Research Notes
The Concept of Islamic Tradition
in Fazlur Rahman’s Thought*
When one considers the thought of the late Fazlur Rahman, it can be seen
that his main endeavors are confined to “a true understanding of the Qur’an and
the Sunnah”- in other words, a “recourseto the Qur’an and the Sunnah in order
to get from there an understanding of and a guidance for solving our new
problems.”l This point cannot be ignored by contemporary Muslims striving
to overcometheir social, political, legal, and religiomoralproblems. However,
it is not a simple and easy task to return to the Qur’an in order to have a true
understanding of it, for there are many obstacles which ensue from history or
traditional Islam itself.
I will therefore elucidate and discuss what Rahman means by the concept
of tradition and, more specifically, the Islamic tradition or, as he sometimes
prefers to call it, the Muslim tradition.2We cannot appreciatehis views on his
Qur‘anicmethodology and on contemporary issues unless we sufficiently acquaint
ourselveswith what he means by Islamic tradition and the problems hund within
Islamic civilization, by which he means the influencethat Islamic tradition that
had on Islamic civilization and its ultimate consequences on that civilization’s
outcome.
When we confront the Islamic heritage as a whole, it is important to elicit
and bring into the open what “Islamic”and ”un-Islamic”meant at that particular
point in the past, for this would appear to be crucial for a better understanding
of the problem at hand. Once we identify those un-Islamic elements and then
eliminatethem from our way to developmentand modernization,we can confine
our attentionto solvingour currentproblems in lightof the Qur‘anand theSunnah.
We cannot find adequate answersto our current problems if we are incarcerated
in a tradition which is, according to Rahman, contrary to the Qur’an’s dynamic
and ongoing spirit. On the other hand, there is the naive view which claims that
*I would like to express my indebtedness to Alparslan Agikgeng and Bekir Demirkol, both
of whom encouraged me to concentrate on this topic, and to thank them for their fruitful
discussion and helpful comments on the first draft of this paper. I would also like to express
my thanks to my colleague Mevlut Uyanik for his critical suggestions on certain points.
lFazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi, Central Institute of Islamic
Research, 1965), 143, hereinafter referred to as Methodology.
ZFazlurRahman, “Islamizationof Knowledge: A Response,” American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences 5, no. 1 (September 1988): 3-11.
244
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
Islam does not address our modem societiesand that it cannot offer solutions
for contemporaryproblems facedby today’s Muslims. Watt points to thisproblem
by saying that:
The thinking of the fundamentalist Islamic intellectuals and of the
great masses of ordinary Muslims is still dominatedby the standard
traditional Islamic mrldview and the corresponding self-image of
Islam. This is a fact of great importanceat the present time when the
influenceof Islam is increasingthroughout theworld, since it means
that how contemporaryproblems are seen by many Muslims may be
different from how they look to Western observers and statesmen.
. . . Unchangingnessis an all-pervading assumption which colors
most aspects of the standard worldview, and this justifies giving it
a prominentplace in the presentation. Moreover, it is somethingwhich
a Westernerfinds difficult to appreciate without deliberate effort of
thought. The idea of development is part of our general intellectual
outlook.
Rahman appeals to Muslims to direct their attention to this end by saying
that: “The first task1 submit to you, indeed, the urgent task, is to reexamine the
Islamic tradition itself.”5In other words, he perceives the present-day problems
of Muslims as stemmingdirectly from the tradition which has developed owing
to the Muslims’ understanding of Islam, rather than from Islam itself. To use
his own m r d s , after the thirdbijri century, the views of certainprominentthinken
were “hardened”in the form of a traditionthat is taken to be the mole and unique
representationof Islam. Rahman therefore inclined towards the view that “the
understanding of our forefathers is the true and only possible understanding of
Islam and therefore unchangeable”is responsible for all subsequentdevelopments
in Islamic civilization.
The purpose of this article is to examineRahman’s understanding of tradition
and, more specifically,Islamic tradition, and how he believes that this tradition
can be utilized to solve certain problems confronting contemporary Islam and
Muslims.
3MontgomeryWatt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1989),
1. Rahman’s view of fundamentalism is that “it is even something of a misnomer to call such
a phenomena in Islam fundamentalist” except insofar as they emphasize the basis of Islam
as being the two original sources: the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.
Otherwise, they emphasize ijtihad (original thought), which is something forbiddenby Western
fundamentalists who, while emphasizing the Bible as the “fundament: reject original or new
thought. Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Tmformation of an Intellectual Tradition
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 142.
4Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, 3.
5Rahman, “Islamization of Knowledge: 8.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
245
Islamic “Tradition” or “Traditional”Islam
The English word“tradition”is derived from the Latin verb tradere (lit. to
transform, to deliver).6 Thus, the original meaning of “tradition” refers to
“transformation”and, as such, has a religious or ecclesiasticalconnotation. In
this sense, theliteral meaning is “thehandw down from generation to generation
of opinions, beliefs, customs, and so
Everything that is transformed to us
from the previous generations constitutes tradition. But we cannot ignore the
fact that what we receive has already been transformed, i.e., altered by the
intederenceof that generation. “Transformation”in the first sense simply means
“transmitting”or “handing down,”whereas in the latter case it means “change,”
both of which coalesce in the significationof tradition. Therefore, whatever has
been transmitted in the traditionhas necessarily undergone a ”transformation.”
