CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Emotions (Jeong/Qing 情)
in Korean Philosophy and Religion
Edward Y. J. Chung and Jea Sophia Oh
The nature of emotions was generally criticized in the Western tradition of
philosophy. This criticism of the emotional part of human nature and
experience is known to have its root in the mainstream Platonic tradition.
In other words, it has championed rationality/reason against emotionality/emotion, especially from certain scholarly standpoints. The Western
dualism of reason and emotion is Platonic in the sense that it endorses the
antagonism between reason and emotion, as Plato in the dialogue Phaedrus
described emotion and reason as two horses pulling us in opposite directions. Plato and Neo-Platonism clearly placed the highest value on reason/thinking over emotion/feeling based on the mind-body dualism.
E. Y. J. Chung (*)
Asian Studies and Religious Studies, University of Prince Edward Island,
Charlottetown, PE, Canada
e-mail: chung@upei.ca
J. S. Oh
Department of Philosophy, West Chester University of Pennsylvania,
West Chester, PA, USA
e-mail: JOH@wcupa.edu
© The Author(s) 2022
E. Y. J. Chung, J. S. Oh (eds.), Emotions in Korean Philosophy and
Religion, Palgrave Studies in Comparative East-West Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94747-7_1
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
The philosophical and spiritual traditions of Asia have been described
to embody a common emphasis on the suppression of or detachment from
the emotional side of the self. For about twenty-five centuries, the
Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions variously taught against the
“precarious,” “disturbing,” “afflicting,” “self-damaging,” or “poisonous”
nature/potential/danger of most (ordinary) emotions, feelings, sensations, desires, or inclinations.
We have recently seen an increasing interest in the discussion of emotions by many scholars in various academic disciplines, which resulted in
an impressive number of studies on emotion-related topics. It appears that
in critical reaction to Platonic philosophy, theological ethics, the conventional wisdom of Asian religion and thought, or other related factors, contemporary philosophers and ethicists tend to pay more attention to the
philosophical, psychological, or cognitive nature and role of emotions in
personal cultivation, ethics, socio-political development, and so on. In
other words, these scholars encourage the study of emotions for human
knowledge, action, and experience.
What we call “emotion” in English can have several meanings, as articulated by various theorists and scholars. Its interrelated words are said to
be “desire,” “feeling,” “sensation,” “sentiment,” “passion,” “affection,”
“attitude,” “belief,” “judgment,” and so on, most of which will be discussed from various angles in the next section on emotions in general, East
and West. As we know, emotions are universally what all human beings
feel, experience, and/or know: hence, they enjoy or suffer; be compassionate or cruel; be pleased or angry; be happy or unhappy; be afraid or
brave; be joyful or sorrowful (resentful); be proud or shameful; love or
hate; like or dislike; be generous or greedy; believe or disbelieve; or hope
or despair. Many of these emotional things also influence us to do or not
to do good for someone or something, although people’s social and emotional lives are highly fluid because their emotions are intricate and
dynamic.
Accordingly, the study of emotions is not just a branch of psychology
or its similar field but, more importantly, a branch or even the heart of
ethics as well as a vital component of comparative philosophy and religion
for us. In this regard, the neglect of East Asia and especially Korea in emotion studies has inspired us to compile this book on the fascinating topic
of emotions in Korean philosophy and religion.
In discussing the question “What is emotion?” Western scholarship
has often underestimated other important questions about emotions:
1 INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
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Why is an emotion aroused; why are emotions diverse; why nourish some
emotions and suppress others; and how different groups/types of emotions relate to the heart-mind, the self, and the world? This introductory
chapter and other chapters of this book will flexibly address these related
questions in the interdisciplinary context of philosophy, religion, and
culture.
The Korean and East Asian notion of “emotions” (feelings; jeong/qing
情)1 is a manifold topic textually, historically, philosophically, ethically, and
religiously. It is diverse, dynamic, and sophisticated in terms of meaning,
experience, role, problem, and so forth. It is therefore important to study
the way in which emotions are expressed, understood, accepted, promoted, or repudiated in all philosophical and spiritual traditions in general
as well as by each particular tradition.
The multilayered and interdisciplinary meanings of emotions can generate certain theoretical and methodological questions that seem to have
developed recent Western scholarship on various philosophical, religious,
psychological, social, or cultural theories and definitions of emotions.
Obviously, one single book like this one or another cannot satisfy all of the
aspects of emotions. We, nonetheless, the authors in this volume are mindful of these issues centering around the dynamic and distinctive flow of
emotions in the Korean framework of Confucian, comparative, Buddhist,
and contemporary perspectives.
This introductory chapter therefore consists of four sections. The first
section presents the general topic of emotions, East and West by briefly
covering current scholarship in emotion studies. Several leading theories
and perspectives and their related issues are discussed in terms of Western
scholarship and East Asian thought. It also addresses the dichotomy of
reason and emotion and the diversity of emotions according to the standard categories of emotions and feelings.
1
The word “emotion” basically refers to “a moving, stirring, agitation and perturbation,”
whereas “feeling” basically means “the sense of touch in the looser acceptance of the term,
in which it includes all physical sensibility not referable to the special senses of sight, hearing,
taste, and smell” (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 1971, s.v. “emotion”). Note that the East Asian term jeong/qing generally means “emotions” as well as
“feelings.” We, therefore, use two English words, “emotions” and “feelings” interchangeably. Overall, the term jeong/qing refers to emotion, feeling, sensation, and other related
words, engaging the body as well as the heart-mind in the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist
traditions of philosophy and religion.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
The second section discusses the Chinese Confucian and related traditions of philosophy and religion by covering their essential textual, ethical,
and religious development with respect to the holistic notion, role, and
problem of emotions and its related words. The third section presents
emotions in the Buddhist tradition by covering Buddha’s teaching and
Theravada, Indian Mahāyāna, and Chinese and Korean perspectives. The
first three sections of this chapter are organized as follows:
1.1. Emotions in General, East and West
1.1.1. Theories of Emotions
1.1.2. A Fundamental Issue with Conventional Theories
1.1.3. Dichotomy of Emotion and Reason
1.1.4. Diversity of Emotions
1.2. Emotions (Jeong/Qing 情) in the Chinese Tradition: Textual,
Philosophical, Ethical, and Religious
1.2.1. Emotions in Early (Pre-Buddhist) China
1.2.2. Emotions in Classical Chinese Confucianism
1.2.2.1. Confucius: True Emotions and Human Character
1.2.2.2. The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean on
the Seven Emotions
1.2.2.3. Mencius: Four Beginnings, Moral Emotions, and
Self-cultivation
1.2.3. Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism on Emotions, Human Nature,
and the Four-Seven Relationship
1.2.4. Wang Yangming on Selfish Emotions, Essence of HeartMind, and Moral Practice
1.3. Emotions in the Buddhist Tradition
1.3.1. Buddha’s Teaching and Theravada
1.3.2. Indian Mahāyāna Perspectives: Great Compassion and
Ultimate Joy
1.3.3. Chinese and Korean Mahāyāna Perspectives: Tiantai, Chan,
Pure Land, Wonhyo, and Jinul
This structure and scope of our discussion are indeed necessary for this
introductory chapter because of China’s strong influence on Korean
Confucianism and Buddhism, which will effectively serve as a textual, philosophical, and religious background of Korean traditions and ideas. This
section also considers certain comparative and cross-cultural perspectives
as well.
1 INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
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As indicated above, this chapter does not offer a separate section on
emotions in the Chinese Daoist tradition because this topic is historically
and religiously beyond the key theme and scope of our book that focus on
Korean Confucian, comparative, contemporary, and Buddhist perspectives.2 However, we also note that some interesting Chinese Daoist perspectives are briefly mentioned here and there in Sect. 1.1 (Emotions in
General, East and West) and Sect. 1.2.1 (Emotions in Early (Pre-Buddhist)
China) of this chapter.
The fourth and final section of this chapter focuses on the topic of
“Korean” jeong/emotions according to its philosophic, religious, and cultural contexts, traditions, and ideas. It is an integrated introduction to and
summary of all three parts of the book as well as all chapters of each part.
Each subsection of this section consists of two or three discussion items as
follows:
1.4. Emotions (Jeong/Qing 情) in Korean Philosophy and Religion
1.4.1. Korean Confucian Perspectives
1.4.1.1. The Holistic Nature, Role, and Problem of Jeong:
Emotions, Self-cultivation, Human Relationships,
Ethics, and Beyond
1.4.1.2. An Introduction to Part I, Chaps. 2–5: Korean
Confucian Perspectives
1.4.2. Comparative Korean Confucian Perspectives
2
To be specific, there are three related historical, thematic, and editorial reasons. First,
Daoism historically did not become an established or independent religion or a competing
school of thought in traditional Korea. This was mainly due to the well-known fact that
Korean religion, philosophy, and culture were dominated by Buddhism in the Goryeo
dynasty (918–1392) and then by (Neo-)Confucianism during the Yi Joseon dynasty
(1392–1897). However, Daoism has influenced the Korean traditions of yin-yang philosophy, herbal medicine, qigong meditation, geomancy and fortunetelling system, nature poetry
and landscaping, traditional burial funeral, and so on. Second, early China’s leading Daoists
such as Laozi (sixth century BCE) and Zhuangzi (late fourth century BCE) strongly repudiated the mundane problem and danger of selfish desires (yok/yu 欲) and emotions (jeong/qing
情) by emphasizing Dao, natural freedom, and mystical (tranquil/ascetic) life. Unlike the
Confucian tradition, however, Daoism did not directly shape or influence the Korean moral
philosophy and social ethics of jeong in terms of what this book as a whole presents. Third,
for these two historical and thematic reasons, this introductory chapter does not need to
include a separate section to discuss the Chinese Daoist philosophy of emotions. This is also
because the goal of this book on Korean emotions cover the Korean Confucian, comparative,
contemporary, and Buddhist perspectives.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
1.4.2.1. An Introduction to Part II, Chaps. 6 and 7:
Comparative Confucian Perspectives
1.4.2.2. An Introduction to Part II, Chap. 8 and Part III,
Chap. 12: Confucianism and Social Emotions: Jeong,
Han, Heung, and Women
1.4.3. Korean Buddhist and Contemporary Perspectives
1.4.3.1. Wonhyo
and
Jinul
on
Emotions
and
Emotional Control
1.4.3.2. Great Compassion and Joy
1.4.3.3. An Introduction to Part III, Chaps. 9–11: Emotions
in Won Buddhism, Modern Buddhism, and Korean
Buddhist Cinema
We present all of this introductory discussion in terms of the holistic,
manifold, and dynamic nature, roles, and problems of Korean jeong. It
also outlines the thematic scope and relevance of each part, summarizes
the common or different aspects of all chapters in each part, and then
emphasizes each chapter’s unique contribution to the discussion of
“Korean” emotions. Key aspects of this holistic theme will be elaborated
further in the concluding Chap. 13 of this book.
As indicated above, this introductory chapter does not offer a separate
section on emotions in the Korean traditions of Christianity, shamanism,
and “new religions” because this topic is beyond the key theme and scope
of our present volume. The book therefore does not provide chapters on
these other Korean perspectives.3 However, we also note that some interesting points about Korean theological, shamanistic, and Daoist perspectives are briefly mentioned in this introductory chapter, some other
chapters (e.g., Chaps. 8, 11, and 12), and the concluding chapter.
3
Note 2 already explains why we have no section on Chinese Daoism in this introductory
chapter and, thus, why Sect. 1.4 on emotions in Korean philosophy and religion provides no
subsection on Korean Daoist perspectives. In the near future, we can certainly consider a new
project as the second volume of this book dedicated to Korean Christianity, shamanism, “new
religions” (e.g., Cheondogyo; formerly known as Donghak [Eastern learning]), and Daoist
culture.
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1.1
INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
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Emotions in GEnEral, East and WEst
What is emotion? As the Asian and Western histories of “emotions studies” tend to indicate, we have no absolute or universal answer to this question. Both traditions of philosophy or religion have developed various
perspectives and insights, each of which embodies its own context, emphasis, or examples. Whether we talk about Korean, Eastern, Western, or
cross-cultural perspectives, the term “emotion(s)” would pertain to the
many dynamic and related aspects of human existence and experience.
As Robert C. Solomon, an American continental philosopher, points
out, in the Western tradition “the word emotion shifts its meaning from
age to age, culture to culture …. The word emotion itself has been in
common use (as opposed to the older word, passion) for only a few hundred years, and what counts as an emotion (and what does not) also
changes” (Solomon 1995b: 257).4 Indeed, no particular philosophical,
religious, or psychological category can sufficiently help us explain all
(types of) emotions, including Chinese and Korean jeong/qing as well. In
the West, emotion is flexibly defined or discussed according to different
theories and approaches, whether classical or contemporary.
From a comparative and cross-cultural standpoint, we believe that
“emotion” is not necessarily a uniformly one category like what Aristotle
(1926) called a “natural” kind or does not pertain only to what the Buddha
and Theravada Buddhism called venada (“sensation” or “feelings’).5 Nor
is emotion something that is limited only to what William James, an eminent psychologist (of religion), calls physiological “sensations” (or the
feelings of bodily changes) (1984, 1990)6 or what the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith calls “sentiments” (A. Smith 2009).7
4
See Marks’s and Ames’s edited volume (1995). See also Solomon (2001, 2003) and
Rorty (1980) for the history of Western theories and interpretations of emotion.
5
For more on the Buddhist notion of venada (“sensation”) as the word for “emotion” in
English, see Sect. 1.3.1 (Emotions in the Buddhist Tradition: Buddha’s teaching and
Theravada.
6
James asked his famous question, “What Is an Emotion?” What he attempted to convince
us rather unsuccessfully is that the answer to this question should fundamentally be how to
identify the general category of emotions as none other than physio-psychological changes
(phenomena).
7
Smith emphasized that certain emotions are moral sentiments. Human nature includes
these sentiments such as sympathy toward fellow human beings. This therefore identified
“sympathy” as an essential motivation for the virtue of “universal benevolence.” See Adam
Smith (2009: 10–13 (sect. I, chapters I and II), 345–349 (sect. II, chapter III)).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
It is therefore important to be open-minded to using an integrated,
broad approach to the study of emotions, one that can handle not just a
particular, specific theory or idea but also multi-philosophical, interreligious, or cross-cultural perspectives.
1.1.1
Theories of Emotions
One theory of emotions focuses on the link between emotions and the
human body, according to which basic human emotions are identical or
similar because of their common physiological functions. This commonality of emotions is therefore based on the human biological condition that
human nature is basically shaped by our natural tendency of emotions and
feelings. From a philosophical standpoint, this “natural theory” resonates
with what Aristotle called the “natural” kind or even the Rousseauian view
of “natural” emotions and feelings as the moral foundation of human life.8
Similarly, it is also somewhat compatible with the Confucian teaching of
moral feelings that are innate in the human heart-mind. According to
Mencius (372–289 BCE), this “innate goodness” makes human nature
universally good and naturally enables all human beings “love their parents” and “be compassionate” to others (Mencius, 2A: 6; 6A: 6).9
On the whole, however, we know that emotions are not always limited
to the category of being biologically natural/innate. As outlined below,
there are certain emotions that appear to be morally motivated, socially
shaped/constructed, culturally informed, or educationally learned.
Overall, different moral, philosophical, and religious traditions have developed and still talk about different types of emotions. For example, some of
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese jeong/emotions are based on their moral
8
According to Aristotle (1926), Nicomachean Ethics, “desire,” “temper,” and “pleasure”
are “natural” (book 3, chapter 11; book 7, chapters 5, 12); see also Aristotle 1954 (1924),
Rhetoric, book 2, chapters 1–11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) believed that human
beings like their natural desires for “self-preservation” and are naturally self-contended.
Human emotions are therefore the natural source of morality. Rousseau affirmed emotions
as morally legitimate, thereby identifying the principle of moral good with emotions, which
made him an important thinker in the “romantic” philosophical movement. See Rousseau’s
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (2011); see also Gauthier (2006), Neidleman (2017),
and Neuhouser (2014).
9
For details on this topic, see this introductory chapter, Sect. 1.2.2.3 (Mencius: Four
Beginnings …); see also Chaps. 2 and 4 of Part I (Korean Confucian Perspectives).
1 INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
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principles, human relationships (e.g., five human relationships in the
Confucian tradition), social values, or cultural norms and expectations.
In some cases, emotions are also interpreted as “patterns of behavior”
so “behaviorism” is claimed to be another contemporary theory of emotions. Behavioral expression is important because it is experienced or
understood by the participants themselves. It is also argued that emotions
are independent on the established cultural context of certain rules, norms,
or expectations. To some extent, this theory does not contradict, for
example, some moral emotions promoted by Confucianism in Korea and
elsewhere in East Asia. Confucian culture informs, for example, the moral
virtue of filial piety—or family love which includes both filial piety and
parental love. Chinese or Korean moral culture therefore expects this kind
of moral emotions from children in their proper behavior: Another key
example is Confucian emphasis on the moral emotion of propriety (ye/li
禮), one of “the four cardinal virtues of Confucianism.”10
Human beings participate in society. All of us do this more or less, for
which reason our emotions, feelings, desires, or inclinations assimilate to
group (social) things and can eventually become socially conditioned
or “constructed.” In other words, emotions are basically “the product of
society,” which concurs with the behavioral theory as well. We can suggest
that this theory is somewhat compatible with the Confucian emotion of
shame, which tends to depend on established Confucian morality and
social relationships as well. East Asian shame is not exactly the same as
what a Westerner might personally feels shameful. The Korean emotion of
shame is rooted in the Mencian Confucian doctrine on the innate “moral
heart-mind (feeling) of shame-and-aversion” (suo ji sim/xiuwu zhi xin 羞
惡之心), one of the so-called Four Beginnings that is identified as the
moral root of justice (righteousness; eui/yi 義), another cardinal virtue
(Mencius, 2A: 6; 6A: 6).11 This tradition is still relevant or influential
among contemporary East Asian people, including many Koreans.
We can argue that the social constructionist theory of emotions underestimates those emotions that are expressed through ethical thinking (reasoning) or one’s subjective intellectual motivation. It also tends to ignore
the subjective or spiritual experience of certain emotions that are deeply
rooted in religious faith (beliefs), for example, compassion in Buddhism.
We will further discuss this below, as well as in Sect. 1.2.2 (Emotions in
10
11
For more on this topic, see Sect. 1.2.2 of this chapter.
For other details on this topic, see n. 9 above.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
Classical Chinese Confucianism) and Sect. 1.3.2 (Indian Mahāyāna
Perspectives) of this introductory chapter.
Another interesting (contemporary) theory of emotions is developed
by Joel Marks, a specialist in the Western ethics of emotions, whose analysis of emotions focuses on what he calls the “strong desire component” of
emotion. As he says, “emotions … are strong feelings” and “emotions or
passions have a strong desire component” (1995b: 140, 2013).12 Marks
therefore theorizes emotions as desires and supports the “cognitive
nature” of emotions. This is partly why he defends dispassion for one’s
ethical life from his comparative Buddhist standpoint (1995b: 143).13 In
Sect. 1.3.1 (Buddha’s Teaching and Theravada), this view is articulated a
little further and also criticized by those ethicists of emotions who support
passions for the ethical meaning of life.
In our comparative and cross-cultural view, even though some emotions may be desires or desire-based feelings, it does not follow that all
emotions themselves are desires or have a “strong desire component”
(Marks’s phrase). This theory can work with, for example, the Confucian
emotion of compassion (sympathy), one of the Four Beginnings because
according to Mencius, the moral heart–mind of compassion is basically an
innate intuition and desire “to do good.” However, there are also good
desires and bad desires. In our view, certain emotions are not considered
as desires at all. For example, although everyone desires (wishes) to be
happy or pleased, nobody ever desires sorrow (or suffering), a major emotion, and no one desires to suffer or to be sorrowful for no unfortunate or
unavoidable reasons such as death, sickness, or similar tragedies. Likewise,
no one desires (wishes for) anger, another strong emotion East and West,
or desires to be angry without any good or justified reason.
Another contemporary theory of emotions emphasizes emotions as
“judgments.” Its leading spokesperson is Solomon who argues that “emotion consists, at least in part, of ways of consciously being in the world,
which I call ‘judgments.’ Judgments require concepts” (1995b: 253).14 In
other words, emotions are aroused through reasoning and judging and
12
For this topic on Marks’s ethics of emotions and “desirism,” see also Marks’s full-length
book (2013).
13
This article is Marks’s “Dispassion and the Ethical Life,” a chapter in Marks and
Ames (1995).
14
See also Solomon’s other works (1993, 1995a, 2001) for more details on his ethics of
emotions as “judgments.”
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
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thus can work with the human intellect (i.e., cognition) while engaging
with subjective and personal experience. Furthermore, an emotional judgment is not a desire or belief; this is why Solomon opposes Marks’s desire
theory. As Solomon writes: “[Emotions] are modes of construal ways of
viewing and engaging in the world …. Like most judgments … they are
culturally taught, cognitively framed, but implemented by the individual.
They are … constitutive of the world, our world, as fearsome, offensive,
appealing, hopeful, painful” (Solomon 1995b: 276).
This theory is interesting but also a naïve academic assumption. To
some extent, it can be applied to some of East Asian emotions such as
Confucian righteousness (eui/yi) and Buddhist wisdom that are both
based on the moral discernment and judging of “right and wrong.”
However, not all emotions are subjective emanations arising from cognitive judgments. For example, the heart-mind (moral emotion) of
Confucian compassion, according to the idealist Mencius, is naturally
“inborn (innate)” in the original “goodness of human nature”; in other
words, it is not socially “constructed” or culturally contextualized or
learned. It is rather a spontaneous moral intuition/emotion to do good
for other human beings “without having to learn” or without cognitively
“judging” others or their situations. In this regard, Solomon’s theory of
emotions as nothing but judgments is certainly narrow and limited and
does not accommodate these moral and spiritual kinds of emotions.
1.1.2
A Fundamental Issue with Conventional Theories
All of the theories of emotions we have outlined so far have more or less
contributed to the ongoing development of emotion studies. Each of
them is distinctive in its own way and can also apply to some of Korean East
Asian emotions in relation to their Confucian, Buddhist, and related traditions and interpretations. On the whole, however, emotions are not just
judgments, desires, natural innate feelings, physiological sensations, feelings of bodily changes, or certain behavioral patterns that are socially constructed or culturally contextualized. What we call emotions from a global
standpoint or an anthropocosmic worldview exists at and also shapes the
very heart of human life and experience in harmony or conflict with the
mundane or transcendent dimension of the self and the universe.
In our view, these theories and opinions have a lingering tendency to
neglect or underestimate the moral-spiritual experience of certain emotions that are deeply rooted in religious faith or spiritual practice. For
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
example, “(great) compassion” in Mahāyāna Buddhism (Indian, East
Asian, or international)—like Christian agape (love)—is ultimately not
just human but also divine. It cannot be passionately practiced without
religious faith in the Mahāyānist doctrine of karuna, the selfless and
unlimited compassion of bodhisattvas. Likewise, the “ultimate joy” of
Mahāyāna Buddhism cannot be attained without having this faith.15
Ancient Chinese Daoist masters such as Laozi and Zhuangzi harshly
repudiated the selfishness and danger of worldly concepts, emotions, and
desires for ruining the true self as well as natural order and harmony. For
Laozi, the Daoist attainment of emotionlessness and desirelessness
(mujeong/wuqing 無情) means the transcendent enjoyment of what
Zhuangzi calls the utmost “joy” (rak/le 樂) of spiritual “freedom” and
“supreme being.”16 This is not an ordinary emotion but rather a religious
type of spiritual experience that engages a this-worldly type of mysticism.
In other words, transcendence beyond the mundane world of ordinary
knowledge and rationality is emphasized here in a religious, mystical
context.17
In short, classical Chinese or later Korean debates—whether Confucian,
Daoist, or Buddhist—on emotions were very interested in understanding
and teaching the quality, role, and problem of emotional experiences not
just morally, psychologically, or socially but also spiritually and religiously
in search for the transcendent (i.e., sagely or enlightened) reality of human
existence.
15
For our detailed discussion of this topic, see Sect. 1.3.2 (Indian Mahāyāna Perspectives)
and Sect. 1.3.3 (Chinese and Korean Mahāyāna Perspectives).
16
See Zhuangzi (2000), A Concordance to the Zhuangzi, 5/15/20–25, 18/48/9–13;
Watson’s translation (2013: 40–41, 140–141).
