Nous

Among the many innovations that mark Frege's Begriffsschrift as a revolutionary work, perhaps the most important is its presentation of the first formal system of logic. Frege believed that the introduction of a new notation, especially for the expression of generality, was necessary if the logical relationships between contents were to be made apparent. This new notation made it possible, at least in an important range of cases, to establish that a given content could be inferred from certain other contents simply by examining the structure of the sentences that expressed those contents. 1 In this regard, Frege's great advance was that, in his system, the logical rules could be stated in purely formal terms, without any reference to the contents expressed by the sentences of his formal language, Begriffsschrift, the conceptual notation. But it is important to recognize that logic, according to Frege, is not 'formal' in any sense that would oppose form to content: The sentences of Begriffsschrift are not mere forms. Frege's goal was "not.. . to present an abstract logic in formulas, but to express a content through written symbols in a more precise and perspicuous way than is possible with words" (AimCN, pp. 90-1). Frege's formal system is intended to be one we can actually use in reasoning, that is, in inferring truths from other truths, which is to say that we can prove theorems in this system, where theorems are true contents. 2 If so, the sentences of Begriffsschrift must express those contents. The point of presenting proofs in a formal system is thus not to empty mathematics of content (FTA, esp. opp. 97ff.), 3

Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the more general question of when and why belief formation ought to be based solely on the evidence.

Der Gegenstand meiner Dissertation ist die aristotelische Intellektlehre im Gesamtbefund des Corpus Aristotelicum, insbesondere aber in der Schrift De anima. Die Kapitel vier und fünf des dritten Buches sind notorisch dunkel und haben vor allem in der mittelalterlichen Rezeption, aber auch schon in der spätantiken Kommentierung besonderes Interesse geweckt. Die aristotelische Lehre vom aktiven und passiven Intellekt war der Ausgangspunkt der Intellektspekulation der Schule Alberts des Großen und der Intellektmystik Meister Eckharts. Von hier aus geht die Entwicklungslinie über Nikolaus von Kues zum Problem der neuzeitlichen Subjektivität. Von besonderem Interesse ist dabei die Identifikation der göttlichen mit der menschlichen Vernunft bei Meister Eckhart. So war es gerade die mittelalterliche Philosophie, die mich zur Frage nach dem Ursprung der Identifikation von Mensch und Gott im Intellekt führte. Ich wollte untersuchen, ob es schon bei Aristoteles diese Identifikation gibt oder ob er sie wenigstens theoretisch grundgelegt hat. Die erste ausdrückliche Identifikation des menschlichen und göttlichen νοῦς findet sich bei Alexander von Aphrodisias, dem frühesten überlieferten Aristoteles-Kommentator im dritten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert. Bei Aristoteles selbst, ist diese Konsequenz noch nicht gezogen.

Like Swinburne's other books, Providence and the Problem of Evil is clearly written and meticulously argued. It is also very ambitious. Swinburne's goal is to specify, for every single evil in the world, goods that would justify God's allowing that evil. ͑"God" is defined as an essentially everlasting, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good person who created and sustains the Universe ͑p. 3͒.͒ The book is divided into four parts. In Part I Swinburne formulates an argument from evil and then uses that formulation to explain why he believes most theists need a theodicy in order to justifiably believe in God. In Part II, he catalogs in great detail what he takes to be the goods and evils in the world and the various factors that make them better or worse. The fact that all this detail is rarely gratuitous testifies to how ambitious ͑and complicated͒ the book is. In Part III, Swinburne tries to show that every evil in the world is such that God's allowing it makes possible certain goods. And in Part IV he attempts to complete his theodicy by arguing for two crucial claims. The first is that the positive value of the goods made possible by the world's evils is greater than the negative value of those evils. The second is that it is morally permissible for God to allow those evils for the sake of the greater goods they make possible, despite the fact that those harmed by the evils are often not the ones benefitted by the goods. I. The Need for Theodicy Many arguments from evil and all theodicies presuppose what I will call a "principle of divine justification"-a principle specifying criteria which must be satisfied in order for the occurrence of an evil to be compatible with the existence of God. 1 Both Swinburne's formulation of the argument from evil NOÛS 35:3 ͑2001͒ 456-474

