Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 229 10 PEACEMAKING Perceptions and practices in the medieval Latin East Yvonne Friedman The prevailing perception of the 1096 to 1291 era as one of Holy War, with peace far removed from the adversaries’ thoughts, is not entirely accurate. In fact, this epoch of Holy War was punctuated by interludes of peace, as indicated by the approximately 120 treaties mentioned in the historical sources. Although crusader society in the East and its diverse Muslim enemies never achieved a lasting peace, the intermittent ceasefires or treaties reached over this period enabled a fragile cohabitation that endured for two centuries. The entry into such agreements required bridging differing conceptions of peace and the lack of shared language and peacemaking mechanisms. I begin by examining the disparate conceptions of peace in Muslim and crusader society. I then consider the factors that encouraged or discouraged the parties involved from engaging in negotiations for a ceasefire or peace treaty and the influence of the shifting balance of power on peace initiatives. Finally, I address issues of mutual acculturation in the stages of peacemaking: how the sides developed a shared verbal and nonverbal language of peacemaking contacts in the arena of the Latin East, as implemented through diplomacy, gesture and formal agreements. Peace was an ideal goal in both medieval Islamic and Western Christian thought. The aspiration to world peace, however, did not contradict the concept or practice of using military force against antagonists. Conceived of in Islam as resulting from a definitive victory that would bring a just solution to current situations, peace was therefore based on just war. In Christianity, peace was an inherent part of an eschatological vision of the world. Yet, both Islam and Western Christianity founded institutions aimed at the destruction of their enemies – in Islam, the jihad; and in Christianity, the crusade – thus making war a religious imperative. Both medieval societies, however, displayed a dichotomy between ideology and practice with respect to war and peace. It was the loopholes between the two that allowed for peace processes. Muslim law differentiates between intra-Muslim peace, sulh, which could only be contracted between Muslim factions, and muhadana, a temporary 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 229 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 230 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 ceasefire–peace with the infidel entered into only for reasons of expediency. Although jihad is obligatory, its status as a collective, not a personal, obligation allows for many exceptions and facilitates utilization of loopholes to make peace. In Islam, war against the infidel needed no justification, whereas peace or even truce-making required both pretext and explanation. In his chapter on jihad, alTabari outlined the basic terms: Al-Awza´i said: If Muslims conclude a peace treaty with the enemy [darb al-harb] in which they agree to pay Muslims a designated amount [of money] every year so that the Muslims will not enter their country, there is no harm in concluding such a treaty with them. Al-Shafi´i said: I would like for the Imam, if a great misfortune were to happen to the Muslims, and I hope God will not allow this [to happen] to them, to consider a peace treaty with the enemy, whoever they are, and he should conduct a peace [treaty] with [the enemy] only up to a certain time . . . And if the Muslims have power, he should fight the polytheists after the peace expires. If the imam does not have the power, there is no harm to renew [the agreement] for the same duration or less, but he should not exceed the [time limit for the first one].1 Later medieval Islamic legal thought was preoccupied with the circumstances and conditions under which it was permissible to contract a truce. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), for example, submitted: The conclusion of truce is considered by some to be permitted from the very outset and without an immediate occasion, provided that the Imam deems it in the interest of the Muslims. Others maintain that it is only allowed when the Muslims are pressed by sheer necessity, such as civil war and the like. As a condition for truce, it may be stipulated that the enemy pay a certain amount of money to the Muslims . . . Such a stipulation (paying of tribute) however, is not obligatory.2 Thus, whereas peace treaties were seen as a necessary evil and had to be temporary, they were clearly permissible. Practical willingness to limit warfare and enter into treaties emerged from centuries of Muslim warfare and diplomatic relations with the Byzantines, leading to the development of an intricate web of means of coexistence, which included institutions like aman,3 captive exchanges4 and formal diplomacy.5 Although still idealizing war as the normative relationship with the infidel, medieval Islam had in fact honed the tools with which to make peace. Bonner describes the relations on the tughur (frontier) as fostering centres for embattled scholars, but at the same time depicts the abode of those embattled scholars – the ribats on the Eastern frontiers – as centres ‘that became devoted to the arts of peace’.6 The encounter with the crusaders led to an intensification of the ideal of jihad, as for example in the writing of al-Sulami. But even in his 230 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 231 PEACEMEKING treatise on jihad, he did not change the basic rules and thus treaties remained a practical possibility.7 The conditions of treaty-making encompassed almost all possible scenarios: (1) from a position of strength either to avoid further bloodshed or, occasionally, to buy time to acquire reinforcements and supplies; (2) from a position of parity in order to settle differences when combat was not desirable; and (3) from a position of weakness in order to make the best of an adverse situation and perhaps gain time for readjustment.8 During the eighth to tenth century, the Byzantine and Abbasid empires often used captive exchanges as an opening and pretext for truce-making. Nor were these endeavours limited to relations with Eastern Christendom alone. In the twelfth century there were other Muslim–Christian encounters besides the crusades, many of which ended or were regulated by treaty. These ranged from military settlements, including a tributary status in Spain, to commercial treaties with Mediterranean powers.9 Although all the Muslim legalists emphasized the temporary nature of these agreements, they still spelled out the conditions and tools of peacemaking. Western Christianity also demonstrated a dichotomy between ideology and practice with respect to war and peace, but its starting point was diametrically opposed to that of Islam. As noted, peace was a religious goal, part of an eschatological programme for the world. It belonged to Christian ritual and, in Augustine’s eyes, was one of the aims of the City of God.10 Medieval Christian ideological adherence to peace, and limitation of warfare, was exemplified by the ‘Peace of God’ movement, organized and hailed by the Church. The medieval Western notion of peace encompassed Christians alone, viewing war against the infidel – the crusade – as another facet of peace, if not a prerequisite for it.11 The Church’s peace councils gave it the authority to decide who could deploy arms, for what purpose, at whose command, against whom, and when. But at the same time this development suggested that, under certain conditions, the Church now regarded violence as licit.12 Seeing crusade as the logical outcome of the Peace of God movement, Mastnak concluded that Urban II was a peacemaking pope, a lukewarm Gregorian reformer who waged a holy war.13 Thus, crusade could be seen as an act of love in Christian eyes,14 and the preaching of this act of love included the rallying of forces to a war of extermination against the infidel enemy, employing concepts like purging and cleansing the holy places. 15 Although the Church preached peace, the practical outcome was war. In principle, the Holy War against the infidel allowed for no mercy for the vanquished enemy. The preachers described a situation of victory or death.16 As they did not expect any mercy from their enemy, the crusaders saw no reason to show them mercy. Christian chroniclers described with proud relish bloody victories that included butchering and looting the defeated.17 On the other hand, Western Christianity had a long tradition of internal peacemaking by treaties and of conflict resolution accompanied by ceremonial gestures, such as satisfactio and deditio.18 Therefore, in facing actual problems of peacemaking – accepting the capitulation of a besieged city, signing a ceasefire 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 231 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 232 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 with a city willing to pay tribute to be left in peace, and so on – the crusaders did not encounter a totally unknown situation. Although, ideologically, they saw no need to make peace with the enemy, when they found it profitable to do so, they had in store an arsenal of rituals and usages that had developed in Europe for intraChristian peace and conflict resolution. Thus, to some extent, like their Muslim foes, the peace-loving Christians felt there was no need to explain the Holy War called by the pope; it was peace that needed a pretext and rationalization. However, in contrast to the Muslim world, for Christianity, it was the idea of Holy War that was new and placed the crusaders in a position in which peacemaking with the infidel was not seen as an option, whereas the notions of peace and of the need for treaty-making were well known. In addressing the question of treaty-making under such circumstances we must remember that the leaders of the First Crusade were not just charged with religious zeal to free the Holy Land from what they saw as its unlawful inhabitants; they were also down-to-earth military leaders governed by realistic strategic considerations. Therefore, when approached by an enemy willing to surrender under favourable conditions, or proposing a pact that might seem expedient or as forwarding their main goal, it seems that the crusaders’ problem was not so much one of overcoming religious or ideological qualms but one of language – cultural language. The main difficulty was to find a mechanism acceptable to both cultures to ensure that both sides would trust and keep an agreement. Not just military, the Muslim–Christian encounter has been rightly defined as one of negotiating cultures.19 It is the story of these negotiations, in sharp contrast to their hostile ideology, which I seek to tell here. The starting point for consideration of the details of the peacemaking processes is naturally the agreements themselves, their number, dates and terms. Using mainly Arabic sources, T. Nakamura charted a list of seventy-two treaties between 1097 and 1145, a period in which the Franks were dominant, ending with their first serious territorial loss, the fall of Edessa.20 More recently, my student Shmuel Nussbaum examined the Latin and French sources in addition and arrived at a table of 109 treaties in the 1097 to 1291 period.21 Although there is a large degree of overlap, by combining both tables and consulting the sources, I arrived at an approximate total of 120 treaties over the two-century period, but with negotiations failing in 11 cases, the final total is 109. The calculation is problematic, because treaties were often renewed and thus the same treaty is counted twice; on the other hand, sometimes negotiations failed and did not in fact end in agreement, although the sources may describe the stages as if they were part of a treaty. But even if the number of treaties is not sufficiently exact for statistical analysis, it suffices for a general impression of the balance of power and to prove that, notwithstanding ideologies of crusade and jihad, treaties were a regular phenomenon in the Latin East. Figure 10.1 shows the balance of power that emerges from comparison of the percentage of initiatives for peace as described in the literary sources, based on Nussbaum’s findings. 