Issue 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Joint Logistics
Innovations
Chinese Cruise Missile
Developments
2014 Essay
Competition Winners
Joint Force Quarterly
Founded in 1993 • Vol. 75, 4th Quarter 2014
http://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Publisher
AMB Wanda L. Nesbitt, Interim President, NDU
Editor in Chief
Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor
Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor
John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor
Joanna E. Seich
Photography Editor
Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Art Director
Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee
COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International
Security Affairs; Maj Gen Brian T. Bishop, USAF/Air War College;
LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College; BG Guy T. Cosentino, USA/National War College;
Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF/Air Command and Staff College;
Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Lt Gen David L.
Goldfein, USAF/The Joint Staff; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/
Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource
Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and
Staff College; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College;
RDML John W. Smith, Jr., USN/Joint Forces Staff College;
LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board
Richard K. Betts/Columbia University;
Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies;
Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University;
COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College;
Mark J. Conversino/Air War College;
Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University;
Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary
of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College;
Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College;
Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff;
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College;
Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University;
Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College;
James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense;
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Marine takes cover behind berm during
firefight in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, July 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/
Joseph Scanlan); Sailor performs maintenance on F/A-18F Super Hornet
aircraft assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 213 aboard aircraft carrier USS
George H.W. Bush (DOD/Brian Stephens); Airmen with 455th Expeditionary
Aircraft Maintenance Squadron work on C-130J Super Hercules engine at
Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force/Kayla Newman)
NEW from NDU Press
A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier:
Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions
By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan
China’s military modernization includes ambitious efforts to
develop antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter
intervention by outside powers. Highly accurate and lethal
antiship cruise missiles and land-attack cruise missiles carried by
a range of ground, naval, and air platforms are an integral part
of this counter-intervention strategy. This comprehensive study
combines technical and military analysis with an extensive array
of Chinese language sources to analyze the challenges Chinese
cruise missiles pose for the U.S. military in the Western Pacific.
“Cruise missiles are key weapons in China’s A2/AD arsenal,
providing a lethal precision-strike capability against naval ships
and land-based targets. The authors use hundreds of Chinese
language sources and expertise on cruise missile technology to
assess China’s progress in acquiring and developing advanced
antiship and land-attack cruise missiles and to consider how
the People’s Liberation Army might employ these weapons in
a conflict. Essential reading for those who want to understand
the challenges China’s military modernization poses to the
United States and its allies.”
—David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.),
Senior Military Scholar, Center for Character and Leadership
Development, U.S. Air Force Academy
“This volume is a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese military modernization.
Although China’s ballistic missile programs have garnered considerable attention, the authors remind
us that Beijing’s investment in cruise missiles may yield equally consequential results.”
—Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of
Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War College
“This book provides an excellent primer on the growing challenge of Chinese cruise missiles. It
shows how antiship and land-attack cruise missiles complicate U.S. efforts to counter China’s
expanding A2/AD capabilities and are becoming a global proliferation threat. The authors also
demonstrate just how much progress China has made in modernizing and upgrading its defense
industry, to the point of being able to develop and produce world-class offensive weapons systems
such as land-attack cruise missiles. This book belongs on the shelves of every serious observer of
China’s growing military prowess.”
—Richard A. Bitzinger, Coordinator, Military Transformations Program,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Available online at ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/force-multiplier.pdf
In this Issue
About the Cover
Soldiers of 92nd Engineer Battalion
stand guard during force protection
exercise at Forward Operating
Base Hadrian in Uruzgan Province,
Afghanistan, March 2013 (U.S.
Army)
Dialogue
2
From the Chairman
4
True and Steady,
Inspection Ready
By Bryan B. Battaglia
and Curtis L. Brownhill
Forum
6
Executive Summary
8
An Interview with
Raymond T. Odierno
13
Theater Airlift Modernization:
Options for Closing the Gap
84 Is Military Science “Scientific”?
By Robert C. Owen
91
19
The Afghanistan National
Railway: A Plan of Opportunity
By Lawrence J. Pleis, Richard
Lliteras, David A. Wood, Matthew D.
Bain, and Steven J. Hendrickson
28 The USCENTCOM Train: The
Deployment and Distribution
Operations Center Turns 10
By Mark A. Brown
Essay Competitions
32
2014 Winners
34 Deterrence with China: Avoiding
Nuclear Miscalculation
By David S. Forman
43 The Limits of Cyberspace
Deterrence
By Clorinda Trujillo
53 Opportunities in Understanding
China’s Approach to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
By Bradford John Davis
JPME Today
57
Cyber Security as a Field of
Military Education and Study
By Eneken Tikk-Ringas, Mika
Kerttunen, and Christopher Spirito
61
70
The Best Man for the Job?
Combatant Commanders and
the Politics of Jointness
By R. Russell Rumbaugh
Features
98 A Potent Vector: Assessing
Chinese Cruise Missile
Developments
By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S.
Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan
106 Blurred Lines: Cultural Support
Teams in Afghanistan
By Megan Katt
114 Determining Hostile
Intent in Cyberspace
By Ramberto A. Torruella, Jr.
122 Understanding the Enemy: The
Enduring Value of Technical
and Forensic Exploitation
By Thomas B. Smith and
Marc Tranchemontagne
Recall
129 Challenges in Coalition
Unconventional Warfare:
The Allied Campaign in
Yugoslavia, 1941–1945
By J. Darren Duke, Rex L. Phillips,
and Christopher J. Conover
Why Military Officers Should
Study Political Economy
Book Reviews
By Rebecca Patterson and Jodi Vittori
135 You Cannot Surge Trust
Low Cost, High Returns:
Getting More from
International Partnerships
By Russell S. Thacker and
Paul W. Lambert
Commentary
77
By Glenn Voelz
Asymmetry Is Strategy,
Strategy Is Asymmetry
By Lukas Milevski
Reviewed by Dov S. Zakheim
136 Engineers of Victory
Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald
137 Next-Generation
Homeland Security
Reviewed by Katie Kuhn
Joint Doctrine
139 Implementing Joint Operational
Access: From Concept to
Joint Force Development
By Jon T. Thomas
143 Dealing with Corruption: Hard
Lessons Learned in Afghanistan
By Richard J. Holdren, Stephen F.
Nowak, and Fred J. Klinkenberger, Jr.
148 Joint Doctrine Update
Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National
Defense University Press for the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship
joint military and security studies journal designed
to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces,
allies, and other partners on joint and integrated
operations; national security policy and strategy;
efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security;
and developments in training and joint professional
military education to transform America’s military and
security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges
better while protecting freedom today. All published
articles have been vetted through a peer-review
process and cleared by the Defense Office of
Prepublication and Security Review.
NDU Press is the National Defense University’s
cross-component, professional military and academic
publishing house.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed or implied within are those of the
contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Department of Defense or any other agency of
the Federal Government.
Submissions and Communications
JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent
research from members of the Armed Forces, security
policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic
specialists, and civilians from the United States and
abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to
JFQ1@ndu.edu, with “Attention A&R Editor” in the
subject line. Or write to:
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
NDU Press
260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504)
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319
Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325
Email: JFQ1@ndu.edu
JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm
4th Quarter, October 2014
ISSN 1070-0692
Chairman speaks with U.S. military officers before
ISAF and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan change of
command ceremony August 26, 2014, in Kabul,
during which Marine Corps General Joseph F.
Dunford, Jr., relinquished command to Army
General John F. Campbell (DOD/Sean K. Harp)
From the Chairman
Commitment to Service
epresenting America to the rest
of the world is something that we
all take great pride in. We know
what a privilege it is to represent our
country overseas. Of course, representing our nation is not an experience
entirely unique to the military.
I recently had the honor of presiding
over a dog tag exchange with our country’s best basketball players as they were
preparing for the 2014 International
Basketball Federation World Cup.
Servicemembers from across the joint
force presented a set of dog tags to
each member of Team USA. Sergeant
R
2
Dialogue / From the Chairman
Major Bryan Battaglia, USMC, presided
over a similar ceremony in June for the
national soccer team as it was departing
for Brazil. In both instances, the athletes
and Servicemembers were honored and
excited to be a part of the ceremony.
Dog tags are an iconic symbol of the
military and have been representative of
the sacrifices inherent in military service
since their debut on the battlefields of the
Civil War. For the men and women who
wear them, dog tags are a personal and
profound reminder of what it means to
represent the United States of America.
They are a symbol of courage and a
representation of the trust we share with
our teammates, our leaders, and the
Nation that supports us.
On the front of these particular dog
tags are the American flag and the words
“Leadership, Service, and Teamwork.”
While these are values we hold dearly
in the Profession of Arms, they are also
shared values that are important to all
Americans.
Service has always been fundamental
to being an American, and the greatness
of our nation stems from our collective
willingness to serve others. Across our
country, police officers, firefighters,
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
teachers, coaches, pastors, Scoutmasters,
business people, and many others serve
their communities every day. No matter
the uniform, the desire to contribute permeates every corner of the United States.
Exchanging these dog tags highlights
that common commitment to our country and its ideals.
Serving Together
Over the past decade, the American
people have provided unwavering
support to our military family. For that
strong support, I am extremely thankful. Looking ahead, we need to think
about how we will continue to connect
with America. The American people
appreciate what we do when we are
called on to fight in faraway places. Less
understood are the ways we continue to
serve in our communities when we take
off our uniforms—whether at the end
of the day or at the end of our careers.
These dog tag exchanges are the
first step in a Department of Defense
initiative to inspire an enduring commitment to service and to enrich local
communities across America through
the influence of the U.S. military and the
popularity of American sports. Through
this Commitment to Service, athletes
and members of the military will work
together—on panels, workshops, and
service projects—to make a difference in
our communities.
Commitment to Service tips off this
Veterans Day with service projects conducted in partnership with the National
Basketball Association. This initiative with
the NBA is one way we can help others
better understand the military and find innovative ways to address the needs of the
communities in which we live and work.
These efforts will showcase the pride
that all of us have in representing our
country, whether in athletic attire or a
military uniform. Servicemembers and
athletes will work side by side to serve
their communities and demonstrate the
value of not only military service, but also
service that aims to better our country
and contribute to the common good.
Sparking a Commitment
to Service
This is not a military appreciation
program focusing on what Americans
can do for Servicemembers. Rather,
Commitment to Service focuses on
what we can do with our fellow citizens
for America. It is a program of appreciation by the military for our great nation
and the communities that support us.
Through Commitment to Service we
can continue to serve others and help
foster a broader spirit of service across
the country.
Every day I am honored to put
on my uniform and represent the
Servicemembers who make up today’s
joint force. For the last 3 years, it has
been my privilege to tell the story of your
military service to the American people.
Often untold, however, is the story of
your commitment to our local communities and your willingness to continue
service, even out of uniform. Over the
course of the next year, I will be highlighting the contributions, beyond their
military service, that Servicemembers and
Veterans make to our communities. The
Commitment to Service initiative is one
way of showcasing those contributions.
I hope you will join me in this effort. JFQ
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
General, U.S. Army
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
New from
NDU Press
for the Center for Strategic Research
Strategic Forum 288
The Rising Terrorist Threat in
Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy
and Regional Threats
by Andre LeSage
In this paper,
Dr. Andre
LeSage
argues that
the growing
number
of militant
Islamist
attacks in
Tanzania
demonstrates a nascent terrorist
threat that can undermine peace
and stability in yet another East
African country. Local and regional
dynamics—including foreign fighter
returns from Somalia, disputes over
the Zanzibar Islands, and national
elections in 2015—could create a
“perfect storm” that would exacerbate the threat. If its issues remain
unaddressed, Tanzania is likely to
experience the same security trends
as Kenya, where, with the help of
external support, local capabilities
have been developed to conduct
increasingly deadly attacks that affect
U.S. and other foreign interests. In
response, the United States needs
to focus policy-level attention on
the situation in Tanzania and invest
additional intelligence, law enforcement, and strategic communications
efforts to combat the spread of violent extremism.
Visit the NDU Press Web site for
more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Dempsey 3
Retired Army 1st Sgt. William Staude of Elliott,
Pennsylvania, salutes Soldiers from 316th
Expeditionary Sustainment Command stationed in
Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, as they march past him
during Veterans Day parade in downtown Pittsburgh,
November 2011 (U.S. Army/Michael Sauret)
True and Steady, Inspection Ready
he global security environment
in which the U.S. Armed Forces
must operate, manage, and influence presents many challenges to our
all-volunteer force. Moreover, shifting
societal norms (domestic and abroad)
often compete directly and indirectly
with the professional norms that shift
over time. The effect of variances in
societal and professional norms can
and often does induce friction points
and challenges us to stay on the right
course, defined by the qualities of
honor, respect, duty, service, courage,
commitment, loyalty, and integrity,
as well as the virtues of decency, fairness, honesty, humility, integrity, and
valor through actions. The standards
T
4
required to sustain the Profession of
Arms must always be maintained.
The American people have always
understood that their external security
and their guarantees of inalienable rights
largely rest on the shoulders of the
U.S. military. Indeed, they support the
raising, funding, and sustainment of the
Armed Forces because without them,
our nation’s safety and security would
decline. Given the importance of the
Armed Forces, its special relationship
to the American people, and the notion
that the few protect the many, young men
and women from all walks of life are
encouraged to serve and contribute to
something larger, deeper, and more profound than one’s own self.
Dialogue / True and Steady, Inspection Ready
There is an enduring obligation on
the part of the members of the Profession
of Arms not only to keep the Nation safe
and secure, conduct and execute wellplanned military operations, and provide
responsible management of national
resources, but also to inspire others and
meet or exceed the expectations of the
American people. Every profession has, in
effect, a compact with the larger society.
Society grants the profession certain
powers, privileges, and prerogatives not
normally granted to others; in exchange,
the profession provides reliable and
longstanding service to society. More
particularly, members of the profession
are granted wide discretionary latitude in
performance of their specialized duties.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Given the nature of the Profession
of Arms, it embodies high standards
fostered through an unwavering dedication to duty, an ethical and moral high
ground, and a rigorous code of conduct.
In the purest sense, all members of our
profession, regardless of rank or status,
live a life ready for inspection.
Living in such a way begins in the
earliest part of the military career. Fresh
from society writ large, new recruits become exposed to a life different from any
other. Trained, tested, and developed,
only then are they afforded an official
membership into the profession. From
that point forward, irrespective of tenure,
true members of the profession instinctively conduct themselves in a manner
that exemplifies confidence, integrity,
obedience, and courage to all who view
them. It is an internal disciplining mechanism that triggers our ability to sidestep
unethical temptations and potential
points of corrosion.
Living a life ready for inspection requires strength in purpose and frequent
introspection. It means sharpness in duty
and squared away in conduct. It is not a
checklist approach to one’s professional
conduct or actions; rather, it is a behavioral compass that keeps a true azimuth.
Indeed, course corrections are within
each of us. So perhaps a good way to
portray the virtues of living a life ready
for inspection is to consider the oaths
of commissioning and enlistment; both
deliver the obligation to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies,
foreign and domestic. That obligation,
however, deserves a deeper consideration.
We understand that a threat to
national security often requires overseas deployment and engagement in
multiple postures, from combat to
partnership-building. However, there
are additional forms of threats to our
nation and the Profession of Arms that
each Servicemember is responsible for
deterring, dissuading, or defeating. For
instance, institutionally and individually,
we defend opportunity for all—to ensure
all have the same rights and no one is
institutionally held back from achieving
his or her goals and desires based on race,
creed, or religion. We fight to defeat
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
prejudice, and we defend human rights.
We do not condone unethical behavior
or less than honorable actions within our
ranks. We ensure command climates and
duty environments are free of intolerance
and are not overly permissive. We instill
a sense of unity, purpose, good order,
and discipline and compliance with standards, tradition, culture, customs, and
courtesies. We police our ranks and are
willing to undergo scrutiny when we fail
in the eyes of our teammates, our units,
our profession, and the society we serve.
Furthermore, when one’s service to the
Nation comes to a close, we give back to
society a stellar model citizen who understands that actions have cause and effect
and that living a life ready for inspection is
a foundation gained from military service.
As part of choosing to serve our
country, we unselfishly sacrifice many
of the comforts and luxuries normally
afforded to an average individual or
American family. Through varying lenses
and under constant evaluation, we execute our duties as the Nation’s defenders
and are prepared to hold accountable
those who are less than ready for inspection. In many regards we are role models
for our youth, warriors to our enemy, and
ambassadors of our country.
The quality of the reciprocal relationship between the military and the
American society it serves goes back to
the citizen soldier of the Revolutionary
War. Over the centuries and decades,
through conscription or through a
volunteer force, the Nation continues
to provide its sons and daughters the
opportunity to serve in this admired profession. For that, we owe it a life ready for
inspection. JFQ
New from
NDU Press
for the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs
China Strategic Perspectives 7
“Not an Idea We Have to Shun”:
Chinese Overseas Basing
Requirements in the 21st Century
by Christopher D. Yung and Ross
Rustici, with Scott Devary and
Jenny Lin
China’s
expanding
international
economic
interests
are likely
to generate
increasing
demands for
the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
to operate out of area to protect
Chinese citizens, investments, and
sea lines of communication. How
will the PLAN employ overseas
bases and facilities to support these
expanding operational requirements? In this study, main authors
Dr. Christopher D. Yung and
Ross Rustici’s assessment is based
on Chinese writings, comments
by Chinese military officers and
analysts, observations of PLAN
operational patterns, analysis of the
overseas military logistics models
other countries have employed, and
interviews with military logisticians.