The two most important arguments concerning freedom, moral responsibility, and determinism during the last quarter century are the so-called "modal argument", articulated independently by Ginet and van Inwagen for the thesis that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism , and Frankfurt's famous argument for the thesis that we may be morally responsible even if we are unable to do otherwise. 1 Fischer has been convinced by both arguments. He calls himself a "semi-compatibilist"-"compatibilist" because he holds the traditional compatibilist view that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility; "semi" because he agrees with the incompatibilist thesis that determinism rules out all alternative courses of action, entailing that we can never do otherwise. Despite this concession to the incompatibilist, Fischer's bottom line is that we've got the kind of freedom we most care about-roughly, the kind that's a necessary condition of rational choice, personhood, and moral responsibilityeven if the modal implications of determinism are every bit as bad as the incompatibilist says they are. Fischer's book is well worth reading for a number of reasons, but perhaps its most important virtue is that it brings together two sets of issues that tend not to be discussed together, and tend not to be discussed by the same people. Frankfurt's counterexamples to the thesis now widely known as the Principle of Alternate Possibilities~the thesis that someone is morally responsible for what he's done only if he could have done otherwise! have achieved almost the status of Gettier counterexamples in the free will literature. 2 The intuitions invoked by Frankfurt stories are highly compelling, and almost everyone agrees that they show us something important about moral responsibility, even though it's still hotly disputed what this is. The modal argument, by contrast, has been influential

This essay refers to 'attributes' of the Absolute and shows how they are reflected in specific facets of contemplative asceticism and renunciation and that this is the way to embody the Absolute in this world.  It attempts to establish contemplative asceticism and renunciation 'a priori', in a way, directly on the basis of metaphysical and spiritual facts and the nature of the One, without recourse to external authorities or traditions.

Here are some comprehensive notes breaking down Plotinus' philosophy of temporality and eternity in Ennead III.vii. They aim to situate Plotinus' work within the context of ancient and late ancient philosophy more broadly. Some special comments are included in order to relate Plotinus back to his precursors (Plato, Aristotle, Epicureans, Stoics) and 'followers' (Augustine, Boethius). Topics discussed include: the nature of eternity (aiōn) as atemporality (rather than everlasting duration); the possibility of defining the nature of time (in terms of diastasis and 'ways of life'); the ongoing opposition between atomism and continuum theory; and the relationship of temporality to the Three Primary Hypostases (One, Nous, Psyche).

Anaxágoras goza de una posición histórica excepcional. Se trata del primer filósofo de renombre establecido en Atenas. Su itinerario filosófico se inserta en el ambiente de los últimos presocráticos del siglo V a. C., pero su procedencia jónica le proporciona puntos de encuentro con los pensadores milesios. Une, pues, a los temas característicos de la filosofía jónica, el rigor especulativo del pensamiento de Parménides. Asimismo, su larga permanencia en Atenas le permitirá ejercer amplia influencia en la polis que se convertiría enseguida en el centro cultural de todo el mundo helénico. En concreto, es considerado maestro del primer filósofo ateniense conocido, Arquelao, quien se honrará de haber enseñado al mismísimo Sócrates. Quizá esta circunstancia haya contribuido no poco a la importancia otorgada a su pensamiento por Platón y sobre todo por Aristóteles. Éste ha determinado hasta nuestros días la información que poseemos sobre Anaxágoras y lo ha convertido en el filósofo del Intelecto (noûs) y de las homeomerías. Durante el siglo XX Anaxágoras ha sido objeto de muchos estudios, suscitando un interés parangonable al de otros grandes presocráticos como Parménides o Heráclito. Sin embargo, permanece un severo desacuerdo sobre algunos puntos centrales de su pensamiento.

The purpose of the present investigation is to determine the role of nous in the context of the defense of a particular conception of the gods on which the law against impiety is based, a conception whose exposition constitutes the ultimate goal of the tenth book of the Laws of Plato. To do that, we follow Stephen Menn?s hypothesis (1995) according to which the notion of nous should be conceived as an areté and we analyze the former historically and etymologically, taking into account the scholar bibliography on the subject as well as the sources of the philosophical thought prior to Plato and the text of the Laws itself. After that, once we establish the meaning of nous as areté, whose distinctive feature is to order; we move on to the discussion on the relation of ontological (in)dependence between the nous and the soul to conclude that the cosmic soul, whose movement keeps the universe in order, cannot exist without the nous; while in the case of the human soul Plato seems to suggest the contrary. Finally, we argue in favor of the nous as that which legitimizes the existence of the gods and the belief in them as perfectly virtuous entities, as well as that on which the truth of laws is based and allows to demand obedience to them.