17
Laozi’s Daodejing (Lau 1979) emphasizes “no desires” (muyok/wuyu 無欲) and
muwi/wuwei (無為; non-action) to become united with the mystical world of Dao by pursuing a simple, natural course of life. The Zhuangzi in its seven “inner chapters” strongly
condemns desires as that which potentially contaminate one’s true mind and damage one’s
spiritual being. It calls for a mystical (religious) way to transcend worldly concepts, emotions,
and desires and enjoy “formless” being and spiritual (mystical) “joy.” See Zhuangzi (2000),
5/15/20–25, 18/48/9–13; Watson (2013: 40–41, 140–141). For a good historical and
textual discussion of emotions in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, see also Virág (2017: 75–100,
133–162).
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
1.1.3
13
Dichotomy of Emotion and Reason
In the Western tradition of philosophy, emotion (passion) was said to be
the antithesis or opponent of reason. In other words, the emotional tendency of feelings and passions goes against or deviate from the intellectual
(philosophic) enterprise of rationality. This century-old conventional criticism of emotions endeavored to defend the ultimate meaning of philosophy itself as the love of reasoning, not feeling.18 Notheless, philosophy
(φιλοσοφία) means the love of wisdom (σοφία) in Greek etymology, and
wisdom is not merely reason alone but also the creative outcome of experience that has become integrated together with our emotions enabling this
process. Considering the fluidity of wisdom between feeling and thinking
as an acquired outcome via balancing emotional and logical thinking,
what has challenged the contemporary ethics of emotions seems to center
around the so-called Neo/Platonic dichotomy of emotion versus reason.
Certain theorists of emotions have argued that emotion and passion are
not in conflict with reason or cognition. For example, in his study of emotive rationality, Ronald de Sousa (1987), a leading philosopher of emotions, notes that the power of emotions enables the core purpose of
philosophy with respect to our rational thinking about human nature life
and experience (1987: 1–20). Furthermore, Marks’s theory of emotions
as desires and Solomon’s theory of emotions as judgments all support the
cognitive nature of emotions: in Marks’s case, desiring means cognitively
knowing what to desire for; and in Solomon’s case, judgments “need concepts,” so one’s judging assimilates to some level of one’s reasoning (i.e.,
cognition).
These endorsements of the rationalistic relevance of emotions relatively
fit in with the Korean and East Asian traditions of philosophy and religion
that played an important role in developing the intellectual (cognitive),
moral, emotional, and spiritual (religious) faculties of the entire human
self. This topic will be addressed further in the next sections of this
18
Some prominent thinkers defended passion against this criticism. For example, David
Hume (1978) proclaimed reason as “the slave of the passions.” We also know G. W. F. Hegel’s
eloquent saying (1956), no great accomplishment in the world “without passion.”
Theologically (specifically, given the theology of John’s Gospel and Letters), Christ is known
as logos (λόγος) incarnated while the divine wisdom (σοφία) has often been interpreted as the
divine feminine, “compassion” that cannot be designated merely in the realm of thinking.
According to Elizabeth Johnson, sophia (σοφία) is self-giving love and empowering love to
and in all of Her creation. See Johnson’s She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological
Discourse (2002).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
introductory chapter on the diversity of emotions, emotions in the Chinese
traditions, and emotions in Korean philosophy and religion. The Chinese
and Koreans have addressed whether emotions are morally good or bad
(evil), human or inhuman, honorable or precarious, altruistic or selfish, or
acceptable or unacceptable. In discussing human nature and the world,
the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist masters therefore articulated why
emotions arise and how the emotions function in interaction with the
body and heart-mind as well as in response to external stimulus by things
and phenomena.
Commenting on emotions (qing) in early (pre-Buddhist) Chinese
thought, Hansen argues that instead of having any serious interest in the
conflict between reason and emotion, early Chinese thinkers focused more
on the nature and role of qing, the “single faculty/organ,” the xin heartmind … rather than separate faculties of heart and mind” (Hansen 1995:
183).19 Likewise, in her book, The Emotions 情 in Early Chinese Philosophy,
Curie Virág keenly points out that early (pre-Buddhist) Chinese thinkers—including Mencius (372–289 BCE), Laozi (sixth century BCE), and
Zhuangzi (late fourth century BCE)—believed that “emotion and cognition … were the domain of a single faculty—the mind/heart (xin 心) …
accordingly, regarded the cognitive and emotive faculties as part of a fully
integrated whole … emotions are indistinguishable from what one might,
in the ‘West,’ refer to as ‘thinking’ or ‘reasoning’” (Virág 2017: 2).
This is also why in Korea eminent Neo-Confucians such as Yi Toegye
(1501–1570) and Yi Yulgok (1536–1584) and famous Buddhist thinkers
like Wonhyo (617–686) and Jinul (1158–1210) did not distinguish emotion from reason (cognition), and vice versa because they were informed
by and used to their traditional belief and teaching that the heart-mind
(sim/xin 心) is one single holistic faculty that coordinates, apprehends, or
commands the entire self with respect to rationality, emotionality, morality, and spirituality.20 Accordingly, Korean jeong/emotions are said to
engage the entire self, including the body as well as the heart-mind, as in
the case of Confucian or Buddhist philosophy and spirituality.
19
Paul Hansen’s article “Qing (Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought” is a book
chapter in Marks and Ames (1995).
20
For details on this topic regarding eminent Korean Buddhist monks, see Sect. 1.4.3.1 on
Wonhyo and Jinul. For Korean Neo-Confucian perspectives, see Sect. 1.4.1; for Toegye, see
Chap. 2 and 3; for Yulgok, see Chap. 4.
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
1.1.4
15
Diversity of Emotions
In many traditions of philosophy, religion, or culture, certain emotions are
admired as moral and recommended to be cultivated, while some other
emotions are repudiated, feared, or avoided. Some emotions are cherished
as essential social virtues, whereas other emotions are believed to be selfish
or potentially evil and therefore require to be controlled or eliminated.
Due to their manifold diversity and multilevel integration as experienced by human beings, we need to study how emotions arise and are
understood. This study seriously considers textual, philosophical, and
spiritual (religious) perspectives. As mentioned before, the term “emotions” would refer to an entire spectrum of interrelated emotive phenomena. Emotions are or related to: physiological sensations, physical responses
to external stimuli, natural or biological feelings and inclinations, passions,
affections, beliefs, desires, judgments, attitudes, behavioral patterns,
innate moral feelings, moral sentiments/intuitions, and even “emotionless” (“desireless”) tranquility (emotion) in Daoism.
In current studies of emotions, we know that emotions like anger,
hated, and fear usually get more attention probably because of their distinctive characteristics. Desire and love are also mentioned from different
angels. Other emotions such as hatred, jealousy, and craving are repudiated negatively. Righteous anger or justified hatred is rather interesting
but considered a little more ethically complicated as “moral indignation.”
This topic will be discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5 of this book by Edward
Chung and Don Baker according to Yi Yulgok and Jeong Dasan
(1762–1836), respectively, two of the most eminent Confucian thinkers in
traditional Korea.
Ironically, however, it is worthwhile to note that sorrow (grief), resentment (or lamentation), and gratitude are often ignored or get much less
attention in Western scholarship without any clear reason. Nonetheless,
these emotions are commonly experienced and talked about in other cultures such as Korea; this is partly why Chungnam Ha’s Chap. 10 of this
book discusses the two religious and ethical emotions of “resentment and
gratitude” according to modern Korean Won Buddhism.
By contrast, compassion and sympathy are frequently discussed with
admiration or care, and other moral sentiments and virtues are regularly
included in the Western or Asian category of emotions for their obvious
significance in the study or practice of ethics and spirituality. As we know,
Confucianism and Mahāyāna Buddhism are well known for these related
16
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
virtuous emotions in two distinctive ways. Particularly in the West, the
emotions of sympathy and compassion are also academically emphasized
in the study of “virtue ethics” (e.g., Slote 2007, 2010).21 This is somewhat
compatible with the Mencian and Korean Neo-Confucian interpretation
of compassion (sympathy) as the emotive-moral root of the universal virtue of benevolence (in/ren).
In three parts of this book, we collectively address all these kinds of
human emotions and feelings22 according to Korean Confucian, comparative, Buddhist, and contemporary perspectives, many of which are more or
less related to Chinese origin or influence. Particular “regular” emotions
and feelings are: pleasure (happiness; hui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu 怒), sorrow (ae/ai 哀), joy (delight; rak/le 樂), fear (gu/ju 懼), love (ae/ai 愛),
hatred (dislike; o/wu 惡), and desire (yok/yu 欲).
Other Korean emotions such as resentment (won/yuan 怨), suffering
(deep resentment/lamentation; han/hen 恨), and utmost joy (exhilaration; heung 興) are often noted, especially in Korean emotion talks regarding Confucian ethics, Won Buddhism, or “social emotions” in Korea. Don
Baker’s Chap. 5 on Jeong Dasan’s ethics of emotions mentions resentment (won/yuan), an important but rarely discussed emotion in the
orthodox Neo-Confucian literature. Chungnam Ha’s Chap. 10 presents
the Korean Won Buddhist teaching of resentment and gratitude. Iljoon
Park’s Chap. 8 on “[Korean] social emotions” discusses han suffering and
heung exhilaration, two common psychological-social emotions in modern Korea.
As mentioned in the next sections on Chinese and Korean emotions, all
chapters of this book discuss Confucian-influenced Korean moral feelings
such as “compassion” (cheugun/ceyin 惻隱), “shame and aversion”
(suo/xiu 羞惡), “courtesy and modesty” (sayang/cirang 辭讓), and
21
For example, according to the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776), certain
emotions embody moral priority (essence) and are therefore important for human nature
and moral virtues (Hume 1978, 1998). Adam Smith (1723–1790), another Scottish moral
thinker, emphasized the virtuous significance of “sympathy” (or “mutual sympathy”) in
direct relation to “universal benevolence” (Smith 2009: 10–13, 345–349), which is the most
important cardinal virtue of Confucianism as well. More recently, Michael Slote’s interpretation of “virtue ethics” is based on the moral power of “empathy” and “care” (Slote
2007, 2010).
22
In the Confucian, Daoist, or Buddhist tradition, the term jeong/qing generally refers to
emotions, feelings, passions, sensations, or related words, engaging the body as well as the
heart-mind.
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17
“discernment of right and wrong” (sibi/shifei 是非), all of which are commonly known as the Four Beginnings of virtue (sadan/siduan) in the
Confucian textual and Neo-Confucian commentary tradition.23 In the
Korean Confucian tradition, compassion (sympathy; empathy) is an innate
virtuous feeling, which is variously discussed in Part I of this book by
Bongrae Seok (Chap. 2), Gabriel S. Choi (Chap. 2), and Edward Chung
(Chap. 4), as well as in two comparative-theme chapters of Part II by
Joseph E. Harroff (Chap. 6) and Hyo-Dong Lee (Chap. 7).
Other virtuous emotions such as gyeong/jing 敬 (reverence; mindfulness; respect) and xiao 孝 (filial affection) are honored and encouraged,
especially by the Confucian tradition. Choi’s Chap. 4 in particular deals
with Yi Toegye’s Korean ethics of gyeong reverence and emotions. Other
moral virtues, including ren 仁 (benevolence; human-heartedness) and li
禮 (ritual propriety), are also mentioned in the next sections on Chinese
and Korean emotions and frequently discussed in many other chapters.
The Buddhist practice of compassion is also very significant in Korea
and East Asia, insofar as it is based on the Buddha’s teaching of nirvana
and the Mahāyāna Bodhisattava’s doctrine of self-sacrificing compassion
(karuṇā) for universal enlightenment. This is flexibly discussed in three
chapters by Ha, Lucy H. Jee, and Sharon Suh on modern Korean Buddhist
perspectives in Part III of this book.
Bad, selfish, or precarious emotions are repudiated and therefore
required to be controlled or eliminated in accordance with moral principles and practice. For all Chinese and Korean traditions of philosophy and
religion, this is an essential part of self-cultivation for the full realization
and practice of human goodness. Confucianism and Buddhism each provided a well-known system of moral-spiritual practice as well. Daoism and
Buddhism each emphasized its own distinctive way of detachment from all
selfish emotions, desires, and cravings, thereby encouraging a naturalistic
(or mystical) Daoist life away from society or a monastic Buddhist
discipline.
23
For the Korean Four-Seven debates on emotions, see Kalton et al. 1994; Ching 1985;
Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Seok 2018; Tu 1985b. See also Chung 1995,
2016, 2020, 2021 (a new book on Toegye’s moral and religious thought), each of which has
a specific chapter on the Korean Neo-Confucian ethics and spirituality of emotions according
to the Four-Seven debate.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
1.2
Emotions (JEONG/QING 情) in thE ChinEsE
tradition: tExtual, PhilosoPhiCal, EthiCal,
and rEliGious
1.2.1
Emotions in Early (Pre-Buddhist) China
The Chinese word qing (情 emotions) has changed its meanings over
many centuries in East Asia as its counterpart did in the West. Its manifold
and multilevel meanings influenced recent scholarship on emotions in
early China. The study of this topic therefore warrants an integrated
approach that is not restricted to a specific philosophical or religious concept or one particular school of thought.
“Emotion” (qing) was a major topic of discussion among leading thinkers and spiritual practitioners in early, pre-Buddhist China prior to the
Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE). For example, Confucius and Mencius
in the Confucian tradition and Laozi and Zhuangzi in the Daoist school
all talked about emotions in their ethical and spiritual discourses and texts.
Various interpretations eventually developed competing insights, ideas, or
recommendations regarding sagehood, self-cultivation, moral action, and
the ultimate meaning of life.
Current scholarship on the semantic origin of the term qing is quite
interesting but not surprising. In his essay “Qing (Emotions) in PreBuddhist Chinese Thought,” Paul Hansen points out that the concept of
qing had two kinds of original meanings in early China: first, “circumstances” and “facts of a case” (we can add “reality” and “situation” as
well); and second, “affections, the feelings, desires” and “emotion and
sentiment” (Hansen 1995: 182). Hansen’s study relied on and concurs
with Graham’s pioneering work on the semantic origin of qing, according
to which the meaning of this word as emotion (or passion) did not exist
approximately until the Han dynasty (1986: 59–65),24 and qing never
meant “passions” in pre-Han (500 BCE–200 CE) literature because it
rather referred to “facts” (as a noun), “genuine” (an adjective), and “genuinely” (an adverb) (Graham 1990: 59).25
However, Christoph Harbsmeier (2004: 69–148) and Michael Puett
(2004: 37–68), two more recent scholarly works, counter-argue that the
24
This is Graham’s “The Meaning of Ch’ing [Qing]” in his “The Background of the
Mencian Theory of Human Nature.”
25
See Graham’s Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (1990).
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
19
very idea of qing did have a various range of meanings prior to the Han
period, including emotions in this semantic range.26 In tracing the emotive and other meanings of qing in pre-Buddhist Chinese literature,
Harbsmeier also points out that classical Chinese thinkers updated an
extensive list of semantics from facts and reality to emotions, feelings, and
desires (2004: 69–148).27 According to Virág’s study as well, the historical
significance of this topic in early China means:
The mainstream vision of emotions … represented the characteristic patterns or dispositions within human beings, giving genuine access to the
workings of the world …. When the mainstream thinkers argued that human
emotions—qing 情—represented the characteristic inclinations of human
beings, they were already taking for granted that nature itself functioned in
certain intelligible ways. (Virág 2017: 4)
In other words, emotions ought to be harmonized with self-cultivation
and one’s true understanding of the world. The ultimate meaning of life
unfolds through the proper experience of emotions.
Confucian masters articulated the nature of emotions and its positive
or negative roles in thinking, self-cultivation, or spiritual practice. They
also criticized the potential selfishness and trouble of certain emotions
while cherishing virtuous emotions in ethics, most of which inspired later
generations of thinkers, including the Korean Neo-Confucians. The
Confucian literature in particular began to develop its distinctive context
and scope of qing 情 as emotions. An extensive vocabulary of its examples
includes: pleasure (happiness; heui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu 怒), sorrow
(ae/ai 哀), joy (delight; rak/le 樂), fear (gu/ju 懼), love (ae/ai 愛),
hatred (dislike; o/wu 惡), desire (yok/yu 慾), and so on. Moral emotions
such as “compassion” (cheugun/ceyin), “shame” (suo/xiu), “courtesyand-modesty” (sayang/cirang), and “discernment of right and wrong”
(sibi/shifei) are also emphasized in Confucian classics and ethics.
These types of qing were thought to be common to all human life and
experience in relation to the world. Confucian thinkers in particular
addressed them with respect to human nature (seong/xing), heart-mind
26
See Christoph Harbsmeier’s “Semantics of Qing” and Michael Puett’s “The Ethics of
Responding Properly: The Notion of Qing in Early Chinese” in Eifring’s edited Love and
Emotions in Traditional Chinese Literature (2004).
27
For this and related points on the original semantics of qing in early China, we are
indebted to Virág’s discussion (2017: 6–7) as well.
20
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
(sim/xin), and innate physical and psychological dispositions. The goal
was to articulate the totality of the self in terms of its intellectual, physical,
emotive, and moral-spiritual faculties and dimensions. This is why the
“holistic” reading of East Asian thought—whether Confucian, Daoist, or
Buddhist—is helpful also because of the integrated meanings of qing.
Confucius and Mencius recommended the Confucian way to cultivate virtuous qing and regulate and transcend selfish and harmful ones through
self-cultivation. Daoists emphasized why human beings should return to
the natural freedom and creativity of Dao. Laozi recommended fewer
desires, and Zhuangzi called for “no emotions/desires” (mujeong/wuqing
無情) and both emphasized a “non-active” (muwi/wuwei 無為), naturalistic, and tranquil (mystical) life beyond the ordinary.
1.2.2
Emotions in Classical Chinese Confucianism
1.2.2.1 Confucius: True Emotions and Human Character
Confucius’s talk of emotions is an essential component of the Confucian
ethics and spirituality of self-cultivation. His ultimate vision of selfperfection (sagehood) points to the person who has not only perfected the
cardinal virtues such as universal benevolence (human-heartedness; in/ren
仁) to the highest level but also attained the utmost emotional-spiritual
fulfilment and harmony between oneself and the world.
In the Analects, Confucius discussed an ideal role model for the selfcultivated (authentic) person (gunja/junzi 君子) in terms of learning,
moral practice, and emotional harmony. Regarding learning, Confucius
says: “At fifteen I set my heart on learning …; at fifty I understood the
Decree [Mandate] of Heaven; at sixty, my ear was attuned; at seventy I
followed my heart’s desire [yok/yu 欲] without overstepping the line [propriety]” (Analects, 2: 4; Lau 1975: 63). As Confucius testified, selfcultivation makes one to follow the mandate of Heaven in order to fulfil
one’s sincere desire in emotional harmony with the transcendent reality of
human existence. For Confucius, then, truthful emotionality should be
harmonized with moral life by properly integrating the body, heart-mind,
and intellect.
As mentioned in the foregoing section (diversity of emotions), desire
(yok/yu 欲) is a major example of emotions in Confucianism and other
philosophical and religious traditions; in the Confucian literature, it is also
one of the so-called Seven Emotions that all human beings have “without
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
21
having to learn.”28 As indicated above, the Analects portrays Confucius’s
affirmation, if not appreciation, of the heart-mind’s desire as a good emotion when it is sincere and properly harmonized.
Confucius taught that true emotions are essential to human experience
because they play a vital role in moral self-cultivation, personal conduct,
social relationships, and even political ethics. He, therefore, recommended
to make one’s emotions and feelings absolutely truthful to oneself and
others while harmonizing the inner and outer aspects of one’s life. This
insight consistently inspired later generations of eminent Confucians and
Neo-Confucian thinkers, including Mencius, Zhu Xi (1130–1200), and
Wang Yangming (1472–1529) in China and Yi Toegye (1501–1570) and
Yi Yulgok (1536–1584) in Korea.
For Confucius, proper emotions should accord with the virtuous
action. For example, if one does not truly feel sorrowful29 when in mourning, this is unfortunately a moral failure in ritual conduct. As Confucius
says, “What can I find worthy of note [at all] in a human being who lacks
in … sorrow (ae/ai 哀) while performing a mourning rite?”30 Furthermore,
according to his disciples, “On a day he had wept, the Master did not sing
[all day].”31 Being true to human emotions such as sorrow points to an
exemplary feature of Confucius’s (sagely) character. The Analects emphasizes Confucius’s “emotional engagement” as a sign of virtue: “For
Confucius … having emotions that are characterized by both appropriateness and depth is an essential attribute of the perfected individual” (Virág
2017: 41). One’s true human character is therefore represented by one’s
genuine experience of emotions. The Analects tells us about Confucius of
being deeply saddened by and mournful for losing someone he has loved.
He is also portrayed of experiencing the emotion of joy (delight; rak/le
樂)32 with something or someone he really respected and cared about.
28
For details on this and related points, see the next section on emotion in the Book of Rites
and the Doctrine of the Mean.
29
Note that sorrow (grief), like desire, is a major example of emotions in Confucianism
and other philosophical and religious traditions, including Buddhism. In the Confucian and
Neo-Confucian literature, it is also one of the Seven Emotions that all human beings have
“without having to learn.” For details on this and related points, see the next section on
emotion in the Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean.
30
Analects, 3: 26; my (Chung) translation.
31
Analects, 7: 10; Lau 1975: 87.
32
Note that joy, like desire and sorrow, is another major example of emotions in
Confucianism and other spiritual traditions such as Daoism and Mahāyāna Buddhism; in the
22
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
The opening passage of the Analects also tells us about Confucius’s
pleasure of learning and his joy of having friendship: “The Master said, ‘Is
it not a pleasure, having learned something, to try out at due intervals? Is
it not a joy [delight; rak/le 樂] to have friends come from afar?’” (1: 1;
Lau 1975: 59). In other words, it is the good character of an authentic
person (gunja/junzi) to be pleased with daily self-cultivation and to truly
delight in the joy of welcoming the best friends from far away (friendship
is one of the five human relationships in Confucian social ethics). The true
feeling of joy is therefore emphasized here. No doubt, Confucius’s passionate experience of joy to learn strongly inspired the later generations of
East Asian peoples in the great development of self-cultivation and education for many centuries. As the German thinker Hegel said, “nothing
great in the world has been accomplished without passion” (1956: 23).
From a comparative perspective, Confucius’s passionate desire for and
true joy of learning and ethical life somewhat fits in with Marks’s theory
that “emotions or passions have a strong desire component” (1995b: 140,
2013) and also supports Solomon’s thesis of “passions and [for] the meaning of life” (Solomon 1993, 1995b: 288–293).
Confucius subtly told his disciples how he wishes to be known to other
people: “He is the sort of man … who is so full of joy (rak/le 樂) that he
forgets his worries and who does not notice the onset of old age.”33 This
famous saying certainly concurs with his emotional joy of learning and
good friendship. On a related note, we can also argue here that Confucius’s
joy culturally resonates with Korean social emotion heung (utmost joy/
excitement), one of “social emotions” in traditional and contemporary Korea.34
It is interesting to note that when Confucius was asked about negative
feelings like resentment (won/yuan 怨) and selfish craving (yok/yu 欲),
Confucius simply confirmed his disciples that it is necessary but difficult to
control such emotions (Analects, 5: 19, 14:1). Despite his positive recognition of the genuine emotions of sorrow and joy, Confucius basically
taught a way of physical and mental self-control by means of following
virtuous propriety and ritual conduct (Analects, 12: 1). In her study of
Confucian literature, it is also one of the Seven Emotions that all human beings naturally have.
33
Analects, 7: 19; Lau 1975: 88.
34
Iljoon Park’s Chap. 8 in Part II of this book discusses Korea’s “social emotions,” including heung.
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23
Confucian emotions in relation to li ritual propriety, Mary Bockover
points out that the virtue of ritual propriety (li) is not something that is
merely “expressed” outside but it should rather be harmonized with one’s
ritualistic, moral, and emotional behavior both internally and externally
(1995: 168–174).35
To conclude, the self-cultivated person’s moral worth is revealed when
their heart-mind’s emotions such as sorrow, pleasure, and joy are naturally
genuine in thinking and acting. Confucius confessed that at age seventy he
has discovered his heart-mind’s desires and emotions in perfect harmony
with his true self and the mandate of Heaven. The ultimate goal of selfcultivation is therefore fulfilled through one’s intellectual, moral, and
emotional harmony with the transcendent reality of human nature and
experience.
