Buddhist theory of momentariness and yogipratyakṣa

Indo-Iranian Journal  () – brill.nl/iij Buddhist eory of Momentariness and Yogipratyaksa ˙ Jeson Woo Dongguk University, S-Korea jwoo@dongguk.edu Abstract e Yoginirnayaprakarana of Jñānaśrı̄mitra (ca. –) is considered unique ˙ among Buddhist śāstras˙in dealing exclusively with yogipratyaksa, the cognition of yogis. is paper examines the section of this text, which explains ˙ this cognition in the light of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (ksanikatva). It consists of a Sanskrit critical edition and English translation, as well˙as˙ a detailed annotation added to the translation. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, . Keywords Jñānaśrı̄mitra; cognition; meditation; yogipratyaksa; Buddhist theory of momen- tariness ˙ Introduction In Buddhist thought, yogipratyaksa arises upon the culmination of intensive meditation upon a true object. ˙is true object is the Buddha’s teaching, often the Four Noble Truths; it never undergoes any change. However, there yogis encounter a problem: even though the object of yogipratyaksa is an unchangeable truth, a yogi’s mind is ever changing moment by moment. ˙ As a result, the practice of meditation (bhāvanā) is unable to be intensified. Moksākaragupta, one of the last Buddhist logicians in medieval India, ˙ two controversies regarding the impossibility of attaining yogi- introduced pratyaksa, given the Buddhist position of momentariness: (i) how can the mind, ˙which is momentary, remain fixed upon one object? and (ii) when the mind is momentary, how is the comparative superiority (viśesa) of a ˙ © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden,  DOI: 10.1163/001972411X573280  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – yogi’s cognition attained?1 It is crucial for the later Indian Yogācārins to demonstrate that even if cognitions are momentary, the vividness of the object continues to intensify during the course of meditation. Without solving this problem, they cannot account for the validity of yogipratyaksa. Neither can they prove a Buddha’s omniscience (sarvajña), which is a major ˙ characteristic of this cognition. e renowned th century Buddhist philosopher Jñānaśrı̄mitra ad- dresses the problem of the impossibility of intensification given in the theory of momentariness and attempts to provide a complete solution to this problem. In his Yoginirnayaprakarana, he demonstrates how, for the ˙ duration of meditation, a distinguishing ˙ quality (viśesa) is added to the ˙ continuum of a yogi’s cognitions and continues to be intensified via a causal relationship between the preceding and the following moments. Obviously, such a solution is vital to the understanding of meditative intensification and the mind of a yogi in general. e aim of this paper is to translate and interpret the section of the Yoginirnayaprakarana, which explicitly addresses the concept of yogi- pratyak˙sa in the context ˙ of the theory of momentariness. e manuscript of ˙ this section corresponds to J ,–,. It has been preserved in the Zhalu temple in Tibet and was photographed first by R. Sāṅkrtyāyāna and ˙ then by G. Tucci.2 In this close reading of the text, I present Jñānaśrı̄mitra’s attempt to harmonize meditative practice and the Buddhist ontological structure, particularly within the strict confines of the doctrine of momen- tariness. Translation3 e Possibility of Meditation Trilocana’s Argument J 339,23 [Objection:]4 And it is [said]: moreover, the practice of meditation (abhyāsa) is to repeatedly keep in mind the object of meditation which is 1) Kajiyama (, p. ). 