Poiché questi principi (potenza e atto) si trovano, alcuni negli esseri inanimati, altri, invece, negli esseri animati, nell'anima e nella parte razionale dell'anima (en psyche\ i kai te\ s psyche\ s en to\ i logon), è evidente che anche le potenze saranno, alcune, irrazionali [dynameis alogoi] altre, invece, razionali [dynameis meta logou]; […] 1 Il ruolo dei principi duv namiı-ej nev rgeia 37 4 40 9 Ivi, 1046a, 19-28. 10 An. 430a, 10-12.

Frege's own ideas are lost in the struggle with larger issues. Reading Currie, by contrast, one is likely to feel occasional impatience. As the discussion veers towards some unresolved question of contemporary interestthe semantics for arithmetic or the analysis ofbelief-contexts, for example -Currie drops the topic, and moves on to further exegesis. We have a more complete picture of Frege in Currie's book, but there is far less life to it.

Die Intellektlehre des Aristoteles ist seit der Antike kontrovers. Insbesondere in der Frage nach dem aktiven Intellekt herrscht keine Einigkeit: Ist er Teil der Seele oder von ihr getrennt? Wie verhält er sich zum passiven Intellekt? Ist er identisch mit dem Gott der Metaphysik? Antworten auf diese Fragen erfordern ein akribisches Textstudium. Daher wird in dieser Arbeit zunächst der grundlegende Text, De anima III 4-5, im bereinigten Original gegeben, übersetzt, kommentiert und interpretiert. Dabei werden die klassischen Fragen der Interpretationsgeschichte seit der Antike behandelt. Es folgt eine Untersuchung des Intellektbegriffs in anderen Werken des Aristoteles, v.a. Zweite Analytiken, Nikomachische Ethik und Metaphysik. Aus diesem Gesamtbefund ergibt sich die Auffassung des Autors, dass Aristoteles den aktiven Intellekt als unsterbliches Aktualitätsprinzip in der Seele konzipiert. In dieser und manch anderer Hinsicht ist Aristoteles Platon verpfl ichteter, als oft angenommen wird. Auch die Auffassung etwa, dass dem aktiven Intellekt bei Aristoteles eine Abstraktionstätigkeit zukomme, erweist sich am Text als haltlos. Das vorliegende Buch will zunächst vor allem Textquelle für ein intensiveres Studium dieser für die abendländische Philosophie zentralen Texte sein, die durch einen philologischen und inhaltlich umsichtigen Kommentar erschlossen werden. Der Autor Christian Jung studierte Philosophie, Griechische Philologie, Indologie und Musikwissenschaft in Tübingen, Oxford und Paris. Arbeitsschwerpunkte sind Antike, Mittelalter, Mystik und Deutscher Idealismus. Zur Zeit ist er Lehrbeauftragter am Institut für Philosophie an der Unviersität Wien.

"This study analyses Hermetic literature and focuses on the seventeen treatises of the so-called Corpus Hermeticum, with support of other philosophical Hermetica as well.
As will be demonstrated, Hermetic literature helps our understanding of how reformulations of symbolic universes led to a specific Graeco-Egyptian mentality.
The Hermetica will be treated as the result of cross-cultural exchange between Greek and Egyptian symbolic universes. This literature is here analysed according to its historical context, i.e. as part of a Greek-Egyptian dialogue."