BRYAN B. BATTAGLIA
Sergeant Major, U.S. Marine Corps
Senior Enlisted Advisor to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer
in the U.S. Armed Forces
CURTIS L. BROWNHILL
Chief Master Sergeant
U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Visit the NDU Press Web site for
more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
Battaglia and Brownhill
5
During rescue mission, HH-3E Jolly Green
helicopter code-named “Banana,” carrying
14 Green Berets, deliberately crash landed
inside walls of North Vietnam’s Son Tay POW
camp, November 20, 1970 (USAF)
Executive Summary
s we mark this 75th issue of Joint
Force Quarterly, I am reminded
of the wisdom I gained some
years ago when I was seeking to
become a teacher. My faculty mentor
at the time offered some advice as I
took up the task of teaching history. I
asked him, “Does history repeat itself?”
His response was useful but not easily
digested. “History does in fact repeat
but not in detail or on a schedule,” he
said. “We as teachers need to identify
both the similarities and differences
of events past and present in order to
have our students learn.” Recent events
that fit this model of the past repeating
itself, but not in detail, include rioting
in Missouri surrounding the violent
death of an African American teenager,
a failed special forces raid into Syria
A
6
Forum / Executive Summary
to rescue an American reporter held
hostage, airliners shot down by military forces, mass migration of people
seeking security in a foreign land,
deadly disease spreading in Africa, and
the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces
from an unpopular war—to name a few
in today’s headlines.
Despite all of the advances in medicine, technology, education, and political
systems, change has yet to completely
impact the one biological fact my mentor
gave me. The human brain remains as it
has been for over 50,000 years. What we
put into it makes the difference in how we
live our lives. Put another way, investing
time and energy into education is the
best means to affect any kind of change
in the human condition. The question
is what kind of education can move us
forward to reduce the cycle of violence,
both domestically and globally, that seems
to continually reappear. Many who read
this may not be old enough to remember the past events that mirror those of
today (Selma, Alabama; the Son Tay and
Desert One rescue missions; the downing
of Korean Airlines Flight 007 and the
Iranian Airbus; Vietnamese and Cuban
refugees; Ebola again), but careful study
can help us see what important work
remains unfinished and what new challenges lie ahead. Our readers are in luck
as JFQ continues to offer opportunities
to learn from the past to prepare for the
future with change for the better in mind.
The Forum opens with an interview
of U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
Raymond T. Odierno. Discussing a
range of topics from force drawdown to
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
modernization, General Odierno lays out
the future for the Army and its relationship to the joint force. Identifying critical
shortfalls ahead, Robert Owen then
provides a range of options to modernize
theater airlift, a critical capability as recent
operations have shown. One of the more
interesting and not well-known success
stories from Afghanistan is its railroad
system. Lawrence Pleis, Richard Lliteras,
David Wood, Matthew Bain, and Steven
Hendrickson, who were involved in its
construction, offer a fascinating look
into how it was built with international
assistance. Next, Mark Brown discusses
another type of train, a joint one, that
recently celebrated a birthday of sorts. He
discusses how U.S. Central Command’s
Deployment and Distribution Operations
Center has been delivering the mail and a
whole lot more for over a decade in support of U.S operations in that theater.
As we do each year, we next present
the winning essays from the 2014 8th
Annual Secretary of Defense and 33rd
Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Essay Competitions. This year’s
competition once again has yielded some
outstanding writing on timely topics. The
judges from across the joint professional
military education (JPME) community
all commended the students for their
critical thinking skills and writing talent.
In the winning Secretary of Defense
essay, Commander David Forman, USN,
discusses how to consider the future of
China’s military in terms of deterrence.
Lieutenant Colonel Clorinda Trujillo,
USAF, won in the Chairman’s strategic
research paper category with an insightful
discussion of deterrence in cyberspace. In
the Chairman’s strategic article category,
in which the author must develop and defend a thesis in only 1,500 words or less,
Lieutenant Colonel Bradford John Davis,
USA, offers some interesting ideas on the
issue of territorial claims to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands.
Our essay competitions this year
indicate that all things cyber are at the
top of the list of issues in international
security circles. Eneken Tikk-Ringas,
Mika Kerttunen, and Christopher Spirito
lead off our JPME Today section by
considering the value of studying cyber
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
security as an element of professional
military education. Of note, the recently
updated curriculum here at the National
Defense University is taking the authors’
advice with a number of lessons dedicated
to cyber issues having been added or enhanced from previous instruction. Other
PME institutions are doing so as well.
From the faculty of the world’s newest
JPME-qualified school, NDU’s College
of International Security Affairs, faculty
members Rebecca Patterson and Jodi
Vittori advocate adding political economy
to PME. From NDU’s International
Student Management Office, Russell
Thacker and Paul Lambert discuss how
to continue benefiting from relationships
with international officers long after they
have graduated from PME classrooms.
Surprisingly, their research shows that we
are not taking sufficient strides to do so.
Our Commentary section has three
distinct authors and ideas to consider.
Returning to the pages of JFQ, Lukas
Milevski develops an important discussion of asymmetry and strategy, which
may seem simple enough. If the last
decade or more of war has taught us,
however, nothing in the world of strategy is easily learned. Another important
argument comes from Glenn Voelz on
the concept of “military science.” Every
student of Carl von Clausewitz knows of
the tension that comes from the desire to
create order out of chaos, but in the end,
is it art or science, or both, that tips the
scale in military affairs? If you are a frequent reader of JFQ, you may have read
Admiral Samuel Locklear’s response to
my question about whether U.S. Pacific
Command would begin rotating among
the Services for its leadership. Russell
Rumbaugh provides us a full appreciation of the history and decisionmaking
involved in who has been selected to
command at the top of U.S. joint forces
around the world.
From China’s growing antiaccess/
area-denial capabilities to determining
hostile intent in cyberspace, the Features
section serves up some of the best of
today’s thinking and writing in these
areas and more. Adding to their recently
published NDU Press book on the subject, Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson,
and Jingdong Yuan describe important
developments in Chinese cruise missiles
to date. By detailing the experience
of dealing with cultural differences in
Afghanistan, Megan Katt adds to the
continuing discussion of how the joint
force deploys new kinds of teams to deal
with complex operations. Adding significantly to what is becoming the leading
collection of cyber related writing,
Ramberto Torruella, Jr., helps us understand the difficulty involved in finding
the responsible person or persons behind
a cyber attack. Lastly, Thomas Smith and
Marc Tranchemontagne show that the
military’s pursuit of terrorist organizations requires a dedicated effort to exploit
the traces left behind by these groups.
Our Recall article, by J. Darren Duke,
Rex Phillips, and Christopher Conover,
examines the highly successful United
Kingdom–U.S. joint unconventional
warfare campaign in Yugoslavia during
World War II.
As always we bring you three fine
book reviews to further assist your efforts
to find good works to add to your library.
Joint Doctrine offers two important
discussions aimed at shaping doctrine in
two important areas: the implementation
of the Joint Operational Access Concept
and how to effectively deal with corruption in those places where the joint force
employs. These important articles along
with the Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine
Update should lead to a good amount of
discussion on emerging areas that should
improve existing—and possibly make
new—doctrine.
Lastly, this issue marks retirement of
the last two remaining “plank holders”
of the original JFQ staff from the journal’s 1993 launch: Mr. Calvin B. Kelley
and Mr. Martin “Jimmy” Peters, Jr. We
who remain have learned a great deal
from these gentlemen who helped build
and sustain the Chairman’s Journal for
more than 20 years and 75 issues. We
wish them great happiness in their lives
ahead. JFQ
WILLIAM T. ELIASON
Editor in Chief
Eliason 7
U.S. Army Chief of Staff
An Interview with
Raymond T. Odierno
Joint Force Quarterly: After more than a
decade of combat around the world, what
can you tell us about the challenges facing
today’s Army?
General Raymond T. Odierno is the Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army. JFQ Editor in Chief Dr. William
T. Eliason interviewed General Odierno at the
Pentagon. NDU Press Internet Publications
Editor Ms. Joanna E. Seich transcribed the
taped interview.
8
Forum / Interview
General Raymond T. Odierno: We’re
starting from an incredible position of
strength because of the experience that
the Army has. This is the first time after a
long period of war that Army leaders are
staying in the Service; they’re not leaving
en masse to do other things. So we have
an incredible force, and I want to build
on that. We have a wealth of experiences
from junior to senior officers that we’ve
never had before, and we have to learn
how to exploit the experiences gained
in joint, multinational, interagency, and
intergovernmental environments, and I
think that’s key to the future.
I do see three major challenges for
the Army: First, as we sit here today, we
still have over 60,000 people deployed
around the world, so we have to make
sure that these Soldiers are prepared to
do the missions that we’re asking them to
do. Second, we have to figure out how to
keep these Soldiers prepared while, with
the fiscal realities of today, we’re in the
process of downsizing the Army. I need to
make sure that I balance that and I need to
make sure that I’m taking the Army down
in such a way in which we are still meeting
our operational commitments and requirements, taking care of our Soldiers, but also
taking a stand in order to meet the budget
pressures. Third, we have to ask ourselves
what we want the future Army to look
like. The world around us is changing
rapidly, and I tell everyone it might not
be the most dangerous time, but it’s the
most uncertain time that I’ve seen. And
we have to have an Army that is capable of
adapting to the new realities. We have to
have an Army that is looking forward and
implementing what we’ve learned in the
past but also looking forward to see what
we have to develop for the future.
JFQ: What are your priorities for meeting
those challenges?
General Odierno: As I look around
the world today, I ask how can the
Army contribute across the full range of
operations in order to prevent conflict,
shape the environment for the combatant
commanders to ensure access to build
partner capacity, and then, if necessary,
win. Maintaining a highly trained and
professional all-volunteer force is the
number one priority; moreover, we have
to develop leaders who can operate in
complex environments. I want to sustain
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
the advantages we have now, and I think
that we have an asymmetric advantage
both in our noncommissioned officers
and officers and in their ability to operate
in a joint, interagency, and multinational
environment. We have to continue to develop these Soldiers as we move forward.
We have to optimize performance; we
have to optimize our management of our
talent. To me, that’s number one by far.
We also have to be globally responsive
and regionally engaged. By globally responsive, I mean that in the future, we’re
going to have many more “no-notice”
small contingencies, and we have to be
responsive in such a way that we can tailor and scale our response to not only the
place we’re going, but also the mission.
When I talk about the need for decisive
landpower as part of the joint force, that
doesn’t necessarily mean decisive landpower to fight wars—that means decisive
landpower to build partner capacity, to
respond to humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, and to build interoperability and multinational capability. We look
to solve problems. Decisionmaking will
probably be much more decentralized
in the future, and we have to ensure that
our young men and women are prepared
for that. “Globally responsive” means responding quickly and understanding the
region in order to be responsible for it.
In fact, there are two recent examples where we’ve done this. The first is
the deployment of four companies to
Eastern Europe to assure our allies after
Russia’s recent actions in the Ukraine.
The second is the quick deployment of
an assessment force to Iraq—a majority
of that being the Special Operation Army
Conventional Capability. They are two
small examples of how I see the future.
We have to possess that capability and we
have to continue to build it as we move
forward. That’s what we’re doing regarding setting our priorities for the future.
JFQ: How do you propose to incorporate
lessons learned from combat in Iraq and
Afghanistan into the future force?
General Odierno: First, a strategic
response is going to be much more
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
decentralized and it’s going to be done at
a lower level. Also, it’s going to be done
in a smaller footprint, which is exactly how
we operated both in Iraq and Afghanistan
where we decentralized responsibilities to
lower levels of commands.
Second, we’ve learned that there will
never again be an operation that’s purely
a military operation. It’s going to be one
that’s conducted in a joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, multinational context. So we have to prepare ourselves to
operate in that environment.
Third, which is almost counterintuitive, since we’re going to have to operate
in this joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment, we
have to ensure that we are preparing our
headquarters to do that.
Last, our adversaries have learned
that they must do everything they can to
take away our technological advantages.
So we have to be capable of operating
in a diverse, hybrid environment that
will have a combination of conventional
capabilities, an environment of terrorist
activity [in counterterrorism], as well as
an environment of opportunists, insurgents, and criminal activity. No matter
where we operate, we are going to have
the potential for these environments.
JFQ: How is the Army dealing with the
fiscal constraints of recent years, and what
kind of planning have you requested should
the full impact of sequestration become a
reality? In particular, can you discuss the
likely effects on the total force?
General Odierno: We’re conducting
significant planning in these areas, and
our assumption right now is that the law
of the land is sequestration and that it’ll
be full sequestration. There will be several
impacts on the Army, but really on the
joint force. I’ll speak to the Army first.
We’ve done our planning in order to
do the things I’ve already mentioned.
But there are three things to balance. You
have to balance end strength, readiness,
and modernization. Because of the sharp
acts of sequestration, however, the next
4 to 5 years will not be in balance. So
upfront, because we have to take end
strength down over a 5-year period due
to the operational commitments that we
have, we are taking some risk in readiness
and modernization. That means we’re
out of balance and we might not obtain
appropriate readiness levels. We are delaying modernization, too, which might not
allow us to keep our edge in mobility, lethality, and survivability. That’s the short,
midterm problem.
Once we get rebalanced again, which
looks like the 2019, 2020, or 2021 timeframe, we have another problem, which
I’ve testified to. We’ll have a smaller
force. It’ll be ready and we’ll begin to
reintroduce modernization, but I think
we will be too small to meet the current
national security strategy. So we have to
readjust the goals we have in national
security because we will not be able to
meet the requirements we currently have
in leading and building security and stability in all the regions around the world.
That’s the longer term challenge.
JFQ: In recent talks, you have mentioned
your view that the Army needs to become
globally responsive. What ways do you
believe the Army needs to change to meet
that goal?
General Odierno: We have to think a
bit differently, and again I think it ties
to how we’re going to operate in the future. Over the last 12 or 13 years, we’ve
gotten very used to moving into areas
with mature infrastructures. For example,
we’ve built up Iraq and Afghanistan so
when we fall in, there are basecamps,
there is support that’s already set up,
there’s life support, equipment support,
and training support, which is what we
normally would do if we were somewhere
for a long period of time. But in the future, we’re going to be required to go in
quickly, and probably into remote areas
that have little infrastructure, so we have
to get back to understanding that when
we deploy somewhere, we have to be able
to sustain ourselves for fairly significant
periods of time organically.
We have to build packages that are
small, that meet the requirement, and that
can be moved very quickly—whether by
Odierno 9
Chief of Staff gives remarks during promotion ceremony at headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado (U.S. Army/Teddy Wade)
air or sea—and we have to be cognizant of
this early on. One of the things all Army
leaders have talked about is our ability to
build these small packages to respond.
There are several important things
along this line of thought that we have
to be able to do. Thus, as we talk about
being globally responsive, we have to
make sure we’re able to acquire and
maintain a level of information awareness,
even as we’re deploying. We have to have
robust command and control communications, but with small packages that
require us to have less support. We have
to increase mobility and survivability,
but in smaller packages. What the Army
brings to the joint force is a variety of
capabilities that no other Service brings:
We can send light, medium, or heavy
airborne capabilities, or we can mix the
three together. We can also provide task
forces from 200 troops to 50,000. We
can support ourselves, so we can build
packages that are uniquely organized to
meet a required need—whether it is for
10
Forum / Interview
humanitarian assistance or operations. We
have to build that capability and make
sure that we can do it in the right size,
get there with the right speed, and be
able to accomplish the right mission. I
believe the Army is the Service that can
do things at many speeds, many sizes, and
many different types of activities.
JFQ: A number of social issues have been
affecting all the Services, such as repeal of
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, integration of women into combat specialties
previously barred to them, sexual assault
and suicides, and senior officer misconduct, to name a few. What is the Army’s
approach to working these issues?
General Odierno: For the Army, it is
important to bring in the best, most
qualified talent that’s available, and it is
about talent management. To do that, we
have to make sure that we create an environment in which all Soldiers not only
believe they can increase their own personal capabilities, but also contribute to
the greater good and the team capabilities
we have. We have to create an environment where many different people with
many different beliefs can operate effectively and are not discriminated against
and can reach their full potential. That’s
the underpinning of everything we do.
We have been able to implement
the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”
frankly, with only very small issues—and
almost no issues at all. It is important that
we continue to integrate and make everybody feel comfortable.
Increased opportunities for women in
the Army is another priority. The Army
has more women than any other Service
in terms of numbers, and it’s important
they get all the opportunities they can
meet. We have to be able to ensure that
they feel comfortable in the environment we’re in, so we take sexual assault
seriously. It is our number one priority,
and we have made some good progress.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Number two is making sure if something
does happen, we have advocates who
allow victims to go through the process
and feel comfortable that people are
concerned about them. The third piece
is holding people—the predators who
are targeting women, and in some cases
men—accountable. Also, holding commanders accountable for creating the
right environment where people believe
they can [talk] openly. We’re working
aggressively at that.
All this comes under the Army profession, which gets to the other points
you were referring to in terms of senior
leader misconduct and other things. We
are the most respected profession, and it
is important that we sustain that. People
have a lot of trust and confidence in us,
so it is important that we sustain that
confidence.