It is this sense of transformation (i.e., change) which Rahman emphasizes in
the very meaning of tradition. If this aspect of alternation in the phenomenon
of tradition is not sufficiently perceived by us, we will be unable to appreciate
his approach to the whole Islamic tradition, for every critique or modification
of a tradition involves a consciousness of what is being criticized or rejected.a
Rahman uses the terms “traditional Islam” and “Muslim tradition”
intexhangeably,thereby maintainingthe original meaning of the term ”tradition”
as both “transformationin the sense of transmission”and “transformationin the
sense of alternation.”His concept of Islamic tradition views the contributions
of former generations as an integral part, a view which implies that there are
some new elements that have been contributed to Islam over the course of time,
mainly in the area of Understandingthe Qur’anand the Sunnah.There is, therefore,
alwaysthe possibility that someun-Islamic elements will be found in that tradition,
a development that would arise if Islam were not understood as consisting of
only the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
This development, according to Rahman, is normal and acceptable.
However, it is both unacceptable and unreasonable to regard traditional Islam
as Islam itself and, as a result, to regard it as sacred and ~nchangeable.~
This
fact led Muslims to the “misunderstandingof the views and interpretationsof
early generations as the only possible understanding and as a result sacred and
unchangeable.”’O
Tar1 J. Friedrich, Tmdition and Authority (New York: Praeger, l m ) , 14.
’Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984).
8For example: “Islamic tradition was never the same again after the conscious activity
of each and all of them”: namely al Ash’ari, al Ghazai, and Ibn Taym-yah. Rahman, Islam
and Modernity, 10.
9 F ~the
r sacred conception of tradition see Seyyed H. Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 65-8.
lORahman, Methodology, 86-7.
248
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
which is patently evident in our political life; its moral emphasescould
lead only to pessimism. Where cynicismand pessimism are allowed
to g m , the life itself molts and seek other avenuesof self-expnzssion
and self-fulfillment - healthy or not-so-healthy.21
The same is also true for educational institutions, such as the orthodox
schools (madrusuh),and for philosophy.22
Rahman is thus seeking to explain his understanding of Muslim tradition
by means of a historical survey. This is also a critical study which is apparently
his assessment of the views of early Muslims and, moreover, how some of the
concepts under review acquired their meanings in such a context. In addition,
he is analyzing how the meanings and contents of these concepts changed over
time. In addition, he applies this technique to such concepts as “ S u ~ a h , ”
“ijmii‘,” and”ijtihad,”and reaches the followingconclusion - one which is very
important if we are to assess his understanding of tradition:
The community as a whole had assumed the necessary prerogative
of creating and recreating the content of the Prophetic Sunnah, . . .
(within which) ijma‘was the guarantee for the rectitude, i.e., for the
mrlung infallbhty (as opposed to absoluteor thmx$ical hhllibfity,
such as assumed by the Christian Church) of the new content.23
Early Muslims, by means of this intellectual activity and under the direction
of “the spiritin which the Prophet acted in a given historicalsituation,”constructed
a dynamic concept of the Sunnah which enabled them to be creative and active
in all possible situations. This activity and creativity was controlled by the
community’suse of ijmii‘ (consensus). Rahman calls this active procedure “the
living Sunnah,” for it is an ongoing process24which “created a tremendous
effulgence in the intellectual, spiritual, scientific fields.”25 However, the
equilibrium and consolidation resulting from the development of the Islamic
tradition was not maintained over time. In other words, although the social
equilibrium achieved did bestow an extraordinary fecundity and creativity on
the Muslim tradition, this phenomenalgrowthwas relatively short-lived, since
its structure’scontent was invested with a halo of sacrednessand unchangeability,
”Bid., 106. See also Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 13-22.
Z Z R a h m a n , M e t W l o g y , 131-2; 1334. S e e also m a n , Islam and Modernity, chap.
3; W a n , Islam, 181-93.
%ahman, “Islam and Modernity,”19. For the concepts of ijmi‘and q i y h , see Rahman,
Islam, 68-15.
Wahman, Methodology, 87. See also Islam, 50-67; Mur Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues
in the Ayyub Khan Era,”in Essays on Islamic Civilization, ed. by Donald Little (Leiden:
Brill, 1976).
25Rahman,Methodology, 86.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
247
as an understanding on the part of our predecessors. Islam came to be understood
and studied through this established image of Islam. Although Rahman claims
that this established tradition contains many Islamic and un-Islamic elements,
as well as others which might be said to be on the borderline, the end result,
in its entirety, is regarded as the only possible understanding of Islam and,
therefore, as unchangeable?’
Before going into the details of how this tradition has developed over the
courseof Islamichistory, we will scrutinizeRahman’s mainargumentwith regad
to its emergence in order to grasp his mainobjectiveconcerning Islamic tradition.
He seems to discern two mainstagesin the developmentof early Islamictradition:
1.
2.
Islamic orthodoxy was led, during its early formative phase,
to adopt certainmore or less extremeremedial measures in order
to face certain particular historical exigencies of an extreme
nature.
These early measures became part of the permanent content
of Islamic orthodoxy after the cessation of ijtihad (rethinking,
reinterpreting)
In other words, “a particular extreme solution, designed for a particular
extreme ailment at a particularjuncture of Islamic religious history, became a
permanent feature of the orthodox content of Islam, and, further, this extreme
solution became extremer and extremer as century after century passed.”19
Rahman thus tries to explain the decline and stagnation of Islamic civilization
through trying to determine what exactly is KIslamictradition” and how it has
influenced subsequent generations. He asks:“What is responsible for the sudden
flowering of the brilliant Muslim civilization?”2oHis response, found in his
critique of Islamic tradition, supplies us with an answer to this question and,
at the same time, illumines his concept of tradition and, more specifically, his
approachto Islamic tradition. A
c
m
m to his understanof Islamic tradition,
certain consequences can be anticipated:
In the politico-social sphereand,more particularly at the moral plane,
the combined effectsof someof the doctrines regardedas fundamental
by our orthodoxy did have, and could not fail to have, disastrous
consequencesfor the moral constitutionof the community;itspolitid
attitudewas a strong contributorycause of inducingpolitical cynicism
”Rahman, “Islamization of Knowledge,” 8; Rahman, Methodology, 86-7.
l8Rahrnan,Methodology, 105.