232 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 233 PEACEMEKING 90 Muslim initiatives 80 Crusaders/Franks 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1098–1124 1127–1192 1193–1250 1252–1290 Periods Figure 10.1 The pattern of initiative-taking in peace treaties between Muslims and Christians, 1098–1290 Note: Treaties where the sources do not specify who asked for peace are not included. 1098–1124 During the first two decades of the principality of Antioch’s history (1098–1128) the Muslim powers were forced to cultivate a generally submissive and conciliatory relationship with the Franks. The treaties reached included clauses setting tribute payments to the Christians and were, according to Tom Asbridge, built on the eleventh-century Iberian precedent of the so-called Taifa states and their tributary status, known to at least some of the crusaders.22 For the Muslim side, this situation was familiar from its relations with the Byzantine Empire. Asbridge sees the difference in willingness to make peace not just as one of political power, but of general outlook: It is worth noting that the Latins of Antioch did not share their neighbours’ willingness to negotiate or purchase peace in times of crisis. When the principality faced disaster in 1105 or 1119, the Franks did not appear to have even tried to negotiate, relying instead upon military force, risking battle even when they lacked resources and manpower.23 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 233 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 234 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 But when the Muslim side showed willingness to submit to crusader rule, this was usually accepted, notwithstanding the ideal of total war. As the balance of power during the first decade of the Latin kingdom and the Syrian principalities was usually in favour of the Franks, treaties, both of tribute and condominium, were signed and implemented. Thus, during this period of overwhelming crusader superiority over the Muslim principalities, we find a minority of Frankish requests for agreements with the Muslims, only 15 per cent of a total of 33 requests attested in the literature, as opposed to Muslim initiation of 46 per cent of the agreements.24 1127–92 With the unification of Syria under Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, the religious slogan of jihad was used as a power-enhancing mechanism to forward their political aims. The gradual unification of Muslim territories, the fall of Edessa in 1144, and the ascendancy of jihad have been identified as points of decline on the Christian side.25 This period saw a shift in the balance of power from crusader superiority until its great defeat at Hattin. The Franks now had to learn to accept that the shoe could be on the other foot. By then, though, a process of acculturation had taught them to accept elements of Eastern usage, and, when necessary, to ask for peace. It is, however, illuminating to note William of Tyre’s negative reaction to the signing of a treaty placing them on an equal footing with their adversary, Saladin, in 1180, seven years before the great disaster at the Battle of Hattin: ‘The conditions were somewhat humiliating to us, for the truce was concluded on equal terms, with no reservations of importance on our part, a thing which is said never to have happened before.’26 The Frankish historian and diplomat thought it permissible to make peace only when the Franks were the victors and found a status of equality humiliating. However, it seems inconceivable that the Franks had never been in a situation of equality, not to mention inferiority, before 1180. That such a shift in diplomatic balance is documented only at a rather late date may stem from the Muslim side’s ideological preference for demonstrating its need for a truce even when it was in fact not the weaker party. At the time Saladin’s propagandists depicted him as a leader who was pursuing jihad and was not making truces from a position of weakness; their explanation was that in this case he had economic motivations for agreeing to a truce. The historian and diplomat William of Tyre saw this shift in diplomatic protocol as a watershed, as marking a new period. During this period, enhanced Muslim military strength, due to unification under the leadership of Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, is reflected in a reduction of the number of Muslim-initiated requests for agreements from 46 per cent in the previous period to 35 per cent.27 Note, however, that Saladin in fact fought more intra-Muslim wars to enhance his own rule in Egypt and Syria than jihad against the Franks, and it was his great victories at Hattin and Jerusalem that enabled his propagandists to paint him as the ideal Muslim ruler fighting only for the faith.28 234 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 235 PEACEMEKING 1193–1250 For the third period, during which the Franks ruled the coastal region and the Muslims ruled the internal region of the Holy Land, the balance of power was largely determined by shifts in internal Ayyubid politics and crusader attempts at incursion on Ayyubid lands, strengthened by crusades from the West.29 The tiny crusader kingdom did occasionally succeed in obtaining additional territory by treaty (especially from 1129 to 1144), but modern historians usually depict them as clearly inferior to the Ayyubids. The balanced number of peace-agreementinitiating requests seems to point to military parity,30 or a balance of diplomatic power that enabled the Franks to appear stronger than they were in reality. In general, both this and the preceding period were characterized by a relatively even number of ceasefire initiatives. 1252–90 During the period of the Mamluk sultanate, when the Muslims achieved ascendancy, and before the final defeat of the Latin kingdom, we find cynical use of agreements to push the Franks out of the Latin East. The overriding consideration was what would bring greater benefit: war or peace? Note, however, that the religious definition of muhadana made designation of practical needs an integral part of treaty formulation. The Muslim leader, even when he was the stronger party, would explicitly state the necessity that permitted him to seek peace, a convention the triumphant Baybars included in his treaties. During Baybars’ reign, when the Franks had to ask for peace time and again and were granted at most an unstable ceasefire, the diplomatic tone emphasized the inferior status of the Franks both in terms of territory and in terms of initiating and paying for the ceasefire. But even then it was necessary to mention the fidah – the return of captives by the Franks – because exchange or ransoming of captives was one of the legally accepted pretexts to end war.31 This period saw the highest proportion of Frankish-initiated requests for ceasefires: 77 per cent of a total of 26 requests.32 This periodization of the two-century-long series of negotiations between Muslims and Franks is naturally arbitrary. In his book on crusader castles, which focuses on military encounters, Ronnie Ellenblum suggests a different scheme. Based on the frequency of hostilities, he divides the twelfth century into three stages: 1099–1115, 1115–67 and 1167–87.33 He sees the second period as one of Frankish military superiority over their Muslim neighbours, and accordingly as a period of relative security for the Franks. His third period includes the unification of Muslim forces under Nur al-Din and Saladin and the subsequent deterioration in Frankish security and, following William, 1180–7 is considered a sub-period, one of constant pressure by Saladin on the Franks until their defeat at Hattin.34 Taking the treaties and peace negotiations as the criterion for periodization, one arrives at comparable but not similar results. As we have seen, William of Tyre, who was contemporary to the treaty of 1180 and well aware of the 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 235 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 236 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 military pressure Ellenblum sees as a watershed, still found equality in treaty negotiations to be novel and humiliating. He could not prophesy the fall at Hattin, but still ended his book on a gloomy note, expressing fear for the future.35 He clearly did not see the 1167–80 period as one of inferior Frankish status. But whatever scheme one adopts, the data clearly demonstrate a correlation between military–political shifts in the balance of power and requests for ceasefires with the underdog generally seeking cessation of hostilities. Whereas the first and last periods’ results are as expected, the state of near equilibrium characterizing the two middle periods does not seem to fit the modern evaluation of the balance of power. With hindsight, the second period is usually seen as one of sharp decline on the Frankish side, and the third period as one of clear Muslim supremacy. Apparently, in contemporary eyes, the picture was different or perhaps was portrayed differently for religious or ideological reasons. Because Muslim ideology accepted a truce only when absolutely necessary,36 the Muslims employed formal wording that placed them as the underdog long after they were in fact equal to, or even stronger than, the Franks. This might explain the discrepancy between the balance of power in the second half of the twelfth century as perceived by modern historians and as reflected by William of Tyre and statistical analysis. The political significance of who initiates the request for peace negotiations is emphasized by Baha al-Din’s description of the negotiations between Richard the Lionheart and Saladin’s representatives in 1192. According to the chronicler, the Muslim mediator al-Adil made a point of noting: ‘We did not make any request of you. It was you who asked us,’37 thereby marking the inferiority of the Latin side. Comparison of the treaties over the whole period points to some changes in the way agreements were reached over the course of the two-century period of coexistence. If initial contacts were characterized by oral agreements between the sides regarding surrender or lifting of a siege for monetary recompense, often emphasizing the gestures involved, towards the end of the period we find the sides drawing up formal written agreements, with fixed clauses defining the obligations assumed by each. As written treaties are sometimes mentioned during the earlier period too, they must have existed, even if they have not survived. But, more plausibly, the extant treaties from the thirteenth century prove that by then a mutual language had been agreed and a common diplomatic protocol had emerged.38 Analysis of the treaties mentioned in literary sources also enables elicitation of the underlying reasons for initiation of ceasefire agreements, revealing that military issues were most prevalent. Other factors promoting Muslim–Frankish agreements were: the need for military cooperation in the face of some common enemy;39 renewal of expired agreements; economic or internal difficulties, such as lack of rainfall, the low level of the Nile, or the weakening of the regime by opposition forces; or, simply, the realization that no advantage would ensue from further conflict.40 Not surprisingly, a greater number of treaties is attested both for periods in which one side showed marked superiority and for periods of intensive warfare, making the renewal or signing of treaties a necessity. 