But there are a couple things we’ve
learned that are necessary for us to
continue to build the profession. For
instance, we’re implementing programs
that do 360-degree assessments for all
commanders, and now we’re starting that
program when people first come into the
Service. It’s a self-development tool, but
it’s also an awareness tool for command
climate and how things are being done.
It also lets us know where we should
expand that particular program. We have
implemented a significant amount of
training in all of our professional military
schools that concentrate on the responsibilities that Soldiers have as leaders and
the ethical/moral requirements that we
expect of leaders. The foundation of
everything is trust: We talk about trust
between Soldiers, trust between Soldiers
and leaders, and then trust among
Soldiers, leaders, and the institution, and
finally trust between the institution and
the American public.
We also talk about three basic characteristics that we expect all our Soldiers
to have: competence, commitment, and
character. We expect our Soldiers to be
competent, which is building expertise
and constantly learning to improve
that expertise. We expect commitment:
commitment to your Soldiers, commitment to your unit, commitment to the
mission, commitment to the institution.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Most important is character. Character is
what defines us. Character is about understanding the moral and ethical values
that we represent, as well as the ethical
dilemmas that we face throughout our
careers. These dilemmas start out small
and it’s how we deal with them early on
that sets our character and how we deal
with difficult problems as we grow in
responsibility. We are focused on ensuring
that we emphasize competence, commitment, and character to the institution.
This is ingrained in every one of our
training programs. I recently attended a
symposium of Army leaders that talked
specifically about the profession and
ethics. We’re taking this discussion very
seriously as we move forward.
Finally, as we look at talent management, it is important to look where all
Soldiers can serve. We want to open up
positions based on standards, not based
on preconceived notions of sex—male
or female—or other biases we want to
eliminate. We want to make the Army a
standards-based organization, so we’ve
worked hard on developing standards
that we think are right for every MOS
[military occupational specialty]. This
is why we are doing significant work to
make sure we have underpinning information that will allow us to move forward
and open as many positions as possible to
women in the future.
JFQ: All the Services have programs for
helping their wounded warriors and their
families. As the Army has the largest population of recent combat veterans in and out
of uniform, can you discuss your program
called Soldiers for Life, as well as other
programs that make up how the Army is
working to help veterans?
General Odierno: There are two specific
programs that relate to this question.
One is the Soldier for Life program,
which I put into place 2½ years ago when
I became the Chief of Staff of the Army.
It’s important for Soldiers to understand
and believe that from the time they come
into the Army and for the rest of their
lives, we consider them to be Soldiers
who served honorably and who deserve
the care and attention necessary. This
covers not only wounded warriors, but
also Soldiers who have served honorably
and now decided to go into civilian life.
We will assist them as they move forward
in integrating back into civilian society.
Because we believe they are great people
to hire, we believe they can be great representatives of and contribute greatly to
society both locally and nationally.
The second piece is that we must
never forget what our Soldiers and
wounded warriors have sacrificed, including the families who have sacrificed lost
loved ones. One of my major concerns
today is that even though people do
understand the importance of providing
care—and we get lots of external support,
both private and public—we have to
ensure that this same care is available in 5,
10, or 15 years, especially to Soldiers who
have been wounded and families who
have lost loved ones. We have to make
sure that we recognize their sacrifices. So
we are building programs that will allow
us to do this.
The second program that is important is the Ready Resilient program,
which builds mental and physical abilities to become more resilient. As we
continue to ask our Soldiers to operate
in complex situations, we want them to
build resilience that enables them to deal
with difficult issues. It’s about not only
proving individual capabilities but also
reducing the risk of suicide and other
issues that we’ve faced.
The last program is one we are
working on with Veteran’s Affairs. As we
hand over our Soldiers from the Army to
Veteran’s Affairs, we want that process
to go as smoothly as possible—and we
still have a lot of work to do in that area.
Although we’ve made some progress, we
have not yet made the progress necessary
to have visibility as we move forward.
JFQ: What is the Army’s role within the
Joint Force 2020 and beyond? Specifically,
what role does jointness play in your efforts
to achieve that force?
General Odierno: As I think about all
the missions we have, whether we’re
Odierno 11
deterring conflict or building capability with our partners, we must have a
balanced joint force. We have to have a
capability in the Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Army that not only enables
us but also ensures that our adversaries
understand we have this capability that
can deter and compel them not to make
misjudgments or miscalculations that
could lead to conflict.
As mentioned earlier, the Army provides specific and unique capabilities that
no other Service can. For example, the
Army provides the majority of support to
the joint force and combatant commanders in terms of enablers. Whether it’s
[intelligence] support, engineer support,
logistics support, command and control
capability, we are the largest provider to
the joint force to include the combatant
commanders, and so I think that’s an
important mission.
I also believe in the notion of strategic
landpower. I often joke that we know
72 percent of the world is water, but I
always say 100 percent of the people live
on land. To create security and stability
requires the ability to interact with
individuals on land, and we do that in
several ways. The United States does it
diplomatically, but it also does it through
[military-to-military] relationships, and
the Army plays a significant role in this.
Understanding the human dimension
of conflict and the human domain and
how that impacts our ability to interact
and build relationships in every region
of the world is very important. This gets
to the point of regional forces and our
ability to align forces to combatant commanders that allows them to meet their
missions and to be an integral part of the
joint force. Doing so establishes what I
consider a global landpower network. It
is a small footprint, but it still allows us to
respond. This network can have Marine
capability, special operation forces capability, and Army capability. We are in the
process of establishing this network, and
the Army will continue to be an integral
part of the joint force.
We have to be careful that all the
Services do not focus on domain warfare,
which takes us away from jointness.
The Services are too worried about the
12
Forum / Interview
Soldier scans surrounding area for potential enemy movement during mission in Saberi district of
Khowst Province, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Justin A. Moeller)
land domain or the air domain or the
space domain or the cyber domain or
the sea domain. We cannot get focused
on individual domain warfare. We have
to stay integrated because every one of
those domains intersects at one time or
another, and it’s crucial to have the ability
to operate jointly when those domains
intersect. We have to stay focused on
that idea, but I am a bit worried that
we’re headed away from that. We have to
remind ourselves that we have to operate
together. For the Army, the intersection
of the land, sea, air, and cyber domains is
critical. An integrative approach to these
domains, to include the human domain,
proves a strength that no one else has. If
we do not take an integrative approach,
we are going to lose synergy. One of the
real advantages that we have is our ability
to do that—and we have to make sure we
stay focused on that.
JFQ: What has the experience of being Chief
of Staff meant to you, and what will you tell
your eventual successor about the job?
We have incredible Soldiers, and I
have the opportunity to see them and
what they do every single day. As we
awarded the Medal of Honor to Staff
Sergeant [Ryan] Pitts only yesterday, I
was reminded of not only the incredible
sacrifice, but also the capability and the
trust that these young men and women
have in the Army. It’s my responsibility
to ensure that we continue to build an
Army that comes forward at these levels.
The lesson I learned is that we represent
many different people; we represent our
Soldiers in the Active and Reserve components, as well as the National Guard.
We also represent our civilians, and it’s
incumbent on the Chief of Staff of the
Army to ensure that the Army continues
to prepare itself for the future while meeting current operational commitments.
The most important job that the Chief
has is to maintain continuity, and we have
to make sure that we move forward in a
consistent manner. Understanding that
the next Chief will have to make some
adjustments is a given, but we must stay
focused on where we want to take this
Army in the future. JFQ
General Odierno: Being the Chief of
Staff of the Army is the most humbling
experience I’ve ever had. I have the opportunity to help shape and ensure that
this institution keeps moving forward.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Halvorsen loader pulls away from C-130J Super
Hercules at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, where
Airmen from aerial port and airlift squadrons
support operations 24/7 at DOD’s busiest single
runway airfield (U.S. Air Force/Brian Wagner)
Theater Airlift Modernization
Options for Closing the Gap
By Robert C. Owen
merica’s renewed strategic
emphasis on state-on-state conflict highlights significant gaps
in the country’s theater airlift capabilities, particularly in the Asia-Pacific
region. Quantitatively, there likely will
not be enough airlift capacity available
to cover major conflict requirements.
Qualitatively, the current programof-record (POR) airlift fleet (what
A
Dr. Robert C. Owen is a Professor in the
Department of Aeronautical Science at EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
the Nation has and what it expects to
acquire) presents serious shortfalls in
the ability to maneuver land forces on
the scale, to the destinations, or in the
timeframes desired by Army planners.
Air commanders also have reason for
concern since the core aircraft of the
theater fleet, the C-17 and C-130, pose
capacity and operational risks in their
abilities to support high-volume combat
operations at forward bases when
threatened or damaged by attack.
Given these gaps between capabilities
and requirements, this article considers
two questions. First, it begins by asking
whether the POR airlift fleet will be adequate to the demands likely to be placed
on it. The discussion then turns to the
question of whether affordable opportunities exist to mitigate the gaps identified.
Requirements
Many organizations articulate versions
of airlift requirements based on subjective guesses about future scenarios.
Moreover, the details of the more
authoritative Department of Defense
(DOD) studies are classified. Therefore,
this article asserts only that the steady
reduction of airlift planning goals over
Owen 13
Thirty-sixth Airlift Squadron co-pilot flies C-130 Hercules during training mission as part of Readiness Week at Yokota Air Base, Japan, providing rapid
tactical airlift support throughout Pacific theater (U.S. Air Force/Raymond Geoffroy)
the past four decades makes shortages
practically certain. In 1981, for example,
defense planners accepted a fleet capacity of 66 million ton/miles per day
(MTMD) as a “fiscally responsible”
target, even though their planning
scenarios required as much as 124
MTMD.1 Ten years later, DOD reduced
its airlift capacity to 54.5 MTMD, which
conveniently matched the force structure actually on hand at the time.2 This
number raised high-level concerns over
the methodology of the study and the
adequacy of its findings.3 Most recently,
the DOD Mobility Capabilities and
Requirements Study 2016 tacitly lowered
the planning baseline to 30.7 MTMD
and declared that the C-130 fleet was
larger than needed.4 These findings and
the methodologies that produced them
drew immediate criticism from the Gov-
14
Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization
ernment Accountability Office.5 Thus,
if baseline airlift studies have a theme, it
is that their force structure goals reflect
budgetary concerns as much as they do
actual requirements.
As in the case of quantitative assessments of airlift shortfalls, qualitative
assessments must be parsed from a collection of formal requirements documents,
strategies, and Service visions. At the
highest level, President Barack Obama’s
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense calls
for the “ability to project power in areas
in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged.”6 The DOD Joint
Operational Access Concept expands on
this guideline, calling for forces capable
of “deploying and operating on multiple
. . . lines of operations,” “maneuver[ing]
directly against key operational objectives
from strategic distance,” and supporting
“forces that may be in multiple locations
with multiple objectives.”7 Joint forcible
entry operations doctrine calls for forces
to “seize and hold lodgments against
armed opposition . . . [making] the continuous landing of troops and materiel
possible and . . . [gaining] maneuver space
for subsequent operations.”8 Thus, the
weight of defense policy implies a need for
airlift forces able to support air and land
combat operations at almost any location
and in the face of substantive threats.
The mounted vertical maneuver
(MVM) vision further articulates the
Army’s maximal airlift requirements.
MVM has passed through several conceptual stages since the mid-1990s, but at its
heart calls for “the maneuver and vertical
insertion of medium weight armored
forces into areas in close proximity to their
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
battlefield objectives without the need
for fixed airports, airfields, or prepared
airheads.”9 To make the MVM vision
practical, proponents call for development
of a large vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) aircraft. As the MVM vision
has matured, the expected payloads of
these joint heavy lift (JHL) aircraft have
increased from 26- to 30-ton Stryker
or Future Combat System vehicles to
Bradley fighting vehicles up to 36 or more
tons in weight. MVM visionaries expect
that these aircraft will enable a revolutionary increase in the combat power and
survivability of air maneuvered forces.10
The Air Force has not developed a
conceptual equivalent to mounted vertical maneuver, but it probably should. In
the past, most Air Force airlift support
concepts have presumed that transport
aircraft would operate under the umbrella
of American air dominance to reach the
main bases used by the combat units they
supported. However, deeper thought
about the possibility of major conflicts in
the Asia-Pacific suggests that the United
States may not always enjoy unbroken
air dominance and invulnerable bases in
future conflicts and that potential foes
may plan to target American airlift forces
at the beginning of any future conflicts.11
There is a need, therefore, to articulate
expeditionary strategies that presume that
the Service’s airlift forces may be called
on to operate at bases that are damaged
or under current or imminent attack.
Land maneuver and air operations
at degraded airfields will demand high
throughputs from airlift forces at austere
or off-runway locations. Even in support
of JHL-based operations, fixed-wing
transports will be needed to move large
quantities of vehicles and supplies into
MVM bases or operating locations established deep in contested territories
or otherwise beyond land lines of communication. Given the vulnerabilities of
transport aircraft at forward bases, local
commanders may want to push their
operations out to unpaved areas of main
bases or even to remote fields. Such relocations would reduce the likelihood that
cargo aircraft could be destroyed during
their predictable ground movements or
at their parking areas. They also would
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
minimize the chance of collateral losses of
personnel and nearby aircraft in the event
of detonations of aircraft loaded with tons
of munitions or other hazardous cargo.
The Air Force POR Fleet
In terms of gross capacity, the program-of-record fleet is in good shape.
The Air Force fields about 213 C-17s
and 428 C-130s, which comprise its
core theater airlift capabilities. The Air
Mobility Command (AMC) manages
all of these aircraft logistically, but they
are assigned to AMC, geographic combatant commands, and the Air Reserve
Components (the Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard). Production
of C-17s has ended, but a program
to replace older C-130s with C-130Js
is under way. Conflict tested for the
past 20 years, this fleet remains the
only force capable of moving brigades,
divisions, wings, air forces, and their
sustainment anywhere on the planet.
Additionally, the Army and Marines
field hundreds of CH-47 and CH-53
battlefield airlift aircraft, while the Navy
and Marines also conduct airlift operations with about 50 C-130s of their
own.
Importantly, the capacity of the Air
Force’s theater transport fleet diminishes
quickly when it is called on to operate
in austere or degraded airfield environments. Under sea level atmospheric
conditions and depending on their
loaded weights, the maximum effort
takeoff distances of the C-130 range
from 1,700 to 3,200 feet.12 Under similar
conditions, C-17s need between 3,000
and 7,000 feet.13 Presuming that runways of suitable length are available, the
limiting operational factor becomes the
load-bearing strength of their surfaces.
A C-17, for example, will rut, gouge,
and render unusable runways rated at a
California bearing ratio of 10 (graded soil
and gravel) in just 30 passes (30 landings
and 30 takeoffs). Lighter C-130s could
make 1,500 passes on the same surface.14
Thus, in situations where airstrips or the
undamaged sections of main runways are
short, the most capacious aircraft in the
fleet will not be able to get in, while the
smaller aircraft could get in but would be
limited in their throughput. The impact
of runway strength becomes clearer when
one considers that a C-17 flying an unrefueled 2,800 nautical mile (nm) round
trip from the main U.S. airbase on Guam
in support of Army operations on the
Philippine island of Luzon could carry up
to 60 tons of cargo, while a C-130 would
deliver only 6 tons. Furthermore, C-130s
could not deliver any of the armored
combat vehicles or other outsize items
required by most maneuver brigades.15
The limitations of the C-17/C-130
team trouble proponents of MVM.
Illustrating the impact of these limitations, a 2008 Army study determined
that a C-5/C-17 fleet would in most
cases be obliged to set down MVM
units 50 kilometers (km) or more from
their objectives or points of need/effect
(PON/E).16 C-130s, once brought
into such a distant theater, could ease
the access problem, but they would
be incapable of delivering much of the
equipment required. These limitations,
therefore, render the MVM vision moot.
In summary, the POR airlift fleet
presents theater warfighters with three capabilities/requirements gaps. Historical
experience suggests that there always
will be shortfalls in capacity versus requirements. Also, the C-17/C-130
combination is capable but restricted in
its ability to deliver high tonnages and
mechanized ground units into degraded
or austere airfield environments. Last,
the fleet on the books has little to no
capability to satisfy the Army’s MVM
vision of conducting air assaults with
medium mechanized units near or at
their PON/Es. While this last gap does
not relate to a concept endorsed for
funding by DOD, it still has relevance to
airlift planners since the Army, historically the biggest user of airlift, favors it.
Options for Closing the Gaps
In broad terms, there are three
approaches to closing these theater
airlift gaps: buy more of the same
aircraft, buy off-the-shelf aircraft offering desired capabilities, or develop
completely new aircraft. Each of these
approaches offers its own mix of cost
and operational features as capability
Owen 15
gap fillers. Consequently, this brief
analysis focuses on three criteria for
assessing these gap-filler approaches: the
likelihood that a given option actually
will close some or all the gaps, lifecycle
costs, and general impact or opportunity costs on other mission areas.
