religions
Article
Transcendental Happiness in the Thought of Ibn Sı̄nā and
Ibn ‘Arabı̄
Ismail Lala 1, *
and Reham Alwazzan 2
1
2
*
Citation: Lala, Ismail, and Reham
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Gulf University for Science and Technology,
Hawally 32093, Kuwait
Department of Philosophy, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PR, UK;
reham.alwzzan@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
Correspondence: lala.i@gust.edu.kw
Abstract: This article explores the concept of transcendental happiness in the philosophies of arguably
the two most important figures in Islamic intellectual thought, Abū ‘Alı̄ ibn Sı̄nā (d. 428/1037) and
Muh.yı̄ al-Dı̄n ibn ‘Arabı̄ (d. 638/1240). The most striking parallels between the philosophy of Ibn Sı̄nā
and that of Ibn ‘Arabı̄ is in their agreement on the Aristotelian principle of transcendental happiness
as the comprehension of God, combined with their emanationist cosmologies. Based on Neoplatonist
emanationism, especially as it is put forth by Plotinus, Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn ‘Arabı̄ argue that there is a
necessary emanation from God that results in the existence of the universe. As corollaries of the divine
emanative process, those endowed with rationality seek to return to the divine in a reciprocal upward
motion that aims to ‘reverse’ the downward motion of the original divine descent. The impetus for
the two-way process incorporating divine descent through emanation and the longing for ascent
found in humans is love. Despite these points of confluence, there are others of divergence. Ibn ‘Arabı̄
disagrees with his predecessor that transcendental happiness is found in absolute annihilation in the
divine, while still maintaining that annihilation of the self is a necessary first step in the attainment of
transcendental happiness. Transcendental happiness, argues Ibn ‘Arabı̄, is ultimately the realization
of human potentiality to become a complete locus of divine manifestation. This is carried out through
the body for Ibn ‘Arabı̄, whereas for Ibn Sı̄nā, transcendental happiness requires the divestment of
materiality.
Alwazzan. 2023. Transcendental
Happiness in the Thought of Ibn Sı̄nā
Keywords: Ibn Sı̄nā; Ibn ‘Arabı̄; Aristotle; Plotinus; annihilation; emanation; Perfect Man
and Ibn ‘Arabı̄. Religions 14: 729.
https://doi.org/10.3390/
rel14060729
Academic Editors: Anné
Hendrik Verhoef and
Omid Ghaemmaghami
Received: 12 April 2023
Revised: 11 May 2023
Accepted: 25 May 2023
Published: 31 May 2023
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
1. Introduction
This article explores transcendental happiness in the philosophies of arguably the two
most important figures in Islamic intellectual thought, Abū ‘Alı̄ ibn Sı̄nā (d. 428/1037)
and Muh.yı̄ al-Dı̄n ibn ‘Arabı̄ (d. 638/1240). The Thomistic definition of transcendental
happiness is adopted, in which true happiness can only be found with God (Theron 1985,
p. 361; Wang 2007). It is known that St. Thomas Aquinas’ conception of happiness was
influenced by Ibn Sı̄nā (Dudley 2018, pp. 180–81); however, this article argues that traces of
Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception of happiness can also be found in Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s works, in which he
retrofits his theological ideas to those of his predecessor in his own way. It is the parallels in
terms of what constitutes happiness, how it is attained, and what relationship it has with the
overarching metaphysics of these two thinkers that constitute the unique contribution this
work makes to the existing literature on transcendental happiness. This study, therefore,
builds on the work of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ‘Happiness and the Attainment of Happiness’,
in the Islamic tradition (2014). More specifically, it reveals the ways in which Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s
meditation on the concept of transcendental happiness has many of the same features as
that of Ibn Sı̄nā, as delineated by Shams Inati in her work, ‘The Relevance of Happiness to
Eternal Existence’ (Inati 1995).
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Religions 2023, 14, 729. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14060729
https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
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This paper first discusses Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception of happiness as a synthesis of Aristotelian eudaimonism and Plotinian emanationism (Inati 1995). It investigates the distinct
amalgamation of these systems within the Islamic framework that is the hallmark of the
Avicennan notion of happiness. The main works in which these ideas are explored are:
Al-Najāt, Al-Shifā’, Al-Ishārāt wa’l-tanbı̄hāt, the various treatises of Ibn Sı̄nā, especially Risāla
fi’l-‘ishq, and the commentaries written on these works. Content analysis of these texts provides an overall conception of transcendental happiness according to Ibn Sı̄nā. Subsequent
to this, the concept of happiness, and matters related to it, are expounded in the mystical
thought of Ibn ‘Arabı̄, who combines Aristotelian, Plotinian, and Avicennan trends. This
allows the excavation of influences and the modes of reformulation that the latter adopts in
order to devise an entirely unique interpretation of happiness that is predicated on, but
nevertheless varies significantly from, that of his philosophical forebear. Content analysis
of Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s two most popular works, the multi-volume, Al-Futūh.āt al-makkiyya, and the
terse, Fus.ūs. al-h.ikam, along with the latter’s numerous commentaries, is carried out. In
the Futūh.āt, special attention is paid to the chapter entitled ‘On the esoteric knowledge of the
alchemy of happiness’ (Fı̄ ma‘rifat kı̄miyā’ al-sa‘āda) which specifically deals with the concept
of happiness.
2. Ibn Sı̄nā’s Exposition of Happiness
2.1. The Influence of Aristotle
It is well known that Aristotle was one of the most important influences on Ibn Sı̄nā.
Dmitri Gutas explains that this was due to the fact that:
Avicenna derived his conception of the history of philosophy from the late antique
tradition of Alexandria, which presented Aristotle as the pinnacle of philosophy,
perfecting all the tendencies previous to his time (Gutas 2014a, p. 286).
On the topic of happiness in particular, Ibn Sı̄nā is affected by Aristotle’s (1999) Nicomachean
Ethics, in which the philosopher begins by rejecting the idea that happiness is a state, as was
commonly conceived. If that were the case, argues Aristotle, then a person could be asleep
their whole lives, essentially living the same sort of life as a plant, and still be happy, which
he does not accept (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 6, p. 162). If it is not a state, then happiness
has to be an activity. Now, he continues, there are those activities that we perform in order
to gain some other benefit, and then there are those that we do because they are good in
themselves; happiness belongs to the latter category (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 6, p. 162).
Aristotle then makes the claim that ‘this seems to be the character of actions in accord with
virtue; for doing fine and excellent actions is choiceworthy for itself’ (Aristotle, book 10,
chp. 6, p. 162). He acknowledges that performing actions that give physical pleasure also
seem as though they are ‘choiceworthy in their own right’, but considers that this argument
is erroneous since everyone thinks that ‘the things they honor are best’ (Aristotle, book
10, chp. 6, p. 162). Taking his cue from Aristotle, Ibn Sı̄nā would come to dismiss the
commonly accepted primacy of physical pleasures over internal ones, and, especially, over
intellectual pleasures, in the Ishārāt:
It is part of the delusions of common folk (awhām al-‘āmma) that pleasures (ladhdhāt) that are strong and obviously superior (musta‘liya) are [those that are]
sensual (h.issiyya), and the ones besides them are weak pleasures; these being
things imagined (khayālāt) that have no reality (ghayr h.aqı̄qa). . . . So it would be
said to [someone like] him, ‘Is not the most pleasurable (aladhdh) of that which
you describe from this perspective sex, or food, or things like them?’ But you
know that someone who has the power (mutamakkin) to win something—even if
it is insignificant (khası̄s), like chess or backgammon—if food or [the possibility of]
sex were put in front of him, would reject them due to the non-sensual pleasure
of victory that they would get1 (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 1, pp. 7–8).
The pleasure of victory, which is in the domain of the internal senses, is, thus, privileged
over the pleasures of food and sex, which are in the domain of the external senses.
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Aristotle then observes that since everyone has the perception that whatever they
honor is best, the thing that is truly ‘honorable and pleasant is what is so to the excellent
person’ (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 6, p. 162). This is because:
to each type of person, the activity that accords with his own proper state is most
choiceworthy; hence the activity in accord with virtue is most choiceworthy to
the excellent person [and hence is most honorable and pleasant] (Aristotle, book
10, chp. 6, p. 162).
Ibn Sı̄nā echoes this sentiment when he writes:
Indeed, food and [the possibility of] sex could be presented before a person who
is virtuous [but] . . . due to the presence of modesty, he withdraws his hand from
them in order to observe modesty (h.ishma) (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 1,
p. 8).
Since the virtue of modesty is ‘most choiceworthy to the excellent person’, it is more
pleasurable, and the person then ‘withdraws his hand’ from food or sex in order to act in
accordance with that virtue.
Having shown that happiness is found in acting in accordance with virtue, Aristotle
argues that it therefore stands to reason that the greatest happiness is to act in accordance
with the greatest virtue:
If happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord
with supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing. The best is
understanding . . . and to understand what is fine and divine, by being itself
either divine or the most divine element in us. Hence, complete happiness will
be its activity in accord with its proper virtue, and we have said that this activity
is the activity of study (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 6, p. 163).