Tres momentos de gran valor jalonan la historiografía sobre el hermetismo, la corriente iniciática de la Tardoantigüedad que recibió ideas de diversas religiones, y que influyó en el renacimiento florentino: la traducción efectuada por Ficino, la recuperación en el siglo XX de originales y nuevas perspectivas, planteadas por Festugière y por Yates, junto a su conversión en objeto de análisis según criterios historiográficos en la academia, gracias a Hanegraaff y su grupo de investigación en la universidad de Ámsterdam. Examinar esos tres periodos de gran difusión cultural en Europa servirá para esbozar algunos de los principios esenciales de la escuela filosófico-religiosa, así como las diversas variaciones históricas y enfoques metodológicos con los que investigar la Hermetica. // There are three moments of great value for marking the historiography of Hermetism, an initiation current from the Late Antiquity, which got ideas from various religions, and influenced the Florentine Renaissance. Those three moments are the following: Ficino’s translation, the recovery in the 20th century of original and new perspectives, posed by Festugière and Yates, together with their conversion into an object of analysis according to historiographical criteria in the academy, thanks to Hanegraaff and his research team at the University of Amsterdam. Studying those three periods of great dissemination of culture in Europe will be useful for outlining the essential principles of the philosophical-religious school, as well as the various historical variations and methodological approaches used to investigate the Hermetica.

Giriş Tüm disiplinlerin kendilerine özgü bir dili ve de terminolojisi vardır. Bir disiplini anlamanın yolu hiç kuşkusuz, o disiplinin dilini bir başka deyişle kavramlarını tanımaktan ve bilmekten geçer. Bir disiplin olarak felsefenin de dilini oluşturan en temel unsurlardan biri kavramlardır. Kavramlar, felsefe ya da felsefelerin anlamlandırılma ve yorumlanma girişiminde vazgeçilmez bir öneme sahip olan mihenk taşlarıdır. Nitekim felsefe tarihi olarak nitelendirilen şey de gerçekte filozofların düşüncelerinin bir tarihidir ki bu, dar anlamıyla düşünce sistemlerinin ifade edilmesinde ya da taşınmasında kendisine başvurulan temel kavramların tarihinden başka bir şey değildir. Bu noktadan hareketle denilebilir ki, bir filozofun felsefesini ya da düşünce sistemini anlamak için öncelikle o düşüncelerin taşıyıcıları olan temel kavramlara başvurmak gereklidir. Aristoteles, 2000 yılı aşkın bir süre ile Batı medeniyetine egemen olmuş, aynı zamanda İslam felsefesinin temellerinin atılmasında da büyük bir rol oynamış, Antik Yunan felsefesinin en parlak en büyük dehalarından birisidir. Öyle anlaşılıyor ki bu filozofun etkisi yalnızca Antikçağ ile sınırlı kalmayıp, Ortaçağ, Yeniçağ ve günümüz dünyasına kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu etkide, elbette O'nun yaşamından -bizlere ulaşabildiği kadarıyla yaklaşık 1462 sayfa Grekçe metin 1 olduğu düşünülen, mantıktan fizik ve metafiziğe, psikolojiden biyolojiye hatta etik ve politikaya kadar daha birçok alanda -geriye kalan mirasının önemi büyüktür. Oldukça geniş bir alana yayılmış olan Aristoteles felsefesinin de tıpkı diğer felsefeler gibi kendine özgü kavramları diğer bir ifadeyle bir dili vardır. Bu kavramların kimisi -sözgelimi nous gibi-Aristoteles öncesi kullanıma sahipken, energeia gibi kimi kavramlar da yalnızca Aristoteles'in bulduğu bir kavramdır. Bir kavramın bir filozof * Nous-Noos: Düşünce/Akıl (mind, intellect, thought, understanding, reason) ya da Düşünme Yetisi. Bu sözcük dilimize ayrıca zeka, zihin, us, anlak, düşünce ve fikir olarak da çevrilmektedir.. -Noesis: Düşünme/Aklın Etkinliği (functioning of the intellect, understanding, thinking) ya da Etkin Düşünme. Noesis sözcüğü de dilimize kimi zaman nous'un işleyişi veya faaliyeti ya da sezgi olarak da çevrilmektedir.

