"Threats, Prospects and Trends in Eritrean-Yemeni Waters"

17 Strategic Insights No. 34 | September 2011 © Risk Intelligence RED SEA/GULF OF ADEN Threats, prospects and trends in Eritrean-Yemeni waters DR. AWET WELDEMICHAEL HIOB LUDOLF GUEST PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG; FERNAND BRAUDEL FELLOW, UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DIDEROT - PARIS 7 Between November and December 1995, Eritrea and Yemen briefly fought over southern Red Sea islands and islets that an Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague described as “uniformly unattractive, waterless, and habitable only with great difficulty.” Nevertheless, roughly located between 14°10’N and 13°35’N and from 42°35’E to 43°E, and a mere 55 nautical miles north of Bab el-Mandeb where the Red Sea funnels into the Indian Ocean, the strategic significance of these archipelagos belies their size and inhabitability. The EritreanYemeni conflict accordingly had potentially far-reaching and disastrous consequences to the international sea lanes passing through that chokepoint. Although the dispute was settled through arbitration in 1998/1999, tensions continue, including accusations of piratical acts against traditional fishermen. Coupled with the region’s fast changing political and security dynamics, on the one hand these effects may complicate international efforts to curb spiralling piracy in the waters off the greater Horn of Africa. On the other hand, the unprecedented militarisation of those waters to contain piracy is proving detrimental to the countries of the southern Red Sea and is bound to worsen an already fragile region. From the roots to the outcome The end of the Cold War had visible local effects in the Greater Horn of Africa. In May 1990, South and North Yemen united under President Ali Abdellah Saleh in Sana’a. A year later, Eritreans defeated the mighty Ethiopian forces and became independent (formalised in 1993). The two immediately started to aggressively monitor what they considered to be their waters in the southern Red Sea, harassing, arresting, and expelling each other’s traditional fishermen for trespassing into their waters, as well as capturing Egyptian illegal fishers. Eritrea and Yemen granted overlapping concessions for oil exploration and engaged in what some observers considered to be competing tourism projects. Sana’a granted a German company a contract to build a hotel and a scuba diving facility in Hanish Kebir, which started in earnest in late 1995. On November 11th, Eritrea issued its own claim to the islands and gave Yemen a one-month ultimatum to withdraw its forces and halt the construction project. Yemen responded by reinforcing its garrison and preventing an Eritrean military landing in the islet. With reinforced units, Eritrea controlled most of the disputed islands after twelve Eritrean and unknown number of Yemeni soldiers were killed, and over 200 Yemeni soldiers were taken prisoners of war. With the international shipping lanes endangered, commercial vessels passing through the area were warned to avoid the Hanish archipelago. A flurry of diplomatic intervention prevented further escalation and led to the May 21th 1996 “Agreement of Principles” that set the stage for arbitration. Ruling on rival claims For Asmara and Sana’a, it was a winner-takes-all sovereignty dispute over the islands with direct bearing on investment, underwater mineral resource potentials and other localised national interests like traditional fishing rights. Signing up to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on December 10th 1982, the Yemen Arab Republic claimed “national sovereignty over all the islands in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean which have been its dependencies since the period when the Yemen and the Arab countries were a Turkish administration.” Acceding to UNCLOS in 1986, Ethiopia (of which Eritrea was a part until 1993) for its part protested the Yemeni declaration and claimed the Hanish archipelago for itself. Since Turkey relinquished its rights to Ottoman possessions at the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, however, questions of sovereignty over these southern Red Sea islands were neither pursued nor adequately addressed. While sovereignty of these islands thus remained in limbo, fishermen on both sides of the coast fished freely in the area to an extent that both Eritrea and Yemen sought to substantiate their claims at The Hague by arguing that these waters had been their traditional fishing grounds. Moreover, Eritrean independence fighters (from Ethiopia) used the islands as staging grounds to supply their forces inside Eritrea and harass the powerful modern Ethiopian navy with small speedboats mounted with machineguns – the equivalent of maritime ‘technicals’. »» 18 Strategic Insights No. 34 | September 2011 After reviewing historical maps and documents, and listening to depositions and oral defences from the Eritrean and Yemeni legal teams on competing notions of