‘Complete happiness’, then, is found in the activity that is most in accordance with ‘the
most divine element in us’, which, he tells us, is understanding. This means that the
activity that leads to complete happiness is ‘the activity of study’. Accepting this premise,
Ibn Sı̄nā explains that this is why the pleasures of the internal senses, such as victory,
are preferred to those of the external senses, such as food and sex, and that the internal
senses themselves are lower than the theoretical intellect that carries out ‘the activity of
thinking’. Consequently, after proving that the internal senses trump the external ones,
he asks, rhetorically, ‘So if the internal pleasures (al-ladhdhāt al-bāt.ina) are greater than
the external ones (al-z.āhira), even though they are not intellectual (‘aqliyya), then what do
you think about the intellectual [pleasures]?’ (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 1, p. 9).
Thus, Ibn Sı̄nā delineates a ‘pecking order’ when it comes to pleasures that is based on
Aristotle’s works, with the exercise of contemplation resulting in the greatest happiness
and the pleasures of the external senses constituting the least (McGinnis 2010, p. 218). In his
Treatise on Happiness (Risāla fi’l-sa‘āda), Ibn Sı̄nā draws a direct equivalence between the
pleasure and joy that a person experiences and the happiness that they feel (Ibn Sı̄nā n.d.b.,
pp. 259–80; Khademi 2014).
Ibn Sı̄nā goes on to say, ‘Surely, pleasure is to perceive (idrāk), and to obtain what is
needed to arrive at (nayl li wus.ūl), what the person who perceives (mudrik) to be perfection
(kamāl) and good (khayr)’ (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 3, p. 11). This means that
pleasure has two constituents, as he makes clear when he writes, ‘Every pleasure is related
to two things’ (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 3, p. 15). These are: (1) perceiving that
something is good, and (2) attaining that thing. Now, the thing that is perceived to be good
and is, therefore, sought, says Ibn Sı̄nā, ‘is the perfection that is particular to it (yakhtas.s.
bih), and in the direction of which it goes with its first preparedness (isti‘dād awwal)’ (Ibn
Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 3, p. 15). Thus, each thing desires its own perfection, that
which is bespoke to it because of its ‘first preparedness’. Nas.ı̄r al-Dı̄n al-T.ūsı̄ (d. 672/1274),
who is regarded as a faithful interpreter of Ibn Sı̄nā’s doctrine (Adamson and Noble 2022),
elaborates that by ‘first preparedness’, Ibn Sı̄nā refers to the fact that:
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A thing can have two preparednesses (isti‘dādān), where one overtakes the other,
but the thing to which something moves towards with its second preparedness
(isti‘dād thānı̄) cannot be better than the relation it has to its essence (dhāt) (Ibn
Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 3, p. 15).
Each thing, then, has a first preparedness, which is related to the essence of that thing
and allows it to actualize, along with a second preparedness that allows the function of
the thing to actualize (Inati 1996, pp. 10–11). Therefore, there is an essential preparedness,
comprising the first preparedness, and a functional preparedness, comprising the second.
Ibn Sı̄nā is adamant that the true perfection that is desired by all things is the perfection of
its essence, or its essential or first preparedness. This, in turn, means that there is nothing
that desires a perfection that is not in accordance with its own essence. Ibn Sı̄nā bases this
argument on the Aristotelian view that:
What is proper to each thing’s nature is supremely best and most pleasant for
it, and hence, for a human being, the life in accord with understanding will be
supremely best and most pleasant (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 7, p. 165).
Since the proper perfection for the theoretical soul is the contemplation of the divine, this
is what it (1) perceives as good, and, therefore, (2) seeks to attain. Fakhr al-Dı̄n al-Rāzı̄ (d.
606/1209), one of the most influential of the Ash’arite theologians (Griffel 2007), explains
in his commentary of this work that:
The things perceived by the senses (mudrikāt al-h.awās) are only the particulars like
colors, tastes, smells, hotness, and coldness, whereas the things that the intellect
perceives are the essence of the Originator (Al-Bārı̄), the Exalted, His attributes
(s.ifātih), and His actions. It is therefore known [from this perception] that there is
no relation (nisba) between one and the other in terms of honor. So, if it is proven
that . . . the things that the intellect perceives are more honorable than that which
the senses perceive, then [it is known] . . . that intellectual pleasure (al-ladhdha
al-‘aqliyya) is more perfect than sensual pleasure (al-ladhdha al-h.issiyya) (Al-Rāzı̄
n.d., vol. 2, p. 92).
The theoretical intellect, al-Rāzı̄ elucidates, perceives ‘the Originator’ Himself, as
opposed to the particulars that are grasped by the senses, which is why the theoretical
intellect is so superior to the external (and internal) senses. However, not all theoretical
intellects are the same. Ibn Sı̄nā writes:
The perfection of the intellectual substance (al-jawhar al-‘āqil) is such that the
lucidity (jaliyya) of the First Truth (Al-H
. aqq al-awwal) is represented (tatamaththal)
in it, so far as it is possible for it to attain the splendor (bahā’) that is particular to
it (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 8, chp. 9, p. 22).
Thus, the theoretical intellect becomes the locus in which the divine is represented. Ibn
Sı̄nā is careful to attach the proviso that the ‘lucidity’ with which the divine is manifested
in the theoretical intellect is commensurate with what is possible. This means that not only
is there a hierarchy when it comes to the pleasures, with the intellectual pleasures being
at the summit, there is also a hierarchy within the intellectual pleasures, in terms of the
lucidity with which the divine is represented. The more lucid the representation of the
divine, the greater the pleasure.
At this point, it is generally assumed that Ibn Sı̄nā transitions to the Plotinian model
because he identifies this contemplation of the divine with union with Him. Inati explains:
We find that the Aristotelian notion of contemplation is transformed into the
notion of union or being with the object. A human is no longer to seek knowledge
as such; he is now to seek union or being with the object (Inati 1995, p. 13).
While there is no denying that Ibn Sı̄nā’s major influence in articulating union with the
divine is the writings of Plotinus (see below), it would be a little hasty to attribute this
notion entirely to Plotinus; even in the Nicomachean Ethics, we find the intimation of some
kind of deep association with the divine when Aristotle says:
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If understanding is something divine in comparison with a human being, so also
will the life in accord with understanding be divine in comparison with human
life. We ought not to follow the makers of the proverbs and ‘Think human, since
you are human’, or ‘Think mortal, since you are mortal’. Rather, as far as we can,
we ought to be pro-immortal and go to all lengths to live a life in accord with our
supreme element (Aristotle, book 10, chp. 7, pp. 164–65).
He may not go as far as to assert union with the divine, in the Plotinian sense, but the
contemplation of the divine, says Aristotle, does imbue us with ‘pro-immortality’ and takes
us beyond our mere humanity to something approaching divinity, which he claims brings
us the greatest happiness. Nevertheless, as stated, Ibn Sı̄nā commits more fully to Plotinian
emanationist cosmology.
2.2. The Influence of Plotinus
Ibn Sı̄nā believes there is an ‘ontological descent from God by necessary emanation’
and the ‘ascent of the creature in a movement of love’ (Houben 1956, p. 217). This
‘emanationistic doctrine’ (Morewedge 1971, p. 469) has ostensible similarities with Plotinus’
model of the cosmos as an emanation from ‘the One’ (Peters 1968, p. 14). However, there
are significant differences between Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception of God and Plotinus’ idea of ‘the
One’; whereas Ibn Sı̄nā’s God is self-aware (Ibn Sı̄nā 1993, book 3, tenet 4, chp. 28, p. 53),
Plotinus’ figure of ‘the One’ is not (Plotinus 2018, pp. 880–98). Indeed, this was one of the
explicit attacks leveled against Aristotle by Plotinus, whose Self-Thinking Intellect was
clearly conscious of Itself (Plotinus 2018, pp. 880–98). Furthermore, Ibn Sı̄nā seems to view
God as a determination of ‘being-qua-being’; Plotinus, in contrast, places ‘the One’ above
‘being’ since it is the generative force behind ‘being’ (Morewedge 1972, p. 11). In light
of these key differences, it would be more accurate to assert that Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception is
Neoplatonized Aristotelianism (Wolfson 1976, pp. 444–48; Dastagir 2001–02, pp. 1–14).
Indeed, as Dimitri Gutas observes, Ibn Sı̄nā’s theological system:
[ . . . ] is unique in comparison to the theology and philosophy that came before
him, since he synthesized in a comprehensive fashion Aristotelianism, Islamic
theology, and Islamic tenets into his metaphysical scheme (Gutas 1988, p. 252).