1.2.2.2 The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean
on the Seven Emotions
The locus classicus for the Confucian term “Seven Emotions”
(chiljeong/qiqing 七情) is the Book of Rites, one of the Five Classics: “pleasure (happiness; hui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu 怒), sorrow (ae/ai 哀), fear
(gu/ju 懼), love (ae/ai 愛), hatred (dislike; o/wu 惡), and desire (yok/yu
欲)” are basic human emotions that “are not acquired through learning
from the outside” (Legge 1970: [1] 379). So nobody learns these feelings
and emotions externally or “acquires” them from external things or phenomena. In other words, they are innate physical and psychological
jeong/qing of human nature.
As the list of the Seven is somewhat lengthy, the Doctrine of the Mean
(Chap. 1), one of the Four Books of Confucianism, gives special attention
to the first three and added joy, representing the Seven as follows:
Before [the emotions of] pleasure (happiness; hui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu 怒),
sorrow (ae/ai 哀), and joy (delight; rak/le 樂) are aroused (bal/fa), it is
called equilibrium (centrality; chung/zhong). After they are aroused and
each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony (hwa/he).
Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony is its universal way. When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree,
heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.36
35
This is Mary Bockover’s “The Concept of Emotion Revisited: A Critical Synthesis of
Western and Confucian Thought,” a chapter in Marks and Ames (1995).
36
Chung’s translation; see also Chan (1963b: 98).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean confirm that emotions arise
from within the self. According to both texts, the Seven refer to common
physical-psychological emotions and are understood as the aroused states
of the mind in response to external things or phenomena. As mentioned
in the Doctrine of the Mean,37 mind cultivation therefore requires a measure of control over emotions, including the Seven. Leading Chinese NeoConfucians such as Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming agreed on this point.
According to this ethics of emotions, the goal of self-cultivation is to attain
the state of “harmony” after emotions are aroused (bal/fa). This topic
became a key topic in the Korean Four-Seven debate, which began in the
mid-sixteenth century and lasted for three centuries.38
Yi Toegye, Yi Yulgok, and other Korean Neo-Confucian basically confirmed that if the Seven are properly expressed or harmonized according
to moral principles, they are potentially good emotions. However, as
Toegye emphasized, any of these emotions like hatred can lead to evil due
to selfish cravings. Sections 1.2.3 (Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism on
Emotions …) and 1.4.1 (Korean Confucian Perspectives) present this
topic further in terms of Zhu Xi’s system of i/li 理 (principle/ground of
being; pattern) and gi/qi 氣 (vital/physical energy; material force) and
good and evil. This part of Zhu’s philosophy is extensively discussed in
current scholarship, so it does not need to be rehearsed here.39
Overall, the key question was: How do the Seven Emotions relate to
jeong/qing in general or differ from what Mencius emphasized as the Four
Beginnings of virtue (sadan/siduan 四端) such as compassion? And how
should they be understood in terms of the heart-mind (sim/xin)? The
Korean Four-Seven debate rigorously discussed these key questions and
issues regarding the Four-and-Seven relationship as well as its implications
37
An excellent discussion of the Doctrine of the Mean is Tu (1989).
For current scholarship on the Korean Four-Seven debate, see Kalton et al. 1994; Chung
1995, 2016 (Introduction), 2019b (in Ro 2019), 2021. For various articles, see Ching
1985; Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Seok 2018; Tu 1985b. Chung (1995)
is a full-length comparative discussion of Toegye and Yulgok in terms of the Four-Seven thesis.
39
The current literature on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi includes Angle and
Tiwald 2017; Chan 1963b, 1967, 1986; Ching 2000; de Bary 1981, 2004; Gardner, 1990;
Huang 2014; Tu 1985a, 1985b, and so on. For Yi Toegye, Yi Yulgok, and Korean NeoConfucianism on this topic, see Ro 1989, 2019; Chung 1995, 2016, 2019a (in Choi and
Kim 2019), 2021; Chan 1985; Kalton 1988, 2019; Hyoungchan Kim 2018. Chung (2020:
38–44, 52–56) presents a detailed discussion of Jeong Jedu’s (Hagok 1649–1736) systematic critique of Zhu Xi’s and Toegye’s philosophies of i/li and gi/qi according to Hagok’s
creative synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea.
38
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for moral cultivation, most of which were not explained clearly in the
Chinese classics and Neo-Confucian commentaries.
1.2.2.3 Mencius: Four Beginnings, Moral Emotions,
and Self-cultivation
Mencius was unaware of the idea of the Seven mentioned in the Doctrine
of the Mean. Nor did he relate the moral significance of the Four to the
nature of the Seven. In our view, the Doctrine of the Mean deals more with
emotional control and harmony—as discussed above, whereas the Mencian
ethics of emotions focuses on a theory of human goodness and moral
practice.
The famous Mencian theory of original human goodness (seongseon ji
seong/xingshan zhi xing 性善之性) emphasizes universal access to the virtuous practice of innate intuitions and emotions such as compassion
(Mencius, 2A: 6; 6A: 6). This central doctrine believes in the foundation
of natural moral knowledge and action, insofar as Mencius talked about
moral emotions and especially in terms of the human “heart-mind”
(sim/xin 心). It is a debatable but bold ontological and ethical claim on
the innate goodness of human beings in the heart-mind, which, according
to Mencius, universally justifies self-cultivation and self-perfection for
everyone, as mandated by Heaven.
Mencius did not specifically explain what he meant by the heart-mind
(sim/xin 心) in relation to moral emotions in particular. For example, the
following passage from the Mencius (6A: 6) illustrates this ambiguity:
Regarding what is genuine in our emotions and feelings (jeong/qing 情), we
are capable of being good. This is what I mean by [saying human nature is]
good …. All human beings have the heart-mind (moral emotion; sim/xin
心) of compassion (cheugeun/ceyin 惻隱), the heart-mind of shame and
aversion (suo/xiuwu 羞惡), the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty
(sayang/cirang 辭讓), and the heart-mind of right and wrong (sibi/shifei 是
非). The heart-mind [moral emotion] of compassion is [the beginning of]
human-heartedness (benevolence; in/ren 仁); the heart-mind of shame and
aversion is [the beginning of] righteousness (eui/yi 義); the heart-mind of
courtesy and modesty is [the beginning of] propriety (ye/li 義); and the
heart-mind of right and wrong is [the beginning of] wisdom (ji/zhi 智).
Human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom …. originally
exist in me [my nature].40
40
Chung’s translation; see also Lau 1970: 163 or Chan 1963b: 54.
26
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
Compassion, shame and aversion, courtesy and modesty, and discernment
of right and wrong do not come from the outside because these moral
intuitions and emotions are originally innate in the heart-mind. Mencius
referred to these “Four Beginnings [roots]” (sadan/siduan 四端) as the
fourfold foundation of what Confucius emphasized as the cardinal virtues
of human-heartedness (benevolence), righteousness, ritual propriety, and
wisdom. For Mencius, the heart-mind of compassion and three other
beginnings are indeed moral emotions (jeong/qing 情) as well. They are
the origin of original human goodness and the starting point of our innate
moral virtues.
In light of Confucius’s teaching of genuine human emotions, the
Mencian doctrine of original human goodness is a bold moral-spiritual
belief in the heart-mind of innate intuitions toward fellow human beings.
As Mencius said, every human being naturally possesses “the heart-mind
of compassion” that “cannot see the suffering of others” (Mencius, 2A:6).
With this good heart-mind (sim/xin), all human beings spontaneously
and immediately feel compassionate to save “a little child who was on the
verge of falling into a well” (Mencius, 2A:6).
For Mencius, the “original goodness of human nature” consisting of
the Four should therefore be “fully developed” for self-cultivation;
“neglecting your own potentials is to destroy yourself.” (Mencius, 2A:
6).41 Mencian belief is that the Four are innate moral emotions in the
heart-mind for self-cultivation and the ethical life. Furthermore, this bold
ontological-ethical claim is also backed up by the child metaphor of the
pure heart-mind regarding the Mencian doctrine of “innate knowledge
[of good]” (yangji/liangzhi 良知) and “innate ability [to do good]”
(yangneung/liangneng 良能).42
This teaching is religiously grounded as well. Original goodness in the
human heart-mind is bestowed by Heaven’s will (cheonmyeong/tianming
41
42
Chung’s translation; see also Lau 1970: 82–83.
As Mencius states,
what human beings are able to do without having to learn it is innate ability [to do
good] (yangneung/liangneng); what they know without having to reflect on it is
innate knowledge [of good] (yangji/liangzhi). All young children [innately] know
loving their parents. As they grow up, they will know respecting their elder siblings.
Loving one’s parents is human-heartedness (in/ren), and respecting one’s elders is
righteousness. We have to extend these virtues to the world; that’s all. (7A: 15;
Chung’s translation; see also Lau 1970: 184 or Chan 1963b: 80)
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
27
天命). As Mencius confessed, “To preserve the heart-mind (sim/xin) and
to nourish human nature (seong/xing) is the way to serve Heaven
(cheon/tian 天),” a sagely human way (Mencius, 7A: 1),43 which therefore
accords with Confucian religious belief in the harmony [unity and oneness] between Heaven and human beings (cheonin habil/tianren heyi 天人
合一). “To serve Heaven” and other human beings faithfully is simply to
follow moral feelings (the heart-mind of the Four) and practice heavenly
mandated innate knowledge and ability to do good.
Leading Chinese Neo-Confucians such as Zhu Xi and the eminent
Korean thinker Yi Toegye discussed Mencius’s teaching of self-cultivation.
In particular Toegye frequently quoted not only Mencius’s doctrine of
original human goodness and the Four but also his moral-spiritual talk of
“Heaven” and “serving Heaven”; this is what Toegye emphasized in
developing a sophisticated “religious” style of Neo-Confucian ethics and
spirituality (see Chung 2016, 2019c, 2021 for details).
In Ming China, Wang Yangming (1472–1529), the founder of the
School of the Mind (simhak/xinxue 心學), also cherished and polished the
Mencian teaching to the extent that his entire ethics and spirituality of
mind cultivation were largely based on the original Mencian thinking.44
For Wang, the Four Beginnings as virtuous emotions confirm the innate
knowledge and ability to be sincere and do good, which universally enables
the spiritual path to sagehood (for more discussion, see Sect. 1.2.4 of this
chapter on Wang Yangming).
Given our discussion of Mencius thus far, the conventional dichotomy
between cognition (reason) and feeling (emotion) in Western thought
does not apply to the Confucian case either directly or efficiently. Mencius,
like Confucius, was not interested in such dichotomy, insofar as traditional
Chinese thought—whether Confucian or Daoist prior to the coming of
Buddhism from India—had not known or developed it. In discussing the
Four as genuine moral emotions, Mencius intended to mean natural,
innate feelings as well as one’s “knowledge” and “ability” to do good
43
Chung’s translation; see also Chan 1963b: 78; Lau 1979: 182.
For Wang’s comment on the Mencian doctrine of the Four Beginnings, see his Chuanxi
lu (Instructions for practical living) (hereafter abbreviated CXL), part II, sect. 150; Chan’s
complete translation 1963a: 131. For details on Wang’s doctrine of yangji/liangzhi and
yangneung/liangneng, see CXL pt. I, sect. 8 and pt. II, sect. 152; Chan’s translation 1963a:
15, 132. See also Wang’s famous essay “Inquiry on the Great Learning” (Daxue wen) in
Chan 1963b: 665.
44
28
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
based on some level of cognitive awareness and judgments regarding one’s
discernment of right (good) and wrong (evil).45
In this regard, Mencius saw no strict division between emotion and
reason; that is, both are fully expected to be integrated and harmonized
because of holistic Confucian belief in the rational, moral, psychological,
and spiritual interaction of the sim/xin heart-mind as a whole. Furthermore,
this dichotomy issue also becomes irrelevant if we care about the spiritualreligious dimension of the Mencian teaching in terms of original human
goodness, sagehood, and Heaven as discussed above.
At this point of discussion, we can make some comparative reflection
on this topic. As mentioned in Sect. 1.1.4 (Diversity of Emotions), one
branch of emotion studies in the West has treated compassion and related
moral sentiments with repect to “virtue ethics.” In our view, Mencius
established the foundation and rationale for the Confucian virtue ethics of
emotions. Likewise, two eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers, David
Hume (1711–1776)46 and Adam Smith (1723–1790), keenly argued that
human nature embodies certain moral essence (or inclination) such as
sympathy (compassion), a moral feeling with/for others.47 This Western
ethical view basically resembles the Mencian view of compassion. Nor
does it contradict the Mahāyāna Buddhist karuna (compassion), an interesting topic we will discuss in Sect. 1.3.2 (Indian Mahāyāna Perspectives)
and Sect. 1.4.3 (Korean Buddhist and Contemporary Perspective). For
both Hume and Smith, sympathy—or compassion or whatever we call it
(like empathy or altruism)—is an innate and universal feature of moral
inclination. In particular, Smith identified the virtuous significance of
“mutual sympathy” with “universal benevolence,”48 which also happens
45
This partly concurs with Solomon’s theory that “emotions are judgments” or based on
rational judgments (1995b: 253, 276); for details, see Sect. 1.1.1 of this introduction on the
theories of emotions. See also Solomon (1993, 1995a, 2001) for more details on his ethics
of emotions as “judgments.”
46
For his moral philosophy of human nature, moral principles, and emotions, see Hume
(1978, 1998).
47
We can debate this further in terms of altruism as well. In his “The Emotions of Altruism,
East and West,” Joel Kupperman points out that “altruism can involve emotions” with
“motivational elements” that are common among Western utilitarian altruism, Confucianism,
and Buddhism (1995: 126–129). The Mencian ethics of compassion is therefore a form of
altruism. However, Kupperman mistakenly over-generalizes Mencian altruism from a
Western standpoint. We need to be mindful of the uniqueness of Mencius’s moral and spiritual (religious) doctrine of compassion, the heart-mind, and Heaven’s mandate.
48
Adam Smith 2009: 10–13 (chapters I and II), 345–349 (chapter III).
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
29
to be the most important among the four cardinal virtues of Confucianism.
More recently, Michael Slote interpreted “virtue ethics” on the basis of
the moral and psychological power of “empathy” and “care.”49
Smith’s and Slote’s insights into sympathy and empathy relatively resemble the Mencian and Korean Neo-Confucian interpretation of compassion
(one of the Four) as the emotive foundation of universal virtue in/ren
(benevolence; human-heartedness). On the whole, however, our comparative opinion on the ethical link between Mencius, on the one hand, and
Hume, Smith, and Slote, one the other hand, would be less meaningful or
insightful if we ignore the spiritual-religious dimension of the Mencian
doctrine of compassion, the heart-mind, and Heaven as discussed above.
1.2.3
Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism on Emotions, Human Nature,
and the Four-Seven Relationship
Neo-Confucian masters in Song China transmitted and expanded the
Confucius and Mencian line of classical Confucianism by articulating its
philosophy of human nature, emotions, and self-cultivation. They also
developed new metaphysical and ethical ideas and concepts partly in criticism of and competition with Daoist and Buddhist influence. The idea of
jeong/qing (emotions and feelings) continued to receive some more
sophisticated discussion as well as new interpretation at an advanced level.
For example, Cheng Yi (1033–1107) briefly said that love (affection;
ae/ai 愛), one of the Seven, is an emotion (jeong/qing), whereas benevolence (human-heartedness; in/ren 仁) is human nature (seong/xing 性).50
He generally meant in the Mencian sense that “the mind-and-heart of
compassion” is an innate moral beginning (sprout) of benevolence inherent in what Mencius calls the “original goodness of human nature” (seongseon ji seong/xingshan zhi xing). However, Cheng Yi did not explain it
further. For example, he made no comments on the Four Beginnings
and/or the Seven Emotions specifically; neither did he clarify any connection, compatibility, or conflict between the Four and the emotions like
love. However, one noticeable statement Cheng Yi made is: “In human
nature there are only the Four Beginnings without any form of evil ….
Similarly, without human nature, how can there be emotions (jeong/qing
49
See Slote (2007, 2010) for details on this stimulating “ethics of care and empathy.”
See Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi (n.d.), Yishu (Surviving works of the two Chengs) (hereafter abbreviated Yishu), 18: 1a, in the Sibu beiyao (1920–1936) edition. See Chan’s translation 1963b: 559.
50
30
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
情)?”51 This passage implies that the Four are the defining moral characteristics of human nature. So self-cultivation involves the Mencian teaching of nurturing the Four and has to maintain “[emotional] harmony after
pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused,” as taught in the Doctrine of
the Mean and quoted by Cheng Yi.52 This line of reasoning became an
important topic in the Korean Four-Seven controversy.
The whole subject matter became more complicated in Zhu Xi’s
thought. The great Neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi (1130–1200)
commented on Mencius’s notion of the Four (Mencius, 2A: 6) as follows:
Compassion (cheugeun/ceyin 惻隱), shame and aversion (suo/xiuwu 羞惡),
courtesy and modesty (sayang/cirang 辭讓), and [discernment of] right
and wrong (sibi/shifei 是非) are emotions (jeong/qing 情). Benevolence
(human-heartedness; in/ren 仁), righteousness (eui/yi 義), propriety
(ye/li 義), wisdom (ji/zhi 智) are human nature. (seong/xing 性)53
In other words, the Four represent our innate moral “emotions” aroused
from human nature; they are therefore “illuminating virtues.”54 Zhu Xi
also mentioned that “the Seven Emotions cannot be separated from the
Four Beginnings,” and “the Four Beginnings can be understood from the
standpoint of the Seven Emotions.”55 So Zhu Xi probably meant that the
Four do not belong to an entirely independent group of human feelings
and emotions (jeong/qing 情). Interestingly, Toegye, Yulgok, and others
in Korea did not quote these two statements at all in their Four-Seven
philosophies. One key issue in their debates was whether or not the Four
such as compassion belong to a special group of moral emotions independent of the Seven.
Zhu Xi did not articulate the Four and the Seven specifically. His Zhuzi
yulei (Classified conversations of Master Zhu) gives a brief statement in
terms of their origins: “The Four Beginnings are manifestations of i/li
(moral principles); the Seven Emotions are manifestations of gi/qi (vital
51
Yishu 18: 1a; Chan 1963b: 559.
Yishu, 18: 14b–15a.
53
See Mengzi jizhu daquan (Great compendium of commentaries on the Book of Mencius),
in Gyeongseo (Four Books) (1972), 516; Chung’s translation. See also Zhu Xi (1880), Zhuzi
yulei (hereafter abbreviated ZZYL), 53: 9a.
54
ZZYL 53: 20a.
55
ZZYL 87: 16a–b; Chung’s translation.
52
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31
energy; material force).”56 It can also be translated as follows: “The Four
Beginnings are aroused by i/li; the Seven Emotions are aroused by gi/qi.”
Does this unexplained statement imply some ontological and conceptual
distinction between the Four and the Seven? This question was rigorously
debated by Korean scholars. Zhu’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi is a wellresearched topic that does not need to be rehearsed here.57
Zhu Xi’s ambiguous comment on the Four-Seven relationship was discussed by Korean Neo-Confucians in terms of moral “purity,” distinction,
or continuum between the Four and the Seven. Toegye emphasized that
the Four are aroused by moral i/li, whereas the Seven are aroused by
gi/qi because they are our ordinary emotions and feelings that can potentially lead to evil due to selfish cravings. According to Yulgok, however,
Toegye misinterpreted the Four and the Seven as two distinctive and separate groups of feelings.58 Yulgok insisted that in the arousal of all emotions
and feelings, including the Four and the Seven, gi/qi is what actually
becomes manifested.59 These aspects of the Four-Seven relationship in
terms of i/li and gi/qi are discussed in Seok’s Chap. 3, Chung’s Chap. 4,
and Harroff’s Chap. 6.
Another controversial Four-Seven issue focused on the Song NeoConfucian doctrine of “original human nature” (bonyeon ji seong/benran
zhi xing 本然之性) and “physical human nature” (gijil ji seong/qizhi zhi
xing 氣質之性). In short, Zhu Xi explained the original human nature
with respect to i/li, and the physical human nature as that which is
56
ZZYL 53: 17b.
In short, i/li means the “ground of being” or metaphysical “principle” present in each
thing or phenomenon in its fullness. We can also consider it the ultimate or omnipresent
principle (or “pattern” or “order” of nature) of all things in full goodness and truth. In relation to human nature and feelings, i/li represents moral order or the original human nature
that is purely good. By contrast, gi/qi refers to the “material force” or “vital energy/stuff”
that actually brings each phenomenon into concrete existence and also determines its transformation, which may lead to either good or evil. In relation to human nature and feelings,
gi/qi represents physical dispositions and psychological matters as well. For current scholarship on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi, see n. 39 in Sect. 1.2.2.2 of this chapter.
58
See Yi Yulgok (1985), Yulgok jeoneso, 9: 35b; I, 192. Hereafter this primary source is
abbreviated YJ. See Chung 1995, 2019b; for a full translation of Toegye’s and Yulgok’s
Four-Seven letters, see Kalton et al. 1994.
59
YJ 10: 5a; I, 198. For articles on the Korean Four-Seven debates, see Ching 1985 (on
Yulgok); Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Seok 2018; Tu 1985b (on Toegye).
For Chung’s comprehensive discussion, see Chung 1995 (both Toegye and Yulgok), 1998
(on Yulgok), 2019b (updated on Toegye, Yulgok, and their schools of thought), and 2021
(Toegye’s religious thought).
57
32
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
conditioned by gi/qi; therefore, the former is purely good, whereas the
latter can lead to good or evil. There are just two different “names,” not
two “separate” natures having their own ontological grounds.60 According
to Zhu Xi, then, Mencius and Cheng Yi referred to “human nature in
itself,” unmixed with the physical dispositions of gi/qi, so they specifically
meant the “original human nature” before it is disturbed by external stimuli involving gi. However, when it is “mixed with gi/qi” in concrete
things, it is what Zhang Zai called the “physical human nature.” As
Zhu stated:
Original human nature is purely good. This is the nature described by
Mencius as “good.” Master Zhou [Dunyi] described it as “pure and perfectly good,”61 and Master Cheng Yi called it “the fundamental character of
our nature”.62 … If one learns to return to the original human nature
endowed by Heaven and Earth, one will preserve it.63 Accordingly, any discussion of human nature must include physical human nature, so that the
discussion can be complete.64
However, Zhu Xi did not apply this topic to the Four and the Seven. As a
result, this part of his thought became a key issue in the Four-Seven
debates, insofar as Korean scholars endeavored to interpret the Four and
Seven in terms of the two interrelated realms of human nature, respectively. Toegye and his followers generally agreed that original human
nature means innate moral virtues (e.g., human-heartedness/benevolence) and moral emotions (e.g., compassion), whereas physical human
nature pertains to our ordinary physical or psychological feelings, sensations, emotions and desires.
Another key component of Zhu Xi’s philosophy that stimulated Korean
emotion talks is about the “[Dao] moral mind” (dosim/daoxin 道心) and
“[ordinary] human mind” (insim/renxin 人心) in detail. Zhu Xi explained
60
ZZYL 4: 12b.
See Zhou Dunyi’s essay Tongshu (Penetrating the Book of Changes), chapter 1.
62
According to Yishu (Surviving works of the two Chengs), 18: 19b.
63
This is originally Zhang Zai’s saying. See Zhang Zai (1935), Zhangzi quanshu (Complete
works of Master Zhang), 2: 18b.
64
See ZZYL 4:11a–b; Chung’s translation. For more original sources, see also Zhu Xi
(1714), Zhuzi quanshu (hereafter abbreviated ZZQS), 42: 4b, 42: 6b–7a, 42: 9b–10a, 43:
2b–4a (Chan 1963b: 613, 616–617, 623–624); for more discussion on this topic in relation
to the Korean Four-Seven debate, see Chung 1995: 47–48, 60–61, 66–69, 104–106 or
Chung 2016: 26–29.
61
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33
that the moral mind is aroused from “the correctness of Heaven’s principle (cheolli/tianli 天理),” and the ordinary human mind from “selfishness
(sa/si 私) identified with physical form (hyeonggi/xingqi 形氣)”: accordingly, the former is “impartial” and “good,” whereas the latter is “partial”
and “prone to error,” involving both good and evil.65 The moral mind
pertains to moral virtues such as benevolence, whereas the human mind
pertains to our ordinary physical desires and cravings.66
However, Zhu did not articulate this topic in terms of the Four-Seven
relationship. Can emotions such as the Four and the Seven be understood
according to these two related aspects of the mind? This issue became
important in the Korean debate. Korean thinkers eventually debated questions regarding Zhu Xi’s conception of emotions, his metaphysics of i/li
and gi/qi, his ethics of good and evil, and his dualism of the moral-andhuman mind. They developed creative ideas and insights and thereby
accomplished a highly advanced and sophisticated philosophy of FourSeven emotions (jeong/qing) and its implications for Confucian ethics and
spirituality.