sovereignty, historical titles, and exercise of authority, the five-judge Tribunal rendered its verdict in two phases. On October 9th 1998, it awarded Eritrea the Mohabbakah islands (including the surrounding islets), and what are generally referred to as the Haycock Islands and the South West Rocks. Yemen was granted the Zuqur-Hanish islands (and surrounding islets as far south as Suyul Hanish), Jabal al-Tayr, Jabal Zubayr and the surrounding islets and rocks. In the second phase, the Tribunal determined the Eritrean-Yemeni maritime boundary on December 17th 1999. While distinct from each other, the awarding of sovereignty and boundary determination generally overlapped. Starting from a mid-sea point at the gates of Bab el-Mandeb in the south, the Eritrean-Yemeni maritime boundary today is made up of slightly zigzagging straight lines toward 15:43N and 41:35E, which places the international shipping lanes mostly on the Yemeni side. Rivalries and regional security dynamics Attendant political and security fluidity and accordingly intractable alliances, rivalries and enmities have characterised the Horn of Africa and south Arabia during © Risk Intelligence the tumultuous turn of the 21st century. Sudan’s destabilising Islamic expansionism compelled Eritrea to severe diplomatic ties in 1994. And Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt and Uganda became the United States’ “frontline states” to contain Khartoum. Suddenly, a 1998 border incident between Eritrea and Ethiopia rudely ended their short-lived honeymoon whereupon the two fought the bloodiest conventional war the region has seen. Active hostilities ceased in 2000, but tensions fester on because of Ethiopian reneging on a binding and final ruling of a mutually agreed upon boundary commission (the EEBC). In October 2002, a loose Ethiopian–Sudanese–Yemeni alliance seemed to take shape against Eritrea. Yemen’s acquisition of North Korean scud missiles in December 2002 only heightened tensions. With Eritrea backing Sudanese insurgencies (in the east as well as in Darfur while the 20-year-old southern rebellion had not yet been settled), however, the alliance fizzled amidst Khartoum’s foot-dragging and Sana’a’s caution in dealing with Asmara – as we will see shortly. Meanwhile, Iranian attempts to establish some influence in the Red Sea are being contested by two rival corners. First, Sunni dominated Arab countries of the Middle East see Iranian projection of power in the region as a Shiite attempt at subverting their faith and The boundary line ruling from the Hague Tribunal [Source: Permanent Court of Arbitration] »» 19 Strategic Insights No. 34 | September 2011 civilization. While most Arab countries quietly introduced domestic mechanisms to restrict possible Shiite expansion, others actively sought to contain Tehran’s hegemonic pretensions. Second, having long considered Iran as its most potent threat, Israel aggressively monitors and seeks to restrict Iranian encroachment. The two are competing for influence in the Red Sea region. Amidst this rivalry, Eritrea – frustrated with Western countries’ failure live up to their promise as guarantors of the peace agreement that Ethiopia rejected – sought ties with Iran. Since Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki visited Tehran in mid-2008 to cement a two-year courting, their relations have been shrouded in secrecy. Speculations abound that Iran has been using Eritrea as a forward base for its Red Sea strategy, including port calls of Iranian anti-piracy vessels and its 2009 slow sailing fleet to the Mediterranean. © Risk Intelligence Traditional fishing According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of the estimated 4 million fishing boats globally at the end of 2004, about 1.3 million were decked and mechanised, out of which 86 percent were in Asia and 1.3 percent in Africa. Given the overall poverty of both sides of the southern Red Sea and northern Gulf of Aden, it is safe to assume that an insignificant number of the fishing fleet there are decked. Traditional fishing crafts in those waters are, thus, open feluccas, sambuks, or ramas, all made locally out of wood and with loading capacity of no more than twelve seafarers. Although FAO estimates suggest that two thirds of the un-decked boats were operated by sail and oars, a growing number of vessels in the fishing fleet around Bab el-Mandeb are powered with outboard engines of varying horsepower. Using gillnet, handline and longline fishing techniques, artisanal fishermen in southern Red Sea meet family (often extended family) subsistence needs with commercial supply that rarely extends far beyond the local port towns. With basic communication technologies, and limited capacity of the local navies to offer timely assistance to fishermen in distress, the latter continue to find safety and support in fishing in large groups. And so it is not uncommon that many traditional fishing boats are spotted in close proximity to each other. The Yemeni coast guard on patrol [Source: Arabian Supply