from the USPACOM perspective. I know that U.S. European Command
has to look at it from a different perspective,
and certainly, there is another view from the
larger global perspective. But from where
I sit, there is benefit in having Russia participate in whatever way it can because its
force levels in the Pacific are not significant
compared to other places it might be, at
least today. Having Russia as a productive
partner in the overall security environment,
particularly as we look at maritime activity
that might be moving north into the Arctic, is
important. In fact, the relationships we have
in the region with allies and partners contribute to an overall understanding that allows us
to operate with and around each other. JFQ
ndupres s . ndu. edu
DOD/Michael Holzworth
LOCKLEAR
Sailor fast-ropes out of MH-60S Knighthawk
helicopter during RIMPAC 2012
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
71
NATO’s Level of Ambition
Beyond Strategic Reach
By D e a n a . n o W o W i e J s k i
crisis. Challenges to the euro and potential
default of nations threaten Europe’s economic unity. The United States borrows 40
cents on the dollar to finance its entitlements
and wars, with no political solution in sight.
Confronting challenges to security with
sparse resources forms the context of NATO’s
strategic situation.
In light of that test, the heads of state
and government, the political leaders of
NATO, met in Lisbon in November 2010
and agreed on a new strategic concept for
the Alliance, entitled Active Engagement,
Modern Defence. This concept not only
reaffirmed the collective defense of the
Alliance, but also established an ambitious
level of effort, particularly given the current
low level of national investment in NATO
via defense budgets, and the significant
economic challenges that most member
states face. Some details of this strategy are
outlined in this article.
This strategic statement offered a
new concept for a new century, and was
immediately put to the test with the NATO
operation in Libya, Active Endeavor. NATO
NATO
T
he North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) faces
many strategic challenges based
on the international security
environment. As an alliance at war, not only
does NATO have to confront an uncertain
future in Afghanistan, but also shadowy
threats of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, cyberwar, and terrorism. The
21st century promises to become an even
more complex environment over time, while
national resources for defense are dwindling.
Both sides of the Atlantic face budgetary
NATO Secretary General speaking at 2012
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
seminar in Washington
72
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndupres s . ndu. edu
NOWOWIEJSKI
demonstrated a core tenet of the new strategic
concept by executing aggressive crisis management. Active Endeavor provided air cover
over Libya to protect citizens and enforced
an arms embargo on the high seas to prevent
resupply of weapons to the regime. Libya
established a new realm of the possible with
the new strategic concept in place and reaffirmed the Alliance’s stated purpose of reaching beyond its own territory proper to ensure
the lasting security of the member states. But
the operation simultaneously revealed significant flaws in capability that have forced
reconsideration of the way the Alliance will
develop resources in the future.
Since Libya, the growing pressure of
the Eurozone crisis leads to questions about
the viability of the strategic concept itself
given the limited focus it gave to resource
use. How will the level of ambition in the
concept be met by members who are giving
less, not more, to the needs of the Alliance?
How will the Alliance restore balance among
the contributions of its members, when the
U.S. share is openly acknowledged to be
around three-quarters of the whole? This
article argues that the constraints of Alliance resources should force a reconsideration of the strategic concept itself, both to
incorporate as a stated purpose the concept
of “smart” defense, and to consider a more
limited level of ambition, focusing on less
security through crisis management.
Extended Reach and Limited
Resources
Active Engagement, Modern Defence
was released from the NATO Lisbon Summit
(November 19–20, 2010). At the time, its concepts reflected an achievement in consensus
and forethought, as the heads of state and
government reaffirmed their commitment
to the bedrock principle of collective defense,
while expanding their strategic ambition
to include out-of-sector missions, missile
defense, cyber defense, access to the global
commons, counterproliferation, counterpiracy, countertrafficking, and modernization. Stating that nuclear weapons should
ideally be abolished, the Alliance reaffirmed
its commitment to nuclear weapons as an
instrument. The heads of state agreed to
Dr. Dean A. Nowowiejski is the Ike Skelton
Distinguished Chair for the Art of War at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
implement ballistic missile defense over the
populations of Europe and, in the same vein,
wrestled with their ongoing partnership with
Russia. All of these missions were affirmed at
the same time that operations in Afghanistan
demanded great effort. All in all, this was a
path-breaking summit with a strategic document to match: Alliance ambition toward the
circumstances of a new century.
The affirmation of three “essential”
core tasks formed the heart of the strategic
concept. The increased level of ambition
for the Alliance lies between the lines that
announce these tasks.
Collective Defense. This task affirms
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the
charter document of the Alliance—with
the addition of a goal to deter and defend
against emerging challenges. This goal of
combating emerging challenges is what takes
the Alliance out of sector and into where
ance is postured for success in the near term
against evolving international threats and a
threatened international economy.
Closer review of the strategy seems to
confirm such lack of fidelity regarding strategic means. The Alliance confirmed its desire
to reform, modernize, and transform to meet
the operational needs of worldwide commitments. NATO required resources for this new
set of missions, and the Allies affirmed their
desire to reduce unnecessary duplication,
develop and operate jointly, and preserve and
strengthen common capabilities. Beyond
these broadly stated goals of transformation,
not much detail is offered in the strategic
concept about what specific means are available to execute the strategy.
This inattention may stem from the
economic distractions of the heads of state
when the document was written, or it may
be intentional. At the time, the European
stating that nuclear weapons should ideally be abolished,
the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear
weapons as an instrument
they emerge, whether in Libya, the Horn of
Africa, or Afghanistan. The task emphasizes
expeditionary operations by modernized and
deployable conventional forces.
Crisis Management. This task
addresses international crises affecting the
Alliance before and after they erupt, stops
ongoing conflicts before they affect security,
and consolidates stability. It commits the
Alliance to a wide range of tasks in operational environments that extend beyond territorial boundaries.
Cooperative Security. This task encompasses security cooperation, arms control,
nonproliferation and disarmament, and
expansion.
At the end of the list of core tasks and
principles, there is this statement: “In order
to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible,
Allies will engage in a continuous process of
reform, modernization and transformation.”1
This is the only reference to resources in the
core principles. This short statement, buried
at the end, seemingly implies a limited focus
in the strategic concept on the potential
means needed to execute such an advanced
strategy. From this simple statement, our
analysis must determine whether the Alli-
economy was struggling with the effects of
the international downturn from 2008, the
threatened default of Greece and perhaps
more European countries, and the growing
need for rescue measures. Declining defense
budgets and reduced contributions to
Alliance operations and modernization
were already a contemporary trend. So the
Allies faced a significant challenge—and
how to deal with it makes no appearance
in the strategic concept. This could mean
that the omission of detail regarding Alliance resources was necessarily intentional.
Consensus concerning Alliance resources
may have been just too difficult. Whatever
the cause, the concept was short on details
of how to deal with a burgeoning resource
crisis, and nothing has rectified the imbalance since. This became clearer as NATO
engaged Libya.
NATO and Libya
Within months of the promulgation
of the new strategic concept, NATO entered
an unexpected phase of execution, Operation Unified Protector. This operation both
offered a glimpse of the future potential of the
Alliance to react quickly to emerging threats,
and a reminder of how the previous lack of
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
73
FEATURES | NATO’s Level of Ambition
resource commitment left the air campaign
short of precision munitions; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); intelligence fusion; electronic warfare capability;
and air component logistic support. Following a successful and fairly rapid conclusion on October 31, 2011, the pundits and
academics began to debate the relevance of
the Alliance.2
Alliance proponents, such as the NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Admiral James Stavridis, USN, and U.S.
Permanent Representative to NATO Ambassador Ivo Daalder trumpeted the success and
sought means to address shortcomings in the
future. Their reviews echoed the themes that
next round of national austerity measures,
better allocating (and coordinating) the
resources the Alliance does have, and following through on commitments to the Alliance
and to each other.4
Given the NATO standard of consensus,
bringing these issues into the open marks Secretary Gates’s departure as a brave episode of
truth-telling. The idea that the Alliance really
needed a more robust commitment from its
European members in order to survive the
challenges of the 21st century struck home,
at least in academe and the media. Secretary
Gates’s remarks also serve as a call to reexamine the relevance of the strategic concept. He
brought into stark contrast the problems of an
alliance with grand ambitions yet an anemic
the idea that the Alliance needed a more robust commitment
from its European members struck home
NATO responded quickly and was ultimately
successful in reaching the goal of protecting
the Libyan people, but the success revealed
stress fractures in the Alliance. These shortcomings were those of resources as outlined
above, limited member participation (only
14 of 28 members participated), and reliance
on the United States for precision munitions
and ISR. Unified Protector provided the first
evidence of a mixed record with the new strategic concept in practice.3
The Gates Challenge
These various assessments crystallized
in a confrontational moment in Brussels at
the NATO Defense Ministerial in June 2011.
Departing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates offered his colleagues a candid assessment of the potential future of the Alliance.
He echoed the assessment that prospects in
Afghanistan were improving and that Libya
was a qualified success for NATO, but he
also offered a warning. Highlighting the
increasing imbalance of member contributions in support to NATO, to the extent that
the U.S. accounted for more than 75 percent
of NATO defense spending, Secretary Gates
warned of a potential retrenchment by
the United States. This would come from
increased budget pressure to the Congress.
He called for three positive things to happen
to ensure a solvent future for the Alliance:
making a serious effort to protect defense
budgets from being further gutted in the
74
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
resource reality. In his view, the Alliance
still suffers from strategic shortcomings in
procurement, training, logistics, and sustainment. He openly linked the decreasing level
of investment on the part of the European
community, the lack of strategic and operational enablers as called for by the strategic
concept, and the potential that U.S. leaders in
the future would not be willing to continue to
invest as strongly in the Alliance when they
have domestic budget problems of a crisis
nature. Would the Alliance change its ways,
and pay for what it wanted to do?
Secretary General Shapes a Response
Fortunately, the Alliance seems to have
a leader who addresses problems strategically
and openly. Secretary General Rasmussen
repeatedly addresses the problem of low
investment in the face of expanded strategic
ambition, seeing it as a threat to the future
viability of the Alliance. He uses a variety of
forums, some outlined below. The solution to
the problem of limited resources most often
repeated by Secretary General Rasmussen is
the concept of “Smart Defence.” The concept
of Smart Defence was officially promulgated
by the heads of state and government at
the Chicago Summit in May 2012 in their
“Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020.” How Secretary General Rasmussen led them toward
the concept, and how they thus validated the
strategic concept reached in Lisbon, follows.
The Secretary General’s timely article
in Foreign Affairs addressed the lessons of
Libya and the relative decline in defense
spending of Europeans in a widely read
forum.5 Rasmussen cited statistics of a 20
percent decline in defense expenditure at a
time of simultaneous 55 percent growth in
gross domestic product (GDP) for European
NATO members. Rasmussen emphasized
both the potential loss of the chance to
be relevant in a changing world, and the
potential of turning the United States away
from Europe in the same way as outlined by
Secretary Gates.
In outlining solutions to this general
problem, Rasmussen offered the idea of Smart
Defence and began to list its key characteristics, without offering a precise definition. This
softness of concept probably allowed Alliance
partners to interpret Smart Defence for themselves, within national constraints, as they
moved toward consensus acceptance. Smart
Defence, according to Rasmussen, “is about
building security for less money by working
together and being more flexible.” It charges
member nations to set spending priorities
on the basis of threats, cost-effectiveness,
and performance, since they cannot afford
everything. Smart Defence includes the key
idea of NATO nations working in “small
clusters to combine their resources and build
capabilities” with the Alliance serving as a
matchmaker for the partners. Rasmussen
then concluded that he had been trying to
engage the transatlantic partners in this
strategic dialogue of smarter use of resources
ever since the Lisbon Summit, since what
NATO requires is an agreement that results in
deployable and sustainable capabilities.
Secretary General’s 2011 Annual
Report
In his first Secretary General’s annual
report, Rasmussen returned to many of the
ideas in his Foreign Affairs article. He again
cited statistics about the low level of member
investment in defense, stating that, for 2011,
annual defense expenditures for 18 of the 28
Allies were lower than they had been before
the global economic crisis began in 2008.
Furthermore, he outlined that only 3 of the
28 member nations were at the required
level of defense expenditure required by the
Alliance (2 percent of GDP). Levels of investment in modernization were similarly low.
The U.S. share of NATO expenditures grew
to 75 percent.6
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NOWOWIEJSKI
The Secretary General’s 2012 Annual
Report
By the time of Rasmussen’s annual
report, Smart Defence had grown important
enough to merit its own section in the document, and a refined explanation of what the
concept means. This includes “greater collaboration and coherence of effort . . . prioritizing the capabilities needed the most, specializing in what Allies do best, and seeking
multinational solutions.” The Secretary
General highlighted an agreement made in
Lisbon to invest in 11 critical needs, demonstrating that concern for strategic resources
dates at least to the same time as the new
strategic concept itself. He also pointed ahead
to the Chicago Summit where defense ministers agreed to “deliver a range of substantive
multinational projects” to be made available
to the Alliance by that time. This effort for
resource harmonization extends to NATO
staffs working with the European Union
(EU) to avoid unnecessary duplication with
EU pooling and sharing. The annual report
thus outlined some specific areas where the
idea of more efficiency is already in progress.
Secretary General Rasmussen is
still emphasizing Smart Defence, and as
time passes, his calls for adequate defense
resources seem to grow more strident. His
second annual report, released January 31,
2013, has a major section calling for securing capabilities for the future. NATO Forces
2020 and Smart Defence are principal to this
effort. The principles announced in Chicago
remain the same, but the number of Smart
specifics in these historical statements, the
real work of fleshing out the idea and putting
it into practice will be confirmed as the Allies
collectively announce and execute collaborative Smart Defence projects. Key to successful
implementation will be whether the heads of
state and government will be willing to make
the bold political decisions that keep the
organization funded to its level of ambition
in the face of declining resources. They may
have to demonstrate this resolve in a deepening economic crisis. Expect Smart Defence
Twelve nations contribute to NATO strategic airlift capabilities
The Chicago Summit declaration
connected the idea of Smart Defence to the
concept of NATO Forces 2020: modern,
tightly connected forces equipped, trained,
exercised, and commanded so that they can
operate together and with partners in any
environment. It outlined the need to cooperate more closely in acquiring capabilities,
prioritize what is needed most, and consult
on changes to defense plans. It spoke of
the need for a strong defense industry in
Europe. The declaration recognized that
“as technology grows more expensive, and
defence budgets are under pressure, there are
key capabilities which many Allies can only
obtain if they work together to develop and
acquire them.” Allies would take forward
specific multinational projects to this end
designed to deliver improved operational
effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer
connections between forces. The words of
the declaration carry forward ideas originally
offered by the Secretary General. Smart
Defence “represents a changed outlook, the
opportunity for a renewed culture of cooperation in which multinational collaboration
is given new prominence.” In these charter
words, the heads of state offered the broad
principles under which Smart Defence will be
executed.7
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
NATO
Summit Declaration on Defence
Capabilities, May 2012
Defence projects has now increased to 25.
The Secretary General proudly announces
that European Allies lead around two-thirds
of these projects, with one-third of the 25
projects purely European. Yet the Secretary
General warns that continued decreasing
levels of defense investment by Alliance
partners will lead to potential capability gaps
between European Allies, across the Atlantic,
and with respect to emerging powers.8
Beginning at least with the post-Libya
NATO assessments, Secretary General Rasmussen called for better resourcing within
the Alliance in order to meet the ambition
outlined in the strategic concept. Smart
Defence is the key response to the current
Alliance resource shortfall, and appears to
be an evolving concept. Though vague on
to continue to evolve within the constraints
of international threat and the relative economic health of its members.
What’s Missing: Coherence and
Realism
What do we make of the overall NATO
resource problem? A common conclusion
for many years is that NATO spends too
much money on personnel costs, and not
enough on modernization or development.
This criticism extends to the type of forces
in which European members customarily
invest: conventional land forces with limited
deployment readiness and not enough strategic lift. These conditions lie behind the
conception of the NATO Response Force
(NRF) a decade ago. Not much has changed.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
75
FEATURES | NATO’s Level of Ambition
substance to the ambition for missile defense
and ISR in the midterm, then the concept
appears to be more viable. The proof will
be contained not in strategic tasks, but in
member investment in defense and modernization over the next decade.
deterrence and defense, crisis management,
and security cooperation, and what the
Alliance will have over time to accomplish
those ambitions. This comes to the question
of whether Smart Defence will work to solve
the problem. European partners are not
going to increase expenditures, and as they
decrease them, Smart Defence becomes how
to do less with less. Smart Defence requires
Alliance members to act with great foresight
and trust in a time of economic crisis. It
requires member states to forego individual
purchase of key operational capabilities in
order to enter a collective arrangement that
requires other members to deliver those
capabilities. The risk of this approach is
that in crisis, the partner nation will withhold needed capability. To a degree, Smart
Defence requires members to surrender
sovereignty over resource decisions to the
Alliance. In many ways, the decisions over
defense resources for European members
parallel the difficulty EU members face
with salvage operations of the Eurozone.
They require collective action in a time of
economic crisis and dwindling resources. It
is a steep order.
Much of the potential success of Smart
Defence will be signaled in implementing
the Chicago Summit Declaration on Defence
Capabilities. If the principles outlined by the
Secretary General are put into action, if the
priority programs are resourced, if there is
An Alternative: Update the Strategic
Concept
NATO
The NRF, once proved in principle and
declared fully operational in 2006, has had
limited activity. One wonders if called upon,
would it be ready, given the commitment of
the Alliance to the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan? This may
be behind the recent U.S. declaration that,
while shifting focus to the Asia-Pacific, it
would dedicate an Army brigade to the NRF
in order to bring to life a concept that may
have gone dormant.
The basic problem for NATO’s strategic
execution is one of resources. NATO has
high ambition for capable operational forces
but struggles to afford them. In reality, the
Alliance has a limited expeditionary, conventionally modernized capability. There is
certain incoherence to the member nations’
investments. They buy the wrong things, or
not enough of the right things. Consider the
acknowledged shortage of lift, ISR, precision
munitions, cyber capability, and supply.
Deployable forces are required, but not yet
built. For years in Afghanistan, commanders have struggled with national caveats on
operational use of forces. Because of these
shortages and caveats, the United States
increased its member investment in Alliance
capabilities to the point of unsustainability.
Insufficient investment and out-ofbalance investment imply lack of realism in
what the Alliance can really do. There is a
simple mismatch between global ambition in
76
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
The questions remain, given successful execution of Smart Defence, is the
2010 strategic concept viable? Even smarter
spending cannot overcome insufficient
spending, and the NATO strategy requires
sufficient resources in the areas of collective
defense, crisis management, and security
cooperation. Collective defense remains the
cornerstone of the Alliance, and will likely
consume whatever limited resources are
available, given real world contingencies
requiring multinational defense. How many
more prevention situations will NATO enter
into? How many more Kosovos, Afghanistans, and Libyas are there?
Given increasingly scarce resources, it is
the crisis management pillar that is likely to
suffer, particularly the ability to stop conflicts
before escalation or to stabilize them long
after they have concluded. There is a pending
struggle over the ability of the Alliance to stabilize Afghanistan over the long term. NATO
is still committed to stability in Kosovo
after a dozen years, thus demonstrating the
resource drain of commitments to long-term
crisis management. Perhaps the pending U.S.
step back from long-term stability operations,
as announced in the January 2012 defense
strategy guidance, will work its way through
the national counsels of the Alliance, and
curtail appetites for long-term crisis management, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and
reconstruction. If European defense budgets
continue to dwindle, the appetite for these
types of operations may be suppressed. Of
course, if members have not yet invested in
crisis capability in the first place, then the
simple status quo remains.
There is the perception in some circles
that the new strategic concept is really U.S.
ambitions pitted against European means,
that the pressure for continued stability
operations stemmed from the U.S. commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of
the Lisbon Summit. If this is true, then the
January 2012 U.S. defense strategic guidance
may be the first glimmer that the protagonist
of such missions is beginning to realize they
ndupres s . ndu. edu
NOWOWIEJSKI
are beyond capability, and the NATO strategic concept should follow suit.9
Conclusion
This article concludes with two small
proposals. One is that the Alliance-wide
strategic concept could use more tacit recognition of the problem of means and the
necessary dedication by members to the
ambition of the Alliance through defense
spending. If Smart Defence proves successful as an approach, then maybe it deserves
inclusion in the published concept. As it is,
the document is lean on recognition of the
impact that declining expenditures on the
wrong things will have on the ability of the
Alliance to execute its desired missions.
Since the draft of the strategy was produced
in the office of the Secretary General before
Lisbon, perhaps the Secretary should now
include his increasingly better defined Smart
Defence concepts in the published NATO
strategy. This would give substance to the
need to focus on strategic means.
The second proposal is that NATO
members may need to amend their level of
ambition. Within the next 3 to 5 years, they
will be forced to reconsider in realistic terms
how much they can do. The strategic concept
published at Lisbon was incredibly ambitious,
expanding the reach of the Alliance beyond
its borders with more missions. It was lean on
detail about how to pay for that level of ambition. Economic realities, even with Smart
Defence, may soon dictate that the Alliance
take a step back from what it tries to do.
Collective defense is a cornerstone mission
that cannot be reduced. Security cooperation, as it plays out over time and in a variety
of small-scale ways, is good value for the
investment. Contingency response is the core
task most suspicious of successful long-term
execution. As governments realize that they
cannot afford to pay for reconstruction and
stability operations for decades, perhaps this
core task in the strategy needs reexamination
and further restriction in scope. Contingency
response should pay as a reduced strategic
goal if NATO cannot come to terms with
the reality of its modernization and defense
investment challenge. JFQ
NOTES
1
Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Brussels: NATO, 2010), 9, available at <www.
nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.
2
See facts at NATO Web site, “NATO and
Libya,” available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/SID2CF4288B-6562C4E3/natolive/71679.htm>.
3
For various assessments of Operation
Unified Protector, see Ivo Daalder, “Leadership,
Lisbon, and Libya,” Remarks to the Aspen Strategy Group, June 10, 2011, available at <http://
nato.usmission.gov/>; Ivo Daalder and James G.