¿Cuál es el origen de todas las cosas? A pesar de su gran diversidad, ¿tienen una raíz común? ¿Tuvo el mundo un comienzo? ¿Cómo surgió la vida en la tierra? Tales preguntas, que aún provocan a los científicos, fueron formuladas por vez primera por los primeros pensadores griegos. Anaxágoras responde a ellas poniendo al inicio del tiempo una confusa mezcla de todas las cosas sobre la cual obró un ser llamado Intelecto, quien dio lugar al orden del mundo que hoy contemplamos. Con ello, este autor presocrático comienza a plantear algunas cuestiones filosóficas que perdurarán hasta nuestros días: la constitución de la materia, la naturaleza del conocimiento sensorial e intelectual, la intervención de Dios en el mundo… Este libro pretende analizar cuidadosamente la filosofía de Anaxágoras prestando atención a los dos aspectos principales de su doctrina: la mezcla e Intelecto. Su comprensión de la realidad física como una mezcla tiene consecuencias filosóficas de gran interés y constituye quizá la más sugestiva entre las primeras concepciones de la materia. Por otro lado, Intelecto es, según Anaxágoras, quien provoca la variedad de los seres a través del movimiento. Así, nuestro filósofo distingue del sustrato material la causa de sus cambios, la cual se hallaría, además, dotada de inteligencia. Tales rasgos de la filosofía de Anaxágoras atrajeron la atención de los grandes filósofos clásicos, particularmente de Aristóteles. El segundo gran objetivo de este libro es, pues, recorrer el camino por el cual discurrieron las enseñanzas de Anaxágoras, desde que fueron expuestas por él en Atenas, justo durante el siglo que definió la preponderancia intelectual de dicha polis durante siglos, hasta que llegaron a oídos de Aristóteles, el testigo más determinante para comprender a Anaxágoras.

There has long been a debate on the possible similarity between some forms of Indian and Greek idealistic monism (Advaita and Neoplatonism). After a basic historical introduction to the debate, the text proposes that Paramādvaita, also known as Kashmiri Shaivism, is a more suitable comparandum for Neoplatonism than any other form of Advaita, suggested in the debate. Paramādvaita's dynamic view of reality summarized in the terms prakāśa-vimarśa or unmeṣa-nimeṣa, corresponds quite precisely to the viewpoint of Neoplatonism, summarized in the similar bipolar terms such as prohodos-epistrophe. The context of the dynamic nature of reality doctrine is also quite similar (svataḥsiddhatva, authypostasis). My arguments are based on the texts of Plotinus and Proclus (Neoplatonism) and the texts of Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja (Paramādvaita). Several parallel doctrines of both systems are further discussed: the doctrine of creative multilevel subjectivity, the doctrine of mutual omnipresence of all in all, the doctrine of creative multilevel speech, and some corresponding doctrines on aesthetic beauty and its important role in the Soul's return towards its ultimate source. Some implications of the high degree of correspondence between both systems are considered at the end of the paper, for instance whether some similarities of compared systems might be explained on a structural basis, since both schools ware facing similar sceptical critique (Mādhyamika, Hellenistic scepticism).

Over the last century, the intermittent but seemingly interminable debates over Plato's theology-and in several respects the overlapping parts of his cosmology and later metaphysics, too-have primarily turned upon scholars' efforts to interpret and incorporate into a coherent system three key concepts or figures that play prominent cosmological and theological roles in Plato's late dialogues: the soul of the cosmos or 'World-soul' (hē tou pantos psuchē -ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχή), 'Intellect' or Nous (νοῦς), and the 'Demiurge' or Craftsman (dēmiourgosδημιουργός). 1 This paper aims to clarify the relationship in the Philebus between the first two of these factors, the World-soul and Intellect, by elucidating a highly significant but frequently misunderstood passage: 30a5-d4, and the sentence at 30a9-b7 especially. 2 1 Ideally, such a system would also incorporate the Form of the Good, but the so-called "cosmological" approaches to Plato's theology, which focus on the former three items and the late dialogues, seldom attempt the additional step of relating these three to the Form of the Good or the One of 'unwritten doctrines'. Likewise, "metaphysical" approaches, which focus on the latter, seldom succeed at integrating the former items. These classifications of approaches to Plato's theology are from Bordt [2006], 15-22 ('metaphysische' and 'kosmologische'). For approaches to Plato's theology linking the Form of the Good with the Demiurge, see: Hampton [1990]; Benitez [1995] doi:10.1515/apeiron.1995.28.2.113; Bordt [2006]; McPherran [2006]