1.2.4
Wang Yangming on Selfish Emotions, Essence
of Heart-Mind, and Moral Practice
Like masters of the rival Cheng-Zhu school, Wang Yangming (1472–1529),
the leading Neo-Confucian of Ming China, addressed the essential topic
of emotions (jeong/qing) in his own way by discussing the aroused
mind and the Four and the Seven. Wang’s Four-Seven thesis is a key to
understanding his doctrines of the heart-mind, innate knowledge, simhak
心學 mind cultivation, and moral practice.
65
Zhu Xi (1930), Zhuzi wenji, 76: 21b; hereafter this source is abbreviated ZZWJ. Quoted
from Zhu Xi (1972), preface to the Zhongyong zhangju (Commentary on the words and
phrases son the Doctrine of the Mean). This doctrine originates from the Book of History,
which reads as follows: “The human mind is precarious; the moral mind is subtle. Remain
refined and single-minded: hold fast the Mean” (Legge 1970 [I]: 61). This instruction contrasts the “precariousness” of the human (ordinary) mind with the “goodness” of the moral
mind. Zhu Xi also identified the daoxin with “Heaven’s principle,” and the renxin with the
“selfishness” of human cravings (ZZYL 61: 5a–b or ZZWJ 76: 21b).
66
ZZYL 61: 5a–b.
34
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
In his most famous work, Chuanxi lu 傳習錄 (Instructions for practical
living),67 Wang states that cardinal virtues such as “benevolence (humanheartedness), righteousness, propriety, wisdom” are “the [moral] qualities
of the heart-mind after the feelings [jeong/qing] are aroused.” The heartminds of compassion (cheugun/ceyin), shame and aversion (suo/xiuwu),
courtesy and modesty (sayang/cirang), and [discernment of] right and
wrong (sibi/shifei) are therefore “manifestations of human nature.”68 In
other words, Wang, like Zhu Xi, basically confirmed the Mencian doctrine
that the Four Beginnings are the emotive moral expression of four cardinal
virtues: for example, the moral emotion (jeong/qing) of compassion is the
beginning of human-heartedness (benevolence).
According to Wang, “the equilibrium [jung/zhong] before the feelings
[jeong/qing] are aroused involves the harmony after the feelings are
aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree.”69 By quoting the
Doctrine of the Mean (Chap. 1) here, Wang, like Zhu Xi and Korean thinkers, pointed out that emotions refer to the “aroused” (bal/fa) states of the
mind. Self-cultivation therefore requires a measure of control over these
emotions after their arousal.
Wang was asked whether the joy (delight; rak/le 樂) of Confucius’s
and his beloved disciple Yan Hui’s learning is the same as “the joy (rak/le)
in the seven feelings [Seven Emotions]” and “if … there is a true joy, then
is it present when sages and worthies meet with [other emotions such as]
great sorrow, great anger, great terror, and great fear?” Wang eloquently
replied:
Joy [rak/le 樂] is characteristic of the original substance of the mind [sim ji
bonche/xin zhi benti 心之本體]. Though it is not identical with the joy of
the seven feelings [Seven Emotions; chiljeong/qiqing]. Sages and worthies
have another true joy, it is true, but it is shared by ordinary people except
that these people do not realize it though they have it. Instead they bring
upon themselves a great deal of sorrow [ae/ai 哀] and grief and, in addition, confusion and self-abandonment.70
67
Chan (1963a) is a full English translation of Wang’s Chuanxi lu (abbreviated as CXL)
with annotation and commentary.
68
See CXL pt. I, sect. 38; Chan 1963a: 34.
69
CXL pt. II, sect. 158; Chan 1963a: 139.
70
CXL pt. II, sect. 166; Chan 1963a: 147–148.
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This passage is self-explanatory and also creatively stated. Note that sorrow and joy belong to the Seven Emotions, as mentioned in the Book of
Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean. Here Wang positively affirms
Confucius’s true joy of “learning” or of “[having] friends come from far
away”; his “joy of knowing …”; and his character “full of joy that he forgets his worries and does not notice the onset of old age.”71 Wang also
reconfirms Confucius’s highest praise of his beloved disciple Yan Hui’s
“joy of learning” and self-cultivation despite Yan’s “hardship” and impoverished life. As confirmed by Wang in the quoted passage above,
Confucius’s and Yan’s virtuous emotion of joy represents the ultimate
goodness of the heart-mind’s “original essence” (bonche/benti 本體). In
other words, this is not the same as ordinary emotional joy partly because
ordinary people’s selfishness eventually generates more delusion, sorrow,
and grief. Self-cultivation is therefore emphasized.
The problem of the Seven Emotions is mainly “excessiveness. “As soon
as it is excessive, it is not in accord with the original substance [bonche/benti]
of the mind.”72 If any of the Seven like anger or desire is excessively
expressed, it is unstable and needs to be controlled and harmonized. Wang
introduced his innovative idea of the mind-in-itself (“original essence of
the mind”) and argued that selfish emotions neglect the original purity of
the mind. Therefore, the idea of controlling and overcoming selfish emotions is strongly embedded in Wang’s ethics of the mind and emotions. As
he states,
How can the human mind be free from anger [no/nu 怒], and so forth? But
it should not have them. When one shows a little bit of feeling of wrath, his
anger is excessive, and his mind is no longer the original substance
[bonche/benti] that is broad and extremely impartial [quoting Cheng Hao].
Therefore, whenever one is affected by wrath to any extent, his mind will
not be correct … [even though] we all feel angry in our minds at the party
who is wrong.73
Wang writes further:
71
See Analects, 1: 1, 6: 20, and 7: 19, respectively. See Sect. 1.2.2.1 of this chapter for our
detailed discussion of these statements about Confucius’s utmost pleasure and joy in
this regard.
72
CXL pt. I, sect. 44; Chan 1963a: 38. For more statements on Wang’s doctrine of the
mind-in-itself (original substance of the mind), see his CXL pt. I, sect. 3; Chan 1963a: 7.
73
CXL pt. II, sect. 167; Chan 1963a: 205.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
Pleasure [hui/xi 喜], anger [no/nu 怒], sorrow [ae/ai 哀], fear [gu/ju 懼],
love [ae/ai 愛], hatred [dislike; o/wu 惡], and desire [yok/yu 欲] are also
natural to the mind. But you should understand innate knowledge [of good;
yangji/liangzhi 良知] clearly …. When the seven feelings [Seven Emotions]
follow their natural courses of operation, they are all functions of innate
knowledge, and cannot be distinguished as good or evil. However, we
should not have any selfish attachment to them. When there is such an
attachment, they become selfish desires and obscurations to innate
knowledge.74
In this passage, Wang gives a complete list of the Seven Emotions and
confirms the Book of Rites that they are the “natural” innate emotions that
we all have and “do not learn from the outside.” However, the Seven can
become bad when they have “any selfish attachment.” For example, anger,
one of the Seven, is a natural human emotion but the excessive anger that
is not properly controlled by the mind can certainly become “selfish” and
lead to evil. It is the negative emotion of wrath deviating from the original
essence (bonche/benti) of the heart-mind. In this case, one’s mind has to
be rectified.
Wang’s disciple asked for his master’s advice on Cheng Hao’s (older
brother of Cheng Yi) saying that “The feelings [emotions] of the sage are
in accord with all creation and yet he has no feelings of his own” and the
claim that “If learning is to stress having no feelings … it ceases to be
Confucian and will become Buddhist. Is that all right?” As Wang advises:
The sage’s effort at extending knowledge is characterized by his absolute
sincerity which never ceases. The substance of his innate knowledge [of
good] (yangji/liangzhi 良知)) as clear as a bright mirror without any slight
obscuration …. This is what is meant by saying that the feelings [emotions;
jeong/qing] of the sage are in accord with all things and yet himself he has
no [selfish] feelings [mujeong/wuqing 無情]. The Buddhists have a saying,
“One should have no attachment to anything and thus let the mind grow.”
This is not correct.75
As far as Wang is concerned, sages have basic human emotions. However,
they not only control and overcome selfish emotions and desires but also
perfect their heart-minds as the “bright mirrors” without any impurity or
74
75
CXL pt. III, sect. 290; Chan 1963a: 229.
CXL pt. II, sect. 167; Chan 1963a: 148.
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selfishness. In other words, they practice virtuous emotions like Confucius’s
true joy in harmony with the original essence (goodness) (bonche/benti)
of the heart-mind; therefore, sagely moral emotions are in cosmic harmony with heaven, earth, and all things.
In the quoted passage above, Wang concisely interprets his entire philosophy of the mind in terms of its three key doctrines: innate knowledge
[of good], the extension of innate knowledge, and absolute sincerity. He
emphasizes the “original substance/essence” (bonche/benti) of the mind
as well as the Mencian teaching of “innate knowledge [of good]”
(yangji/liangzhi) and “innate ability [to do good]” (yangneung/liangneng
良能).76 Wang certainly liked Mencius’s ontological moral belief in original human goodness in the heart-mind of virtuous emotions. The Four
Beginnings refer to as the mind-in-itself and thereby confirm its innate
knowledge of good, which universally enables moral self-cultivation and
the path to sagehood.
Overall, Wang’s ethics of emotions emphasizes self-cultivation as moral
awakening and practice; that is, extend the good heart-mind
(yangsim/liangxin 良心) to others by “making the will sincere” to “do
good and remove evil.”77
Unlike the orthodox Zhu Xi (Cheng-Zhu) school, Wang Yangming did
not have a major impact on the Korean philosophy of emotions mainly
because the Yangming school in Korea was effectively opposed by the
orthodox Zhu Xi school (known as Seongnihak) and officially persecuted
by the Joseon dynasty for centuries. However, Jeong Jedu 鄭齊斗 (Hagok
霞谷; 1649–1736) was a prominent thinker who accomplished his “great
synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea” (Chung 2020).
Hagok articulated the Four-Seven philosophy of emotions but focused his
creative interpretation more on the Mencian and Yangming doctrines.
This topic is discussed further in Sect. 1.4.1 on Korean Confucian
perspectives.
76
For more details on Wang’s doctrine of yangji/liangzhi and yangneung/liangneng, see
CXL pt. I, sect. 8 and pt. II, sect. 152; Chan 1963a: 15, 132. See also Wang’s famous essay
“Inquiry on the Great Learning” (Daxue wen) in Chan (1963b: 665). Furthermore, for the
original Mencian doctrine of yangji/liangzhi and yangneung/liangneng, see Mencius,
7A:15; Lau 1970: 184 or Chan 1963b: 80.
77
See CXL pt. I, sect. 129 and pt. III, sect. 315; Chan 1963a: 86, 244. See also “Inquiry
on the Great Learning”; Chan 1963b: 664, 666. Furthermore, Ching (1976) is a good book
on this topic, and consult Chung (2020) for my detailed discussion of this topic in the
Korean and comparative context of Jeong Jedu’s (Hagok) Yangming Neo-Confucianism.
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1.3
1.3.1
Emotions in thE Buddhist tradition
The Buddha’s Teaching and Theravada
The word “emotion” variously appears in the Buddhist scriptures of
Theravada or Mahāyāna. We see its related words and concepts more
often: for example, “sensations (Pāli vedana),” “feelings (vedana),” “craving (or desires)” (taṇhā),” “moods,” “psychic dispositions,” “consciousness (mind),” “mental distraction,” “clinging,” “attachment,” and so on.
It is also important to note that specific examples of human emotions and
feelings are frequently mentioned either negatively or positively in certain
scriptures and discourses of Indian Buddhism: for example, “sorrow” (suffering; duhkha), “ill-will,” “hatred,” “pride,” “passion,” “depression,”
and so on in the negative cases; and “equanimity,” “calmness,” “compassion,” “joy,” “love,” “extreme joy” in the positive cases.
Some Mahāyāna scriptures repudiate “unwholesome” emotions and
desires such as “craving,” “desire,” “anger,” “happiness,” “greed,” “fear,”
“hatred,” “pride,” and “jealousy” and, more importantly, encourage or
praise “compassion,” “great compassion,” “love,” “courage,” “generosity,” “utmost joy,” “joy of omniscience,” “humbleness,” and so forth.
According to the Buddhist tradition, after attaining his enlightenment
under the Bodhi tree, the Gautama Buddha preached the famous First
Sermon on the Middle Way, the Four Noble Truths, and the Noble
Eightfold Path. He explains the Middle Way as follows:
The pursuit of desires and of the pleasure which springs from desire, which
is base, common, leading to rebirth, ignoble, and unprofitable; and the pursuit of pain and hardship, which is grievous, ignoble, and unprofitable. The
Middle Way of the Tathāgatha avoids both these ends. It is enlightened, it
brings clear vision, it makes for wisdom, and leads to peace, insight, enlightenment, and Nirvana.78
This passage is self-explanatory on why the historical Buddha negatively
viewed several examples of common emotions: self-indulging desire and
78
Samyutta Nikāya 5: 421 ff; de Bary 1969: 16. In this section, this and other excerpts on
the historical Buddha’s teaching come from several scriptures in the Sutta Pitaka, one of the
Pali Tipitaka of Theravada Buddhism. See selected translations in de Bary’s edited The
Buddhist Tradition in India, China, and Japan (1969). Another good primary source is
Conze (1963).
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pleasure and self-damaging pain and grievance (sorrow). His message
about the Middle Way is to gain peace and nirvana by suppressing and
transcending these two extremes of life.
As the Buddha taught, sorrow (suffering; duhkha in Pāli) is universal
human suffering not only physically but also emotionally, and it is ultimately caused by craving (desires, greed; taṇhā). These are the first two
items of his teaching of the Four Noble Truths:
This is the Noble Truth of Sorrow [duhkha]. Birth is sorrow, age is sorrow,
disease is sorrow, death is sorrow, contact with the unpleasant is sorrow …
in short, all the five components of individuality [forms, sensations, perceptions, psychic dispositions, and consciousness] are sorrow. And this is the
Nobel Truth of the Arising of Sorrow. It arises from craving [taṇhā], which
leads to rebirth, which brings delight and passion, and seeks pleasure now
here, now there—the craving for sensual pleasure, the craving for continued
life, the craving for power. And this is the Noble Truth of the Stopping of
Sorrow. It is the complete stopping of that craving, so that no passion
remains, leaving it. Being emancipated from it, being released from it, giving no place to it. And this is the Noble Truth of the [Middle] Way which
leads to the Stopping of Sorrow.79
This self-explanatory passage articulates the Buddha’s repudiation of negative emotions and inclinations such as self-pleasing craving, sensations
(feelings), passion, and pleasure because all of them ultimately cause universal suffering (duhkha). Thus, the Eightfold Path means to eliminate all
kinds and levels of selfish or self-indulging emotions, passions, and desires
and to eventually become completely “emancipated” and gain nirvana.
Selfish feelings of attachments are the result of taṇhā (craving) that
causes more duhkha (suffering). This inevitable condition of life is the
fundamental reason for moral-spiritual discipline known as the Eightfold
Path. Human beings need to constantly practice “non-attachment” in
order to control self-indulging thoughts, desires, and emotions, all of
which can be extinguished only when nirvana is attained. Emotional
experience is therefore closely linked to human sufferings. Suffering is the
reality of existence that is further entrenched by bad attitudes of selfishness, clinging, or defilement. The Buddha taught a true understanding of
the existential human conditions of suffering, including emotions and
desires in their interdependent, dynamic nature.
79
Samyutta Nikāya 5: 421 ff; de Bary 1969: 16.
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In articulating the “the arising of the whole body of ill [suffering]”
(also known “the twelve interdependent chain of causation”), the Buddha
includes emotions and sensations such as craving, grief, lamentation, sorrow, and despair as follows:
Ignorance is the cause of psychic constructions, hence is caused by consciousness, hence physical form, hence the six senses, hence contact, hence
sensations, hence craving, hence attachment, hence becoming, hence birth,
hence old age and death with all the distraction of grief and lamentation,
sorrow, and despair. This is the arising of the whole body of ill [suffering].
So we agreed that by the complete cessation of ignorance, the whole body
of ill [suffering] ceases.80
Craving (desire), grief, and sorrow as mentioned in this passage are three
common emotions that are compatible with Chinese and Korean yok/yu
慾 (desire; craving) and ae/ai 哀 (sorrow; grief). The Buddhist emotion
of lamentation is also similar to the Chinese and Korean won/yuan (怨) or
han/han (恨). The Buddha recommends the suppression of these kinds of
self-afflicting emotions, as articulated in his discourse on rejecting conventional Hindu belief in the eternal soul:
If one experiences a happy sensation, and thinks “this is my soul,” when the
happy sensation ceases he will think “My soul has departed.” One who
thinks thus looks on his soul as something impermanent in this life, a blend
of happiness and sorrow with a beginning and end, and so this proposition
is not acceptable …. When a monk … refrains from such views and clings to
nothing in the world; and not clinging he does not tremble, and not trembling he attains Nirvana.81
In this passage, the Buddha rejects belief in the permanent self by affirming only one’s temporary existence consisting of sensations, happiness,
sorrow, and other physical and mental components. The emotions of happiness and sorrow are highlighted here.
When the Buddha taught the monk Rāhula (formerly his son) on “right
mindfulness,” the seventh stage of the Noble Eightfold Path, he emphasizes: “Develop the state of mind of friendliness, Rāhula, for, as you do so,
ill-will will grow less; and of compassion, for thus vexation will grow less;
80
81
Majjhima Nikāya 1: 256 ff; de Bary 1969: 19.
Dīgha Nikāya 2: 64 ff; de Bary 1969: 21.
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of joy, for thus aversion will grow less; and of equanimity, for thus repugnance will grow less.”82 A good number of emotions are mentioned here.
The Buddha praised compassion, joy, and equanimity/calmness as the
wholesome emotions that will “grow” as one cultivates right mindfulness.
Note that these emotions and friendliness are also known as the four cardinal virtues of Buddhism. By contrast, vexation (displeasure), aversion
(hatred), and repugnance are negatively viewed, respectively.
The Buddha’s perspectives on the relationship between the emotions
and the doctrine of selflessness (anatta) can provide a rich array of philosophical and spiritual resources to help us to distinguish selfish emotions
from self-less (or self-emptying) emotions. The so-called three poisons of
clinging attitudes are greed, hatred, and delusion. These are classified as
unwholesome states of the mind, and suffering is generated by these
afflicting emotions and their concomitant psychic states. Padmasiri de
Silva, a scholar of Indian Buddhist philosophy and psychology, points out
that “non-egoistic” and “self-transcending emotions” in the Buddhist
context include “loving kindness (metta), compassion (karuṇā), gladness
at the success of others (mudita), and equanimity (upekkha)” (de Silva
1995: 110).83 These wholesome emotions are gained through the process
of realizing enlightened selflessness (śūnyatā).
In the Discourse of the Great Passing-away (Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta),
we also read the last instructions of the Buddha to his beloved disciple
Ānanda: “A monk becomes his own lamp and refuge by continually looking on his
body, feelings, perceptions, moods, and ideas in such a manner that he
conquers the cravings, and depressions of ordinary men and is always
strenuous, self-possessed, and collected in mind.”84 The Buddha’s final
teaching therefore reiterates the practice of self-control by controlling all
ordinary feelings and removing all selfish emotions. That is to say, moods
and ideas are also highlighted here in relation to cravings.
On a comparative note, Marks argues that since the Buddhist teaching
on the universal cause of suffering disparages strong desires (craving;
taṇhā), it requires “the elimination of strong desires” (1995b: 143).85
This is partly why Marks defends the Buddhist admiration of dispassion for
82
Majjhima Nikāya 1: 256; de Bary 1969: 27.
See de Sila’s article “Theoretical Perspectives on emotions in Early Buddhism” in Marks
and Ames (1995).
84
Dīgha Nikāya, Sutta 16; de Bary 1969: 29.
85
Marks (1995b) is “Dispassion and the Ethical Life,” a book chapter in Marks and
Ames (1995).
83
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
the ethical life. On the other hand, in his “The Cross-cultural Comparison
of Emotion” (1995b),86 Solomon criticizes Marks by arguing that the latter’s support for “the goodness of dispassion” is not convincing because
Marks was influenced by Buddhism. From a non-Buddhist (Western) perspective, Solomon himself prefers to support passions for the ethical life.87
Buddhist morality, the second part of the Eightfold Path (right speech,
conduct, and livelihood), also represents Gautama’s role model as follows:
The Monk Gautama … lives modestly, full of mercy, desiring in compassion
for the welfare of all things living. He has given up taking what is not given,
he has lost all inclination to it … he lives in honesty and purity of heart ….
His pleasure is in peace, he loves peace and delights in it …. He speaks only
words that are blameless, pleasing to the ear, touching the heart, cultured,
pleasing the people, loved by the people.88
This passage stresses Buddhist virtuous emotions such as compassion,
modesty, and mercy for all beings and also positively affirms the three
common emotions of delight (joy), pleasure, and love in the Buddhist
context of seeking holistic peace. It is also worthwhile to note that the
Buddhist discipline of detachment should not be completely identified
with “the destruction of emotion.” This is because “wholesome emotions
are an integral part of refined sensibility and provide fertile soil for clear
judgment and the generation of moral and spiritual insights” (de Silva
1995: 112).
The Buddha’s thought-provoking teaching of pure mind and righteousness therefore emphasizes love over hatred and sorrow:
Never in this world is hate
Appeased by hatred;
It is only appeased by love—
This is an eternal law.
Victory breeds hatred
For the defeated lie down in sorrow.
Above victory or defeat
The calm man dwells in peace.89
86
This work is the concluding chapter in Marks and Ames (1995).
For Solomon’s ethics of passions, an interesting and important topic, see Solomon
(1993, 1995a, 1995b).
88
Dīgha Nikāya, 1: 4 ff; de Bary 1969: 29.
89
Dhammapada, 3–5, 201: de Bary 1969: 39.
87
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The following excerpt also explains Gautama’s experience of nirvana
through self-awakening and complete emotional liberation at the conclusion of his seven-day meditation just prior to attaining his enlightenment:
Having acquired the concentration of mind which springs from solitudes,
the price was filled with extreme joy and bliss [of enlightenment] …
Alas, wretched is he who, out of ignorance and blindness of pride, ignores
others who are distressed by old age, sickness, or death …
He became neither excited nor distressed; free from pleasures; and
untouched by hatred for contempt of others.
While this passionless, pure insight of that great-souled one grew …
I am free from the evils of passion arising from objects of sense.90
One has to abandon negative emotions like selfish pride, pleasure, and
hatred and remain “passionless” in order to seek true insights and ultimate
peace and joy in attaining nirvana. In other words, Buddhists endeavor to
suppress emotions and desires, but this would never mean that their entire
lives are absolutely empty of all motivational elements (Kupperman 1995:
128). They have ethical and spiritual motives: that is, a religious faith and
desire to seek peace, “love,” and, ultimately, enlightenment “with extreme
joy and bliss.”
In our view, despite their psychological and ethical context, the
Buddhist emotions of compassion, pleasure (happiness), delight (joy),
love, and hatred are basically compatible with the Korean and East Asian
Confucian counterparts. The Buddhist emotion of modesty also resonates
with the Confucian and Neo-Confucian teaching that the moral emotion
(heart-mind) of modesty is one of the Four Beginnings of virtue. “Mercy”
and “dispassion” appear to be more or distinctively Buddhist, which is
discussed further in the next two sections on Indian and Chinese Mahāyāna
perspectives.
1.3.2
Indian Mahāyāna Perspectives: Great Compassion
and Ultimate Joy
The Mahāyāna doctrine of the bodhisattva provides both clergy and laity
with its ideals of religious faith and practice. It emphasizes that all good
Buddhists are bodhisattvas in the making and should work endlessly
90
de Bary 1969: 64–65.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
toward the universal goal of complete enlightenment. One of the most
important virtues of the bodhisattva is therefore compassion (karuṇā) to
help and save all beings from suffering to ultimate nirvana.