Stavridris, “NATO’s Triumph in Libya,” Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2012; Steven Metz, “Swan
Song: Is Libya the end of NATO?” The New
Republic, April 15, 2011; Fareed Zakaria, “A New
Era in U.S. Foreign Policy,” CNN.com, August 23,
2011; Jamey Keaten and Slobodan Lekic, “NATO
Bounces Back in Libya, But Troubles Remain,”
Associated Press, August 23, 2011; “Europeans
Retreat on Defense Spending,” Wall Street Journal,
August 24, 2011; “Libya’s Lessons for NATO—and
U.S. Defense Cuts,” Christian Science Monitor,
August 24, 2011.
4
Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense
Agenda (Future of NATO),” Brussels, Belgium,
Friday, June 10, 2011, available at <www.defense.
gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1581>.
5
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO After
Libya,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, 2–6.
6
NATO, “The Secretary General’s Annual
Report 2011,” January 26, 2012, available at <www.
nato.int/cps/en/SID-95ACA050-DC78A506/natolive/news_83709.htm?selectedLocale=en>.
7
“Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020,” May 20, 2012,
available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease>.
8
NATO, “The Secretary General’s Annual
Report 2012,” January 31, 2013, available at <www.
nato.int/cps/en/SID-482A978C-0B70AC4D/natolive/opinions_94220.htm>.
9
The author wishes to thank Professors
James Cricks and James Varner of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College for their
review of this article. This idea stems from Professor Cricks’s personal experiences while assigned to
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for the Study of Weapons of
Mass Destruction
Case Study 5
he Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of
1991–1992
By Susan J. Koch
In late 1991 and early 1992, President
George H.W. Bush announced a series
of changes to U.S. nuclear forces that
became known as the Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives. Intended to be primarily
unilateral, the proposals challenged the
Soviet Union to take comparable actions.
It did so, in responses irst by Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev and then
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. he
initiatives, which resulted in the reduction
of nuclear forces and changes in nuclear
practices, were unprecedented on several
levels: the broad scope and scale of the
reductions, their unilateral nature (even
though they were reciprocated), and the
extraordinary speed and secrecy in which
they were developed (3 weeks compared
to months and years for traditional
arms control measures). his case study
discusses the general context of the
initiatives, the concerns that motivated
them, and the national and international
processes that saw them carried out,
including the texts of the key U.S.
proposals and Soviet/Russian responses.
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
77
From Sea Power to
Cyber Power
Learning from the Past to Craft a Strategy for the Future
U.S. Navy cryptologic technicians preview Integrated System for Language Education and
Training program at Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture, Pensacola, Florida
78
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
U.S. Navy (Gary Nichols)
By k r i s e . B a r c o m B
ndupres s . ndu. edu
BARCOMB
Naval strength involves, unquestionably, the possession of strategic points.
—Alfred Thayer Mahan
A
lfred Thayer Mahan saw the
ocean for what it is. While it
spans the globe and covers a
predominant portion of the
Earth, not all parts of it are equally important. Mahan offered a focused naval strategy
in an era when America was struggling to
define itself as either isolated from, or an
integral part of, the larger international community. The force structure of the U.S. Navy
hinged upon leaders deciding between protectionism and expansionism. Rather than
simply a mechanism to defend the coasts,
Mahan envisioned the Navy as a powerful
means for promoting American economic
prosperity. In one sense, his strategy allowed
the Nation to achieve both objectives simultaneously. By projecting naval power at key
points around the globe, Mahan’s approach
allowed for economic expansion and had the
second-order effect of pushing conflict away
from U.S. shores.
Cyberspace represents a similar challenge. The United States now faces a contemporary struggle between expansionism and
protectionism in this domain. We can learn
a great deal from Mahan’s methodology for
delineating and prioritizing the sea domain
into actionable terms. Thus, this article
identifies strategic categories in cyberspace
by adopting Mahan’s approach. In doing so,
it seeks to identify similarities and differences between sea power and cyber power.
The aim is to provide senior leaders with a
better understanding of the salient aspects of
cyberspace, offer insights for securing those
points, and suggest a new paradigm for the
proper role of the military in this domain.
This tailored expansionist strategy for cyberspace should provide the United States with
Major Kris E. Barcomb, USAF, is a Cyberspace
Strategist for 24th Air Force at Lackland Air Force
Base, Texas.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
both economic growth and security akin to
Mahan’s approach to sea power a century ago.
A Mahanian Approach to Cyberspace
Mahan did not view the Navy as an
end unto itself, but as a key component of
the larger economic welfare of the Nation.
He tied the very existence of the Navy to
commerce when he wrote, “The necessity of
a navy, in the restricted sense of the word,
springs, therefore, from the existence of
a peaceful shipping, and disappears with
it.”1 Similarly, while cyberspace originated
through U.S. Government investment,
the domain owes its rapid expansion and
modern character to commerce. In this
sense, sea power and cyber power share a
common objective. They both primarily exist
to protect economic interests within their
respective domains.
and overcome resource constraints: “The
search for and establishment of leading principles—always few—around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to
reduce confusion of impression to simplicity
and directness of thought, with consequent
facility of comprehension.”3 In accordance
with these two principles, this article identifies seven strategic points of concentration
in cyberspace: operating systems (OSs),
search engines, physical communications
infrastructure, cloud computing, governance
forums, cryptography, and Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6).
Each of these categories has unique
challenges, and some are more established
than others. Fortunately, the United States
holds dominant roles in many of these
categories, such as operating systems and
search engines, and it must define strategies
sea power and cyber power both primarily exist to protect
economic interests within their respective domains
Two principles guided Mahan’s analysis. First, Mahan looked for strategic points
of convergence and concentration. He stated,
“In general . . . it will be found that by sea, as
by land, useful strategic points will be where
highways pass, and especially where they
cross and converge.”2 As a result of his foresight and the willingness of key U.S. leaders
to act on it, such as President Theodore Roosevelt, American influence secured the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Guantanamo
Bay, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal, to
name a few. Despite both the realities and
perceptions of the decentralized nature of
cyberspace, careful inspection reveals several
points of concentration.
Second, Mahan emphasized the need
to minimize the total number of points considered important to communicate priorities
to maintain those positions. In others, such
as physical communications infrastructure
and cloud computing, the United States has
played a leading role in their early development, but the future share of influence is still
uncertain. Here, more proactive measures
must be taken to help assert U.S. influence.
Key Differences
Before continuing with a detailed
review of each category, it is important to
evaluate the salient differences between the
nature of the sea and the essence of cyberspace. First, while the government played a
key role in helping establish the technological
foundations of the Internet, commercial
interest quickly surpassed the government in
terms of influence over the domain. Martin
Libicki, a senior policy analyst at the RAND
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FEATURES | From Sea Power to Cyber Power
Corporation, succinctly described the current
state of government influence: “As it is, the
days when governments were leading-edge
consumers and manipulators of information
technology are long past. . . . Man for man, it
cannot compete with Microsoft.”4
The second important difference is the
relationship between hard and soft power
in each domain. Mahan emphasized hard
power, and he viewed the threat or use of
force as foundational to protecting maritime
interests. He also tied sea power to command
when he asserted, “These national and
international functions can be discharged,
certainly, only by command of the sea.”5 Yet
his view of command and the role of force
do not translate well into cyberspace, where
soft power plays a predominant role. In
for centuries.9 Europeans recognized that
they could not control the outcome of the
economy as a whole. Instead, they established
policies to facilitate economic growth. In contrast, China’s attempt to control its economy
too tightly led to its decline. Given that
commercial interests dominate cyberspace,
and influence is based largely on merit, the
United States must act more like the Europeans than the Chinese of the middle ages.
So far, we have established convergence and simplicity as key components of a
Mahanian-style analysis for cyberspace. We
have also established how the proper employment of both sea power and cyber power is
intimately linked to promoting economic
growth. Yet the two also have important
differences. Commercial entities wield more
influence over cyberspace technology than
governments, power and influence in cyberspace are based on attraction and cooperation rather than command, and low barriers
to entry into cyberspace likely require a
decentralized security model.
William McNeill wrote about how European
sea power in the 16th century was quasiprivate in character. Neither the British Royal
Navy nor Spanish Armada significantly differentiated themselves from their respective
merchant shipping enterprises until after
1600.7 The utility of a government-led navy
was not realized until the barriers to selfprotection increased beyond practical limits
of individual commercial entities. As barriers
to entry increased, the security paradigm
shifted from a distributed model to a centralized one. This belief in a centralized security
model persists today, even though it may not
be relevant in cyberspace. Instead, the much
lower barriers to entry into cyberspace may
require the reversion to a distributed security
model dominated by private interests.
USS George H.W. Bush in Naples, Italy, in support of maritime security operations and
theater security cooperation
U.S. Navy (Betsy Lynn Knapper)
Seven Strategic Points in Cyberspace
cyberspace, strategies centered on relationship-building, performance, and legitimacy
will be more effective than those based on
force. In contrast to Mahan, Joseph Nye
stated, “To succeed in a networked world
requires leaders to think in terms of attraction and co-option rather than command.”6
The final differentiator is ease of access.
Cyberspace has much lower barriers to entry
than the sea. Perhaps this key difference will
lead to a devolution of norms with respect to
the proper role of government and military
in protecting private interests in cyberspace.
80
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
While Western navies were expanding
the sphere of European influence, events in
the East were unfolding differently. In 1433,
in an attempt to inhibit the link between
military and commercial enterprises, the
Chinese imperial court halted naval expeditions. Then, in 1436, the Chinese government
banned the construction of new seagoing
ships.8 Because the Chinese economy was
only allowed to function within the narrow
limits defined by the government, commerce
failed to expand, thereby allowing European
interests to dominate the global economy
The first strategic point is operating
systems. While cyberspace is distributed
and lacks a centralized authority, a single
company has tremendous influence over
nearly every desktop computer on the planet.
Microsoft Windows commands 92 percent of
the global market share, followed by Apple’s
Mac OS at a distant 6 percent, and Linux
trailing at only slightly more than 1 percent.10
In real numbers, this equates to over 1.25
billion computers running versions of the
Windows OS.11 Despite the complaints about
security flaws and functionality restrictions
in Microsoft product offerings, the United
States can be thankful that Microsoft is a
U.S.-based company subject to its own laws
and cultural norms.
Similarly, U.S. companies currently
dominate the global market share of mobile
operating systems, although not to the degree
of concentration seen in the desktop market.
The breakdown of the top four companies
is Google Android at 43 percent, Nokia
Symbian 22 percent, Apple iOS at 18 percent,
and Research in Motion at 12 percent (Microsoft carries less than a 2-percent share).12
The U.S. position in the mobile OS space is a
relatively recent development. Nokia ceded
the top spot in 2010 as a result of the transformation of cellular phones from simple voice
communication devices to “smart phones.”13
ndupres s . ndu. edu
BARCOMB
From a national security standpoint,
even if the government or military cannot
directly control the software powering the
bulk of the world’s desktop and mobile
devices, it is far better to at least have the
preponderance of software come from a
U.S.-based company. Imagine if we woke up
tomorrow and 92 percent of the world’s personal computers ran on an operating system
designed by a strategic competitor to the
United States. We would quickly wish for the
good old days of Microsoft.
Search engines are the second strategic
point in cyberspace. While operating systems
define the technical performance characteristics of systems, search engines exert tremendous influence over ideas. In many ways,
they embody Nye’s concept of soft power;
they must attract users through superior
performance, and the results they return are
a powerful form of agenda-setting and preference-shaping. Most users can easily switch
from one search engine to another, yet they
often choose only one: Google. The company
commands 91 percent of the global market
share for search.14 Google’s search algorithm
returns what it believes are the most relevant
matches to a user’s request from its index of
over 1 trillion unique URLs.15 Since people
generally only review the top three to five
results, the company wields historically
unprecedented ability to shape preferences.
Over 1 billion times every day, Google
decides what is and is not important across
the Internet.16 That is power.
The struggle for control of this strategic
point in cyberspace has already begun. For
example, China and Google have had a public
dispute over the Chinese government’s efforts
to censor Google’s search results within
its borders and the government’s attempts
to hack into Google’s infrastructure.17 In
a demonstration of corporate soft power,
Google withdrew its search services from
mainland China in 2010 and rehosted them
in Hong Kong. Google’s absence in mainland
China opened the door for the government
to increase its own authority over Internet
searching. The state-run search engine Baidu
became a de facto monopoly over the country’s 400 million Internet users.18 Prior to
pulling its search engine out of the mainland,
Google had over 35 percent of the Chinese
market share. As of June 2011, Google’s
dispute caused them to slip to an 11 percent
share, while Baidu rose to over 83 percent of
the Chinese search engine market.19
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
To maintain its dominant position in
both operating systems and search engines,
the United States must continue to adhere
to economic principles that promote growth
and innovation. It must also be extremely
cautious in exerting hard power in either of
these categories. For example, antitrust regulation that fostered U.S. competition in the
industrial era may now open a door for global
competitors to rise to the top. The United
States should also guard against mandating
controls or censorship within either of these
areas. Too much government interference
could delegitimize companies such as Microsoft, Apple, and Google and subsequently
facilitate the ability of non-U.S. companies to
take their place.
of driving that traffic to infrastructure
outside of U.S. control.21
Additionally, some U.S. companies
have been shortsighted with regard to
expanding their services. After the dot-com
bubble of 2000 burst, these companies were
either not in a financial position to invest
in physical communications infrastructure
or were unwilling to take another chance
on risky technology. This myopic stance
allowed non-U.S. interests to attain those
resources and open independently owned
and operated communications paths.22 A
more farsighted investment strategy combined with targeted financial incentives
could have helped the United States retain
the preponderance of ownership.
antitrust regulation that fostered U.S. competition
in the industrial era may now open a door for global
competitors to rise to the top
A third strategic point in cyberspace
is physical communications infrastructure.
In particular, this category relates to those
physical systems supporting the backbone
of the Internet. Only a handful of companies, known as Tier 1 Internet Service
Providers, control the bulk of the communications passing through cyberspace.
The United States has historically held the
majority stake in this category, and until
recently, nearly all Internet traffic has been
routed through U.S.-owned infrastructure.
In an address to Congress in 2006, former
Central Intelligence Agency Director
Michael Hayden acknowledged this point:
“Because of the nature of global telecommunications, we are playing with a tremendous home-field advantage, and we need to
exploit that edge.”20
Unfortunately, from a national security
standpoint, this situation is rapidly changing
as information technology costs decrease
and the legal environment governing the
protection of electronic communications
grows more uncertain. In this environment,
lawmakers must be mindful of unintended
effects as nations become increasingly
willing to recreate their own communications backbones to reduce the need to pass
through U.S. infrastructure. For example,
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in
part to help monitor nefarious cyber activity,
but the law had the unintended consequence
The fourth strategic point is cloud
computing. While physical communications
infrastructure established the need to maintain influence over the global communications paths, this category deals with maintaining similar influence over the current
trend to centralize processing and storage on
the Web. Cloud computing providers such as
Amazon, Microsoft, and Google allow users
to rent storage and processing capacity on
hosted infrastructures. While the current
market for this category is relatively small,
it is an emerging aspect of cyberspace that
will be important in the near future. As the
market for cloud services grows, more and
more data will flow across the infrastructures
of a handful of providers, making it a strategic concentration point in cyberspace.
For now, U.S. companies are the cloud
computing market leaders, but that could
change. If it does, it could mean that an
increasing share of cyberspace data, including that of U.S. citizens, could be hosted on
machines operating outside the boundaries of U.S. law. The United States should
encourage the development of these services
within regions covered by U.S. jurisdiction.
It should incentivize U.S. cloud service
providers through both appropriate fiscal
policy and continue to participate in the
governance bodies defining standards for
this emerging capability. U.S. Government
organizations such as the National Institute
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FEATURES | From Sea Power to Cyber Power
of Standards and Technology (NIST) have
performed well in building a foundation of
legitimacy and credibility in the cloud computing arena. These kinds of activities need
encouragement.
The fifth strategic point is governance
forums. Governance in cyberspace is more
like a cultural phenomenon than a means of
control. There are many consortiums made
up of various interested parties that work
together to decide the standards for communicating in cyberspace. The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, International Telecommunications Union, World
Wide Web Consortium, Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority, and many others play
integral roles in shaping the characteristics
of the cyber domain. A detailed description
of each forum and its relevance to the cyberspace is beyond the scope of this article, but it
is enough to emphasize that the United States
must make a concerted effort to support,
participate with, and help set the direction for
these governing bodies.
Another area where NIST has been
instrumental in exercising U.S. Government
soft power in cyberspace has been in the sixth
strategic point, cryptography. The mathematical underpinnings of cryptography provide
the foundation of security in cyberspace. If
the modern methods for securing data were
broken, the entire economic engine of the
Internet would crumble almost overnight.
Fortunately, the odds of that happening are
extremely low because of the NIST’s transparent process for defining cryptographic
standards. Since 1972, NIST, in coordination
with the National Security Agency, has been
instrumental in testing and certifying cryptographic standards and making them available to the general public. A 2001 economic
assessment determined their efforts had
improved the U.S. economy by $1.2 billion as
of 2000. 23 While more recent data were not
available, given the exponential growth of
e-commerce, it seems clear that this number
has grown tremendously since then.
The U.S. Government has an important
role to play in this field because of the fragility of cryptography when poor practices
or design implementations undercut its
theoretical foundations. Enigma, the cypher
machine used by the German military to
encrypt communications during World War
II, provides an excellent historical case study
to support this point. R.A. Ratcliff describes
the negative consequences of decentralizing
the management of cryptography and how
it undermined the German war effort.24 A
similar problem would arise if individual
companies were left to define their own cryptography standards. Cryptography also represents the elements of soft power in cyberspace since the government cannot dictate its
implementation outside its own networks. Yet
NIST’s open, competitive process for defining standards helps attract security conscious
private entities that recognize the value of
such a process.
The United States must also continue
to support research and development efforts
into quantum computing as a subset of the
cryptography category. Quantum computers
have the potential to undermine the fundamental security assumptions of modern
encryption. Fortunately, quantum computers
are currently too immature to achieve this
feat, but when and if they do reach that level
of complexity, it is in the best interest of the
United States to be at the forefront of this
next generation of computing technology.
U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn briefed
on cloud computing by Google representatives
82
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
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BARCOMB
The final strategic point, IPv6 (the next
generation standard), is associated with the
fundamental routing protocol of the Internet.
The current standard, IPv4, was formally
defined in 1981, and it has sufficient capacity to handle over 4 billion unique Internet
addresses.25 While this number sounds
impressive, all of the available addresses were
allocated as of February 3, 2011.26 There are
many economic barriers associated with
adopting IPv6, which will dramatically
increase the total number of unique Internet
addresses. While there are financial incentives for adopting the new standard, many
companies are concerned that if they are the
first to move to the new space, they will also
have to bear the cost of dealing with security
or design flaws. This makes adopting IPv6 a
classic example of a public good, and therefore the U.S. Government should play a role
in helping overcome this critical hurdle.
Another pressing reason to facilitate
IPv6 adoption in the United States is China’s
national push to do the same. China has
already developed a substantial program to
implement the standard across its next generation of Internet architecture.27 With over
400 million users and a growing economy,
China has the potential to wield significant
influence over the IPv6 standard, its hardware implementations, and its governance
forums. The United States must take a more
proactive role in helping its own commercial
interests overcome the adoption hurdles and
curtail the possibility of losing the preponderance of influence over this critical piece of
the Internet.
Conclusion
While the United States cannot dictate
the direction of the overall global economy,
it can take steps to facilitate the growth of
American private enterprise in cyberspace
and thereby maintain or improve U.S.
leadership in the key strategic points of this
domain. Securing the ocean’s concentration
points with sea power helped foster American economic dominance for decades. Similarly, purposefully selecting, prioritizing,
and capitalizing on the strategic “locations”
of the electronic world could secure American influence in cyberspace. Like coastal
defense, tactical security in cyberspace will
emerge as a function of projecting cyber
power at these key points, while also facilitating economic growth.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Hard power will be secondary to soft
power in cyberspace for the foreseeable
future. Strategies aimed at attracting and
co-opting will be more successful than those
attempting to control through force. This
limits the role the military will play in cyberspace, but it does not invalidate the need for
tailored government programs and policies.
The United States must resist the current
trend toward protectionism in an effort to
maintain the status quo. Excessive attempts
to control or exert hard power will likely do
more harm than good. Like Mahan’s strategy
for sea power, if the United States exerts soft
power appropriately in these seven strategic
points of cyberspace, it will be able to achieve
both expansionism and security simultaneously. Through tailored fiscal policy, partnership with private enterprise, and prioritized
research and development, the United States
will continue to wield cyberspace power in
the 21st century. JFQ
NOTES
1
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval
Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 28.
2
Ibid., 118.
3
Ibid., 97.
4
Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace:
National Security and Information Warfare (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 281.
5
Mahan, xx.
6
Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New
York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 101.
7
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power:
Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D.
1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984),
102.
8
Ibid., 45.
9
Ibid., 49.
10
NetMarketShare, “Desktop Operating
System Market Share,” available at <http://marketshare.hitslink.com>.
11
Matt Rosoff, “Right Now, There Are 1.25
Billion Windows PCs Worldwide,” Business
Insider, December 6, 2011, available at <http://
articles.businessinsider.com/2011-12-06/
tech/30481049_1_android-apps-ios>.
12
“Gartner Says Sales of Mobile Devices in
Second Quarter of 2011 Grew 16.5 Percent Yearon-Year; Smartphone Sales Grew 74 Percent,”
Gartner, August 11, 2011, available at <www.
gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1764714>.
13
“The Nokia Story,” Nokia.com, available at
<www.nokia.com/global/about-nokia/company/
about-us/story/the-nokia-story/>.
14
“Browser, OS, Search Engine including
Mobile Market Share,” Statcounter.com, available
at <http://gs.statcounter.com/>.
15
“Our history in depth,” Google.com, available at <www.google.com/about/company/history.
html>.
16
Steve Lohr, “Google Schools Its Algorithm,” The New York Times, March 6, 2011,
available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/
weekinreview/06lohr.html>.
17
Nye, 140.
18
Ibid., 115.
19
Viet Hoang, “Baidu vs. Google: Is the battle
already lost for Google?” February 21, 2012,
available at <http://digimind.com/blog/marketindustries/infographic-baidu-vs-google-is-thebattle-already-lost-for-google/>.
20
John Markoff, “Internet Traffic Begins to
Bypass the U.S.,” The New York Times, August 29,
2008, available at <www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/
business/30pipes.html?pagewanted=all>.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
National Institute of Standards and Technology, “Planning Report 01-2: The Economic
Impacts of NIST’s Data Encryption Standard
(DES) Program,” October 2001, ES-1, ES-3.