191bid., 103.
201bid.,141.
248
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9 2
which is patently evident in our politicallife; its moral emphasescould
lead only to pessimism. Where cynicismand pessimism are allowed
to grow, the life itself revolts and seeksother avenuesof self-expmsion
and self-fulfillment - healthy or not-so-healthy.21
The same is also true for educational institutions, such as the orthodox
schools ( d r m u h ) ,and for philosophy.22
Rahman is thus seeking to explain his understanding of Muslim tradition
by means of a historical survey. This is also a critical study which is apparently
his assessment of the views of early Muslims and, moreover, how some of the
concepts under review acquired their meanings in such a context. In addition,
he is analyzing how the meanings and contents of these concepts changed over
time. In addition, he applies this technique to such concepts as "Sunnah,"
"ijmii'," and"ijtihad," and reaches the followingconclusion - one which is very
important if we are to assess his understanding of tradition:
The community as a whole had assumed the necessary prerogative
of creating and recreating the content of the Prophetic Sunnah, . . .
(within which) ijma' was the guaranteefor the rectitude, i.e., for the
working inMlib&y (as opposed to absoluteor theoretical infallibility,
such as assumed by the Christian Church) of the new content.z3
Early Muslims, by means of this intellectual activity and under the direction
of "the spiritin which the Prophet acted in a given historicalsituation,"constructed
a dynamic concept of the Sunnah which enabled them to be creative and active
in all possible situations. This activity and creativity was controlled by the
community's use of ijM (consensus). Rahman calls this active procedure "the
living Sunnah," for it is an ongoing processz4which "created a tremendous
effulgence in the intellectual, spiritual, scientific fields."25 However, the
equilibrium and consolidation resulting from the development of the Islamic
tradition was not maintained over time. In other words, although the social
equilibrium achieved did bestow an extraordinary fecundity and creativity on
the Muslim tradition, this phenomenalgrowthwas relatively short-lived, since
its structure's content was invested with a halo of sacrednessand unchangeability,
W i d . , 106. See also Rahman, Islam and Modernity, 13-22.
2zRahman,Methodology, 131-2; 133-4. See also Rahman, Islam and Modernity, chap.
3; Rahman, Islam, 181-93.
23Rahman,"Islam and Modernity," 19. For the concepts of ~rmi'andqiyciS, see Rahman,
Islam, 68-75.
24Rahman,Methodology, 87. S e e also Islam, 504% Fazlur Rahman, "SomeIslamic Issues
in the Ayyub Khan Era,"in Essays on Islamic Civiliultion, ed. by Donald Little (Leiden:
Brill, 1976).
25Rahman,Methodology, 86.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
249
as it came to be looked upon as uniquely deducible from the Qur’an and the
prophetic Sunnah. The growth and floweringof Islamic tradition was, therefore,
stifled at its very mots and almost at the very moment when it began to blossom.26
Thus, according to Rahman, if we take into consideration the intellectual
history of Islam, someof the important political, theological, and m o d doctrines
which originated in the “livingSunnah,”as a result of the Islamic tradition acting
on the Qur‘an and the prophetic Sunnah,were transformed through “the medium
of the Hadith into immutable articles of Faith.”27Consequently, Rahman’s
”traditionalIslam,”or “Muslimtradition”or “establishedtradition,”tookits place
in the history of Islam and affected the future developments of the Islamic
community up to the present day.
There were many attemptsand movements (especiallyduring the eighteenth
century) which started in different parts of the Muslim world and had as their
goal the regenerationof the Islamic traditionand the resolution of the problems
arising within that tradition. It is within this trend of regenerationthat Rahman’s
approach to tradition should be evaluated. Therefore, his criticism of Islamic
tradition cannot be understood as a destruction, but rather as a reconstruction,
of traditionalIslam. This meansthat his conceptof Islamic traditionhas a complex
structure,one projected by his effortsto analyze the problems of contemporary
Muslims in accordancewith the Qur‘anand the Sunnah.In order to seethis more
clearly, we need to examine Rahman’s efforts in other fields of the Islamic
tradition, such as society, law, and morality. We shall therefore briefly examine
his analysis of what he calls the “making of the Islamic tradition.”
It is appropriatehere to give some concrete examples as to how Rahman
approachesthe problem. It seemsthat his approachis critical and that his attitude
is constructive,having as its purpose the restoration of Islam’s original vitality
and dynamism. His model seems to be the early Muslim community. His
treatment of the social fabric of the early generations bears a resemblance to
modern critical social theories, such as those of the Frankfurt School. In this
case, he can be compared with Habermas for, despite the major differences in
their aimsand the contexts of their endeavors,there are similaritiesin their method
vis-‘a-vis social phenomena. A few more words will be said on this point in the
concludmgsection. Here, it is sufficientto point out that Rahman’s critical attitude
cannot be treated with the fairness it deserves unless one also examines the
arguments in defense of his views, which are sometimes in conflict with their
more widely accepted counterparts among the adherents of traditional Islam.
It should also be noted that his attitude implicitly conforms to Kuhn’s theory of
scientific revolutions and paradigm change.28
Tbid., 87.
271bid.