2) I would like to thank E. Franco who kindly gave me an electronic file of Tucci’s pho- tos. ey allowed me to read the text much easier and more clearly than the copy of Sāṅkrtyāyana’s photos, upon which I have based my reading so far. 3) In˙ this translation, page and line indications refer to J. For instance, J , indicates the page  and line  of J. 4) is is a part of Trilocana’s objection in the Nyāyaprakı̄rnakā. For details, see SS , ˙  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () –  a real thing (vastu).5 It is admitted that this strengthened [practice of medi- tation] performed by an ascetic through [his] penance with attention, for a long duration of time and without interruption, produces the vividness for a conceptual cognition whose image is [otherwise] unclear.6 However, that is unable to be asserted for those who advocate the doctrines of momen- tariness and selflessness [i.e., the Buddhists]. To be more explicit, when a certain kind of conceptual cognition which grasps the object of meditation is produced, that [very cognition] ceases without a persisting trace (anvaya). When that [cognition] has ceased, if such a cognition arises again, it is produced anew. In this way, a newly produced [cognition] cannot have a distinguishing quality (viśesa) even if ˙ [a yogi engages in meditation] for a thousand kalpas!7 For this reason, there is no samskāra produced by this [always new cognition] in the practice 8 ˙ of meditation. By means of this [rationale just outlined], the practice of meditation which produces a distinct cognition [i.e., yogipratyaksa] is explained. Indeed, how can a previous cognition which has ceased without ˙ –,. Ratnakı̄rti identifies Trilocana’s name in SS ,: trilocanas tu nyāyaprakı̄rnake prāha. Trilocana here argues that the process of meditation is impossible for Buddhists ˙ because they hold the position of momentariness. SS ,–: api ca bhāvyasya vastunah punah punaś cetasi niveśanam abhyāsah. sa ca brahmacaryena tapasā sādaram dı̄rghakālam ˙ ˙ nirantaram āsevito drdhabhūmir asphu˙tākārasya vikalpasya sphu ˙ tābhatvajanana ˙ istah. sa ksa- ˙ nikatvanairātmyavādinā˙ ˙ dradhayitum ˙aśakyah. tathā hi bhāvyagrāhı̄ ˙ ˙˙ ˙utpannas yādrśo vikalpa ˙ ˙tādrśa eva niranvayam nirudhyate.˙ tasmimś ca˙niruddhe punah punar utpadyamāna ˙ h pratyayas tād˙rśa evāpūrva utpadyate. ˙ ˙ tad anena paryāye ˙ ’py apūrvotpatter aviśe na kalpasahasre ˙ sān na ˙ tajjanya h samskāro ’bhyāsa utpadyate. etena viśi ˙ stavijñānotpādo ’bhyāso vyākhyātah.˙ niran- ˙ ˙ m hi pūrvapūrvavijñānam katham˙˙ uttarāvasthāntaram viśistam janayet. vayaniruddha ˙ sar- ˙ vathā kramabhāvibhi ˙ h pratyayair avasthitam ˙ eva rūpam śakyam samskartum. ˙˙ ˙ 5) NBT ,: bhūtasya ˙ bhāvanā punah punaś cetasi viniveśanam. ˙ ˙ ˙See also Kajiyama (, ˙ ˙ p. ): “Meditation practice (bhāvanā) means to imagine (samāropa) [an object] repeatedly in the mind.” 6) e three qualifications of meditation, “with attention,” “without interruption,” and “for a long duration of time” are shared between both Buddhist and Hindu traditions. See YS I. : sa tu dı̄rghakālanairantaryasatkālāsevito drdhabhūmih; YBh ,–: dı̄rghakālāsevitah, ˙˙ nirantarāsevitah, satkālāsevitah, tapasā brahmacarye na ˙vidyayā śraddhayā ca sampādita˙ h ˙ ˙ ˙ satkāravān, drdhabhūmir bhavati; TSP2 , f. and NK , f.: yā sādara- ˙ ˙˙ nairantaryadı̄rghakālaviśe sanā bhāvanā sā … 7) e distinguishing quality˙ ˙ (viśesa) is used as the synonym of atiśaya, a fresh quality which is added to an effect when a cause˙is associated with its co-operating causes (sahakārin). See HB II, p. , n.  and Woo (, p. ). 8) Samskāra is a mental state that arises as the result of an ordinary or meditative activity. ˙ (, p. ) translates it as “one’s unconscious, latent conditioning.” It is often Lusthaus synonymous with vāsānā which is translated “imprint,” “tendency,” “latency” and so on. See Bronkhorst (, pp. –). Samskāra here is a kind of force left by the practice of ˙ meditation. It makes a yogi’s mind concentrate upon a certain object.  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – a persisting trace produce a following special [cognition] of higher and higher state?9 In every case, a form (rūpa) which is in fact enduring can be enhanced by successive cognitions. Refutation of Trilocana’s Argument J 340,4 [Reply:]10 is is incorrect. For other than contact with a violent deity, there is no cause for establishing the rule [of the opponent] that the first cognition which grasps the object of meditation and ceases without any persisting trace must produce a cognition exactly like itself. [Objection:] It is because of momentariness. [Reply:] Momentariness is incompatible with duration, not with the production of something that is not the same. at is, as this previous [moment] which has ceased without a persisting trace produces