Yet it may be argued that he was unique only in the manner in which he synthesized these
myriad trends, for his predecessor, Abū Yūsuf al-Kindı̄ (d. 259/873?), had synthesized
Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Islamic theology, and Islamic tenets in his own way and
to serve his own ends (Al-Kindı̄ 1948; Adamson 2016, pp. 26–32). Ibn Sı̄nā was, thus,
operating in a tradition that was inaugurated by al-Kindı̄, but he made a highly original
contribution to that tradition through his unique mode of synthesis.
The impetus for the two-way process of divine descent through emanation and the
longing for ascent by humans, Ibn Sı̄nā tells us, is love (Ibn Sı̄nā 1899, pp. 1–27; Anwar 2003,
pp. 331–45). Ibn Sı̄nā elaborates that the innate love humans have for God, and the longing
that they feel to return to Him, is a direct corollary of His effulgent emanation, which
caused the emergence of the cosmos (Ibn Sı̄nā 1986, pp. 106–8). God, the Highest Being
(al-Mawjūd al-‘ālı̄), is the object of love and the cause of its dissemination and reciprocity
in sensible existence (Ibn Sı̄nā 1899, pp. 1–27). It is God’s self-love that is manifested in
humans’ longing for Him and it is that which galvanizes them to seek a return to Him.
This is their supreme happiness. Goichon explains that God’s self-love necessitates the
emanative process, and it also provides the impetus for the reverse ascent of the soul.
Quoting from the Najāt, she writes:
The Necessary Being is, thus, He Himself for Himself, the greatest Lover and
the greatest Beloved, the One who enjoys the greatest bliss and is the greatest
object of bliss. His love for his essence is, therefore, the most perfect and the most
faithful. (Goichon 1956, pp. 116–17)
Ibn Sı̄nā is influenced by the Aristotelian tradition when he underscores the idea that
God is the supreme object of love, as mentioned previously (Dudley 1983, pp. 126–37);
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however, in his theoeroticization of this love, he is drawing on the Sufi tradition in which
the love of the human for the divine takes on a distinctly individualistic and personal
connotation, wherein happiness can only be attained with the divine (Massignon 1982;
Anwar 2003, p. 341). Unification with the divine, says Ibn Sı̄nā, is the utmost perfection of
the human soul, and thus, its greatest happiness (Ibn Sı̄nā 1899, pp. 1–27). Deep parallels
between Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception of human perfection and the Sufi concept of annihilation in
the divine (fanā’) are perceptible here (Sells 1996; Karamustafa 2007). Since a human being
can achieve perfection and complete transcendental happiness through their annihilation
in the divine, Ibn Sı̄nā asserts that the yearning for the divine is simultaneously a yearning
for self-perfection (Anwar 2003, p. 343).
Delineating this emanatory process in the Ishārāt, Ibn Sı̄nā writes:
Think about how existence (wujūd) began, from the noblest (al-ashraf ) to what is
noble, until it ended up in matter. Then, it returned from what is basest (al-akhass)
to the less base, then to what is nobler to what is noblest, until it reached the
rational soul (al-nafs al-nāt.iqa) and the acquired intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafād) (Ibn
Sı̄nā 1993, book 3, tenet 7, chp. 1, pp. 241–42).
God is the noblest (al-ashraf ), says Ibn Sı̄nā, and existence began with Him and descended
to the less noble intellects, which are also not sensible, until it ended up in matter, which is
the basest point. As one would expect, he provides more detail about this in the Ilāhiyyāt:
Since existence begins from the One, every proceeding existent being from Him is
of a lower level (adwan martaba) than the first, and the ranks continue to fall. The
first of these is purely spiritual angels (al-malā’ika al-rūh.āniyya al-mujarrada) that
are called ‘intellects’ (‘uqūl). Then come the levels of the spiritual angels called
the ‘souls’ (nufūs) . . . then the levels of the heavenly bodies. . . . Then, after these,
begins the existence of matter (al-mādda) (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 10, chp. 1, p. 435).
The resultant existents seek to return to the perfection whence they came, which is why,
according to Ibn Sı̄nā, ‘the fundamental principle is that everything that exists desires
its perfection; some sort of an ontological love’, as Louis Gardet observes (El-Bizri 2001,
pp. 762–63). It is, thus, their ontological love for and need to meet God—the source of
perfection—that drives their ascent upward in order to attain transcendental happiness.
Thus, ontological love is the force behind the upward creational motion toward God that
imbues us with transcendental happiness.
Taking his cue from Plotinus, Ibn Sı̄nā states that, through a process of contemplative
emanationism, from the One is derived the intellects, the souls, the heavenly bodies, then
the sensible realm, which means that all existents are the result of this divine emanative
process:
It is proven for us, through that which we have adduced, that the Necessary
Existent (Wājib al-wujūd) in itself is one, and that He is not a body (laysa bi-jism),
nor in a body (fı̄ jism), and that He cannot be divided in any way. The existence
of all existent beings (mawjūdāt), thus, comes from Him (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9,
chp. 4, p. 402).
Due to the fact that everything comes from Him by means of the emanative process, it
seeks a return to Him, its divine source, and this return constitutes absolute transcendental
happiness. Ibn Sı̄nā precludes intentionality as the impetus for the emanative process when
he says:
It is not possible that there is, for Him, a principle (mabda’) in any way, nor
a cause (sabab), not in that which comes from Him, and not in that in which
something comes to exist in it or by it, or because of it. It is due to this that it is not
possible for the being of everything (kawn al-kull) to come from Him through an
intention (qas.d), like our intention for creating everything, and for the existence
of everything because, in that case, He would be intending [this] for the sake of
something other than Him (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 4, p. 402).
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Ibn Sı̄nā believes that God, inasmuch as He is the Necessary Existent, is knowable,
unlike Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s absolute essence of God. Thus, he regards the emanation of the universe
from Him to be nothing but a manifestation of Himself, in the same way that Ibn ‘Arabı̄
regards the emanation of the universe as a manifestation of God’s divine Names (see next
section). Ibn Sı̄nā argues that, because it is impossible that there should be any cause for
God’s existence, it likewise follows that all things emanating from Him would neither have
another cause, because no other cause exists, nor that God would intend the emanation of
all things for some other reason, since there is no other existent but Him. In other words, it
is God’s self-love that drives the emanative process, and it is the reversal of this process
that constitutes transcendental happiness. Ibn Sı̄nā continues:
His essence (dhāt) knows that His perfection (kamāl) and His exaltedness (‘uluww)
are such that from them emanate goodness, and that this is one of the requisites
(lawāzim) of His majesty (jalāl) that the object of love is in itself (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998,
book 9, chp. 4, pp. 402–3).
The levels of existence are the corollaries of this self-love, which are numerous before they
enter our sensible world in Ibn Sı̄nā’s ontology. Ibn Sı̄nā explains that the first product of
the emanation from God cannot be sensible and must, therefore, be immaterial:
The first of the existent beings (mawjūdāt) that comes from the First Cause (Al-‘Illa
al-ūlā) is one, and its essence (dhāt) and quiddity (māhiyya) is one, but its matter
(mādda) is not. So nothing of [sensible] bodies (ajsām)—or the forms, which are
the perfections of the bodies—is a proximate effect (ma‘lūl qarı̄b) of God. The first
effect (al-ma‘lūl al-awwal) is a pure intellect (‘aql mah.d.) because it is a form (s.ūra),
and it does not have matter (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 4, p. 404).
The first product of the emanation from God is one, in terms of its essence and quiddity,
says Ibn Sı̄nā. He uses the terms essence and quiddity synonymously here, in opposition to
existence (wujūd). This bifurcation constitutes one of the most basic distinctions in Islamic
philosophy, as Toshihiko Izutsu notes:
The distinction between ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ is undoubtedly one of the
most basic philosophical theses in Islamic thought. Without exaggeration, the
distinction may be said to constitute the first step in ontologico-metaphysical
thinking among Muslims (Izutsu 1969, p. 49).
The essence and quiddity of the first existent to proceed from God, reasons Ibn Sı̄nā, is
immaterial because God, the First Cause of the universe, is a pure intellect and is thus
entirely free from matter. Through careful argumentation, Ibn Sı̄nā proves that if matter
were to proceed from God and if it were the first product of the emanative process, this
would mean that matter is the cause of further products of emanation, but this cannot
be the case since it is only a recipient of emanation and not the cause of it (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998,
book 9, chp. 4, pp. 404–5). This means that ‘it is necessary (wājib) for the first effect [of
emanation] to be in a form that is not material (s.ūra ghayr māddiyya): in fact, it is an intellect’
(‘aql) (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 4, p. 405).
Ibn Sı̄nā answers the question of how unity leads to multiplicity by appealing to the
intrinsic activity of the intellect. As an emanation from God, the first intellect is one and
has ‘pure unity’ (wah.da mah.d.a); however, because it is an intellect, it understands that it has
necessary existence through God, and has possible existence (mumkinat al-wujūd) in itself.