The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines Sūtra, a famous
Mahāyāna scripture, articulates it as follows:
And immense compassion grips him [the bodhisattva]. His Divine eye sees
numerable beings, and he is filled with great distress at what he sees, for
many bear the burden of punished in purgatory, others will have unfortunate rebirths. So he pours out his love and compassion upon all beings, and
attends to them, thinking, I shall become the saviour of all beings.91
Here Mahāyāna faith in the bodhisattva power is emphasized for universal
salvation (enlightenment). The virtuous emotions of “love” and “compassion” are not just ordinarily human but also selfless and transcendent
(divine). Many passages of the Mahāyāna texts talk about the bodhisattva’s
solemn religious vow of self-sacrificing compassion to endlessly assist all
beings from suffering to enlightenment and peace. For example, the
Śikṣāsamuccaya (Compendium of doctrine)92 states:
The bodhisattva …. The virtue of generosity is not my helper …. It is I who
help them. For all beings are caught in the net of craving, encompassed by
ignorance, held by the desire for existence; they are doomed to destruction,
shut in cage of pain …. I must so bring to fruition the root of goodness that
all beings find the utmost joy, unheard of joy, the joy of omniscience. (de
Bary 1969: 83–85)
All bodhisattvas must always practice moral and spiritual precepts such as
supreme “generosity” for the utmost joy of all beings. Furthermore, the
same text emphasizes the bodhisattva’s full “happiness” even under the
most painful or self-sacrificing circumstances. The bodhisattva must bring
about “the joy of complete enlightenment”:
So the bodhisattva … is happy even when subjected to the tortures of
hell …. For this was the resolve of the Great Being, the bodhisattva: “…
And those who revile me, afflict me, beat me … or take my life—may they
91
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, 22: 402–403; de Bary 1969: 81–82.
This work is written by the seventh-century Mahāyāna master Śāntideva; see Barbra
Clayton (2006): Moral Theory in Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya: Cultivating the Fruits of Virtue.
92
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all obtain the joy of complete enlightenment … he cultivates and develops
the consciousness of joy in his relations with all beings, and so he acquires a
contemplative spirit field with joy in all things.93
Here the bodhisattva’s joy is not just an emotional joy but, more important, “joy in all things” in a spiritual and religious sense. Joy and compassion are two of the four cardinal virtues of Buddhism. From a similar
standpoint, another Mahāyāna sūtra emphasizes the bodhisattva’s ten
“perfections” (perfect virtues; pāramitā [Skt.])94 “by which a bodhisattva
gains her strength.” Five of these perfect virtues are: the bodhisattva
“bows humbly to all beings, and does not increase in pride”;
“has compassion on the weak and does not dislike them”;
“protects those who are afraid”;
“delights the poor with his riches”; and
“speaks to all beings pleasingly.”95
Note that these virtues are also associated with common emotions such
as humbleness and pride, compassion, fear, delight (joy), and pleasure,
respectively. General speaking, compassion, humbleness (modesty), altruism, and joy (delight) are emphasized as moral-spiritual emotions in the
Confucian tradition as well. As we have seen in the foregoing sections,
anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred (disliking), and desire (craving) are the
common emotions that are also discussed in Chinese Confucian texts
as well.
No wonder why most of these emotions that the Buddha and Indian
Mahāyāna mentioned are therefore articulated in the Chinese and Korean
Buddhist texts as well.
Śikṣāsamuccaya, 181 f; de Bary 1969: 90–91.
In Mahāyāna Buddhism the bodhisattva’s six pāramitās (virtues) are generosity (dāna),
morality (śīla), patience (kṣānti), vigor (vīrya), concentration (dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā).
This list became expanded to promote the ten perfect stages (bhūmi) of a bodhisattva in the
process of attaining full enlightenment. The ten perfections of the bodhisattva are (1) generosity, (2) morality, (3) renunciation (nekhamma), (4) insight (pañña), (5) energetic diligence (viriya), (6) patience, (7) truthfulness (sacca), (8) resolution (adhiṭṭhāna), (9)
loving-kindness (metta), and (10) equanimity (upekkhā).
95
Tathāgataguhya Sūtra, Śikṣāsamuccaya, 274; de Bary 1969: 91.
93
94
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1.3.3
Chinese and Korean Mahāyāna Perspectives: Tiantai,
Chan, Pure Land, Wonhyo, and Jinul
The Tiantai school of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China developed an important doctrine that influenced both Chan (Zen) and Pure Land Buddhism.
According to its doctrine of the “perfectively harmonious threefold truth,”
all beings and dharmas are generated by interdependent causation, so they
are ultimately “empty” for having no permanent self-nature. However,
each of them has a temporary existence as well. In other words, “the truth
of emptiness” and “the truth of temporariness” also mean the “truth of
the Mean” regarding all dharmas.
In his famous work the Profound Meaning of the Scripture of the Lotus of
the Wonderful Law, Zhikai, the founder of Chinese Tiantai Buddhism,
articulated the harmonious threefold truth:
The present scripture uses ten dharmas to comprise all dharmas, namely the
such-like character, such-like nature, such-like substance, such-like power,
such-like activity, such-like causes, such-like conditions, such-like effects,
such-like retributions, such-like beginning-and-end-ultimate, and the like of
the dharmas …. Distinction makes it easier to understand, hence we specify
Emptiness, Temporariness, and the Mean. (de Bary 1969: 164)
Emotions and feelings are indeed included in and interdependent on what
Zhikai calls “such-like” character, nature, activities, conditions, and effect;
therefore, they are physical and mental phenomena that do not have any
permanent self-existence. The Tiantai teaching basically resonates with the
historical Buddha that emotions and desires have to be “emancipated” for
self-awakening nirvana because the “deluded” self generates selfish emotions, feelings, and desires and thereby continue causing more suffering.
In section 17, one of the most frequently quoted sections of the
Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, the most eminent Chan maser
Huineng says:
No thought is not to think even when involved in thought …. If one instant
of thought is cut off, the Dharma body separates from the physical body,
and in the midst of successive thoughts there will be no place for attachment
to anything …. If you stop thinking of the myriad things and cast aside all
thoughts …, you will be reborn in another realm …. The deluded man,
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however, does not himself see and slanders the teaching of the sūtras. (de
Bary 1969: 218–220)96
By “no-thought” and “stop thinking,” Huineng also means no “craving”,
no “abiding” attachments, and, of course, no more emotions, desires, or
passions. And one’s “physical body” must be controlled and regulated
accordingly. As Huineng says, “Because man in his delusion has thoughts
in relation to his environment, heterodox [wrong] ideas stemming from
those thoughts arise, and passions [emotions] and false views are produced from them” (de Bary 1969: 220). From another angle, awakening
is gained by actual practice.
Richard Shusterman, an American pragmatist philosopher, calls Zen
“practical somaesthetics,” for it involves disciplined, reflective practice
aimed at “somatic” self-improvement (Shusterman 2012: 45). Chan (Zen)
Buddhism warns against the distracting nature and afflicting role of emotions and passions. Christoph Anderl, a Buddhist scholar, points out that
jeong/qing doesn’t mean the “real state of affairs or feelings” but refers to
the activities of the “unenlightened mind” and thus has a rather negative
connotation (2004: 149).97 The failure to overcome the deluded self can
result in “attachment” to the mental processes of conceptualizing the
deluded perspectives of the world.
Section 36 of the Platform Sutra also states: “Crush the passions and
destroy them.” This concurs with the Gautama Buddha’s experience of
nirvana through self-awakening and complete liberation; that is, having
“passionless, pure insights” and being freed from “the evils of passion”
arising from objects of sense (de Bary 1969: 64–65). In discussing Chan,
Huineng, and emotions, Parkes points out that for Huineng, “deluded
ideas or delusive emotions” are viewed as “clouds and mists,” so one’s
“mastery over the passions and emotions” is demanded for enlightenment
(1995: 217).98 Huineng’s teaching is self-explanatory on the question of
why Chan Buddhism, the most ascetic (meditative) and rigorous form of
East Asian Mahāyāna, like the historical Buddha, strongly repudiates emotions and thoughts for their self-indulging delusion and self-damaging
96
This and other excerpts on Huineng come from de Bary (1969), all of which were originally taken from Yampolsky’s translation (1967).
97
Anderl’s article “Qing in Chan Buddhist Chinese” is in Love and Emotions in Traditional
Chinese Literature edited by Halvor EIfring (2004).
98
See Parkes’s comparative essay on emotions and passions in Zen and Nietzsche in Marks
and Ames (1995).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
craving that ultimately cause suffering. Selfish emotions, passions, and
desires have to be completely “transcended” in the process of “selfemptying” and for the final goal of enlightenment.
The eminent, ecumenical Korean monk Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686)
strongly criticized the problem of emotions from a similar standpoint. In
his famous work Ijang eui 二障義 (Doctrine of the two hindrances),99
Wonhyo writes: “The greed, hatred, delusion, and so forth … are all of
unwholesome quality” (Muller and Nguyen 2012: 78). The afflictions of
emotions such as craving, anger, and pride should be rejected because they
cause delusion and suffering. “Eliminated in the Path of Cultivation are
the anger of the desire realm and the three afflictions of greed, pride, and
nescience.”100 These emotions are harmful (unwholesome) and should
therefore be eliminated in “the path of cultivation.” Wonhyo’s teaching
therefore concurs with early Buddhism; that is, certain forms of suffering
are dependent on emotions like craving and hatred, two of the so-called
three poisons (Muller and Nguyen 2012: 54). Both poisons originate
from the first poison nescience that conditions negative emotions. Afflictive
(Skt. kleśa) emotions are the reason for suffering.
Similarly, Jinul 知訥 (1158–1210), the most influential Seon (Chan)
master in the formation of Korean Buddhism, harshly repudiated “the
deluded mind” for engendering poisonous emotions such as “greed” and
“hatred” and thus their continuous afflictions.101 By contrast, “the true
mind” “does not give rise to [afflicting] feelings of hatred or lust” (Buswell
1991: 135). Jinul’s message, like the Buddha’s and Huineng’s teachings,
is that the (Seon) Buddhist way of enlightenment means to eliminate all
unwholesome (“poisonous”) emotions, passions, and desires, thereby discovering “the true mind (self).”
Mahāyāna contains a soteriological paradox in regard to Pure Land doctrine and practice. Pure Land Buddhism, the unique school of East Asian
Buddhism, stresses the Mahāyāna doctrine of universal enlightenment
through faith in the divine power of the Amitabha Buddha. It praises
“compassion” and “love” as not only virtuous moral emotions but also
the Amitabha’s universal divine virtue and grace. In his Compendium of the
99
This text is fully translated with annotation by Charles Muller in Muller’s and Nguyen’s
edited Wŏnhyo’s Philosophy of Mind (2012).
100
Ijang eui 4.2; Muller and Nguyen 2012: 107.
101
For the life and thought of Jinul, see Buswell’s Tracing Back the Radiance: Chinul’s
Korean Way of Zen (1991). Consult Buswell (1992) for his experience and interpretation of
Korean Zen pracitce as well.
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49
Happy (Pure) Land, Daocho (562–645), one of the greatest masters of
Pure Land Buddhism in China, explained the recitation of the Amitabha’s
name as the most effective universal way of salvation by emphasizing the
Amitabha’s “great compassion” and his “compassionate mindfulness of
the beings” (de Bary 1969: 202). The Pure Land teaching uniquely
emphasizes the bodhisattva path of “great compassion” for its universal
salvation of “complete enlightenment.”
In this regard, Wonhyo and Jinul strongly support the bodhisattva path
of Korean Mahāyāna. Wonhyo highlighted the cultivation and practice of
“great compassion” (Buswell 2007: 253) as the most important virtue for
universal salvation. In his influential Jinsim jikseol 眞心直說 (Straight talks
on the true mind),102 Jinul talks about what he calls “the heart-mind of
great compassion” (Buswell 1991: 135). As represented by Wonhyo and
Jinul, then, Korean Buddhism emphasizes universal enlightenment for “all
sentient beings”: “great compassion” is the virtuous-spiritual emotion of
the bodhisattva.103 In this book, Sharon Suh’s Chap. 11 on jeong and
interrelationality in Korean Buddhist cinema discusses the modern
Buddhist meaning and role of “bodhisattvic compassion” in relation to
Confucian-influenced Korean jeong emotions.
1.4
Emotions (JEONG/QING 情) in KorEan
PhilosoPhy and rEliGion
What has been discussed in this introductory chapter so far is the editors’
detailed introduction to three related topics: “Emotions in General, East
and West” (Sect. 1.1); “Emotions (Jeong/Qing 情) in the Chinese
Tradition “ (Sect. 1.2); and “Emotions in the Buddhist Tradition” (Sect.
1.3). All of these sections will efficiently serve as a helpful textual, philosophical, ethical, and religious background of Korean jeong 情 studies. We
are now ready to introduce Korean perspectives according to their leading
traditions and doctrines and their comparative and contemporary meanings and implications in harmony with the Korean way of human experience, rationality, and emotionality.
102
This text is fully translated in Buswell (2007): Cultivating Original Enlightenment:
Wŏnhyo’s Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-Sūtra (Kŭmgang Sammaegyŏng Non).
103
For more details on Wonhyo’s and Jinul’s teachings of “great compassion,” see Sect.
1.4.3.2 (Great Compassion and Joy).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
This last section of the introductory chapter introduces and outlines all
three main parts of the book as follows:
1.4.1
Korean Confucian Perspectives
1.4.1.1 The Holistic Nature, Role, and Problem of Jeong: Emotions,
Self-cultivation, Human Relationships, Ethics, and Beyond
Korean Confucianism greatly contributed to articulating the nature of
emotions (jeong/qing 情) and its manifold and multilevel roles in selfcultivation and ethics. It championed virtuous emotions while repudiating
the potential problem or selfishness of negative emotions, and this mode
of reasoning consistently influenced many generations of Confucian thinkers and ordinary Koreans. As a result, the Korean Confucian tradition has
developed its comprehensive context and scope of jeong/qing emotions
common to all human life and experience in relation to human nature
(seong/xing), heart-mind (sim/xin), and physical and psychological dispositions. Its extensive vocabulary of jeong includes the Four Beginnings of
virtue and the Seven Emotions as well.
We cannot deny the essential influence of Chinese Confucian texts,
doctrines, and ideas on Korean emotion talks with respect to the Four and
the Seven, the Book of Rites, Zhongyong, Mencius, and Zhu Xi. However,
it is also wrong to argue that Korean Confucians merely followed the
Chinese tradition because Yi Toegye (1501–1570), Yi Yulgok
(1536–1584), Jeong Hagok (1649–1736),104 and Jeong Dasan
(1762–1836) not only discovered the fundamental ambiguity and limitation of these Chinese classics and Neo-Confucian commentaries but also
creatively developed their original ideas, interpretations, and insights. This
became a key topic in the Korean Four-Seven debate, which began in the
mid-sixteenth century and lasted for three centuries.105
104
See Chung (2020: 46–52) for Jeong Jedu’s (Hagok) Four-Seven ethics of emotions.
This book is a full-length study of Hagok’s “great synthesis” of Wang Yangming NeoConfucianism in Korea, including his critical reinterpretation of Zhu Xi’s and Toegye’s philosophies. Hagok was the leading Korean thinker and scholar of Yangming
Neo-Confucianism.
105
For current scholarship on the Korean Four-Seven debate, see Kalton et al. 1994;
Chung 1995, 2016 (Introduction, Part II, Sect. 1.2), 2019b, 2021 (a new book on Toegye’s
ethics and spirituality). For various articles, see Ching 1985; de Bary and Haboush 1985;
Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Seok 2018; Tu 1985b. Furthermore, Toegye’s
Four-Seven letters are included in Yi Toegye (1985), Toegye jeonseo (hereafter abbrevi-
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
51
Their unique common goal was how to understand and explain the self
rationally, psychologically, morally, and spiritually. This is why the holistic
nature of Korean jeong seems to be more associated with or influenced
by the Confucian tradition of language, philosophy, moral psychology,
and social relationships. In this regard, one can say that the foundational
meaning and implication of Korean jeong are more Confucian in teaching
and practice than Buddhist or another. In fact, it is historically true that
Korea was comparatively the most “Confucianized” country and culture
in East Asia.106
In the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), Korean Neo-Confucians comprehensively discussed various textual and philosophical questions about
jeong. In particular, they rigorously debated those regarding the FourSeven relationship as well as its implications for moral-spiritual selfcultivation, most of which had not been explained clearly in the Chinese
tradition of classics and Song Neo-Confucian commentaries. Part of their
common practice was to interpret a conceptual, moral, and psychological
distinction or connection between the Four and the Seven in terms of
emotions (jeong/qing), sentiments, passions, desires, and related emotive
phenomena.
For example, how do the Four and the Seven all relate to jeong/qing
feelings and emotions in general? This quickly became a major issue in the
Korean Four-Seven debates. One critical issue was about whether the Four
and the Seven are only different “names” for emotions or actually have
two distinctive conceptual and moral meanings and roles. What about
ordinary physical or psychological feelings or desires? Another key question was why Mencius described the Four as “emotions” (jeong/qing) and
especially in terms of the “heart-mind” (sim/xin). What about the question of why the Four are moral willing, emotions, or intuitions? This ambiguity existing at the heart of Mencius’s moral philosophy and psychology
and Song Chinese Neo-Confucian commentary was one of the most
important issues in the Korean Four-Seven and Horak debates. These
kinds of issues regarding the orthodox, mainstream line of interpretation
ated TJ), 16: 8a–30a, and Yulgok’s letters in YJ 9: 32b–10:40a (vol. 1, 192–216); for a full
translation of these letters, see Kalton et al. 1994, 7–104, 109–183. Chung (1995) is a
comparative, comprehensive discussion of Toegye and Yulgok and the practical implications
of each thinker’s Four-Seven thesis.
106
For this topic on the “Confucianization” of Korean language, culture, and society from
historical or socio-institutional angels, see Haboush (1991), Deuchler (1992),
Rozman (1991), Duncan (2002), Elman et al. (2002), and Chung (2015).
52
E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
are variously discussed in Chaps. 2, 4, and 6 of this volume by Seok,
Chung, and Harroff, respectively. Chapter 5 by Baker is unique in discussing Jeong Dasan’s own unorthodox interpretation of emotions and “the
pursuit of sagehood.”
Korean Neo-Confucians Toegye and Yulgok—like Korean Buddhist
thinkers such as Wonhyo and Jinul—did not fully distinguish emotion
from reason (cognition), and vice versa. In other words, they traditionally
viewed the heart-mind (sim/xin 心) as one integrated holistic faculty that
unites, coordinates, or apprehends the entire self with respect to rationality, emotionality, morality, and spirituality. Jeong/qing emotions engage
the entire self, including the body as well as the heart-mind, as in the case
of Confucian or Buddhist philosophy and spirituality.107 This issue of
emotion-and-reason continuum is discussed by Seok in his Chap. 2 on the
Korean Four-Seven and Horak debates; it is also mentioned in Chung’s
Chap. 4 on Yulgok’s ethics of emotions, and see Harroff’s Chap. 6 on his
Western comparative views of the Four-Seven relationship.
Korean thinkers cited the Confucian term “Seven Emotions”
(chiljeong/qiqing 七情) according to the Book of Rites, one of the Five
Classics: “pleasure (happiness; hui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu 怒), sorrow
(ae/ai 哀), fear (gu/ju 懼), love (ae/ai 愛), hatred (dislike; o/wu 惡), and
desire (yok/yu 欲)” are basic human emotions that “are not acquired
through learning from the outside” (Legge 1970: [1] 379). They also
discussed the Doctrine of the Mean (Chap. 1), which gives attention to the
first three together with joy (delight; rak/le 樂) and emphasizes “equilibrium” and “harmony” in terms of “before arousal” and “after arousal,”
respectively.108 In other words, these are innate physical and psychological
jeong/qing of human nature. The cultivation of mind therefore requires a
measure of control over emotions, including the Seven, as clearly taught
in the Zhongyong. According to this ethics of emotions, the goal of selfcultivation is to attain the state of control and “harmony” after the Seven
or related emotions are aroused (bal/fa 發).
This topic of emotions is discussed in Chaps. 2 and 4 of this book by
Seok and Chung, respectively. Seok gives a general overview according to
107
For this topic regarding top eminent Korean Buddhists such as Wonhyo and Jinul, see
Sects. 1.3.3 and 1.4.3 of this introductory chapter.
108
For our discussion of the Seven Emotions according to the Book of Rites, Sect. 1.2.2.2
(The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean …) of this introductory chapter. See also
Sect. 1.1.4 on the diversity of emotions.
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the Korean Four-Seven debate, and Chung focuses on Yulgok’s interpretation. As discussed in Chap. 5 by Baker, Dasan seriously doubted this
mainstream orthodox line of interpretation by giving his own opinions on
human emotions. For example, Baker keenly argues that Dasan went
beyond the conventional Confucian list of the Seven by discussing other
significant emotions (jeong/qing 情) according to his creative reading of
the classics: resentment (lamentation; won/yuan 怨), remorse (regret; 悔
hoe/hui), suffering/grievance (恨 han/hen), and resentful suffering (怨恨
wonhan/yuanhen).
Many chapters of this book discuss Confucian moral emotions such as
“compassion” (cheugun/ceyin 惻隱), “shame and aversion” (suo/xiu 羞
惡), “courtesy and modesty” (sayang/cirang 辭讓), and “discernment of
right and wrong” (sibi/shifei 是非), all of which are known as the Four
Beginnings of virtue (sadan/siduan 四端) according to the Mencius (2A:
6; 6A: 6) and Chinese Neo-Confucian commentaries.109 In the Korean
tradition, the moral emotion of compassion (sympathy; empathy) is an
innate virtuous feeling. This topic is variously discussed by Seok (Chap. 2),
Choi (Chap. 4), and Chung (Chap. 5) and two comparative-theme chapters of Part II by Joseph E. Harroff (Chap. 6) and Lee (Chap. 7).
Other virtuous emotions such as gyeong/jing 敬 (reverence; mindfulness; respect) are also emphasized and encouraged, especially by the
Toegye school. Moral virtues, including in/ren 仁 (benevolence; humanheartedness), ye/li 禮 (ritual propriety), and xiao 孝 (filial affection), are
also honored. Choi’s Chap. 3 in particular deals with Toegye’s ethics of
gyeong reverence and emotions. Choi makes an important point that
Toegye’s way of self-cultivation and moral practice stresses gyeong to control selfish emotions and cravings internally and externally.110
With respect to these moral virtues, Confucius also believed that true
emotions are essential to sincerity and virtuous human experience and
should therefore play a vital role in the process of self-cultivation.111 This
insight inspired later generations of eminent Confucians and NeoConfucian thinkers, including Yi Toegye and Yi Yulgok in Korea.
109
For the Four, see Sect. 1.2.2.3 on Mencius; regarding Zhu Xi’s and Wang Yangming’s
views of the Four, see Sects. 1.2.3 and 1.2.4, respectively.
110
For more discussion of this topic from a moral and religious standpoint, see Chung
2016, 2021 (a new book on Toegye’s ethics and spirituality).
111
For details, see Sect. 1.2.2.1 (Confucius: True Emotions and Human
Character). Furthermore, consult Ames (2020) for an interesting discussion of “role ethics”
and human “becoming.”
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
The Korean Four-Seven debates rigorously discussed textual, conceptual, ethical, or psychological issues regarding the Four-and-Seven relationship or difference as well as its implications for moral cultivation, most
of which were not explained clearly in the Chinese classics and NeoConfucian commentaries. For example, how the Four and the Seven differ
from each other, and why they should be understood in relation to the
heart-mind (sim/xin). Toegye and Yulgok similarly confirmed that the
Four Beginnings, including compassion, are indeed moral emotions
(jeong/qing). For Mencius, the “original goodness of human nature” consisting of the Four should therefore be “fully developed” for selfcultivation; “neglecting your own potentials is to destroy yourself.”
(Mencius, 2A: 6).112 Self-cultivation not only involves the Mencian teaching of nurturing the Four as the moral essence of human nature but also
has to maintain what the Zhongyong calls “[emotional] harmony after [the
Seven such as] pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused.” Chapter 2
(Seok) generally discusses this part of the Korean Four-Seven debate on
emotions, and Chap. 4 (Chung) focuses this discussion on Yulgok’s ethics
of emotions and political reform.