24
R.A. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence:
Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 215.
25
Internet Engineering Task Force, “Internet
Protocol: DARPA Internet Program Protocol
Specification,” September 1981, 7.
26
ICANN, “Available Pool of Unallocated IPv4
Internet Addresses Now Completely Emptied,”
February 3, 2011, available at <www.icann.org/en/
news/press/releases/release-03feb11-en.pdf>.
27
Ben Worthen, “Internet Strategy: China’s
Next Generation Internet CIO.com,” CIO.com, July
15, 2006, available at <www.cio.com/article/22985/
Internet_Strategy_China_s_Next_Generation_Internet>.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
83
U.S. Air Force (Mike Buytas)
The Future of
U.S. Landpower
Special Operations Versatility,
Marine Corps Utility
By k e v i n D . s t r i n g e r and
katie m. sizemore
Army Special Forces on patrol in Iraq
84
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
ndupres s . ndu. edu
STRINGER and SIZEMORE
A
merican military landpower,
represented by the U.S. Army
and Marine Corps, finds itself
in a period of transition. This
phase is characterized by troop drawdowns
from the decade-long, manpower-intensive
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan; an uncertain budgetary perspective given impending defense cutbacks;
and a divisive debate on the appropriate
roles and missions for ground forces in
the future. This article aims to provide a
forward-looking view of U.S. landpower for
the next decade. While the sheer difficulty of
predicting the future is known, the demands
of policy and force planning require some
attempt to delineate at least the rough contours of this upcoming period.
To achieve this tour de horizon, the
article first provides an overview of the
current state of American land forces. It
then highlights the fiscal, demographic, and
doctrinal challenges that impact American
landpower. The authors then propose a more
subtle application paradigm for landpower
that is both indirect and preventive. The
lead instruments for this approach are U.S.
special operations forces (SOF) and Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Their
missions involve interceding in priority geographic combatant command regions to stabilize, prevent, or preclude conflict situations in
order to avoid manpower-intensive and costly
conventional or counterinsurgency interventions, which will be unsustainable given
future fiscal and demographic constraints.
Examples from the most relevant or
representative combatant commands for the
future—U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM),
and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)—
demonstrate the developing nature of this
“light touch” approach. The conclusion
supports the premise that demography,
finance, and threats dictate a more nuanced
and sophisticated use of landpower than in
the past.
Current State and Fiscal Challenges
U.S. landpower consists of its Army and
Marine Corps elements, both of which bear
consequences from the troop drawdowns in
Iraq and Afghanistan, national demographic
trends, and continuing controversy over roles
and missions. The Army consists of 45 Active
and 28 Reserve Brigade Combat Teams, while
the Marine Corps is broken down into 29
Active and 9 Reserve Infantry Battalions.1
As of June 2011, there were 571,108 Active
Army personnel and 200,827 Active Marine
personnel stationed worldwide.2 When
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
itemized the fiscal year 2012 Department
of Defense (DOD) budget, he stated that by
the beginning of 2012, there would be fewer
than 100,000 troops deployed in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. He also added that by 2015,
Army Active force levels would be reduced
by at least 27,000 and the Marine Corps by
15,000 to 20,000 troops, assuming that the
majority of troops in Afghanistan exit by
2014. This level would still be 40,000 troops
larger than in 2008.3
demography, finance, and threats dictate a more nuanced and
sophisticated use of landpower
But given a new Presidential strategy that envisions a regional focus on the
Asia-Pacific, the Army may be reduced
to 490,000 troops from 570,000 and the
Marines to 175,000 from 200,000 over the
next few years.4 To place these figures in
historical perspective, the Army today has
200,000 fewer Active-duty troops than in
1991.5 While the projected numbers may
seem sufficient for national defense, these
troop strengths depend upon a wider and
highly volatile fiscal context that could bring
further reductions.
In this period of economic uncertainty,
Congress is targeting DOD for cost reduction measures. The Congressional Budget
Control Act passed in August 2011 seeks
to reduce defense spending by $882 billion
over the next 10 years.6 Furthermore, lack of
congressional decisionmaking could result in
lowered “sequestration” ceilings on spending
that would effectively cut more than $500
billion from what the Pentagon has projected,
plus sequestration cuts that would further
indiscriminately slash as much as $500
Dr. Kevin D. Stringer (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve) is an Associate Professor at Webster University
Geneva. Katie M. Sizemore is a Master’s degree candidate in International Peace and Conflict Resolution in
the School of International Service at American University.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
billion more.7 In all, sequestration constraints
could trim anywhere from $500 billion to
over $1 trillion from projected long-term
defense spending.8
The results could be devastating, with
grave implications for the land components.
As Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated,
“It’s a brigade without bullets. . . . It’s a paper
tiger, an Army of barracks, buildings and
bombs without enough trained Soldiers able
to accomplish the mission. . . . It’s a force that
suffers low morale, poor readiness and is
unable to keep up with potential adversaries.
In effect, it invites aggression.”9 Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey echoed this view by stating that
the U.S. military’s capacity to deploy ground
forces for future operations would be reduced
by around 15 percent as a result of defense
spending cuts over the next decade. Concretely, American land forces would retain
capability across the spectrum of conflict, but
the frequency and capacity for use would be
greatly limited.10
In the face of these unprecedented
budgetary limits, defense planners face some
nightmarish dilemmas about how best to
maintain real flexibility and cost effectiveness.11 For instance, the Middle East remains
the highest priority in terms of a continued
military commitment, while Africa and Latin
America receive the lowest priority for a large
American military presence.12 The Asian
theater increases in importance, but it does
not require a large number of ground forces.
Hence, policymakers must choose how to
allocate declining resources and determine
which areas require a strong U.S. military
land commitment.
Demographics
In addition to budget cuts, demographic
trends have the potential to strain recruiting
as well as retention for the land components.
Of the military Services, the Army deployed
the largest number of personnel to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan but struggled
to maintain and increase its end strength in
accordance with congressional authorization.
With recruiting and retention a stated priority
for the Army, 2009 witnessed a decrease in
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85
FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower
longer life expectancies further affects these
numbers.17 This development leaves the
American population with a lower number of
young people of recruiting age as a proportion of the total population. This phenomenon partially explains the slight decrease
seen in 2009 retention. Also, since military
personnel tend to retire earlier due to the
nature of the system, the overall ground force
faces declining numbers at both ends of the
military career spectrum.18 Finally, from a
purely supply-side perspective, only 3 out of
every 10 young Americans (17–24 years old)
meet the medical, educational, and moral
standards of the U.S. military.19 These facts
equate to a smaller pool of personnel from
which to recruit and retain.20 These combined fiscal and demographic limits imply a
much smaller land component, which must
still maintain adequate flexibility and combat
power for future contingencies, yet be used
sparingly for only the most crucial national
security interests.
Doctrinal Roles
At the same time that American
military landpower navigates a period of
fiscal and demographic transition, threats
to national security continue to multiply. A
2010 U.S. Joint Forces Command21 study on
warfare lends credence to the view that the
U.S. Marine Corps (Daniel A. Negrete)
recruiting by 14.2 percent, or some 24,120
Soldiers. Retention measurements, referring
to the number of Soldiers who reenlist within
a given fiscal year, also saw a decrease in 2009
of 3.2 percent, or 3,830 Soldiers.13 Conversely,
the Marine Corps has met or exceeded all
of its recruiting goals in terms of quantity
and quality every year since 2000, but these
goals were lowered by 10 percent over the
period 2000–2006.14 Several studies seem to
confirm the challenges of future recruitment
in a modern society. One Armed Forces &
Society article looked at propensity to serve
in the military, which is shown to be a strong
predictor of actual enlistment. Propensity to
serve is declining among American youth,
and there are not sufficient “high propensity”
youth to meet manpower needs, so harderto-reach segments must be targeted and
recruited.15 Another study from the same
journal explored underlying themes affecting
enlistment while illustrating that the U.S. military faces substantial recruiting challenges.
These hurdles stem from the high percentage
of youth pursuing education beyond high
school, cyclical fluctuations in civilian job
opportunities, and the occurrence of international events that can lead to periods of
heightened concern.16
The demographic trend of a “graying”
population due to lower birth rates and
U.S. Marine with Air-Ground Task Force posts security during jungle patrol exercise in Poptun, Guatemala
86
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
future holds a high potential for instability
due to demographic, energy, and climate
trends.22 Hostile great powers, once the predominant threats to American security, have
been supplanted by rogue states, failed states,
and nonstate actors—all of them pursuing
asymmetrical strategies to offset U.S. military strengths.23 In Latin America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia, an intertwined wave of
violent extremism and criminality confronts
governments and populations.24 China and
other emerging regional powers, often with
opaque intentions, represent potential risks
too. This future implies the commensurate
need for adequate ground forces to address
the contingency operations produced by such
a volatile world.25
American society needs landpower for
a diverse set of national security objectives:
to fight and win major wars, secure a U.S.
presence overseas, confront counterinsurgencies, execute stability operations, and
assist in domestic disturbances and national
disasters at home and abroad. Yet while the
general public can create such task lists, policymakers struggle to organize or prioritize
these missions since there is no objective
standard to determine what constitutes
“enough” security, or what particular mix
of goals and resources is best. 26 To address
this broad societal mandate, U.S. Army
doctrine clearly describes future expectations for an expeditionary, campaign-quality
Army that is proficient at full-spectrum
operations—conventional warfare, hybrid
warfare, irregular warfare, humanitarian
assistance, stabilization operations, and any
other mission the Nation gives it. The complexity of these missions defies the concept
of a “one-size-fits-all” force structure. There
are too many variables and uncertainties to
expect a homogeneous army to be equally
proficient and optimally organized for any
mission in any scenario. This combination
will most certainly require tradeoffs in force
structure, training proficiency, and future
acquisition programs.27
Similarly, the Marine Corps, considered a general purpose force in DOD,
operates on the land, sea, and air, but is not
optimized to dominate any of them. Rather,
the Marine Corps is designed to be expeditionary. Organized in MAGTFs ranging in
size from a 2,000-man Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to a 45,000-man Marine
expeditionary force, the Marine Corps can
provide rapid response to humanitarian
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STRINGER and SIZEMORE
crises, traditional power projection, forcibleentry capabilities, and sustained, large-scale
combat operations.28
Yet ongoing military operations in two
wars have exposed the difficulties of accomplishing critical policy aims while maintaining flexibility within manpower restrictions.
In these conflicts, the Nation relied heavily
on the Army to carry a significant portion
of the national effort on land.29 Equally,
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan required
the Marine Corps to fight as a second land
army.30 These campaigns strained the fullspectrum flexibility of both organizations.
This recent history raises an important question for landpower usage in the future: What
concept should determine land force employment, training, and structure in a limited
personnel and fiscal context? To date, the
debate centers around whether conventional
means or counterinsurgency concepts should
predominate.31 The next section summarizes
this controversy and then offers a relevant
third way for consideration.
respectful of human rights.34 Sufficient U.S.
troop numbers for counterinsurgency would
most likely not be available in the future
given budgetary and demographic limits.
Additionally, institutional resistance stays
strong inside the Army, despite recent growth
in its special operations components. Though
the Marine Corps remains comfortable
with counterinsurgency because of its long
history of small wars and policing operations,
the Army, notwithstanding considerable
experience in small wars, has never viewed
counterinsurgency as anything other than a
diversion from its main mission of conventional combat against like enemies.35
Contemporary supporters of the conventional view, notably Colonel Gian Gentile,
contend that counterinsurgency has become
the new American way of war prematurely
and without proper examination.36 He calls
for a reassessment of the doctrine in order to
reach a more complete and operational role.37
Gentile rejects a doctrinal approach that
places Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
tional conflicts.”42 This article subscribes to
this view and proposes an indirect and preventive land force paradigm where worldwide
ground engagement is led by SOF and the
Marine Corps. This approach finds support
from several sources. As Secretary Gates
noted in a February 25, 2011, speech at West
Point, the United States will not send large
land armies into the Middle East again, and
the most plausible, high-end scenarios for
the U.S. military are primarily naval and air
engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian
Gulf, or elsewhere. The strategic rationale for
swift-moving expeditionary forces, whether
Army or Marine, airborne infantry or special
operations, is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction,
disaster response, or stability or security
force assistance missions.43 The new DOD
strategic guidance confirms that U.S. forces
will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale,
prolonged stability operations.44
With versatility and flexibility
vital characteristics for future landpower
Mission Dissonance
Landpower experts typically divide
into two camps. Proponents of counterinsurgency such as Colonel Robert M. Cassidy,
John Nagl, and David Kilcullen advocate
U.S. ground forces addressing asymmetric
conflicts for the future. They believe the U.S.
military is more likely to be called upon to
counter insurgencies, intervene in civil strife
and humanitarian crises, rebuild nations, and
wage unconventional types of warfare than it
is to fight mirror-image armed forces. In this
school, U.S. forces should focus on winning
the “hearts and minds” of the population
through compromise, negotiation, and above
all the defeat of the insurgent’s strategy. The
essential role of military forces is to create
the preconditions necessary for nonmilitary
measures to succeed.32
Yet such circumstances require large
numbers of properly trained ground troops
for securing population centers and infrastructure, maintaining order, providing
humanitarian relief, and facilitating revived
delivery of such fundamental services as
electric power, potable water, and refuse
collection.33 As one researcher noted, counterinsurgency campaigns are winnable if they
attain a sufficient force density, are defending
a generally popular and capable government,
and rest largely on the shoulders of indigenous forces who are skilled, flexible, and
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
the Army has never viewed counterinsurgency as anything
other than a diversion from its main mission of conventional
combat against like enemies
above conventional capacities. He writes that
“the future of war is not only the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan” and
that “the choice should be to build an army
on the organizing principle of fighting.”38 He
demands a military more heavily weighted
to the requirements of conventional war.39
This latter perspective follows the intellectual tradition of Colonel Harry Summers
in his 1982 On Strategy: A Critical Analysis
of the Vietnam War, which repudiated the
counterinsurgency lessons of Vietnam.40 Proponents of this group find succor in the 2008
Russo-Georgian war and the 2006 Lebanon
war, both of which demonstrated the need for
adequate levels of conventional capabilities.41
Given this impasse, it seems a third
way is needed for the future. In a prescient
article, Michael Cohen summarized thinking
on the counterinsurgency and conventional
approaches and concluded that both camps
have it wrong. He asserted the argument of
Steven Metz that, “in the end, perhaps the
focus of the U.S. military and American
foreign policy, writ large, should be to avoid
counterinsurgencies—and to avoid conven-
operations, coupled with the need to husband
scarcer ground force personnel, SOF and the
Marine Corps both possess capabilities
and cultures for early and successful initial
ground engagement in the exceedingly
complex, unpredictable, and unstructured
world that confronts the U.S. military.
Their characteristics also complement
those of the more conventional Army.
While the regular Army remains expert at
large-scale land combat and the integration of huge formations against similarly
sized foes, SOF concentrate on irregular
warfare—that is, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, psychological operations,
and foreign internal defense. 45 The present
and future environment is so complex
that SOF can use their high levels of warfighting expertise, coupled with cultural
knowledge and diplomacy skills, to lay the
groundwork for interagency development,
defense, and diplomatic activities that contribute to overall U.S. national interests. 46
Similarly, the Marine Corps offers
real cross-functional utility. The Service
can bridge the critical seam between Army
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87
FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower
and Navy operations, is culturally and
operationally adept and comfortable with
irregular warfare, and can transition to fight
as a second conventional army if needed.
While SOF and Marine Corps land activities
would be undertaken to preclude larger and
more costly interventions, if these “steering”
engagements, often interagency in character,
are not successful, adequate numbers of
heavy Army conventional forces should
remain for reinforcement. David E. Johnson
eloquently makes this case in a recent RAND
study on the future of the heavy army. Army
Heavy Brigade Combat Teams provide a
crucial hedge against the full range of potential enemies that the United States could
face in the future: nonstate irregular, statesponsored hybrid, and state adversaries.47
But these assets, most likely limited by fiscal
constraints, should be kept in reserve. Rather,
the future of landpower employment, based
upon regional priorities, already tends toward
giving SOF primacy of engagement, while
simultaneously utilizing the versatility of the
MAGTFs. This trend should be reinforced.
Landpower by Geographic Combatant Commands
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Southern Command
(USSOUTHCOM), USCENTCOM, U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM),
USPACOM, and USAFRICOM form part of
the unified combatant command community
and are charged with the command and
control of the U.S. military on a geographical
basis.48 This arrangement is controversial.
Some experts question whether these commands should be modified or rendered obsolete altogether given the limitations posed by
a rigid regional organization that no longer
fits comfortably in today’s global security
environment.49 Ambassador Edward Marks,
noting that one of our foremost security challenges is international terrorism, makes the
following observation:
The lead for planning (and often conducting)
military counterterrorism campaigns falls
on the shoulder of [U.S.] Special Operations
Command—a global, functional command.
Another major security challenge is monitoring and securing weapons of mass destruction . . . a task that falls to another global,
functional command—[U.S.] Strategic
Command. In other words, the [geographic
combatant commands] are not designated as
88
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
the lead military organization for managing
our two primary military challenges.50
Conversely, Ambassador Mary Yates
views an interagency combatant command
like that found in USAFRICOM as more relevant to the post-9/11 environment through a
close integration of both military and civilian
efforts.51 While acknowledging this debate and
the imperfections of dividing the world into
regional commands, a prioritized combatant
command lens provides useful examples to
show the utility of SOF and the Marine Corps
to shape, influence, manage, or deter specific
risks found in key regions in the future.
In terms of priorities for future landpower employment, four of the current combatant commands stand out and illustrate the
relevancy of leading with SOF and Marine
Corps capabilities. USCENTCOM remains
a priority for strategic landpower since it
oversees operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan, and conducts a theater-wide
campaign against al Qaeda.52 USPACOM’s
importance grows as American foreign policy
pivots away from the greater Middle East to
the Asia-Pacific. President Barack Obama’s
United States. Yet as troop withdrawals
continue, the future role of landpower in
USCENTCOM is unclear. As Secretary Gates
noted, a large land army will not be a part of
the U.S. role in the Middle East in the future,
but rather a lighter, more diverse force will
shape the strategic architecture of U.S. engagement in the region. The reduction of conventional troops will likely place a larger burden
on SOF formations as well as increase their
roles in the region. As a case in point, the
majority of Army Special Forces are operating
in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.56
In addition to carrying out direct combat
and counterterrorism operations, in-theater
SOF conduct a wide variety of indirect missions including psychological, training, and
support operations for paramilitary forces.57
Besides SOF, the Marine Corps is active. The
15th MEU demonstrated a perfect example of
the future of land warfare in USCENTCOM
when it simultaneously provided close-air
support in Afghanistan, conducted evacuation and disaster-relief operations in Pakistan,
and secured and removed suspected pirates
from the container ship Magellan Star in the
Gulf of Aden.58
in-theater SOF conduct a wide variety of indirect missions
including psychological, training, and support operations for
paramilitary forces
new “Hedge” strategy confirms this shift.53
Finally, USAFRICOM is uniquely focused on
building security capacities rather than warfighting and serves as a surrogate example in
this section for the equally vital USSOUTHCOM given their similarities in mission.54
These two latter commands, USAFRICOM
and USSOUTHCOM, will merit more attention in the future since instability in these
regions is multigenerational and represents
a long-term threat to security in an increasingly globalized world.55 USNORTHCOM
and USEUCOM, while important as logistics
bases and power projection platforms, are less
relevant for the landpower discussion given
the lower threat profiles found there.
USCENTCOM. While overseeing the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Central
Command has been the focal point of the
combatant command community for most
of this decade. Its region includes Pakistan,
which together with Afghanistan constitutes
the epicenter of the terrorist threat to the
USPACOM. Similarly, the security
environment in the Pacific demands versatility and flexibility from the military’s land
forces. Currently composed of 250,000 personnel, U.S. Pacific Command’s major effort
has been enhancing the stability of the AsiaPacific region. Its main focus areas include
strengthening and advancing alliances and
partnerships, remaining prepared to respond
to a Korean Peninsula contingency, and
countering transnational threats.59
As in USCENTCOM, SOF are uniquely
organized and prepared to counter the
present threats. U.S. Special Operations
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) has increasingly used an indirect approach to combat
terrorism in the region and the threats posed
by al Qaeda. SOCPAC’s efforts consist mostly
of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. It works closely with host
nation militaries and political leadership to
foster ties and coordinate efforts so that they
can develop the capability to provide security
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STRINGER and SIZEMORE
three principles of collaborating with African
partners, approaching the continent within a
regional framework, and cooperating as part
of an interagency team. While a conventional
military conflict in Africa is unlikely, the
challenges created by crime, poverty, corruption, illicit trafficking of materials, terrorism,
and institutional weakness call for a more
varied and preventive security cooperation
approach.65 A traditional military culture
focused primarily on major land conflict has
difficulty using this capacity-building methodology in foreign nations, yet since it is the
heart of USAFRICOM’s mission, SOF formations, with their versatility, play an important
role in its execution.66
In September 2011, General Carter
Ham, commander of USAFRICOM, asked
for more special operations forces. His statement referenced the growing counterterrorism effort in Africa due to signs of increased
collaboration between al-Shabaab in East
Africa, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
and Nigeria-based Boko Harem.67 To avoid
future high-profile wars, subordinate
commanders were told to focus on “smart
power”—that is, training national armies to
keep the peace and neutralize threats before
they reach the headlines.68 The Army’s role
in USAFRICOM places stability operations
on par with major combat missions through
its SOF elements within Special Operations
Command Africa.69
Meanwhile, U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Africa (MARFORAF) focuses on engagement through military-to-military training
with partner nations. In anticipation of this
broader future, the Marine Corps created a
Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground
Task Force concept tailored for security cooperation and civil-military operations. This
force provides another expeditionary option
to augment joint and interagency capabilities
that are already available to geographic combatant commands. This formation will help
partner nations in not only Africa but also
Southwest Asia and South America in order
to foster stability and prevent conflict in their
respective regions.70
In Africa, Special Purpose Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) 12
exemplifies this concept by sending small
training groups to partner with local militaries in an effort to indirectly blunt the spread
of extremist groups across the continent.