236 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 237 PEACEMEKING Muslim willingness to enter into agreements was largely conditioned by the pragmatic or political needs of the rulers. In the early period, individual leaders of the local principalities acted in their own best interests, as seen from what reportedly motivated Shams al-Khilafa, the governor of Ascalon, who made a truce with Baldwin I in 1111: his being ‘more desirous of trading than of fighting and inclined to peaceful and friendly relations and the securing of the safety of travellers’.41 But whereas in Muslim sources this was viewed as a valid and even honourable pretext, William of Tyre felt that ceasing fighting for economic reasons indicated greed, and he castigated Amalric for his readiness to negotiate a treaty after the conquest of Bilbeis in 1169 because of the large tribute the Egyptians offered.42 However, this does not mean that the chronicler was unaware of the economic advantages of peace. In another famous diatribe William lamented the end of peace with Egypt: From a quiet state of peace [quieto et tranquillo penitus status] into what turbulent and anxious condition has an immoderate desire for possessions plunged us! All the resources of Egypt and its immense wealth served our needs; the frontiers of our realm were safe on that side; there was no enemy to be feared on the south. The sea afforded a safe and peaceful passage to those wishing to come to us. Our people could enter the territories of Egypt without fear and carry on commerce and trade under advantageous conditions. On their part, the Egyptians brought to the realm foreign riches and strange commodities unknown to us, were at once an advantage and an honour to us.43 Although William admitted that peace had its sunnier sides, for him war was the honourable task of a chivalrous, fighting society. Nonetheless, even these fighting societies engaged in peaceful contacts, as we have seen. Notwithstanding the use of jihad to forward political aims under Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, the Ayyubid period (the third period in Table 10.1) saw many peaceful contacts with the Franks. 44 During the Mamluk period, however, we witness almost cynical use of agreements to push the Franks out of the Latin East. Although we have charted the shifting balance of power and changed historical circumstances in the Latin East as underlying the conventions of treaty-making, note that initiating negotiations is not always a clear-cut sign of objective military inferiority on the local scene, and that the global political situation, the real reason behind a diplomatic move, sometimes receives no mention in the treaty itself. Thus, for example, as Kedar has recently shown,45 Ayyubid willingness to extend the treaty with the Latin kingdom in 1204 and to cede Kafr Kanna and Nazareth to the Franks did not stem from the balance of power in the Holy Land itself, but rather from the rumours that had reached the East about the preparations for the Fourth Crusade in the West. It may well have seemed expedient for the Muslim side to make concessions to the Franks in order to prolong the ceasefire; concessions which perhaps later proved unnecessary.46 Thus the Fourth 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 237 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 238 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 Crusade impacted on the balance of power in the Holy Land even though most of its crusaders never landed in Acre.47 Similarly, Ibn Wasil’s explanation that the Egyptian sultan al-Kamil had to cede Jerusalem to Christian rule in 1229 because he had promised it to Frederick II perhaps sounds like a shallow excuse for a move that seemed irrational to local Muslims in light of the imbalance between Frederick’s small military presence (and dwindling local backing) and Ayyubid resources.48 But to a Muslim leader, aware of the danger of Khwarizmian intervention in Syria and the Holy Land, as well as the still unstable division of the Ayyubid Empire between Saladin’s heirs, a treaty with the greatest lay power in Christendom might not have seemed so outlandish.49 The emperor’s naval superiority, grounded in the backing of the Sicilian navy, was not apparent on the local scene, but it was evident to an Egypt-based sultan who well remembered the Latin conquest of Damietta a decade earlier.50 The global balance of power may well have been the reason why the treaty, which was condemned by both Christian and Muslim contemporary chroniclers because of its religious connotations, was kept for its whole ten-year duration, despite the criticism voiced in both camps. To this point, we have looked at peacemaking efforts through the prism of the shifting balance of power between the adversaries over the two-century period of Holy War in the Latin East and the impact of economic and political factors, both local and international. It remains to examine the verbal and nonverbal means the parties to the conflict employed to bridge their cultural differences and reach agreements. Diplomacy Note, at the outset, the differing conceptions in the Muslim and Christian camps. For the Muslims, negotiations were usually carried out by sending delegates to the enemy camp. For the Christians, the accepted mode of negotiating peace often took place at the highest levels, between the leaders themselves.51 The need to overcome the cultural gap between the parties enhanced the culture-bridging role played by diplomats, and the emergence of a class of diplomats with special privileges and safeguards comprises an important aspect of peacemaking in the Latin East. From the first encounters between the enemies, and until their conclusion, emissaries played a prominent part in preventing hostilities and achieving agreements. The initiation of negotiations by sending delegates to the enemy camp presupposed a state of immunity, like the Muslim aman. This safe-conduct was essential, and although it could often be a risky business to bring tidings or offers to the other side, the envoys usually returned to their own camp unscathed. In the initial stages of drawing up an agreement, emissaries from each side engaged in preparatory talks, whose outcome often depended on their talents. In this case, too, there existed longstanding traditions of polyglot, skilled diplomats passing between the Muslim and Christian camps, some of them former captives, who learned the language and mores of the antagonist while in captivity; these 238 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 239 PEACEMEKING could be either Christians or Muslims, depending on the circumstances. In the East emissaries were usually chosen from among persons with connections to the ruling elite, at times even members of the royal family. Thus the mediator became a kind of hostage, protected by the safe-conduct granted by the enemy and the assumption that the monarch who dispatched him would consider any injury to him a great loss. Therefore, by its very nature, engaging in a diplomatic mission was indirectly a sign of trust in the enemy who was being approached. Moreover, the emissary’s rank also played a role in negotiations. Sending someone of high rank was a sign of honour; whereas sending somebody of lower rank could be seen as an insult. Perhaps the crusaders in Antioch thought Peter the Hermit a suitable envoy to Kerbogha of Mosul, who was laying siege to the city in 1098, along with the addition of Herluin as a translator. But a shabby hermit did not fit the other party’s expectations. Notwithstanding Peter’s report to the army that he had offered Kerbogha the option of converting to Christianity, which sounds very doubtful, his appearance alone was probably enough to persuade Kerbogha to refuse any offer.52 Perhaps his real mission was to suggest a trial by battle with twenty soldiers instead of a total war, or to discuss possible surrender, but it seems in this case that the cultural, rather than the linguistic, gap was the problem.53 Not surprisingly, the mission failed. When Shirkuh, Saladin’s uncle, wanted to use his captive, Hugh of Caesarea, as a diplomat to Amalric, he described the prerequisites for a mediator: You are a great prince of high rank [nobilis] and much influence [clarissimus] among your own people, nor is there any one of your barons to whom, if free choice were offered me, I would prefer to communicate this secret of mine and make my confidant . . . you are a man of high rank [homo nobilis es], as I have said, dear to the king and influential in both word and deed, be the mediator of peace between us.54 This flattering description was reported by Hugh himself, who was worried that as a former captive his own people might be suspicious that he ‘was more interested in obtaining his own liberty than concerned for the public welfare’. He therefore preferred that another captive, Arnulf of Turbessel, take this task upon himself; however, Hugh joined him for the later stages of negotiations and ‘put the final touches’ to the treaty.55 As one function of the diplomat could also be to identify potential weaknesses in the opposing side during his mission, astuteness in spying out trends in the enemy camp played a role in his selection. Prominent diplomats like Saladin’s brother al-Adil (Saphadin in Western sources) and the qadi Fahr-a-Din, who negotiated with Frederick II on behalf of al-Kamil, cultivated friendly relationships with the opposing side. A diplomat’s political judgement was taken into account, and his influence certainly surpassed that of a simple message bearer. Polyglot abilities were an advantage, but not a prerequisite. The envoy’s status and diplomatic skill and knowledge counted for more. 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 239 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 240 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 A well-known instance of the extent to which diplomats could influence the pact-making process is the part played by al-Adil, Hubert Walter, Bishop of Salisbury, and Henry of Champagne (Richard’s relative) in the negotiations between Saladin and Richard I in August 1192. We may well disregard the tearful speech of love and admiration attributed to al-Adil by Richard of Devizes, as well as his chronology, but his description of the secret agreement reached without the sick king’s knowledge rings true in having al-Adil promise, ‘I shall arrange with my brother either for a perpetual peace for you, or at the least for a firm and lasting truce.’56 The king’s sudden recovery placed his ministers in a shaky position, as they had already arranged the treaty terms with al-Adil. Unaware of this agreement, Richard tried to organize an offensive while Hubert Walter and Count Henry did their best to sabotage mobilization of the army.57 When failure made the king willing to negotiate, this provided the opening the negotiators needed. To their surprise, or so they claimed, they found that al-Adil, who was supposed to be in Jerusalem with Saladin, was in fact near by. Instructed by his colleagues on how to speak to Richard, al-Adil obtained a temporary truce ratified by the giving of hands and returned to his brother to arrange his part of the plot. Baha al-Din’s description of the same encounter proves that al-Adil’s sudden appearance was no chance occurrence; he was in fact waiting to be summoned. The Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi knows nothing of the devious part played by the mediators but agrees that the truce initiative came from the crusader side and that the king was presented with a written document of a truce obtained by al-Adil: ‘The terms were recorded in writing and read out to King Richard, who approved them’, presented there as the best terms for which Richard