another similar moment, so if it produces another moment which includes a minute distinguishing quality on the basis of a minute difference of a causal com- plex (samagrı̄), then what is the problem? For it is not the case that like you, a thing too is adverse to momentariness. J 340,9 So too there is in the case of [the practice of meditation] the differ- ence in a causal complex to a minute degree [moment by moment]. To be more explicit, [a yogi] who is engaged in meditation in order to eliminate the suffering of samsāra has a cognition which is in fact different from the mere repetition of˙ “all conditioned things are momentary.” As long as this [cognition] also produces a special [quality] just greater than an atom, it eventually obtains an effect through the gradual sequence [of meditation], as in the case of a seed.11 9) In PV, Dharmakı̄rti introduces an objection that one cannot change his nature com- pletely through the practice of meditation (abhyāsa). e examples in that objection are “jumping” and “heating water” (PV II.: abhyāsena viśese ’pi laṅghanodakatāpavat, svabhā- ˙ vātikramo mā bhūd iti cet). e height one can jump is enhanced through practice, but only up to a certain point; water can be heated only so much before it begins to evaporate. See also Franco (, pp. –) and Taber (, p. , n. ). Kamalaśı̄la also introduces the same kind of objection (TSP1 ,–: parijñāne ’pi vā laṅghanādı̄va vyavasthitotkarsatayā janmāntarāsambhavena vā bhāvanāyā atyantaprakarsam asambhāvayan nābhiyogavān˙ bha- vati). Ratnakı̄rti summarizes this objection in SS ,: ˙ tasya vyavasthitagunatvāt. 10) SS ,–: tad apy asamgatam. tathā hi yādrśa eva bhāvyagrāhı̄ pratyaya ˙ h prathamo niranvayo niruddhas tādrśa evāpara utpadyata iti niyamaniścayakāranam na ˙ kiñcid asti ˙ ˙ candadevatāsparśād anyat.˙ ksanikatvād iti cet. nanu ksanikatvam sthāyitayā ˙ ˙ virudhyate na ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ visadrśotpādena. tad dhi prācı̄nam niranvayanirodhe yathā sadrśaksanāntaram ārabhate tathā ˙ svahetugatasāmarthyayogāt ˙ kāryotpādānumeyād ˙ ˙ s˙tam ksanāntaram utpā- yadi viśesaleśaviśi ˙ ˙˙ m dayati, tadā na kācit ksatih. na hi bhavata iva bhāvasyāpi ksanikatāyā ˙ pradve ˙ ˙ so nāma. 11) e production from ˙ ˙a seed is a stock example for explaining ˙ ˙ causality ˙ ˙ later Indian in the Yogācāra school. For details, see Katsura () and Woo ().  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () –  However, if attachment (vyāsaṅga) and the like are inserted into the J 340,12 middle [of the practice of meditation], there would be, in fact, degrees of delay and so on. It is said in the Bhāsya: ˙ If samskāra gets stronger, the distraction (vyāksepa) is removed. ˙ distraction gets stronger, samskāra is pushed If the ˙ away.12 ˙ [Objection:] If [a cognition-moment] perishes without a persisting J 340,17 trace (anvaya), then how does the second [cognition-moment] obtain a dis- tinguishing quality (viśesa) since the distinguishing quality of the previous [cognition]-moment does ˙ not transfer over? [Reply:] So, then, there could not be such a distinguishing quality, even given a different causal complex, because it does not transfer over in that case.13 erefore, even though this distinguishing quality does not exist [at the first cognition-moment], it does arise through the power of causes. is is the same here. [Objection:] en, this [second distinguishing quality] would be the same as that [first distinguishing quality]. [Reply:] is is not the case because one cannot prevent the distinguish- ing quality of a cause from [producing] the distinguishing quality of [its corresponding] effect. To be more explicit, the first distinguishing quality is produced from [cognition] which does not have a distinguishing quality like that. However, this [second distinguishing quality] is produced from [cognition] which has a distinguishing quality like that.14 So, how could [those two] be the same? 12) PVBh II.: samskārasya balı̄yastvād vyāksepasya nivartanam, vyāksepasya balı̄yastve ˙ samskārah syāt parāṅmukha h. e deeper a yogi ˙practices meditation, ˙ the ˙stronger samskāra ˙ becomes. ˙ It makes his mind˙ concentrated. On the other hand, the deeper a yogi is attached ˙ to an