The task force has dispatched teams across
a wide swath of Africa over the course of its
6-month deployment in support of MAR-
U.S. Marine Corps
over the long term. SOCPAC land forces have
learned to do more with less via an indirect
approach of institution- and capacitybuilding for addressing asymmetric threats
in USPACOM.60
In addition to SOCPAC’s unique
efforts in the region, the self-contained and
sea-based MAGTFs are the best kind of fire
extinguishers—because of their flexibility,
reliability, logistical simplicity, and relative
economy.61 The Marines were scheduled in
2012 to begin reorienting from Afghanistan
to the Pacific because of the increasing
emphasis on a ground force presence in the
region.62 For example, the Marine Corps
showcased its expeditionary force readiness
by deploying within 20 hours to Japan and
beginning humanitarian assistance following
the devastating tsunami in March 2011.63
Forward-positioned MAGTFs, supported
when necessary by immediately deployable
reinforcements, enable swift power projection and rapid crisis resolution throughout
the USPACOM area of operations.64
USAFRICOM. Created in 2007 as the
newest addition to the geographic combatant commands, U.S. Africa Command
covers all 53 countries on that continent.
The USAFRICOM mission operates on the
U.S. Marines with Echo Company, 4th
Reconnaissance Battalion, demonstrate
amphibious assault during Marine Week Saint
Louis, June 2011
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FEATURES | The Future of U.S. Landpower
FORAF, sending from 5 to 50 Marines into
partner nations from days to months at a
time. The 180-troop-strong unit was formed
over the summer of 2011 from Marine Forces
Reserve units and equipped with two KC-130
Hercules aircraft to ferry teams to and from
African countries. The unit is among the first
of its kind.
In Uganda, the Marine team of force
reconnaissance, infantry, and combatengineering troops taught common soldiering skills that Ugandan soldiers need for use
against the brutal Lord’s Resistance Army.
More specialized follow-on training was
designed to help Ugandan field engineers
counter al-Shabaab insurgency tactics in
Somalia, where urban obstacles and improvised explosive devices reminiscent of the
Iraq War are common. This small task force
represents one of the first significant security
cooperation missions undertaken by DOD in
Uganda, a nation more accustomed to State
Department interaction.
Under Secretary of the Navy Robert
Work singled out the task force as a prime
example of the type of “low footprint, high
payoff operations” the White House is
seeking as a means of maintaining global
defense postures as the Pentagon pledges
to cut at least $450 billion in spending over
the next decade. Using a small group such
as the one in Uganda could simplify the
complex politics associated with deploying and hosting troops in a foreign nation.
During testimony to Congress on February
29, 2012, General Ham noted that African
nations’ reluctance to host large numbers of
U.S. troops was one reason for USAFRICOM
headquarters to remain in Europe despite
growing threats in Africa. SPMAGTF 12
missions on the continent could represent
an early example of a long-heralded Marine
Corps return to quick reaction operations.71
President Obama’s decision announced
in November 2011 to redeploy 2,500 Marines
to Australia in order to expand and solidify
military alliances with Asia, and subsequent
policy documents, provide a glimpse into
this evolving future of American landpower.
Small, versatile forces judiciously placed in
key locations to symbolize long-term American military commitment could provide
expandable platforms for capabilities across
a range of missions—humanitarian crises,
power projection, and disaster relief. This
blueprint mirrors the new strategic guidance that states, “Whenever possible, we
will develop innovative, low-cost, and small
footprint approaches to achieve our national
security objectives.”74 This foretaste demonstrates that even in times of stringent budgetary cuts and adverse demographic trends, the
measured use of landpower remains a strategic tool for projecting American interests and
influence abroad.75 JFQ
Conclusion
While many uncertainties cloud the
future, the United States must possess a flexible land force—one that can engage, respond,
and project—to operate across the domains
that challenge its ability to execute global
responsibilities.72 Yet demographic, financial,
and future threat parameters dictate that
the use of landpower must become more
nuanced and sophisticated than in the past.
Rather than argue the merits of counterinsurgency or conventional approaches
for the future, the U.S. military should
concentrate on a subtler application paradigm for landpower that is both indirect
and preventive. In this setting, SOF and
MAGTFs lead the ground force effort
to prevent, deter, and contain threats in
USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USAFRICOM,
and USSOUTHCOM in order to avoid
manpower-intensive engagements. Conventional and heavy land forces remain on
hand, but they are husbanded as the strategic reserve to be used only if the SOF and
MAGTF efforts fail. This model still allows
“strategic pluralism,” an approach that calls
for a wide variety of military forces and
weapons to meet a diversity of threats.73
NOTES
U.S. Navy (Josh Ives)
Security force team member for PRT Farah
provides security during key leader engagement
90
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
1
Frank A. DiStasio, Jr., The Army Budget
Fiscal Year 2012: An Analysis (Arlington, VA:
Association of the United States Army, 2011).
2
“Active Duty Military Personnel by Regional
Area and by Country,” Department of Defense,
Defense Manpower Data Center, 2011.
3
DiStasio.
4
Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The President’s
Risky Defense Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 6, 2012.
5
Max Boot, “Slashing America’s
Defense: A Suicidal Trajectory,” Commentary, January 2012, available at <www.
commentarymagazine.com/article/
slashing-americas-defense-a-suicidal-trajectory/>.
6
David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis
Sharp, “How to Cut the Defense Budget Responsibly,” Foreign Affairs, November 2, 2011.
7
Based on President Barack Obama’s fiscal
year 2012 budget proposal to spend over the next
10 years.
8
Defense Spending, the Super Committee, and
the Price of Greatness (Washington, DC: Defending Defense Project, November 17, 2011), available
at <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/
defendingdefense.pdf>.
9
Leon Panetta, Department of Defense news
conference, Washington, DC, November 10, 2011.
10
James Blitz, “U.S. military cuts will affect
ground forces, says Dempsey,” The Financial
Times, December 1, 2011, 4.
11
Philip Sabin, The Current and Future Utility
of Air & Space Power, Discussion Paper No.1 (Wilt-
ndupres s . ndu. edu
STRINGER and SIZEMORE
shire, UK: Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power
Studies, 2010).
12
Barno, Bensahel, and Sharp.
13
U.S. Army Sustainability Report 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment,
2011).
14
Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of
Military Personnel (Washington, DC: Congressional
Budget Office, 2006).
15
Todd Woodruff, Ryan Kelty, and David
R. Segal, “Propensity to Serve and Motivation to
Enlist among American Combat Soldiers,” Armed
Forces & Society 32, no. 3 (2006), 353–366.
16
John Eighmey, “Why Do Youth Enlist? Identification of Underlying Themes,” Armed Forces &
Society 32, no. 2 (2006), 307–328.
17
George H. Quester, “Demographic Trends
and Military Recruitment: Surprising Possibilities,” Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 27–40.
18
Ibid.
19
Michèle A. Flournoy and Alice Hunt, “The
State of US Ground Forces: Fact Sheet,” Washington, DC, Center for a New American Security,
2008.
20
Laura B. Shrestha and Elayne J. Heisler,
The Changing Democratic Profile of the United
States, RL32701 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, March 31, 2011).
21
U.S. Joint Forces Command was formally
disestablished August 4, 2011.
22
Joint Operating Environment 2010 (Norfolk,
VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010).
23
Jeffrey Record, The American Way of War:
Cultural Barriers to Successful Counter-Insurgency,
Cato Policy Analysis, no. 577 (Washington, DC:
Cato Institute, September 2006), 6.
24
Cheryl Pellerin, “Commanders Cite Unpredictable Future Threats,” American Forces Press
Service, 2011.
25
Kevin D. Stringer, “Global counterinsurgency and US army expansion: the case for recruiting foreign troops,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22,
no. 1 (2011), 142–169.
26
Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., “In the Army
Now,” American Interest 6, no. 1 (2010).
27
“Revisiting Priorities for the Army’s Future
Force,” Military Review 89, no. 5 (2009).
28
James T. Conway, “The Posture of the U.S.
Marine Corps,” Military Technology 34, no. 9
(2010).
29
Lacquement.
30
Conway.
31
Lacquement.
32
John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,”
Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009); Robert
M. Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars
Badly,” Military Review 82, no. 5 (2002); John A.
Nagl, “A Better War in Afghanistan,” Joint Force
Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010); and David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005).
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
33
Record, 7; and Max Boot, “The Struggle to
Transform the Military,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2
(2005).
34
Carl Conetta, “No Good Reason to Boost
Army, Marine Corps End Strength,” Project on
Defense Alternatives, Briefing Report No. 20,
Washington, DC, 2007.
35
Record, 10.
36
Gian P. Gentile, “Is Counterinsurgency the
Right Path in Afghanistan? No,” U.S. News Digital
Weekly 1, no. 40 (2009).
37
Gian P. Gentile, “Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24,” Joint Force Quarterly 58
(3rd Quarter 2010).
38
Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win
All Wars,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter
2009).
39
Gian P. Gentile, “A (Slightly) Better
War: A Narrative and Its Defects,” World
Affairs Journal (Summer 2008), available
at <www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/
slightly-better-war-narrative-and-its-defects>.
40
Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:
Presidio, 1982).
41
Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,”
Parameters (Spring 2009).
42
Michael Cohen, “The Counterinsurgency Trap: Future of the US Military,”
The New Atlanticist, March 23, 2009, available at <www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/
counterinsurgency-trap-future-us-military>.
43
Robert M. Gates, speech, West Point, NY,
February 25, 2011.
44
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities
for 21st Century Defense (Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 6.
45
Lacquement.
46
Eric Olsen, “Context and Capabilities in
Irregular Warfare,” Special Warfare 23, no. 5
(2010).
47
David E. Johnson, Heavy Armor in the
Future Security Environment (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2011).
48
“U.S. Unified Combatant Commands,”
International Debates 8, no. 6 (2010).
49
Edward Marks, “Rethinking the Geographic
Combatant Commands,” Interagency Journal 1, no.
1 (2010).
50
Ibid.
51
Mary C. Yates, “U.S. Africa Command:
Value Added,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter
2009).
52
“U.S. Unified Combatant Commands.”
53
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership.
54
Jerry Lanier, “Foreword,” in African Security
and the African Command: Viewpoints on the US
Role in Africa, ed. Terry F. Buss et al. (Sterling, VA:
Kumarian Press, 2011), x.
55
“Doctrine Man,” Defense Technology International, January 2012, 73.
56
Kate Brannen, “U.S. Army Special Operations Force Not Expected to Grow Beyond 2017,”
Defense News, 2010.
57
John J. Kruzel, “Special Forces to Remain in
Iraq through Drawdown,” American Forces Press
Service, 2010.
58
George J. Flynn, “Versatility in the Age of
Uncertainty,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136,
no. 11 (2010).
59
Robert F. Willard, “United States Pacific
Command Strategic Guidance,” available at
<www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/strategicguidance.shtml>.
60
David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk,
“Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations
Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter 2007).
61
B.H. Liddell Hart, Deterrence or Defense
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).
62
Daniel A. Wetzel, “Future of the Marine
Corps Afghanistan Drawdown,” Marines Blog,
December 1, 2011.
63
Ibid.
64
Flynn.
65
“United States Africa Command: Statement
of General Carter F. Ham,” Washington, DC,
House Armed Services Committee, 2011.
66
Edward P. Donnelly and Robert Maginnis,
“Preparing Soldiers to Help Foreign Partners Meet
21st Century Challenges,” Military Review 91, no. 3
(May–June 2011).
67
Robert Burns, “Terror Collaboration in
Africa Worries U.S. General,” The Washington
Times, September 14, 2011.
68
“American in Africa: A Light Footprint, the
Pentagon’s Unusual African Arm,” The Economist,
April 14, 2011.
69
“United States Africa Command: The First
Three Years” (Stuttgart, Germany: U.S. Africa
Command Public Affairs Office, 2011).
70
Vincent J. Ciuccoli and David A. Anderson,
“Marines Are Optimizing Forward Presence,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 11 (2010).
71
Jad Sleiman, “Small footprint, high payoff:
US Marines train Ugandan forces to face alShabaab, LRA,” War on Terror News, March
14, 2012, available at <http://waronterrornews.
typepad.com/home/2012/03/small-footprint-highpayoff-us-marines-train-ugandan-forces-to-faceal-shabaab-lra-.html>.
72
Flynn.
73
Owens.
74
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 3.
75
Jackie Calmes, “Obama and Gillard Expand
U.S.-Australia Military Ties,” The New York Times,
November 16, 2011.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
91
The German Military
Mission to Romania,
1940–1941
By r i c H a r D l . D i n a r D o
W
hen one thinks of security
assistance and the training of foreign troops,
Adolf Hitler’s Germany is
not a country that typically comes to mind.
Yet there were two instances in World War II
when Germany did indeed deploy troops to
other countries that were in noncombat circumstances. The countries in question were
Finland and Romania, and the German military mission to Romania is the subject of this
article. The activities of the German mission
to Romania are discussed and analyzed, and
some conclusions and hopefully a few takeaways are offered that could be relevant for
military professionals today.
Wikimedia Commons
Creation of the Mission
Finnish Volunteer Battalion of German Waffen-SS return home from front in 1943
92
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
The matter of how the German military
mission to Romania came into being can be
covered relatively quickly. In late June 1940,
the Soviet Union demanded from Romania
the cession of both Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina. The only advice Germany could
give to the Romanian government was to
agree to surrender the territory.1 Fearful of
further Soviet encroachments, the Romanian government made a series of pleas to
Germany including a personal appeal from
King Carol II to Hitler for German military
assistance in the summer of 1940. Hitler,
however, was not yet willing to undertake
such a step. Thus, all Romanian requests
were rebuffed with Hitler telling Carol that
Romania brought its own problems upon
itself by its prior pro-Allied policy. Hitler also
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urged the Romanian government to settle its
problems with Hungary peaceably.2
Having been urged by Hitler to attain
a peaceful solution, Romania and Hungary
then asked Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini
to act as arbitrators in their dispute over the
contested area of Transylvania.3 Much to
Romania’s chagrin, however, Hitler and Mussolini tried to split the difference but in Hungary’s favor. On August 30, 1940, Germany,
Italy, Hungary, and Romania signed the
Second Vienna Award. By the terms of that
agreement, Romania had to cede about half
of Transylvania to Hungary.4
The territorial losses incurred during
the summer of 1940 caused considerable
political instability in Romania. The Second
Vienna Award, coming after Romania’s
agreeing to conduct a pro-Axis foreign
policy, completed the discrediting of Carol’s
government. Carol appointed Romania’s
top military leader, General Ion Antonescu,
as prime minister on September 4, 1940.
Antonescu promptly forced Carol’s abdication on September 6, with exile following
soon thereafter. The now vacant Romanian
throne was then occupied by King Michael, a
callow youth of 19, while Antonescu assumed
dictatorial powers and the title of “Leader,”
much in keeping with his Nazi and Fascist
colleagues.5
With Antonescu’s ascension to power,
the relationship between Germany and
Romania warmed considerably. Antonescu
began by promising closer collaboration with
Germany. He also renewed the request for
German military assistance, with the idea
of having Germans train and reorganize the
Romanian army. This time, Hitler agreed
and on September 19, 1940, he decided to
send a military mission to Romania. The
improvement in relations would culminate
on November 23, 1940, with Romania’s
adherence to the Tripartite Pact.6
To be precise, Germany actually sent
four missions to Romania. The umbrella
organization was the German military
mission, commanded by Army General Erik
Hansen, who was also the military attaché
to Bucharest. Hansen also commanded the
German army mission (Deutsches Heeres
Mission in Rümanien, or DHM) to Romania.
Richard L. DiNardo is Professor of National Security
Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
College in Quantico, Virginia.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
The next major element was the German air
force mission (Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission
in Rümanien, or DLM), commanded by Luftwaffe Lieutenant General Wilhelm Speidel.
The final part of the military mission was the
German navy mission, headed by Admiral
W. Tillesen.7 This article looks at the activities of the DLM to a small degree, but the
major focus will be on the DHM.
Hitler laid out the chains of command
for the elements of the German military
mission in his directive of October 10, 1940.
Each service mission traced its administrative chain of command to its respective
headquarters in Germany. Hansen, as head
of the military mission, would decide matters
of common concern. Political matters would
be turned over to the German minister in
Romania, who looked after German foreign
policy interests there.8
German Me 109E, German Hs 112B, and
Romanian IAR 80A fighters. The bomber
fleet included German He 111s, French Bloch
210s and Potez 63s, Italian SM 84s, Polish
PZL 37Bs, and Romanian IAR 37s. The
Romanians used several of their own aircraft
models for reconnaissance as well as British
Blenheims. Under these circumstances, the
best the Germans were able to do was to
train ground troops extensively in aircraft
identification and make sure the Romanians
received British aircraft and parts captured in
Yugoslavia in 1941.10
The DHM and Romanian Army
The major effort in Romania was made
by the German army mission, the DHM,
first commanded by Hansen and later by
General Eugen Ritter von Schobert. Aside
from Schobert’s own staff, the presence of
the DHM would be manifested initially in
with Antonescu’s ascension to power, the relationship between
Germany and Romania warmed considerably
The DLM and the Aerial Defense of
Romania
The DLM had two principal missions.
The first was to create air defenses around the
vital oil region of Romania in the vicinity of
Ploesti and the Black Sea port of Constanta.
Also involved was the regulation of air space
over the defended areas. The second mission
was to modernize the Romanian air force.
The DLM was more successful in completing
the first mission. Speidel and his staff were
able to use both Romanian and German
materiel and procedures to make Ploesti one
of the most heavily defended targets against
air attacks. This was to prove invaluable in
the initial Romanian participation in Operation Barbarossa. Between late June and midOctober 1941, Ploesti and Constanta were
attacked 91 times by Soviet aircraft. Led by
the efforts of the Luftwaffe’s Jagd Geschwader
52, the combined Romanian-German defense
brought down some 81 Soviet aircraft.9
Modernizing the Romanian air force
proved a bridge too far for the DLM to travel.
Bringing the air force up to date assumed
growing importance for Germany as Romanian participation in Barbarossa became a
certainty. The most notable problem was
the veritable plethora of aircraft used by the
Romanian air force. This mélange included
the form of a division-size unit. At first, this
was to be Friedrich Wilhelm von Rothkirch’s
und Panthen’s 13th Motorized Infantry Division, but was later expanded to include Hans
Valentin Hube’s 16th Panzer Division as well.
Several infantry divisions were added in the
course of 1941 as German plans first for the
invasion of Greece and later the Soviet Union
took shape.11
Like the DLM, the DHM had two missions. Aside from the training mission, the
German units were to assist the Romanian
force in erecting defenses against a possible
Soviet invasion, although the mere presence
of German units in Romania did act as a
guarantee against further Soviet encroachments. The second mission was to train the
Romanian army up to a level that was as close
to German standards as possible. These units
would play a part in the invasion of the Soviet
Union. Hitler had distinctly mentioned
this in his December 5, 1940, speech to the
heads of the Wehrmacht. Both Finland and
Romania are mentioned as possible allies in
the execution of Operation Barbarossa in
Hitler’s first official directive on the subject
issued December 18, 1940.12
The DHM’s ability to carry out its
training mission was hampered by several
factors outside of its control. The first was an
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
93
RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania
earthquake that struck Romania on the night
of November 9–10, 1940. German soldiers in
the 13th Motorized Infantry Division found
themselves in the unaccustomed position of
rendering humanitarian assistance to Romanian civil authorities, which did yield some
dividends in terms of goodwill.13
The second factor that disrupted
DHM activity was the tension between the
Antonescu government and Romania’s contribution to fascism, the Iron Guard. By January
1941, Antonescu decided that cooperation
between his government and the leader of the
Iron Guard, Horia Sima, was no longer possible and that the Iron Guard would have to be
dealt with decisively. For his part, although he
had more affinity ideologically with the Iron
Guard, Hitler decided that Antonescu was a
much more reliable ally with whom to deal.
The result was the suppression of the Iron
Guard by the Romanian army, in some cases
with German support. Horia Sima and some
of his principal followers fled to Germany,
where they were offered safe haven.14
Third, DHM efforts were interrupted
by the German invasion of Yugoslavia and
Greece, an operation that had to be mounted
from Romania. The German High Command
had already indicated to Antonescu that some
500,000 German troops slated for the invasion of Greece would pass through Romania.
While the troops would be under the tactical
command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List, the
Twelfth Army commander, List would be subordinate to the head of the DHM for the purposes of the preparation and conduct of the
Twelfth Army’s passage. As head of the DHM,
Hansen would keep Romanian headquarters
informed of the army’s progress.15
Since there were large numbers of
German troops passing through Romanian
territory, the DHM also had to negotiate a status-of-forces agreement with the
Romanian government. German troops
were instructed not to buy too many goods
from the Romanians, especially items from
the countryside, since it would weaken the
Romanian economy. Romania was already
paying for the two initial instruction units
that would conduct the training of its army
for the DHM. German soldiers were told to
present as friendly a face to the Romanians
as possible and to help the Romanian people
when circumstances required. Finally, training of the Romanian army by the DHM was
set back by the hard winter of 1940–1941,
especially in Moldavia.16
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JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Aside from these problems,
members of the German military mission
in Romania, especially in the DHM, had
to avoid stepping into the minefield of
ethnic minority politics. For the DHM,
this centered around the Volksdeutsche
(ethnic German) community in Romania.
Like all ethnic German communities in
that part of Europe, the Volksdeutsche in
Romania had major connections to the
Nazi Party, and the Nazis had newspapers
and political organizations in Romania.
Not surprisingly, German language
newspapers ran articles welcoming the
German military presence.17
A sticky issue for the DHM was the
fact that the Volksdeutsche in Romania
were subject to conscription and service
in the Romanian army, which they were
resistant to for a variety of reasons. Matters
were made more complex by the presence of the Schutzstaffel (SS) recruiters in
Romania who were eagerly seeking ever
more members for Heinrich Himmler’s
expanding SS empire. The Romanians
naturally objected because they sought
this manpower for their own army, and
avoiding military service in Romania was
in fact a crime. Both issues were eventually solved. When a local Volksdeutsche
leader, Gauleiter Fromm, came to Hans
lowed by Himmler’s recall of all SS officials
from Romania.18
As these problems were dealt with by
Germans or Romanians or both, the DHM
got on with the business of training the
Romanian army. Training was conducted at
the tactical and operational levels, at least in a
theoretical sense. There was also an ideological aspect to the training.