Numerous studies have been done
on at least some elements of this issue. In
2007, DOD issued an initial capabilities
document (ICD) for a JHL aircraft with
either super-short takeoff and landing
(SSTOL) or VTOL capabilities. By
SSTOL, the ICD meant an aircraft able
to take off from an unprepared surface
and climb over a 50-foot obstacle in
1,000 feet or less. The concept aircraft
also was to be capable of carrying a
28-ton medium armored vehicle over a
250 nm mission radius to within either
25–50 km of desirable points of need (if
SSTOL capable) or less than 25 km (if
a VTOL design).17 Sensitive to its other
airlift support obligations, the Air Force
in 2010 eased the takeoff- obstacle-clearance distance requirement to 1,500 feet
to gain some trade space to increase the
notional aircraft’s mission radius to 1,000
nm and thereby improve its ability “to
satisfy a wide variety of airlift mission
requirements.”18 More recently, the
U.S. Transportation Command and Air
Mobility Command conducted studies
focused on satisfying mounted vertical
maneuver needs.19
The Air Mobility Command’s Joint
Future Theater Lift (JFTL) Technology
Study, released in February 2013, addressed gaps in the command’s ability
to operate into austere landing areas,
support the maneuver of medium-weight
armored vehicles, and transport mediumweight forces and their logistics over
strategic and operational distances directly to their PON/E.20 The technology
options it studied included the C-17s,
C-130s, and CH-47s of the “baseline
fleet,” a conventional takeoff and landing
(CTOL) turboprop-powered aircraft, a
CTOL turbofan-powered aircraft, a short
takeoff and landing (STOL)-capable
turboprop, a STOL turbofan-powered
aircraft of planform design, a VTOL
tiltrotor, and a VTOL hybrid airship.
In the end, AMC concluded that a new
heavy-lift tiltrotor would be the “most
operationally effective of all the options.”
New design STOL turboprops, planform
turbofans, and hybrid airships also offered
useful, but not maximal, operational
values in the scenarios examined.21 Given
the characteristics of those scenarios, the
JFTL found the turboprop CTOL option
as “high risk.”22
The JFTL also estimated the 30-year
lifecycle costs of a force of each aircraft
capable of carrying a medium-armored
brigade over strategic distances into
a theater, carrying a “primarily medium weight” brigade task force in a
forcible entry operation, moving a medium-weight battalion within a theater, and
supporting the logistics of these operations (see table).
Table. JFTL Technology Study Lifecycle Cost Estimates
Alternative
Number of Aircraft
Baseline
63 (C-130)
36 (C-17)
20 (CH-47)
Lifecycle Cost of Budget Year 2012 (in $ billions)
62.1
CTOL Turboprop
49
36.4
CTOL Turbofan
84
111.1
STOL Turboprop
93
110.7
STOL Turbofan
93
120.8
VTOL Tiltrotor
98
128.4
VTOL Hybrid Airship
92
84.3
Source: Air Mobility Command, Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final Report, February 20,
2013, 125.
Key: CTOL = conventional takeoff and landing; STOL = short takeoff and landing; VTOL = vertical
takeoff and landing.
16
Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization
Assessing the Options
We turn now to analysis of options for
closing the theater airlift gap. Option
1—buying more of the same aircraft
already in the POR fleet—likely will
be unattractive to theater and Service
planners. Most important, buying additional C-17s and C-130s will not close
any of the three airlift gaps. They might
make a contribution to the shortfall
in gross capacity, but they would have
little impact on the Air Force’s ability to
deliver high cargo volumes and outsize
vehicles into damaged and austere
airfields, and they would leave MVM
unsupported. In terms of opportunity
costs, acquisition of such aircraft could
make airlift capacity available to otherwise unserved users, but its $62.1 billion
price tag also would siphon funds away
from other programs. In addition, the
Air Force has stated that it has plenty of
C-17s and C-130s, so making a politically and financially compelling case for
more would be difficult.23
Option 2—acquiring an off-the-shelf
aircraft—is a more complex proposition
than expanding the existing fleet. The
only mid-sized airlifter on the market
that could address the Air Force’s airlift
gaps would be the Airbus A400M, an
aircraft similar to the turboprop CTOL
aircraft discussed in the JFTL. With a
maximum payload of 40.5 tons and the
ability to carry a Bradley fighting vehicle
for 2,400 nm, this aircraft could contribute to gross long-range lift capacity.
Moreover, the A400M has airfield length
and strength requirements close to those
of the C-130, giving it significant ability
to sustain high throughput into airfields
not suitable for the C-17.24 The A400M
also could deliver medium-weight armored units closer to their PON/E than
could a C-5/C-17 fleet. Thus, if the
Army and Air Force remain unable to attain DOD authorization and funding to
pursue a VTOL option, an off-the-shelf
turboprop CTOL could be an affordable
second approach to at least improving
joint aerial maneuver capabilities.
It is worth noting here that the
lifecycle costs of the medium CTOL
option likely would be lower than those
estimated in the JFTL. Those numbers
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Air Force C17 Globemaster takes off from old Israeli airstrip in Sinai Peninsula of Egypt to provide airlift support for Soldiers from Aviation Company,
1st Support Battalion, Task Force Sinai (U.S. Army/Thomas Duval)
were based on an unaugmented fleet of
49 CTOLs needed to meet the gross lift
requirements of its chosen scenarios.25
But in reality, the Air Force likely would
buy only enough new CTOL aircraft to
augment the existing C-130 fleet’s ability
to deploy and sustain forces into airfields
too short or soft for C-17s. For example,
C-130s would be capable of moving the
personnel, supplies, and about half of the
300 or so vehicles possessed by a mechanized infantry battalion. Consequently,
the Air Force would need to field only
enough new medium CTOL aircraft,
such as the A400M, to move the other,
heavier vehicles in the battalion. More
practically, however, the Air Force
might want to acquire enough medium
CTOLs to make such moves alone, since
they would greatly increase movement
velocities and the flow of sustainment in
forward airfields or at degraded air bases.
This brings the discussion to the
final option for addressing theater airlift
gaps—developing and acquiring a completely new aircraft. If DOD pursued
this costly option, the only reasonable
choice would be the VTOL tiltrotor. The
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
other options discussed in the JFTL are
unrealistic, and their merits in relation
to the theoretical capabilities of a new
tiltrotor and the real capabilities of, say,
the A400M would be too marginal to
justify their costs. Given its inherent
performance limitations, the tiltrotor
would make little or no contribution
to the general airlift shortfall over strategic distances. Over distances of a few
hundred miles, VTOL tiltrotors could
increase the flow of forces into austere
airfields because more of them could land
in a given area. But their ability to sustain
high throughputs at those locations, in
comparison to what fixed-wing transports could do, bears close examination.
Historically, rotary-wing aircraft have not
been able to generate the flight hours
over time or the ton-mile productivity
of fixed-wing transports. Of course, the
attraction of a heavy-lift VTOL would be
its maximal contribution to the aspirations of MVM advocates.
The assertion that tiltrotors would
be inherently unable to generate fixedwing-like throughputs bears some
expansion. Suffice it here to offer a simple
comparison of the current MV-22 tiltrotor and the C-130J fixed-wing transports.
An MV-22, with total engine power
of 12,300 horsepower, cruising at 240
knots with its maximum 8-ton payload,
produces 0.12 ton-miles of useful lift per
hour per engine horsepower available.26
A C-130J, with total power of 19,364
horsepower, cruising at 350 knots with a
less-than-maximum payload of 20 tons,
will produce 0.36 ton-miles per available
horsepower.27 This comparison is inexact,
but in its magnitude, it offers compelling
and relevant insights into the operational
offsets of VTOL capabilities.
Recommendations
In its examination of theater airlift gaps
and mitigation options, this article has
highlighted two broad conclusions.
First, gaps do exist in general longrange airlift capacity, the C-17/C-130
team’s ability to achieve high throughputs into austere landing areas, and the
POR fleet’s ability to satisfy the maximal
requirements of the MVM vision.
Second, there are numerous mitigation
options for these shortfalls. But as likely
Owen 17
as the gross lift shortfalls will be, they
are unlikely to spur additional spending
on airlift forces. The shortfall in austere
airfield capabilities, in contrast, should
trouble combatant commanders and
fortunately can be addressed through
modest investments in existing aircraft
designs. Addressing the MVM requirement, if it ever gains DOD funding
approval, will be both an expensive
undertaking and one with significant
implications for other mission areas.
The first step toward mitigating these
theater airlift gaps will be to settle the
MVM issue, at least for the moment.
Because MVM is the long pole in theater
airlift planning and has dominated recent
studies, combatant commanders need to
determine how badly they want it. The
estimated cost of $128 billion or more
represents a large commitment, particularly when the JFTL indicates that MVM
will shorten the closure time of a maneuvering battalion by only 21 hours in
comparison to current capabilities of the
POR fleet.28 Perhaps the time has come
for the Army to accept less “precise”
maneuver for its medium forces or to develop an MVM concept based on lighter
units that can be lifted by a modestly augmented POR fleet and helicopters.
The second step should be to
develop an affordable strategy for
enhancing the ability of combatant
commands to deploy ground forces to
austere locations and support combat
air operations from degraded airfields.
This is an immediate requirement affecting land force mobility and air combat
capabilities. If an appropriate fixedwing aircraft is chosen to mitigate this
requirement, acquiring it in appropriate
numbers probably will not break the
bank. Moreover, since such new planes
will be augmenting the existing fleet,
their costs can be offset by reducing buys
or deferring the service-life extensions of
other transports. The imperative, in any
case, is to begin taking concrete steps
to understand and address theater airlift
shortfalls in the very near future, rather
than let them worsen until they unhinge
future combat operations. JFQ
18
Forum / Theater Airlift Modernization
Notes
1
Duncan McNabb, “Point Paper, Subject:
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study
(CMMS),” Headquarters MAC/XPPB (Scott
Air Force Base, IL: Air Mobility Command
History Office, February 12, 1986); John Shea,
interview by Robert C. Owen, August 8, 1990,
tape 3A, index 409.
2
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
“Executive Summary,” Mobility Requirements
Study 2005 (MRS) (Washington, DC: OSD,
December 2000), 4.
3
“GAO: Military 30% Short of Airlift
Requirement for War,” Defense Week, December 18, 2000, 1; “Ryan: ‘We Will Never
Have Enough Lift’ for Two Regional Wars,”
Aerospace Daily, June 22, 2000, 1.
4
Carl Lude and Jean Mahan, “Executive
Summary,” Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (Washington, DC: OSD,
2010), 1–8; John A. Tirpak, “The Double Life
of Air Mobility,” Air Force Magazine (July
2010), 31.
5
U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), Defense Transportation: Additional
Information is Needed for DOD’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 to Fully
Address All of Its Study Objectives, GAO Report
11-82R (Washington, DC: GAO, December 8,
2010), 3–12 and throughout; GAO, Mobility
Capabilities: DOD’s Mobility Study Limitations
and Newly Issued Strategic Guidance Raise
Questions about Air Mobility Requirements,
GAO Report 12–510T (Washington, DC:
GAO, March 7, 2012), 9.
6
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 2012), 4.
7
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,
January 17, 2012), ii, 32.
8
Joint Publication 3-18, Joint Forcible
Entry Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint
Staff, November 27, 2012), I-1.
9
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army–Marine
Corps Concept, March 2012, 10. Emphasis
added.
10
Brigadier General Robin P. Swan and
Lieutenant Colonel Scott R. McMichael,
“Mounted Vertical Maneuver: A Giant Leap
Forward in Maneuver and Sustainment,” Army
(January–February 2007), 52–62. The Bradley
concept is based on discussions by the author
and Army proponents of the MVM concept.
11
OSD, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, Annual Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
2008), 17; and Roger Cliff et al., Entering the
Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and
Their Implications for the United States (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 60–62.
12
Lockheed Martin Corporation, “C-130J
Super Hercules: Whatever the Situation, We’ll
Be There,” 27–28, available at <http://cc130j.ca/wp-content/pdfs/Spec_Book.pdf>.
13
Boeing Corporation, “Backgrounder:
C-17 Globemaster III,” February 2014.
14
The California bearing ratio (CBR)
measures the resistance of unpaved surfaces
to compression and rutting. A CBR of 100
equates to a surface of crushed California
limestone, almost equivalent to pavement in its
strength. A CBR of 10 equates to one of wet
sand and soil, while anything less delineates wet
tilled soil or plain mud. For discussions of C-17
and C-130 effects on soft fields, see Air Force
Civil Engineer Support Agency, “Engineering
Technical Letter 97-9; Criteria and Guidance
for C-17 Contingency and Training Operations on Semi-Prepared Airfields,” November
25, 1997, 10; and Lockheed Martin, “C-130J
Super Hercules.”
15
Lockheed Martin, “C-130J Super Hercules,” 29.
16
U.S. Army Concepts Integration
Command, “Global Deployment Assessment:
Examining Deployment Considerations within
the Arc of Instability,” PowerPoint briefing,
July 7, 2008, slides 15–24.
17
Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
“Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Heavy
Lift (JHL),” October 12, 2007, 8, 22.
18
Air Force, Chief of Staff, “Initial Capabilities Document for Joint Future Theater Lift
(JFTL),” October 27, 2009, 5, 6, 9.
19
U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), Future Deployment and
Distribution Assessment: Mobility Lift Platforms,
Final Report, Volume 1 (Scott Air Force Base,
IL: USTRANSCOM, 2011); and Air Mobility
Command, Joint Future Theater Lift: Technology Study Final Report, February 20, 2013
(hereafter “AMC JFTL”).
20
AMC JFTL, 17–18, 31.
21
Ibid., 10–14, 125–126.
22
Ibid., 77–86.
23
Lude and Mahan, 6; and David Ignatius,
“No clipping these wings,” The Washington
Post, July 5, 2013, available at <http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2013-07-05/opinions/40390066_1_planes-c-130s-cuts>.
24
EADS North America, “Joint Future
Theater Lift (JFTL) Technology Study Capability RFI (C-RFI) Response,” December 22,
2012, 44.
25
AMC JFTL, 125.
26
All MV-22 data in this paragraph are
extracted from U.S. Marine Corps, V-22 Osprey
Guidebook 2011–2012 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2011), 5, 44, 59.
27
All C-130J data in this paragraph are extracted from Lockheed Martin, “C-130J Super
Hercules.”
28
AMC JFTL, 125.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
New train track 75 kilometers long between Afghanistan border and
Mazar-e-Sharif provides hundreds of jobs to local Afghans and means of
importing and exporting goods (DOD/Michael Reinsch)
The Afghanistan
National Railway
A Plan of Opportunity
By Lawrence J. Pleis, Richard Lliteras, David A. Wood,
Matthew D. Bain, and Steven J. Hendrickson
Steam railroading is important not because it represents some nostalgic
past that, in truth, never was. Steam railroading is important because it was
a human tool that radically transformed a continent, affecting everyone.
—WILLIAM L. (BILL) WITHUHN, CURATOR EMERITUS,
Smithsonian Institution
Colonel Lawrence J. Pleis, USMC (Ret.), is Chief of the Strategy and Policy Office (SPO) in the Directorate
of Logistics and Engineering at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). Colonel Richard Lliteras, USA
(Ret.), is Deputy Chief of SPO. Colonel David A. Wood, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Associate with Booz Allen
Hamilton. Major Matthew D. Bain, USMC, is a Logistics Strategist in the Directorate of Logistics and
Engineering at USCENTCOM. Mr. Steven J. Hendrickson is an Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
n support of the State Department’s
“New Silk Road” initiative, U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM)
formed a planning team of subject
matter experts spanning the Department
of Defense (DOD), the interagency
community, academia, and the U.S.
railroad industry to provide recommendations that advance the development
of a national railway system for the
Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA). The Afghanistan
National Railway Plan (ANRP) was
provided to the Afghanistan Railway
Authority (ARA) in August 2013.
The ANRP was developed on the basis
of Afghanistan’s urgent need for a national
transportation system as a precursor of
economic development and political stability. Expansion of the existing 75-kilometer
rail line could ultimately allow Afghanistan
to export minerals and agricultural products, significantly enhance its position as a
regional trading partner, improve domestic
commerce, and link products, consumers,
and markets across Eurasia and beyond.
I
Pleis et al. 19
Assessing the economic viability and
technical and financial feasibility of a
national railway system for Afghanistan,
as well as the regional connectivity imperatives, to develop recommendations
for large capital-investment infrastructure
projects was a nontraditional assignment
for USCENTCOM. The railroad expertise formerly resident in the U.S. Army
Reserve has been significantly reduced to
tactical-level repair, operations, and advisory capability. Notwithstanding these
planning challenges, USCENTCOM
partnered closely with the Task Force
for Business and Stability Operations,
U.S. Transportation Command’s Joint
Distribution Process Analysis Center, the
Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command’s Afghanistan Railway
Assessment Team, the Center for Joint
and Strategic Logistics at National
Defense University (NDU), and United
States Forces–Afghanistan to collectively
plan, model, assess, and validate the recommendations in the ANRP. Invaluable
to DOD planners was the voluntary
technical assistance provided over the
18-month planning process by the
Department of Transportation, Federal
Railroad Administration, Department of
State, and Treasury Department, as well
as the largely pro bono support from
rail, mining industry, and cultural experts
from Columbia University, George
Mason University, and Michigan State
University. While these organizations
formed the core planning team, several
other stakeholders, including other DOD
organizations, were critical to reviewing
and refining the ANRP.