Thus, ‘the multiplicity (kathra) is not from the First [Cause]’, says Ibn Sı̄nā (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998,
book 9, chp. 4, pp. 405–6). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ has a completely different answer to this question,
one that involves the multiplicity of the divine Names, which is the way in which God is
known by His creation, but not as He truly is in His essence (see Section 3). Nevertheless,
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ agrees with the essential simplicity and immateriality of the first product of
divine emanation (Chittick 1982, p. 113).
When the first intellect thinks about God, it causes the emanation of another intellect,
and when it thinks about itself as the product of God’s thought, it causes the emergence of
a celestial sphere (falak) with only its matter and form, which Ibn Sı̄nā calls its soul (nafs).
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Finally, when it thinks about itself as having a possible existence, it brings forth the body of
the celestial sphere. Ibn Sı̄nā writes,
There is, under every intellect, a celestial sphere—with its matter (mādda) and
form (s.ūra)—which is its soul (nafs), and an intellect under it. This means that,
under every intellect, there are three things in existence (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9,
chp. 4, p. 406).
The three things in existence comprise the celestial intellect (the result of the intellect
thinking about God as the cause of its coming into being), the celestial soul (the product of
its thinking about its necessity, inasmuch as it is the necessary corollary of God’s thought),
and the celestial body (the outcome of its thinking of its intrinsic possibility (imkān)) (Inati
1995, p. 14). These, then, are the intellectual, the spiritual, and the celestial levels of
existence, which Ibn Sı̄nā delineates more concisely in the Ishārāt (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 10,
chp. 1, p. 435). He dubs the first level the ‘purely spiritual angels’ (al-malā’ika al-rūh.āniyya
al-mujarrada), which corresponds to Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s ‘angelic world of determinations’ (Corbin
1997, p. 225). Ibn Sı̄nā calls the second level the rank of the souls, which correlates with
Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s ‘determinations of the souls’ (ta‘ayyunāt rūh.iyya) (Corbin 1997, p. 225); the
third level he calls the ranks of the heavenly bodies, which Ibn ‘Arabı̄ dubs the ‘world of
the Idea-Images’ (‘ālam al-mithāl) (Corbin 1997, p. 225). These levels would come to be
formalized by his followers as the divine presences (h.ad.arāt) (Chittick 1982).
These three levels pertain to each of the ten intellects (besides God), souls, and celestial
bodies, says Ibn Sı̄nā, the last of which is the lunar sphere, when there is the emergence of
the corporeal realm:
There is always the necessary [emanation of] an intellect after every intellect
until the sphere of the moon (kurrat al-qamar) comes into existence, and then the
elements come into existence (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 4, p. 409).
This rounds off the levels of existence, according to both scholars. However, because it is so
many emanations or differentiations away from the level of divinity, this material realm
is the least perfect of the levels of existence, according to both thinkers. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ agrees
with Ibn Sı̄nā that the physical world is the least perfect of all the levels of existence, not
only because it is furthest removed from the divine Essence, in the same way as the lower
intellects are further removed from the First Cause than the higher ones and the physical
world is the product of the most remote intellect from God, but also because the sensible
world is dependent on the pre-sensible world, in the same way that lower intellects are
dependent on those intellects that are above them. Ibn Sı̄nā explains that:
[ . . . ] every intellect is higher in level (martaba) [to others] because of a ‘meaning’
(ma‘nā) that it has, which is that because it thinks about the First [Cause], there
is necessarily the existence of an intellect under it, and because it thinks about
its own essence, there is necessarily a celestial sphere (falak) from it, with its own
soul and body (jirm) (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 4, p. 409).
It is the process of undoing this emanative process that—in its furthest differentiation
from the divine—brings about sensible reality, which constitutes transcendental happiness,
according to Ibn Sı̄nā. He adds that since the soul is eternal, after the body passes away, it
unites with God; that is its absolute transcendental happiness. Here, again, Ibn Sı̄nā parts
ways with Aristotle, for although Aristotle maintains that humankind has the capacity for
the divine activity of contemplation, he denies that it can ever be ‘identifiable with God’
(Morewedge 1972, p. 8).
2.3. Transcendental Happiness as Union with the Divine
Many scholars argue that union with the active intellect is what constitutes transcendental happiness for the rational soul, as suggested by Ibn Sı̄nā, and that there is no union
with the divine (Gutas 2014a; Rapoport 2019, p. 180). Dmitri Gutas, for instance, writes
that Ibn Sı̄nā ‘saw the supreme happiness in the contact of the human intellect with the
active intellect during the split-second of hitting upon the middle term’ (Gutas 2014b, p. 10),
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which is something that the rational soul of the philosopher would continually achieve
after detachment from the body (Gutas 2014b, p. 62). It is fair to say that Ibn Sı̄nā defines
transcendental happiness as both of these things (Fakhry 1976), which would make it rather
plausible that while both constitute transcendental happiness, this conjunction (ittis.āl) with
the active intellect represents a lower level than the supreme transcendental happiness that
is achieved by union with the divine (Inati 1995, pp. 15–16). This is because Ibn Sı̄nā sees
no barrier to union with the divine; he writes in numerous works that he has proven ‘the
Necessary Existent . . . is, in His essence (dhāt), the act of intellecting (‘aql), the One who
intellects (‘āqil), and the article of intellection (ma‘qūl)’ (Ibn Sı̄nā n.d.a., p. 200; n.d.b., p. 248;
2007, p. 131), going so far as to dedicate a chapter to this topic in his Najāt (Ibn Sı̄nā n.d.a.,
pp. 200–1).
This being the case, supreme transcendental happiness would be found in union with
the divine, in a reversal of the emanative process. Indeed, Ibn Sı̄nā makes many references
to union with the divine in the mystical section of his Ishārāt:
The one who deems it permissible to make God an intermediary is the recipient
of mercy (marh.ūm) only from a certain perspective (min wajh) because he is not
nourished with (yut.‘am) the pleasure of magnificence in Him (ladhdhat al-bahja
bih), so he can seek this attachment (yata‘t.afah). His knowledge of pleasure is
deficient (mukhdaja), so he yearns for it (h.anūn ilayh), oblivious to what is beyond
it (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9, chp. 6, p. 74).
There are many points worthy of note in this passage. First, Ibn Sı̄nā mentions that God
should not be an intermediary but the absolute purpose, and that supreme transcendental
happiness only lies in this. Ibn Sı̄nā then defines what he means by this kind of happiness
and says that it is ‘the pleasure of magnificence in Him’. He, therefore, seems to articulate
that it can only be union with the divine that can afford a person supreme transcendental
happiness. He follows this up by stating that those who make God an intermediary do not
‘seek this attachment’ with God; again, he is intimating that it is an absolute attachment to
God that yields transcendental happiness. Furthermore, he chastises those who do not have
this conception of pleasure and happiness, describing their view as ‘deficient’ (mukhdaja).
It is significant that the term he uses denotes ‘the young one of a camel brought forth
imperfectly formed, even if the period of gestation have [sic] been completed’ (Lane 2003,
vol. 2, p. 707). What Ibn Sı̄nā insinuates is that despite having had the same length of time
as the philosophers to know what transcendental happiness is, those who do not realize
that it is found in union with the divine have an incomplete or deficient understanding of
it. This is why they ‘yearn for’ their own deficient conception of happiness and do not seek
‘what is beyond it’.
Later, Ibn Sı̄nā says of the advanced knower of God (‘ārif ), who has reached the
penultimate stage in his path, that:
If he crosses over from spiritual exercise (riyād.a) to attainment (nayl), his essence
[lit. his secret, sirruh] becomes a polished mirror (mir’āt majluwwa), through which
he faces the direction (shat.r) of God, and the exalted pleasures (al-ladhdhāt al-‘alı̄)
flow copiously on him (darrat ‘alayh). So he rejoices within himself due to the
traces of God that are in it/them (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9, chp. 16, p. 91).
After perfecting his spiritual exercises, says Ibn Sı̄nā, the knower can achieve ‘attainment’
of the divine, whereby his essence becomes a polished mirror in which is reflected the
divine. Therefore, he rejoices because the traces of the divine are present in it/them. The
pronoun can refer to two things here: either it refers to what flows copiously on him from
the exalted pleasures or, as is more fitting, it refers to his soul (nafs). It would, therefore,
mean that the traces of the divine are present in the soul of the knower, due to his union
with it. Indeed, this is how al-T.ūsı̄ seems to understand it, writing in his commentary:
The knower (‘ārif ), if he has perfected his spiritual exercises, and if he does not
need them to arrive (wus.ūl) at what he seeks, which is his permanent conjunction
(ittis.āl) with God, his essence becomes void (khālı̄) of everything that is not God,
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like a polished mirror . . . so the traces of God are represented (yatamaththal) in it
(Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9, chp. 16, p. 91).