Tactically, the Germans set up training
centers for the Romanian 5th, 6th, 13th, 18th, and
20th infantry divisions as well as for the Romanian Panzer Division. These centers aimed at
training Romanian soldiers in both German
weapons and tactics. Later on in the spring of
1941, the Germans extended the training in a
limited way to artillery.19 They also sought to
improve the quality of Romanian general officers through education. The DHM set up the
equivalent of the German Kriegsakademie in
Romania. All aspirants for general officer rank
were to take a 2-year course of instruction.
Like its German counterpart, the Romanian
war college was tactically oriented and focused
on division-sized operations. The course was
also aimed at producing officers who could
undertake all staff and administrative functions associated with division and brigade
operations. A course was also set up for
general officers and older staff officers as well,
lasting from 1 to 3 months.20
like its German counterpart, the Romanian war college was
tactically oriented and focused on division-sized operations
Valentin Hube on January 28, 1941, he
complained about Romanian conscription
and recounted all manner of mistreatment
of Volksdeutsche by Romanian authorities.
Hube sidestepped Fromm’s complaints
first by expressing skepticism of his tales
of Romanian mistreatment, and then got
around the conscription issue by telling
Fromm that service in the Romanian army
was also service to the Führer. The activities
of Himmler’s SS recruiters were also curbed
after the SS was able to recruit about 1,000
men from the Romanian Volksdeutsche.
The German minister to Romania, Manfred
Killinger, wrote to Himmler that if so many
young German men were removed from
Romania, the remaining female Volksdeutsche in Romania would have no choice
but to marry Romanians, thus polluting
good German blood lines. This was fol-
As might be expected of such an effort
mounted by a country such as Nazi Germany,
there was the previously mentioned ideological component to DHM activities. In a
situation report, Hube noted that, in addition
to the need for measures to be taken against
corruption in the officer corps, friendly
attitudes toward Great Britain and the Jews
had to be eliminated. To aid this, German
propaganda was disseminated that found a
degree of receptivity in Romania, although
not as much as the Germans hoped.21
The various endeavors of the DHM
brought about a record of mixed success. The
biggest problem the DHM had was a lack of
time. Given all of the issues discussed above
and the ever-looming onset of Operation
Barbarossa, the DHM had at best 4 months
to train with the Romanians before they
would be committed to combat against the
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n d u p res s .ndu.edu
The final problem faced by the DHM
in conducting its activities was lack of
standardization in the Romanian army.
Like many of the armies in that part of the
world, Romania did not have an armaments
industry sufficient to equip the army by itself.
To make up the difference, the army made
all manner of weapons purchases. The result
was that by the time the German military
mission arrived in Romania, the Romanian
army was using a bewildering variety of
weapons including Czech, Russian, French,
and Austrian rifles; French, Russian, and
Czech machineguns; and German, French,
Italian, Russian, Czech, Romanian, and Austrian artillery pieces, all of varying calibers.
Although the Romanian army tried to mitigate this situation by minimizing the number
of different weapons allocated to specific
divisions, the lack of standardization made
training difficult.27
The Test of Combat
The ultimate outcome of DHM activities was the record of the Romanian army in
combat. In this regard, the Romanian record
was mixed. Broadly put, Romanian participation in Barbarossa could be divided into two
German Federal Archive
Soviets.22 This was particularly important
regarding the issue of mindset. During the
interwar period, Romania’s closest ally had
been France. Naturally, such a relationship
had a military component. Romanian officers
attended French schools, and, institutionally,
the Romanian army was greatly influenced
by French doctrine and thinking. If it proved
difficult to get more senior Romanian officers to abandon what the Germans saw as the
overly “schematic” and methodical French
approach to combat operations, the younger
officers, in contrast, proved more receptive to
German concepts and doctrine.23
A major problem faced by the DHM
involved the lack of interpreters. To be sure,
the mastery of a foreign language was a
requirement for graduation from the Kriegsakademie. The vast majority of German
officers who studied a foreign language generally gravitated toward French or English.
In 1932, for example, a language examination
was administered by Wehrkreis (Military
District) III in Berlin. Some 178 officers took
examinations, the great majority of which
were in French or English. Only 34 took the
examination in Russian, and no one took it
in Romanian. Examinations administered
by the Luftwaffe showed a somewhat wider
variation, but again Romanian was well down
on the list.24
Consequently, the German divisions
with the DHM had relatively few interpreters available to provide instruction
and training to the Romanians. The 16th
Panzer Division, for example, had only two
interpreters on its staff, a wholly inadequate
number given the tasks set for the unit. The
Romanians did not have the resources to
make up the shortfall. They were able to
provide only one interpreter to the German
170th Infantry Division.25
Another major problem the Germans
saw in trying to train the Romanian army
was the lack of a professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps able to carry out
its responsibilities. In the German army, the
day-to-day conduct of training and, indeed,
the daily running of the army at the lowest
levels were often left to its NCOs and junior
officers. In the Romanian army, however,
such positions were not held in the same
degree of esteem. In the eyes of DHM liaison
officers, too many Romanian NCOs looked
upon their positions as chances for personal
monetary gain.26
Ion Antonescu with Adolf Hitler in Munich, June 10, 1941
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
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RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania
96
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
which was also operating on that part of the
front, thanks to the efforts of German liaison
officers with both formations.32
The siege of Odessa proved long and
costly to the Romanians. The Soviet High
Command was able to keep the Independent
Coastal Army, garrisoning Odessa, supplied by
sea. That allowed the garrison to conduct an
active and energetic defense. Several successful
Soviet sorties forced the Fourth Army to fight
repeatedly over the same ground in bloody
assaults. It was only after the Romanians
Radu Mihai Crisan
phases. The first phase extended from the start
of the invasion on June 22, 1941, up through
the first week of July. During this time, the
Romanian army was tasked by Hitler to
defend the Pruth River and then gain some
bridgeheads across it. The army would also
defend the Romanian oil-producing areas
and the Black Sea port of Constanta.28 The
second phase of the Romanian army’s part in
the invasion would begin with the crossing
of the Dniestr River once Army Group South
penetrated the Soviet defenses to the north.
Ultimately, the army would advance across
the Dniestr and Bug Rivers into what would
become Transnistria, and the Romanians
would eventually besiege and finally occupy
the port of Odessa on October 16, 1941.29
Since the main Romanian effort was
to be made by General Petre Dumitrescu’s
Romanian Third Army, Romanian headquarters concentrated the majority of
divisions that had German training under
Dumitrescu’s command. In addition,
the German-trained divisions enjoyed a
greater degree of standardization in terms
of weapons and equipment. For the basic
small arm, for example, these divisions used
the Czech 7.92mm rifle, which could take
German ammunition. Reserve units would
have to make do with the previously noted
plethora of Russian-, Austrian-, and Frenchmade weapons.30
In the first phase of the campaign,
Romanian performance might be regarded as
satisfactory. The army was able to accomplish
its task even though, in a number of places,
the Romanians’ Soviet opponents were often
better armed and equipped. Even Colonel
General Franz Halder, the chief of the
German Army General Staff and no particular admirer of Romanian military prowess,
confessed pleasant surprise at the initial
performance of the Romanians. The liaison
staff with the Romanian 1st Border Division
thought well enough of the division’s conduct
to submit the names of some 37 members for
German military awards.31
Things were much tougher in the
second phase of the 1941 campaign. The
Romanian Third and Fourth Armies were
now required to undertake missions well
beyond their normal operational radius. That
often left them requiring logistical support
from the Germans, who were not always in a
position to deliver it when needed. Dumitrescu’s Third Army narrowly avoided a deadly
clash with the Hungarian Mobile Corps,
Ion Antonescu
secured key points in the fortress’s defense
system, combined with the threat of intervention by German airpower on a massive scale,
that the Soviets evacuated the city on October
15, 1941. Odessa’s occupation marked a clear
end of the campaign for what was by that time
an exhausted Romanian army.33
Takeaways for Today
So what can be drawn from the experiences of the German army mission to Romania
that would be of use to today’s military professional? The first takeaway concerns the size
and composition of liaison staffs. The German
effort in this regard was consistently hindered
by the fact that liaison staffs were small. An
army-level liaison staff, headed by a general
officer, usually did not exceed 18 members,
while a corps-liaison staff, normally led by a
colonel, would be no more than 10. Division
and brigade staffs were tiny, consisting of no
more than an officer, a major or even a captain,
plus an interpreter and a driver. This made it
difficult for liaison officers to be absent from
their units for any length of time, whether for
official or personal business.34 In addition, it
did not take into account the fact that liaison
officers, like other human beings, were subject
to problems such as sickness or sheer exhaustion. The difficulties associated with the small
size of German liaison staffs mirror the complaints of many involved with Mobile Training
Team efforts in Iraq during the 2005–2008
timeframe and more recently in Afghanistan.35
The structure of liaison teams is also
an issue. Some current critics, such as T.X.
Hammes, suggest that the Army replace
field-grade officers on staffs with skilled
and professional NCOs. This would allow
company-grade officers to spend more time
at the company level, and reduce the number
of field-grade officers. At the same time, he
calls for the creation of larger advisory teams
to work with allies against fourth-generation
warfare opponents.36
While Hammes’s call for larger advisory
teams is correct, the German experience
detailed above suggests that more officers, not
fewer, are needed, especially when it comes to
working with foreign partners. Hammes, like
his German counterparts in the DHM, comes
from a military culture that values the NCO.
Such was not the case in Romania. German
reports consistently noted that capable Romanian NCOs were rare. Too often, Romanian
NCOs were corrupt and abusive. On the other
hand, it does seem clear that Romanian officers regarded NCOs as not much more than
privates who had a bit more rank.37 Getting a
military culture to create a professional NCO
corps where one has not existed previously
involves a profound change in mindset, a
process that would require great investments of time and patience. This was true in
Romania in 1940 and it is just as true today.
Rank also becomes an issue here. As
noted previously, both the German military
culture of World War II and contemporary
American military culture value the judgment
as well as the independence of NCOs and
relatively junior officers. In other cultures,
this is not the case. In Germany, sending rela-
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tively lower-ranking officers to units as liaison
officers was at times regarded as an insult by
the commanders of those units, who believed
that their status demanded that they deal with
a liaison officer of higher rank.38 This is still
true today, and using short-term expedients
such as frocking NCOs with field-grade ranks
and sending them out as liaison officers, as we
did in the Gulf War, will simply not do.
continue to impact our efforts in a negative
sense, and it will not yield to the type of quick
fix so desired by both American military
culture and the broader society it represents.
The experience of the German
military mission to Romania holds a good
many lessons useful for today’s military
professional. Like so many other events
from history, when placed in the context
the German effort was consistently hindered by the
fact that liaison staffs were small
A third takeaway concerns language.
As noted previously, German officers who
were attendees of the Kriegsakademie were
required to study a foreign language. The
vast majority of them, however, took French
or English, the foreign languages they were
most familiar with and had probably already
had some knowledge of from their days as
students in the German educational system.
French and English were also, as the biographer of one of Germany’s most successful
field commanders noted, the languages of
Germany’s two most likely enemies. This had
also been the case for an extended time.39
Not much thought, however, had
apparently been given to training people in
the languages of those countries that might
be allies. Thus, while cultural and historical
factors alleviated a need for the Germans to
have interpreters when dealing with the Finns
and Hungarians, the Romanians and Italians
were another story.40 Consequently, Germany,
especially the army, found itself consistently
short of Romanian and Italian interpreters.
Complaining that the allies were not doing
their parts, as the Germans did in regard to
the Romanians, although gratifying emotionally, was not a solution to the problem.41
Solving the problem of language, especially
the more difficult ones, again requires
a long-term attempt at a solution, while
understanding that the problem may remain
insoluble. Providing language instruction
to field-grade officers at intermediate-level
professional military education institutions,
as the U.S. military has been doing over the
past few years, frankly yields too little return
for the size of the investment made. A longer
term solution would be to improve the type
of education in language afforded students in
the education system generally, but this is too
problematic to ensure the desired outcome.
In short, the issue of language will most likely
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
of contemporary events, the story of the
German mission once again shows the
wisdom of William Shakespeare’s words
carved outside of the National Archives in
Washington, DC, “What Is Past Is Prologue.”
JFQ
NOTES
1
Documents on German Foreign Policy
1918–1945 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949–1956), Series D, vol. X, document
no. 28, 27–28. Hereafter cited as DGFP, vol. X, no.
27, 27–28. Unless otherwise noted, all references to
DGFP are from Series D.
2
DGFP, vol. X, nos. 51, 56, 80, and 171, 52–53,
58, 91, and 218–219, respectively.
3
Romania was awarded Transylvania as part
of the Treaty of Trianon in 1919. Prior to that,
Transylvania was part of the dual monarchy of
Austria-Hungary.
4
DGFP, vol. X, no. 413, 583. The First Vienna
Award was allocated on November 2, 1938, when
Hungary was given a piece of the rump Slovak
state that had survived the Munich agreement. See
Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s
Germany, vol. 2 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1994), 472.
5
DGFP, vol. X, no. 57, 60; Mark Axworthy,
Cornel Scafes, and Cristian Craciunoiu, Third Axis/
Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945 (London: Arms and Armor
Press, 1995), 23; and Richard L. DiNardo, Germany
and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 96.
6
Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries, vol. 4
(Washington, DC: Infantry Journal, 1950), 201;
DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 19 and 80, 25 and 136–137,
respectively; Jürgen Förster, “Die Gewinnung von
Verbündeten in Südosteuropa,” Das Deutsche
Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 4, Der Angriff
auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags
Anstalt, 1983), 338.
7
Axworthy, Scafes, and Craciunoiu, 26.
8
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 171, 281–282.
9
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW),
“Defense of Constanza and Oil Area,” February
20, 1941, Bundesarchiv-Militäarchiv File 2 II/271,
Freiburg, Germany (hereafter cited as BA-MA);
Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien (DLM),
“Report on the Defense of the Romanian Oil
Area,” December 14, 1941, BA-MA RL 9/62;
DLM, “Defended Air Space in Romania,” July 16,
1941, National Archives Records Administration, Microfilm Series T-405, Roll 49, Frame
4888173, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as
NARA T-405/49/4888173); and Alexander Statiev,
“Antonescu’s Eagles Against Stalin’s Falcons: The
Romanian Air Force, 1920–1941,” The Journal of
Military History 66, no. 4 (October 2002), 1102.
10
Statiev, 1094; and DLM to Luftwaffe High
Command, “Yugoslavian Booty for Romania,” July
5, 1941, NARA T-405/49/4888254.
11
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 80, 136; Deutsches Heeres
Mission in Rümanien (DHM), “Build-Up and
Action of the Romanian Army Since the Start of
the German Army Mission,” January 18, 1942,
NARA T-501/269/000069; and Förster, 337.
12
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900; and Förster, 338.
13
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian Army”; DGFP, vol. XI, no. 84, 145; DHM,
“Order of the Day No. 4,” November 12, 1940,
NARA T-501/272/000418; and DiNardo, 98.
14
DGFP, vol. XI, nos. 9, 652 and 691, 11,
1090–1091 and 1169, respectively; and Förster, 339.
15
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 664, 1114; and Oberkommondo des Heeres (OKH), “Instructions on
Command Relationships in Romania,” December
28, 1940, BA-MA RL 2 II/271.
16
OKW, “Instructions for the Behavior of
German Soldiers in Romania,” January 11, 1941,
NARA T-501/281/000230; Förster, 338; and DHM,
“Build-Up and Action of the Romanian Army.”
17
See, for example, the Banater Deutsche
Zeitung, December 14, 1940, NARA
T-315/680/000045.
18
German 16th Panzer Division, “Partial
Record of Conversation Between Gauleiter Fromm
and General Hube,” January 28, 1941, NARA
T-315/680/000088; DGFP, vol. XII, no. 258, 444;
and “Killinger to Himmler,” February 26, 1941,
NARA T-175/128/2653688.
19
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the
Romanian Army”; DHM, “Course of Instruction
for Romanian Artillery Officers,” May 12, 1941,
NARA T-315/1516/000402; and Artillery Commander 20, “Report on the Establishing of Liaison
with the Romanian II Corps and the Romanian
10th Division on 21/22 May 1941,” May 24, 1941,
NARA T-501/275/000329.
20
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian Army”; DHM, “Handbook for German
Trainers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA
T-501/286/000522; and Chief of the General Staff
of the DHM, “Training of General Officers,” February 1, 1941, NARA T-581/281/000216.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
97
RECALL | The German Military Mission to Romania
NEW
from NDU Press
for the
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Perspectives, No. 12
James J. Przystup’s
Japan-China Relations 2005–2010:
Managing Between
a Rock and a Hard
Place, An Interpretative Essay, examines
the metafactors
shaping the ChinaJapan relationship:
the rise of China,
a competition for regional leadership within
a shifting balance of power, and history. At the
strategic level, there is intense, but quiet political competition for the mantle of leadership in
the Asia-Pacific region. The author discusses
the increasing integration of the two economies—for example, within Japan’s business
community, the China boom is widely recognized as the driving force behind Japan’s recovery from its “lost decade” in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the Japan-China relationship is also
marked by a number of combustible political
issues including conflicting territorial claims, a
disputed maritime boundary in the East China
Sea, and security anxieties in both countries.
Moreover, highly nationalistic, zero-sum issues
relating to sovereignty, such as the September
2010 Senkaku incident, have the potential to
derail the relationship at significant cost to both
nations. These issues must be managed with
care if Sino-Japanese relations are to reach their
full potential.
STRATEGIC PERSP
ECTIVES 12
Japan-China Relati
Managing Between ons 2005–2010:
An Interpretative a Rock and a Hard Place
Essay
by James J. Przystup
Center for Strategic
Research
Institute for National
Strategic Studies
National Defense
University
Visit the NDU Press Web site
for more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
98
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
21
Commander of Training Staff II to DHM,
“Situation Report,” February 7, 1941, NARA
T-315/680/000134; and Radu Ioanid, The Sword
of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania
(Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1990),
193–194.
22
Adolph Hitler’s initial military directive
made it quite clear that the invasion of the Soviet
Union would involve Romanian participation.
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 900.
23
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the
Romanian Army”; German 13th Liaison
Command, “Final Report of the German 13th
Liaison Command,” October 29, 1941, NARA
T-501/275/000706; and DHM, “Report and Map
Annexes of the German 2nd Liaison Command
on the Campaign of the Romanian Fourth Army,”
October 25, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000605.
24
Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examination (Oral), Berlin, October 7, 1932, Nachlass
Freytag von Loringhoven, BA-MA N 362/1; James
S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational
Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1997), 253; and DiNardo, 21.
25
German 16th Panzer Division, “List of Officers for the Staff of the 16th Panzer Division from 1
November–11 December 1940,” December 11, 1940,
NARA T-315/680/000013; and DHM, “Course of
Instruction for Romanian Artillery Officers,” May
12, 1941, NARA T-315/1516/000402.
26
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power:
German and US Army Performance, 1939–1945
(Westport: CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 121–123;
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the Romanian
Army”; and Commander of Training Staff II of the
DHM in Romania, “Situation Report,” February 7,
1941, NARA T-315/680/000134.
27
OKH, Foreign Armies East, Taschenbuch
Rümanisches Heer, February 1940, NARA
T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison Staff
with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and the
Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief of the
General Staff of the DHM, April 23, 1941, NARA
T-501/275/000284.
28
DGFP, vol. XII, nos. 614 and 644, 1004–1005
and 1048, respectively.
29
DGFP, vol. XI, no. 532, 901; Friedrich
Forstmeier, Odessa 1941: Der Kampf um Stadt und
Hafen und der Räumung der Seefestung 15 August
bis 16 Oktober 1941 (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach,
1967), 18; and DiNardo, 112.
30
DHM, “Build-Up and Action of the
Romanian Army”; OKH, Foreign Armies East,
Taschenbuch Rümanisches Heer, February 1940,
NARA T-501/281/000004; and German Liaison
Staff with the Romanian I Mountain Corps and
the Romanian 4th Mountain Brigade to the Chief
of the General Staff of the DHM, April 23, 1941,
NARA T-501/275/000284.
31
German XXX Corps to German Eleventh Army, “Evening Report,” June 22, 1941,
NARA T-314/823/000258; German 13th Liaison
Headquarters, “Final Report of the German 13th
Liaison Headquarters,” October 29, 1941, NARA
T-501/275/000706; Halder, 214; and German
37th Liaison Command to German 2nd Liaison
Command, “German Awards for Romanian
1st Border Division,” August 2, 1941, NARA
T-501/280/000854.
32
“Inspection Report of Major (General
Staff) Stephanus of 25 and 26 July 1941 to German
XXX and XI Corps, Romanian Third Army,” July
26, 1941, NARA T-312/359/7933496; Romanian
Third Army to German Eleventh Army Quartermaster, “Memo on Supply of Romanian Third
Army East of the Bug River,” August 21, 1941,
NARA T-312/354/7927680; and “Dumitrescu to
German Eleventh Army,” August 15, 1941, NARA
T-312/360/7934785.
33
Hitler’s Table Talk 1941–1944, trans.
Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (New York:
Enigma Books, 2000), 66; and DHM, “Build-Up
and Action of the Romanian Army.”
34
DiNardo, 105; and “Second German Liaison
Command to Subordinate Liaison Commands,
Official Operation of German Liaison Commands,” July 30, 1941, NARA T-501/280/000971.
35
This is an observation made to the author by
one of his students, an Army major with considerable experience in this duty.
36
Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the
Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN:
Zenith Press, 2004), 244, 264–265.
37
German 13th Liaison Headquarters, “Final
Report of the German 13th Liaison Headquarters,”
October 29, 1941, NARA T-501/275/000706;
DHM, Build-Up and Action of the Romanian
Army”; and DHM, “Handbook for German Trainers in Romania,” September 23, 1942, NARA
T-501/286/000522.
38
An excellent example of this comes from
the German experience working with the Italians
in North Africa. See German Liaison Officer to
Italian Fifth Air Fleet, “Report of Liaison Officer
to Italian Fifth Air Fleet in North Africa to Commanding General of German X Air Corps,” May
19, 1941, BA-MA RL 2 II/38; and DiNardo, 62.
39
Wehrkreis III Foreign Language Examinations; and Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian:
A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt
1875–1953 (London: Brassey’s, 1991), 13.
40
German was taught as a second language in
the Finnish school system from early on, while all
officers who graduated from the Hungarian General
Staff College had to know German since about
half of the school library books were in German.