28ThomasS. Kuhn, me Structure of ScientiJicRevolutions (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, lm),43.
250
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
Sociopolitical Theory and “Traditional Islam”
Rahman evaluates the emergence of “traditional Islam’s’’ political theory
through an analysis of the early Muslim community’spolitical activitiesor views.
The early political upheaval in Islam led to the emergenceof certain sects such
as Khawfirij, the Shi’ah, and the Sunnis (Orthodoxy). Rahman asserts, in
accordance with his above-mentioned argument, that the emergence and the
political views of the Khawiirijand the Shi’ah supplied Sunnism with its political
content. Thus, the development of Sunni political views took place over time
and as a response to the extremism of the KhawBrij and the S h h h Z 9
The mainmotivationbehind Sunnismwas to maintain the ummah’s external
solidarity and to save it from dogmatic civil wars. Rahman emphasizes this by
pointing out that Sunnism’s main feature is =doctrinesof submissivenessto the
de facto
This is an important aspect of his argument,for it explains
and underlines the fact that because of this view the doctrineof authority became
part of the permanent Sunnibelief structure:“The Sunnis had, for ever, become
the king’s party, almost any king.”,, This understanding of politics led the Sunnis
to political opportunism, i.e., to a position which could easily adapt itself to the
prevailing political authority. The end result was that the Sunnis chose not to
make any serious attempt to challengeor change the existing regime even when
it violated Islamic principles.
Rahman’scriticalanalysis of this early formativephase of Islamic political
tradition led him to the conclusion that “in political theory . . .the Orthodoxy
of the two political extremes adopted the extreme of absolute obedience and
conformi~m.”~~
And so in the name of preserving the community’sintegrity and
safety’this Sunni doctrine was forever after maintained as a permanent feature
of orthodoxy.
What seems even more interesting in this context is that the ulama did not
attempt to develop shiirii (a Qur’anicterm which can be worked out in some detail
and would be more suitable to the spirit of the Qur’an) into an effective and
permanent organization. Instead, the ulama “continuedto strenuouslyadvocate
absoluteobedience and, on the other hand, to draw perfectionist pictures of an
ideal caliph,”33with the result that “the ground was prepared and justification
supplied [withinthe ‘Islamictradition’] for visitation ofthe Muslim world from
the fourth century onward by sultan after sultan and amir after amir.”
z9“This o&odox political doctrine is the direct result of the political events that occurred
in the early history of Islam.” Rahman, Methodology, 88. See also Rahman, Islam, 23740.
30Rahman,Methodology, 88; Rahman, Islam, 238-40.
31Rahman, Methodology, %.
3*Ibid.
331bid.,94;Rahman, Islam, 239.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
251
Rahman does not accept this account of political theory and thus falls into
a crucial conflict withthe politicalsphereof Islamic tradition. However, he neither
ignores nor completely brushes this theory aside; he rather points out that there
were some historical exigencieswhich required the adoption of this positionJ4
and then asserts that the original needs have, over time, passed away and were
even forgotten by the orthodox. As a result:
A genuine historical need was erected into a kind of dogma, with
serious results for the politico-social ethic of the Muslim society in
the latter Middle Ages, where it encouraged political opportunism
on the one hand, and generally inculcated political apathy among the
people on the other.35
Morality and Traditional Islam
In the case of morality, the most important problem confronting Muslims
is the traditional understanding of human freedom. (There is also the problem
of good and evil, which will be dealt with in a later section due to its theological
implications.)Here, I would like to examine Rahman’s appmach to freedom from
the point ofview of traditional Islam. In essence, his contentionis that “the same
story, as mentioned above, is repeated at the moral plane on the fundamental
questions of human freedom and acc~untability.”~~
To begin with, Rahman’s mainargument with regard to human freedom and
accountabilityis based on and developedfromthe Qur’anand the “living Sunnah.”
He asserts that both the Qur’an and the Prophet’s behavior had provided an
adequate h e w o r k to ensure, on the one hand, the maximum capacity of creative
human energy and, on the other hand, to keep this human creativity on the right
moral track. He then argues that the Qur’an vividly and fbrcefully emphasizes
the tension that is necessary to bring about the right moral action. At the same
time, the Qur’an also severely warns against the nihilist trend, which may trick
humanity into considering itself a law unto itself. Thus, he concludes that:
The Qur’an is not interested in a discussion of the problem of the
“freedomof human will”or “determinism”but, on the basis of a true
appreciation of the human nature, in releasing to the maximum the
34Rahman, Methodology, %.
351bid.
361bid., 97. See also Rahman, Islam, 241, in which he states that the case of political
dogma is exactly the same: “the thoughtless perpetuation of a dogmatic solution arrived at
to meet a particular extreme situation.”
252
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
creative moral energy of man. The Prophet, in his deeds and sayings,
was an actual paradigm of this attitude and the response he evoked
from his Companions was nothing essentially otherwise.37
This is Rahman’s main argument and standing before analyzing the
emergence of the traditional account of human freedom and accountability.Pure
and speculativediscussionsor reasoning on the problem, he asserts, began about
a century after the Prophet’s death with the appearance of two extremist
contenders: the Mu‘tazilah and their opponents. The Qur’an, in order to keep
in view the moral creativity of humanity, emphasizes its potentialities and
accountabilityand the strictjustice of God, whereas the Mu’tazilahasserted only
the latter point. As a result, “they became irretrievable prisoners of their own
position by emphasizing the absolute freedom of the human being. Thus their
opponents, especially the Orthodoxy, criticized them for denuding God of all
godhead and substituting a naked humanism for the essentials of religion.”38
Orthodoxy, however, “accentuated the Will and Power of God only,” so much
so that they became totally and irrevocably mortgaged to this doctrineand, over
time, erected determinism into an unalterablepart of its creed.39Rahman then
concludes:
. . . the Orthodoxy was once again manoeuvered into an extreme
position. In place of the living, concrete and synthetic moral tension
of the Qur‘an and the Prophetic Sunnah we have again a conflict of
pure and naked extremes. What the Orthodoxy did was essentially
to take the latter of these two extremes and install it into its dogmatic
structure. Or, rather, the Orthodoxycame into existenceon the very
plea and with the very programme of installing the omnipotenceof
God and the impotence of man into a
As is clear from the above quotation, Rahman treats this issue in a manner
which aims at constructing a more dynamic and viable understanding which,
at the same time, is (to us) more faithful to the Qur’anic spirit. In fact, this
represents his critical approach to other problems of Islamic tradition.