The planning effort culminated in
February 2013 at a stakeholder review
workshop, co-hosted by the Near East
South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
at NDU and USCENTCOM, when 56
representatives from 24 organizations
conducted a detailed assessment of the
draft plan. Highlighting the workshop
was the participation of the Afghanistan
Railway Authority, established under
the Afghan government’s Ministry of
Public Works in September 2012, and
the Ministry of Mines. Guidance, discussion, and buy-in from these key Afghan
representatives were critical to reshaping
20
the preliminary ANRP into an actionable
plan reflecting the requirements and priorities most relevant for Afghanistan.
Why Rail?
Afghanistan is blessed with billions of
dollars’ worth of accessible mineral
wealth (primarily copper and iron ore)
but does not currently have a railway
capable of transporting high volumes
of these lucrative exports. Similarly, the
country relies on relatively inefficient
trucking routes for vital imports such
as wheat, cement, fertilizer, consumer
goods, and petroleum. The absence of a
railway system dampens trade and inhibits the landlocked nation’s economic
growth and trade with its neighbors
and global markets. A railway could
facilitate commercial exchange and
promote stability, serving as a regional
hub for Central and South Asia. The
potential for significant revenue enabled
by rail could aid in reducing poverty
and improving the standard of living
of the Afghan people. A railway is also
critical to the country’s security, with
select rail corridors supporting national
defense. The potential of these benefits
has drawn railway development support
from the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program,
South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation, and Afghanistan-Pakistan
Border Region Prosperity Initiative,
which was launched by the G-8.
Regional Support
Regional railway integration has drawn
support from Afghanistan’s neighbors,
including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and
regional trading partners such as India
and China. Long reliant on northern
routes to the Baltic Sea for access to
the global economy, the Central Asian
Republics are developing the potential
to transport goods through Afghanistan
to Indian Ocean ports at lower costs
and shorter distances. The economies of
Afghanistan and regional partners could
also benefit from trade borne by trains
traversing Afghanistan since its neighbors Pakistan (26 percent), India (26
percent), and Tajikistan (10 percent)
Forum / The Afghanistan National Railway
constitute the biggest export destinations. Rail transport is a key component
of the reemerging Silk Road, a comprehensive concept to expand trade, transit,
and supply route networks from the
Indian Ocean to the Ural Mountains. As
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yerzhan
Kazykhanov explained in 2012, regional
investment in Afghanistan will pay dividends: “We must look beyond 2014 and
help Afghans help themselves.”
The Business Case
Sustainable growth is the best way for
Afghanistan, a largely agrarian country,
to reduce dependence on foreign aid.
The country is eager to leverage its vast
iron ore and copper deposits, mines that
could generate a total of $78 billion in
corporate taxes and royalties by 2040.
Geological surveys also indicate the
country possesses exploitable reserves
of valuable elements such as lithium.
In Afghanistan, rail and mining development are integrally linked; mining
requires rail to transport ore efficiently
to market, and rail is reliant on revenue
generated by exporting ore. Competitive analysis indicates that current
low-cost global producers of iron ore,
including Brazil and Australia, are
able to extract, rail, and ship to Asian
markets for as little as $39 per metric
ton (2012 equivalent). To successfully
compete in the global iron ore market,
Afghanistan must approach this level
of efficiency. Delivering hundreds of
millions of metric tons of minerals to
market at competitive rates will require
expeditious rail routes linking mines
with seaports and Standard gauge
track able to support heavy-haul loads.
The ANRP forecasts 75 percent of the
country’s estimated rail freight traffic
between 2017 and 2040 will be mineral
transport. The rest of the traffic will represent shipments of agricultural products, raw materials, and finished goods
to and from the country, shipments that
will grow as Afghanistan’s society modernizes and accumulates wealth.
A Wealth of Minerals
Afghanistan’s mineral abundance,
widely dispersed throughout the
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
country, could ultimately exceed $1
trillion. The country has been known
since antiquity for gemstones such
as lapis lazuli and emeralds, but the
greatest potential for wealth generation
consists of bulk quantities of copper and
iron ore available close to the Earth’s
surface. Seven iron and copper mining
“areas of interest” would produce the
majority of the country’s export earnings: Haji Gak, Syadara, and Zarkashan
for iron and Aynak, Balkhab, DusarShaida, Kundulan, and Zarkashan for
copper. According to forecasts, mining
operations would yield about 58 million
metric tons of ore annually, almost all of
it requiring rail transport. Production
totals could approach 1.4 billion metric
tons between 2017 and 2040. Minerals
from Haji Gak, acclaimed as one of the
world’s largest iron reserves, account for
most of the anticipated freight demand
for a proposed southern line. Haji Gak’s
output is expected to be four times that
of all the other mining areas combined.
Afghanistan offers many advantages
as a source for minerals to supply the
teeming markets of fast-developing
South Asia.
Emerging Rail Routes
Economic feasibility, including the need
to negotiate Afghanistan’s challenging
terrain, dictates the location of proposed rail routes. The national railway
concept envisions a southern mineral
freight line of Standard gauge that
would approach Indian Ocean ports
in Iran and Pakistan. The prohibitive
cost of traversing the Hindu Kush, the
mountainous interior of Afghanistan,
suggests the southern rail line would
initially function largely independently
of the northern line. The northern
commercial freight line consisting of
the wider Russian gauge would link to
the existing 75-kilometer line in the city
of Mazar-e-Sharif and join a network
serving the Central Asian states. Major
Afghanistan commercial centers such as
Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-eSharif will serve as hubs of this transportation network. It is necessary to note
that medium-term CAREC program
priority projects through 2020 include
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
supporting Afghan railway goals for a
route from Tajikistan to Turkmenistan
through Afghanistan:
•
•
•
Turkmenistan: construction of
railway line Atamurat–Imamnazar–
Aqina (estimated cost of construction $200 million; implementation
period of the project 2012–2015)
Afghanistan: construction of railway
line Aqina–Andkhoy–Sheberghan–
Naibabad–Kholm–Kunduz–Sherkhan
Bandar (estimated cost of construction $525 million; implementation
period of the project 2012–2015)
Tajikistan: construction of railway
line Kolkhozabad–Dusti–Panji
Poyon–Afghanistan border (estimated cost of construction $90
million; implementation period of
the project 2012–2015).
These projects would link northern
Afghanistan rail lines, via Turkmenistan,
to the Caspian Sea, which would expand
Afghanistan’s commercial opportunities
to a new part of the world.
The Plan
The ANRP is underpinned by the
Commercial Market Feasibility Analysis
(business case), Terrain and Freight
Rail Corridor Feasibility Analysis
(technical and financial feasibility and
risk analysis), and Legal and Regulatory Framework (proper governance
and facilitation of economic viability).
The plan supports the achievement
of Afghanistan’s strategic priorities,
which are to enhance economic growth
and economic development, facilitate
regional cooperation and development, and better connect the people
of Afghanistan. The ANRP supports
these strategic priorities by providing
analysis and recommendations for four
sequential key decisions to effectively
expand Afghanistan’s existing railway
and identifies the critical path for timely
and integrated railway development,
operation, and sustainment to achieve
the best possible, most financially viable
national rail system over time.
The key decisions are to finalize the
primary and supporting railway purposes,
determine the preferred rail system design,
determine the most suitable railway
ownership model(s) and management
structure, and determine regional connectivity requirements. These four decisions
are foundational to ensuring successful
railway development and implementation.
Key Decision 1
Finalize the Primary and
Supporting Railway Purposes.
Afghanistan railway development will be
driven primarily by transport of iron ore
and, to a much lesser degree, by copper
cathode, merchandise, and transit traffic
transport. Cumulative mineral, merchandise, and transit traffic shows potential
for approximately 1.8 billion net metric
tons of freight available for railway transport between 2017 and 2040. Mining is
expected to generate approximately 76
percent of potential railway freight traffic
demand. Merchandise traffic, including
mine-driven imports required for mine
development and commercial imports
(grain, fertilizer, petroleum, cement,
machinery, and other equipment), is
expected to generate approximately 17
percent and transit traffic, 7 percent.
The greatest potential for wealth
generation consists of bulk quantities of
copper and iron ore. The best prospects
for near-term revenue generation center
on the seven mining areas of interest: Haji
Gak, Syadara, and Zarkashan for iron and
Aynak, Balkhab, Dusar-Shaida, Kundulan,
and Zarkashan for copper. Estimated net
tonnage of minerals from Afghanistan’s
mining areas of interest exceeds 58 million
metric tons per year, on par with some of
the largest freight operations in the world.
Output from the Haji Gak iron ore area
of interest is estimated to account for
80 percent of all mineral traffic and 60
percent of all freight traffic. To successfully
compete in the global iron ore market,
Afghanistan will need to approach the
level of efficiency achieved by low-cost
producers in Australia and Brazil at $39
per metric ton (2012 equivalent). If ore
is not moved competitively to market by
utilizing the shortest and most efficient
railway route to seaport, the railway will
lack the revenue to expand and sustain
itself. Enabling regional connectivity and
establishing a regional transportation
Pleis et al. 21
Figure 1. Recommended ANR Design
•
Prioritize and develop the Haji Gak
mining area of interest first.
Key Decision 2
Table 1. Recommended ANR Design: Financial and Risk Metrics
Total Cost
$42,135.40
Total Revenue
$68,726.20
Profit
$26,590.80
Cost Present Value
$19,533.60
Revenue Present Value
$18,135.40
Net Present Value†
($1,398.20)
Internal Rate of Return
8.7%
Operating Ratio
52.3%
Risk Score‡
Medium (9)
All dollar values based on 2012 US$ millions for 2017–2040
†Based on 10 percent discount rate
‡Risk score based on scale of 1–20, with 1 being low risk and 20 being extremely high risk
hub that facilitates trade, industry development, and commercial-based traffic,
and eventually passenger transit to better
connect the Afghan people, are important
supporting purposes of expansion of the
railway system.
Recommendations to GIRoA:
•
22
Finalize the primary and supporting
purposes of the national rail system.
The primary purpose is to enable
self-sustainability and economic inde-
•
Forum / The Afghanistan National Railway
pendence via mineral-based traffic
to provide regional connectivity and
serve as a regional transportation
hub, with supporting purposes of
trade facilitation, industry development, commercial-based traffic, and
eventually passenger transit to better
connect the Afghan people.
Support development of mining
areas of interest to meet transport
demand thresholds needed for profitable railway operations.
Determine the Preferred Rail System
Design. Economic feasibility, including
the need to negotiate Afghanistan’s
rugged terrain, inevitably dictates the
length and location of proposed railway
corridors. The Terrain and Freight Rail
Corridor Feasibility Analysis evaluated the
technical and financial feasibility of developing a national rail system. Employing
a three-phased approach, seven assumption-driven construction and operating
scenarios were examined to determine a
preferred design. Results of the analysis
indicate the cost to build rail lines over
steep mountainous terrain, which significantly increases the number of bridges
and tunnels, is approximately $9.3 million
per kilometer, compared to $1.9 million
per kilometer for flat and undulating
terrain. Therefore, constructing and operating a rail line traversing the Hindu Kush
in the immediate future is not cost effective. The recommended railway design
consists of two separate, purpose-built rail
lines with potential for future expansion
to unify the two lines and support emerging economic sectors at some time in the
future, as shown in figure 1.
The two lines consist of a southern, mineral freight–focused, Standard
gauge line, which primarily supports
transport of bulk mineral ore to seaports
in Pakistan and/or Iran for onward
shipment to global markets at the
lowest possible overall (rail and sealift)
transit cost; and a northern, commercial
freight–focused, Russian gauge line,
which expands the existing 75-kilometer line running between Hairatan and
Mazar-e-Sharif, connects the Central
Asian Republics and Iran via Afghanistan,
and supports the recent memorandum
of understanding for the establishment
of railway transport infrastructure linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Tajikistan.
The financial metrics and risk score
for the recommended national railway
design are included in table 1. These
financial metrics reflect railway operations
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Figure 2. Recommended ANR Design: Cumulative Cost,
Revenue, and Profit Projections
$80
$70
Cumulative Cost
Cumulative Revenue
Cumulative Profit
$60
$50
$40
Billions US$
$30
$20
$10
$-
Southern Line
Break-Even Point: 2024
$(10)
Northern Line
Break-Even Point: 2033
$(20)
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
exclusively and do not include the
positive financial impacts estimated for
potential mining operations.
The combined southern and northern
rail lines of the recommended national
railway design do not achieve a positive
net present value (NPV) and 10 percent
internal rate of return (IRR), though
the calculated operating ratio of 52.3
percent reflects a generally favorable revenue-to-operating cost ratio once rail lines
are operational.
To more fully analyze the two primary
rail lines comprising the national railway
design, the planning team considered
both the southern and northern lines
as independent railways. The southern
mineral freight–focused line generates
a positive $635.6 million NPV, an IRR
exceeding 10 percent, and an operating
ratio of 53.6 percent. The northern
commercial freight–focused line is less
economically viable with a negative $2.3
billion NPV, an IRR less than 10 percent,
and an operating ratio of 47.6 percent.
Table 2 presents the financial metrics
associated with the recommended railway
design of southern and northern lines.
Figure 2 reflects the cumulative cost,
revenue, and profit projections for the
recommended Afghanistan national
railway design over the designated railway
lifecycle, 2014 to 2040, and the southern
and northern line break-even points,
where cost is recovered by sufficient revenue generation.
The combination of the southern
and northern rail lines is projected to
reach the cost/revenue break-even
point in 2026. Viewed independently,
the southern line is projected to reach
its break-even point in 2024, and the
northern line is projected to reach this
point 9 years later in 2033. The impact
of these varying profitability profiles may
drive GIRoA to leverage the potential
revenue generation of the southern
mineral freight–focused railway to offset
construction and operations of the less
profitable northern railway.
Recommendation to GIRoA:
Develop and implement the preferred
Afghanistan national railway design, the
most financially feasible alternative with
an acceptable level of risk. It is further
Table 2. Southern and Northern Lines Financial Metric Comparison
Financial Metrics
Southern Line
Total Cost
Northern Line
$33,988.6
$8,563.6
Total Revenue
$56,147.2
$12,579.0
Profit
$22,158.6
$4,015.4
Cost Present Value
$14,473.1
$5,349.8
Revenue Present Value
$15,108.7
$3,026.7
$635.6
($2,323.1)
Net Present Value†
Internal Rate of Return
10.9%
3.8%
Operating Ratio
53.6%
47.6%
All dollar values based on 2012 US$ millions for 2017–2040
†Based on 10 percent discount rate
recommended that GIRoA consider
increasing the assumed mineral freight
rate from $0.030 to $0.033 per net ton
kilometer to potentially yield a positive NPV and IRR above 10 percent.
Additional analysis is required to determine an appropriate mineral revenue rate
once a railway operating plan has been
developed.
Key Decision 3
Determine the Most Suitable
Railway Ownership Model(s) and
Management Structure. The ARA is
responsible for developing and instituting
policies, laws, and regulations needed for
the safe, efficient, and reliable operation
of a national railway. Four general railway
ownership models and associated management structures were examined to
determine the most suitable ownership
model and associated management structure for the Afghanistan national railway:
•
Model 1: 100 Percent Public Ownership. The government owns railway
assets, including land and infrastructure, and operates and maintains the
Pleis et al. 23
Table 3. Strengths and Weaknesses of Railway Ownership Models
Model
Strengths
Weaknesses
•
•
•
Model 1:
100 Percent Public
Ownership
Model 2a:
100 Percent
Private Ownership,
General Purpose
•
•
•
Model 2b:
100 Percent
Private Ownership,
Purpose Built
•
Increased government control promotes achievement
of GIRoA defined-objectives and priorities (for example,
enhance economic growth and independence, facilitate
regional cooperation and development, and better connect
the people of Afghanistan)
Little or no GIRoA investment or subsidies required for
development and operations
Strong operator incentives exist to operate efficiently, invest,
and develop markets and could generate higher revenues
from taxes and royalties for GIRoA than public model
Little or no GIRoA investment or subsidies required for
development and operations
Strong operator incentives exist to operate efficiently, invest,
and develop specific markets and could generate higher
revenues from taxes and royalties for GIRoA than public
model
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Model 3:
Mixed PublicPrivate Ownership
•
•
•
•
Model 4:
Hybrid Ownership
•
•
24
Increased flexibility enables railway to be more adaptable to
changing political and economic environments
Able to provide solutions to unique railway ownership
challenges
Can support multiple rail purposes
Allows for GIRoA participation in development and/or
operation of specific rail lines, which may help sustain overall
railway financial feasibility
railway with government employees
or contractors.
Model 2: 100 Percent Private Ownership. A private, self-funded corporation owns, operates, and maintains
railway assets. Operating decisions
are based mainly on market demands
and profitability. Two subcategories
of this model exist:
•
•
•
•
Provides for railway competition between above rail
operators, which may foster more efficient operations
Distributes capital risk between the above and below rail
operators
Allows for integration of future passenger service,
particularly with GIRoA ownership of track
Model 2a: General purpose
(mixed freight)
Model 2b: Purpose-built (bulk
mineral freight from mines)
Model 3: Mixed Public-Private
Ownership. The government owns
“below rail” assets, including land
and infrastructure such as tracks,
while a private entity owns, operates,
and maintains “above rail” assets and
•
•
•
•
Significant capital expenditures require GIRoA funding
Public model does not facilitate concurrent generation of
mining and railway revenue
Large government-generated tax revenues are required for
Afghanistan railway development and operation
Lack of competition has historically fostered inefficient and
uncompetitive railway operations
May require GIRoA introduction of railway competition to
stimulate competitive transportation rates
Insufficient or inappropriate GIRoA control and oversight
could result in a rail line that does not correspond to
Afghanistan railway requirements
Single purpose operation could constrain future
Afghanistan railway expansion options
Lack of sufficient GIRoA oversight at a prescribed level could
result in a rail line that does not meet Afghanistan railway
requirements
Requires unique regulation of infrastructure and access
rates to satisfy both GIRoA and private stakeholders
Limited GIRoA control over rate setting could cause
insufficient return on investment for publicly funded
portions of the railway
Deferred GIRoA support of infrastructure maintenance and
planning could lead to unreliable rail operations for private
stakeholders
Inadequate management of responsibilities for funding,
development, and operation, and control of the railway could
increase the potential for capital risk, instability, and/or
insufficient return on investment
infrastructure, including locomotives,
rolling stock, and control systems.