DiNardo, 108; and telephone interview with Bela
Kiraly, December 20, 1993. Kiraly was a Hungarian
officer who served on the eastern front in World War
II and one of my professors in graduate school.
41
DiNardo, 100; and German 107th Liaison
Command, “Annex to War Diary of German 107th
Liaison Command, Experiences,” September 17,
1942, NARA T-501/282/000184.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
BOOK REVIEWS
the generals: american military
command from World War ii to today
By Thomas E. Ricks
Penguin Press, 2012
576 pp. $32.95
ISBN: 978-1-59420-404-3
Reviewed by
ROBERT BRACKNELL
T
om Ricks is no stranger to
criticizing the modern crop
of generals. A fellow at the
Center for New American
Security, Ricks decisively established his
national reputation with Making the Corps,
followed by two successful analyses of the
Iraq War, Fiasco: The American Military
Adventure in Iraq and The Gamble: General
David Petraeus and the American Military
Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008. Along the
way, Ricks became a cynic, relentlessly
critiquing the decision to go to war in Iraq,
the conduct of the conflict, particularly the
generalships of Tommy Franks and Ricardo
Sanchez, the utter dysfunction of the strategic decisionmaking and interagency processes required to make America’s modern
conflicts successful, and, most saliently, the
failures of the conflict’s most senior military leadership. Ricks weaves critiques of
Army leadership, in particular, into a fluid,
meticulously researched tapestry, but leaves
room for debate about his ultimate conclusions. Ricks’s focus on the technical and
strategic prowess of generals causes him to
gloss over the moral and ethical components of leadership that have eviscerated
the legacies of a number of senior generals.
Even so, failing to consider and evaluate the
themes that Ricks identifies risks maturing
a crop of generals for whom the professional
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
end simply is wearing stars, not leading
the military properly into the next century
and candidly rendering their best military
advice to our nation’s civilian leaders.
Ricks convincingly traces modern
failures of generalship to their origins
in the interwar period, through World
War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operations
Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring
Freedom. He juxtaposes successful Army
and Marine generals through their histories
with the characteristics of history’s failed
generals. Ricks draws specific, substantiated conclusions about generalship, Army
culture, civil-military relations, and the
way the Army has elected to organize, train,
and equip itself in ways that ultimately
suboptimized Service performance. Specifically identifying the Army’s modern-era
reluctance to effect senior leader reliefs as
a departure from the pattern of history,
Ricks paints an image of the ultimate
country club, self-righteously convinced of
its own infallibility—an Army for the sake
of The Army, rather than for the sake of the
Nation. The result is an outline of what ails
the modern Army, with lessons to be considered not only for that Service to correct
itself, but also for all the Armed Forces
and their civilian leaders. Convincingly,
Ricks identifies history’s A-list of generals—George C. Marshall, George S. Patton,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Matthew Ridgway,
O.P. Smith, Creighton Abrams, William
E. DuPuy, and David Petraeus, among
others. Not surprisingly, on his B-list of
general officer failures, Ricks singles out
Douglas MacArthur, William Westmoreland, Norman Schwarzkopf, Franks, and
Sanchez, suggesting strongly that their
failures in generalship have amounted not
only to massive strategic failures, but also
to unnecessary loss of American lives, from
Korea through Afghanistan.
Ricks works to identify tangible, quantifiable historical trends and specific strategic, operational, personnel, and program
decisions that yielded undesirable shortand long-term effects. He bemoans the
Army’s gravitation away from the concept
of meaningful relief (performance-based
firing, as opposed to mere conduct-based)
as a leadership-shaping mechanism. Once
upon a time, senior leaders fired generals
because they believed line Soldiers deserved
to be well led and not to have their lives
squandered. Now, suggests Ricks, the needs
of the institution and concerns over the
senior leader’s career compete for consideration in the decision space. In an effort to
demonstrate an example of “doing it right”
in the modern era, Ricks reaches deep
below the senior-leader level to examine
the relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, USMC,
the commander of First Marine Regiment
in the march to Baghdad. Dowdy’s (not
uncontroversial) relief demonstrates that
there is no indispensable man, and if a commander loses confidence in a subordinate,
the subordinate must go. In Ricks’s view, if
it is a close call, senior leaders should err on
the side of relief: the human and strategic
costs of getting that call wrong are virtually
unconscionable. Ricks rightly concludes
that too much emphasis has been placed
on the “career consequence” of relief for
individual officers. For leaders who ascend
to flag rank, the Armed Forces must rewrite
the “promotion contract” with an unspoken clause: if you accept this position, and
things go wrong on your watch, you will
be sacrificed on the altar of generalship,
regardless of whether it was your “fault.”
This clause is not unfamiliar; our senior
leaders talk about it a lot, but enforce it very
little. Wanat springs to mind.1
If Ricks comes up short anywhere in
this tome, it could be that he attempted to
write a neutral and unbiased analysis on
a topic that he feels so strongly about. It is
no secret that Ricks has taken his disdain
for the professional failures of Franks,
Sanchez, and their cohorts and elevated
them to a level of malice that approaches a
personal grudge. Ricks’s writing on Franks
and Sanchez is a bit like trying to take seriously a critique of Red Sox pitching written
by Don Zimmer. Moreover, while Ricks’s
book was complete and published prior
to Petraeus’s spectacular fall from grace,
Ricks’s loving treatment of Petraeus suggests that he views generalship more like
being an accountant—a brilliant technical
specialist—than being a priest, whose principal currency of authority is moral. Ricks
underestimates the moral component necessary to maintain the respect of privates,
sergeants, captains, and colonels, a shortfall
roundly and regularly on display on the
front pages of the Washington Post. True
generalship is an ability to borrow elements
of Patton’s technical military competence
and the moral pureness of Ghandi, mixed
with Bill Clinton’s artful communication,
issue 69, 2 d quarter 2013 / JFQ
99
BOOK REVIEWS
Ryan Crocker’s diplomatic savvy, and
George Kennan’s strategic acumen—in
other words, to approximate a fraction of
the soul of George Marshall.
The Generals is a serious study of
senior-level leadership that rivals H.R.
McMasters’s Dereliction of Duty: Johnson,
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Lies That Led to Vietnam, and Lewis
Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined
Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s
Last Years in Vietnam. Ricks’s tone toward
certain of his subjects eclipses censure
and borders on vituperation, while others
bask in the gentle glow of his prose. This
may bother some readers, but not this
reviewer—in fact, it is refreshing to read
a commentator calling a spade a spade in
terms of his unvarnished criticism of the
shortfalls of certain generals (and their
civilian counterparts and seniors) whose
decisions unnecessarily cost American
lives and strategic currency in Vietnam
and Iraq. His warranted criticisms of the
leadership failures of certain senior generals, insidious careerism, moral cowardice,
and self-interest (Maxwell Taylor, MacArthur, the Vietnam Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom Joint Chiefs of Staff), the policies
that led to those failures, and the dysfunctional civil-military relationships (Harry
Truman–MacArthur, Lyndon Johnson–the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld–the
U.S. military writ large) are underwritten by scholarly research and meticulous
documentation. If the military truly is
as reflective and self-critical as it likes to
advertise, The Generals should land on the
Chairman’s and Service chiefs’ reading lists
soon. JFQ
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bracknell, USMC, is a
Staff Attorney with the Trial Judiciary, Office of
Military Commissions.
NOTE
1
See Thomas Shanker, “Three Officers Face
Reprimands Over 2008 Battle,” The New York
Times, March 13, 2010, A8.
100
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
the generals: american military
command from World War ii to today
By Thomas E. Ricks
Penguin Press, 2012
576 pp. $32.95
ISBN: 978-1-59420-404-3
Reviewed by
ALAN L. GROPMAN
T
om Ricks has done it again,
producing an interesting
and useful book. He has
two major themes in The
Generals. The first is with Army generals
today: senior leaders are unable to remove
inadequate generals. His second is more
important: the costly incapability of the
generals to think and act strategically. In
every case of disaster Ricks cites, strategic
thinking was absent.
The book contains 30 chapters (and
an epilogue) covering World War II, the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the two
Iraq wars. The author sketches portraits
of U.S. Army (and one Marine Corps)
general officers from World War II forward.
There are heroes including George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, O.P. Smith,
Matthew Ridgway, and David Petraeus
(the book was published before Petraeus
resigned from the Central Intelligence
Agency). There are also villains including
Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland,
Tommy Franks, and Ricardo Sanchez.
The strategic debacle in Vietnam is
exceptionally well treated. Ricks’s cogent
analysis is a searing critique of errors that
we must never make again, and it tells
readers how to lose a war—and in doing so
damaging America’s reputation, severely
weakening the home country, provoking
runaway inflation, and, most importantly,
wasting 58,000 American lives.
Ricks’s generalized portraits of the
World War II generals will meet with broad
acceptance. His model officer is Marshall,
an Army chief of staff who was in the right,
place at the right time. The main attribute
Ricks cites is Marshall’s inclination to
relieve officers he thought were inadequate
to the task. He let hundreds go in his 6 years
as chief, which became a lost art (except for
Ridgway) after he left.
His number one antihero is Taylor.
Ricks, unfortunately, gets carried away here:
“Maxwell Taylor arguably was the most
destructive general in American history.
As Army Chief of Staff in the 1950s, he
steered the U.S. military toward engaging
in ‘brushfire wars.’” Also, “[H]e encouraged President John F. Kennedy to deepen
American involvement in Vietnam. As
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he poisoned
relations between the military and the civilian leadership. He was also key in picking
Gen. William Westmoreland to command
the war there.”
To begin with, Taylor steered neither
the Army nor the military in any direction while he was chief of staff. Dwight
Eisenhower was the President, and his
grand strategy did not focus on “brushfire
wars,” and certainly neither did the Air
Force strategy. This was the era of strategic
bombers, massive retaliation, and bomberpilot generals put in command of Air Force
fighter commands by bomber-pilot chiefs
of staff. Secondly, Eisenhower was never the
ultimate decisionmaker (certainly not in the
1950s), and in the next decade, he worked
under a strong-willed Secretary of Defense
and determined Presidents who were much
more culpable for the Vietnam tragedy.
There is, therefore, a balanced shortcoming in this book. Ricks has abundant
examples of senior officers failing in their
missions because they were strategically
inept, but all of them had civilian supervisors who, while not getting a complete pass
from Ricks, are not nearly as appropriately
condemned by the author. I realize the
title is The Generals, but there are levels of
authority above combat general officers.
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did
not have to follow Taylor into oblivion in
Vietnam. Johnson was not required to let
Westmoreland fight with a totally backward
ground strategy while dropping more tons
ndup res s . ndu. edu
BOOK REVIEWS
of bombs on South Vietnam than were
dropped on Germany and Japan combined
in World War II. President George H.W.
Bush and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
did not have to let Norman Schwarzkopf
stop Operation Desert Storm after 4 days of
ground warfare, leaving Iraq’s Republican
Guard nearly intact and prolonging Saddam
Hussein’s murderous reign for more than a
dozen years.
Regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Generals Tommy Franks and Ricardo
Sanchez were tacticians when strategists were needed. The former rushed to
Baghdad leaving his support forces to be
mauled by bypassed mujahideen, and the
latter permitted the inhumane treatment
of Iraqi insurgents and rounded-up civilians as well as the atrocities at Abu Ghraib
prison. These actions made enemies of the
Iraqi population, and Ricks completely misappropriates the blame.
Finally, Ricks appears to believe
counterinsurgency combat is a valid combat
mission for the U.S. military. It is not. I do
not understand why any political decisionmaker, after costly failures in Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, would advocate
counterinsurgency. We go to war in places
we do not understand—in order to save
nondemocratic and often corrupt states that
are open to attacks by insurgents—against
adversaries who have greater knowledge
than we do of the countries we fight.
We need to continue to study counterinsurgency art to advise states seeking
our help, and who are worthy of our help,
ever careful to avoid mission creep, but
not sacrificing our people—58,000 in a
losing effort in Vietnam, thousands more
in Iraq—and our wealth, estimated to be $1
trillion in Iraq. Tell me what we got for our
money and our lost men and women.
That said, read Tom Rick’s The Generals to appreciate better the awful costs to
the United States of failures in strategic
thinking. JFQ
Dr. Alan L. Gropman is Professor Emeritus in
the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National
Security and Resources Strategy at the National
Defense University.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
the next Wave: on the Hunt for al
Qaeda’s american recruits
By Catherine Herridge
Crown Forum, 2011
272 pp. $25.00
ISBN: 978-0-30788-525-8
Reviewed by
GEORGE MICHAEL
I
n the final years of his life, Osama
bin Laden served mainly as an
inspirational figure rather than an
actual commander. He counseled his
faithful that jihad was an individual duty
for every Muslim capable of going to war.
Ominously, a small but notable number of
Americans have answered his call. In fact,
American recruits are highly valued by
al Qaeda for their passports and abilities
to blend in with American society. In her
book The Next Wave, Catherine Herridge
explores the travails of prominent American jihadists. She draws on her 10-year
experience reporting on the war on terror
and cites numerous military and intelligence officials and analysts.
The chief focus of her book is Anwar
al-Awlaki, who played an important
operational role for al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and reached out to several
American jihadists. For instance, al-Awlaki
exerted a strong influence over Major Nidal
Malik Hasan, with whom he exchanged
several emails. On November 5, 2009, the
Virginia-born Muslim and U.S. Army
psychiatrist went on a shooting rampage at
Fort Hood, Texas, that killed 13 people and
left 38 wounded. On Christmas day of that
same year, a young Nigerian, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutuallab, attempted to ignite an
explosive device that was sewn into his
underwear while he traveled on Northwest
Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit.
According to Herridge’s sources, al-Awlaki
had coached the Nigerian on security and
surveillance in Western countries and was
the middleman between Abdulmutuallab
and the bombmaker. Al-Awlaki’s sermons
also inspired Faisal Shahzad, a seemingly
upright and assimilated middle-class computer technician and U.S. citizen who lived
in Connecticut but was born in Pakistan.
Shahzad attempted to detonate three bombs
in an SUV parked in the heart of Times
Square in New York City in May 2010.
Once characterized as the “bin Laden of
the Internet,” Al-Awlaki’s pronouncements
have been broadcast on jihadist Web sites
and YouTube. Fluent in both Arabic and
English, he had an encyclopedic knowledge of Islam and was regarded as a gifted
speaker who was capable of moving his
listeners to action.
Al-Awlaki was born in 1971 in New
Mexico, where his father pursued his
higher education. Sometime in 1977 or
1978, the family returned to Yemen, where
the senior al-Awlaki went on to become a
well-respected and well-connected government minister. In 1991, Anwar al-Awlaki
returned to America to pursue a degree in
engineering at Colorado State University.
He misrepresented himself as foreign born,
presumably to receive a $20,000 scholarship from the U.S. State Department in a
program intended for foreign students. On
his Social Security application, he claimed
that he was born in Yemen and was issued
a new Social Security number. When he
renewed his passport in 1993, however,
he presented his birth certificate, which
indicated that he was actually born in
New Mexico, but he used his fraudulently
obtained Social Security number.
After graduation, al-Awlaki moved
to San Diego where he became the imam
of the al-Rabat Mosque. While there in the
late 1990s, he met regularly with Nawaf
al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, two of the
9/11 hijackers. Herridge avers that al-Awlaki
was part of a support cell sent to the United
States prior to 9/11. Sometime in 2001, he
moved to Falls Church, Virginia, where
he became the imam of the Dar al-Hijra
Islamic Center and crossed paths with Hani
Hanjour who, along with Hazmi and alMidhar, hijacked American Airlines Flight
77, which slammed into the Pentagon.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents
took an immediate interest in al-Awlaki
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
101
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102
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
and interviewed him at least four times in
the first 8 days after the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, the unflappable and mediagenic
al-Awlaki was often the go-to guy for sound
bites on local and national broadcasts for
the Muslim-American perspective on 9/11.
In fact, Herridge discovered that al-Awlaki
had participated in a Pentagon outreach
program to moderate Muslims in the
immediate aftermath of the attacks.
Despite his veneer of moderation, alAwlaki continued to consort with Muslim
radicals and came under increasing scrutiny by Federal investigators. In June 2002,
a Denver Federal judge issued an arrest
warrant for al-Awlaki based on his fraudulent misrepresentations on his Social Security and passport applications in the early
1990s. He left the United States sometime
in 2002 but returned on October 10. When
he arrived at John F. Kennedy Airport,
Federal agents apprehended and held him
but quickly released him because on that
same day the Federal judge had rescinded
his arrest warrant. According to the official
explanation, prosecutors did not believe
there was enough evidence to convict him
of a crime; moreover, the 10-year statute of
limitations for lying to the Social Security
Administration had expired. Before the end
of 2002, al-Awlaki left the United States for
the last time, after which he went first to
England and then to Yemen.
For her part, Herridge believes the
government has not entirely come clean on
al-Awlaki. During her investigation, she
noted that the mere mention of his name to
a government official can be a conversation
killer. She questions why the FBI instructed
customs agents to allow al-Awlaki to reenter
the country in October 2002. The decision,
she concludes, must have come from higher
up. Why then, she muses, did the FBI
want al-Awlaki in the country? She finds it
odd that the decision to rescind his arrest
warrant came the same day he returned
to the country. Adding further suspicion
is the fact that the U.S. Government has
not released all of the intercepted emails
between the Fort Hood killer and al-Awlaki.
As Herridge explains, through new
media, offbeat loners can be self-radicalized
and become dedicated terrorists. She characterized al-Awlaki as a “virtual recruiter”
who almost never met his jihadists in
person. In the final months of his life,
al-Awlaki encouraged American jihadists
to launch lone wolf attacks on their own
initiatives. In addition to his propaganda,
U.S. officials believed that al-Awlaki was
involved in the operational planning of terrorist attacks. After his return to Yemen, he
skillfully used his connections to expand
his influence in the jihadist movement.
Despite his U.S. citizenship, in the spring
of 2010 he was placed on the Central Intelligence Agency kill-or-capture list. On
September 30, 2011, two Predator drones
fired Hellfire missiles at a vehicle carrying
al-Awlaki and other suspected al Qaeda
operatives as they traveled on a road in
Yemen’s al-Jawf Province. Shortly thereafter, Yemen’s defense ministry announced
that al-Awlaki was killed.
Herridge’s book is interesting but
leaves many questions about al-Awlaki
unanswered. Moreover, she left out many
important details about al-Awlaki’s activities after he left America, including his
stay in England and his role in al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula while in Yemen.
Surprisingly, Herridge made no mention
of another prominent American jihadist,
Adam Gadahn (also known as “Azzam the
American”), arguably the most recognized
American al Qaeda spokesman on the
Internet. The young California native and
convert to Islam is believed to be an important member of al Qaeda’s media committee—as Sahab—under whose direction the
organization’s propaganda has become
more sophisticated. In recent years, Gadahn
has emerged as somewhat of an Internet
celebrity on Web sites such as YouTube.
Still, Herridge provides an interesting
journalistic study of the radicalization of
American jihadists and their connections to
their ideological brethren overseas. As such,
it will be of interest to students of terrorism
and political extremism. JFQ
George Michael is Associate Professor of Nuclear
Counterproliferation and Deterrence Theory in
the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center at
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
Lead Turning the Fight
The Joint Operational Access Concept
and Joint Doctrine
By g r e g o r y k r e u D e r
Our nation and Armed Forces are transitioning from over a decade of war to a future that presents us with a security paradox. While the world is trending towards greater stability overall,
destructive technologies are available to a wider and more disparate range of adversaries. As a
result, the world is potentially more dangerous than ever before.
—General Martin E. Dempsey
In peace prepare for war, in war prepare for peace. The art of war is of vital importance to the
state. It is matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances can it be neglected.
—Sun Tzu
O
ver the last decade, U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have taken advantage of an
unprecedented level of unchallenged operational access. This linchpin
to virtually all military operations will
become increasingly contested during future
operations. The Joint Operational Access
Concept (JOAC) proposes how future joint
forces will achieve and maintain access in
the face of armed opposition by adversaries under a variety of conditions as part of
a broader national approach.1 Until these
concepts become reality, there will be a gap
in joint doctrine regarding how U.S. Armed
Forces synergistically leverage cross-domain
capabilities to overcome emerging threats
and ensure operational access. The good
news is that the joint doctrine community
has options available that can help solve this
dilemma. This article discusses how the
changing operational environment, combined with emerging antiaccess/area-denial
(A2/AD) threats, is creating doctrinal gaps.
It then discusses the relationship between
doctrine, policy, and concepts, along with
ways to accelerate the transition from concept
to doctrine. Finally, this article draws current
concepts from the JOAC and suggests tools
that proponents can use to make their
concept reality and to ensure U.S. operational
access for future joint operations.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Most concepts gradually become extant
and incrementally inform joint doctrine.
Before proposing ways to accelerate this
process, it is important to emphasize that all
concepts must first be validated. Because of
this requirement, those not familiar with the
process occasionally see doctrine as lethargic
or nonresponsive.2 On the contrary, doctrine
can rapidly inculcate validated concepts.
However, if doctrine responded to every
seemingly “good idea,” it would unnecessarily thrash the baseline for joint force employment. Worse yet, it could yield unpredictable
and potentially tragic consequences.
To highlight the damage an unproven
concept can cause, consider the example
of effects-based operations (EBO). Initially
seen as a reasonable approach to help
targeters metaphorically “see the armored
division, not just the tank,” it later became
something else. Along with operational net
assessment (ONA) and system of systems
analysis (SOSA), EBO morphed into an
attempt to bring mathematical certainty to
warfare, an inherently uncertain endeavor.
The Israeli Defense Forces applied EBO in
the Israeli-Hizballah conflict in 2006 and
failed. Israeli Major General Amiram Levin,
former commander of Israel’s Northern
Command, lamented that EBO, “ignores . . .
the universal fundamentals of warfare. This
is not a concept that is better or worse. It is a
completely mistaken concept that could not
succeed and should never have been relied
upon.”3 General James Mattis, USMC, then
commander of the disestablished U.S. Joint
Forces Command, terminated the use of
EBO in the development of future concepts
and doctrine as the “underlying principles
associated with EBO, ONA, and SOSA are
fundamentally flawed and must be removed
from our lexicon, training, and operations.
Current EBO thinking, as the Israelis found,
was an intellectual ‘Maginot Line’ around
which the enemy can maneuver.”4 Although
EBO may well have future potential, it is not
ready for joint doctrine at this time.