Going into other aspectsof this moral issuegives us a better grasp of Rahman’s
thinking. Tim good examples are the doctrine of the independenceof faith and
the legal definition of a Muslim. In his opinion, “the doctrine of the essential
independence of faith vis-his acts was regarded by the majority of the
37Rahman,Methodology, 97, Rahman, Islam, 241-4.
38Rahman, Methodology, 98. See also Rahman, Islam, chap. 5.
39Rahman,Methodology, 98.
‘%id.; Rahman, Islam, 143-4.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
253
Community as a necessary defence against Kharijism and was adopted in a
modified
But this majority attitude, while harmless in itself, was
supported by the Umayyad state which, fearing that an emphasis on human
freedom and initiativemight unseat it,42favoreddeterminism. As a result, certain
theories which blatantly contradictthe Qur’anic worldview began to emerge in
traditionalIslam. In the face of such negativedevelopments,how could Islamic
tradition pass without the keen criticism of such sincere scholars as Rahman?
Thus once more Rahman tries to show the importance of the historical
situationwhich influenced the nature and direction of intellectualdevelopment.
He evaluates the problem and points out that the Orthodoxy has adopted this
doctrine in order to provide only an external legal definition of a Muslim, and
that it did not describe the content of Islam as such. He maintains that the
particular historical situation “was not kept in view and the doctrine of the
independenceof faith and works was allowed to become not merely formal, but
a real definition of a Muslim.”43Rahman regards this formulation of faith, which
at the beginning was undoubtedly a reaction against Kharijism and other internal
disputes, as extreme and, in the long run, a morally suicidal measure, for he
saw it as being almost an exact Muslim replica of the Christian doctrine of
“justificationby faith.”44
As a result of this development,determinism became part of the orthodox
creed, has been defended ever sinceby scholars, and gradually became regarded
as an unchangeable creedal pillar. During the fourth and fifth centuries AH, for
example, Muslim philosophers (being pure rationalists)developed determinism
even further and, by identifying causal, rational, and theistic forms of
determinism, produced a truly imposing deterministic structureof the universe
and of humanity.45It is enough to recall Fakhr a1 Din al Riizi (d. 606AH),the
famous and influential theologian who was also a theistic predestinarian of a
truly frighteningorder. Even worse, Rahman maintains, was Sufism, for “most
Sufi theosophers carried the doctrine to much greater lengths and, in fact,
transformed it completely under their utterly monistic wrldview; instead of
saying, ‘Every act or Occurrence is created by God,’
they ended up by saying,
‘Everyact or occurrence is God‘through the intermediate statement,‘Every act
or occurrence is a manifestation of God.”’46Thus not only was there no agent
besides God - there was nothing besides Him.
As a result, this attitudeeventuaUygeneratedan undue easing of the religious
conscience, a development which obviously lowers the tensions inherent in
41’Rahman, Methodology, 99.
4ZIbid.
431bid.
441bid.
451bid.,101.
461bid.,102; Rahman, Islam, 141-8 and chaps. 8 and 9.
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
254
malung moral decisions and, propodonately, moral standards. In Rahman’s view,
therefore, the chief property of a Muslim’s spiritual and intellectual life - the
whole Islamictradition - becamefatalistfromapproximatelythe seventhcentury
AH onward, and the accompanying moral-psychological attitudeturned out to
be passivity.47In the face of such developments,if the same train of thought is
followed to the end, Islamic tradition cannot remain unquestioned.
Islamic Jurisprudence (Flqh) as the Basis
of ‘Islamic Tradition”
As we have seen, Rahmanbelievesthat the attitude of the first Muslim generation, namely that of relying on the Qur’an and regarding or understanding the
Sunnah as a “living”process, was gradually changed by later developments in
Islamic tradition. For example, in the case of Islamic law (fiqh), the second and
third generations of Muslims appealed to individual Qur’anic verses and
a&idittth in their effortsto resolve issues legally. After this practice was no longer
used, two significant and new approaches emerged:
If a sufficientlydirect and obvious text was available, the matter was considered “settled” for good, and thus a decision on
the basis of a “clear text” was given.
2 If such was not the case, a text had to be found that was close
enough to the case under considerationso that the issue could
be resolved on the basis of similarities, although allowing for
differences (qiyiis).48
1.
Both of these traditional legal methods are regarded by Rahman as “loose
tools” and as inadequate for resolving any given problem. He believes that this
attitude had the consequenceof bringing abouta proliferationof u&i&th which,
in turn, resulted in the cessationof an orderly growth in legalthought h~general.
Rahman claims that this static attitude on the part of Muslim jurists led to the
stagnation of the Islamic tradition’s legal sphere and thus gave birth to legal
secularism in many Muslim countries.