The Mencian doctrine of compassion and other moral emotions was
discussed by Korean Neo-Confucians with admiration and care for their
significance in self-cultivation and ethics. It is also important to note that
Toegye emphasized the Mencian teaching in his ethics and spirituality of
emotions and self-cultivation. Toegye frequently quoted not only
Mencius’s doctrine of original human goodness and the Four but also his
spiritual talk of “Heaven” and “serving Heaven,” which seemingly contributed to Toegye’s Korean religious thought.113
Another issue was whether or not the Four and the Seven are two separate or distinctive types of jeong emotions. Toegye emphasized that the
Four such as compassion and the discernment of right and wrong definitely belong to a special, separate group of moral emotions. By contrast,
Yulgok insisted that the Seven represent the “totality” of emotions and
feelings that includes the Four as their “good side [subset].” The FourSeven debates also addressed questions regarding Zhu Xi’s Four-Seven
statements, his dualism of the moral-and-human mind, and his ethics of
self-cultivation. Toegye, Yulgok, and their debaters built the constructive
meaning of the Four-Seven relationship by covering various texts,
112
113
Chung’s translation; see also Lau 1970: 82–83.
For details on this topic, see Chung 2016, 2019c, 2021.
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INTRODUCTION: EMOTIONS (JEONG/QING 情) IN KOREAN…
55
thinkers, and ideas comprehensively and systematically. This was indeed
necessary to understand and practice the vital role of human emotions in
moral and spiritual self-cultivation.
To Toegye and his followers, Zhu Xi’s unexplained statement that “the
Four Beginnings are manifestations of i/li (理; principle), and the Seven
Emotions are manifestations of gi/qi (氣 vital/physical energy)”114 implied
an ontological and conceptual distinction between the Four and the Seven.
This issue was also discussed by Yulgok and other Korean scholars in relation to Zhu’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi.115 Chapters 2 (Soek), 4
(Chung), and 6 (Harroff) of this book discuss this topic from various
angles. Choi’s Chap. 3 deals more with Toegye’s ethics of gyeong reverence and emotional control in relation to Zhu Xi’s teaching of gyeong.
Chapter 5 (Baker) articulates why Dasan opposed the orthodox line of
Korean interpretation in terms of i/li and gi/qi.
Korean thinkers argued that Zhu Xi’s ambiguous comment on the
Four-Seven relationship is to be understood in terms of “[moral] purity,”
and there must be moral distinction or continuum between the Four and
the Seven. For Toegye, the Four and the Seven are different ontologically,
conceptually, and morally; this is why Zhu Xi meant that the Four are
aroused by i/li whereas the Seven are aroused by gi/qi. In other words,
Toegye emphasized that one should overcome dehumanizing tendencies
such as the potential selfishness of the Seven stimulated by gi/qi; this can
be done by practicing our moral virtues backed up by i/li. According to
Yulgok, however, there is moral-emotive continuum between the Four
and the Seven, for which reason Toegye misinterpreted the Four and the
Seven as two distinctive and separate groups of feelings.116 As Yulgok
states, “what is manifested is gi/qi, and the reason for its manifestation is
114
ZZYL 53: 17b.
See n. 57 in Sect. 1.2.3 (Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism) for details on Zhu Xi’s philosophy
of i/li and gi/qi; for current scholarship on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi, see also
n. 39 in Sect. 1.2.2.2. For more on this topic in relation to emotions, see Chaps. 2, 4, and 6
of this book by Soek, Chung, and Harroff, respectively. See Sect. 1.2.2.2, n. 39 for the current literature on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi.
116
YJ 9: 35b; I, 192 (see Chung 1995, 2019b for my discussion of Yulgok’s critique of
Toegye’s four-Seven thesis). For a full translation of Toegye’s and Yulgok’s Four-Seven letters, see Kalton et al. 1994.
115
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
i/li.” In the arousal of all emotions and feelings, including the Four and
the Seven, gi/qi is therefore what actually becomes manifested.117
Toegye, Yulgok, and other Korean Neo-Confucians all confirmed that
the Four Beginnings such as compassion are purely good because they are
backed up by the original goodness of human nature inherent in the heartmind. They basically agreed that ordinary human emotions and feelings
such as the Seven are potentially good if they are properly expressed or
harmonized according to moral principles (i/li 理). However, as Toegye,
in particular, argued, any of these emotions like anger, hatred, or desire
can easily become precarious or evil because they are stimulated by impure
gi/qi (氣) in response to daily things or phenomena (Chung 1995, 2021
[Chaps. 4 and 8]).
Another controversial issue of the Korean Four-Seven debate dealt with
Zhu Xi’s doctrine of “original human nature” (bonyeon ji seong/benran zhi
xing 本然之性) and “physical human nature” (gijil ji seong/qizhi zhi xing
氣質之性) in terms of i/li and gi/qi, respectively.118 Toegye and his followers generally argued that by original human nature Zhu Xi meant the
Mencian notion of “original human goodness,” including innate moral
virtues like human-heartedness (benevolence) as well as moral emotions
such as the Four Beginnings (e.g., compassion). By contrast, the Seven
belong to physical human nature that includes all ordinary physical or
psychological feelings, sensations, and desires; in other words, the Seven
Emotions of the physical human nature are conditioned by gi/qi and can
therefore lead to good or evil. Chapters 2 (Seok) and 4 (Chung) discuss
this part of the Four-Seven debate on emotions.
Furthermore, Yulgok in particular became interested in discussing Zhu
Xi’s doctrine of “[Dao] moral mind” (dosim/daoxin 道心) and “[ordinary] human mind” (insim/renxin 人心): the moral mind is “good”
because it is aroused from heavenly moral principles (cheolli/tianli 天理),
whereas the ordinary human mind is “precarious” and involves both good
and evil because it is aroused from “the selfishness (sa/si 私) of physical
117
YJ 10: 5a; I, 198. For articles on the Korean Four-Seven debates, see Ching 1985 (on
Yulgok); Ivanhoe 2015, 2016; Hyoungchan Kim 2015; Seok 2018; Tu 1985b (on Toegye).
For Chung’s comprehensive discussion, see Chung 1995, 1998 (on Yulgok), 2019b,
2021 (chapter 4).
118
See Sect. 1.2.3 (Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism …) for details of this topic on the bonyeon ji
seong and gijil ji seong.
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57
form.”119 However, Zhu did not explain this topic in terms of emotions
and the Four-Seven relationship, so it was a major issue in the Korean
debate. Chapter 2 (Seok) discusses the moral/human mind issue in the
Four-Seven debate, Chap. 3 (Choi) presents the same issue from the
standpoint of Zhu Xi’s and Toegye’s ethics of reverence (gyeong).
Yulgok emphasized “the oneness of the mind” ontologically and ethically. There is a “mutual relationship” of continuum between them: the
mind is one, even though there are just “two names” used in explaining it.
As good moral emotions, the Four are included in the Seven.120 Yulgok
states: “Mencius selected good [moral] emotions out of the Seven
Emotions, thereby calling them the Four Beginnings.”121 When love, one
of the Seven, is expressed properly, then it is a moral emotion that is no
different from compassion, one of the Four.122 The Four do not exist outside the Seven, the “totality” of emotions: it is impossible for the “good
side” (the Four) and the “totality” (the Seven) to be divided into two
kinds of emotions.123 Accordingly, the moral and human minds should be
understood in terms of the oneness of jeong emotions. “The Four
Beginnings refer to the moral mind in particular; the Seven refer to the
moral-and-human mind combined as a whole.”124 Just as the reality of the
heart-mind is “one,” the wholeness of emotions and feelings is also one
and not divided into the Four and the Seven. In this regard, Yulgok also
criticized Toegye for dualistically misinterpreting the Four and the Seven
as two distinctive groups of emotions.
Jeong Jedu 鄭齊斗 (Hagok 霞谷; 1649–1736), the most eminent
thinker in Korean Yangming Neo-Confucianism,125 discussed the
119
ZZWJ 76: 21b; quoted from Zhu’s preface to the Zhongyong zhangju. More details on
this topic and quotations from Zhu’s ZZYL and ZZWJ, see Sect. 1.2.3 (Zhu Xi NeoConfucianism …), nn. 65, 66. Furthermore, Zhu’s moral psychology of the dual nature of
the mind strongly influenced Toegye’s advanced moral-religious thought (Chung 2016:
26–45, 2021 [chapter 6]).
120
YJ 9: 34b; I, 192. This statement is almost identical to the original thinking of Gi
Daeseung (Gobong; 1525–1572) who rigorously debated with Toegye.
121
YJ 20: 56b; I, 455; Chung’s translation.
122
This opinion basically corresponds to Gobong’s original view; see TJ 16: 13b; I, 408.
123
Yulgok’s argument indirectly concurs with Zhu Xi’s unquoted statement that “the Four
can be understood in the context of the Seven.” See ZZYL 87: 16a–b. Note that Yulgok, as
well as Toegye and Gobong, were not familiar with this statement by Zhu Xi.
124
YJ 10: 7b; I, 199; Chung’s translation.
125
In Korea, this tradition is also known as the school (learning) of the mind (simhak/
xinxue 心學). Hagok is as important as Korea’s three famous Confucian thinkers: Yi Toegye,
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
Four-Seven philosophy of emotions by criticizing Cheng-Zhu thought
through his creative reading of the Mencian and Yangming doctrines. Like
Wang, Hagok said that the Four as virtuous emotions represent “the original essence (bonche/benti 本體) of the heart-mind.”126 This ontologicalethical claim is backed up by the Mencian teaching of “innate knowledge
[of good]” (yangji/liangzhi 良知) and “innate ability [to do good]”
(yangneung/liangneng 良能) (Mencius, 7A: 15). Hagok’s thought reconciles Wang Yangming, Zhu Xi, and Seongnihak Neo-Confucianism in
Korea. Like Wang, he interpreted emotions in terms of emotional control,
yangji/liangzhi, and moral practice. Moral emotions such as the Four,
including compassion, refer to as the innate knowledge and ability of the
mind-in-itself. Hagok’s ethics of emotions, therefore, posits moral practice “to do good and remove evil.”127 Wang’s and Hagok’s ideas of “innate
heart” (conscience; yangsim/liangxin 良心) and “essential heart-mind”
(bonsim/benxin 本心) positively contributed to Korean emotive and ethical language, to the extent that contemporary Koreans often talk about
what they call yangsim/良心 and bonsim/本心 as the true [good] heart
with emotive emphasis on everyday human relationships.
Jeong Yagyong 丁若鏞 (Dasan 茶山; 1762–1836), a leading Korean
Confucian scholar, criticized and opposed the orthodox Korean school
(Seongnihak) of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism in many ways. For example, in his view the mainstream Neo-Confucian theories of emotions in
terms of i/li and gi/qi do not represent the original teaching of Confucius
and Mencius. This is why Dasan concluded that the Seongnihak’s theoretical and practical discussion of emotions (jeong/qing) is limited and
unsuitable for the sagely Confucian way of ethics. As discussed by Baker in
Chap. 5, Dasan’s reading of various classics such as the Book of Rites,
Analects, and Mencius inspired him to discuss more types of common
emotions (jeong/qing), including resentment (lamentation; won/yuan
怨), remorse (regret; 悔 hoe/hui), suffering/grievance (恨 han/hen), and
Yi Yulgok, and Jeong Dasan. The Korean Yangming school was effectively opposed by the
orthodox Zhu Xi school (known as Seongnihak) and officially persecuted by the Joseon
dynasty for centuries.
126
A comprehensive discussion of Hagok’s life and thought is Chung (2020): The Great
Synthesis of Wang Yangming Neo-Confucianism in Korea.
127
Consult Chung (2020) for Hagok’s discussion of this topic. For Wang’s sayings, see
CXL pt. I, sect. 129 and pt. III, sect. 315; Chan 1963a: 86, 244. See also “Inquiry on the
Great Learning”; Chan 1963b: 664, 666.
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resentful suffering (怨恨 wonhan/yuanhen). These emotions were ignored
by the orthodox Zhu Xi school of Neo-Confucianism.128
As Baker points out, Dasan wrote an essay on won/yuan 怨 (resentment; lamentation), in which he insightfully quotes the Mencius (5A: 1–2;
6B: 3) and Analects (17: 9) for directly addressing the emotion of resentment (won/yuan).129 For Dasan, then, resentment is something that even
the sages and wise persons would feel as a genuine human emotion. Dasan
was arguably the first Korean Confucian thinker who formally talked about
these “significant” emotions textually and ethically.
It is also important to note that Dasan’s discussion closely resonates
with three of the most common “Korean” emotions such as won (怨), han
(恨), and wonhan (怨恨) that continue to engage the contemporary
Korean repertoire of emotion (jeong/qing) talks morally, socially, and
psychologically.
What follows hereafter is our overall, integrated introduction to four
main chapters of Part I on the Korean Confucian perspectives of emotions.
1.4.1.2 An Introduction to Part I, Chaps. 2 –5: Korean
Confucian Perspectives
Chapter 2 by Bongrae Seok is titled “Moral Psychology of Emotion
(Jeong/Qing 情) in Korean Neo-Confucianism and Its Philosophical
Debates on the Affective Nature of the Mind.” This chapter discusses the
so-called Four-Seven debate (1559–1572) and the Horak debate (Horak
nonjaeng 1709–1715)—the two major philosophical debates of Korean
Neo-Confucianism—and analyzes how Korean Neo-Confucians in the
Joseon dynasty explained jeong/qing “emotions in relation to the heartmind (sim/xin 心), human nature (seong/xing 性), and morality.”
Although these thinkers respected the philosophical framework of orthodox Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, they also developed their own theories of emotions “by focusing on the affective foundation of morality in
the heart-mind.” Seok applies what he calls the onto-directive and the
psycho-affective approaches to this topic and discusses the Korean NeoConfucian understanding of emotions. The chapter concludes that Korean
Neo-Confucianism coherently developed “a unique form of moral
128
See Yeoyudang jeonseo (Complete works of Yeoyudang Jeong Yagyong [Dasan]); Jeong
2012: I, 8: 27b (2, 72).
129
Jeong 2012: I, 10: 4a–b (2, 205–206).
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psychology,” the moral psychology of “the emotional mind rooted in the
ethical and devotional nature of human beings.”
Seok’s basic insight concurs with the jeong/qing chapter of his Embodies
Moral Psychology and Confucian Philosophy, according to which Confucian
jeong is more than “subjective” emotions as extended and shared experience of human experience and the foundation of the moral heart-mind
(Seok 2013).130
Seok’s Chap. 2 is a helpful historical and philosophical introduction to
the Korean Confucian philosophy of emotions according to the FourSeven and Horak debates. It specifically explains the Four-Seven relationship in terms of i/li and gi/qi and other related issues such as “before
arousal” (mibal/weifa 未發) and “after arousal” (ibal/yifa 已發) from a
conceptual and analytic standpoint. This chapter will also facilitate the
readers’ understanding of the three other chapters in Part I. For Toegye,
Yulgok, and their debaters, the Four and the Seven are all aroused (ibal)
emotions. One can question the extent to which Seok’s detailed discussion
of the Horak debate’s mibal concept explains the nature and role of emotions. Furthermore, one key aspect of their Four-Seven debates highlights
the issue of good and evil. Toegye persistently articulated the fundamental
Four-Seven difference in this regard: that is, potential moral evil of the
Seven regarding uncontrolled or selfish emotions and desires. This is precisely why Toegye passionately emphasized the virtuous and transcendent
reality of human nature as the Four [moral emotions] backed up by i/li.
We need to be mindful of this vital moral-religious dimension of Korean
Four-Seven philosophy,131 although this topic is beyond the scope of
Seok’s chapter due to its limited space. The reader will see that to some
extent the next chapter by Choi covers Toegye’s attention to the moral
and transcendent goodness of human nature in terms of gyeong (reverence).
Chapter 3 by Suk Gabriel Choi is titled “The Idea of Gyeong/Jing 敬 in
Yi Toegye’s Korean Neo-Confucianism and Its Availability in Contemporary
Ethical Debate.” It presents the Confucian doctrine of gyeong in relation
to emotions according to Zhu Xi’s and Toegye’s interpretations, as well as
its distinctive implication for contemporary Western virtue ethics. Gyeong
130
Seok points out that jeong in the Korean Confucian context is “a resonating affective
state that can be sensed by and expressed through the body, and that can be shared with others and the community, but not exclusively, necessarily, or always felt as inner personal feelings” (Seok 2013: 168).
131
For this topic, consult Chung 1995, 2019b, 2019c, 2021 (a new book on the religious
thought of Yi Toegye with comparative perspectives).
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敬 (C. jing; translated as “seriousness,” “reverence,” “reverential concentration,” “reverential seriousness,” “mindfulness,” etc.) is one of the most
significant ideas in the Confucian tradition. Choi examines the meaning
and cultivation of gyeong according to Zhu Xi and then discusses its relation to the topic of emotions and emotional control in the Korean NeoConfucian context. In particular, Choi explains how Toegye understood
Zhu Xi’s idea of gyeong/jing and also systemized his own ethics of gyeong
and self-cultivation. Furthermore, this chapter articulates how Toegye’s
Korean notion of gyeong can play “a distinctive role” in contemporary
Western debates “on emotion, morality, and virtue.”
Choi’s chapter contributes to explaining Toegye’s philosophy of gyeong
from the contemporary Western standpoint of virtue ethics pertaining to
Sher (1998), Montague (1992), and other ethicists’ comparative views in
terms of virtuous dispositions, motivations, habits, and so on. Overall, it
makes an important point that “gyeong/jing is a crucial practice of selfcultivation,” including an appropriate control of emotions and feelings. It
keenly identifies gyeong as “the emotion of reverence” [and] self-reflection
that is essential in the practice of self-cultivation. The phrases “being
mindful,” “clear from obscurity,” and “self-examination” are rightly cited.
In other words, according to both Zhu Xi and Toegye, gyeong plays a vital
role in the practice of moral virtues and emotions such as the Four
Beginnings.
A related question Toegye himself would ask us is: what about the role
of gyeong, “the master of the unified self,” in controlling or transcending
(eliminating) “selfish cravings” (sayok), the potential origin of moral evil?
This is because Toegye emphasized gyeong in terms of contemplative “selfreflection,” emotional control, and “self-rectification.” In other words,
there is something important about his gyeong beyond Choi’s textual and
ethical analysis. Toegye’s notion of gyeong is not just a philosophical theory or moral practice but, more importantly, a holistic system of ethics and
spirituality based on his own experience engaging in contemplation, spiritual cultivation, and Confucian belief in the transcendent reality of human
existence.132 Some discussion of this topic could have been given if more
space with a slightly deeper analysis was allowed for this chapter.
Chapter 4 by Edward Y. J. Chung is titled “Yi Yulgok on the Role of
Emotions in Self-cultivation and Ethics: A Modern Korean Neo-Confucian
132
For the religious nature of Toegye’s life and spirituality of gyeong reverence, see
Chung 2004, 2010, 2011, 2016 (introduction), or 2021 (chapters 5, 6).
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Interpretation.” It presents Yi I 李珥 (Yulgok 栗谷; 1536–1584), a leading Neo-Confucian thinker and one of the greatest statesmen in Joseon
Korea (1392–1910), by focusing on Yulgok’s philosophy of emotions
(jeong/qing 情) and statecraft. It covers his Four-Seven debate letters and
Seonghak jibyo (聖學輯要; Collected essentials of sagely learning) as well as
his major political essays such as Yukjogye (六條啓; Six-article memorial for
current affairs). The second and third sections articulate the holistic
nature and roles of emotions and briefly compare Yulgok’s interpretation
with some leading Western theories. These sections also discuss Yulgok’s
ethics of “the transformation of gi/qi” (氣; vital energy),133 and why it
supports his political reform ideas. The concluding section comments on
the modern relevance of Yulgok’s insights for a comparative and crosscultural study of emotions.
Chung argues that Yulgok’s view of emotions (jeong) as “desires”
(yok/yu 欲) to fulfil the specific “needs” of the human body resonates with
what William James emphasized as physiological “sensations” (1984,
1990) and concurs with Joel Marks’s theory of emotions as desires (1995a,
2013). Yulgok’s theory that moral emotions like filial piety and compassion involve moral awareness and conscious judgment is compatible with
Robert Solomon’s emphasis on emotions as “judgments” (1993, 1995a,
2001). Furthermore, we can compare Yulgok’s practical ethic of compassion with Michael Slote’s virtue ethics of “empathy” and “moral motivation” (2007, 2010, 2020). Chung also notes that Solomon’s theory of
“passion,” “justice,” and “the ethical life” (1993, 1995a, 1995b) resembles Yulgok’s moral passions for political justice and social wellbeing.134
Beyond this compatibility and resemblance, the sixteenth-century Korean
thinker not only passionately emphasized real actions but also actively
participated in the development of political reform and social improvement, for which reason this combination of passion, action, and contribution represents the Korean distinctiveness of Yulgok’s Neo-Confucian
virtue ethics.
133
See Chung 1995 (Chapter 5) or 2019a (in Choi and Kim 2019) for details on Yulgok’s
philosophy of gi-transformation and self-cultivation.
134
A good question beyond the focus and limited scope of this chapter is to discuss the
differences among Yulgok’s theory and these contemporary Western theories in a new
detailed comparative study. In the coming years, I (Chung) plan to prepare a new book
manuscript on Yulgok’s Neo-Confucian thought that will likely include such a study (chapter). This will be based on Chung’s translation and interpretation of Yulgok’s famous philosophical and political essays.
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Yulgok strongly advocated political reform actions to bring about economic and cultural benefits to a changing society at large. Chung concludes that the modern spirit of democracy, political responsibility, and
social justice remarkably resembles Yulgok’s ethical passions for government “for people,” “by public opinion,” and “people-based policies.”135
This is another key reason for recognizing the distinctiveness and contemporary relevance of Yulgok’s Korean Neo-Confucian ethics of passions
(jeong). Chung hopes to have provided a thought-provoking chapter for
Korean Neo-Confucianism and the comparative ethics of emotions and, at
the same time, to make a worthwhile contribution to the field of
Comparative Philosophy.
Chapter 5 by Don Baker is titled “Jeong Dasan on Emotions and the
Pursuit of Sagehood.” Jeong Yagyong (Dasan [l.n.]; 1762–1836) is said
to have spent much of his life trying to understand the role emotions play
in motivating both moral and immoral behavior. This chapter discusses
why Dasan “did not limit his investigation of moral psychology to the
standard list of Seven Emotions” but also looked at other essential emotions such as “resentment” (won/yuan 怨) and “apprehension” (gonggu/
kongju 恐懼). Dasan concluded that, in order to ensure our emotions
direct us to “act appropriately,” we need to cultivate an attitude of caution
and apprehension. As mentioned in the chapter, this includes one’s emotional apprehension of (god) Sangje/Shangdi 上帝, the Lord on High, as
well as the moral emotion of empathy for fellow human beings. Grounded
in such an attitude, the heart-mind will control and integrate “the inclinations (which Dasan believes constitutes human nature) and emotions
which inspire us to act selflessly.”
Baker’s chapter presents one remarkable aspect of Dasan’s Korean ethics by discussing several unconventional emotions that rarely appear in the
orthodox Zhu Xi or Seongnihak Neo-Confucian repertoire of emotion
(jeong/qing) talks: resentment (won/yuan), remorse (regret; 悔 hoe/hui),
suffering/grievance (恨 han/hen), and resentful suffering (怨恨
wonhan/yuanhen). Even the sages and wise persons would feel these
135
The notion of “Confucian democracy” (S. Kim 2014, 2016) is also relevant here.
Another interesting point that emerges out of the focused context of Chap. 4 is to develop a
new comparative study that will articulate this part of Yulgok’s moral and political thought,
especially in terms of Confucian moral-political thinking, human dignity and equality, political justice, modern democracy, and so on. In the coming years, Chung hopes to prepare a
full-length book manuscript on Yulgok’s life and thought, which will likely include a chapter on this topic.
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human emotions, for which reason Dasan discussed them as “significant”
emotions. Another interesting point discussed in this chapter is that certain emotions and inclinations inspire one’s effort to overcome selfishness
and act morally. Dasan’s phrase “be cautious and apprehensive” is a key
teaching of self-cultivation originating in the Doctrine of the Mean
(Zhongyong). Baker quotes an important passage from Dasan:
It is the fear that our misbehavior will be noticed. Noticed by whom? … We
are cautious (gyesin/jieshen 戒愼) and apprehensive (gonggu/kongju 恐
懼) … because we know our sovereign can punish us if we behave improperly. What makes us behave properly even in the privacy of our own room
and make sure that even our thoughts are appropriate thoughts? The only
reason why a moral person is watchful over his thoughts and behavior even
in the privacy of his own room is that he knows that the Lord on High
[Sangje/Shangdi] is watching him.136
The self-cultivation of the Way requires self-control by “being cautious
[over what one does not see] and apprehensive [over what one does not
hear].”137 It appears that Dasan intended to integrate the Zhongyong’s
teaching with classical religious belief in Sangje vis-à-vis one’s moral or
immoral thoughts and actions. Does this not mean the religious emotion
of fearing Sangje’s spiritual (divine) power and judgment?138 Fear is one of
the Seven Emotions, so one’s apprehension of Sangje certainly resonates
with the emotion of fear (worry) belonging to the general Confucian list
of the Seven Emotions.139
136
Jeong 2012: II, 3: 4b–5a (6, 232–233).
