Mark Murphy. God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency
& the Argument from Evil. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017. x+210 pp. $70.00 (hbk).
Christian B. Miller
Wake Forest University
For some time now, it has been striking how little scholarship has been produced at the
intersection of philosophy of religion and contemporary ethics (including meta-ethics,
ethical theory, and moral psychology). While the field of philosophy of religion has benefited
for decades from fruitful applications of work in metaphysics and epistemology, the same
cannot be said for ethics.
Mark Murphy’s new book is a notable exception. Drawing extensively on important
recent work on reasons, moral rationalism, and other related topics, Murphy outlines a bold
and original position on God’s ethics, or more precisely on God’s dispositions when it comes
to treating different considerations as reasons (2). This account is highly interesting in its
own right, but it also has a major payoff by providing a novel response to the problem of evil.
The result is a book which is essential reading for anyone working in philosophy of religion
(and not just on the problem of evil). Indeed, it has many arguments which would be of
interest to philosophers in mainstream analytic ethics, even if they happen to have little
interest in God’s ethics.
Murphy begins by noting that he will be focusing on an Anselmian conception of God
as absolutely perfect, where this is distinct from the greatest possible being, the supreme
object of worship, and the supreme object of allegiance. About such an Anselmian being,
Murphy defends two controversial assumptions:
The Distributive Assumption: “God exhibits the maximal level of the divine perfections,
understood distributively – for each unqualified good-making property that God
exhibits, God exhibits that property to the intrinsic maximum of its value” (12,
emphasis his).
The Absolute Greatness Assumption: The “metaphysical limit of the good-making
properties permits a being who exhibits those properties to that limit to be
sufficiently great, absolutely speaking” (17).
Although Murphy’s goal is not to develop a detailed version of Anselmianism, he does argue
at some length that these traditional assumptions are plausible.
In what is likely going to be the most controversial and most widely discussed section
of the book, Murphy next turns to the question of whether the Anselmian being is loving. His
claim is that if the Anselmian being is loving, that is captured completely by that being’s
perfect moral goodness. There is nothing more left over. ‘Moral goodness’ is understood here
Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 8, August 2020
10.12978/jat.2020-8.020701120817
© 2020 Christian B. Miller • © 2020 Journal of Analytic Theology
Review of God’s Own Ethics
Christian B. Miller
as “fittingly responsive to values of the sorts that are at stake in morality” (23), and the sort
of moral goodness that Murphy focuses on is what he calls ‘familiar welfare-oriented’
goodness (24). A being who is morally good in this way, then, will aim to prevent losses of
well-being for rational beings, unless there are reasonable grounds for allowing those losses
(such as a greater good they will bring about) (25). From here, Murphy claims that “For being
loving both to be a divine perfection and to motivate in a way that moral goodness does not,
then, it must be the case that it is a divine perfection to be motivated in particular ways
toward some value – say, that of created persons – in a manner that goes beyond that
rationally necessitated by that value” (29, emphasis his). Murphy discusses two possibilities
of how this might happen, and finds them implausible.
So if the Anselmian being is loving, then that is captured by its moral goodness. But it
does not follow that this being is morally good. Indeed, in chapter three, Murphy offers
reasons to doubt the claim. In particular, he raises doubts about whether the well-being of
humans gives the Anselmian being reason to act. On top of this, he argues that even if such
reasons are generated, they need to be both reasons to promote human well-being, and they
need to be requiring as opposed to merely justifying reasons. But doubts can be raised about
both of these claims as well.
Chapters four and five give us a more positive account of the ethics of the Anselmian
being. In particular, the Anselmian being has justifying reasons to promote the existence,
well-being, and perfection of human beings. At the same time, such a being has requiring
reasons against intending evil as a means or as an end. Along the way in these chapters we
find fascinating discussions of whether humans have intrinsic value (they do not), and
whether the intended/foreseen distinction is defensible and applies to the Anselmian being
(it does).
Chapter six delivers a huge payoff of the preceding discussion. There Murphy argues
that the problem of evil – in both its logical and evidential versions – does not tell against the
existence of the Anselmian being. Here is the main reason why:
…the reasons that the Anselmian being has to promote the nonexistence of creaturely
evils are not requiring reasons, but only justifying reasons. Since one can exhibit
perfect rationality with respect to some justifying reason without acting on it, even in
the absence of reasons to the contrary, the fact that there are evils that God has
justifying reasons to prevent but does not prevent does not count in any way against
God’s being absolutely perfect (105).
Murphy also argues that his response to the problem(s) of evil is superior to the well-known
skeptical theism defenses.
