- Rochester, New York, United States
Edward Wierenga
University of Rochester, Religion and Classics, Faculty Member
items whose existence and nature do not depend on minds. Grossmann develops his empiricism and realism by interacting with prominent figures from the history of philosophy. He devotes chapters, for example, to Descartes, Berkeley, Reid,... more
items whose existence and nature do not depend on minds. Grossmann develops his empiricism and realism by interacting with prominent figures from the history of philosophy. He devotes chapters, for example, to Descartes, Berkeley, Reid, Kant, and Brentano on perception, and to Kant, Bolzano, Mill, and Frege on mathematical knowledge. These historical chapters, typically concise, clear, and illuminating, are followed by systematic chapters on the relevant philosophical issues. The book falls into three main parts: (1) Knowledge of the External World: Perception, (2) Knowledge of Our Minds: Introspection, and (3) Mathematical Knowledge: Perception Again. Each part contributes to a wide-ranging defense of Grossmann's fourth way, a way that goes against the grain of much contemporary epistemology. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.33 on Sat, 26 Nov 2016 04:17:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Research Interests: Philosophy and Noûs
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One of the strongest arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free action appeals to the apparent fixity or necessity of the past. Two leading responses to this argumentOckhamism, which denies a premiss of the... more
One of the strongest arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free action appeals to the apparent fixity or necessity of the past. Two leading responses to this argumentOckhamism, which denies a premiss of the argument, and the socalled "eternity solution", which holds that strictly speaking God does not have foreknowledge-have both recently come under attack on similar grounds. Neither response, it is alleged, is adequate to the case of divine prophecy. In this paper I shall first state the argument in question and the two responses to it. I shall then consider objections to these responses, focusing primarily on how they deal with prophecy.
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I discuss conditions for the validity of proxy consent to treatment on behalf of an incompetent person. I distinguish those incompetents who, when previously competent, expressed an opinion on the treatment in question from those who were... more
I discuss conditions for the validity of proxy consent to treatment on behalf of an incompetent person. I distinguish those incompetents who, when previously competent, expressed an opinion on the treatment in question from those who were never competent or who, though previously competent, never expressed an opinion on the proposed treatment. In the former case valid proxy consent usually requires respecting the stated wishes of the patient. The latter case is more difficult. I consider a widely-held principle which appeals to the counterfactual wishes of the incompetent person. I argue that it is unacceptable and propose in its place a principle having to do with the best interests of the patient.
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... Action sentences are existential quantifications over events. Thus, (4) Shem kicked Shaun amounts, on Davidson's account, to (5) (3x)(Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x)), which is read "There is an event x such that x is a kicking of... more
... Action sentences are existential quantifications over events. Thus, (4) Shem kicked Shaun amounts, on Davidson's account, to (5) (3x)(Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x)), which is read "There is an event x such that x is a kicking of Shaun by Shem". ...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and God time
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According to Myles Brand, ‘[t]he key to advocating a particularist account of events -or any account of events - is to provide adequate identity conditions’ . He thinks that the function of an identity condition is ‘to specify the nature... more
According to Myles Brand, ‘[t]he key to advocating a particularist account of events -or any account of events - is to provide adequate identity conditions’ . He thinks that the function of an identity condition is ‘to specify the nature of’ events.To state an identity condition for events is to provide a way to complete the formula:(IC) (e) (f) (if e and fare events, then e=f iff----)The mere fact that a proposed completion of (IC) is true does not imply that it is an informative identity condition for events or that it plays any role in specifying the nature of events.
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viii, p.168.: ill.; 23 c
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Edward Wierenga* Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premise of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is... more
Edward Wierenga* Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premise of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. Skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about m...