This teaching was also frequently quoted by the leading Neo-Confucians such as Zhu
Xi, Wang Yangming, Toegye, and others.
138
We make this interesting point here from a religious standpoint of Shangdi and early
Confucianism, although Baker does not mention it in this chapter partly due to its limited scope.
139
Another further question beyond the focus and scope of this chapter is about any possible influence of Catholic Christian beliefs on Dasan’s talk of the apprehensive fear of
Sangje’s anthropomorphic and transcendent power in an emotive yet religious way. This
question is interesting from a comparative religious standpoint. It is historically true that
while interacting with early Catholic missionaries from Europe and their Korean Christian
converts, including his older brother and his friends during the late eighteenth century,
Dasan became familiar with Christian doctrines, including faith in heavenly God as the
supreme being (lord). In other words, it would be more interesting to know if Dasan’s talk
of religious fear of the Heavenly Lord (Shangje) was directly or indirectly influenced by the
Christian fear of God as the divine watcher, judger, or punisher. Dasan himself did not for137
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According to this chapter, another emotion Dasan passionately discussed is desire (yok/yu 欲): all human beings desire to feel good and have
the desire for that which is good. For Dasan, those who desire to follow
the moral good will “live a righteous life” by “acting appropriately” [morally] in private as well as in public.140 Dasan likely did not confirm either
desire as one of the Seven Emotions or the mainstream Neo-Confucian
view that the desire is a potentially “precarious” [selfish] emotion that
should be suppressed. However, unlike other Neo-Confucians, including
Toegye, Dasan strongly affirmed desire as a positive and engaging emotion that can contribute to the Confucian way of self-cultivation.
1.4.2
Comparative Korean Confucian Perspectives
The second part of the book presents three interesting chapters in order
to enrich our comparative discussion of key Korean Confucian doctrines
and views of emotions. This is to be done from our three contributors’
comparative ethical, political, or social perspectives. Many essential aspects
of the Korean Confucian perspectives that we have presented in the foregoing sections also apply more or less to all three chapters of Part II of this
book. These three specialized chapters are organized as follows, and their
abstracts and our comments are discussed below.
In summary, Harroff’s Chap. 6 presents the Four-Seven debate while
assimilating this topic with some aspects of Western philosophy. From a
comparative moral-political angle, Lee’s Chap. 7 discusses jeong (emotions) as “a core political notion” that ethically and politically influenced
the development of “Confucian democracy” and “public culture of civility” in South Korea. Iljoon Park’s Chap. 7 will be treated separately along
with Jea Sophia Oh’s Chap. 12 (final chapter) of Part III because their
shared views of Korean jeong (情; emotions)” and han (恨; resentment/
suffering) from contemporary Confucian, social, or related angles.
mally or directly testify so in any of his writings, partly due to his own fear of being persecuted by the Joseon dynasty that politically oppressed and religiously prohibited Catholic
missions and converts. Nonetheless, the current Korean and Western literature on Dasan’s
life and thought basically confirms the subtle theistic dimension of Dasan’s thought as something that not only relates to the religious dimension of early Confucianism but also was
likely influenced by his early private study of Catholic Christianity (known as seohak 西學
[literally Western learning]) or his basic familiarity with its theistic moral beliefs.
140
Jeong 2012: II, 2: 170 (6, 219–220).
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1.4.2.1 An Introduction to Part II, Chaps. 6 and 7: Comparative
Confucian Perspectives
Chapter 6 by Joseph E. Harroff is titled “Thinking Through the Emotions
with Korean Confucianism: Philosophical Translation and the Four-Seven
Debate.” It attempts to articulate a method for engaging in responsible
cross-cultural comparative philosophy via what Harroff calls “translingual
practice and hermeneutically transformative re-description.” Emotional
experience and embodied moral subjectivity are said to be engaged via this
method in the context of the Four-Seven debate. Harroff wants to render
“foregrounding uncommon assumptions and remaining hermeneutically
open to translational in-betweeness,” while arguing for some fruitful
ground for more philosophical research regarding the uniqueness of
Korean Neo-Confucian thinking through emotions and embodied ethical
cultivation. Considering Yi Toegye on the importance of “reverent attention” (gyeong/jing 敬) as cultivated habitus, “the importance of somaesthetic culture” generally in transforming “sedimented structures of
emotions in order to become more inclusive and appreciative of diverse
values is appealed to in a cosmopolitan horizon as a source of melioristic
hope and creative intelligence.”
After a detailed introduction, the second section of this chapter covers
“Ars Contextualis as philosophical translation,” the third section discusses
“the Four-Seven debate as translingual practice,” and the final section
gives some comparative conclusion. Only the Toegye-Gobong part of the
Four-Seven debate is highlighted in terms of “the dual or non-dual nature
of i 理 and gi 氣.” This chapter also confirms the common argument that
the Four and the Seven “are all human emotions (jeong).” Harroff keenly
points out that the debate was about self-cultivation and ethical practice
more than metaphysics and abstract epistemology.141 Toegye’s idea “reverential attention” (gyeong/jing) is mentioned as an important aspect of the
Toegye-Gobong debate, although it needs further clarification.142
141
In this regard, Harroff concurs with other scholars’ works on Toegye’s Four-Seven
thought; see Kalton (1994), Ivanhoe (2015, 2016), and Chung (1995, 2019b, 2021).
142
In regard to translating gyeong/jing (敬) as “reverential attention,” Harroff emphasizes
the non-dualistic aspect of gyeong as “somaesthetically embodied ethical practice” by saying
gyeong is rather “a transformation of the very kind of ethical subjectivity as an embodied
attentional economy that one brings to the act of constituting a world of value.” In this
regard, Halla Kim calls gyeong “reverential seriousness” a li-oriented therapy of mind-body
and argues that “Toegye stressed the role of li in the path to self-cultivation” (Kim 2017:
602). In Choi’s Chap. 3, we can read more about the literal, moral, and philosophical nature
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Regarding the issue of philosophical translation, Harroff makes an
interesting argument that it is important to talk about Freud, Marx,
Dewey, and Wittgenstein in “employing a hermeneutics of suspicion
regarding dominant epistemologies.” A good question beyond the limited
scope and length of this chapter is to discuss why or how this kind of
hermeneutics applies to the Korean Four-Seven debate on emotions. A
worthwhile part of Harroff’s discussion is also about the joint work of
Ames and Hall on the philosophical translation and glossary problem of
Confucian classics and especially the Zhongyong (Ames and Hall 2001).
This chapter concludes that translingual practice is suitable for discussing
the “ethical subjectivity and cosmopolitan universalism” of a “recontextualized” Four Seven debate. The Four-Seven debate makes a “uniquely
Korean Neo-Confucian contribution” to Asian and comparative philosophy and (post)modernity.
Chapter 7 by Hyo-Dong Lee presents “Jeong (情), Civility, and the
Heart of a Pluralistic Democracy in Korea.” It seeks to interpret the
Confucian concept of emotions (jeong/qing) as a core political notion of
what might be called “Confucian democracy” within the traditional
Korean context. This chapter examines the philosophical underpinnings of
the Mencian seongseon/xingshan (性善) thesis (human nature is good) in
terms of the Four Beginnings (Sprouts) of virtue (sadan/siduan), and its
potential to support a “Confucian theory of democracy.” For reinterpreting the “politicality of the Four Beginnings,” this chapter focuses on
jeong/qing emotions as the core notion of Neo-Confucian moral psychology, as a kind of “affectionate and moral solidarity,” and as an innate
human potential which confers upon us political equality. By understanding jeong as a kind of “political and social glue” that holds together diverse
groups of Korean people with competing visions of human flourishing, Lee’s study attempts to lay the basis for envisioning a thriving “pluralistic democracy” sustained by a public culture of civility in modern Korea.
Following the introductory section, the second section of this chapter
presents the Confucian teaching of “jeong and the heart-mind: the affective basis of moral equality,” which includes some essential points about
“empathetic” jeong emotions according to the Korean Four-Seven debate
of gyeong and its vital role in self-cultivation according to Zhu Xi’s and Toegye’s virtue ethics
of gyeong/jing. Furthermore, the spiritual and religious significance of Toegye’s gyeong is
comprehensively discussed in Chung’s recent books on Toegye (2016, 2021) or see his articles Chung 2004 (in Tu and Tucker 2004), 2011.
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as well. The third section discusses “from moral equality to political equality: a Confucian theory of civil democracy.” Lee makes an important concluding remark that the Korean Confucian form of jeong has contributed
to moral-political equality and civility.143 For example, the Four Beginnings
of virtue—the humane heart of compassion and empathy—intrinsically
animate “the moral public culture of a Confucian democracy.”
Lee has envisioned this chapter as a political-philosophical discussion of
emotions from a Korean Neo-Confucian perspective and hence examined
its possible implication for modern politics. It is written as a good theoretical, analytic topic on Confucian emotions and ethics and modern
democracy.144 However, an important question beyond the limited focus
and scope of this chapter is to discuss the distinctively Korean patterns of
interplay between empathetic jeong, moral equality, Confucian civility, and
political democracy in South Korea today.
1.4.2.2 An Introduction to Part II, Chap. 8 and Part III, Chap. 12:
Confucianism and Social Emotions: Jeong, Han, Heung, and Women
The Korean (Confucian) concept of jeong closely relates to other common
emotions such as han (恨; suffering; deep resentment/lamentation) and
heung (興; exhilaration, utmost joy), both of which are said to be Korean
“social emotions.” Furthermore, the jeong and han are also associated
with Korean women’s experiences in their traditional gender roles according to Confucian-influenced social norms. The inevitable connection
between han and jeong is also discussed along with other related emotions
or concepts such as heung in Iljoon Park’s Chap. 8 and uri (we/our) and
salim (enlivening/power of life) in Jea Sophia Oh’s Chap. 12.
Park seeks to discover some positive, powerful elements of Korean
emotions in a contemporary Korean context of socio-cultural jeong and
heung. He argues that the basic message of the Korean Four-Seven debate
emphasizes the moral and emotional essence of being genuinely human.
143
Lee briefly mentions the uniquely Korean form of jeong in relation to Sungmoon Kim’s
(2014, 2016) discussion of Korean jeong, uri (our)-responsibility, and political democracy.
144
The detailed third section of this chapter carefully analyzes several theorists of Confucian
moral politics and modern democracy, including Sungmoon Kim, Joseph Chan, and Edward
Shils. Its key words and phrases include “the empathetic heart,” moral equality, political
authority/equality, Confucian civility/democracy, democratization, and so on. Thus, a good
thinking question is also to ask how these political theories specifically apply or relate to the
trends of Confucian influence on Korean people’s jeong emotions, moral culture, and political democracy in South Korea.
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Korea’s social-emotive culture of han, heung, and jeong cannot be separated from this “Confucian understanding” of emotions. Oh addresses a
similar theme of jeong and han from her “Korean-American” standpoint
of understanding Korean family life and women’s experience. Despite traditional Korea’s patriarchal gender roles, Korean women are said to have
transcended their emotion of han (suffering) and played their leading
roles as wise wives and mothers, compassionate caregivers, educators, colleagues, business women, public officials, and so on.
On a related note, the Korean phenomenon of han (resentment) has
been studied from several angles: historical, sociological, religious, theological, feminist, and so on. For example, Andrew Sung Park, a Korean
theologian of han, explained the han as the relational consequence of sin
that is the pervasive reality of victims’ suffering and the scars left from the
sins of others who have wronged them (1993).145 Park also argued that
the han of women, han of nature, and han of God are all characterized by
such embodied emotional trauma. From this liberation theology viewpoint, subordinated groups, minjung (the oppressed), and women are
said to be depicted as han-bearers. In a similar vein, Wonhee Anne Joh, a
postcolonial theologian, combined han and jeong together in formulating
her Christological arguments from a Korean-American postcolonial perspective. Joh offered a hybrid Christology of han and jeong by dealing
with native Korean concepts as lived and understood (2006). Jeong makes
relationships “sticky” (xiv) and is therefore an “adhesive bond” that gives
rise to hopefulness in the midst of han suffering.146 Examining the
145
The thematic title of this book is sophisticated and outside the Confucian context with
a liberation theological approach: The Wounded Heart of God: The Asian Concept of Han and
the Christian Doctrine of Sin. It is important to note Park’s bold approach to deconstruct the
traditional Western-oriented theology and to introduce a Korean contextualized theology of
han (suffering) by comparing the Christian doctrine of sin with Korean minjung people’s
han from his comparative process theological perspective. However, it is a limited interpretation of Korean emotions (jeong) that only partially tells about the integrated dynamics of
jeong, han, authoritarian society, and moral psychology in the Korean context.
146
See Joh’s Heart of the Cross: A Postcolonial Christology (2006), which not only provides
postcolonial-liberationist-feminist insights into the area of theology but also achieves its distinctiveness as a narrative theology by using the Korean notion of jeong and han. Her theological interpretation of jeong and han is said to appeal to Asian/Korean American women’s
experience. Since our volume does not include the Korean Christian interpretation of jeong,
readers may find some interest in Joh’s postcolonial theological work. Joh’s final chapter
seeks to answer a Christology of jeong by comparing it with the Buddhist concept of the noself”: “Jesus is awakened to no-self through jeong” (2006: 123). Nonetheless, Joh’s insights
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Korean-American experience of han and jeong, Joh therefore atempted to
construct a postcolonial theology of the Cross by suggesting the power of
jeong as compassion.
In Chap. 8, “Korean Social Emotions: Han (한 恨), Heung (흥 興),
and Jeong (정 情),” Park deals with Korean social emotions such as jeong,
han (resentment, suffering), heung (exhilaration, utmost joy), and musim
(non-attachment, no heart-mind). The South Korean dynamics of emotions through “the coupling of heung and han” or that “of musim and
jeong” is called pungnyu (also spelled poong-ryu; 풍류 風流), the Korean
aesthetic tradition of “enjoying the flow of life and nature.” Park argues
that jeong emotions may serve as a “social interface to optimally exchange
personal feelings with others,” so that human beings and things achieve an
affective way to interact with one another. The pungnyu may be an “ideal
stabilizer to balance emotional instability” and promote emotional harmony in the contemporary world.
Following a short introduction, the second section of this chapter
briefly presents emotions in the Korean Confucian tradition, including the
textual and philosophical meanings of emotions (jeong) according to the
Four-Seven debate as a theoretical background. This provides a good
foundation for Park’s discussion of Korean social emotions. The third and
fourth sections present “dangers of unstable emotions in the internet connected world” and “precarious conditions for social emotions” in Korea
by citing some Western scholars and their relevant views. The detailed fifth
section discusses social emotions such as jeong, han, heung, musim, miunjeong (미운정; hateful jeong), wonsugatun jeong (원수같은 정; “enemylike jeong”), and injeong (인정 人情; human[e] jeong).
The concluding section offers Park’s thoughtful comments. For example, the Korean Four-Seven debate motivates us “pay more attention to
the emotional and ethical feature of what it means to be truly human”
because it teaches that “the core way of being human is the self-cultivation
of emotions/feelings, and this insight [possibly] corresponds to the contemporary scientific understanding of emotions.” Park keenly concludes
that Korea’s emotive-social culture of han, heung, and jeong has become
hardly address profound Confucian influence on Korean jeong; that is, the linguistic, humanistic, moral, and socio-cultural influence—both positive and negative—of Confucian human
relationships, values, bonds, and emotions and feelings (jeong).
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“a matrix to accept the Confucian understanding of being human.”147
During the pandemic world of non-contact culture, the Korean spirit of
pungnyu and heung is “to respect differences among people and to benefit
all humans accordingly.” Emotions seek to find a balance, so Park concludes that we can appreciate “this transformation as an art that shows a
harmonized beauty of han, heung, and jeong.”
Chapter 12, the second final chapter by Jea Sophia Oh, is titled
“Emotions (Jeong 情) in Korean Confucianism and Family Experience: An
Ecofeminist Perspective.” It “critically reimagines the dynamics between
Korean Confucianism and family life. In doing so Oh rediscovers constructive meanings and functions of emotions (jeong 情) as sites of ethical
and political transformation. This chapter introduces the Korean concept
of jeong in relation to the closely related concepts of uri (we/us) and han
(resentments). By examining Korean women’s gender roles in their
staunchly patriarchal Confucian society of the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897)
to the present time, it attempts to deconstruct the traditionally prejudicial
misogynic images of Korean women who have been mystified as passive
and compliant housewives while at the same time sexually objectified and
fetishized along with other Asian women.”148
147
Park also makes another interesting concluding remark: “the emotion of heung is associated with Confucian rak (락 樂; joy) and hui/xi (희 喜; happiness, pleasure), two of the
Seven Emotions, and han closely relates to Confucian ae/ai (애 哀; sorrow, grief), another
example of the Seven.” However, the question is whether this makes the emotions of han
and heung more Confucianized or more Korean. This relevant point needs further research
and discussion in terms of the dynamic interplay between the social emotions of han and
heung and the Confucian ethical and psychological culture of emotions in today’s Korea.
148
As Oh carefully points out in this chapter, “feminist philosophers in the East and West
tend to be anti-Confucian and to criticize Confucianism as a primary instigator that legitimizes women’s oppression.” Although historically bound up with oppressive practices in
some societies, Confucian philosophy is not inherently sexist. Thus, feminist critics of
Confucianism and Confucian societies must do further researches to clearly justify or explain
what specifically the politicized criticism (or tradition) of Confucian “misogynic” patriarchy
has to do with the essential Confucian teaching and practice of “five human relationships” or
its ethics and education of moral emotions such as the Four Beginnings as well as love (ae/ai
愛) [one of the Seven Emotions], including reciprocal compassion or affection, conjugal
intimacy, and yin-and-yang gender harmony. For this topic on Confucianism and women in
modern Korea and especially women’s enormous contributions to family, education, social
ethics, and economic development, see Chung 1994, 2015 (chapter 8: “Korean Women and
Confucian Values: Change and Assimilation”). See also Kim and Pettid, eds. Women and
Confucianism in Choson Korea (2012). From Chinese Confucian feminist perspective, Robin
R. Wang wrote a constructive scholarly work to discover the egalitarian origin of gender:
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On the other hand, Oh keenly “recognizes Korean women’s leading
roles in traditional Confucian families as advisors, educators, and caregivers.” “Korean women have been recognized as icons of the uniquely
Korean feelings of jeong and han. Unlike general assumptions that Korean
society has been described as essentially an extreme form of patriarchy,
Korean women’s role in the Confucian family can be predominant and
perhaps even more integrally powerful than the role typically proscribed
for women in the liberal Western family.” This chapter “analyzes multiple
degrees of jeong as consisting of more than just essentially genderized
emotions, but more importantly as being composed of transformative
affects that elicit compassion and care with and for others despite its inherent potential for destructiveness and oppression. Korean women have
thrived through han by dealing with salim (enlivening) as the subject of
life. Oh’s ecofamilial extension of jeong broadens the horizon of care and
compassion to our planetary living with more than humans beyond any
reductionistically biological ties grounded in anthropocentrism.”
An interesting question emerges out of Oh’s chapter for our further
consideration beyond the focus and scope of this chapter. What is unique
or distinctively “Korean” about this historical, ethical, and/or social pattern of emotions, Korean Confucianism, family, and women?149 It appears
that the Korean-ness of jeong or the Korean distinctiveness of jeong and
women has something to do with the traditional Korean context of uri
(we or our) relationship and interaction, han emotive culture, and salim
“enlivening.” In fact, the uniqueness of han (resentment, suffering) and
jeong is also more or less confirmed by Park’s Chap. 9 in relation to the
emotive Korean spirit of pungnyu and heung as well as by Baker’s Chap. 5
in terms of Dasan’s unique Confucian discussion of wonmang (resentment, lamentation) and han. The distinctiveness of Korean jeong and its
Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture (2012), and Ann
A. Pang-White excavated Confucian empowerment of women in her book The Confucian
Four Books for Women: A New Translation of the Nü Sishu and the Commentary of Wang
Xiang (2018).
149
In Chap. 12, the phrases “Korean women and gender roles” and “Korean society” are
frequently mentioned for criticizing the misogynic practice of Korean Confucian society at
the same time while discovering the positive and constructive aspects of Korean women in
their Confucian family and society. In this regard, a related question or topic for further
discussion in another research project is the distinctiveness of the Korean case in comparison
with the Chinese (or Japanese) tradition that went through the similar historical, institutional, or social patterns of the past.
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diversity and dynamics will be discussed further in our concluding
Chap. 13.
1.4.3
Korean Buddhist and Contemporary Perspectives
Wonhyo and Jinul on Emotions and Emotional Control
The Buddha’s teaching, Indian Mahāyāna, and Chinese Buddhism generally influenced key Korean Buddhist doctrines and ethics of the mind and
emotions and therefore contributed to the contemporary Korean Buddhist
notion of jeong emotions morally and religiously.
Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Jinul 知訥 (1158–1210) were the two
most eminent Buddhist masters in Korea.150 Korean Buddhism is influenced by Wonhyo’s great works on Mahāyāna scriptures and especially the
Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the foundation for yoga practitioners)
and Avatamsaka Sūtra (Flower Garland sūtra). Hwaeom (Huayan)
Buddhism emphasizes its central doctrine of the “interdependence” and
“interpenetration” of all beings, things, and phenomena in the universe.
Similarly, Wonhyo highlighted the teaching of “all-in-one, one-in-all”
through its image of a net of jewels reflecting one another. He reformed
Buddhism to be more open to the common people and lived the life of a
secular monk, emphasizing the need to harmonize spiritual ideals with the
realities of everyday life. According to Wonhyo’s central teaching, original
human nature is the Buddhanature (bulseong/foxing 佛性) as one heartmind (ilsim/yixin 一心). Chapter 9 by Hyekyung Lucy Jee articulates that
Wonhyo’s ilsim doctrine provides a Buddhist philosophical foundation for
understanding Korean jeong emotions.
Jinul, another prominent figure in Korean Buddhism, successfully
reformed Buddhism by refocusing on Seon (Zen) meditation and by providing its doctrinal foundation from the scriptures. He taught that the
cultivation of one’s mind is what will bring enlightenment. As Huineng,
the greatest mater of Chinese Chan, said, enlightenment could be found
by looking inwardly and directly into one’s self-nature. A sudden enlightenment cannot be sustained unless all unwholesome thoughts and habits are eliminated. Like a newborn baby, the enlightened mind is born with
all of the tools and capabilities it needs but also has to cultivate them
150
For the life and thought of Wonhyo, see Muller and Nguyen (2012) and Buswell
(2007). For Jinul as well, see Buswell (1991).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
(Addiss et al. 2008: 138). For Jinul, then, one must apply this insight to
cultivating a lifestyle that is aligned with the Seon Buddhist standards and
similar to the Confucian teaching of self-cultivation.
Wonhyo’s major work Ijang eui 二障義 (Doctrine of the two hindrances)
occasionally criticizes the “afflictive hindrances within the three [karmic
moral] qualities” and explains the moral problem of emotions: “The
greed, hatred, delusion, and so forth … are all of unwholesome quality.”151
In discussing Wonhyo’s philosophy and spirituality of mind, Charles
A. Muller points out that the Śrīmālā-sūtra (Sūtra of Queen Śrīmālā), a
key Mahāyāna text, lists “the entrenchment of emotion toward objects in
the desire” as one of the four entrenchments. The Buddhist notion of
“four entrenchments” is taught in other Tathāgatagarbha (Embryo of the
Buddha) Mahāyāna scriptures (Muller and Nguyen 2012: 59). The basic
nature of particular emotions such as desire, craving, anger, and pride is
therefore condemned for causing continuous suffering.
For Wonhyo, one of the two hindrances that are mentioned in Mahāyāna
scriptures is the afflictive hindrances (kleśa-āvarana), according to which
suffering is caused by certain phenomena that delude the mind to see
things untruly. These afflictions (kleśa) are believed to involve all mental
activities associated with nescience, delusion, anxiety, and so forth. The
term kleśa also means pain, trouble, or defilement. The so-called six afflictions (upakleśa) are craving, anger, ignorance, pride, doubt, and wrong
views (Buswell 2007: 367).