Questo volume esamina uno dei temi più controversi e attuali della filosofia di Aristotele: le sue riflessioni sulla natura del pensiero e sulla sua relazione con il corpo. L’unità inscindibile di anima e corpo si riflette sulle analisi aristoteliche di passioni quali l’ira e la paura, e di attività caratteristiche come la percezione, l’immaginazione e il desiderio. Pur sostenendo la natura psicofisica di queste «affezioni», tuttavia Aristotele difende la «non mescolanza» e la «separabilità» del pensiero. Per affrontare il problema, l’autrice ricostruisce nei dettagli la filosofia della mente aristotelica adottando una prospettiva «fisiologica», ossia alla luce della filosofia della natura, della biologia e della «chimica» di Aristotele. Emerge così un’originale concezione dell’anima e del pensiero, che rilancia ancora una volta, ma sotto una nuova luce, l’attualità di Aristotele nel dibattito contemporaneo sul problema della relazione mente-corpo.

Platons später Dialog Philebos kann als locus classicus einer Philosophie gelten, welche die Relevanz der Lust für die eudaimonia, die gelungene oder glückende Lebensführung, untersucht. Der Dialog liefert Elemente sowohl zur Phänomenologie wie zur Ethik der Lust, auf die alle späteren Lustlehren, etwa bei Aristoteles, in der Stoa und bei den Epikuräern, aufbauen werden. Wenn auch das Substantiv hedoné bereits bei älteren Autoren (etwa Aischylos und Herodot) belegbar ist, so gebührt dem Autor des Philebos gleichwohl das Verdienst, die Lust erstmals umfassend für die Reflexion erschlossen und ihr damit gewissermaßen auch zur Geburt verholfen zu haben. Vernunft und Lust erblicken in einer spannungsreichen Konstellation gemeinsam das Licht der Welt, gewinnen Kontur erst in ihrer Entgegensetzung. Wenn auch der Vernunft im Dialog letztlich ein Vorrang eingeräumt wird, bedeutet dieser Vorrang keinen Sieg; einerseits geht die Tätigkeit der Vernunft, wie sie sich in der Philosophie zu institutionalisieren beginnt, selbst mit einem Lustgewinn einher, andererseits steckt in der Lust eine ganz eigene Art von Vernunft. Für Platon erwiese sich eine "reine" Vernunft, die sich nicht an die Perspektive eines gelingenden und letztlich lustvollen Lebens zurück binden ließe, in letzter Konsequenz als unvernünftig. Gleichwohl wird er, gegen die eigene Einsicht, am Ende des Dialogs für ein Leben plädieren, das sich ganz einer solchen reinen Vernunft verschreibt.

On where the Cutting Edge of the Western Tradition might be found with respect to the development of Fundamental Ontology within Continental Philosophy

-- Key Words:  Continental Philosophy, Ways of Being, Fragmentation of Being, Time, Cutting Edge

Aesthetic Formalism has fallen on hard times. At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift rejection. At worst it is the object of abuse and derision. But I think that there is something to be said for it. In this paper, I shall try to find and secure the truth in formalism. I shall not try to defend formalism against all of the objections to it. 1 Instead I shall articulate a moderate formalist view that draws on aesthetic0nonaesthetic determination and Kant's distinction between free and dependent beauty. I shall examine four central art forms-painting, sculpture, literature and music-and I shall show that only moderate formalism provides a satisfactory understanding of them.

Abstract: Many personalists have argued that an adequate account of the human person must include an account of subjectivity as irreducible to anything objectively definable. The personalists contend that Aristotle lacks such an account, claiming that he fails to meet three criteria that a theory of the human person must fulfill in order to have an account of subjectivity as irreducible. I show first that some later Aristotelians fulfill these criteria, and then that Aristotle himself also does so. I do this through an interpretation of Aristotle’s accounts of substantial actualities, nous, friendship, and beauty.