Model 4: Hybrid Ownership. The
hybrid model contains elements of
the above models and accommodates
dynamic railway ownership requirements. This model could provide
the flexibility to focus government
participation on some, but not all,
rail lines.
The strengths and weakness of the four
railway ownership models are shown in
table 3.
Overall, the hybrid model is best
suited for GIRoA adoption initially. This
model best supports implementation of
a southern rail line primarily focused on
supporting mineral extractive industries
and a northern rail line primarily focused
on commercial transit traffic and regional
trade. Given the flexibility of the hybrid
Forum / The Afghanistan National Railway
ownership model, the model could
evolve and adapt to dynamic political
and economic situations, which may be
more suitable for Afghanistan. To support implementation, management, and
oversight of a hybrid ownership model, a
detailed management structure was also
developed for the ARA.
Recommendations to GIRoA:
•
•
•
Adopt a hybrid ownership model as
the initial national railway model.
Refine and implement the initial
hybrid ARA management structure.
Furthermore, this recommendation includes formally approving a
minimum 3-year operating budget.
Adopt relevant policies, laws, and
regulations to support safe, efficient,
reliable, and profitable railway operations within Afghanistan.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Key Decision 4
Determine Regional Connectivity
Requirements. A key driver of railway
profitability is the avoidance of costly
transloading operations due to track
gauge changes. Because Afghanistan
is surrounded by countries whose railways have three different track gauges,
regional rail connectivity is a major
challenge to operational efficiency.
Potential Afghanistan rail freight would
be required to traverse multiple Central
and South Asian countries with differing
track gauges including Standard (1435
millimeters [mm]), Russian (1520 mm),
and Indian Broad (1676 mm). Details are
shown in figure 3.
The gauge of new rail lines is best determined by the gauge of its connecting
lines. Since Iran uses Standard gauge and
the Central Asian Republics use Russian
gauge, selection of the preferred rail system design establishes a separated system
of a southern, mineral freight–focused
Standard gauge line linking to Iran and
Pakistan, and a northern, commercial
freight–focused, Russian gauge line linking to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan.
Iran is a primary destination for mineral exports traversing the southern line,
offering the most expeditious routing to
port, with Pakistan providing an alternate
route to mitigate the risk of only one outlet to port. Implementation of Standard
gauge for the southern line mitigates the
requirement for transloading operations
for freight en route to Iran. To address
potential requirements to export ore
through Pakistan, implementation of a
Standard gauge railway within Pakistan
or a dual gauge railway should be
considered.
Northern line operations are commercial, freight-focused, and depend
heavily on trade with the Central Asian
Republics, all of which operate Russian
gauge lines. Implementation of Russian
gauge leverages the existing rail line from
Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif and minimizes the requirement for transloading
operations and facilities, with the possible
exception of Herat. A transload facility
near Herat could support the transport of
commercial goods through Afghanistan
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Figure 3. Regional Track Gauges
Table 4. Evaluation of Risk Factors for National Rail System
Risk Category
Ranking (1: Greatest Impact
to Railway Success)
Scaled Risk Category Score
1
Medium
Political (Internal to Afghanistan)
2
Medium
Security
3
Medium
Operations
4
Medium
Development
5
Medium
Political (External to Afghanistan)
6
Medium
Legal and Regulatory
7
Medium
Investment and Funding
Overall Risk Score: Medium (9)
Low
1–5
High
11–15
to Iran, assuming Iran adopts Standard
gauge to connect with Herat.
Recommendations to GIRoA:
•
•
Implement Standard gauge for the
southern rail line.
Implement Russian gauge for the
northern rail line.
Risk Assessment
Though there is substantial support
for expansion of Afghanistan’s current,
Medium
6–10
Extremely High
16–20
single rail line, there are challenges in
developing and operating a national rail
system. The planning team evaluated
risk associated with the preferred design
scenario through a broad assessment
that weighed 37 risk factors organized
in 7 risk categories to account for these
challenges and the assumptions used for
planning (see table 4).
1. Investment and Funding. As
GIRoA does not have the required
resources to finance the construction of
Pleis et al. 25
New track from Uzbekistan border to just beyond Mazar-e-Sharif lets Afghan traders import and export goods (DOD/Michael Reinsch)
the national railway on its own, sufficient
financing is essential from both the international financial community and private
sector. To encourage investment by financiers, GIRoA must ensure that capital
and operating cost estimates for projects
are accurate; the appropriate laws, policies, and regulations are in place; and an
overall project manager is appointed to
plan and manage initial development.
Land grants could also serve as a means
to finance national railway construction.
2. Political (Internal to
Afghanistan). GIRoA instability following the drawdown of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization forces in 2014 could
halt the development of railway and
mining operations. National, regional,
and local governments are encouraged
to work collectively to ensure a sufficient
level of governance during and after foreign troop withdrawal.
3. Security. Insufficient security
measures could lead to theft, vandalism, and/or terrorist attacks on railway
26
and mining property, infrastructure,
equipment, and personnel, resulting in
schedule delays and loss of railway and
mining revenues. GIRoA should work
with regional and local governments and
tribes to develop and implement a security plan that encourages regional and
local governments and tribes to participate in, and support, security operations.
Local employment for security forces,
land grants, and revenue sharing could
be leveraged as incentives.
4. Operations. Due to a lack of
experience, industry experts must be recruited for the startup of operations and
to train local labor. GIRoA should also
consider sending some people to train
on neighboring railways and explore
opportunities in railway management
education offered at the university level.
Afghanistan rail operations must be
coordinated closely with neighboring
countries to ensure efficient interchange
of operations and traffic. Safety and operating standards for equipment, track,
Forum / The Afghanistan National Railway
and personnel must be developed and
promulgated to ensure safe, reliable, and
efficient operations.
5. Development. Failure to achieve
sufficient project management, acquire
and retain technical staff, receive building permits, maintain sufficient water
and energy delivery to mining sites, and
sustain an adequate labor force could
jeopardize expansion of Afghanistan’s
rail system. Professional project management and recruitment of the staff
needed for construction and for railway
and mining operations must be achieved
for these mutually reliant sectors. Land
use agreements, potential land grant
arrangements, and building permits must
be both properly negotiated and legally
binding to enable railway construction
to proceed. Customs arrangements with
neighboring countries must also be
expedited to ensure railway construction
materials and equipment as well as rolling
stock and control systems equipment can
be imported in a timely manner.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
6. Political (External to
Afghanistan). Afghanistan’s relations
with neighboring countries and their respective railways will have a major impact
on the success of the Afghanistan railway.
Relations with Iran and Pakistan are
crucial to efficient transport of iron ore to
port for onward sealift to South and East
Asian markets. Negotiations with those
countries and their railway programs are a
high priority and are essential to revenue
generation. Continued negotiations with
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan
are encouraged to determine procedures
for freight originating, terminating, and
transiting between the countries.
7. Legal and Regulatory. Afghanistan
will need a viable legal and regulatory
framework for both the railway and
mining sectors permitting and enforcing
property rights and the contractual agreements. The ARA will also need sufficient
resources and capabilities to develop
appropriate economic and safety regulations for the railway. Establishment and
enforcement of safety regulations should
enable a safe environment for railway personnel and communities near the railway
and encourage a more efficient railway,
resulting in fewer accidents.
Overall, the preferred national railway
design presents medium risk based on key
ANRP stakeholder input and is consistent
with other large-scale capital investment
projects in Afghanistan.
Recommendations to GIRoA:
•
•
•
Develop and implement a comprehensive railway risk management
process to identify and manage risk
throughout development and operation of the railway.
Assign the ARA chief executive
director as the risk management
functional lead and provide sufficient
resources to the ARA for execution
of risk management responsibilities.
Require formal approval of project
risk mitigation/avoidance plans prior
to project funding approval.
Implementation Strategy
The ANRP provides a framework
connecting Afghanistan’s outlying
cities, industrial sites, and commercial
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
interests with neighboring countries
and new markets. The implementation
strategy describes a macro-level plan
for the expansion of Afghanistan’s
existing rail line. The expanded railway
will help Afghanistan resume its historically important place in international
trade and figure prominently in the
region’s future stability and progress.
The overarching objectives of this
implementation strategy are to 1)
develop a combined rail-maritime logistics network capable of transporting
Afghanistan iron ore, copper, and other
minerals in a cost-efficient manner to
yield competitively priced exports in the
global market; 2) develop a multimodal
network to promote development of
industries and traffic identified in the
Commercial Market Feasibility Analysis;
and 3) develop the commercial, financial, and government structures needed
to promote the preceding objectives.
Appealing to Regional Investors
Private investment backed by firm commitments from the GIRoA is a critical
imperative for successful development
and operation of the railway. International donors have already taken the
initiative in Afghanistan’s transportation
revival, but much more assistance is
needed. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) is currently the lead donor
for advancing rail in Afghanistan. For
example, ADB covered 97 percent of
the $175 million cost of the Hairatan–
Mazar-e-Sharif rail line. ADB has also
funded a $2.86 million feasibility study
to expand the existing rail line from
Mazar-e-Sharif through Sheberghan
and Andkhoy to Aqina. The Indian
government has offered $1 billion to
help build a line from the Haji Gak
iron mining area of interest near Kabul.
Ownership would likely be mixed, with
GIRoA retaining the land and rail lines
and private entities largely controlling
locomotives and rolling stock. As he
contemplated myriad rail projects in
2012, Afghanistan Deputy Public Works
Minister Noor Gul Mangal emphasized
that further railway development could
be instrumental in ending Afghanistan’s
economic and geographical isolation:
“We would be able to import and
export to Russia, Turkey, and even
European countries.” That’s a good deal
for Afghanistan—and the world at large.
Conclusion
Joint DOD and interagency planning,
analysis, and collaboration, complemented by academic and private industry expertise, enabled development
and delivery of comprehensive recommendations to Afghanistan that can
facilitate sustainable revenue generation
and regional connectivity. While many
railway proposals have been provided to
GIRoA, the uniqueness of the ANRP is
twofold: the ANRP provides objective
recommendations principally focused on
best value for the Afghan people, and
the ANRP is underpinned by a business
case (the Commercial Market Feasibility
Analysis) reflecting revenue potential by
sector over a 25-year period.
Afghanistan and its neighbors face
numerous tough challenges to realize the
potential economic growth that could
potentially result from development of a
national railway system with regional connectivity. Interministerial competition,
lack of cooperation and transparency,
and rampant corruption must genuinely
be fixed before the key decisions in the
ANRP can be enacted. GIRoA must
develop a reinvestment strategy for the
revenue generated by a national rail
system that supports continued railway
expansion and funding for other national
priorities. And the people of Afghanistan
must tangibly benefit from a national rail
system to ensure long-term security and
economic success.
Time will tell how much of the ANRP
comes to fruition, but the collective
efforts of the ANRP stakeholders have
significant potential to improve conditions for the people of Afghanistan. JFQ
Pleis et al. 27
Mine-resistant, ambush protected vehicle
recovers pallet of supplies dropped from C-130
Hercules aircraft in Shay Joy District, Afghanistan
(U.S. Navy/Jon Rasmussen)
The USCENTCOM Train
The Deployment and Distribution
Operations Center Turns 10
By Mark A. Brown
n December 12, 2003, just
months after the U.S. invasion
of Iraq and on the cusp of transition to Operation Iraqi Freedom II,
General John Abizaid, USA, accepted
on behalf of U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM) an invitation that
would birth the first Deployment
and Distribution Operations Center
(DDOC). In an October 24, 2003,
memorandum, General John Handy,
USAF, commander of U.S. Transportation Command (USTR ANSCOM),
and General Paul Kern, commander of
Army Materiel Command, had offered
a “joint intermodal distribution team”
O
Colonel Mark A. Brown, USAF, is Chief of Current
Operations for the U.S. Central Command
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.
28
Forum / The USCENTCOM Train
led by a flag officer who “would have
visibility and synchronization authority
over all theater-level lift platforms.”1
With General Abizaid’s go-ahead, a
team of 42 USTR ANSCOM distribution experts began arriving at Camp
Arifjan in Kuwait to establish initial
operational capability and validate the
emerging DDOC concept during the
major muscle movements of the Iraqi
Freedom II transition.
Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld decided in September 2003
to transfer oversight of the entire
Department of Defense (DOD) distribution process to USTRANSCOM.2
With the title of DOD Distribution
Process Owner added to his list of responsibilities, General Handy decided
process changes would be appropriate
for oversight of movements, especially
those supporting the operation and the
active USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Furthermore, a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report
released in December 2003 revealed
inefficiencies in the logistics support
structure; these inefficiencies created a
$1.2 billion discrepancy between the
amount of materiel shipped to theater
and the amount received by the end user
and a “backlog of hundreds of pallets
and containers of materiel at various
distribution points due to transportation constraints and inadequate asset
visibility.”3 So on December 12, 2003,
General Abizaid accepted the offer for a
USTRANSCOM team of transportation
experts to establish themselves at Camp
Arifjan to eliminate “gaps and seams
between the Strategic and Theater movement end distribution systems.”4
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
But why a new organization? The theater Joint Movement Center (JMC) had
been formally defined in joint doctrine
and was performing functions similar to
those of the emerging DDOC. The GAO
report, USTRANSCOM’s new role,
and perceptions of theater airlift being
inefficiently tasked led Generals Handy
and Abizaid to conclude the theater JMC
needed to be replaced. The JMC did not
have a joint manning document with a
specified list of transportation skill sets
required; forming a JMC was more of a
pick-up game. USTRANSCOM wanted
to send its transportation experts into
theater to work the issues, and that is
exactly what that first-generation DDOC
was chartered to do. The USCENTCOM
DDOC (CDDOC) became fully mission
capable on January 20, 2004, and during
the brief transition, USCENTCOM/J4
assigned the theater-level JMC as a subordinate organization under the CDDOC
director.5 The theater-level JMC merged
into CDDOC on March 22, 2004.
The original concept, titled Joint
Intermodal Distribution Operations
Center, envisioned the new center
under the tactical control of a “theater commander, nested into existing
Theater Support Command.”6 However,
when actually deployed in early 2004,
CDDOC was assigned not to a theater
commander or any component but to
USCENTCOM headquarters under the
J4. That command relationship endures
to the present. It was important then
and now for CDDOC to make decisions
on allocation, mode determination, and
validation of movements from an area of
operations–wide, combatant command
perspective. Although CDDOC physically resides as a next-door neighbor to
U.S. Army Central headquarters at Camp
Arifjan, it is a tenant organization assigned to Headquarters USCENTCOM/
J4. An enduring operating principle at
CDDOC has been its charge to act independently from the service or functional
components. From the onset, CDDOC
has acted based on USCENTCOM priorities and direction.
At the 10-year mark, CDDOC has
matured and evolved from the initial
sketches of late 2003. CDDOC has
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
served USCENTCOM and the Defense
Transportation System (DTS) from the
Operation Iraqi Freedom II transition,
through the troop surges in both Iraq
and Afghanistan, through the withdrawal
from Iraq, and now into a full-thrust redeployment and retrograde as Operation
Enduring Freedom winds down. Manning
has varied in step with movement tempo,
from the initial cadre of 42 to a high of 85
while both operations were running full
throttle. CDDOC has proved its worth
over 10 years of refinement and proliferation across all the geographic combatant
commands, refining and evolving to
match the requirements of the current
operational environment, and must do so
again in the face of a redeployment and
retrograde of unprecedented proportions.
The present 2014 structure consists of 45
teammates largely from USTRANSCOM
and its components, as well as the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), headed by a
one-star flag officer. The scope of their
task at hand is daunting.
Current Mission
After 13 years of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, U.S. and allied
bases have proliferated, and some have
matured into well-established and
fully equipped hubs of activity, people,
and materiel. Before the Presidentially
directed deadline of December 31,
2014, CDDOC will oversee the redeployment of the bulk of the 47,000
troops currently in Afghanistan. The
actual number of troops to remain
in place is contingent on the Afghan
government signing a bilateral support
agreement authorizing a relatively small
and enduring U.S. military presence.
Since January 2012, CDDOC has
guided the redeploy movement of
87,000 military, civilian, and contractor
personnel from Afghanistan, roughly
the population of Des Moines, Iowa,
the Ohio State University, or a packed
Rose Bowl stadium. There is also the
equipment: tactical vehicles of every
variety as well as road graders, cranes,
and fuel tanker trucks; containers of
spare parts; and a miscellany of unit
gear. This mountain of equipment must
be transferred to the Afghan govern-
ment, transferred or sold to another
allied nation, or destroyed by DLA
Disposition Services. The remainder
enters the DTS to be retrograded back
to home bases in the United States or
military installations overseas.