could have hoped.58 The important role of the diplomats finds corroboration in Baha al-Din’s detailed record of the same events. He noted that Richard was presented with a written draft of the truce as a fait accompli and referred the finishing touches, including some cardinal terms, to Henry and ‘the others’.59 Baha al-Din mentions that there was a delay in the oath-taking ceremony, attributed to the fact that the Christians ‘do not take an oath after eating’, and that they had already eaten that day. This too may have been the diplomats’ invention and a way of gaining time to convince Richard. The mediators were apparently successful in setting international policy behind the backs of the rulers who had sent them to negotiate in their name. Thus the messengers who were only supposed to go between the camps grew in importance and became independent policy-makers, using the power bestowed by their connections with the other side. According to Baha al-Din, Richard had suggested a personal meeting with Saladin to discuss peace terms back in November 1191. Saladin refused, making the counter-proposal that he and Richard should send envoys instead. Although his explanation that it was unseemly for kings to fight after having met, and that the terms ought to be settled by interpreters and messengers before such a meeting could take place, may have been a prevarication to gain time, it also exemplifies the above-mentioned difference in the diplomatic traditions of the two 240 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 241 PEACEMEKING sides.60 Richard met Philip August for direct negotiations and treaty-making at Messina in March 1191,61 and a similar meeting took place between Gaillon and Le Vaudreuil in January 1196.62 Messengers were not unknown in the West but, apparently, relying on a long tradition of inter-religious diplomacy, the role of diplomats was more prominent in the East. In fact, Richard and Saladin never met except on the battlefield as commanders who did not really meet face-to-face, and it was their diplomats who finally made the treaty between them. Illustrations showing them fighting a duel belong to the realm of myth, not history.63 Gestures of conciliation Another noteworthy aspect of the peacemaking encounters between enemies in the Latin East belongs to the nonverbal realm – gesture and ceremony. Some historians attribute the importance of gestures in the Middle Ages to the weakness of literacy in medieval societies. On the one hand, medieval culture greatly emphasized writing and reading because they were rare and used to spread Scripture; on the other, gestures publicly transmitted political and religious power and endowed legal actions with a living image. Gestures bound together human wills and bodies.64 This was true for both societies, but the encounter between them emphasized the need for gestures that could be immediately understood and seen by all. In its stress on visual images through television and the internet, modern culture may be closer to the medieval perception of the importance of body language and political rituals than former generations.65 Set conventions and conciliatory gestures were part of the cultural mechanisms that facilitated peacemaking, or prevented it in the cases where gestures were misunderstood by one of the sides. For effective, fruitful negotiations, a common cultural language had to be found. Some of these gestures of conciliation were learned by acculturation and became a common language; others remained specific to one of the sides and were never transmitted, whereas some were imposed on one side by the other, thus becoming part of the language of power. Potentially, there could be several stages of peacemaking, each accompanied by its characteristic gestures. Thus, the capitulation of a city was signified by flying the conqueror’s banner. This gesture occurred in the early encounters between the enemies and was presumably known to both sides. But how did the losing side obtain the banner? This presupposes the holding of some negotiations at an earlier time. These negotiations are usually not spelled out in the chroniclers’ descriptions, perhaps because they were often carried out secretly, whereas the official submission had to be done publicly, for all to see. Nor did the problems end there. As each military leader had his own banner, it was important to know whose banner to fly in order to avoid becoming the victim of internal rifts in the victors’ camp. Thus the anonymous Gesta Francorum claims that both Raymond of St Giles’s and Bohemond’s banners were flown at Antioch.66 At Tarsus the rivalry between Tancred and Baldwin over the city’s capitulation, which surrendered by flying Tancred’s banner in 1097, ended in bloodshed.67 And in August 1099 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 241 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 242 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 crusader rivalry at the siege of Ascalon saved the city from surrender. Richard the Lionheart’s tactless behaviour in flying his banner at Acre after its surrender did not alter the city’s fate, but marred his relations with his partners during and after the Third Crusade.68 William of Tyre mentions signs given by the inhabitants of a conquered city spelling out their willingness to convert, but he does not explain what those signs were.69 Another self-explanatory gesture understood by both sides was presenting the victor with the key to the city. This is shown in illustrations such as that in the fourteenth-century Grandes chroniques de France, where the surrender of Acre to Philip Augustus and Richard I of England in 1191 is depicted by the offering to the monarchs of a disproportionately large key.70 Muslim sources recognized a similar significance in the transfer of keys. The chronicler al-Yunini (1242–1326) described the capitulation of Crac des Chevaliers to Baybars in 1271: ‘when Hisn al-Akrad [Crac des Chevaliers] was captured, the lord of Antartus (which belonged to the Templars) wrote to al-Malik al-Zahir [Baybars] to request the making of a truce and sent to him its keys’.71 This was a symbolic gesture, as the lack of keys did not usually prevent the victorious army from entering the city. The letter to Baybars presumably included the request for a truce and its proposed terms, but the keys were the gesture of surrender. The long list of cities that entered into treaties with the crusaders during the first years of their rule in the Levant, paying tribute and often retaining their former leaders as dependants of the new ruler, presupposes the holding of negotiations about which most chroniclers remain silent. It seems logical to assume that the vanquished side presented terms of capitulation, both because this was the usual practice in the East before the crusaders’ arrival, and because it would be easier for the victorious crusaders just to accept the favourable terms that had been suggested than to negotiate in line with terms unknown in the East.72 That perhaps explains the continuation of Eastern practices between the victor and the vanquished in the East, such as tribute, gifts and the like. Just as we do not know exactly how the actual fighting on the battlefield ended, except in cases where the enemy was butchered to total extinction, it is not entirely clear what signalled a ceasefire. Elsewhere, I have shown that by 1150 there existed a gesture apparently known to both sides, namely the laying down of arms and clasping the hands, first on one side, then on the other. This is not the same as the modern gesture of capitulation by raising both hands, which signifies inferiority and even humiliation, albeit both gestures share the laying down of weapons as a first step. As opposed to the modern gesture, William of Tyre views the medieval gesture as showing reverence between military leaders and signalling a willingness to stop fighting, but not humiliation.73 In 1150 the protagonists knew each other beforehand from earlier diplomatic missions and the gesture served as the sign to end fighting and start negotiating. Other Eastern gestures were ineffectual when dealing with a Western Christian army. Thus, at the Battle of Ascalon, the vanquished Egyptians ‘threw themselves flat on the ground, not daring to stand against us, so our men slaughtered them as one slaughters beasts 242 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 243 PEACEMEKING in a shambles’.74 Neither this gesture nor grasping the victor’s leg to beg for mercy evoked any pity in crusader hearts, and the chroniclers make no apologies for killing the vanquished enemy.75 At the Battle of Dorylaeum (July 1097) the Christian women employed a different gesture of surrender (women were not supposed to be on the battlefield but, during the First Crusade at least, the difference between soldiers and noncombatants was blurred): Stunned and terrified by the cruelty of the most hideous killings, girls who were delicate and very nobly born were hastening to get themselves dressed up, they were offering themselves to the Turks so that at least, roused and appeased by love of their beautiful appearance, the Turks might learn to pity their prisoners.76 In contrast, the crusaders prided themselves on killing, but not raping, enemy women: ‘In regard to the women found in the tents of the foe [Antioch 1098], the Franks did them no evil but drove lances into their bellies.’ 77 The Muslim chronicler Imad al-Din al-Isfahâni clearly saw the conquest of women as part of victory and did not spare the reader any descriptive details of their fate.78 In this case, as in many others, the enemies had distinct cultural languages of war and peace; the vanquished had to learn the nuances of the other’s nonverbal language quickly in order to save their lives. The conclusion of the actual battle was followed by the stage of initiating negotiations. One gesture involved was that of bowing. Bowing before the ruler is a liminal gesture: a means of introduction that bridges the gap of the unknown at a first meeting between sides.79 The lower the bow, the greater the humility shown. Koziol classifies bowing as a ‘natural’ gesture and therefore familiar to both sides: To place oneself beneath another person is clearly a sign of inferiority. Indeed this meaning is so widespread among social mammals that one wonders if it does not have some common source, perhaps in their perception of space or in the reinforcement of dependent, infantile behavior. Nevertheless, the kind of inferiority a prostration represents is not inherent in the physical act. Still less does the act convey any information about the world. They are explained in the cultural framework through their analogies with similar liturgical gestures (as one knelt before God or saints).80 The only exception to this ranking according to height was the seated ruler: by standing before him, the messengers or captives showed deference, and the ruler’s immobility was a sign of his exalted position even though the standing petitioner was higher. As Koziol has shown in detail for the West, there was a difference between a slight bow, kneeling on one knee or two, and the full-length prostration of a rebel 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 243 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 244 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 seeking pardon. We have already seen that, as a gesture of surrender asking for one’s life to be spared, this gesture was not effective during the First Crusade. In the East, the usual procedures for initiating treaty-making included bowing, kneeling and the bringing of gifts, generally performed not by the ruler himself, but by proxy, via his messenger. A messenger sent to the Byzantine court or the court of the Abbasid caliph was expected to kiss the ground in front of the ruler and to bow and