Chain] Adding to the long swirling claim that Israel maintains a listening post and supply base in Eritrean islands, The Sunday Times reported in April 2009 that Iran and Israel were running rival intelligence operations from Eritrea. In November 2009, the French News24 channel took this unconfirmed information a step further when it quoted an Eritrean opposition source based in Ethiopia as saying that the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen received arms from Iran through Eritrea. And as recently as June 2011, Saudi Arabian Al-Arabiya TV aired a long interview with a Kuwaiti professor who alleged that Iran has bases in Eritrean islands where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard also trains Shiite youth from the neighbouring countries. Given the ongoing instability in Yemen and its fluctuating relations with Eritrea, the possible spillover effects of Israeli-Iranian intelligence rivalry does not augur well for either country and the freedom of maritime navigation through their strategic waters. Nor does it hold pro-mise to vulnerable traditional fishing communities that may also be exploited by maritime criminals and also face risks during national and international responses. Sailors and prickly armed guards with limited or no experience in those waters have reported – and variously responded to – dangerous-looking formations of many small boats. For their part, traditional fishermen in the Greater Horn of Africa waters have complained of big commercial ships either tearing their fishing nets, their waves wrecking their small boats or even deliberately spraying them with hot water. Past and ongoing active conflicts have left the region with an abundance of firearms of all sizes and shapes, which makes traditional fishing boat formations rather tricky for suspicious commercial navies passing by. On the south-eastern side of the Red Sea, for example, automatic weapons are as common among Yemenis as are jembiyas (the curved traditional daggers), and rocket launchers and machineguns are openly traded in Sana’a’s outskirts. With an estimated 8–12 million guns in civilian possession (Yemen features prominently among the top ten in the world), the BBC once quoted a Yemeni professor as saying, “Just as you have your tie, the Yemeni will carry his gun.” In Eritrea, by contrast, private possession of all firearms is prohibited. But government enforcement cannot be expected to be watertight and more so in the high seas that are infested with gunrunners, contraband smugglers and human traffickers traversing the porous maritime borders. 2007 estimates of the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, for example, indicate that there »» 20 Strategic Insights No. 34 | September 2011 © Risk Intelligence were a total of 20,000 guns in private hands in Eritrea, which puts it low among the bottom ten in the world. Generally, moreover, with supply outstripping demand and insurgencies flaring up across both sides of southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, prices of weapons of war in that region have plummeted, making gun possession a matter of want. The contagion of Gulf of Aden piracy During the October 1998 award of sovereignty over the disputed Eritrean-Yemeni islands, the Tribunal impressed on the two sides that its awarding of “such sovereignty is not inimical to, but rather entails, the perpetuation of the traditional fishing rights in the region and 2005, Eritrea and Yemen officially exchanged each other’s nationals arrested for illegal fishing. Capturing each other’s traditional fishermen continued unabated. But when private Yemeni media reported in late 2009 that “Eritrean authorities continue[d] to arrest Yemeni fishing boats and harass their crews,” on November 16th official media (SABA) reported the alleged arrest of Yemeni fishermen and confiscation of their equipment as something perpetrated by pirates, signalling government attempt to deescalate simmering tensions caused by preceding allegations that Eritrea was an accessory to Iran providing weapons to the Houthis. Fishing vessels in the region may look like dangerous formations [Source: NATO] around the Hanish and Zuqar and the islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group.” Given that these are now sovereign Yemeni territories, the Tribunal placed the onus on Yemen to “ensure that the traditional fishing regime of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men ... including free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen.” Interpreting that as an equal right to fish in each other’s waters, Yemeni fishermen crossed into the Eritrean side only to be arrested by the Eritrean navy. The Yemeni navy reciprocated in kind by arresting Eritrean traditional fishermen in waters that the Arbitral Tribunal awarded to Yemen but allowed for Eritrean traditional fishing. Twice, in 2002 This type of reported “piracy” is different from the piracy plaguing the Gulf of Aden and to a lesser extent the Red Sea. But it may complicate regional and