Al-T.ūsı̄ speaks of the knower having a ‘permanent conjunction with God’, which
means that he unambiguously interprets Ibn Sı̄nā’s view as championing union with the
divine. He further consolidates this position with the statement that in this station, the
essence of the knower ‘becomes void of everything that is not God’, which is why it
becomes a ‘polished mirror’ in which the divine is faithfully reflected. The astronomer
and philosopher, Shams al-Dı̄n al-Samarqandı̄ (d. 710/1310?), who was instrumental in
promulgating the ideas of Ibn Sı̄nā, as well as making some original contributions, especially
in the field of Avicennan logic (Faydei 2020), also seems to favor this interpretation. He
writes in his commentary on this passage that in the soul of the knower, ‘the traces of God
are represented, and true pleasures (al-ladhdhāt al-h.aqı̄qiyya) are poured on him, as well as
the trace of divine perfections (athar al-kamālāt al-ilāhiyya)’ (Al-Samarqandı̄ 1979, vol. 3,
p. 411). Al-Samarqandı̄ identifies the acquisition of ‘divine perfections’ and the ‘traces of
God’, as represented in the rational soul, with experiencing ‘true pleasures’. Transcendental
happiness, then, only occurs when there is union with the divine.
In the following stage, which represents the final step in the progress of the knower,
Ibn Sı̄nā explains that there is absolute conjunction with the divine, such that the knower:
[ . . . ] withdraws (yaghı̄b) from his soul, and observes (yalh.az.) only the side (jānib)
of sacredness (quds). And if he observes his soul, it is only in the sense that he
notices [the divine], not in the sense that his soul is bedecked with it. And, at
this point, the arrival (wus.ūl) is complete (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9, chp. 17,
pp. 92–93).
In this final stage of the knower’s progress, the soul no longer observes itself as being
a separate entity from the divine; it observes only the divine and does not even realize
that it is ‘bedecked’ with divinity, according to Ibn Sı̄nā. This represents absolute union
with the divine, or complete arrival, which is when the soul experiences supreme transcendental happiness. Al-T.ūsı̄ draws an equivalence between this stage and the Sufi terms
of ‘effacement’ (mah.w) and ‘annihilation’ (fanā’) in God (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9,
chp. 17, p. 92) when there is absolute union with the divine, according to some Sufi writers
(Massignon 1982). Al-Rāzı̄ employs the same term of ‘annihilation’ (fanā’) to describe this
stage, writing:
It is the first of the stations of ‘absolute arrival’ (al-wus.ūl al-tāmm) to God, and it
is the complete annihilation (fanā’) of everything besides God, and the complete
subsistence in Him (baqā’ bih) (Al-Rāzı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 119).
According to al-Rāzı̄, at this stage, everything besides God vanishes, and the only existence
that is left for the soul is its subsistence in the divine.
These commentators of the Ishārāt are clearly of the view that Ibn Sı̄nā believes that
union of the rational soul with the divine, and not just with the active intellect, represents
the highest level of transcendental happiness. Ibn Sı̄nā provides more detail on this issue
in Al-Shifā’, when he speaks of the exalted rank of the rational soul:
The perfection that is particular to (khās.s. bih) the rational soul is that it becomes
an intellectual realm (‘ālam ‘aqliyy) wherein the form of everything (s.ūrat al-kull) is
inscribed, as well as the arrangement (niz.ām) of everything that is comprehended,
and the good (khayr) that pours forth to everything. This starts with the basis of
everything (mabda’ al-kull), then goes to the exalted, purely spiritual substances
(al-jawāhir al-sharı̄fa al-mut.laqa), then to the spiritual substances that are related to
bodies in some way (al-muta‘alliqa naw‘ mā bi’l-abdān), then to elevated bodies (alajsām al-‘ulwiyya) with their formations and their faculties, then it carries on until
it exhausts in itself the formation of all of existence (wujūd). So it turns into an
intellectual realm that completely corresponds to the existing realm. It therefore
bears witness to absolute excellence (al-h.usn al-mut.laq), absolute goodness (al-khayr
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al-mut.laq), and the beauty of the absolutely existent Truth (Al-H
. aqq al-mut.laq) and is
united with it (muttah.ida bih) (Ibn Sı̄nā 1998, book 9, chp. 7, vol. 1, pp. 425–26).
In this long passage, Ibn Sı̄nā clearly states that the rational soul becomes an intellectual
realm that mirrors the sensible world, which is an idea that Ibn ‘Arabı̄ makes extensive
use of in his conception of transcendental happiness (see Section 3). He elaborates that
this mirroring starts with ‘the basis of everything’, which is an unambiguous reference to
God, and then proceeds to ‘the exalted, purely spiritual substances’, which are the celestial
intellects that have no connection to matter. After this, the rational soul reflects ‘the spiritual
substances that are related to bodies in some way’, which are the celestial souls. Next,
it reflects the ‘elevated bodies’, which are the celestial bodies. Finally, ‘it carries on until
it exhausts in itself the formation of all of existence’, which refers to the sensible world.
When it has completed this reflection, it becomes an ‘intellectual realm that completely
corresponds to the existing realm’; therefore, it bears witness to ‘the beauty of the absolutely
existent Truth,2 and is united with it’. This means that once the rational soul has become a
complete mirror for the whole of existence, it witnesses the beauty of God and is united with
God. Ibn Sı̄nā writes a virtually identical passage in the Najāt (Ibn Sı̄nā n.d.a., pp. 240–41),
underscoring his commitment to the idea that supreme transcendental happiness for the
rational soul lies in becoming a microcosmic mirror for all of sensible reality, and, ultimately,
in union with the divine. Although Ibn ‘Arabı̄ does not agree with union with the divine
as a source of supreme transcendental happiness, he is conspicuously influenced by Ibn
Sı̄nā’s general conception of transcendental happiness.
3. Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s Exposition of Happiness
3.1. The Influence of Aristotle
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ is known to have been influenced by Ibn Sı̄nā (Inati 1996, p. 62) and his
exposition of transcendental happiness bears the hallmarks of Aristotelian contemplative
perfection and Plotinian emanationism, by which Ibn Sı̄nā’s conception is characterized.
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ declares that all happiness lies only in comprehending God (Chittick 1989, p. 151;
Nasr 2014, p. 84). This declaration has ostensible similarities with Aristotle’s notion of
happiness in terms of exercising the activity of our ‘most divine element’—the rational
soul—that is, understanding (see above).3 In his most detailed exploration of this topic,
comprising chapter 167 of his magnum opus, Al-Futūh.āt al-makkiyya, and entitled On the
esoteric knowledge of the alchemy of happiness (Fı̄ ma‘rifat kı̄miyā’ al-sa‘āda),4 he explains the
concurrence between alchemy and happiness:
Alchemy is a term for knowledge that relates to [things] . . . that have the capacity
for transformation (istih.āla), I mean, to change the states (taghayyur al-ah.wāl) of
one essence (al-‘ayn al-wāh.ida) (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 270).
The main point of confluence between alchemy and happiness, Ibn ‘Arabı̄ reveals,
is the capacity to change from one state to another, even though the essence is the same.
It is the transformation from potentiality to actuality that is the definition of happiness,
according to Ibn ‘Arabı̄. Deep resonances with Aristotle’s notion of happiness are felt here
(Blumenfeld 2022; also, see above). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ elaborates that:
[ . . . ] all minerals (ma‘ādin) come from one base. This base seeks, in its essence
(bi dhātih), to attain the rank of perfection (darajat al-kamāl), which is ‘goldness’
(dhahabiyya) (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 270).
‘Goldness’, then, is the full actualization of the potentiality that is present in the essence of
all minerals, according to Ibn ‘Arabı̄; this is their ‘rank of perfection’, which they seek to
attain. In the same way, humans seek to attain their own rank of perfection, in which lies
their supreme transcendental happiness. However, much as humans face the obstacle of
materiality that impedes their path to the perfection of universal intellection, according to
Aristotle (Inati 1995, p. 13), minerals encounter similar obstacles because they are a ‘natural
affair’ (amr .tabı̄‘ı̄) (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 270). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ gives examples of the effects
of nature, from the ravages of time to the fluctuations of temperature and moisture, etc.,
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which hamper their path to the full actualization of their potentiality of perfection (Ibn
‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 270). The analogy of alchemy and transcendental happiness, therefore,
is an apt one.