kneel.81 The bowing gestures in both Christianity and Islam originated in the religious sphere and were part of prayer ritual. This has been amply illustrated in the detailed prayer gestures in the West.82 The religious connotations of prostration were problematic for the Muslims, as sujud – the full-fledged proskynesis before a person – is forbidden, as it is supposed to be restricted exclusively to the religious sphere. Bowing is therefore misused when performed before anyone other than God, even more so in this case of bowing not just before a human being, but an infidel.83 Nevertheless, the Byzantine diplomatic protocol insisted on this gesture, so when the Franks and locals met in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, this gesture was well known and understood by both sides. The above-mentioned difference in height could become part of a power play, as in the case of Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (1223–93), the head of the royal chancery under Baybars and Qalawun, and a court biographer, who described his part as a diplomat sent to ratify Baybars’ treaty with the Latin kingdom in 1268: I was an ambassador together with the Amir Kamal al-Din b. Shith to take the king’s oath . . . We entered Acre on 24 Shawwal [7 July 1268] and were received by a numerous gathering. The sultan had instructed us not to demean ourselves before [the king] in sitting or speech. When we entered to him, we saw him sitting enthroned together with the Masters [of the orders] and we would not take our seat until a throne was placed for us opposite him.84 To this point, many of the gestures of conciliation belong to the sphere of natural human behaviour and, as we have seen, some of its aspects, like gestures of humiliation and issues of height, have universal meaning. But other gestures were certainly culture-specific, and we must inquire how the parties to the conflict learned what they signified to the other side. This is the case for gifts, which were part of the trust-building, deferential steps taken by the parties to negotiations. There was, however, a cultural difference between East and West. In the East bringing gifts was a primary gesture necessary to open negotiations. In one of the Old French manuscripts of William of Tyre’s history there is an illustration showing the satraps of the northern principalities extending their gifts of gold, horses and expensive clothes to Baldwin I, who receives them sitting on his throne.85 The incident depicted is typical of this kind of opening gesture. But even when the Muslim side had the upper hand, it still saw gift-giving as a preliminary stage of negotiations. Thus the messengers 244 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 245 PEACEMEKING Baybars sent to Acre, who were instructed to behave insultingly to the Frankish ruler, as we saw above,86 were still dispatched with the gift of twenty of the prisoners of Antioch, priests and monks.87 When Baybars laid siege to Safed in 1266 he sent the Templars gifts to initiate negotiations for their surrender ‘after the custom of the Saracens’. When they refused the gifts and catapulted them back by mangonel, this infuriated Baybars. After conquering the castle he executed all the Templars even though he had previously promised them safe-conduct.88 In the West, on the other hand, gifts marked the culmination of the agreementreaching process, and usually signified the hierarchical relationship between the parties: the more prominent side gave a gift to the lesser, thereby signifying its dependent status. Not to accept was tantamount to effrontery, if not a declaration of war. Following Marcel Mauss, Essai sur le don,89 anthropologists emphasize the need for reciprocity in gift-giving. As it creates some sort of obligation on the part of the recipient, it is sometimes a dubious blessing. In the words of Arnoud-Jan A. Bijsterveld: Gift exchange is defined as a transaction to create, maintain or restore relations between individuals or groups of people. The reciprocity is an essential element of this exchange. A gift has the capacity to create those relationships, because the initial gift obliges the recipient to return some other gift in the future. Because of the counter-gift, gift-giving is not restricted to one occasion: do ut des, it is an episode in a continuous social relationship. Gifts and counter-gifts, landed property, money, objects, brides and oblates act as a means of social integration.90 If we have seen that, in the encounter between enemies, gift-giving can work to initiate talks or to seal a mutual obligation, according to cultural background, Richard the Lionheart exemplifies what I see as a process of acculturation. When al-Adil initiated peace negotiations by sending Richard ‘seven valuable camels and an excellent tent’, Richard was severely criticized for accepting these gifts.91 Later, when Richard wanted to initiate talks with Saladin, he sent him two falcons, specifying what he would like in return, although it is not clear if these were really meant as a gift or as a pretext to spy on the enemy.92 The falcon, a hunting bird, was in and of itself a symbol of peace, as hunting was the favourite pastime of non-belligerent warriors among both the Eastern and Western nobility. Hunting – the use of arms outside the battlefield – symbolized peaceful encounters, somewhat similar to modern sport. This is illustrated, for example, by the Bayeux tapestry, where a herald rides with a falcon on his shoulder to prove his peaceful intentions.93 Usamah Ibn Munqidh’s colourful description of the two rivals Amir Muin- al-Din and Fulk, King of Jerusalem, hunting together conveys the same meaning.94 Thus, if in fact carried out, Richard’s gesture, which is not mentioned by the Latin sources, had dual layers of meaning. It is interesting to note that Baha al-Din claims that the gift was accepted only on 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 245 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 246 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 the explicit condition that Richard accept a comparable present.95 At the same time al-Adil made a point of emphasizing that the initiative had come from the English king; in other words, by Oriental standards, he was the weaker party. The gift of a falcon as part of a peace treaty is further illustrated by a Western illumination to William of Tyre’s chronicle showing the Hungarian king returning the hostages to Godfrey of Bouillon. The two leaders clasp right hands and a falcon sits on the Hungarian king’s arm, this hunting bird being a gift to seal the agreement.96 The importance of gifts in the Eastern tradition of negotiations is further illuminated by the Kitab al-Hadaya wa al-Tuhaf (The Book of Gifts and Rarities), apparently compiled a generation before the First Crusade. 97 Gifts presented to Muslim rulers are carefully described, valued and detailed; there was evidently a special treasury where royal, diplomatic gifts were kept and registered. Another example of mutual acculturation comes from the gesture of giving the right hand. Comparison of two treaties, one from 1098 – between the ruler of Azaz and Godfrey of Bouillon – and the other from 1167 – between the Caliph of Egypt and a Frankish emissary – shows a process of mutual acculturation, exemplified by the employment of the Western ceremony of extending the right hand and the Eastern use of gifts. Both cases reflect cultural mediation via outside intervention. In the earlier treaty, a captive Christian wife of the Muslim ruler teaches him Western mores. She instructs him to give Godfrey his right hand rather than to use his preferred Eastern method of messengers bearing gifts, a gesture that did not inspire trust on Godfrey’s part. Later Western sources describe Godfrey, as the victorious party, giving gifts as a sign of lordship and supremacy. In the second treaty, the diplomat Hugh of Caesarea forces the caliph to extend his bare hand, contrary to his usage: ‘Therefore, unless you offer your bare hand [my emphasis] we shall be obliged to think that, on your part, there is some reservation or lack of sincerity.’ Finally, with extreme unwillingness, as if it detracted from his majesty, yet with a slight smile, which greatly aggrieved the Egyptians, he put his uncovered hand into that of Hugh. He repeated, almost syllable by syllable, the words of Hugh as he dictated the formula of the treaty and swore that he would keep the stipulations thereof in good faith, without fraud or evil intent.98 The treaty clauses were important, but for the chronicler, William of Tyre, imposing the gesture of giving his right hand was seen as a greater diplomatic victory. In September 1192, during the protracted negotiations between Richard the Lionheart and Saladin, this basically Western usage for sealing a treaty is attributed to both sides. Thus Baha al-Din claims that Richard, who was too sick to read the draft of the treaty presented to him, said, ‘I have no strength to read this, but I herewith make peace and here is my hand’, while Saladin said to the Christian envoys, ‘These are the limits of the land that will remain in your hands. If you can 246 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 247 PEACEMEKING accept these terms, well and good. I give you my hand on it.’99 Thus, according to the Muslim chronicler, this gesture had become part of the conventions of treaty-making on both sides. Notwithstanding this ‘victory’ of Western mores of peace gestures in the twelfth century, I think that careful comparison of the few surviving written treaties and earlier treaties in the West and in the East demonstrates the greater influence of Eastern usage in the Latin East. Such a comparison must, however, take into account the tendency of the victorious side to impose its norms on the text and terms of agreement. For the period for which written texts are extant, this was usually the Muslim party.100 A further source for the ceremonial aspects and nonverbal gestural language of peacemaking encounters is pictorial evidence. One such source is Matthew Paris’s illustration of the treaty between Crac and Acre, in which both rulers meet, kneel, extend their hands, and remove their helmets while their forces look on from a distance.101 The scene clearly represents a Western image of peacemaking, whereas Eastern illustrations of peacemaking emphasize gift-giving and a subservient gesture of bowing, as with the scene depicting Baldwin I from the Old French manuscript of William of Tyre’s history, described above. Similarly, the Leningrad manuscript (1225–35) of the illustrated Maqamat al-Hariri has a characteristic miniature where the hero of the tales, Abu Zaid, approaches a city governor in a bent posture, arms raised in supplication.102 Another major mechanism of treaty-making that required familiarity with the enemy was ratification by oath. The use of oaths as a way of ensuring a treaty would be upheld necessitated some knowledge of the enemy’s religious tenets and is thus in a way recognition of the ‘other’’s belief at the supreme moment of distrust, when assurance was most needed. The texts of these oaths, extant for some of the Mamluk treaties, include a detailed list of the religious beliefs that the oath-taker is willing to abrogate should he fail to keep his promises, as well as a self-imposed penance of thirty pilgrimages. Clearly based on local usage, it was necessary to find a way to make an infidel’s oath valid. Only one of the extant oaths cited requires swearing on the Gospels, which was the normal Western procedure in oath-taking and belonged to the legal procedures of the Latin kingdom. For the Christians, swearing by touching a relic or a holy book served as a surety, as it made the saint a guarantor of the oath-taker’s good faith. But this gesture of touching a holy object had no meaning for the