Although “mostmodern Muslim thinkers have laid blame for this relative“Rahman, Methodology, 102; In Rahman, Islam, 244, he points out that “it is obvious
that any attempt to reconstruct Muslim society and restate Islam, a task in which all important
Muslim countries seem to be engaged in their own ways, must take into account the colossal
moral and spiritual debris which is the legacy of Sufism.”
48Rahman,Islam and Modernity, 25. See also Rahman, Islam, chap. 4.
49Rahman,Islam and Modernity, 26.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
255
ly static state of affairs on the destruction of the caliphate in the mid-thirteenth
century [AH] and the political disintegration of the Muslim world,” Rahman
claims that “the spirit of Islam had become essentially static long before that;
indeed, this stagnationwas inherent in the bases on which Islamic law was founded.”50Unfortunately,this fabric of Islamic law or jurisprudence, which was formulated and constructed during the Middle Ages, was thereafter accepted and
maintainedas the only possible way of understandug it. In other words, it gradually became unchangeable and above criticism. Rahman tries to illustrate some
weaknesses in this attitude by means of a question from al Awza’i, a younger
contemporaryof Abij Han-fah, thus once morepointing out this issue’shistoricd
character:
. . .who takes the legislationof alcohol from the Kufans,the legalization of mut‘ah “temporary marriage” from certain Makkan fuqaha’,
the legalizationof drugs fromother Makkan fuqaha’and the legalization of music from the Madinans, he has collected all the evil that
he can.51
Consideringthe weakness superimposedon the basis of fiqh, as developed
in Islamic tradition, it is suggestedthat Rahman’s position regarding this tradition be reconsidered. Can the traditional legal methodology still be effectively
employed today in the legal sphere as an integral part of Islamic tradition? The
fact that the Qur’an includes many legal injunctions is clear evidence that fiqh
can be considered as the basis of the entire Islamic tradition. If this is true, then
Rahman’sposition imposes a crucialtask on the Muslims: they should question
the very basis of their tradition. This does not, however, mean a total annihilation of Islamic tradition. On the contrary, according to Rahman, without that
tradition we would be unable even to understand the Qur’an, the very source of
that tradition. In that case, the legal tradition of Islam must be reevaluated in
light of the Qur’an itself, for only on such a basis would that traditionbe worthy
of the name Islamic.
Traditional Theology (Kdtirn) and Sufism
The emergenceand development of theology, accordingto Rahman, displiys
the same characteristicseven more dramatically than the legal tradition. Traditional theology ( k a h ) , which took shape during the fourth, fifth, and sixth
centuries AH, gradually claimed for itself the exalted function of being the
Tbid.
51Rahman,“Islamization of Knowledge,” 6.
256
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
“defender of the basis of Islamic law” in its more dominant and enduring form
of Ash’m-thought.52Due to this development in Islamic tradition, Muslim
theologians speculated on issues such as: Does an individual have the power
to act or not? Does the qadar (decree) of Allah include in itself everything as
predestined or not? AR good and evil knowable through revelation or reason?
Do the divine commandmentsin the Qur’an have any purpose or are they to be
obeyed solely because they are divine ~ommandments?~~
Such questions have been discussed for centuries. In addition, the main
elaboratorof Ash’ari doctrine, al Baqillh- (d. 403 AH) even recommendedthat
“every Muslimjust as he/she believes in Allah, the Books, the Messengers, the
Angels, and the Last Day, must also believe in atomism,” which is another
characteristic of Ash’ari thought. According to this doctrine:
The world is all made up of atoms. These atomsare brought together
in a certain way, structuredin a certain way, so that living beings like
us come intoexistence. Then, whena person dies, the atomisticstructure falls apart. Sometlungof this atomic structure,however, remains
and then Allah, on the Day of Judgement, will re-create that body
around that nucleus. 54
The Ash’ari doctrine of resurrection, as well as many of their important
theologicaldoctrines, is based on this doctrine of atomism. This is perhaps why
al Baqillh- recommended that Muslims accept atomism as an article of faith.
He viewed it as so basic and so important that he thought that Muslim leaders
ought to legislate belief in it. Rahman, however, argues that “this is the Ash‘ari
doctrine. W may accept it; we may reject it; we may question: ‘Whatis therein
that is fully Islamic and what is therein that is less Islamic, and what is therein
that is un-I~lamic?’”~~
Holding such a view conveys the idea that there is a gradual development
in the making of Islamic tradition. People such as al Ghazdi, al &i, and al
Baqillh-belong to a specifictime. Their views should thereforebe treated and
evaluated accordingly, for it is obvious that, as demonstrated by Kuhn, people
are influenced by the dominant views and doctrines of their own time (i.e.,
paradigms)56when they try to understand and interpret the Qur’an. Any new
elements, which may sometimesbe called un-Islamic and new interpretations,
arise from this attitude.
5 * R a h m a n , Islam and Modernity, 26-7; Rahman, Islam, 93.
53Ralunan,Islam and Modernity, n,Rahman, “Islamizationof Knowledge,”7-8; m a n ,
Islam, 91-4.
54Rahman,“Islamization of Knowledge,” 8.
551bid.
56Kuhn, Zhe Structure of Scienfijc Revolutions, 43, 176.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
257
Rahman gives severalconcreteexamples. For instance, after discussinghow
al Ghazdi and al R b i contributed and developed theology as a system and as
an answer to the philosophical system, he once more asks: “How far is al Razi’s
Ash’arism in conformitywith the Qur‘an? How hr is al G h d i ’ s teaching in conformity with the Q~r’an?’’~~
These cases are concrete examples of his analysis
and show how Islamic tradition came to be regarded as a static and fixed body
of opinions, one which is considered as sacred as the Qur’an itself.