international efforts to curb it. Besides numerous “suspicious approaches”, MaRisk recorded 16 Somali pirate attacks in southern Red Sea during the first half of 2011. Indian Ocean monsoons displaced pirate activities back to waters just north of the heavy presence of international navies that IMB reported 14 such cases after May 20th alone. Almost all attacks involved the use of firearms. Lucrative ransoms that the pirates are collecting may be luring some individual Yemenis into the risky business of piracy as American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson told journalists in »» 21 Strategic Insights No. 34 | September 2011 London in March 2011. But there is no evidence to suggest that Yemeni (or Eritrean) traditional fishermen are involved in piratical activities. The Yemeni government, like its Eritrean counterpart, does not negotiate with pirates. Nor do Sana’a and Asmara allow armed private security guards into their waters. Both have relatively small but agile navies that have been correspondingly aggressive in asserting their control – smugglers not withstanding – and can be relied upon to help in the prevention of piracy from becoming the menace that it is in the Gulf of Aden. Besides numerous speedboats and possibly two frigates each, a 2011 report shows Eritrean navy consisting of the Super Dvora Mk II and Osa II class patrol boats whereas its Yemeni counterpart has Tarantul I class corvettes and Osa class missile boats. Moreover, Eritrea has many well-positioned islands, an advanced American-built naval base in Massawa, and a dry dock left behind by the Soviets in Asseb. International counter-piracy measures Nevertheless, repeated appeals by seafarers for the International Maritime Organization’s endorsement of, and the commercial navies’ active use of, armed private security guards on board ships, are transforming the scope and degree of militarisation of the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden waters that has been spearheaded by foreign governments. The deployment of private military companies in an already fragile security environment is having – and will continue to have – unpredictable and differing consequences. Several such companies – Lotus, Hart, PVI among others – have outsourced protection of ships that hire them to the Yemeni naval forces within the latter’s waters. Acting almost exclusively on instructions and operational details provided by such companies, the Yemeni forces are doing so to the detriment of their mandate – counter-terrorism, control of smugglers and human traffickers, and overall defence of Yemeni sovereignty. Moreover, the non-transparent wheeling and dealing with security companies, while undisclosed sums of money change hands, is likely to foster corruption that would undermine the credibility and capacity of the Yemeni navy and coastguard to meet domestic and international expectations. In a recent case, Protection Vessels International (PVI) committed a grave violation of local and international laws when its personnel deliberately occupied the uninhabited Eritrean islands of Ramia and Harmil between November and December 2010 and made a disguised port call at Massawa with hidden illegal weapons. When Eritrean navy intercepted and captured four of PVI’s British personnel, it touched off a consequential diplomatic row between Eritrea and the UK, which was only resolved six months later with Qatari government intercession. © Risk Intelligence Conclusion Although increasingly engine powered and armed with firearms, artisanal fishermen in southern Red Sea are generally averse to piracy as it undermines their harsh but otherwise stable livelihoods. The Eritrean and Yemeni states’ relatively better – although varying – control of their coasts also denies potential pirates the necessary overland safe havens to bring their catch to anchor. Their navies have been aggressively monitoring their respective waters with a considerable degree of success. But these positive scenarios are threatened and likely to change for a number of reasons. The festering political uncertainty in Yemen does not bode well for the security of the whole region. Nor do Eritrea’s external relations that involve Ethiopia’s declared goal of “pursuing regime change in Asmara” and the debilitating December 2009 UN Security Council sanctions. The unsustainably expensive militarisation of the regional waters, devoid of local capacity building and parallel pursuit of credible inland solutions, has a longer-term destabilising effect. In their impetuous, tactical and short-sighted military responses at sea to Somali piracy, foreign governments, commercial navies and contracted private security companies are introducing practices that will inevitably get out of control and backfire. National and international actors passing through traditional fishing areas in southern Red Sea (up to 100 miles north of Bab el-Mandeb) should err on the side of caution in telling pirates from fishermen lest their actions turn the latter into the former.