Although many have tried, no concept
has yet improved upon the Clausewitzian
trinity that describes the nature of war: violence, chance, and reason.5 As the capstone
publication and foundation for all joint doctrine, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States, makes the
point crystal clear: “War is a complex, human
undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules.”6 On the other hand, Clausewitz describes how a war is fought, and where
it lies along the spectrum of conflict can
and will change.7 Concepts that recognize
the immutable nature of war, yet correctly
predict and address the changing character
of warfare, have the potential to affect force
employment at a historic level.
These are the concepts that proponents
must learn to identify, validate, and accelerate to joint doctrine. Consider the German
concept of “mission-type tactics,” or Auftragstaktik, which specified a clearly defined
goal and empowered subordinate leaders to
act independently in order to achieve their
commander’s intent.8 The German army and
air force combined this concept with maneuver warfare and unleashed a historic offensive
that overwhelmed numerically superior
French and British forces in May 1940.9
General Mattis describes two additional concepts that had a similar effect on U.S. military
forces in the 1980s:
Concepts can transform organizations. I
believe this. I have witnessed it twice in my
Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Kreuder, USAF, is a
Joint Doctrine Planner Action Officer in the Joint
Staff J7 Joint Doctrine Division.
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
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JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight
military career, when the introduction of the
Air Land Battle doctrine transformed the
Army and Air Force in the 1980s and the
introduction of maneuver warfare similarly
changed the Marine Corps a few years later.
One may argue these were doctrines rather
than concepts, but at the heart of each was an
innovative operating concept—an underlying
idea for how Army or Marine Corps forces
would operate in dealing with their respective
challenges—and that concept was a driving
force behind the dramatic institutional
changes that those Services experienced.10
It is reasonable to conclude that the
JOAC could produce as profound an effect on
the joint force as Auftragstaktik and Air Land
Battle. The JOAC is derived from the Capstone Concepts for Joint Operations, which
outlines 10 primary missions through which
U.S. joint forces will protect future American interests. Of these missions, the JOAC
emphasizes the importance of being able to
“project power despite [A2/AD] challenges.”11
There is nothing new about the need to
gain and maintain operational access in the
face of a formidable and capable adversary; this
has been a consideration throughout history.
For any force to fight on foreign land, it must
first gain access to it. This is understandably
not in the best interest of the opposing force
that attempts to deny access by any means
necessary. Throughout history, opposing forces
have sought an asymmetric advantage that will
deny access. This ability can blunt an otherwise
overwhelming offensive by a vastly superior
force. King Leonidas of Sparta demonstrated
the importance of A2/AD during the Battle
of Thermopylae in 480 BCE. His numerically
inferior yet determined force exploited local
geography, significantly delayed operational
access to the Persian Empire, and arguably
altered the outcome of the Persian war in the
Greeks’ favor.12 Although operational access
has proven a challenge throughout history, the
underlying conditions that will affect future
U.S. operations are going through slow moving
yet tectonic shifts.
The JOAC outlines three emerging
trends that will challenge operational access.
The first is the dramatic improvement and
proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom
of action within an operational area. These
threats can employ not only advanced technologies, but also innovative applications of
basic, even crude, capabilities. The second
trend is the changing U.S. overseas defense
posture, which is a consequence of markedly
decreased support abroad for an extensive
network of military bases around the globe
and projections of severely contracting
resources following a decade of war. The
third trend is the emergence of space and
cyberspace as increasingly important and
contested domains in the projection of military force.13
Potential adversaries are exploiting
rapidly evolving and relatively inexpensive
technologies to upgrade their A2/AD capabilities. Furthermore, antiaccess technology
is generally much easier to develop than
Way Ahead: A Campaign Approach to Operational Access
Antiaccess and Area-denial Capabilities in an Integrated Defense
Unconventional
attacks on
infrastructure that
supports deployment,
employment, and
sustainment
104
Space and
cyber attacks
on the
systems and
networks that
support
deployment,
employment,
and
sustainment
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
Antiship
ballistic
missiles and
surface
combatants
Theater
ballistic
missiles and
submarines
Attack boats,
surface-to-air
missiles;
rotary-wing
aircraft and
unmanned
aerial systems
Fixed-wing
aircraft and
advanced
antiship cruise
missiles
Guided rockets,
artillery, mortars, and
missiles; naval and
land mines; ground
maneuver units; and
antiaircraft artillery
ndup res s . ndu. edu
KREUDER
technology that ensures access. Technologies under various stages of development
could also create antiaccess challenges
for the United States including accurate
surface-, air-, and submarine-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles; long-range
reconnaissance and surveillance systems;
antisatellite weapons; submarine forces; and
cyber attack capabilities. Key area-denial
capabilities include advances in adversary
air forces and air defense systems designed
to deny local U.S. air superiority; shorter
range antiship missiles and submarines
employing advanced torpedoes; precisionguided rockets, artillery, missiles, and
mortars; chemical and biological weapons;
computer and electronic attack capabilities;
abundant land and naval mines; armed
and explosives-laden small boats; and
unmanned aircraft and vehicles, which
could loiter to provide intelligence collection
or fires in the objective area.14
Many of the more advanced capabilities, for example the Chinese HQ-9 and
Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems,
are already extant. Others are progressing through the prototype stage, such as
the Chinese J-20, J-31, and Russian Sukhoi
PAK-FA stealth fighters. Other threats do
not require advanced systems, yet highlight
potential vulnerabilities that a savvy adversary can exploit using available technology,
similar to how improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) have challenged access for U.S. forces
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The joint force
must reorient itself to meet these existing and
emerging A2/AD threats.
Although the emerging trends
addressed in the JOAC reflect vulnerabilities
that in some cases already exist, current
joint doctrine’s coverage of A2/AD is not
keeping pace. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry
Operations, is dedicated to overcoming area
denial in order to establish a lodgment, but
does not yet address these emerging challenges and has only seen modest updates
during the last decade. JP 3-01, Countering
Air and Missile Threats, and JP 3-09, Joint
Fire Support, vaguely reference the importance of overcoming A2/AD challenges to
operational access. None of these, or any
other JPs, address the emerging trends and
challenges identified in the JOAC; this is
partly intentional, as many of the necessary
capabilities are not yet extant. Aside from
IEDs, however, ongoing operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan have not faced significant
nd u p res s .ndu.edu
A2/AD challenges. As a consequence, the
doctrinal gap is large and growing.
This highlights an important point. As
the emerging trends outlined in the JOAC
gradually challenge future U.S. operational
access, mitigating concepts requiring new
capabilities will need to be inculcated into
the joint force. These concepts may someday
have a sweeping impact on joint doctrine
similar to Auftragstaktik, Air Land Battle,
and maneuver warfare. The key is in identifying these concepts early, validating them,
and finding ways to accelerate their introduction into joint doctrine. Proponents must
take a proactive approach and not passively
wait for concepts and capabilities to gradually
become fully extant in the field before socializing them throughout the joint community.
Before identifying the tools available
to accelerate these concepts and capabilities,
it is first important to briefly discuss what
doctrine is and what it is not. Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction
5120.02C, “Joint Doctrine Development
System,” and CJCS Memorandum 5120.01,
“Joint Doctrine Development Process,”
provide guidance on the development of joint
doctrine: “Joint doctrine establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and provides
the guidance on how best to employ national
military power to achieve strategic ends.”15
More specifically, joint doctrine is:
based on extant capabilities; i.e., current
force structures and materiel. It incorporates
time-tested principles (e.g., the principles of
war, operational art, and elements of operational design for successful military action)
as well as contemporary lessons learned that
exploit US advantages against adversary vulnerabilities. Joint doctrine is authoritative
guidance and will be followed except when,
in the judgment of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise.16
To alleviate some common misperceptions, it is worth noting what joint doctrine
is not. First, joint doctrine is not policy,
although the two are closely related. Each
fills separate requirements, as policy can
“direct, assign tasks, prescribe desired capabilities, and provide guidance for ensuring
the Armed Forces of the US are prepared
to perform their assigned roles.”17 In most
cases, policy informs doctrine. If an identified
need can only be satisfied “using prescrip-
tive words such as ‘shall’ and ‘must,’ then
the void is in policy and policy development
should precede doctrinal development.”18 In
other words, doctrine should not be used as a
forcing function to change policy, yet policy
can and often does drive changes to doctrine.
Doctrine shares a similarly close and
complementary relationship with concepts. In general, a concept expresses how
something might be done. Before discussing how the JOAC can inform joint doctrine, it is imperative to fully understand
this relationship:
In military application, a joint concept
describes how a Joint Force Commander
may plan, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain,
and redeploy a joint force; guides the further
development and integration of the Capstone
Concepts for Joint Operations and subordinate joint concepts into a joint capability; and
articulates the measurable detail needed for
. . . assessment and decision making. From a
ways, means, and ends perspective, concepts
and doctrine both describe how (the ways)
a joint force uses given capabilities (means)
in a generic set of circumstances to achieve a
stated purpose (ends). There also is an important distinction between the two. Approved
joint doctrine is authoritative, describes
operations with extant capabilities, and is
subject to policy, treaty, and legal constraints,
while joint concepts—whether near-term or
futuristic in nature—can explore new operational methods, organizational structures,
and systems employment without the same
restrictions. Joint concepts provide the basis
for . . . assessment. These concepts are refined
and validated during . . . modeling and simulation, selected training events and exercises,
and capabilities-based assessment.19
Concepts respond to perceived inadequacies in current joint capabilities, test new
capabilities, or propose innovative solutions
to military problems. Worthwhile concepts
should improve upon joint force effectiveness, not only propose another way to do
something already addressed in approved
doctrine. However, lessons learned from
recent operations and emerging capabilities with relevant military applications also
improve upon methods in doctrine. Since
concepts usually project an operating environment in the future, they describe new
approaches and capabilities that, when developed, should enable the military to operate
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
105
JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight
successfully. On occasion, forecasting may
uncover ideas that could improve how joint
forces operate now and could have an immediate impact on current doctrine. Before
changes are made to doctrine, operational
joint force commanders will validate these
concepts. These concepts must represent an
extant capability and clearly demonstrate
how they will improve doctrine. Finally, the
joint doctrine community assesses concepts
and their exercise results to determine necessary changes to approved doctrine.20
Now that we have established what doctrine is, what it is not, and its relationship to
policy and concepts, it is time to discuss how
concepts can make their way into approved
joint doctrine. There are roughly four general
methods: through scheduled JP revision,
through a change recommendation, through
a joint test publication (JTP), and through a
joint doctrine note (JDN).
The first method, routing a JP for revision, is the traditional and most common
method of informing doctrine, and it
employs the preexisting doctrinal review
process. The Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine
Division (JDD) goal is to maintain current,
relevant doctrine that is no more than 5 years
old. The JDD has conducted multiple user
studies that consistently indicate doctrine
over 3 years old begins to lose relevance to
the joint warfighter. To meet that objective,
approved doctrine is normally assessed for
revision when approximately 2 years old.
Revision begins with a formal assessment of the JP, where the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and combat
support agencies provide feedback on
recommended changes. The percentage of
the publication affected by the recommended
changes determines the scope of the change.
If 20 percent or less of the publication needs
to be revised, a change-in-lieu-of-revision is
likely; if greater than 20 percent, a full revision is warranted. In either case, any authorized organization can recommend changes,
which will be evaluated on merit during the
joint doctrine development process.21 This
traditional method is the simplest, although
not necessarily the most timely. With sufficient justification, however, proponents can
accelerate this timetable and request an early
revision to a JP.
The second method of informing
doctrine is through an urgent or routine
change recommendation. This may be the
best choice if a proponent wants to submit a
106
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
capability that recently became extant and
the affected publication was just signed.
Any member of the joint community can
submit changes at any time. These changes
are specifically designed to assist when a
joint publication is current and not undergoing revision. Urgent changes are “those
. . . that require immediate promulgation
to prevent personnel hazard or damage to
equipment or emphasize a limitation that
adversely affects operational effectiveness.”22
Actions on urgent changes begin within 24
hours of submission. If the change does not
meet urgent criteria, a routine change may
be more appropriate: “Routine changes are
those changes to JPs that provide validated
improvements; address potentially incorrect,
incomplete, misleading, or confusing information; or correct an operating technique.”23
The third method of introducing
concepts into doctrine is the joint test publication. Although concept-based changes to
doctrine are usually incremental rather than
sweeping, on occasion a concept addressing
a doctrinal gap may be large enough in scope
either to affect a significant portion of an
existing JP or justify creating a new JP. Semiannual joint doctrine planning conferences,
hosted by the Joint Staff J7, approve proposals
for developing JTPs. Once the designated lead
agent develops the JTP, it enters the assessment phase, where combatant commanders
exercise the JTP and its associated evaluation
to “field test” the concept.
Unlike testing of emergent concepts,
JTP field-testing should use extant forces
and capabilities. Concepts that propose a
different way of performing a mission with
today’s forces are also known as concepts of
operations. Exercising concepts with capabilities and forces that are still emerging can
yield useful information, but should not be
included in joint doctrine. Once testing of
the JTP is complete, evaluation results will
recommend one of the following disposition
options: “discontinue work on the JTP with
no impact on joint doctrine, incorporate
the JTP or portions of it in existing JPs, or
develop the JTP into a new JP.”24
The fourth method, the JDN, is relatively new to U.S. joint doctrine, although
the British Development, Concepts and
Doctrine Centre has used them successfully
for years. The JDN is considered part of the
initiation stage of the joint doctrine development process. JDNs are intended to socialize
potential best practices and capabilities that
have demonstrated early and strong potential
to positively impact joint force operations.
Although predoctrinal, JDNs present generally agreed fundamental principles and guidance for joint forces. Although they must
contain capabilities and concepts somewhat
rooted in reality, they are not necessarily
constrained by purely extant capabilities.
JDNs also have flexibility in scope and size,
and they can address doctrine at any level
and range, from a few pages in length to
several hundred.
Since they are not approved joint doctrine, JDNs are not necessarily beholden to
the same vetting requirements that JPs are.
JPs can take years to develop; a JDN can be
written and published in less than 1 year.
This can save significant amounts of time
that would otherwise be required before a
concept gains visibility in the joint community. If the joint community accepts a published JDN, it can then be transitioned into
a JTP for validation. If already sufficiently
validated and extant, the JDN can instead
transition directly into an existing JP or
become a JP of its own. JDNs thus introduce
flexibility into a necessarily procedural doctrine development system and have the ability
to bridge the gap and accelerate the transition
of a concept into doctrine.
The JOAC is already driving the creation of several concepts that demonstrate
potential as future JDNs and JTPs. The
Air-Sea Battle concept, under development
by the Air-Sea Battle Office, is a prime candidate. It describes how to organize, train, and
equip land, naval, and air forces to address
evolving adversarial A2/AD threats. The
preliminary objective of Air-Sea Battle is to
provide combatant commanders networked
and integrated forces that ensure freedom
of access in the global commons.25 Air-Sea
Battle’s goal is to develop forces capable of
“networked, integrated, and attack-in-depth”
operations across land, sea, air, space, and
cyber domains in order to counter A2/AD
capabilities and provide operational advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces.26
In 2012, then–U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff
General Norton Schwartz outlined the
importance of this emerging concept:
Ballistic and cruise missiles, the advanced
submarines, fighters, and bomber aircraft,
enhanced electronic and cyber warfare
capabilities, and over the horizon surveillance and modern air defense systems, as
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KREUDER
well as the improved ability to network and
integrate these capabilities; these all present
significant challenges that will contest our
access to and freedom of action, freedom of
movement in strategically important areas.
And in vital areas such as the Hormuz or
the Malacca Straits, even low technology
capabilities such as rudimentary sea mines
and fast attack craft or shorter range artillery
and missiles can turn vital free flow movements in the global commons into maritime
choke points to be exploited by aggressive or
coercive actors. These capabilities, both the
more advanced and the less exquisite, are
increasingly available, effectively affording
modestly resourced actors, including some
non-state entities with the ability to shape
outcomes in regional operating environments
and perhaps even on the geostrategic environment indirectly. And the ability that was once
the exclusive domain of only well funded and
well endowed nation states.27
Proponents looking to create a JDN
concerning Air-Sea Battle in the near term
should select portions of this concept that
can employ existing capabilities in new ways
to counter the A2/AD threats that General
Schwartz highlights as similarly extant
today. It may take the Air-Sea Battle Office
significant time to develop some of the
capabilities that would be appropriate for a
JDN. Proponents could justify a JDN much
sooner, however, by developing innovative
solutions that synergistically apply current
joint force capabilities to counter extant A2/
AD threats. The JDN, when published, could
inform the joint force on a timeline years
before a JP ever could. If the JDN gains widespread acceptance by the joint force, it can
be transitioned into a JTP to be validated by
combatant commanders or, if both validated
and extant, can be transitioned directly into
joint doctrine.
Another JOAC concept that proponents
could soon seize to create a JDN is Gaining
and Maintaining Access (GAMA). Prepared
by the Army and Marine Corps, this concept
recognizes emerging AD trends identified in
the JOAC. It is a logical extension in the scope
of operations designed to seize a lodgment,
currently only discussed in JP 3-18. GAMA
recognizes that future operations will face
increased challenges to the relatively permissive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that
allowed forces to build in-theater before
commencing operations. Future access to the
nd u p res s .ndu.edu
global commons and “ports, airfields, foreign
airspace, coastal waters, and host nation
support in potential commitment areas”
will become increasingly competitive.28 In
addition to emerging adversary capabilities,
internal factors will complicate the application of the principles of war. For example,
surprise will be more difficult to obtain due
to “political transparency combined with the
instantaneous transmission of information
around the world.”29
The central idea of GAMA is to
“contribute to the joint effort to gain and
maintain operational access by entering
hostile territory without benefit of domain
dominance and by using littoral and ground
maneuver to locate and defeat area-denial
challenges.”30 As with A2, many AD threats
are already extant, such as air and missile
defenses, antishipping capabilities, and
enemy maneuver units. Precision-guided
munitions have seen widespread use since
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and potential adversaries have had over two decades
to similarly upgrade their arsenals and
employ them to deny operational access.
Other adversary threats under development
include guided rockets, artillery, mortars,
and missiles.
Despite these threats, GAMA discusses
the importance of “seizing key terrain in
order to deny it to the enemy or to facilitate
the introduction of follow-on forces” and
rapidly project “follow-on forces that can be
employed with minimal need for reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration
or dependence on local infrastructure.”31
Forces must be able to conduct “simultaneous
force projection and sustainment of numerous maneuver units via multiple, distributed,
austere and unexpected penetration points
and landing zones in order to avoid established defenses, natural obstacles, and the
presentation of a concentrated, lucrative
target.”32 GAMA proposes to counter these
effects through cross-domain synergy in
“the air, sea, space and cyberspace domains
by locating/seizing/neutralizing/destroying
land-based capabilities that threaten those
domains.”33 Potential adversaries may field
layered and fully integrated A2/AD defenses
in multiple domains in an attempt to deny
operational access altogether, “while others
with less robust and comprehensive capabilities may simply attempt to inflict greater
losses than they perceive the United States
will tolerate politically.”34
When sufficient joint force capabilities
are identified and then created to address
AD, proponents should consider creating
a JDN, which would inform the joint force
and ease the transition to joint doctrine.
Although discussing a concept still in its
early stages, GAMA is an important step in
recognizing how emerging trends will make
future operational access both more important and challenging. The JDN can be a mix
of concept and extant capabilities, but should
be executable with the existing joint force.
Similar to the suggestion for Air-Sea Battle,
this JDN (if accepted by the joint force) can
be transitioned into a JTP for validation or
transitioned directly to joint doctrine if it
meets doctrinal requirements.
Finally, the JOAC itself may someday
drive a joint publication and subsequent
realignment of subordinate joint doctrine. As
a recent example, in December 2012, Lieutenant General George Flynn, USMC, director
of Joint Staff J7, approved development of
JP 3-XX, Joint Support to Security Cooperation. This publication recognizes security
cooperation as the overarching activity that
encompasses other joint doctrine such as JP
3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JDN 1-13,
Security Force Assistance, which is currently
under development. Once this new joint
publication is developed, it may either absorb
doctrine on foreign internal defense and
security force assistance or retain them as
subordinate publications.
As capabilities become extant, the
JOAC may drive production of a JTP or
even a JP similar to JP 3-XX, perhaps
entitled Achieving Joint Operational Access.
This publication, once validated, could
provide authoritative guidance for ensuring the Armed Forces are prepared to gain
and maintain operational access in future
joint operations. This could subsequently
drive subordinate joint publications, possibly including Air-Sea Battle and GAMA.
Regardless of the mechanisms that proponents employ to make JOAC a reality, joint
doctrine stands ready to assist.
The JOAC outlines concepts that
address emerging trends that will challenge
the relatively permissive operational access
U.S. forces have enjoyed in recent operations.
The joint force is rapidly developing concepts that attempt to address the widening
doctrinal gap these trends are creating. The
traditional method of informing doctrine
may prove too slow and, in the meantime,
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
107
JOINT DOCTRINE | Lead Turning the Fight
holds the joint force ability to gain and maintain operational access at risk against extant
threats. The JTP and JDN are available tools
that proponents, who are willing to pick up
the flag, can use to accelerate the validation
and subsequent transition of valid concepts
into joint doctrine. By proactively employing
these available tools, JOAC proponents can
help keep the leading edge of joint doctrine
razor sharp and ready to provide authoritative guidance to the joint warfighter. JFQ
NOTES
1
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, January 17, 2012), 1.
2
Joint doctrine is much more responsive than
it was a decade ago. The average age of the 82 joint
publications is 2.8 years, or roughly half what it
was then.
3
Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long
War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008),
62.
4
James N. Mattis, “USJFCOM Commander’s
Guidance for Effects-based Operations,” Parameters (Autumn 2008), 23.
5
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
6
Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The
Joint Staff, 2009), I-1.
7
Clausewitz, 220. To avoid confusion, joint
doctrine distinguishes between “war,” which
is unchanging, and “warfare,” which is ever
changing.
8
Jochen Wittmann, Auftragtaktik (Berlin:
Miles Verlag, 2012), 33.
9
David T. Zabecki, World War II in Europe:
An Encyclopedia (London: Taylor and Francis,
1999), I-1175.