Rahman then applies the same method of critique to Sufism, using the
widespread Sufism of the seventh century AH as an example. Ibn al ‘Arabi(d.
638 AH) asserted that there was one and only one existence in reality - namely God - and regarded all else as illusion, shadow, or a ~ p e a r a n c eRahman,
.~~
while not rejecting or denying the spiritual refinements or the intellectual
sophisticationand originality shownby many great Sufis, asks: “Doesthis Sufism
with its pantheistic matrix bear any relationship either to the theology or to the
social message of the Qur’an; or indeed, to the conduct of the Prophet himself
and that of the early generations of
Within this context, he relates al Ghazdi’s life story and his spiritual and
intellectual development so that he can demonstrate how a man of al Ghazdi’s
caliber developed his personality and changed over time. Thus Rahman once
again points out the developmental character of the issue by asking if we want
to understand Islam from al G h d i , how do we go about it? For example: “Was
the teaching of theology and law the first phase? Was his second phase more or
less Islamic? How about his third phase?”60
Although al Ghazdi goes on to say that Sufism is undoubtedly the best path
when compared and contrasted with the others (i.e., the paths of the
mutukdimiin, the philosophers, the Isma’iliyah [al Bii[hGyah]), Rahman still
criticizes him for followinga path which is not Qur’anic. It is indeed only such
a path that has the true characteristic of Islamicity. Rahman thus agrees with
Ibn Thym-yah that al GhaziKisabsolutelycorrect when choosing the Sufipath, b r
it is absolutely correct that, from among these four paths, the path
of the Sufis is undoubtedly the best, and despite the fact that there
are extremist Sufigroups of all sortsespousing strangeviews and practices, on the whole, the Sufis are very pious people, God-fearing,
and genuine Muslims. But there is another path, a fifth path, and that
is the path of the Qur’an and the Prophet.61
”Rahman, “Islamization of Knowledge,” 8.
5 * ~ a nIslam
,
and Modernity, n,
Rahman, Islam, 145-8.
59Rahman,Islam and Modernity, Z-8.
6oRahman,“Islamization of Knowledge,” 9.
blIbid.
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
258
But Ibn Tap-yah also noted that al Ghazdi had not thought of this (fifth) path
at all. Therefore, when analyzing traditional Islam, all of these facts have to be
carefully considered so that a clear and truejustification of traditional Islam will
be possible.
Considering all the spheres of Islamic tradition discussed above, there is
only one remaining aspect: the sources of that tradition - the Qur’an and the
SUM&. It is clear that all of the above specific traditions sprang from these
sources as Muslims tried to understand them. Thereforethe intellectual efforts
of Muslims are the integral part of Islamic traditionas a whole. Indeed, it is this
aspect of Islamictraditionwhich Rahman suggestsshouldbecriticallyr e e d e d
using the perspectiveof our present-day situation. Such a proposal has significant consequences.
Conclusion
As we have seen, the conceptof Islamicity plays a major role in Rahman’s
understandug of tradition. It is therefore of great importanceto inquire into what
he means by this concept, for this will enable us to grasp and appreciatehis position with regard to the Islamic tradition as a whole.
It is evident from Rahman’s works, especially his Major Themes of the
Qurbzn,that he wants to base his views primarily on the Qur’an. As for the Sunnah, he is very cautious about using the u w t h . In fact, he considers history
books (i.e., siyar, maghiizi, @ b e t ) more reliable than the hadith literatureproper. 62 Moreover, he distinguishesthe “concept”of the Sunnah from its “content.”
If we call the former a “conceptual Sunnah”and the latter a “literal Sunnah,”then
for Rahman it is the =conceptualSunnah” which gives us universal normative
principles. A “literal Sumah,’’on the other hand, enables us to understand the
mtio Zegis behind the general principles, so to speak. Thus the “conceptualSunnah”is the one which is binding (it is normative), not the “literalSunnah.” Hence
”tradition”in his view is not a cumulative static and unchanging heritage from
our past, but rather a dynamic and ever-changing process which should be
directed according to the principles derived from the Qur‘an and the Sunnah.63
Only in this way can it qualify as an Islamic tradition.
In this context, therefore, it is importantfor Rahman to distinguishthe Zslamic
from the historic,which leads himto distinguishnormative Islam from historical
Islam. The former is temporal, whereas the latter can be properly called tradition. His criterion of true Islamicity is as follows: “A doctrine or an institution
62See, for example, Rahman, “Some Islamic Issues.
63Rahman,Islam and Modernity, 23.
641bid.,22-3.
. . ,” 287.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
259
is genuinely Islamic to the extentthat it flows h m the total teaching of the Qur’an
and the S ~ n n a h .If” ~this
~ conditionis not met, the doctrine is not truly Islamic
and thus belongs to Muslim tradition (provided that it is developed by Muslims).
If this criterion of true Islamicity were to be applied to the Islamic tradition as
a whole, we might be able to elicit its Islamic and un-Islamic components.
There now arisesacrucial question: Is Rahman rejecting the Islamic tradition as such? It is clear that he does not accept the unquestionable authority of
the past. 65 Hence tradition can be questioned. But, does being critical of tradition involve its rejection? We know that this is not true in Rahman’s case, for he
criticizesin order to demarcatethe tradition’sIslamicity from its historicalaspect
(i.e., its historicity which may be introduced from without) so that when he
reaches a new solution for a given contemporary problem, he can justifiably
claim that his new solution may be in conflict with the tradition’shistoricity but
not with its Islamicity. Therefore one should not say that Rahman is ignoring
or rejecting the tradition.