object, the stronger the distraction (vyāksepa) becomes. It makes his mind agitated. See PVBh ,–: yadā balı̄yān atyantam bhavati˙samskāras tadā vyāksepe ’pi na vyākulatā cetaso ˙ tadā vidyamāno yadā tu balı̄yān bhavati vyākulabhāvas ˙ ˙ na svakāryam anurūpam ’pi samskāro samvedanam janayati. ˙ ˙ 13)˙ Here, a˙ different casual set refers to a seed, soil, sunshine, etc. which are necessary for producing a sprout. If the opponent’s argument were true, even the set of a seed, soil, etc. would not produce a sprout. But actually they do. 14) Prior to the practice of meditation, a yogi’s mind does not have any special quality that is distinguished from ordinary people. When the yogi meditates on the Four Noble Truths, however, his cognition-moment C1 produces the first distinguishing quality V1 in the next cognition-moment C2; on the basis of V1, C2 produces the second distinguishing quality V2 in C3. In this way, the distinguishing quality is intensified up to the stage of culmination (paryanta). For the process of meditation, see Steinkellner () and Woo (, pp. – ).  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – Yet a persisting trace (anvaya) is totally illogical.15 is is because J 340,22 there is no operation (vyāpāra) of another cause with regard to the part which is transferred over from that cause. is operation itself must pertain to something that did not exist before.16 us, that whose part ceases does not continue [as it is]; and that which continues has no cessation [of part].17 en, how is cessation or production possible [in the theory of cessation] with a persisting trace (sānvaya)?18 [Objection:] It is possible because [the persisting trace] exists simultane- ously with that [which has the trace, i.e. the cause].19 15) See VN I ,–: athāsty anayor vibhāgo na kaścid virodhah, kevalam sānvayau bhāvasya ˙ janmavināśāv iti na syāt, yasmād yasyānvayo na tasya janmavināśau ˙ ca tau na tasyān- yasya vayah, and Much’s translation VN II ,–: Wenn es aber einen Unterschied zwischen den ˙beiden gibt, liegt kein Widerspruch vor; bloss könnte (dann) nicht sein, dass Entstehen und Vergehen des Dinges [in dem Ding dem Wesen nach] erhalten bleiben; denn bei dem (Ding), dem das [als Kraft aufzufassende] Erhaltenbleiben zukommt, gibt es kein Entstehen und Vergehen, und bei dem (Ding), dem diese beiden zukommen, gibt es das Erhaltenbleiben nicht. 16) ere are two theories of cessation (vināśa or nirodha) in Indian philosophy. One is that cessation is not total but a trace persists (sānvayavināśavāda). e other is that cessation is total without any remaining trace (niranvayavināśavāda). For instance, as long as the flame of a lamp keeps burning, there is cessation with a persisting trace of the individual flames. is is sānvayavināśavāda. On the other hand, when the lamp is extinguished for good, it is cessation without a persisting trace. is is niranvayavināśavāda. e two respectively correspond to the theory that there is the effect in the cause (satkāryavāda) and the theory that there is no effect in the cause (asatkāryavāda). Sānvayavināśavādins may argue that the cause leaves behind some element of it persisting after it ceases. at is, the cause ceases from the moment T1 to the moment T2; yet its persisting part A still exists in T2. e effect which co-exists with the part A arises from the moment T2 to the moment T3. In this case, however, it is not possible for the cause to produce A. Neither is possible for any other cause to produce it. e reason is that the part A has already existed regardless of their causal activity (vyāpāra). On the other hand, the effect has to be something that did not exist before. e real causal activity only pertains to something completely new. Otherwise, the effect would have come to being even before its production. 17) It is illogical to say that the one cause would be in part existent and in part non-existent. e Sānvayavināśavādins’ idea that the cause ceases with a persisting part is completely wrong. ere is no way for them to explain the process of cessation and production. 