Chapter seven turns to two notions that are frequently associated with the perfection
of the Anselmian being, namely worship-worthiness and allegiance-worthiness. It turns out
on Murphy’s view that worship-worthiness is entailed by perfection, but allegianceworthiness is not. Murphy considers two kinds of allegiance – alliance and obedience – but
his basic worry applies to both of them. According to Murphy, for a person to be worthy of
another’s allegiance, “ends, goals, etc. must be shared by the parties in question. But…ends,
goals, etc. are not necessarily shared by the Anselmian being and created rational beings. So
the Anselmian being is not necessarily worthy of the allegiance of created rational beings”
(135).
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The Anselmian being is contingently worthy of allegiance. And according to orthodox
theism, God is worthy of allegiance in this world. So Murphy has to explain what makes the
Anselmian being worthy in this way, which is the project of chapter eight. His focus centers
on the good of religion, and the main move he makes is to argue that if the good of religion is
available and reasonably pursuable by us, then “we have decisive reason to have allegiance
to the Anselmian being; and that good is available to us if the Anselmian being can,
contingently, exhibit a certain sort of ethics with respect to us” (148). ‘Religion’ as used here
roughly involves being properly related to or in harmony with the divine.
Finally, in chapter nine Murphy ends by taking up two additional formulations of the
problem of evil, as well as the criticism that his project in the book has been at best a
‘rearguard’ action or delaying maneuver. The first formulation notes that the contingent
ethics the Anselmian being has in this world (in order to be allegiance-worthy) is such that
the being will have requiring reasons to prevent every evil. That would be enough, then, to
revitalize the problem of evil. The second formulation looks to the details of Abrahamic
theism in particular, and claims that the ethics we find via revelation is one according to
which God has requiring reasons (at least in this world) to prevent every evil. Murphy offers
interesting and important responses to both of these formulations.
Murphy’s writing is philosophically rigorous and careful. The book is packed full of
arguments. It is not a book merely adding one small move to the enormous literature on the
problem of evil or God and morality. Rather each chapter contains original work that
deserves to be discussed in the secondary literature at great length.
The book can also be a challenging read in some places. I found myself struggling at
times with sentences like this one:
If God might have a maximal love, without that maximal love’s being manifested in
anything like motivation toward the maximal good of and unity with creatures, then
we could protect the compatibility of the affirmation of God’s being perfectly loving
in the supreme degree sense with the denial of there being an intrinsic maximum of
the motivation toward the good of, and unity with, creatures (41-42).
So here’s my hope – that Murphy will be inspired to write a trade or non-academic version
of this book for a religious (or even secular) audience. My fear is that the degree of difficulty
of the material may discourage readers who don’t have an advanced degree in philosophy.
And that would be a real shame, as Murphy’s central ideas should be of great interest and
benefit to people who wrestle with the problem of evil or even just want to think more about
God and morality. So I very much hope that he, or someone else who is sympathetic with his
view, will take this project on.
More substantively, I found myself in agreement with many of Murphy’s arguments.
So instead of criticism, let me end with two topics which I wish Murphy had explored in
greater detail. The first is the Anselmian being’s character. As noted, Murphy operates with
an understanding of moral goodness as appropriate responsiveness to familiar welfareoriented considerations, and then argues that moral goodness so understood is not a feature
of the Anselmian being’s nature. Since there is nothing to being loving that is not captured
by moral goodness, then the Anselmian being is also not essentially loving.
But what about the moral virtues of the Anselmian being? Suppose that virtues are
excellences which are (plausibly) part of the character of a perfect being. It seems as if they
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would not be optional or contingent features of that being. But then they might serve as a
basis for revitalizing the problem of evil. Claims like “the Anselmian being might, without
error, be totally indifferent to us” (168, emphasis in original) might seem less plausible when
talking about a being whose character is perfectly compassionate and perfectly just. My point
here is not to support such a formulation of the problem of evil, but rather to suggest one
topic for further exploration.
The second topic is parenthood. Here I suspect some readers may have wanted
Murphy to take up the frequently used analogy between God and his human children on the
one hand, and human parents and their children on the other. Suppose Murphy is right that
merely creating human beings does not bring with it requiring reasons for promoting their
well-being. But if the Anselmian being is not just a creator but also a parent (indeed, a perfect
parent) to those human beings, then that might change things. For in the human case, it is
not at all clear that a good parent does not have requiring reasons to promote the well-being
of her child, say when the child is seriously injured or is in danger of wandering away and
getting lost. For a good human parent, both moral goodness and being loving do not seem
optional, at least with respect to the parent’s own child. So too for the Anselmian being, I
suspect some critics might hold. If such a being is not just our creator but also our perfect
parent, then Murphy’s claims like “God loves us, though God did not have to” (195, emphasis
removed) might seem less plausible. Again, I am not endorsing this line of reasoning, but
only noting it in the hope that Murphy will expand his discussion in both of the above
directions in future work.
Mark Murphy’s latest book is one of his best. As anyone who has read his previous
books will know, this is very high praise indeed.
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