Muslims, for whom the verbal component of the oath was the main one. Even though Saladin and Richard signed a written document described in detail by Baha al-Din,103 this was not considered sufficient to ensure its endurance. The taking of oaths was an important part of peacemaking, and probably more binding than the written contract. Because both societies were religious, an oath ensuring the involvement of what they saw as holy – be it their tenets of belief or their saints – was considered necessary. But can we extrapolate from the detailed late thirteenth-century texts of oaths to the earlier oaths taken by crusaders and Muslims? No earlier evidence exists for the content of early twelfth-century oaths, but oath-taking on both sides is 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 247 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 248 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 mentioned in the late twelfth century, during the Third Crusade. Joinville (1250), however, describes the same kind of pre-formulated, written oaths as the late Mamluk ones in relating how Louis IX refused to swear because he would never agree to the clause inserted by renegades: ‘He should be as dishonoured as a Christian who denies God and his law and in contempt of him, spits on his cross and tramples it underfoot,’ and was only persuaded to change his mind by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who was tortured by the Muslims to this end and promised to take the sin upon himself in addition.104 The emirs’ oath, which included the clause, ‘they were to incur the same disgrace as a Saracen who has eaten pork’, was checked by Nicole d’Acre, ‘a priest who knew their language, and assured him that according to their law they could have devised no oaths that were stronger’.105 When there was a diplomatic will to compromise, a neutral form could be used, as in the following example from a Latin document from Genoa, clearly translated from Arabic: ‘In the name of God the Beneficent, the merciful. May God bless all the Prophets and Have Peace upon them.’106 This general opening, clearly formulated by a Muslim, could fit any prophets and all three monotheistic religions. The formal language of the oaths, while being a tool to bridge the suspicion between the sides, also made it necessary to learn the other side’s religious tenets. Yet another realm of peacemaking involving gestures was the concluding stage of negotiations. In the Christian setting, conflict resolution was achieved not only by one side admitting the other’s supremacy; the sign of peace was an act of friendly association – eating and drinking with the other party – and one consequence was the return of the letter of diffidatio. When war was over, it was over.107 Gestures of emotion were part and parcel of treaty-making and expected of the protagonists. In the West public tears were taken as a sign of sincerity,108 but they would probably have been misunderstood in the case of a religious adversary. In the thirteenth century King Alfonso el Sabio of Spain was able to provide a format for peacemaking that included not only the formal treaty but its accompanying gestures, especially the ‘kiss of peace’.109 Men sometimes agree to make peace with one another . . . know all persons who see this instrument, that . . . So and So . . ., and . . . So and So . . . have mutually agreed to keep peace with one another perpetually with regard to the disagreements, disputes, grudges, and insults, of which they have been guilty toward one another in word and in deed . . . And as a mark of the true love and concord which should be preserved between them, they kissed each other before me, notary public, and the witnesses whose names are subscribed to this instrument, and promised and agreed with one another that this peace and concord should forever remain secure, and that they would do nothing against it, or to contravene it, of themselves, or by anyone else either in word, deed or advice, under a penalty of a thousand marks of silver; and whether the penalty is paid or not, this peace and this agreement is to remain forever enduring and valid.110 248 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 249 PEACEMEKING Such a kiss had very little to do with emotions, but was an obligatory part of signing an agreement in the West. The kiss of peace was not part of Muslim cultural heritage, nor was it part of their gestural language. For the Muslims, any physical contact with a ruler was a special privilege. Usually not granted to an infidel mediator or envoy, the decision to grant it even to his co-religionists lay with the ruler.111 Thus, it did not become part of the shared Muslim–Christian repertoire of gestures in the Latin East. This was also the case for another significant gesture in the East, the khil’a – giving a garment or a horse invested with military meaning to a dependant to signify the transfer of authority and as a special sign of honour – which dates back to antiquity. This is illustrated by the biblical story of Esther, where Mordecai is endowed with a horse that the king has ridden and a garment he has worn, with a herald crying out before him: ‘This is what is done for the man whom the king desires to honour!’112 This may well be an example of ancient Persian usage. It was clearly used in the medieval Islamic world, but not in the Western lay community (although the investiture of clergy may retain something of this old gesture).113 But it was not a gesture of peace in the medieval West. However, in one of the first treaties between the crusaders and the local northern principalities, Godfrey of Bouillon bestowed on Omar of Azaz a hauberk and a golden helmet. From his perspective, this gesture was part of the feudal gesture of submission, where the recipient proves his inferiority by giving an oath of fidelity and receiving a present. For his part, Omar of Azaz probably accepted this ceremony as the bestowing of authority through a military outfit. Thus, in this case, the misunderstanding of the gesture’s meaning by the other side probably facilitated the treatymaking and its accompanying ceremony. Three generations later, after a long process of acculturation, Henry of Champagne asked Saladin to send him a garment that he would wear although it was against Western usage. At this stage, accepting the gift of a khil’a was understood by the Western side, but he was certainly cognizant of deviating from his own mores.114 The final stage of signing a treaty was its public proclamation by a herald. Witness Baha al-Din’s description of the proclamation of the treaty of 1192: ‘he ordered the herald to proclaim in the encampments and in the markets, “Listen all! Peace has been arranged. Any person from their lands who wishes to enter ours may do so and any person from our lands who wishes to enter theirs may also do so.”’115 The connection between trade and proclamation of peace was also described by William of Tyre after the surrender of Alexandria and the agreement that both Saladin and Amalric would leave Egypt in 1167: Then the herald proclaimed to each cohort and to the public in general that the fighting was at an end; a legal edict was also issued forbidding further molestation of the Alexandrians. As soon as peace was concluded, the people worn down by the hardship of the long-continued siege issued forth rejoicing . . . There was now abundant food, and 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 249 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 250 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 the resumption of trade was granted . . . The Christians, for their part, were no less eager to enter the city so long the object of their desires. Wandering freely about the streets . . . they collected material from which, on their return home, they might often weave stories for their friends and refresh the minds of their listeners with agreeable converse.116 The joyous reaction to the proclamation of peace was an important gesture in the West and part of the ceremony.117 In this case Saladin was ‘heralded by the blare of trumpets, the sounds of drums and of every kind of musical instruments, he advanced by bands of singing men . . . and crowds of shouting men at arms’. Noise and music were elements of warfare, as is revealed in both verbal descriptions and illustrations, but they were also part and parcel of the peace. The publicity was apparently supposed to show popular joy at victory and for the achievement of peace. It was indeed a performance, a staged arrangement of power.118 Thus, we have traced here the concepts of peace, the balance of power between the sides and how this influenced peacemaking, and the rich gestures and ceremony that accompanied Christian–Muslim negotiations for peace in the Latin East. Ultimately, despite the changes in practical peacemaking during the two centuries in the Latin East from oral agreements to more formal written ones, and mutual acculturation regarding the formal terms and the nonverbal gestures accompanying their implementation, peacemaking remained something that had to be explained and for which apology was necessary. In the Latin East the Christian side neither sought nor achieved its eschatological ideal of peace. From the Muslim perspective, its victory at the end of two centuries of struggle meant that peace had been attained. Notes 1 Al-Tabari’s Book of Jihad, Y.S. Ibrahim (tr.), Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2007, p. 79. 2 Averroes, Bidāyat al-Mudjtahid, in Rudolph Peters (tr.), Jihad in Mediaeval and Modern Islam, Religious Texts in Translation Series NISABA 5, Leiden: Brill, 1977, pp. 9–25, at 21. The compulsory nature of the jihad is founded on Koran 2:216. Jihad can be carried out by a limited number of individuals and cancelled for the remaining Muslims (Koran 9:112, 4:95). 3 Peters (tr.), Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam, p. 13: ‘It is only allowed to slay the enemy on the condition that aman has not been granted. There is no dissension about this among Muslims. There is controversy, however, concerning the question who is entitled to grant aman. The majority of scholars are of the opinion that free Muslim males are also entitled to grant it, but Ibn Madjishun maintains that in this case, it is subject to authorization of the Imam.’ See also Majid Khadduri (tr.), The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani’s Siyar, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966. 4 See Yvonne Friedman, Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, Leiden: Brill, 2002, ch. 2. 5 For an example, see al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk: The History of al-Tabari, Joel Kraemer (tr.), Albany: SUNY, 1989, pp. 168–9. For the Byzantine side, see John Haldon, ‘“Blood and Ink”: Some Observations on Byzantine Attitudes towards 250 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 251 PEACEMEKING 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Warfare and Diplomacy’, in Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (eds), Byzantine Diplomacy, Aldershot: Variorum, 1992, pp. 281–94. For the later period, see P.M. Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290), Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 3–15. M. Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 137. For ‘Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami’s Kitab al-Jihad, see Niall Christie, ‘Jerusalem in the Kitab Al-Jihad of ‘Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami’, Medieval Encounters 13, 2007, 209–21. W.B. Bishai, ‘Negotiations and Peace Agreements between Muslims and NonMuslims in Islamic History’, Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya, S.A. Hanna (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1972, pp. 50–63, esp. p. 51. Allaudin Samarrai, ‘Arabs and Latins in the Middle Ages: Enemies, Partners and Scholars’, in D.R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (eds), Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, pp. 137–45. Augustine, De civitate Dei contra paganos, lib. 19, cap. 11–12. Many historians have written about the connection between the Peace of God movement and the First Crusade. For a recent synthesis, see Tomaz Mastnak, Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Mastnak, Crusading Peace, pp. 10–21. See also Jean Flori, ‘De la paix de Dieu à la croisade? Un réexamen’, Crusades 2, 2003, 1–23, who emphasizes the economic reasons the Church had for promoting a peace that would guard its interests. Mastnak, Crusading Peace, p. 89. Jonathan Riley-Smith, ‘Crusading as an Act of Love’, History 65, 1980, 177–92. Penny Cole, ‘“O, God, the heathen have come into your inheritance” (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1095–1188’, in Maya Shatzmiller (ed.), Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria, Leiden: Brill, 1993, pp. 84–111. FC 411–12: ‘Eia Christi milites, confortamini, nihil metuentes . . . qoud si hic interieritis, beati nimirum eritis. Iamiamque aperta est vobis ianua regni caelestis. Si vivi victores remanseritis, inter omnes Christianos gloriosi fulgebitis, si autem fugere volueritis, Francia equidem longe est a vobis.’ Pope Gregory VIII put it simply, PL 202, Col. 1542: ‘Sive autem supervixerint, sive mortui fuerint’. For example, the descriptions of the slaughter at Ma’arat al-Numan (GF 79–80) and Jerusalem (GF 91–2). See B.Z. Kedar, ‘The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades’, Crusades 3, 2004, 15–75. Gerd Althoff, ‘Satisfaction: Peculiarities of the Amicable Settlement of Conflicts in the Middle Ages’, in Bernhard Jussen (ed.), Ordering Medieval Society: Perspectives on Intellectual and Practical Modes of Shaping Social Relations, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, pp. 270–84. Geoffrey Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 15, noted, however: ‘If rituals like supplication and peacemaking formed a common language throughout northern France, then different regions spoke different dialects.’ R.I. Burns and P.E. Chevedden, Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim–Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror, Leiden: Brill, 1999. Taeko Nakamura, ‘Territorial Disputes between Syrian Cities and the Early Crusades: The Struggle for Economic and Political Dominance’, in Beyond the Border: A New Framework for Understanding the Dynamism of Muslim Societies, Proceedings of an International Symposium, Kyoto, 8–10 October 1999, pp. 126–41. Shmuel Nussbaum, ‘Peace Processes between Crusaders and Muslims in the Latin East’, unpublished MA thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2002 (in Hebrew). 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 251 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 252 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 22 T. Asbridge, The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1098–1130, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000, pp. 48–9. 23 Asbridge, The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, pp. 49–50. 24 With respect to the remaining 39 per cent, it was impossible to determine which side initiated the agreement. Nakamura’s statistics substantiate this finding. He counted 58 agreements: 29 Muslim initiatives (50 per cent), 15 crusader initiatives, and 11 socalled mutual ones. Nakamura, ‘Territorial Disputes between Syrian Cities and the Early Crusades’. 25 Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 103–17; see also Emmanuel Sivan, L’Islam et la croisade, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1968, p. 44. 26 WT 1008: ‘humilibus satis quantum ad nos conditionibus, quodque nunquam antea dicitur contigisse, paribus legibus fedus initum est, nichil precipue nostris sibi in ea pactione reservantibus’. Translation by E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (trs), A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, p. 447. This shows the shift not only in balance of power, but in outlook. Saladin was after jihad and was not making truces from a position of weakness; he had an economic motivation for agreeing to a truce. 27 Frankish-initiated requests rose from 15 to 41 per cent. A total of thirty-four agreements are attested for this period. 28 See, among others, Baha al-Din Ibn Shadad, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, D.S. Richards (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 28–32; Fath, passim. 29 For example, the treaties of 1192, 1198, 1204 and 1229. 30 Of the sixteen peace-agreement-initiating requests, 38 per cent were Muslim-initiated and 31 per cent Frankish-initiated. 31 Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, pp. 43, 59–62, 70. 32 As opposed to only 8 per cent of Muslim-initiated requests. 33 Ronnie Ellenblum, Crusader Castles and Modern Histories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 149–64. 34 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 277. 35 WT 1061–2. 36 Note, for example, Qalqashandi’s remark when explaining the procedure of drafting a truce: ‘So the clerk may draw on them for the terms of truces with which he is perhaps unacquainted – God Most High keep us from needing them.’ Subh al-a’sha fi sina’at al insha 14, 71 cited in Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, p. 8. This implies that a truce was a necessary evil even when favourable to the Mamluks. 37 Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, p. 156. 38 It is a stroke of luck that al-Qalqashandi saved nine treaties in his book Subh al-a`sha fi sina`t al-insha and that other members of the Mamluk chancery kept the texts of other treaties (Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, pp. 1–11). Written treaties are mentioned by earlier chroniclers on both sides, but although some of the writers were part of the royal chancery, such as William of Tyre and Imad al-Din al-Isfahâni, they did not cite the treaties verbatim, apparently finding the text less important than the oaths and other relevant gestures. 39 For example, the treaty between Godfrey and Omar of Azaz (1098) and between Amalric and Shawar (1167). 40 The economic incentive, such as dividing crops from conquered areas (1111), was probably prominent in the early period. 41 Abu Ya`la Hamza Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhayl ta’rikh dimashq, H.F. Amedroz (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1908, p. 172. Translation from H.A.R. Gibb (tr.), The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, London: Luzac, 1932, pp. 109–10; Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, p. 396. For the economic background to treaties, see, for example, the 252 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 253 PEACEMEKING 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 treaties between Baldwin I and Tughtigin of Damascus in 1108–9, 1111 and 1113, sharing the income from territories held as condominiums, in Ibn al-Qalanisi, 92, 113, 147. WT 919–20, 923–5. WT 924. Translation from Babcock and Krey, A History of Deeds, II.375–8. M.A. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient: Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben von 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. B.Z. Kedar, ‘The Fourth Crusade’s Second Front’, in A.E. Laiou (ed.), Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences, Paris: Lethielleux, 2005, pp. 89–110. R.S. Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260, Albany: SUNY, 1977, pp. 133–4. For an extreme view, see Joshua Prawer, Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem, 2, Paris: Centre Nat. de la Recherche Scient., 1970, I.123. Witness the long debate over who was to blame for the diversion of the crusade in D.E. Queller and S.J. Stratton, ‘A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 6, 1969, 233–77. See also D.E. Queller and T.F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, p. x: ‘The overriding concern of the Latins was no longer making their way to the Holy Land, but consolidating and defending their newly born base in the Levant.’ Jamal al-Din Muhammad b. Salim Ibn Wasil (d. 1298), Mufarrij al-kurub fi akhbar bani ayyub, 3, Jamal al-Din al-Shyyal (ed.), Cairo: al-Idarat al-’Ammat li-Thiqafa, 1954 (Volumes 4 and 5 edited by S.A.F. Ashur and H.M. Rabi, Cairo: al-Idarat al-’Ammat li-Thiqafa, 1972–7); Francesco Gabrieli (tr.), Arab Historians of the Crusades, London: Routledge, 1969, pp. 269–71. Humphreys, From Saladin to the Mongols, pp. 195–204. Negotiations with Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah against al-Kamil had begun already under al-Muazzam in 1226, and in 1228 the Khwarizmians threatened Armenia and al-Nasir Daud tried to make an alliance with them. See also David Abulafia, Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor (3rd edn), London: Pimlico, 2002 [1998], pp. 182–90, who mainly follows Ibn Wasil’s account. J.H. Pryor, ‘The Crusade of Emperor Frederick II, 1220–29: The Implication of the Maritime Evidence’, The American Neptune 52, 1992, 113–32. I thank John Pryor for sending me his illuminating article. See below for the negotiations between Saladin and Richard the Lionheart. GF 66. RA 79, 81; AA 4, 44. Albert describes Peter as ‘small in size but great in worth’, but Kerbogha apparently did not appreciate his greatness. See J. France, Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 280. WT 905–6: ‘“Magnus princepses, nobilis et apud tuos clarissimus nec est de vestris principibus quispiam, si libera michi daretur optio, cui magis hoc meum communicare secretum cupiam et verbi huius participem constituere . . . Homo nobilis es, ut dixi, regi carus, sermone potens et opere: esto inter nos pacis mediator”.’ Translation from Babcock and Krey (trs), A History of Deeds, II.339–40. WT 907: ‘novissimam manum et finem placitum apposuit’. Richard of Devizes, The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes of the Time of King Richard the First, J.T. Appleby (ed. and tr.), London: Nelson’s Medieval Texts, 1963, p. 78: ‘Vel pacem perpetuam cum fratre meo uobis adquiram, uel ad minus indutias bonas et diuturnas’. Translation by Appleby. Richard of Devizes, pp. 82–3. Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, in Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 38, 2, London: Longman, 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 253 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 254 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 1864–5, I.429: ‘Harum formam induciarum in scripturam redactam, sibi recitatam, rex Ricardus annuit observandam.’ Translation from H.J. Nicholson (tr.), Chronicle of the Third Crusade, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 371–2. Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, pp. 230–2. Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, p. 193. Pierre Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 69. Chaplais, English Democratic Practice, p. 74. See, for example, the famous marginal illustration in the Lutrell Psalter showing them fighting face-to-face; and Debra Higgs, Saracens, Demons and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Arts, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 167. J.C. Schmitt, ‘The Language of Gestures in the West: Third to Thirteenth Centuries’, in J.N. Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg (eds), A Cultural History of Gesture, Ithaca: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 59–70, esp. p. 60. Volker Kapp (ed.), Die Sprache der Zeichen und Bilder: Rhetoric und nonverbale kommunikation in der frühen Neuzeit, Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1990, pp. 7–11. GF 71. AA 150–8. Richard of Devizes, pp. 46–7; Otto of St Blasien, Chronicon, A. Hofmeister (ed.), MGH Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum 46, Hanover: Hahn, 1912, p. 54. For the political consequences of hurling Leopold of Austria’s banner into the ditch, see J.P. Hoffman, The Social Politics of Medieval Diplomacy: Anglo-German Relations (1066–1307), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 138. WT 675: ‘occupant violenter, civibus qui ibi reperti sunt non parcentes, nisi forte qui ex eis verbo vel habitu vel quovis signo christiane professionis se esse sectatorem designaret’. Surrender of Acre to Philip Augustus and Richard the Lion-Hearted, king of England (BnF, FR 2813), fol. 238v. Al-Yunini, Dhayl mir’at al-zaman, 4, Hyderabad: Dar al-Maaref Osmania, 1955, II.669–70; Holt (tr.), Early Mamluk Diplomacy, p. 48. In her forthcoming book, Milka Rubin argues that the same happened during the Muslim conquest in the seventh century, when the capitulating Byzantine generals formulated the treaties of aman: that is, they knew how to formulate the treaties and presented the conquerors with ready-made documents. I thank Dr Rubin for sharing her thoughts with me before publication. WT 784L: ‘repositis armis et iunctis alternatim ad latus minibus signum exhibens reverentie’. See Yvonne Friedman, ‘Gestures of Conciliation: Peacemaking Endeavors in the Latin East’, in I. Shagrir, R. Ellenblum and J. Riley Smith (eds), In laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies for B.Z. Kedar, Crusades-Subsidia 1, 2008, 31–48. GF 96: ‘iactabant se in terram, non audentes erigere se contra nos. Nostri igitur illos detruncabant, sicut aliquis detruncat animalia ad macellum.’ Translation by Rosalind Hill. B.Z. Kedar, ‘The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades’, Crusades 3, 2004, 15–75. AA 130: ‘Hac crudelitate atrocissime necis stupefacte et pauide tenere puelle et nobilissim, uestibus ornari festinabant, Turcis se offerebant, ut saltem amore honestarum formarum accensi et placati, discant captiuis misereri’. Translation by S.B. Edgington. FC 257: ‘mulieribus in tentoriis eorum inventis, nihil aliud mali eis Franci fecerunt, excepto quod lanceas suas ventres earum infixerunt’. Fath, p. 34. B.D. Palmer, ‘Gestures of Greeting: Annunciations, Sacred and Secular’, in Clifford Davidson (ed.), Gesture in Medieval Drama and Art, Early Drama, Art and 254 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 255 PEACEMEKING 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Music Monograph Series 28, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2001, pp. 128–57. Geoffrey Koziol, Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 301. See also al-Tabari, Tarikh al-rusul wa’l muluk; David Waines (tr.), The History of Al-Tabari: The Revolt of the Zanj [Volume 36 of The History of Al-Tabari], Albany: SUNY, 1991, p. 101. Peter the Chanter, De penitentia, in Richard Trexler (ed.), The Christian at Prayer: An Illustrated Prayer Manual Attributed to Peter the Chanter (d. 1197), Binghamton: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1987, esp. pp. 54–5. Roberto Tottoli, ‘Bowing and Prostration’, Medieval Encounter 5.1, 1999, 99–111. Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, p. 70. Armenian satraps offering gifts to negotiate a treaty, William of Tyre, History of Outremer [Old French translation], Paris: Bibliothèque nationale, MS fr. 9084, fol. 42r. Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, p. 70. Holt, Early Mamluk Diplomacy, p. 70. The Templar of Tyre, ‘Chronique du Templier de Tyr’, in Les Gestes des Chîprois: Recueil de chroniques françaises écrites en orient aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles, Gaston Raynaud (ed.), Geneva: Zeller 1887, #346. Marcel Mauss, Essai sur le don, forme archaique de l’exchange, in Sociologie et Anthropologie, Ian Cunnison (tr.), as The Gift, London: Cohen and West, 1966 [1925]. A.-J.A. Bijsterveld, ‘The Medieval Gift as Agent of a Social Bonding and Political Power: A Comparative Approach’, in Esther Cohen and Mayke de Jong (eds), Medieval Transformations, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 123–56. Itinerarium peregrinorum, I.296: ‘septem camelos pretiosos et tentorium optimum’. Nicholson (tr.), Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 273. See also Ambroise, Estoire de la guerre sainte, 2, Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber (eds), Marianne Ailes (tr.), Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003, lines 7410–11. Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, pp. 155–6: According to Baha al-Din, the king said: ‘It is the custom of princes when they camp close to another to exchange gifts. I have something suitable for the sultan and beg permission to convey it to him.’ Al-Adil replied, ‘You may do that on condition that you accept a comparable present.’ The envoy then asked for fowls to feed the birds, and al-Adil joked, ‘So the king needs chicken and fowls and wishes to get them from us on this pretext.’ The conversation ended with al-Adil emphasizing that the initiative for talks came from the crusaders. Wolfgang Grape, The Bayeux Tapestry: Monument to a Norman Triumph, Munich: Prestel, 1994, p. 92. Usamah ibn Munqidh, Kitāb al-i’tibār; P.K. Hitti (tr.), An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah ibn-Munqidh, New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, p. 226: ‘When I was in the company of alAmir Muin- al-Din to ‘Akka to the king of Franks, Fulk, son of Fulk, we saw a Genoese . . . He brought with him a large molted falcon. Al-Amir Muin- al-Din asked the king to give him that falcon. The king took it with the bitch from the Genoese and gave them to al-Amir Muin- al-Din.’ Hitti (tr.), An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades, p. 226. Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS fr. 9081, fol. 16v: Godfrey and King of Hungary. Kitab al-Hadaya wa al-Tuhaf, G. al-Hijjawi al-Qaddumi (tr.) as Book of Gifts and Rarities, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs 29, Cambridge, MA: Harvard CMES, 1996. 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 255 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 256 YVONNE FRIEDMAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 98 WT 889: ‘“propterea aut nudam dabis, aut fictum aliquid et minus puritatis habens ex parti tua cogemur opinari.” Tunc demum invitus plurimum et quasi maiestati detrahens, subridens tamen, quod multum egre tulerunt Egyptii dexteram suam in manum domini Hugonis nudam prebuit, eundem Hugonem, pactorem formam determinantem, eisdem pene sillabis sequens, tenorem conventorum bona fide, sine fraude et malo ingenio se observaturum contestans.’ 99 Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, pp. 229, 230–1. 100 The opposite appears to have been true in Spain, where the Christians were the victors. As we have no extant written treaties from the period when the Franks clearly had the upper hand, it cannot be proved that such was the case in the East, although we have seen that in the sphere of nonverbal diplomatic language, the Latins did indeed impose their mores on the other side. 101 Cambridge: Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 138v. 102 William of Tyre, History of Outremer [Old French translation], fol. 42r; Abu Zayd before the governor of Mevr, Maqamat al-Hariri: Thirty-eighth Maqama, Leningrad: Oriental Institute, Academy of Sciences, MS S23. 103 Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, p. 229: ‘the draft treaty was drawn up, in which the conditions were recorded and peace for three years, from the date of the document, namely, Tuesday 21 Shaban 588’. (Imad al-Din, the secretary who actually drew up the treaty, has 21 Shaban (1 September 1192) for a period of three years and eight months. See Fath, p. 436.) 104 Jean de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis: credo et lettre à Louis X, N. de Wailly (ed. and tr.), Paris: Hachette, 1868, p. 160: ‘il voulait être aussi honni que le chrétien qui renie Dieu et sa loi, et qui en mépris de Dieu crache sur la Croix et marche dessus’. Translation by M.R.B. Shaw, Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, pp. 254–5. 105 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p. 160: ‘il voulaient être aussi honnis que le Sarrasin qui mange de la chair de porc . . . Nicole d’Acre, qui savait le sarrasinois, dit qu’ils ne les pouvaient faire plus forts selon leur loi’. 106 Michele Amari, Nuovi ricordi arabici su la storia di Genova, Genova: Tipografica del R. Istituto sordo-muti, 1878, Doc. I, 1–5, pp. 45–75. See also Samarrai, ‘Arabs and Latins in the Middle Ages’, pp. 140–1. 107 Otto Brunner, Land and Lordship, Howard Kaminsky and James van Horn Melton (trs), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, pp. 63, 90. 108 Nicolas Offenstadt, ‘The Rituals of Peace during the Civil War in France, 1409–19: Politics and the Public Sphere’, in Tim Thornton (ed.), Social Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century, Thrupp: Sutton, 2000, pp. 88–100. 109 For the kiss of peace in Western European treaty-making, see Kiril Petkov, The Kiss of Peace: Ritual, Self and Society in the High and Late Medieval West, Leiden: Brill, 2003. 110 Alfonso X ‘el sabio’, Las Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso el sabio, Madrid: La Imprenta Real, 1807; translation by S.P. Scott (tr.), Las Siete Partidas, Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1931, 3.13.82. 111 Baha al-Din saw Saladin’s departure from this behaviour as a special sign of modesty: ‘Whenever the sultan shook hands with someone he would not let go his hand until that person had taken the initiative to do so’ (The Rare and Excellent History, p. 35). 112 Esther 6:9. 113 G.R.G Hambly, ‘From Baghdad to Bukhara, from Ghazna to Delhi: The Khil’a Ceremony in the Transmission of Kingly Pomp and Circumstance’, in Stewart Gordon (ed.), Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture, The New Middle Ages, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 95–135. 114 `Izz al-Din `Ali b. Abi al-Karm Muhammad Ibn al-Athir al-Jaziri (1160–1233), al-Kamil fi al-ta’rikh, ‘Umar al-Tadmuri (ed.), Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-’Arabf, 2001; 256 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION Crusades-01-p.qxd 29/6/10 13:44 Page 257 PEACEMEKING 115 116 117 118 translated by D.S. Richards (tr.) as The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period, Part 2, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, p. 397: ‘You know that wearing a robe and a tall bonnet we hold to be shameful, but I shall wear them from you out of love for you.’ Baha al-Din, The Rare and Excellent History, p. 231. See also Nicolas Offenstadt, Faire la paix au Moyen Age: discours et gestes de paix pendant la guerre de Cent Ans, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007, pp. 197–201, 240–5. WT 907: ‘Indicitur ergo voce preconia cohortibus singulis et omnibus generaliter preliandi finis et per legem edictalem ne Alexandrinis inferatur molestia interdicitur. Egrediuntur igitur concessa pace letantes qui diuturna fuerant obsidione macerati angustiasque . . . inventa etiam alimentorum copia et commerciorum libertate permissa . . . nostri quoque non segnius urbem ingrediuntur optatam et liberis discursibus vias . . . colligunt unde ad propria reversi suis aliquando texere possint historias et audientium animos gratis confabulationibus recreare’. Translation from Babcock and Krey (trs), A History of Deeds, II.341–2. Offenstadt, ‘Rituals of Peace’, pp. 88–100. Jacoba Van Leeuwen, Symbolic Communication in Late Medieval Towns, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia Series I, Studia 37, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006, p. viii. 1 2 3 4 511 6 7 8 9 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 257 TAYLOR & FRANCIS FIRST PROOFS - NOT FOR PUBLICATION