Introduction. Nancy Cartwright's newest book, The Dappled World, seeks to extend the project begun in her first, How the Laws of Physics Lie.~1983! The first book provided a much needed wake-up call. Attention to how science actually writes and applies theories shows a picture much at odds with the familiar view of deduction from a few completely general natural laws. Iñ 1983:139-42! Cartwright described "physics as theatre". Just as a stage performance succeeds if it gets across the important ideas and attitudes embodied in a form that streamlines the details of real life, the theoretical descriptions provided by science succeed when, and in many ways because, they abstract from and simplify the welter of actual experience. At the other end science deals, not with "raw data", but "prepared descriptions" carefully manicured to abstract the relevant aspects of experience in a way that can smoothly be brought into contact with abstract theory.~1983: 133! It is likewise a primary motivating theme of the present book that description of theory as deduction from natural laws leaves out or hopelessly distorts how science works. For example, Cartwright objects that in interpretive work on the measurement problem in quantum mechanics ... the literature tends to live inside the mathematical structure of quantum theory and seldom asks how that theory serves to model the world. Sometimes this is even done consciously, with the division of labour as a rationale: we study physics theory, modelling is a different matter, one of applied physics. @But as a result, Cartwright suggests# ... @w#hat is left out in the usual studies in foundations of physics is not how the physics is applied, but rather, as @Willis# Lamb urges, the physics.~230! 2

This paper asks what it is about 'intelligence' (νοῦς) that, in Aristotle's view, makes 'insight' (νοεῖν) its proprietary work. It argues that the answer lies in the peculiar clarity and distinctness of its activity, 'insight' (νόησις). This clarity and distinctness, it argues, make intelligence the very 'form' or 'measure' of its objects-what they all 'have in common,' what 'makes' them intelligible, what their intelligibility consists in.

I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that the human intellect can understand. For Aristotle, cognitive powers with bodily organs are always spatiotemporally limited, but the understanding is not. Aristotle claims that our understanding applies to all instances of the thing understood wherever and whenever they exist. On Aristotle’s own account the intellect in its nature is only “potential, ” it does not actually possess any form. Thus nothing prevents it from possessing all forms.

I examine Aristotle’s account of nous, the intellect or power of understanding, in the De Anima (DA) and the implications this account has for Aristotle’s conception of the human being. At the beginning of the DA, Aristotle presents what I argue is a condition for separability in existence: the soul is separable from the body if it has some activity that can be done without the body.
In order to determine whether Aristotle thinks the soul meets this condition, I lay out his metaphysical views concerning human beings. I argue that for Aristotle the human being, not the body or the soul, is the underlying subject of all human activities, including understanding. I then argue that Aristotle’s conception of the soul is compatible with the soul having powers and activities that do not involve the body. If the intellectual power and its activities can exist separately from the body, the human being can as well.
I present Aristotle’s account of the intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual, and use this account to reconstruct and defend Aristotle’s argument in III 4 that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. Understanding is universal, but any cognitive activity that operates through bodily organs will be particular.
I then argue that in DA III 5 Aristotle introduces a human intellectual power, the productive intellect, which draws out the intelligible characteristics of things from the images we possess in order to produce understanding. I maintain that my Human Intellect view, according to which Aristotle is claiming that the human intellect is undying and divine, is superior to the Divine Intellect view, on which Aristotle’s claim is about a divine extra-human intellect. On my view, understanding is not an activity that is done with the body, it only employs the soul. Aristotle can reasonably maintain that understanding no longer requires images after the destruction of the body, since there is no longer a need to coordinate with other cognitive powers. Human beings persist after death because we continue to understand, although we can no longer remember or experience emotions.

U radu razmatramo uticaj neoplatonizma (pre svega Plotina) na Avgustinovo mišljenje, fokusirajući se na deveto poglavlje sedme knjige Avgustinovih Ispovesti. Najpre se razmatra Avgustinova interpretacija Plotina. Prikazuju se paralelno principi Plotinove filozofije i Avgustinonova interpretacija. Zatim se razmatra Avgustinovo iskazivanje nezadovoljstva Plotinovim metafizičkim sistemom, koji mu nije dovoljan, i na koji odgovara citatima iz Biblije. Nastojimo da objasnimo razloge zbog kojih hrišćanin ne može biti zadovoljan Plotinovim učenjem. Sumu osnovnih razloga treba da ponudi zaključak rada.

What next? We are forever making decisions. Typically, when unsure, we try to identify, then compare, our options. We weigh pros and cons. Occasionally, we make the weighing explicit, listing pros and cons and assigning numerical weights. What could be wrong with that? In fact, things sometimes go terribly wrong. This paper considers what cost-benefit analysis can do, and also what it cannot.