Wonhyo quotes his favorite Mahāyāna scripture, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra
(Treatise on the foundation for yoga practitioners)152 as follows:
Each of [the ten derivative afflictions of] anger, enmity, hypocrisy, vexation,
jealousy, parsimony, deceit, guile, conceit, and hostility arises separately in
unwholesome states of mind … these ten are all limited in their function to
the desire realm …. This summarizes the characteristics of the afflictive
hindrances.153
151
Ijang eui 2: 1.2.1.2; Muller and Nguyen (2012: 78).
Wonhyo liked Yogācāra Mahāyāna and especially the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, a scripture
that he frequently quoted in his commentaries. For him, it was considered as the most
important source for the Buddhist philosophy and psychology of the mind and emotions.
The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith also influenced Wonhyo’s Buddhist philosophy. For this
topic, see Muller and Nguyen (2012).
153
Ijang eui 2: 1.2.1.2; Muller and Nguyen 2012: 80.
152
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Wonhyo continues to articulate: “The confusions in regard to the Truth
of Suffering within the desire realm include the ten afflictions ….
Eliminated in the Path of Cultivation are the anger of the desire realm and
the three afflictions of greed, pride, and nescience in all three realms.”154
Certain examples of these afflictions are, therefore, the harmful (unwholesome) emotions of anger, desire, greed, and pride that must be eliminated
in “the [Buddhist] path of cultivation.”
Geumgang sammaegyeong non 金剛三昧經論 (Exposition of the
Vajrasamādhi-sūtra)155 is another major work by Wonhyo. In this text,
however, Wonhyo occasionally talks about specific emotions. When he
does, he repudiates certain emotions that hinder contemplative practice.
For example, he explains the afflictions of the mind as follows:
The mind that is startled is not at rest … “[This panting] is driven both
internally and externally”: the four drivers … have the sense of a personal
self as their internal conditions; the six drivers of the mind-consciousness
[that is, the upakleśa (six afflictions) of craving, anger, ignorance, pride,
doubt, and wrong views] have sense-objects as their external conditions.
“[The afflictions] flow along and form, following those drivers”. (Buswell
2007: 194, 367)
Here Wonhyo highlights several afflicting emotions: craving, anger, pride,
and enmity (hatred) in particular. This is what he said in his Ijang eui as
well: various afflictions of the mind are caused by these unwholesome
emotions and passions. In discussing “entrenchments” and “the entrenchments of emotion,” Wonhyo also writes: “the emotive attachments are …
included in the category of emotive mental functions. Therefore, they are
also known as the entrenchments of the emotive category.”156 Wonhyo
basically means that these emotive attachments are “deluded” mental
activities. Unwholesome emotions such as craving, anger, greed, hatred,
jealousy, and pride therefore cause harmful afflictions (kleśa), so one has
to eliminate them in one’s path of moral-spiritual cultivation.
In his Susim gyeol 修心訣 (Secrets on cultivating the mind), an influential
introduction to Korean Seon (Zen) practice, Jinul rarely discusses the
problem of emotions or emotive attachments. He briefly mentions feelings (jeong) in relation to defilements and emotional suppression (Buswell
154
Ijang eui 4: 2; Muller and Nguyen 2012: 107.
An annotated English translation of this text with an introduction is Buswell (2007).
156
Ijang eui 4: 6; Muller and Nguyen 2012: 114.
155
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
1991: 111). However, in his another major writing, Jinsim jikseol 眞心直
說 (Straight talks on the true mind), Jinul specifically discusses the problem of emotions by pointing out that “the deluded mind” creates poisonous emotions such as “greed” and “hatred” and thus the afflictions of the
self. He writes:
When the deluded mind is in contact with the sense-spheres it knows
through discriminative awareness: it gives rise to greedy or hateful states of
mind depending on whether pleasant or unpleasant objects are present. . . .
Since the three poisons of greed, hatred, and delusion are produced because
of these objects, it is easy to see that the mind is deluded. (Buswell 1991: 138)
By contrast, “the true mind” (jinsim/zhenxin 眞心) is “impartial, quiet,
and utterly radiant” and “since it does not give rise to [afflicting] feelings
of hatred or lust, it is different from the deluded mind.” The true mind is
“neither hateful nor lustful” (Buswell 1991: 135).
The practical meaning of Jinul’s and Wonhyo’s teachings is that the
Korean Buddhist way of enlightenment is to be detached from and eliminate all unwholesome (“poisonous”) emotions, passions, and desires, conquer the “deluded (impure) mind,” and cultivate and then discover the
enlightened self (buddha-nature). These “unwholesome” types of emotions are discussed by Chinul and Wonhyo in the traditional Buddhist
context. Nonetheless, it is quite relevant to note that the Korean Buddhist
teaching and practice of suppressing and eliminating these negative [selfish or potentially harmful] emotions is compatible with—or at least does
not contradict—the Confucian way of emotional control and
self-cultivation.
Korean Buddhist monks are required to make a “departure” known as
chulga (출가 出家). This Korean word literally denotes leaving one’s family according the Confucian tradition. Some possible conflict between
Buddhist monastic practices and Confucian family values can exist; nonetheless, the act of chulga actually emphasizes Buddhist “detachment,” the
practice of danjeong 斷情or “cutting off” (eliminating) one’s mundane
attachments. This central teaching in Korean Seon Buddhism means “no
thought” (munyeom/wunian 無念) and signifies the state of being
“unstained” (buran/bulyeom 不染). It is to transcend one’s selfish
thoughts, desires, and emotions so that one is no longer deluded by
them. However, the great departure in the Mahāyāna context is neither a
completely ascetic denial of reality nor a radically reactionary renunciation
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from the world. It is rather to realize the buddha-nature as the enlightened self by “emptying” selfishness and detaching oneself from worldly
cravings and afflictions in the endless cycle of suffering.
1.4.3.2 Great Compassion and Joy
As a leading Korean Mahāyānist, Wonhyo liked the bodhisattva ideal of
universal enlightenment, for which reason he highlighted the bodhisattvic
emotion and virtue of “great compassion.” For example, his Geumgang
sammaegyeong non states that “the joint practice of concentration and wisdom” cannot be completed without compassion and
the cultivation of great compassion … inspires both oneself and others ….
This is because, if one cultivates samādhi and wisdom directly but is devoid
of great compassion, one will fall into the stage of two-vehicle adherents and
find the bodhisattva path blocked. (Buswell 2007: 253–254)
Unlike the Ijang eui—which focuses on the Yogācāra school’s interpretation of the mind, emotions, and afflictive hindrances—Wonhyo’s
Geumgang sammaegyeong non emphasizes the cultivation and practice of
“great compassion” as the most important moral-spiritual emotion for the
bodhisattva path of Mahāyāna universal salvation. For Wonhyo, then, wisdom may be gained through meditation but enlightenment is to be found
in the practice of compassion. Great compassion as a supreme moral virtue
enriches one’s wisdom and inspires one’s holistic realization of the interconnectedness and interdependency of all beings and phenomena in light
of the Buddha’s universal teaching as well.
Jinul’s Jinsim jikseol also emphasizes the practice of stopping “the
deluded mind” and realizing “the true mind” as “the mind of great
compassion”:
The dust is defilement; the force of the polishing hand is the practice of no
mind …. As it is said in the Awakening of Faith: “… the mind of great compassion … aims to establish the sufferings of all sentient beings.” According
to this explanation, bringing the deluded mind to rest is the primary practice
and cultivating all wholesome dharmas is the secondary aid. (Buswell
1991: 135)
Note that like Wonhyo, Jinul emphasizes the bodhisattvic heart-mind (sim
心) of “great compassion” for the Korean Mahāyāna ideal of universal
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enlightenment for “all sentient being.” The practice of “great compassion” is therefore the essential virtuous emotion for all.
Jin Y. Park points out that according to Korean Buddhist ethics, the
noumenal requires wisdom, but to understand the phenomenal, one must
cultivate “compassion” (2008: 219). In other words, compassion is the
bodhisattvic recognition and practice of moral-spiritual love for others.
The Latin etymology of the term “compassion” literally means “feeling
with [others].” In accordance with the bodhisattva path of Mahāyāna and
Chinese Buddhism, compassion in Korean Buddhism is also a selftranscending jeong to transform the world. In this regard, Sharon Suh’s
Chap. 11 makes some interesting point about bodhisattvic compassion
and “interrelationality.”
We are talking about the moral-spiritual emotion of compassion jeong
in the Buddhist context. By removing selfishness, the heart-mind is filled
with compassionate love and the individual self becomes an extensively
interconnected self as “we” (K. uri 우리). Under Confucian influence as
well, Buddhist compassion is a shared jeong among and beyond Korean
Buddhists. It heals han suffering and brings about utmost joy.
As Wonhyo and Jinul taught, jeong emotions can be poisons when
defined by selfish clinging and attachment. Emotional life can be turned
into anger, greed, hatred, ignorance, or delusion. However, jeong can also
be transformed and made sublime as the bodhisattva’s selfless compassionate and caring responsiveness heals not only the self but also others in an
entirely enlightened community with the transcendent power of life.
Furthermore, this also points to the spiritual, religious significance of bodhisattvic compassion in Mahāyāna Buddhism and the mainstream Korean
Buddhist tradition.
1.4.3.3 An Introduction to Part III, Chaps. 9 –11 : Emotions in Won
Buddhism, Modern Buddhism, and Korean Buddhist Cinema
Part III of this book contains three chapters on emotions according to
Korean Buddhism. These chapters are more interested in the contemporary Buddhist notion of jeong emotions by focusing on the idea of “one
heart-mind” (hanmaeum) in the famous monk Wonhyo and the twentiethcentury nun Daeaeng (Jee’s Chap. 9), the Won Buddhist teaching and
practice of “resentment and gratitude” (Ha’s Chap. 10), and “jeong and
interrelationality “in modern Korean Buddhist cinema (Suh’s Chap. 11).
Chapters 9–11 of this book endeavor to present this contemporary and
socially engaging Buddhist theme as well as its implications for Buddhist
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self-realization, the interconnected self, and the transformative dynamics
of jeong in Korean society and beyond.
In Chap. 9, “Hanmaeum (One Mind): A Korean Buddhist Philosophical
Basis of Jeong Emotion (情),” Hyekyung Lucy Jee introduces Wonhyo’s
notion of “one heart-mind” (ilsim 일심 一心) and compares it with
Daehaeng’s (1927–2012) teaching of hanmaeum (한마음), an indigenous
Korean word for “one heart-mind.” Jee emphasizes that the Buddhist
philosophical concept of “interconnectedness” can best be understood
through the combination of jeong and hanmaeum. This is how Korean
Buddhists share their jeong together. This chapter articulates that the concept of hanmaeum can provide a “Buddhist foundation of jeong.” The
non-dualistic notion of one heart-mind may indeed be the greater self
extended to others according to Daehaeng’s doctrine of juingong (주인공
主人空; emptied self or sūnyatā of the self). In cultivating and practicing
hanmaeum and juingong, jeong is a crucial element as well as a collective
power in the practice of sharing activities.
The first section of this chapter deals with the basic notion of jeong
according to some Korean psychological and Korean-American psychiatric
works. It includes a detailed discussion of popular Korean words such as
jeong, miunjeong (미운정; bad jeong or jeong from hatred), gounjeong (고
운정; good jeong or jeong with love), mujeong (무정 無情; no jeong or
heartlessness), and uri (우리; we or our) “we-ness” and “we-ism.” The
second section presents a long list of jeong-related Korean words by relating it to Confucianism, thereby seeking a meaningful connection between
the Korean idea of hanmaeum (one heart-mind) and the Confucian language and ethics of jeong emotions. The third section represents the focus
of this chapter, gives a detailed discussion of Daehaeng’s doctrine of
hanmaeum,157 and briefly mentions Wonhyo’s teaching of ilsim.158
157
A good question beyond the focus and scope of this chapter is to ask what Deahaeng
meant by hanmaeum specifically in terms of jeong or whether she made any comments on
jeong in the (Mahāyāna) Buddhist context of emotions, desires, attachments, afflictions, and
so on. This might possibly be a good research topic in the future.
158
It would be helpful to articulate Wonhyo’s notion of ilsim (one mind; enlightened
mind) further in close relation to his ethics and spirituality of emotions (jeong). Accordingly,
editor Chung adds a supplementary point that regarding mind cultivation and self-control,
Wonhyo rigorously discussed “afflictions” (kleśa) and “the entrenchment of emotions
(jeong)” and repudiated the psychological and moral problem of “unwholesome” [bad]
emotions—such as craving, anger, greed, hatred, pride, and so on—for causing continuous
suffering. This discussion appears in Wonhyo’s two leading works: Ijang eui (Doctrine of the
two hindrances), a detailed commentary on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other Mahāyāna
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Jee makes a thoughtful point that jeong, “a moral, social, and cultural
emotion of the Korean people,” is strongly associated with the Korean
Confucian notion of uri we-ness (our-ism), which concurs with Daehaeng’s
hanmaeum and Wonhyo’s ilsim as well. Jee concludes that this Buddhist
understanding of ilsim and hanmaeum supports the Korean culture of
jeong in order to overcome the problems of our interconnected world and
promote the present and future wellbeing of Korean and global society.
Chapter 10 by Chung Nam Ha is titled “Resentment and Gratitude in
Won Buddhism.” It presents the Won Buddhist ethics and spirituality of
“resentment” (wonmang 원망) and “gratitude” (gamsasim 감사심). This
chapter starts with the Won founder Sotaesan’s teaching that the emotion
of resentment is “the cause of all human suffering,” individual and collective, and discusses why its religious ethics teaches the “removal of resentment” by practicing the virtuous emotion of gratitude through “beneficent
requital.” Ha explains how Sotaesan’s doctrine of gratitude embodies a
soteriological solution to heal suffering. Sotaesan strongly endorsed the
Confucian teaching and practice of virtuous emotions such as benevolence. Ha also envisions that the Won Buddhist practice of gratitude can
heal the illness of the world. She concludes that it can provide a possibly
universal foundation of morality for the mutual benefit of the entire world.
Specifically, the first section of this chapter introduces the emotion of
resentment as “the main cause of discord and troubles.”
As Sotaesan said, “money illness” and “illness of resentment” are the most
serious moral evil. The second section makes a thoughtful point that Sotaesan
appreciated the Confucian moral-social teaching of benevolence (in/ren) and
righteousness. Ha points out that Sotaesan’s teaching also concurs with the
original Buddhist doctrines of “three poisonous minds” (greed, anger, delusion) and “two hindrances.” Craving and resentment are caused by delusion
or ignorance and represent the so-called afflictive (emotional) hindrance.159
texts, and Geumgang sammaegyeong non (Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra). For more
details on this topic, see Sect. 1.4.3.1 of this chapter: the editors’ introduction to Wonhyo
and Jinul on emotions and emotional control. Furthermore, the reader is also invited to
relate this topic to the Korean Won Buddhist teaching of “resentment” and “gratitude,” as
presented by Ha in Chap. 10.
159
Resentment is an emotion as affirmed in this chapter. However, the question for our
further reflection is how it pertains to the general nature and role of jeong. Resentment is said
to be caused by mental delusion (pollution) and kleśa (affliction), so bad (unwholesome)
resentment causes unjustified blaming (“find fault with others”) or hatred (a related emotion). However, is resentment always a bad emotion? Not always; it depends on why resent
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The third section discusses “how to recover moral sensitivity and friendliness.” Proper moral actions should follow Sotaesan’s teaching of “fourfold
beneficence.” The fourth section focuses on the life of gratitude and Won
faith. This chapter thoughtfully concludes that Confucianism deeply inspired
Won Buddhist ethical teaching, insofar Sotaesan emphasized the convergence
between Confucianism and Buddhism and that Won Buddhism offers a moral
foundation for universal wellbeing by transforming “the life of resentment”
into “the life of gratitude.”
There are two interesting questions for our further consideration
beyond the limited scope and length of this chapter. Sotaesan’s doctrine of
resentment and gratitude is Buddhist and integrated with classical
Confucian moral teaching. The first question is how the Won Buddhist
practice of gratitude as a virtuous emotion relates to the supreme Mahāyāna
compassion that both Wonhyo and Jinul emphasized.160 It seems that to
express gratitude is a way of being grateful or compassionate to others.
Accordingly, the related second question is: What makes the Won Buddhist
way of gratitude distinctively Korean? The Korean-ness of Sotaesan’s
teaching has something to do with the traditional Korean notion of resentment as han or wonmang—which is also more or less indicated in Chaps.
5, 8, and 12 by Baker, Park, and Oh, respectively. Similarly, the Won
Buddhist practice of gratitude arguably concurs with the common historical and religious trend of Korean religion and philosophy that emphasizes
the actual holistic practice of faith or spiritual teaching over abstract thinking or theoretical argumentation.161
In Chap. 11, “Jeong and the Interrelationality of Self and Other in
Korean Buddhist Cinema,” Sharon Suh discusses the role of jeong in
or what kind of resentment. For example, someone’s wholesome (good) resentment may
well be a moral passion (concern) for justice or respect when this suffering of resentment is
caused by another person’s immoral or wrong action. In other words, this would be the
moral emotion of “justified” resentment (or anger) or we call it moral indignation. As mentioned earlier in Sects. 1.1.1 and 1.1.4 of this introductory chapter, justice is a moral emotion
of discerning right and wrong.
160
It seems that Sotaesan did not specifically talk about “great compassion,” the most
important Mahāyāna virtue and emotion, insofar as it is not mentioned in this chapter.
161
In this regard, one’s practice and experience of spiritual teaching is a unique and important feature of Korean religion and philosophy as a whole, regardless Confucianism,
Buddhism, shamanism, or Christianity. For this theme of Korean religion and thought, see
Buswell’s edited Religions of Korea in Practice (2006); see also Buswell 1992 (a book about
his experience of Zen monasticism in Korea) and Chung 2016, 2021 (a new book on
Toegye’s moral-religious Neo-Confucian thought).
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
Korean Buddhist films to explore the Mahāyāna premise that “ultimate
freedom (nirvāṇa) is not to be found in an escape from the world of suffering (saṃsāra), but rather in its compassionate embrace.” Focusing on
Im Kwon-taek’s film Aje Aje Bara Aje (아제 아제 바라 아제 [Come,
Come, Come Upward]), this chapter argues that jeong/qing (정 情; affection) fused spiritual kinship facilitates “the Buddhist disciple’s recognition
and embrace of the abject as none other than the self.” Suh first relies
significantly on a post-colonial Christian theological interpretation of
jeong and then explores Im’s film about “Buddhism’s responsiveness to
the embodied suffering of han (resentment) through the affective dimensions of jeong and Buddhist compassion.” The chapter also suggests “jeong
as an ethical response to the other that finds striking resonance with the
Buddhist teaching of emptiness and interdependence.”
Following an introduction, the second section assimilates “the expression of jeong in Korean Buddhist films” with W. Anne Joh’s postcolonial
theological (Christological) analysis of Korean jeong as “stickiness,” “affection,” “affective … relatedness,” and “deeper adhering” (Joh 2006, 2007,
2011)162 as well as with the Korean notion of monastic life as a new
“dharma family.” The detailed third section is titled “A Buddhism for the
People—Aje Aje Bara Ajei.” It is an interesting story-telling analysis of
two young nuns’ experiences and especially Sun Nyeo’s “han-filled suffering,” “grief,” and “somatic compassion” in dealing with her men outside
her monastery. The next section discusses “Buddhism, han, and jeong” by
covering Korean Buddhist ability to manage han vis-à-vis Sun Nyeo’s
“bodhisattvic compassion.” It also affirms her jeong as an “affection,”
“empathy,” “adhesive bond,” and “relational attachment.” Jeong is “a
relationality that has the power to transform relationships and finds striking resonance with the Buddhist concepts of emptiness and interdependence.” Suh thoughtfully concludes that jeong is “Confucian in origin”
but “not a discrete emotion that runs parallel to the Buddhist ethic of
compassion.”
For our further discussion, three engaging, related questions emerge
out of this chapter within or beyond its intended focus and scope. The
notion of “somatic compassion” is repeatedly mentioned in describing
Sun Nyeo’s experience of “han” and “grief.” The question is whether the
deeper meaning of the Korean nun’s experience is not merely a form of
somatic compassion but, more likely (significantly), her selfless and
162
For details on Joh’s analysis of this topic, see Suh’s Chap. 11.
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self-sacrificing compassion on a spiritual and religious level. This supreme
compassion represents the key Mahāyāna vow of karuṇā with its spiritual
and religious faith. Suh’s chapter mentions the Mahāyāna teaching of
karuna163 as “bodhisattvic compassion” briefly (in the third and fourth
sections); therefore, we can ideally elaborate this key point further with its
scriptural support by citing some primary Buddhist sources.164 In this
introductory chapter,165 the reader will therefore find the editors’ discussion of Mahāyāna and Chinese and Korean texts on the bodhisattva’s
“great compassion” and “joy.”
Dealing with Sun Nyeo’s han suffering and grief in relation to jeong
emotions, we need to think of this following question for further reflection: Is the Korean nun’s experience compatible with the term jeong/qing
(情) as discussed in relevant Buddhist scriptures? As this introductory
chapter and many chapters of this book indicate, jeong or Korean jeong as
a whole is not necessarily positive (good) emotions. As far as the entire
Buddhist tradition is concerned, jeong emotions, except boddhisattvic
compassion and utmost joy, are mostly negative in relation to selfish
attachment and craving unless they are overcome and transformed into
“compassion”: Theravada, Mahāyāna, and Chinese and Korean texts
strongly repudiate most emotions as “unwholesome,” including desire
(craving), suffering, grief, anger, greed, fear, hatred, passion, pride, jealousy, attachment, and on.166 Chapter 10 by Ha mentions some of these
examples according to Theravada. In fact, the word jeong occasionally
163
It might also be more interesting to relate the scriptural doctrine of karuna compassion
to the six pāramitās (virtues) or ten perfections of being a bodhisattva, especially generosity,
patience, and loving-kindness that seem to resonate with the Korean nun’s moral dilemma
and religious experience. Regarding philosophical research on Korean Buddhist nuns’ life,
Jin Y. Park’s Women and Buddhist Philosophy: Engaging Zen Master Kim Iryop (2017) articulates Korean Buddhist nuns’ karma in relation to contemporary issues in the particularly
Korean Buddhist context of practices. This is discussed in a comparative philosophical and
dialogical way.
164
Chung supplements this point by providing the following examples: Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā; Tathāgataguhya Sūtra; Śikṣāsamuccaya
[Compendium of doctrine]; Lotus Sūtra; Chinese commentaries on the Lotus Sūtra or Pure
Land Scripture; and leading Korean texts written by Wonhyo and Jinul, such as the former’s
Ijang eui and Geumgang sammaegyeong non and the latter’s Jinsim jikseol.
165
For example, see Sects. 1.3.2 (Indian Mahāyāna Perspectives), 1.3.3 (Chinese and
Korean Mahāyāna Perspectives), and 1.4.3.1 (Wonhyo and Jinul on Emotions and Emotional
Control).
166
For details on this point, see the editors’ discussion in all parts of Sect. 1.3 (Emotions
in the Buddhist Tradition) of this introductory chapter.
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E. Y. J. CHUNG AND J. S. OH
appears along with these examples of emotions in leading Korean Buddhist
texts compiled by Wonhyo and Jinul (see Sects. 1.3.3 and 1.4.3.1).167
The end of Chap. 11 briefly comments that, although Korean jeong is
“Confucian in origin,” it compatibly works with the Buddhist doctrine of
compassion. It would be more engaging to elaborate this interesting point
further. Throughout the history of Buddhism in Korea, the nature of
Korean jeong gradually accommodated the Mahāyāna teaching of compassion and interdependence that continues to inspire contemporary Korean
Buddhists. The Korean Buddhist notion of monastic life as a “dharma
family” or family bond also accords with the Confucian tradition of family
life and group relationships. Suh’s “socially engaged Mahāyāna” approach
and Joh’s Asian or “postcolonial” theological theorization of jeong emotion as “affection,” “empathy,” “adhesive bond,” and “relational dependence” remarkably echo the Korean Confucian-based talk of human
values, relationships, and bonds in terms of universal benevolence (humanheartedness; in), sympathy (compassion) and moral jeong, affective heartmind (sim 心), emotional bond/intimacy, and reciprocal respect/role in
traditional and contemporary Korea. This echoing therefore confirms the
humanistic, moral, and social context of Korean jeong expression and
experience, thereby pointing to holistic Confucian influence on Korea’s
moral language, humanistic culture, and social and psychological interdependency. This point is discussed further in our (editors’) concluding
chapter at the end of the book.
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