This vast redeployment and retrograde task nests in a tangle of diplomatic,
geographic, and fiscal constraints, each
contributing to the complexity and requiring the careful attention of CDDOC
and its several strategic partners. For
example, in the diplomatic realm, some
neighboring countries in the Middle East
are sensitive to overt support to this U.S.
operation. In some cases, governments
find that American equipment publicly
and visibly transiting their corridors is
politically untenable. The DTS adopts
mitigating measures. Similarly, some
partner nations want to be careful not to
provoke retaliation by the Taliban if they
openly grant the United States access to
their transportation nodes and corridors.
Simple geography presents significant
constraints that compound the diplomatic factors. Afghanistan is, of course,
a land-locked country with some major
land routes traversing rugged terrain.
Access to seaports starts with lengthy
ground or air legs to position cargo for
onward movement by sea. High altitudes
in the north are susceptible to severe
winter weather.
On the home front, the U.S. electorate generally supports the withdrawal
from Afghanistan but demands efficiency
in the face of extraordinary fiscal constraints. That is why General Paul Selva,
commander of Air Mobility Command
(AMC), announced at the September
2013 Air Force Association symposium
that “we’ve documented now this
past year $400 million of essentially
cost avoidance” from choosing sealift
over airlift for transatlantic legs back
to the United States.7 When airlift out
of Afghanistan increased in mid-2013
after Afghanistan threatened to levy
ground transit fees, the New York Times
highlighted the impact on the overall
retrograde price tag: “Air shipments
are a far more expensive solution than
simply paying the fines demanded by the
Afghan government. If continued, the
Brown 29
air shipments could result in the withdrawal of forces reaching or exceeding
$7 billion, the upper end of [the DOD]
estimated cost.”8 CDDOC is charged
to execute the redeploy/retrograde
mission within reasonable costs. There
is generally no great urgency to the retrograde of equipment back to its home
station, and airlift, a scarce and costly
mode of transportation, must remain a
carefully allocated resource even if capacity consistently exceeds requirements.
That is a principle long codified in joint
doctrine9 and one of the business rules
that CDDOC has dealt with throughout
its 10-year history. In 2003, in fact, inefficiencies in airlift allocation were one
factor leading to establishment of the
first DDOC.
What Lies Ahead
Although CDDOC has operated
through the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and the withdrawal from Iraq,
the exact conditions and scope of the
present Afghanistan withdrawal are
unprecedented. A withdrawal is fundamentally different from a rotation;
nothing can remain behind. The United
States is well entrenched in several large
operating bases after 12 years of battling
the Taliban, and everything and everyone must be moved by one of several
processes. Redeployment returns military members, DOD civilians, and their
unit equipment to their home stations.
Retrograde moves theater-procured
equipment (equipment that was not
unit deployed) to its final destination.
A substantial remainder of U.S. equipment will be neither redeployed nor
retrograded. Through the Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Excess Personal
Property programs, the United States
transfers ownership of its unneeded
property to other nations.
Items not transferred, retrograded,
or redeployed are destroyed by DLA
Disposition Services. DLA’s process
ensures that items identified as excess
are destroyed to ensure nothing of any
tactical value to adversaries is left behind.
Brigadier General Francisco Espaillat,
USA, CDDOC director from August
2013 to January 2014, called DLA
30
Forum / The USCENTCOM Train
disposal capabilities “nothing short of
amazing in terms of capacity, scale and
scope. During the months of July, August
and September of 2013, almost 140
million pounds of materiel was turned
into scrap . . . a simply remarkable feat.”
Where feasible, DLA sells the scrap
locally, which generates revenue while
putting potentially useful (but nonlethal)
materials into Afghan hands.
The threat scenario also contributes
to define the nature of the CDDOC
task at hand since U.S. forces gradually become less militarily capable and
therefore more vulnerable as the withdrawal progresses. This dynamic is by
no means unique to Enduring Freedom;
withdrawing forces faced this set of risks
leaving Iraq as well. The power vacuum
inevitably created by U.S. and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
withdrawal from Afghanistan means there
is uncertainty about future allocations of
political power. Will the Taliban exploit
the exit, gain influence in Afghan politics, and exact retribution on Afghans
who collaborated with U.S. and NATO
forces? With December 31, 2014, clearly
defined as the end of the operation and
NATO operations, CDDOC’s primary
customer is faced with a dilemma: U.S.
warfighters in Afghanistan may continue
to face a viable, even resurgent, threat
from the adversary while CDDOC and its
partners on the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) staff are asking them to turn
in their tactical vehicles for redeployment.
Warfighting commands must make
complex decisions during this withdrawal
about the sequence, rate, and timing of
base closures; reduction in “boots on the
ground”; and turn-in of tactical equipment. These same commanders must
logically synchronize their equipment
redeployment and retrograde with the
corresponding personnel redeployments.
These actions must, in turn, be adjusted
to accommodate the changing operational environment.
Within this complex set of decisions
lies a classic scenario in which those who
lead logistics must be careful not to
constrain operational forces and unwittingly create vulnerabilities. There is an
inherent tension, accentuated during a
withdrawal, between the priorities of the
warfighter and those of the logistician.
The warfighter demands equipment and
supplies in abundance to bolster fighting
power against known threats and to hedge
against unknown ones. The logistician,
also executing USFOR-A orders like the
warfighter, demands a steady, scheduled
flow of personnel and equipment to be
made available for transportation out
of theater. This natural tension requires
constant communication between the
warfighter who wants to keep his soldiers
and equipment, and the logistician who
wants to transport them home.
The CDDOC staff is one major
point of intersection for these competing interests. More specifically, much
of this deconfliction and crucial communication happens in a compact set
of offices in the New Kabul Complex
in Afghanistan. There, liaison officers
(LNOs) to USFOR-A from CDDOC and
USTRANSCOM interface directly with
the USFOR-A commander and staff—the
warfighters. Successfully mapping out
details of this massive withdrawal hinges
on striking a proper balance between warfighter and logistician priorities, and the
LNOs serve both parties as brokers, negotiators, and channels of direct “hot mic”
communication. They communicate warfighter direction and priorities to CDDOC
and its partners, and CDDOC adapts and
shapes its processes in response.
Innovations
Within the last year, CDDOC has
created processes—“re-tooled the
plant”—to optimize the theater transportation system while remaining
responsive to warfighter requirements
and priorities. First, CDDOC has regularly deployed a small forward team
of transportation experts into Afghanistan known as the Advisory Team for
Expeditionary Air Mobility (A-Team).
A-Team plans its engagements based on
upcoming base closures and provides
deployed warfighters with on-scene
guidance and assistance in planning
their outbound movements. Though
fighting units at all echelons have
capable embedded logisticians, these
units are not necessarily prepared to
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
execute a comprehensive base closure
required during a withdrawal. The
A-Team contributes expertise for planning and executing the complete transition from a fully manned and equipped
forward operating base (FOB) engaging
the enemy to bare terrain revealing little
evidence of past warfighter presence.
A-Team members educate, initiate, and
collaborate with remote warfighters to
assist the theater’s transportation system
make that transition happen.
Second, CDDOC has adjusted its
movement processes in response to a
persistent and effective threat to U.S.
and NATO personnel: improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Truck convoys
manned by U.S. and NATO personnel
have proved highly vulnerable to IED
attacks, with adversary tactics constantly
evolving. As the IED threat persisted and
proved consistently lethal, the urgency
to get soldiers off the road increased.
CDDOC and its partners substantially
adjusted the ratio of air and ground
movements to lessen soldiers’ exposure
to the IED threat during convoy operations. Since planning for air movements
requires greater precision (such as in load
planning, pallet building, and identifying hazardous material), the A-Team’s
engagements at closing FOBs, while
educating users on airlift processes,
complemented the overall effort to
increase air movement and get soldiers
off the road. Lieutenant Colonel Breck
Woodard, USAF, who has led CDDOC’s
new Retrograde Division since August
2013, quantified the results of those first
engagements: “In the first 60 days of this
initiative, the [US]CENTCOM DDOC
enabled the closing of three major FOBs,
increased airlift velocity 400 percent,
supported the building and shipment of
over 14,771 air pallets, put over 7,386
twenty-foot equivalent units of cargo in
the air, and most importantly, eliminated
224 ground convoys which kept over
5,600 Soldiers out of harm’s way on the
most dangerous roads in the world.”
A third CDDOC innovation, affecting
a variable in the airlift velocity equation, is
the One-Touch concept. When planning
FOB closures, CDDOC looks for airlift-capable sites where intratheater airlift
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
can deliver FOB cargo directly to one of
the theater’s seaports instead of aggregating air cargo at an Afghanistan hub such
as Bagram. Where aircraft performance
factors permit, CDDOC plans C-130s
or C-17s to fly full planeloads directly to
a seaport where USTRANSCOM ships
provide cost-effective onward movement
to the United States. Overall velocity is
increased, and handling decreased, when
intermediate stops are eliminated. As redeployment tempo increases, One-Touch
mitigates cargo bottlenecks at the major
hubs by overflying those hubs and delivering directly to the multimodal ports.
A fourth initiative, Cascading FOBs,
turns those airlift-capable FOBs into aggregation points. Smaller FOBs without
fixed-wing airlift capability feed their
cargo into a nearby airlift-capable FOB.
Finally, CDDOC has assisted the J3
staff at USCENTCOM with developing
expanded options for further accelerating
movements in response to the warfighter’s needs.
As the redeployment and retrograde
operation began in the summer of
2013, then–Brigadier General Lee Levy,
the CDDOC director from January
to August 2013, commented that the
experience of overseeing this massive
redeployment and retrograde was like
“getting a doctorate in strategic transportation.”10 Earlier logistics leaders
such as General Handy and General
Kern had foreseen in 2003 the need for
an independent team of transportation
experts to guide USCENTCOM’s
movement processes. Their original Joint
Intermodal Distribution Operations
Center concept has matured into a network as DDOCs proliferated across all
the geographic combatant commands
(and one subunified command: United
States Forces Korea). It has also evolved.
CDDOC, out of operational necessity,
has modified its manning, organization,
and processes to fit the given conditions:
periods of steady-state sustainment
between surges and withdrawals. The
DDOC is defined and codified in joint
doctrine, having proved its worth as a
forward-deployed USCENTCOM/J4
team formed from USTRANSCOM and
DLA movement experts.
In the current season of retrograde
and redeployment, CDDOC has
modified movement processes to accommodate the warfighters of Operation
Enduring Freedom and address the
inherent and chronic tension between
warfighter and logistician priorities.
Lessons will be learned and processes
will be refined as the remaining withdrawal concludes at the end of the year.
But what does a post-2014 CDDOC
look like? CDDOC will likely downsize
significantly in 2015 and transition to
smaller-scale, steady-state operations.
Its structure, processes, and experts,
though, will stand by in reserve for
USCENTCOM’s next contingency. JFQ
Notes
1
General John P. Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command, official correspondence, December 12, 2003.
2
Department of Defense, “U.S. Transportation Command Appointed as Defense Distribution Process Owner,” press release 701-03,
September 25, 2003.
3
Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, GAO-04-305R (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003).
4
Abizaid.
5
Glenn G. Joerger, Deputy Director of
Operations, Headquarters U.S. Transportation
Command, telephone interview by author,
February 12, 2004.
6
General John W. Handy, USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, official
correspondence, October 24, 2003.
7
Brendan McGarry, “Air Force Shortens
Cargo Routes from Afghanistan,” Military.com,
September 24, 2013, available at <www.military.
com/daily-news/2013/09/24/air-force-shortens-cargo-routes-from-afghanistan.html>.
8
Matthew Rosenburg, “Rifts Over Fees
and Taliban Sour Afghanistan Exit,” The New
York Times, July 18, 2013, available at <www.
nytimes.com/2013/07/19/world/asia/riftsover-fees-and-taliban-sour-afghanistan-exit.
html?pagewanted=2&_r=0>.
9
The new edition of Joint Publication 3-17,
Air Mobility Operations (Washington, DC: The
Joint Staff, September 30, 2013), maintains this
principle. See I-13–I-14.
10
Video interview with Brigadier General
Lee Levy II, USAF, U.S. Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
director, March 20, 2013, available at <www.
dvidshub.net/video/285910/brig-gen-lee-levyii#.U9Ea5lbqxSZ>.
Brown 31
The NDU Foundation
Congratulates the Winners of the
2014 Essay Competitions
he NDU Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly essay
competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 15–16,
2014, during which 23 faculty judges from 15 participating professional military
education institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place
winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages.
T
Secretary of Defense National
Security Essay Competition
Third Place
Marie L. Sanders, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence
National War College
“Avoiding Thucydides’ Trap: China’s
Interests in Latin America and
Opportunities for the United States”
In 2014, the 8th annual competition was
intended to stimulate new approaches to
coordinated civilian and military action
from a broad spectrum of civilian and
military students. Essays were to address
U.S. Government structure, policies,
capabilities, resources, and/or practices
and to provide creative, feasible ideas
on how best to orchestrate the core
competencies of our national security
institution. The NDU Foundation
awarded the first place winner a
generous gift certificate from Amazon.
com.
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Strategic
Essay Competition
First Place
Commander David S. Forman, USN
National War College
“Deterrence with China: Avoiding
Nuclear Miscalculation”
Second Place
Mark Libby, U.S. Foreign Service
National War College
“Hedging, Cooperation, and Prestige:
British and French Nuclear Deterrence
(How We Can Stop Worrying & Learn
to Live with These Bombs)”
32
Essay Competitions / Introduction
Strategic Research Paper
First Place
Lieutenant Colonel Clorinda Trujillo,
USAF
Air War College
“The Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence”
Second Place
Lieutenant Colonel Nicole S. Jones,
USA
U.S. Army War College
“Adapting International Law for
Cyberspace”
Third Place
Major Matthew L. Tuzel, USAF
School of Advanced Warfighting
“Tactics, Technology, and the End of
America’s Precision Advantage”
Strategy Article
This annual competition, in its 33rd
year in 2014, challenges students at
the Nation’s joint professional military
education institutions to write research
papers or articles about significant
aspects of national security strategy to
stimulate strategic thinking, promote
well-written research, and contribute
to a broader security debate among
professionals. The first place winners
in each category received a generous
Amazon.com gift courtesy of the NDU
Foundation.
First Place
Lieutenant Colonel Bradford John
Davis, USA
U.S. Army War College
“Opportunities in Understanding
China’s Approach to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands”
Second Place
Lieutenant Douglas W. Gates, USN
Naval War College (Junior)
“U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Security
Cooperation: The Negative Secondary
Effects of the Pacific Pivot”
Third Place
Colonel Timothy D. Brown, USA
U.S. Army War College
“RAF Enhanced: A New Concept for
Whole-of-Government Solutions”
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Joint Force Quarterly Kiley Awards
Each year, judges select the most influential articles from the previous year’s four
issues of JFQ. Three outstanding articles were singled out for the Kiley Awards,
named in honor of Dr. Frederick Kiley, former director, NDU Press.
Best Forum Article
Lindsay L. Rodman, “Fostering
Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual
Assault”
Best Recall Article
Richard L. DiNardo, “The German
Military Mission to Romania,
1940–1941”
Best Features Article
Marc Koehler, “The Effects of 9/11 on
China’s Strategic Environment: Illusive
Gains and Tangible Setbacks”
Distinguished Judges
Twenty-three senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions
took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication
and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition.
NDU Foundation
The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit
501(c)(3) organization established
in 1982 to support and enhance the
mission and goals of the National
Defense University, America’s preeminent institution for military, civilian,
and diplomatic national security
education, research, outreach, and
strategic studies. The Foundation
promotes excellence and innovation in
education by nurturing high standards
of scholarship, leadership, and professionalism. It brings together dedicated
individuals, corporations, organizations, and groups that are committed
to advancing America’s national security and defense capabilities through
the National Defense University. The
Foundation provides NDU with privately funded resources for:
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Education, Research, Library,
and Teaching Activities
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Endowments, Honoraria, Seminars, and Conferences
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National Security and Homeland
Defense Outreach
Keep informed about NDU
Foundation activities by visiting online at: www.nduf.org.
Left to right: Dr. James A. Mowbray, Air War College; Dr. Joseph J. Collins, National War College;
Dr. Nichola E. Sarantakes, Naval War College; Dr. Douglas Hime, Naval War College; Dr. Stephen
Burgess, Air War College; Dr. Eric Shibuya, Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Dr. Ryan Wadle,
Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Dr. James Kiras, School
of Advanced Air and Space Studies; CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN, Eisenhower School; CAPT Bill
Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; COL Dale D. Fair, USA, Joint Forces Staff College; Dr.
Jim Chen, Information Resources Management College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Eisenhower
School; Dr. Richard J. Norton, Naval War College; Lt Col Michelle Ewy, Air Command and Staff College;
Dr. Mark Clodfelter, National War College; Ms. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Dr. Donna Connolly, Naval
War College
Not shown: Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief, Joint Force Quarterly; Dr. Geoffrey Gresh, College
of International Security Affairs; Dr. Antulia (Tony) Echevarria, U.S. Army War College; Dr. Carl Horn,
Information Resources Management College; Dr. James Lacey, Marine Corps War College; and Dr.