18) “at which has a persisting trace” (sānvaya) can refer to the cause or the effect. For Sānvayavināśavādins, the cause in a moment consists of both the part which will cease and the part which will persist in the next moment; the effect consists of both the part which is left from the cause and the part which arises anew. It is impossible to say that the cause is completely destroyed because some part of it still persists in the following moment. Neither is it possible to say that the effect is newly produced since some part of it has been existing from the previous moment. 19) Sānvayavināśavādins may argue that cessation or production is possible in their theory  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () –  [Reply:] [Not so,] for there is an unwanted consequence of positing that even the ether (ākāśa) would have a persisting trace, since [a cause] which produces an effect over the mere consecutive succession of two moments cannot be one and the same thing [i.e., it is differentiable].20 But in the case where there is the destruction of a pot and the production of potsherds, for their interval [the simultaneity of existence] cannot be excluded for the pot and the potsherds.21 J 341,1 e [opponent’s] shouting, which is [all that] remains, is his only way. It is contrary to a valid cognition. us, what is the use of it? ere is no connection between waxing and waning with regard to ātman, which is fixed like the vernal equinox. So, [the opponent’s view] is only chewed repeatedly.22 Existence of Distractions Trilocana’s Argument J 341,3 [Objection:]23 As it is said: furthermore, the practice of meditation is undertaken for the purpose of removing distractions (viksepa) in order to ˙ on the ground that since the persisting part and the cause co-exist in the same moment, they can co-operate to produce the effect in the next moment. 20) Note that the Sānvayavināśavādins’ stance on a thing’s causal nature consists precisely in its having parts i.e., being differentiable. If simultaneous existence were the condition for being the cause, even the ether which simultaneously exists alongside a thing in a given moment T1 would be included in the cause for the persisting part of the thing in the next moment T2. As far as the ether becomes a cause, however, an absurd consequence follows that it would be divided into the ceasing and the persisting parts. is undermines the nature of the ether as “undifferentiated and partless.” 21) e destruction of a pot is the cause of the production of potsherds. e destruction of a pot is the process of its being destroyed from the moment T1 to the moment T2. e production of potsherds is the process of their being produced from the moment T2 to the moment T3. For the interval of its destruction and their production, i.e. T2, the pot and the potsherds simultaneously exist. 22) e later Indian Yogācārins have gone over this kind of argument many times. For instance, see VN I ,–,. 23) is passage is a part of Trilocana’s objection in the Nyāyaprakı̄rnakā (especially see SS ,–: kim ca cittam ekāgram vyavasthāpayitum viksepatyāgārtham˙ abhyāso ’nusthı̄yate. ˙ m viksiptam ˙cittam asti, pratyarthaniyatatayā na ca ksanikavādinā ˙ ˙ ˙˙ sarvasya cittaikāgratvāt). See also˙ SS ˙ ,: yac˙ ceda˙m kim ˙ cetyādinā ksanikatve cittam aviksiptam āveditam. e basic idea of this objection has ˙already ˙ appeared˙ in˙ YBh ,–,: ˙yasya tu pratyarthaniyatam pratyayamātram ksanikam ca cittam, tasya sarvam eva cittam ekāgram nāsty eva viksiptam ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ and YBh ,–: pratyarthaniyatatvād ekāgra eveti viksiptacittānupapattih. See Bühnemann ˙ (, p. , n. ). ˙ ˙  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – concentrate the mind. For the proponent of the theory of momentariness, however, the mind is not distracted because each and every [mind] is focused when fixed upon a [single] object. Refutation of Trilocana’s Argument J 341,5 [Reply:] at too is irrelevant. It is proven through experience that some minds trend towards the truth (tattva), some have it backwards, others are preoccupied with mere actions and the like.24 Among them, every mind without exception which is turned away from truths such as selflessness is said to be distracted. However, by the procedure mentioned [before],25 given that a [mind] which is solely focused on the truth is [properly] concentrated, what