He emphasizes the parallel between the human quest for perfection and transcendental
happiness with that of minerals when he says:
In the same way as the bodies of minerals (ajsād al-ma‘ādin) are [arranged] in
levels (marātib) due to causes (‘ilal) that affect them while they are being created—
even though they all seek the rank of perfection (darajat al-kamāl), on account
of which their essences (a‘yān) are manifest—so, too, is humankind created for
perfection. Thus, the only things that can turn it away from that (s.araf ‘an dhālik)
are the deficiencies (‘ilal) and diseases (amrād.) that affect it, either in the essences
themselves (as.l dhawātihim), or because of accidental (‘arad.iy) causes (Ibn ‘Arabı̄
n.d., vol. 2, p. 272).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ explains that the potentiality of humans, as with minerals, is to achieve actuality,
which is perfection. However, despite both humans and minerals seeking perfection, not
all attain it. He has already mentioned the external impediment to this attainment in
the case of minerals, when he spoke of the effects of nature. Likewise, for humans, the
external impediments are those causes that prevent them from pursuing contemplation of
the divine. Nevertheless, he adds another cause in this passage, which is what is found ‘in
the essences themselves’. Whereas Aristotle attributes the desires of the body as a corollary
of materiality that impedes full actualization, Ibn ‘Arabı̄ effects a bifurcation in which parts
of the essence are one of the obstacles to perfection and transcendental happiness, while
the natural effects of the world represent the other. In the characteristic emphasis that he
places on homonymy (Lala 2019, 2023a), he states that the ‘causes’ (‘ilal) that negatively
affect the minerals during their stages of formation are the same as the ‘deficiencies’ (‘ilal)
that afflict the essences of humankind. This, then, is their intrinsic preparedness (isti‘dād),
which, in addition to the natural effects of the world, determines whether they can achieve
the perfection of transcendental happiness (Lala 2023b).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ elaborates on this preparedness when he says:
Know that souls, in terms of their essence, are made ready (muhayya’) to accept the
preparedness (isti‘dād) that emanates for them from what the divine carries out (altawqı̄‘āt al-ilāhiyya). So, among them are those who just obtain the preparedness
for carrying out sainthood (isti‘dād tawqı̄‘ al-wilāya) and do not go past that. And
among them are those who are given the preparedness for all or some of the
stations (maqāmāt) that we have mentioned (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 272).
Every person, therefore, has a preparedness that is divinely imbued. For Ibn ‘Arabı̄, as for
Aristotle, the preparedness that each person possesses to achieve transcendental happiness
is in their contemplation of the divine. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ makes this clear when he writes:
God has given mastery (mallaka) to particular souls (al-nufūs al-juz’iyya) over conducting the affairs of (tadbı̄r) the body, and He has appointed them as vicegerents
(istkhlaf ) of them. He has, therefore, made it apparent to the bodies that they are
their vicegerents, in order for them [i.e., the souls] to alert them (tatanabbah) [i.e.,
the bodies] to the fact that they have an Originator (Mūjid) who has appointed
them as vicegerents, so it is their duty (yata‘ayyan ‘alayhā) to seek knowledge
about He who appointed them [i.e., the souls] as vicegerents of them [i.e., the
bodies] (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 272).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄, as does Aristotle, asserts that the practical intellect of the rational soul has the
function of managing the body. He argues that the only reason God appointed the rational
soul as a vicegerent over the body was so that this would lead to the realization that there
must be someone who gave the rational soul this power. The rational soul, thus, alerts
the body that it has an Originator who gave it this power and that it is the raison d’être of
humankind to seek knowledge of this divine Originator; it is only in this search that its
transcendental happiness resides.
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In much the same way as Ibn Sı̄nā—who discusses the role of the prophet-legislator in
terms of the individual pursuit of transcendental happiness, asserting that obedience to
him is necessary and is in accordance with the dictates of the rational soul to contemplate
God (Ibn Sı̄nā 1968, book 4, tenet 9, chp. 4, pp. 60–67)—Ibn ‘Arabı̄ argues that the prophetlegislator:
[ . . . ] prescribes laws that make apparent the path that allows one to attain the
rank of perfection and happiness (darajat al-kamāl wa’l-sa‘āda), in keeping with
what contemplation necessitates (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 273).
The role of the prophet-legislator, therefore, is to make clear the path to transcendental
happiness, which lies in the contemplation of the divine. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ writes that the prophetlegislator ‘makes clear the path of knowledge (t.arı̄qat al-‘ilm) that leads to Him, on which
lies their happiness’ (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 273). This, argue Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn ‘Arabı̄, is
why the laws of the prophet-legislator are in conformity with the essential activity of the
rational soul. However, not everyone will attain transcendental happiness. Revealing the
rationale behind calling the chapter ‘The Alchemy of Happiness’, Ibn ‘Arabı̄ writes:
It is on account of there being no happiness except in it. Furthermore, there
is nothing that people—from among the people of God (ahl Allāh)—have that
is better than it. And it is that He gives you the rank of perfection (darajat alkamāl) that behooves humankind to attain. This is due to the fact that not every
person who is happy (s.āh.ib al-sa‘āda) is given perfection, so that all those who
have perfection (s.āh.ib al-kamāl) are happy, and not all who are happy are perfect.
Happiness is a term denoting the attainment of a lofty rank (darajat al-‘ulyā),
which is imitation (tashabbuh) of the Cause (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 272).
There are many topics of interest in this passage. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ asserts that transcendental
happiness only lies in full actualization, ‘which it behooves humankind to attain’. However,
he then goes on to explicate that while it is axiomatic that everyone who has achieved full
actualization possesses transcendental happiness, there are also those who are happy but
who have not attained perfection. There are similarities here with Ibn Sı̄nā’s classification of
people into seven classes, of which three classes are afforded transcendental happiness, two
classes are given relative happiness or suffering, and three classes are doomed to absolute
suffering (Inati 1996, pp. 18–27). This is because, according to Ibn Sı̄nā:
[ . . . ] eternal happiness or eternal suffering . . . are caused by theoretical perfection and theoretical imperfection, respectively. It is obvious, though, that not all
theoretical imperfection leads to suffering, but only that which is accompanied
by knowledge of one’s perfection (Inati 1996, p. 27).
Ibn Sı̄nā says that one requires theoretical and moral perfection in order to achieve supreme
transcendental happiness without undergoing any suffering in the hereafter. Those who
attain moral perfection, but who do not attain theoretical perfection because they were
unaware of what the latter entailed, will only attain relative happiness in the second life
(Inati 1996, p. 19). Ibn ‘Arabı̄, likewise, accords those who achieve moral perfection but
who are not aware of the true reality of things a state of relative happiness, but they do
not have the supreme transcendental happiness that is the preserve of the spiritual elite.
These are the people who have attained the ‘lofty rank (darajat al-‘ulyā), which is imitation
(tashabbuh) of the Cause’. It is in this aspect of imitating the Cause, or God, that Ibn ‘Arabı̄
is most influenced by the writings of Plotinus.
3.2. The Influence of Plotinus
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ adheres to the Plotinian notion of ontological love as a downward motion
from the divine to the creation, along with an upward motion that seeks to return to Him,
as espoused by Ibn Sı̄nā. However, for Ibn ‘Arabı̄, God is being in its most unrestricted
sense, not as a determination of it, as William Chittick explains when he says that:
[ . . . ] anything that exists is a particular mode, within which the One Being
displays Itself. But being is not any thing that exists, for, if it were one thing, it
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could not be, at the same time, another thing. Being is the ‘thing in every respect’,
not in one respect or another (Chittick 1982, p. 111).
Chittick makes it clear that, for Ibn ‘Arabı̄, everything that exists is a manifestation of the
One Being that is God. God is not, as Ibn Sı̄nā asserts, a type of being. He is all being.
As being itself, which is what God is in His absoluteness (Izutsu 1983), God is beyond
human understanding, according to Ibn ‘Arabı̄. However, since Ibn Sı̄nā views God as
a determination of ‘being-qua-being’ (Morewedge 1972, p. 11), he proceeds from a level
below that espoused by Ibn ‘Arabı̄. This means that, unlike Ibn ‘Arabı̄, Ibn Sı̄nā believes that
the Necessary Being is humanly comprehensible; however, he argues, much like Ibn ‘Arabı̄,
that all existents are nothing but God. There is also a difference in the overall purpose
served by emanationism. Ibn Sı̄nā conscripts the emanatory process as a justification for
the denial of creation ex nihilo (Morewedge 2001, p. 79), in opposition to Ibn ‘Arabı̄, for
whom the divine yearning for self-expression does not contradict its temporal unfolding
(Ibn ‘Arabı̄ 2002, p. 48).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ begins his most popular work, Fus.ūs. al-h.ikam, by delineating the impetus
for the emanation coming from Him. In one of the most well-known and often-translated
passages, he states:
God, be He exalted, desired to see the essences of His most beautiful Names
(Al-Asmā’ al-h.usnā), which cannot be counted, or, you could say, He wanted
to see His essence. So, He chose to do this through a comprehensive creation
(kawn jāmi‘) that encapsulates the whole matter through being characterized by
existence (wujūd). God’s secret would, thus, be manifest to Him via this creation
because seeing something in itself is not the same as seeing it in something else
that becomes like a mirror for it (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ 2002, p. 48).