10
James N. Mattis, “Vision for Joint Concept
Development,” attachment to Memorandum
for U.S. Joint Forces Command, Subject: Joint
Concept Development Vision Norfolk, VA, 2009, 1.
11
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint
Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 10, 2012), 1.
12
Alfred S. Bradford, Leonidas and the Kings
of Sparta: Mightiest Warriors, Fairest Kingdom
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 87.
13
JOAC, 9–12.
14
Ibid., 9.
15
As described in Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs (CJCS) Instruction 5120.02C, “Joint Doctrine Development System,” A-5.
16
Ibid., A-2.
108
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
17
Ibid., A-3.
Ibid.
19
Ibid., A-7.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., A-8.
22
As described in CJCS Memorandum
5120.01, “Joint Doctrine Development Process,”
B-20.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., B-26.
25
“Air-Sea Battle: Multi-Service Collaboration
to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial (A2/AD)
Challenges to the Joint Force,” Washington, DC,
Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013, 6.
26
Ibid., 6.
27
Air-Sea Battle Doctrine: A Discussion with
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval
Operations (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 2012), 9.
28
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations,
Version 3.0 (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, January 2009), 6.
29
Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army–
Marine Corps Concept, Version 1.0 (Fort Eustis,
VA: U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center and
Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
2012), 5.
30
Ibid., 7.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
JOAC, 13.
18
Joint Publications (JPs) Under
Revision
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 1-05, Religious Affairs
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment
JP 3-00.1, Strategic Communication and Communications
Strategy
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations
JP 3-05, Special Operations
JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations
JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations
JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support
JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater
JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Environments
JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations
JP 3-14, Space Operations
JP 3-16, Multinational Operations
JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations
JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations
JP 3-26, Counterterrorism
JP 3-27, Homeland Defense
JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations
JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime
Operations
JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations
JP 3-63, Detainee Operations
JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations
JP 4-0, Joint Logistics
JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System
JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning
JP 4-08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations
JP 4-09, Distribution Operations
JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support
JPs Revised (within last 6 months)
JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint
Operations
JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations
JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations
JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations
JP 3-13, Information Operations
JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations
JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations
JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting
JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
ndup res s . ndu. edu
Redefining Information
Operations
By c a r m i n e c i c a l e s e
W
hether it is strategic communication, information
operations, or cyberspace
operations, the Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the
importance of conducting operations within
the information environment. Over the past
decade, several information-related capabilities have grown or matured revealing that the
military recognizes the value of conducting
operations in the information environment.
Computer network operations have
expanded to cyberspace operations, and the
Services have established cyberspace component commands to complement U.S. Cyber
Command.1 Military information support
operations forces have also matured as the
U.S. Army Special Operations Command has
established the Military Information Support
Command and added another group-level
command.2 The Air Force continues to
increase the number of behavioral influence
analysts, integrating them into joint commands.3 In August 2012, the Joint Forces Staff
College hosted the Office of the Secretary of
Defense–sponsored Information Environment Advanced Analyst Course to further
develop the military’s ability to analyze and
operate in the information environment.
To capture the power of information,
DOD must recognize the value in understanding the information environment
and articulating the integrating processes
required within information operations.
Despite continued misunderstanding and
rewording, information operations is an
important integrating function for achieving the commander’s objectives through the
information environment—a complex and
dynamic environment depicted by human
Figure 1. Decisionmaking Cycle: Dimensions Are Linked
interaction with other humans, machines,
and subsequent cognitive determinations
or decisions. This information environment
further comprises three interlocking dimensions—physical, information, and cognitive—that are interwoven within a decisionmaking cycle (see figure 1). This article uses
historical vignettes to offer greater clarity
in understanding the difference between
strategic communications and information
operations and adding depth in recognizing
how military information-related capabilities
affect the decisionmaking process.
The New War of Words
A Secretary of Defense memorandum
signed January 25, 2011, stresses the importance of strategic communication (SC) and
information operations (IO) in countering
violent extremist organizations, while also
redefining IO for DOD and subsequently the
joint force. As Dennis Murphy noted on mastering information, “The U.S. military will
achieve such mastery by getting the doctrine
right.”4 The Secretary’s memorandum was a
step in the right direction leading to recent
doctrinal changes. Joint IO is now defined as
the “integrated employment, during military
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the
decision-making of adversaries and potential
adversaries while protecting our own.”5
This new definition detaches itself from
a reliance on the previously included core
capabilities of computer network operations,
operations security, and military information
support operations—previously known as
psychological operations, electronic warfare,
and military deception. This change should
benefit the force. First, it allows the commander and staff to consider more options
for affecting decisionmaking than simply
relying upon the previously stated capabilities. Simultaneously, it allows capabilities to
grow and change unencumbered by a doctrinal or fiduciary connection to IO. Lastly, the
new definition recognizes the ability of the
commander to affect adversary and potential
adversary decisionmaking. All the while,
IO remains an integration function, not a
Colonel Carmine Cicalese, USA, is a former
Director of the Joint Command, Control, and
Information Operations School at the Joint Forces
Staff College.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
109
JOINT DOCTRINE | Redefining Information Operations
capability owner, and one that is directed at
foreign rather than domestic audiences.
This new IO definition is a long overdue
improvement, though one might make the
improper interpretation that IO is only about
coordinating the themes-and-messages
part of the SC “say-do” rubric as it is
included within the same overarching DOD
memorandum on strategic sommunication.
The joint force commander (JFC) should
synchronize communication and operation efforts to support the national-level SC
process and overall narrative. By conducting
IO coordinated with public affairs, the JFC
can effectively communicate to the variety
of intended audiences and affect adversary
decisionmaking to maximize effects in the
information environment.
Since 9/11 and the start of the war on
terror, the author has frequently heard fellow
military officers calling for a supporting global
IO campaign. These continuous calls are
problematic because, doctrinally, IO in itself is
not a campaign. The applicability of a global
IO campaign can be challenged as the military
cannot apply many IO or information-related
capabilities, such as military deception or military information support operations, toward a
U.S. domestic audience.
Synchronizing communications and
actions may not yet be a doctrinal campaign,
but it is vital to support a combatant commander’s coherent theater campaign plan.
For those who insist on some sort of an
information campaign, a synchronized communication plan could supplant the heretofore unending calls for an IO campaign.
Because of these reasons and the previous IO
core capabilities having improved capacity,
one might infer that IO is no longer relevant,
as the strategy’s narrative or message would
be paramount to all information. However,
the narrative without IO is not enough to
affect decisionmaking.
At the 2011 World Wide IO Conference,
much of the first day’s discussion supported
the notion that strategic communication and
IO are the same. The discussion centered
on coordinating geographic combatant
command Phase 0 (figure 2 depicts the
notional phases) messages and the programs
that support these activities to shape the
operational environment. It was not until
the afternoon panel session—when Colonel
James Gferrer, then commanding officer of
the Marine Corps IO Center, commented,
“IO is more than just messaging”6—that the
110
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
conference discussion duly adjusted. IO is
much more than coordinating themes and
messages or being the military’s version of a
chattering class.
While several military informationrelated capabilities deliver a message that
can support communication strategy and
IO, IO is still about affecting information
content and flow as it relates to adversaries’
and potential adversaries’ decisionmaking
cycles. Synchronized communication itself,
while a contributing factor, is not enough
to affect adversary and potential adversary
decisionmaking because it solely focuses on
the broadcast or dissemination of the commander’s message.
Even though listening, understanding,
and assessing are all part of the communication process, the primary communication
goal is to send a message. While important,
the commander’s message is but one of
several messages competing for the audience’s attention. This only affects the
commander’s information content output
to adversaries and potential adversaries. It
does not affect the adversary’s information
content or flow, neither is it the sole means of
protecting the commander’s decisionmaking
capability. Figure 1 depicts a comprehensive
decisionmaking cycle and annotates how
the commander’s message is part of the dissemination step within this cycle. To affect
adversial decisionmaking and protect his
own, the commander must demand his IO
cell look beyond best practices and templated
planning. He must insist upon an agile plan
capable of affecting the information environment in more ways than coordinated themes
and messages.
More Than Themes and Messages
Just as J2 has the intelligence and counterintelligence mission and J3 (operations)
has the fires and counterfires mission, the
Information Operations Working Group, on
behalf of the commander, should also consider the countermessage mission. Limiting
oneself to coordinating and delivering messages as a countermessage mission, however,
is insufficient when engaged in a contest as it
is both limited and inherently reactive.
Phase 0 (shape) is the predominant
phase across the combatant commands,
and the commander’s communication
plan should include all information-related
capabilities. Still, the IO professional needs
to think beyond just messaging. He needs
to maintain a holistic perspective of affecting the adversary’s decisionmaking cycle to
include part of the countermessage mission.
Figure 2. Notional Operation Plan Phases
ndup res s . ndu. edu
CICALESE
In practice, the IO cell needs to consider a
counterinformation or even counterdecision
cycle approach.
As former Secretary Robert Gates noted
to Congress, “adversaries leverage multiple
communications platforms, to proselytize,
recruit, fund, exercise [command and
control], share tradecraft and perpetuate
their ideology. Understanding the increasing
complexity of the information environment
and the compelling need to leverage information effectively as an element of national
power is critical to achieving the Department’s military objectives.”7
Other nation-states have acknowledged
a similar approach when they removed media
access to their countries’ populations. For
example, on February 12, 2010, U.S., British,
and German broadcasts accused Iran of
deliberately jamming their outputs to deny
Iranian citizens access to an opinion that
counters the Islamic Revolution.8 Also, on
March 12, 2010, Yemeni authorities seized the
transmission gear of al Jazeera and al Arabiya
channels over their coverage of deadly unrest
in the south of the country. Yemeni officials
stated such equipment “should not serve to
provoke trouble and amplify events in such a
way as to harm public order.”9
Iran and Yemen are not engaged in a
legally declared war with one of the offended
parties, but they still chose to limit a platform
that was disseminating nonsupportive messages. The author does not advocate this
tactic as a form of censorship, but instead recognizes the action as part of the IO integrating function. Iran, a potential U.S. adversary,
recognizes the value of affecting the information flow of its potential adversaries. IO professionals should understand how to affect
the cycle depending on the overall situation
more than the designated operational phase.
Thus, a geographic combatant commander
could ably adjust from Phase 0 to Phase 1
(deter) and future phases depicted in figure 2.
The Wartime Information Cycle
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) demonstrated
an understanding of using a range of options
to affect information during the period of the
organization’s apex from February 2006 to
July 2007. AQI destroyed antiterrorist radio
stations in Baghdad, deliberately assassinated
Iraqi reporters in Mosul, and lethally targeted
U.S. psychological operations teams in an
effort to limit the messaging capabilities of
AQI adversaries.
nd u p res s .ndu.edu
Meanwhile, the coalition inclination to
counter AQI information was mostly limited
to delivering broadcasted messages via handbill, radio, television, or any standard means
of communicating across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The proclivity
toward using paper resulted in an insufficient
“death by a thousand paper cuts” approach.
The tactical coalition commanders
saw a threat in AQI’s Internet presence. This
could have warranted a coalition response to
deny AQI freedom of access on the Internet.
The Internet presence, however, is just the
transmission point within the communication process. An online video of an improvised explosive device destroying a coalition
convoy vehicle is the culminating point of the
process. A videographer must first record an
event and move the video to a point where it
can be uploaded to the Internet. Today’s videographers often have the means to complete
the entire information cycle, thus taking a
tactical kinetic attack and transforming it
into a strategic information attack.
Presuming the videographer broke host
nation law by inciting violence toward legal
authorities, the tactical commander could
realistically interdict the information cycle
by arresting the videographer. The terrorist
message is never transmitted—or at least it
is delayed—and the ability to keep transmitting is affected without having to fight for
authorities to stop a possible Internet transmission. This is how an IO professional must
view the situation.
Beyond the Information Cycle
The IO perspective is not limited to
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. It is
also applicable in stability or peacekeeping
operations (PKO) where adversaries may
not be shooting at the U.S. military but are
nonetheless in opposition to the combatant
commander’s objectives and mission. For
example, three ethnic groups are vying for
position. Two are willing to disarm, but the
third and most powerful is reluctant. United
Nations (UN) and coalition-led town meetings are popular operations during PKO
as a means to bring the belligerent parties
closer toward mutual governance. The
typical pattern for a town hall meeting is for
representatives from the parties to socialize,
discuss matters for an hour, come to tentative
agreements, and then take a break. During
the break, the representatives contact their
superiors via mobile devices for further guid-
ance on any tentative agreement. It is not
uncommon for one of the parties to return
to the meeting with a renewed reluctance to
agree with what was otherwise tentatively
achieved, such as an agreement to disarm. At
this point, the IO professional should consider actions and outcomes to the following
possibilities:
■■ What happens if the town hall representatives are unable to communicate with
their superiors during the break and thus
unable to renegotiate a new position?
■■ What happens if a public demonstration calling for immediate disarmament
occurs inside or outside the town hall?
■■ What happens if the host nation
media suddenly confront the supreme leader
of the most powerful ethnic group over his
plans to support a tentative disarmament?
The answers to these questions lie in
the IO professional’s ability to understand
the culture, emotion, and status within
the adversary’s decision cycle and a way to
integrate a variety of activities as a means
to inform, influence, or even persuade the
adversary into taking action favorable to the
commander’s mission. While the events may
occur around the spoken events of the town
hall, the message is but a facilitator to something larger.
To accomplish some of these hypothetical tasks, especially disrupting potential commercial communication means, the IO cell
should consult with the electronic warfare
and staff judge advocate staff to understand
the commander’s authorities. According to
the UN Charter, electronic warfare jamming
may violate national sovereignty and be
legally construed as an act of war.10 Likewise,
it may violate the UN General Assembly
determination that freedom of information
is a human right.11 Still, these determinations
may not apply to the situation. To overcome
any limitations, the IO staff must make an
argument for what the current situation
requires as opposed to what the past allowed.
Authorities underpin the mission at all levels,
and much of the responsibility for acquiring
the authorities for the commander rests on
the joint IO staff.
The Authorities Barrier
In spring 2002, the Coalition Forces
Land Component Command (CFLCC) in
Kuwait developed the ground invasion plan
issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013 / JFQ
111
JOINT DOCTRINE | Redefining Information Operations
that became known as Running Start. IO
planners were embedded within the command’s strategic plans and civil military
operations teams for planning Phase 2
through Phase 4 (dominance) operations.
The CFLCC commander was keenly
interested in the IO plan to support the
invasion and wanted a separate brief on it
so he could get more details. The attached
plans team developed a thorough plan to
use the available IO capabilities to support
the land component commander mission to
destroy Saddam’s ground forces by focusing
IO efforts to disrupt the decisionmaking of
the Iraqi ground forces’ center of gravity, the
Republican Guard. As a supporting effort,
IO would influence the Iraqi people not
to interfere with coalition operations. The
commander optimized the force and plan to
swiftly and violently destroy a nation-state
military more than stopping to deliver a
message to the Iraqis.
The IO planner was cognizant of a
variety of capabilities that could achieve palpable effects to support the CFLCC mission.
However, the planner knew of problems in
attaining authorities for some of these capabilities. For the prebriefing to J3 leadership,
the planner inserted a slide titled “Issues”
with five bulleted items to acknowledge up
front what the IO plan did not cover. As soon
as the J3 saw the slide, he directed the IO
planner to remove it from the briefing.
The IO planner was too inexperienced
to understand the need never to discuss
issues with the commander until the staff
tried to resolve them first. While the planner
was unable to convince the J3 that the issues
were germane to the plan, the intermediate
leader was too inexperienced with IO to
understand why the issues were significant
and assist the staff in resolving them.
When the IO team briefed the CFLCC
commander, the commander was dissatisfied with the IO plan. He believed that it did
not go far enough and push the envelope.
The commander thought IO could win the
war without firing a shot. Within the first 5
minutes of the briefing, he inquired about
three of the five items listed on the excluded
Issues slide. The IO planner was on the right
track, but he did not know how to resolve the
authority issues.
Later, open source media reports indicated the coalition tried to influence a coup
of Saddam from within his inner circle using
emails and other means.12 While no U.S. or
112
JFQ / issue 69, 2 n d quarter 2013
coalition government official or agency has
ever confirmed this, the notion of instigating
a coup that targeted regime member decisionmaking might have satisfied the CFLCC
commander’s thirst for a more comprehensive IO plan. The planner’s lesson learned
was to develop a bold yet feasible plan and
then seek the authorities to execute the plan
instead of accepting the past authorities as an
impediment to future plans.
The IO planner later added a second
lesson learned. After further analysis, such
an attempt to avoid conflict is an example of
deterrence. Shape and deter phases matter.
Even though Congress is cutting the DOD
budget on such information programs,13
today’s joint force continues to invest more
time and effort in planning and executing IO
throughout the range of military operations.
Conclusion
Joint IO is evolving. The strategic
communication process is improving as
commanders inform all audiences. IO is
much more than coordinating themes and
messages. The IO integrator certainly needs
to understand the coordinated message but
needs to understand the information environment as it relates to the information and
decisionmaking cycles of foreign audiences,
adversaries, and potential adversaries even
more. Communication synchronization is
vital, but when the bullets are flying even
the best messages are insufficient to affect
decisionmaking.
Future military operations will require
IO professionals with an understanding of
past authority limitations to explore the realm
of the possible and justify new operations
originating in the information environment.
IO, as these vignettes revealed, is never a
“cookie-cutter” or “best practices” solution.
Planning and executing IO in accordance with
its doctrinal definition requires thought and
adaptation facilitated by operational analysis.
Meanwhile, many information-related
capabilities are growing in capacity. All of
this is for the better as the Defense Department’s ability to operate within and affect the
information environment remains a growth
industry. To make the most of these processes
and capabilities, the joint force commander
needs a limber staff capable of maximizing
the commander’s options and minimizing
staff frictions in order to achieve the commander’s effects and complete the mission.
JFQ
NOTES
1
“Army establishes Army Cyber Command,”
available at <www.army.mil/article/46012/
army-establishes-army-cyber-command/>.
2
Curtis Boyd, “The Future of MISO,” Special
Warfare 1 (January–February 2011), 22–29.
3
Air Force Instruction 10-702, Operations
(Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of
the Air Force, June 7, 2011).
4
Dennis M. Murphy, “The Future of Influence in Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 64 (1st
Quarter 2012), 47–51.
5
Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December
2012).
6
Colonel James Gferrer approved the author
using this quotation from an otherwise nonattribution conference discussion.
7
“Request for Support of Funding Authorities to Combat Information Operations,” Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, 2010.
8
“International Broadcasters Condemn Iran
Over ‘Jamming,’” BBC, available at <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8511921.stm>.
9
“Yemen Seizes Arab Satellite TV Gear Over
Southern Unrest,” Agence France-Presse, available at <www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5gkrWanPN6xBGeMX_ax8TdFNrC9Ow>.
10
United Nations, Charter of the United
Nations, 7/51, October 24, 1945, available at <www.
un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.
11
GA Res 424 (V), UN GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp.
No. 20, UN Doc. A/1775 (1950), (“Freedom of
information is a human right.”).
12
Peter Ford, “Is it too late for a popular uprising inside Iraq? Refugees report signs of unrest in
Baghdad,” Christian Science Monitor, January 27,
2003, 14.
13
Walter Pincus, “Lawmakers Slash Budget
for Defense Department’s Information Ops,” The
Washington Post, June 22, 2011, available at <www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/lawmakers-slash-budget-for-militarysinformation-ops/2011/06/22/AGVC3cfH_blog.
html>.
ndup res s . ndu. edu
NEW
from NDU Press
The Chinese Air Force:
Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities
Edited by Richard P. Hallion, Roger Cliff, and Phillip C. Saunders
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force has undergone a rapid transformation
since the 1990s into a formidable, modern air force that could present major challenges to Taiwanese and U.S. forces in a conflict. To examine the present state and
future prospects of China’s air force, a distinguished group of scholars and experts
on Chinese airpower and military affairs gathered in Taipei, Taiwan, in October
2010. This volume is a compilation of the edited papers presented at the conference, rooted in Chinese sources and reflecting comments and additions stimulated
by the dialogue and discussions among the participants. Contributing authors
include Kenneth W. Allen, Roger Cliff, David Frelinger, His-hua Cheng, Richard P.
Hallion, Jessica Hart, Kevin Lanzit, Forrest E. Morgan, Kevin Pollpeter, Shen PinLuen, Phillip C. Saunders, David R. Shlapak, Mark A. Stokes, Murray Scot Tanner,
Joshua K. Wiseman, Xiaoming Zhang, and You Ji.
Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004–February 2007
By George W. Casey, Jr.
General, U.S. Army Retired
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the first major wars of the 21st century. They
will not be the last. They have significantly impacted how the U.S. Government and military think
about prosecuting wars. They will have a generational impact on the U.S. military, as its future leaders,
particularly those in the ground forces, will for decades be men and women who served in Iraq and
Afghanistan. It is imperative that leaders at all levels, both military and civilian, share their experiences
to ensure that we, as a military and as a country, gain appropriate insights for the future.
When General George W. Casey, Jr., was the Army chief of staff, he encouraged leaders at the war
colleges, staff colleges, and advanced courses to write about what they did in Iraq and Afghanistan so
that others could be better prepared when they faced similar challenges. This book is General Casey’s
effort to follow his own advice, offering narratives and insights about his tenure as commander of MultiNational Force–Iraq so that future leaders can be better prepared for the next conflict.
Available in PDF and e-book formats at: www.ndu.edu/press/strategicreflections
Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991
Steven L. Rearden’s Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 surveys the role and
contributions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from the early days of World War II through the end of
the Cold War. The JCS, an organization of military advisors and planners established early in World
War II, first advised the President on the strategic direction of U.S. Armed Forces in that war and
continued afterward to play a significant role in the development of national policy. Because of their
relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, a history of
their activities, both in war and in peacetime, provides insights into the military history of the United
States. The importance of their activities led the JCS to direct that an official history of their actions be
kept for future generations to study. Dr. Rearden’s Council of War follows in the tradition of volumes
previously published about JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, and adopting a broader view of previous volumes, this fresh work of scholarship examines the military implications of problems from 1942 to 1991.
Although focused strongly on the JCS, Rearden’s well-researched treatise deals too with the wider effect
of crucial decisions and their ensuing policies.
JOINT
FORCE
Q UA R T E R LY
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press
National Defense University, Washington, DC