is not adequate? For we must certainly postulate a single [mind] that engages multiple objects.26 Also, since a mental image of “I” is separate prior to the direct realization of the truth, the [mind] in everyday life is also [distracted].27 Due to this [mind],28 it is not said that the practice of meditation on the path is impossible, saying “for me in fact there will be the eradication of flaws (dosa).” is is because the thought (samkalpa) on what should be obtained ˙ a person to action (pravartaka) ˙in every case.29 If that is so, even stirs 24) Some people pursue the truth; some people act on the basis of a wrong view (drsti). On the other hand, others do not care about the way things are. ey are only concerned ˙˙˙ with what they must do, such as the required ritual actions. 25) e procedure mentioned before refers to J , ff. According to Ratnakı̄rti, it is the process of meditation. See SS ,–: tad apy asādhu, nairātmyāditattvaparāṅmukhasya sarvasyaiva viksiptatvāt, bhāvanābalena tattvasāksātkārinah samāhitatvāt. ˙ 26) In the previous ˙ objection, J . f., Trilocana has˙ insisted ˙ that since each and every mind is fixed upon a single object, there is no distracted mind in the position of momen- tariness. His intention is to say that for Buddhists, the practice of meditation is useless. In the later Indian Yogacāra school, however, this is not acceptable. For a mind is not that which is fixed upon only a single object. e mind can have multiple mental images in one and the same moment. For more, see Woo (, p. , n. ). e distraction of the mind is a separate issue from determining whether it has one object or multiple objects. 27) Consciousness (vijñāna) consists of subjectivity (ātman) and objectivity (dharma). Due to their usages (upacāra), there are attachments to them, respectively called ātmagrāha and dharmagrāha; and again since there are these attachments, there are obstacles of jñeyāvarana and kleśāvarana which lead sentient beings to the ocean of sufferings. ese obstacles make ˙ ˙ the mind of ordinary people distracted. For details, see Kochumuttom (, pp. –). 28) I insert “mind” into this passage on the basis of SS ,–: atha ca tattvasāksāt- kriyālābhāt grāhakākārāvagrahasambhavāc ca vyāvahārikam api viksiptam asti cittam, ˙yato ˙ mamaiva dosaksayo bhāvı̄ti mārgābhyāsaprav rttir abhyāhateti. ˙ ˙ ˙ 29) A yogi practices meditation in order to˙ remove flaws which take place on the basis of the wrong notions of subject and object. See also SS ,–: paramārthatah prāpyādı̄nām abhāve ’pi tatsamkalpasyaivānādyavidyāprabhāvitasya sarvatra pravartakatvāt.˙ ˙  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () –  in the absence of right knowledge, what is to prevent [the person] from practicing [meditation]? [Objection:] en, in the same way, how can there be the practice [of meditation] by one who ascertains momentariness and the like through inference?30 [Reply:] It is because, since certainty is not compatible with a mind which is subservient to the imprints (vāsanā) of beginningless ignorance, the workings of ordinary life are in fact not consistent with certainty.31 For this very reason, it is said in the Vārttika that even when the path of vision (darśanamārga) is obtained, the need for the path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga) should be admitted.32 erefore, after obtaining the result [of the path of vision], meditation is practiced solely because of ignorance. And omniscience is established through the practice of meditation [on the Noble Truth of Path].33 Sanskrit Text34 yac cedam, api ca bhāvyasya vastunah punah punaś cetasi niveśanam J 339,23 ˙ ˙ abhyāsah. sa ca brahmacaryena tapasā sādaradı̄rghakālanirantaram āsevito ˙ ˙ drdhabhūmir asphutākārasya vikalpasya35 sphutābhatvajanana istah. sa ca ˙ ˙nikanairātmyavādinā ksa ˙ dradhayitum aśakyah. ˙ ˙˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ tathā ˙ ˙ hi bhāvyagrā(64a1)hı̄ yādrśo vikalpa utpannas tādrśa eva niranvayam nirudhyate. tasmimś ca niruddhe ˙ punar utpadyamāna˙h pratyayas tādrśa ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 30) e opponent argues that for a person who has right knowledge through inference, the mind is no longer distracted and so the practice of meditation is useless. Cf. TSP1 ,–: saiva tādrśı̄ bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yā tathābhūtapratyaksajñānaphalā bhaved. See also Woo˙ (, pp. –). ˙ 31) A person who only has the knowledge of momentariness through inference has not firmly made it his own. For him there is no real internalization of the truth. He acts without certainty, with a mind possessed by ignorance. is is the reason why the practice of meditation is necessary. 