The cause of this emanation from the divine was the love that God had to see Himself
manifested in the Other, or as Ibn ‘Arabı̄ puts it, God wanted to see the essences of ‘His
most beautiful Names’ (Al-Asmā’ al-h.usnā), which are ‘His essence . . . in a comprehensive
creation’ (kawn jāmi‘). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ bases this opinion on a tradition in which God declares, ‘I
was a hidden treasure (kanz makhfiyy), and I wished to be known, so I brought forth the
creation so that through it they would know Me’ (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 303). Ibn ‘Arabı̄
offers a commentary on this tradition, in which he says:
So, God wished to be manifested in the forms of existence (s.uwar al-wujūd), and
He wished for Himself to be known to Himself in the mirrors of contingency
(marāyā al-mumkināt), just as humans observe their forms in the mirror so as to
attain something that they could not attain in themselves without the existence of
this form. So that is the love that is the cause (‘illa) of the creation of the world,
and it is the true basis (al-asās al-h.aqı̄qı̄) for which He brought forth existence (Ibn
‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 303).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ explicitly declares that the ‘cause of the creation of the world’ is God’s self-love,
which is the ‘true basis’ for His bringing forth existence. This ontological love results in
the existence of the universe as the disparate loci of divine manifestation and imbues them
with a love to return to Him. For Ibn ‘Arabı̄, then, because divine ontological love is a
love for self-manifestation in the form of His most beautiful Names (as mentioned in the
Qur’an), it is by manifesting these Names most precisely that this proximity to the divine is
achieved (Lala 2021; Nettler 1978, pp. 219–29; Nettler 2003, pp. 17–22).
This means that even though Ibn ‘Arabı̄ and Ibn Sı̄nā agree on Plotinian emanationism,
they disagree about the essential impetus behind it, in addition to viewing transcendental
happiness as perfection in different ways. Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s explanation suggests that there was
a divine ‘yearning’ to be known, which is the reason why God brought about existence.
Even though Ibn ‘Arabı̄ does not accept that this ‘yearning’ implies a lack in the way that
humans yearn for self-perfection, wherein lies their transcendental happiness, because they
do not possess it, yet, here, he differs from Ibn Sı̄nā, who rejects the idea that there could
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ever be divine yearning because that would that mean God does not possess something, as
Inati explains:
God does not, and cannot, yearn for anything because . . . yearning implies some
lack, and God does not lack anything. Even if no other beings conceive the
presence of His essence and, therefore, love Him, He would still not lack anything
(Inati 1996, p. 28).
Therefore, even though divine self-love brings to pass the emanative process for Ibn Sı̄nā
and Ibn ‘Arabı̄, the latter’s conception admits of some form of ‘yearning’, whereas the
former’s does not. In addition, for Ibn Sı̄nā, perfection and transcendental happiness can
be found in an upward motion in which the rational souls (al-nufūs al-nāt.iqa) become more
and more perfect as they acquire perfections. One of these is the perfection of the acquired
intellect (al-‘aql al-mustafād), which enables the rational soul to have the intelligibles, so that
it can perceive the intelligibles, which are universal concepts, whenever it wishes (Inati
2014, p. 201). At this stage, Ibn Sı̄nā repeatedly asserts that the rational soul becomes ‘like a
polished mirror upon which are reflected the forms’ of things as they are in themselves [i.e.,
the intelligibles without any distortion]’ (Gutas 2012, p. 424).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ agrees with the essential notion of acquiring perfections, but rather than
believing that it is an upward motion in which the baseness of materiality is divested, he
views it in completely the opposite way. Since the purpose of the universe is so that God
could see Himself in the Other, in something that is not Him, materiality is not something
that is base, according to Ibn ‘Arabı̄, and thus an impediment to perfection, as it is for
Aristotle and Ibn Sı̄nā. Instead, it is the opposite: it is the way in which the divine purpose
for the universe is achieved. This is because, as Ibn ‘Arabı̄ clarifies in his commentary of
the tradition in which God likens Himself to a hidden treasure, what is gained by the form
of the divine Names that exist in sensible reality cannot be gained from the self in itself,
much as the form of a person that exists in a mirror cannot be perceived without the mirror.
It is in this sense of manifesting the divine Names, and in this sense alone, that
Plotinian union with the divine occurs for Ibn ‘Arabı̄, and it is this that constitutes supreme
transcendental happiness. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ rules out absolute union with the divine that Ibn
Sı̄nā seems to allow. Indeed, he regards annihilation (fanā’) as an initial stage in which the
person annihilates their creaturely traits and takes on divine traits. This is why he pairs
annihilation with subsistence (baqā’) (Al-H
. akı̄m 1981, p. 203), as al-H
. akı̄m elaborates:
Annihilation (fanā’) is when the blameworthy characteristics (al-khis.āl al-madhmūma)
are annihilated from a person. And subsistence (baqā’) is that praiseworthy characteristics (al-khis.āl al-mah.mūda) are maintained and made firm in a person. So, the
seekers on the spiritual path (sālikūn) differ about annihilation and subsistence:
some of them annihilate their base desires, that is, what they desire of worldly
things, so when their desires are annihilated, their [pure] intention (niyya) and
sincerity (ikhlās.) in servanthood (‘ubūdiyya) remain. And whoever annihilates
their blameworthy traits, like envy, pride, hatred, and others, will be left with
magnanimity and sincerity (Al-H
. akı̄m 1981, p. 202).
Considering that one needs to divest oneself of creaturely traits before divine traits are
adopted, annihilation precedes subsistence, and subsistence represents a higher level than
annihilation. However, there is also another reason why subsistence is superior, as Ibn
‘Arabı̄ explains:
The connection (nisba) of subsistence, in our opinion, is more exalted in the
spiritual path than the connection of annihilation . . . for annihilation is that
which annihilates in you [creaturely traits] . . . and subsistence is your connection
to God (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 515).
Since annihilation is simply breaking free from the shackles of creaturely desires,
whereas subsistence is a state in which the connection to the divine is maintained, the latter
represents a higher level than the former. Taking on divine traits, then, or subsistence, is the
actualization of human potentiality and, therefore, constitutes transcendental happiness.
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However, this is not a divestment of materiality, as it is for Aristotle and Ibn Sı̄nā. Quite the
contrary. For Ibn ‘Arabı̄, materiality is a conduit for transcendental happiness, for it is only
when the physical form of a person becomes a locus of manifestation of all of God’s most
beautiful Names that they attain full actualization and transcendental happiness. This is
the rank of the Perfect Man (Al-Insān al-kāmil) (Al-Jı̄lı̄ 1997; Morrissey 2020).
3.3. Transcendental Happiness as the Perfect Man
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ asserts that the reason for the creation of the whole universe was so that
God could see His knowable aspect—as represented by His most beautiful Names—in
something other than Himself. The whole of the universe, therefore, is a manifestation of
God’s most beautiful Names, as Ibn ‘Arabı̄ elaborates in his commentary of Q45:37.
For Him is all majesty (kibriyā’) in the heavens and the earth, and that is the essence of
God, so it is not possible for His essence not to be a locus because all that is in
the heavens and earth is a locus (mah.all) for Him. And His being praised in the
universe itself is what ‘majesty’ means, for He is too exalted for anything to be
not Him (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 3, p. 538).
Everything in the universe is a locus of divine manifestation because that was the very
purpose for His bringing it into existence. Ibn ‘Arabı̄ states that God is far too exalted for
there to be anything besides Him that exists in the universe. Therefore, all that exists is a
locus of manifestation of one of His most beautiful Names.
Even though all individual things in the world represent individual Names from
the list of God’s most beautiful Names, the rank that humankind—with Ādam as its
representative—occupies is different, as Ibn ‘Arabı̄ explicates:
God, the Exalted, brought forth the whole universe in a form of existence (wujūd)
that was vague and undifferentiated, which had no soul; that is why it was like
an unpolished mirror (mir’āt ghayr majluwwa). And it is the nature of the divine
decree (al-h.ukm al-ilāhı̄) that it only prepares a locus if it is to receive the divine
spirit (rūh. ilāhı̄) . . . so Ādam was the very polish (jalā’) of this mirror and the soul
of this form (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ 2002, p. 49).
Ādam specifically, and humankind more generally, holds a special rank because of being
the polish of the mirror in which God sees Himself, in something other than Himself (Sells
1988, pp. 121–49). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ then explains what it means to be the polish of the mirror:
‘All the divine forms that are the [divine] Names are manifest in the formation (nash’a) of
humankind, so it has attained the degree (rutba) of completeness and all-inclusiveness’ (Ibn
‘Arabı̄ 2002, p. 50). Thus, humankind has the potential to be the locus of divine manifestation for all of God’s most beautiful Names, which represents its ‘degree of completeness
and all-inclusiveness’. However, it is only when humankind fulfills this potentiality that it
reaches the rank of the Perfect Man, who has the right to be called the vicegerent (khalı̄fa)
of God, according to Nūr al-Dı̄n al-Jāmı̄ (d. 898/1492) (Al-Jāmı̄ 2005, p. 79), one of the
most important disseminators of Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s philosophical thought (Rizvi 2006). It is
the fulfillment of this potentiality that represents perfection and supreme transcendental
happiness, as Ibn ‘Arabı̄ clarifies when he states that happiness is:
[ . . . ] the perfection (kamāl) that is sought, which is the reason humankind was
created to be a vicegerent, that Ādam, peace be upon him, attained by divine
providence (al-‘ināya al-ilāhiyya) (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 2, p. 272).