To him, it is impossibleto understandthe Qur’an in the absenceof tradition
and what tradition provides, for: “Althoughthe method I have advocated here
is new in form, nevertheless its elements are alltraditional. It is the biographers
of the Prophet, the Hadith collectors, the historians, and the Qur’an commentators who have preserved for us the general social-historicalbackground ofthe
Qur’an and the Prophet’s activity.”66Thus Rahman’s attitude towards tradition
does not involve a total annihilationof Islamic tradition: moreover, without that
tradition, Rahman claims that we would be unable to understand the very sources
of that tradition - the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
To sum up, Rahman’s method is both critical and dialectical, as he wants
to study in a critical manner both traditional Islam and how this tradition was
formed, i.e., the environmentin which the Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet
and its subsequent development, so that the un-Islamic elements in our tradition can be discerned and discarded. Such a method gives us the opportunity
to develop a more effectivehermeneuticalinterpretationof the Qur’an, one which
considers the Qur’an as a whole and in its proper context. Since, as Rahman
claims, “no systematic attempt has ever been made to understand the Qur’an in
the order in which it was revealed,”67he asserts that his method is original and
can be summarized as follows: The Qur’an must first be taken as unity or as a
whole on the one hand, and the Sunnah of the Prophet on the other. He then says
that “anyviable set of Islamic laws and institutionsmust be derived from a twofold
movement: First, one must move from the concrete case of treatments of the
Qur’an - taking the necessary and relevant social conditions of the time into
651bid., 143.
671bid.
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 9:2
260
account - to the gened principles upon which the entire teaching converges.
Second, fromthis generallevel there must be a movement back to specificlegislation, taking into account the necessary and relevant social conditions now obtaining.’’ In short, the process of interpretation proposed by Rahman consists
of a double movement, first from the present situationto Qur’anictimes and then
back to the present. 68 This can also be done over time, and new interpretations
might sometimesbe mailable. In other words, it is not necessary that a certain
interpretation, once accepted,be accepted forever;there is alwaysenough room,
and the necessity, for new interpretations. This also explains why Rahman claims
that tradition is not normative and hence not binding. Our interpretation of the
Qur’an is also open to criticism and rejection by subsequent generations of
Muslims.
Rahman’scritical method can be compared and contrasted with Habermas’s
critical theory, for there are many similaritiesbetween the two contemporary
thinkersdespitetheir very differentbackgroundsand different aims for employing
the critical method.
The role and functionof a critical theory, in brief, is precisely that of emancipating us from our present stageof false consciousnessby enlighteningus about
its causes. This process takes place, according to Habermas, in three stages:
1.
2.
3.
It makes us aware of the unconscious determinantsof our present consciousness.Mk come to see that our current legitimating
beliefs have not in fact been rationally acquired, and thus our
present desires and corresponding patterns of social behavior
are out of line with our real human interests.
Then, we rise to atrue understandingof our social situation and
attain an objective knowledge of the social world.
This objective knowledge is claimed to set us free.69
In other words, Habermas attempts to develop a critical theory of society
with practical intentions: the liberation of the human being, with the aid of an
analysis of modem society, from all forms of unnecessary domination. The resultant critical theory is to be directed at overcomingthe systematic distortionsof
thought, speech, and action inhibiting the self-understandingof those social
groups capable of bringing about an emancipatory transformationof sociallife. 70
bsFor details of this method, see hid., 1-11.
69R.Roderick, The Theory of Communicative Action,’’ Politicul Zhwry 14, no. 1 (February
1986): 152.
’ O Q . Skinner, “Habermas’s Reformulation,” The New York Review (10 July 1982): 37. See
also J a e n Habe-,
me Zheory of ComnzunicativeAction, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1984), W,Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utqia: A Study of the Foundation
of Critical Zheory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 3.
Ozdemir: The Concept of Islamic Tradition
261
Therefore, according to Habermas, the lifeworld must not be viewed as a
transcendental constitute but as one reproduced over time, which means that
its structures change dynamically and temporally. So a critical social theory,
in the Habermasian sense, not only diagnoses social crises but also evaluates
the present in light of its future emancipatorypotential, namely, “critical social
theory gives us the hope of a better future, provides the courage to live in the
present.”71What distinguishes Rahman from Habermas is that he uses reason
enhghtenedby revelation, whereas Habermas employs in his method the criticism
of reason by reason.72I have attempted here to point out by way of allusion a
palpable similarity between Rahman and Habermas. This point, however, needs
to be investigated more deeply in order to assess Rahman’s position as a Muslim
social scientist.
When we consider the general outline of Rahman’s Qur’anic insight, as
presented here, we seethat in orderto break the vicious circle of stultifymgtradition, a Muslim must make a clear distinction between “normative”Islam and
“historical”Islam, i.e., Islamic “tradition.”From this initial distinction follows
W a n ’ s dialectical and critical approach to Islamic tradition and his distinctive method for understanding and interpreting the Qur’an.73 By means of this
critical method, traditioncan be evaluatedand even changed, a possibility which
gives us the courage to overcome our current problems in light of the total
teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Considering the task Rahman assigns
to Muslims, we have a long way to go before we achieve that goal.
Ibrahim Ozdemir
Middle East Technical Univ.
Dept. of Philosophy
Ankara, Turkey
71Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia, 15.
72Habemasconfiies the first volume of his h o u s book The Theory of Communicative
Action to “Reason and the Rationalization of Society.”
73Seealso S. Parvez Manzoor, “Damning History But Saving the Text,”Inquiry (December
1989): 66.