32) I cannot identify this idea in Dharmakı̄rti’s Pramānavārttika. Of course, this is not new in Buddhist texts. For instance, see AKBh ,–:˙darśanamārge hy anājñātam ājñātum ˙ pravrttah. bhāvanāmārge nāsty apūrvam ājñeyam tad eva tv ājānāti śesānuśayaprahānārtham; ˙ ˙ ˙ AKV ,–: darśanamārgo darśanamārgānatarasya bhāvanāmārgasyāśaiksamārgasya ca ˙ sabhāgahetur iti trayānām. ˙ 33) SS ,–: ata˙ eva mārgasatyābhyāsāt siddhah sarvajñah. 34) e abbreviations which I use for making a Sanskrit ˙ ˙ are as follows: edition […] uncertain reading {…} correction added by a different hand, usually at the top or bottom of the page w.c. without correspondence. 35) °{sphutākārasya vikalpasya} Ms. ˙  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – evāpūrva utpadyate. tad anena paryāyena kalpasahasre ’py apūrvotpatter aviśesān na tajjanyah samskāro ’bhyāsa˙ utpadyate. etena viśistavijñānot- pādo˙’bhyāso vyākhyāta ˙ h.˙ niranvayaniruddham hi pūrvavijñāna ˙˙m katham uttarottarāvasthāntaram˙viśistam janayet. sarvathā ˙ kramabhāvibhi˙h pratya- ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ yair avasthitam eva rūpam śakyam samskartum iti. ˙ J 340,4 tad etad asamgatam. ˙ na hi˙ yād˙rśa eva bhāvyagrāhı̄36 pratyayah pra- ˙ thamo niranvayaniruddhas tādrśa evāpara ˙ ˙ utpadyata iti niyamaniścayakā- ranam kiñcid asti candadevatāsparśād ˙ anyat. ˙ksa˙nikatvād iti cet.˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ksanikatvam sthāyitayā virudhyate, na visadrśotpādena. tad dhi nanu ˙ ˙ prācı̄nam ˙niranvayanirodhi yathā sadrśam ksanāntaram ˙ ārabhate,37 tathā ˙ yadi sāmagrı̄bhedaleśato ˙ ˙sanāntaram viśesaleśaniveśik ˙ ˙ utpādayati tadā kā ˙ ˙ ˙ ksatih. na hi bhavata iva bhāvasyāpi ksanikatāyām38 pradvesah. ˙ asti cehāpi leśena sāmagrı̄bheda˙ h.˙ tathā hi˙ ksanikāh˙ sarvasa ˙ J 340,9 ˙ mskārā ity anuvādamātrāpeksayā samsāraduhkhaksayārthitayā bhāvanāyām˙ abhi- ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ prayujyamānasya39 viśi ˙ sta eva˙ samkalpa ˙ h. so ˙ ’pi viśistam anumātrayātirik- ˙˙ tam janayati yāvat taratamādikrame ˙ nāntimāt ˙ ˙˙ h, ˙bı̄jādivat. phalalābha ˙J 340,12yadi tu vyāsaṅgādayo madhyam ˙ adhyāsı̄ran, mandatāditāratamyam ˙ eva syāt. yad bhāsyam, ˙ samskārasya balı̄yastve vyāksepasya40 nivartanam | ˙ vyāksepasya balı̄yastve samskāra ˙ h syāt parāṅmukhah || iti. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ J 340,17 niranvayavināśe tarhi prācı̄naviśesāsamkramanād dvitı̄yasya kuto viśesalābhah. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ m tarhi eva ˙ sāmagryantare ’pi tādrśā viśesena na41 bhavitavyam, asya tatrāsamkramanāt. tasmād asann api˙ sa viśe ˙ ˙ h kāranabalād udapādi42 ˙ sa ˙ ˙ yathā, tathāyam api. ˙ ˙ ˙ samānas tarhi tenāyam iti cet. na, hetuviśesāt phalaviśesasya durnivāratvāt. tathā hi prathamo viśesas tādrgviśesavināk ˙ rtād utpanna ˙ h. ayam tu tādrśaviśesasacivād iti katham ˙sa- ˙ mānah syāt. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 36) yādrśa [eva] bhāvyagrāhı̄ J : yādrśa {eva} bhāvya eva grāhı̄ Ms. 37) sadr˙saksanānta{[ra]m ā}rabhate ˙Ms : (Franco reads Ms sadrsaksanāntarabhate.) 38) ˙˙ ˙ ˙ m Ms. ksanikat[ā]yā ˙˙ ˙ ˙ 39) ˙ ˙ ˙ °prayujya° J : °prajya° Ms. 40) (Franco reads Ms vyākhyeyasya.) 41) w.c. na J. 42) (Franco reads Ms udayādi.)  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () –  J 340,22 anvayas tu vicārāsaha eva. yo hi hetutah samkrānto bhāgas tatra nāparasya hetor vyāpārah. ya eva vyāpārah sa ˙pūrvam ˙ asann eva. evam ˙ ˙ yadaṅgasya nirodho na tasya sthitih, sthitimataś ca na nirodhah. tat katham ˙ sānvaye nirodhajanmanı̄. ˙ ˙ ˙ tena sahavrtter iti cet. ākāśenāpi ˙sānvayatvakalpanāprasaṅgāt, ubhayakālānuvrttimātrajanyas- ya43 sahārthasyābhāvāt. tac ca kalasakapālayor44 nidhanasa ˙ mbhavakāle ’ntarālasya na vāryate. ˙ J 341,1 śesam prakriyāmātraghosanam pramānaparipanthı̄ti kim tena. hari- padavad ˙avasthite˙ tv ātmany utkar ˙ ˙sāpakar ˙ ˙ iti bahuśaś carvitam sāyoga ˙ āstām tāvat. ˙ ˙ ˙ J 341,3 yac cāha, kim ca cittam ekāgram avasthāpayitum viksepatyāgārtham abhyāso ’nusthı̄yate, ˙ na ca ˙ ˙ (64b1) ksanikavādinām viksiptam cittam asti, prat- ˙˙ ˙ yartham niyatatayā sarvasyaikāgratvād iti. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ J 341,5 ˙ tad apy asambaddham. anubhavasiddham hi cetasah kasyacit tattvasammukhı̄kara˙nam, kasyacid viparyayah, ˙kāryādimātraparāmarśo ˙ ’parasyeti. ˙ tatra nairātmyāditattvaparāṅmukha ˙ m˙ sarvam eva cittam viksip- tam ucyate. uktakramena tu tattvaikanistham ˙samāhitam ity etāvatā ˙ ˙m ki ˙ ˙˙ ˙ na paryāptam, yad avaśyam ekasyaiva vicitragocaracāritvam anvesitavyam. ˙ atha ca tattvasāksātkriyākālāt prāg aham ity ekākārāvagrahasambhavād ˙ vyāvahārikam tad apy ˙ asti, yato mamaiva dosaksayo bhāvı̄ti mārgābhyāsā- ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ pravrttir avyāhrtā bhavati. prāpyasamkalpo hi sarvatra pravartakah. sa 45 46 ˙ vastutathābhāvavyatireke ced asti ˙ ’pi kah˙ pravrttim nivartayati. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ yena47 tarhi tathānumānena niścitam ksanikatādi tasya katham pravrttir iti cet. 48 ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ niścayasya sātmı̄bhāvābhāvād anādyavidyāvāsanāvaśı̄krtena cetasā niś- cayānucitasyaiva vyavahārasya pravartanāt. ata eva darśanamārge ˙ ’pi labdhe bhāvanāmārgāpeksanam uktam vārttike ’nvesanı̄yam. tasmāt tatphalalā- bhād arvāg abhyāso ˙ ˙’vidyayaiva˙ sampādyate. abhyāsāc ˙ ˙ ca siddhah sarvajña iti. ˙ ˙ 43) °mātra{janya}sya Ms. 44) kalasa° J : kalaśa° Ms. 45) °{ā}pravrttir Ms : °apravrttir J. 46) avyāhrtā˙ Ms,J : abhyāhatā ˙ SS ,. 47) ˙ yena Ms : yena hi J. 48) {[ksani]katādi} tasya katham pravrttir iti Ms : ksanikatādi tasya pravrttir iti J ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙  Jeson Woo / Indo-Iranian Journal  () – Acknowledgements is work was supported by the Dongguk University Research Fund of . I gratefully acknowledge the help received from Professors P. Patil, T. Cahill and A. Mcgarrity, who carefully read and corrected my translation. But any error that may occur is mine. Abbreviations AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāsya. In: Abhidharmakoshabhāsya of Vasubandhu, ed. by ˙ Jayaswal Research Insititute, P. Pradhan, Patna: K.P. ˙ . AKV Abhidharmakośavyākhyā. In: Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist ˙ Book Store, . DhPr Dharmottarapradı̄pa. In: Dharmottarapradı̄pa with Dharmakı̄rti’s Nyāya- bindu and Dharmottara’s Tı̄kā, ed. by D. Malvania, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, . ˙ HB II Hetubindu Part II. In: Dharmakı̄rti’s Hetubindu Part II, tr. by E. Steinkellner, Wien: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, . J Jñānaśrı̄mitranibandhāvali. In: akur (). Ms Manuscript b7-b3 of the Yoginirnayaprakarana. NBT Nyāyabindutı̄kā. In: DhPr. ˙ ˙ NK ˙ Nyāyakanikā. ˙ In: Nyāyakanikā, ed. by M. Goswami, Varanasi: Tara Publi- cations, ˙. ˙ PS Pramānasamuccaya. In: Dignāga, on Perception, Being the Pratyaksaparic- cheda ˙of Dignāga’s Pramānasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments ˙ and Tibetan Versions, ed. by M.˙ Hattori, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, . PV Pramānavārttika. In: e Pramānavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakı̄rti with ˙ the Commentaries Svopajñavrtti ˙of the Author and Pramānavārttikavrtti of Manorathanandin, ed. by˙R.Ch. Pandeya, Delhi: Motilal ˙ Banarsidass, ˙ . PVBh Pramānavārttikabhāsya. In: Pramānavārttikabhāsyam or Vārttikālaṅkārah ˙ of Prajñākaragupta, ˙ed. by R. Sāṅk˙rtyāyana. Patna: ˙ K.P. Jayaswal Research ˙ Institute, . ˙ SS Sarvajñasiddhi. In: akur (), pp. –. TSP1 Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā. In: Pemwieser (), pp. –. TSP2 Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā. In: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntaraksita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalaśı̄la, ed. by S.D. Shastri, ˙ Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, . VN I Vādanyāya Teil I. 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