Transcendental happiness, says Ibn ‘Arabı̄, lies in becoming a manifestation of all
the divine Names in a single locus, which represents the actualization of our potentiality.
Al-Jāmı̄ elaborates that this is why Ādam (and humankind more generally) has a ‘divine
form’ (s.ūra ilāhiyya) (Al-Jāmı̄ 2005, p. 74). It is the true meaning, he continues, of the
prophetic tradition: ‘Surely God created Ādam in His form (‘alā s.ūratih)’ (Muslim n.d., vol.
4, p. 2017; ‘Abd al-Razzāq 1983, vol. 9, p. 444; Ibn H
. ibbān 1988, vol. 12, p. 420; Al-Bazzār
1988–2009, vol. 15, p. 161; Ibn H
anbal
2001,
vol.
12,
p. 275). The potentiality of this form
.
can only be fulfilled when all the creaturely traits are divested, and all the divine traits are
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adopted. This is the point when one becomes a mirror for the divine, and this can only be
achieved through orthopraxy.
To emphasize his fidelity to orthopraxy as the only vehicle by which to attain this level
(Addas 1993; Chittick 1992, pp. xii–xiii; De Cillis 2014, p. 169), Ibn ‘Arabı̄ states:
In the same way as your happiness is secured from your actions, likewise, the
divine Names (al-asmā’ al-ilāhiyya) are only affirmed through His actions, which
are you and are originated. Thus, in terms of His traces (āthār), He is called ‘God’,
and in terms of your actions, you are called ‘happy’ (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ 2002, p. 95).
It is only by following the formalistic aspects of religion through the body and by being
cognizant of one’s inner reality that one can attain the rank of the Perfect Man, in which
one becomes a mirror for the divine and achieves transcendental happiness. God is so
named in terms of the manifestation of His actions in the universe, but it is only through
these actions that humankind achieves transcendental happiness. The commentators of
the Fus.ūs. are in complete agreement with Ibn ‘Arabı̄ on this issue. The influential early
commentator, Mu’ayyid al-Dı̄n al-Jandı̄ (d. 700/1300?), whose commentary became a
model that subsequent generations would emulate (Dagli 2016, pp. 95–104), states in his
commentary on this passage:
There is no doubt that your following the commands of God are your actions and
that in respecting His commands and prohibitions resides your happiness. . . . So,
it is only your actions that lead to your happiness, which are only Him in reality
because the actions of God are originated and established by the most beautiful
Names (Al-Jandı̄ 2007, p. 330).
Al-Jandı̄ explains that because humans are merely the loci of manifestation of all the divine
Names, their actions are the actions of God. It is in this respect that the actions of God are
‘originated’ because they are nothing but the actions carried out by the manifestation of the
divine Names, which are originated in themselves. Therefore, it is only through these acts,
and through realizing their true reality, that humans can achieve transcendental happiness.
Following the writings of al-Jandı̄, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānı̄ (d. 736/1335?), whose
formalization of Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s philosophical thought exerted an abiding influence on the
reception of the former’s ideas (Lala 2019), articulates that it is only actions that lead to
happiness because ‘happiness is an attribute that you possess, and this attribute is only
achieved by your actions, so your happiness is derived from your actions because every
action is voluntary (ikhtiyārı̄) and inevitably produces an effect in the agent’(Al-Qāshānı̄
1951, p. 125). He concludes by echoing the sentiment of his predecessor that these actions
are only performed by a locus of the divine Names and so, are in that sense, divine (AlQāshānı̄ 1951, p. 125). Al-Qāshānı̄’s disciple and author of the most widely circulated
commentary on the Fus.ūs. in the Ottoman era, Dawūd al-Qays.arı̄ (d. 751/1350) (Rustom
2005), clarifies that this does not mean that ‘actions are the causes of the Names since it is
the Names that are the causes of the actions and their source. But as the Names are the
divine realities hidden within creation, their manifestation is only achieved through their
traces and actions.’ This is the source of happiness for humankind because it is through this
that the ‘fixed essences’ (a‘yān thābita), or intrinsic preparedness to achieve transcendental
happiness, can be realized (Al-Qays.arı̄ 1955, p. 669). Al-Jāmı̄ stresses that it is not only
adherence to formalistic worship that enables one to achieve transcendental happiness;
rather, it is achieved by the full realization of the body as a locus of the divine, and its
actions as manifestations of the effects of the divine Names in phenomenality (Al-Jāmı̄
2009, p. 210). The important early-modern commentator, ‘Abd al-Ghanı̄ al-Nābulusı̄
(d. 1143/1731), is even more explicit when he declares that the perfection (kamāl) of the
divine Names can only be expressed through actions, which means that ‘actions are . . .
from His perfection’ (Al-Nābulusı̄ 2008, vol. 1, p. 338). Ibn ‘Arabı̄ and his commentators
agree, then, that transcendental happiness is only attained through the fulfillment of one’s
potentiality through the physical body and the actions that it performs. In other words, it
is only through materiality that transcendental happiness is achieved. Ibn Sı̄nā speaks of
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transcendental happiness occurring when the rational soul becomes an intellectual realm
that mirrors the sensible world, which corresponds to Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s notion of the Perfect
Man becoming the ‘microcosmic universe’ (al-‘ālam al-saghı̄r), along with the universe being
‘the macrocosmic man’ (al-insān al-kabı̄r) (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ n.d., vol. 3, p. 11). Both become mirrors
for the divine when they attain transcendental happiness. Nevertheless, the rational soul,
according to Ibn Sı̄nā, becomes polished when it divests its materiality since it is materiality
that is an impediment to transcendental happiness. For Ibn ‘Arabı̄, the opposite is true. As
God only achieves His purpose of manifesting His Names in the Other through materiality,
it is only through materiality that transcendental happiness is attained. It is only when the
physical self—the divine form—fulfills its potential of manifesting all the divine Names
through orthopraxy that this occurs. It is in the sense of taking on all the divine traits and
divesting all the creaturely traits that true contemplation of, and ‘union’ with, the divine
takes place.
4. Conclusions
There are many parallels between Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn ‘Arabı̄’s notions of transcendental
happiness. Both writers agree with the Aristotelian conception of happiness as an understanding of the divine. They also agree on the Plotinian idea of divine emanation; for both
writers, this is driven by divine self-love, as is the reciprocal upward motion that seeks
to ‘reverse’ it. This upward motion, both writers maintain, is propelled by love for God.
However, they disagree as to how transcendental happiness is attained. For Ibn Sı̄nā, when
the rational soul is completely liberated from materiality, it becomes a mirror for the divine
and the soul is then able to unite with it. This is its supreme, transcendental happiness.
While agreeing that to become a mirror for the divine is the realization of the potentiality of
humanity, and that in this lies transcendental happiness, Ibn ‘Arabı̄ makes materiality a
necessary ingredient for the attainment of that happiness. Thus, it is in the acceptance of
divine traits and the divestment of creaturely traits that transcendental happiness resides.
It is also only in this sense that humans can unite with the divine.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, I.L. and R.A.; formal analysis, I.L. and R.A.; investigation,
I.L.; resources, I.L.; data curation, I.L.; writing—original draft preparation, I.L.; writing—review and
editing, I.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This project has been supported by Gulf University for Science and Technology under
project code: ISG–Case 14.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Notes
1
2
3
4
All translations from the Arabic are our own, unless otherwise indicated.
‘The Truth’ is commonly used to refer to God by the Sufis (Al-Jurjānı̄ 1845, p. 96).
A key figure in Shi’ite philosophy, Mullā S.adrā (d. 1045/1636), synthesizes the ideas of Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn ‘Arabı̄ in his conception
of transcendental happiness as the point at which the virtuous soul meets God (Murtada’i 2012). Mullā S.adrā underscored the
principality of existence (wujūd) over quiddity (māhiyya); he asserted that change in the phenomenal world was not just accidental
change but also existential change, which he called ‘trans-substantial motion’ (al-h.arakat al-jawhariyya) (Nasr 2014). This change is
the cause of the gradations of existence. Therefore, just as there are gradations of existence, there are gradations of happiness;
indeed, the former is the cause of the latter (Kalin 2010). The lowest level, as Ibn Sı̄nā and Ibn ‘Arabı̄ delineate, is the happiness
that derives from the body, followed by intellectual happiness, and culminating in the transcendental happiness of meeting with
the divine (Kalin 2010; Nasr 2014).
Ibn ‘Arabı̄ clearly had the work of the same name by his predecessor, Abū H
. āmid al-Ghazālı̄ (d. 505/1111), in mind when he
wrote this chapter, which lends credence to the assertion that he viewed himself as someone who was dealing with the issues
raised by his forebear, but in a very different way (Ibn ‘Arabı̄ 2017, pp. 1–2). Indeed, Franz Rosenthal suggests that the overall
layout of the Futūh.āt, which mimics that of the Ih.yā’—al-Ghazālı̄’s most popular work—implies that it was offered by Ibn ‘Arabı̄
as an alternative to the former (Rosenthal 1988, p. 35).
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