Harold R. Winton, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Photo by Katie Lewis, NDU
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
2014 Winners
33
Preamplifiers of National Ignition Facility are first
step in increasing energy of laser beams as they
make their way toward target chamber (Lawrence
Livermore Research Laboratory/Damien Jemison)
Deterrence with China
Avoiding Nuclear Miscalculation
By David S. Forman
The record reveals that defense planners have not been particularly successful in predicting the future.
The U.S. has suffered a significant strategic surprise once a decade since 1940: Pearl Harbor, the North
Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet H-bomb test, the Soviet reaction to the Arab-Israeli War
of 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union and, most recently, 9/11.
—MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS
Commander David S. Forman, USN, wrote this
essay while a student at the National War
College. It won the 2014 Secretary of Defense
National Security Essay Competition.
34
s China rises and the United
States seeks to maintain its
global dominance, the world is
faced with a new historical phenomenon: a dramatic shift in power between
A
Essay Competitions / Deterrence with China
two nuclear-capable nations. As the relative power of each nation nears parity,
tension is inevitable and the character
of the evolving Sino-U.S. relationship
poses a risk of nuclear miscalculation.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Nuclear use between China and the
United States would be a catastrophe,
but China is an independent actor, and
the United States can only influence,
but not control, the crossing of the
nuclear threshold. If U.S. policymakers
neglect this risk, miscalculation is more
likely.
This article analyzes nuclear deterrence principles with China across the
spectrum of peacetime, conventional
crisis or conflict, and nuclear war. If the
United States finds itself in a crisis or conflict with China, it would be important
to know how the United States achieved
deterrence in peacetime as well as how
deterrence might be regained if a crisis
deteriorates to the point of involving
nuclear weapons. The article then makes
recommendations on how to enhance
nuclear deterrence. By assessing the full
spectrum of potential conflict in this
manner, the United States can lower the
risk of miscalculation.
Nuclear weapons have helped prevent
conflict between world powers on anything close to the scale of another world
war,1 but nuclear deterrence toward
China is different. Pivotal factors that
allowed deterrence to be effective in the
past do not project to the future of the
Sino-U.S. relationship for two main reasons: the relative growth of China within
the relationship, and the fluid maritime
relationship between the United States
and China, which affects how a conflict
might begin and therefore how nuclear
deterrence could be implemented.
Though 20th-century China developed in a world largely influenced by the
United States, China is now in a position
to influence the world toward its own
interests.2 China’s growth from a considerably closed society in 1972 to a global
near-peer to the United States today is a
fundamental difference from the SovietU.S. relationship. The history of the
nuclear age has yet to see a significantly
weaker nuclear power eclipse a dominant
nuclear power.
The second factor that distinguishes
the Sino-U.S. relationship is its maritime
nature, and military tensions at sea differ greatly from tensions on land. Naval
assets are continually in motion, and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
there is no equivalent to trench warfare
or prolonged stalemates in the air or
on the sea. Also, as evidenced by North
Korea’s suspected sinking of the South
Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010,3 the
sea sometimes offers a sense of plausible
deniability that leads to aggression that
would not occur on land.
China’s nuclear arsenal is estimated
to be small in comparison to that of the
United States, but it is growing.4 Without
official reports from China, U.S. estimates are susceptible to large errors, but
analysts assess that China holds between
175 and 250 nuclear warheads.5 China
has demonstrated land and air launch
capabilities, and reliable submarine
launch capability is expected in 2014
or 2015.6 Some of China’s missiles are
already capable of reaching portions of
the United States, and fielding capable
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will
only improve their capability.
If conflict begins, China and the
United States do not currently have
the tools to ensure it does not become
nuclear.7 When policymakers consider
the art of nuclear deterrence, many still
default to Cold War principles.8 Blindly
assuming that two great powers, each
with expectations of influence and respect, can avoid conflict is unwise and
increases risks of miscalculation. Based
on the character of the Sino-U.S. relationship, nuclear deterrence cannot be
evaluated in a vacuum, but rather along
a continuum of peacetime, conventional
crisis or conflict, and nuclear war.
Deterrence during Peacetime
A nation’s primary goal for peacetime
deterrence should be to achieve its
political objectives without fighting a
nuclear war.9 Three basic elements help
codify peacetime deterrence. First is
a nation’s nuclear declaratory policy,
which lays the foundations of a nation’s
intentions and is a powerful political
tool. Second is the demonstrated performance of delivery systems and warheads, referred to as deterrent reliability.
Third is a measure of each nation’s
ability to achieve military objectives
using only its conventional capability
(without resorting to nuclear weapons),
or nonnuclear stability. When each
nation can manage these three elements
in the correct way, the cost-benefit
calculations of each side should favor
deterrence of a nuclear conflict.
Declaratory Policy. From Beijing’s
perspective, current U.S. nuclear declaratory policy suggests that if Washington
determined an “extreme circumstance”
existed, it might resort to using its
nuclear weapons to strike first. Because
China is not a nonnuclear country under
the terms of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the negative security assurance of
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review does
not apply to China.10 Though U.S. political leaders assess a first strike as next to
impossible, not all Chinese leaders hold
the same view.11
Deterrent Reliability. A credible
nuclear deterrent is the product of capability and intent.12 Intent derives from
declaratory policy as mentioned above,
and capability is sustained through demonstrated reliability of delivery systems
and warheads. The United States expends
considerable effort to ensure the reliability of each leg of its nuclear weapon
delivery triad, which consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and B-2 and B-52 bombers.
The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy fully
test the continuity of launch signals and
together launch five unarmed missiles
each year. The launch record is stellar,
and confidence in these delivery systems
is extremely high.13 Confidence in the
warheads is a different story.
The United States last detonated an
actual warhead in 1992. Time is incrementally eroding warhead reliability and,
in turn, U.S. nuclear credibility. The
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
was created in the mid-1990s to ensure
existing warheads were properly maintained, and from a scientific perspective,
this program is a success; however, as
noted by Dr. Kathleen Bailey from the
National Institute for Public Policy, “SSP
is not intended as, nor is it, a substitute
for nuclear testing. There is no way that
SSP can ever provide the high level of
confidence in reliability of the stockpile
that can be achieved by nuclear testing.”14
Forman
35
Despite rigorous nonnuclear testing of
the stockpile,15 quarterly testing reports
from the National Nuclear Security
Administration eventually may be insufficient to convince future adversaries,
China included, that U.S. warheads are
reliable.16 Detailed computer simulations provide American scientists with
confidence of continued reliability, but
the United States is not trying to deter
American scientists.17 After 21 years,
the question is rapidly becoming: do
other countries consider U.S. warheads
credible?
Nonnuclear Stability. When nuclearcapable nations are greatly outmatched
by an adversary’s nonnuclear capabilities,
leaders of the less capable nation are
forced to rely more heavily on their nuclear arsenals for security. Retired Russian
General Makhmut Gareyev, president
of the Academy of Military Sciences in
Moscow, stated in 2004, “Basically [our
nuclear arsenal] is the only factor which
can still ensure our country’s safety. We
have nothing else to repel strategic military threats anymore.”18 In response to a
perceived threat, if a nation’s leaders are
forced to choose between relinquishing
their own political power and authorizing a nuclear strike, then under some
circumstances, a nuclear strike becomes a
rational decision.
Five Policy Recommendations
First, the United States should maintain
its current nuclear declaratory policy
and not adopt an explicit “no first use”
policy; certain forms of strategic ambiguity discourage military adventurism
and can enhance nuclear stability. As a
deterrence specialist stated, the overall
concept of deterrence “takes place in
the head of an adversary who lives in
another country, has different values,
is under different pressures, and has
different goals.”19 Being too explicit
in declaratory policy removes political
options and reduces the strength of
deterrence.
Second, to maintain the reliability
of its nuclear arsenal, the United States
should seek international agreement
among current nuclear powers to test
nuclear warheads on a cyclic schedule.
36
Each nation would be permitted to
conduct infrequent underground tests
that could be observed by select nuclear
and nonnuclear countries. Though the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
procedure for peaceful tests was meant
to account for geological construction
projects, the precedent could be expanded because testing with international
consensus would not be provocative.20
Periodic international testing dates would
serve as natural vehicles to discuss nuclear
policies, and extended deterrence credibility could be strengthened. With no
testing ever, the success of the CTBT
could undermine nuclear deterrence and
threaten the very security it was designed
to protect.
Third, the United States must continue the uphill battle of maintaining the
demonstrated reliability of its nuclear
delivery triad. More specifically, the Air
Force has yet to determine plans for
replacing its long-range bombers21 and
has been plagued by injurious reports
that could undermine confidence in the
reliability of the ICBM launch teams.22
The Navy is under pressure to justify
the cost of its plans to replace its SSBN
fleet. After a recent 2-year delay in the
planned SSBN replacement program, any
further delays would cause shortages in
the 2030s of SSBNs for combatant commander requirements.23 The challenges
of designing, testing, certifying, and deploying a new submarine, combined with
the challenges of maintaining the oldest
Ohio-class submarines, already incur additional risk for the leg of the triad that
could carry up to 70 percent of U.S.
nuclear warheads.24
Additionally, if the United States were
to lose its current ICBM capability, either
deliberately or due to perpetual neglect,
the lack of a land-based deterrent would
allow China to focus solely on SSBNs to
prevent U.S. retaliatory attack capability.25 The likelihood of being able to
simultaneously disarm U.S. ICBMs and
SLBMs is so remote that China would
be wasteful to invest in trying; however,
if the United States reverts to a dyad of
delivery systems in SLBMs and aircraft
(aircraft cannot be readied quickly),
then investing in technology to mitigate
Essay Competitions / Deterrence with China
SLBMs becomes reasonable. This may
still sound like a wasteful investment, but
private enterprise is inadvertently allowing potential adversaries to close the gap
on U.S. undersea dominance. Google is
mapping and imaging the ocean floor in
high resolution,26 and research initiatives
are proliferating underwater hydrophones
that stream to the Internet.27
Fourth, although too much information about an adversary can tempt the
use of force,28 the United States must
seek a basic understanding of the essential
elements of Chinese nuclear doctrine
to lower the risk of miscalculation. The
United States can incentivize information-sharing by offering China economic
benefits. China’s recent economic growth
is not on auto pilot, and the success of
President Xi Jinping’s domestic agenda
is far from certain. As one example,
exchanging U.S. support for Chinese
membership in the developing TransPacific Partnership for basic Chinese
nuclear doctrinal information would be a
win-win for regional strategic security.29
Fifth, the United States must consider
how the development of a conventional
prompt global strike (CPGS) capability—the ability to conduct a conventional
strike anywhere in the world within 1
hour—would affect the nonnuclear balance with China. As part of a broader
desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy, the Obama
administration has continued to support
the Department of Defense’s pursuit of
a global strike capability that was mentioned in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review.30 The capability of CPGS may
prove advantageous in some scenarios,31
but those advantages do not come without a cost to nuclear deterrence stability
with China—a cost that could outweigh
the benefits.
Deterrence during Conventional
Crisis or Conflict
Despite overt attempts by the United
States to support the peaceful rise of
China’s military through cooperation
in events such as Rim of the Pacific
2014 and humanitarian assistance/
disaster response exercises, the United
States does not have the only vote
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Target assembly for National Ignition Facility’s first integrated ignition experiment is mounted in cryogenic target positioning system, while two triangleshaped arms form shroud around cold target to protect it before shot (Lawrence Livermore Research Laboratory)
when it comes to choosing peace or
conflict. There is evidence that the
Sino-U.S. relationship will be predominantly adversarial. Henry Kissinger
recently noted, “Enough material
exists in China’s quasi-official press
and research institutes to lend some
support to the theory that relations are
heading for confrontation rather than
cooperation.”32
China has rapidly modernized its
naval forces over the last decade,33 and
David Gompert’s research at RAND
provides evidence of why the Sino-U.S.
relationship is especially challenging. He
analyzed three historical cases of what
happened when developing sea powers
challenged existing sea powers: Germany
and the United Kingdom in 1914, Japan
and the United States in 1941, and the
long but steady ascent of the U.S. Navy
over the Royal Navy. The first two cases
ended in war, and the third “led to a
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
gradual and largely amicable transfer of
first regional and then global predominance from one navy to the other.” 34 But
importantly, Gompert quickly notes, “the
United States is not about to defer to
China in East Asia as Britain deferred to
America in the Western Hemisphere.”35
If the Sino-U.S. relationship develops
similarly to Gompert’s first two cases
studies, then history’s lessons do not
bode well for peace in the Pacific.
Assessing the Actual Threat. The
United States misjudged the precursors
of conflict in the past, and the same could
happen again. Dennis Ross, chief peace
negotiator for George H.W. Bush and
Bill Clinton, recounts how the United
States misjudged Iraq’s 1990 invasion
of Kuwait: “Few in the neighborhood
or in the administration foresaw the
possibility of Iraq actually seizing all of
Kuwait. Their assessments were guided
by the wrongheaded assumptions about
Saddam Hussein.”36 China analysts must
consider the consequences of similarly
wrongheaded assumptions. For example,
few analysts predicted China’s decision to
declare its November 2013 Air Defense
Identification Zone, yet its unilateral action sent shockwaves of concern through
the region.37
How Limited Can War Be? Several
of America’s previous limited wars were
fought against vastly weaker and nonnuclear powers. Yet China is not vastly
weaker than the United States, and the
United States would be unwise to assume
crisis or conflict with China would remain
limited. Carl von Clausewitz theorized
that war is a “paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and
enmity,”38 and conclusions extrapolated
from previous wars cannot completely
inform American policymakers in their
thinking about the possibility of conflict
with China.
Forman
37
Blue crew of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nevada prepares to moor as submarine returns home to Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following
strategic deterrent patrol (U.S. Navy/Ahron Arendes)
Many current discussions of the
likelihood of conventional confrontation leading to nuclear conflict are
not logically consistent. Writers often
simplify their analyses and presume the
use of nuclear weapons is so unlikely it
can simply be ignored. As an example,
defense policy advisor Michael Pillsbury
specifically depicts 16 Chinese fears, 6 of
which specifically apply to conventional
crisis or conflict scenarios: fear of an island
blockade, fear of aircraft carrier strikes,
fear of major airstrikes, fear of attacks on
strategic missile forces, fear of jamming or
precision strikes, and fear of attacks on antisatellite capabilities.39 Yet despite China’s
proximate fears, some analysts propose
strategies that directly stimulate those
fears while ignoring the nuclear threat.40
In the Journal of Strategic Studies,
Sean Mirski of Harvard Law School
explores how the United States might
implement a blockade strategy against
China but also admits, “The United
States will probably never have to consider implementing a blockade in the
context of an unlimited war because such
38
a conflict . . . could only arise subsequent
to a total breakdown in nuclear deterrence.”41 Additionally, T.X. Hammes of
the National Defense University promotes a distant blockade of China that
“establishes a set of concentric rings that
denies China the use of the sea inside the
first island chain, defends the sea and air
space of the first island chain, and dominates the air and maritime space outside
the island chain.”42
All these concepts fail to adequately
consider that China is a nuclear capable
nation with several hundred warships.
Even though not all of those warships
are extremely able or their crews proficient, analysts should not assume China
would allow the United States to starve
China’s economy with a blockade. A
blockade would threaten China’s regime
and easily cause it to resort to force,
and perhaps nuclear force. Precisely
because some analysts do not understand
China’s psychology and assess scenarios
devoid of nuclear risk, promoting these
strategies may increase the likelihood of
nuclear miscalculation.
Essay Competitions / Deterrence with China
Finally, the precedent of U.S. actions will determine the future validity of
extended nuclear deterrence, and if U.S.
commitment is rapidly eclipsed by desires
to de-escalate, other nations may find
renewed desire to both increase their own
conventional weapon capabilities and seek
their own nuclear arsenal. Nations such
as Japan and South Korea may decide
America’s extended deterrent guarantees
are unreliable and pursue nuclear weapons as security against nuclear attack.43
The United States must anticipate how
difficult it might be to pursue a limited
conflict due to the political pressures to
defend other nations in the region and
prevent nuclear proliferation.
The Crisis Before the Storm. A SinoU.S. confrontation would have global
consequences that could cause physical
and economic hardship for millions.44
Political and military leaders would
find themselves in crisis mode, and
understanding this mindset is critical to
sustaining nuclear deterrence during a
Sino-U.S. crisis or conflict. William Ury
and Richard Smoke, from Harvard and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Brown universities, respectively, analyze
nuclear crises and note, “Times of crisis
call for a special kind of negotiation.
There is no time for drawn-out discussion or the usual diplomatic dance, and
typically the negotiators are under considerable stress.”45
In conventional engagements with
modern powers such as China and the
United States, large quantities of airplanes, ships, submarines, and cyber and
space assets can rapidly come into play.
As Ury and Smoke make clear, “Decision
makers may fail to appreciate the value of
time in a crisis or potential crisis, thereby
unintentionally allowing the crisis to
grow worse.”46 If conflict begins, events
may transpire at a pace that challenges the
current national security decisionmaking
apparatus. If this occurs, the risk of miscalculation will increase.
Natural uncertainties inherent in any
conflict would be exacerbated because
the U.S. method of political and military
communication is so different from
China’s. For example, when a Chinese
F-8 aircraft collided with a U.S. Navy
EP-3 aircraft in April of 2001, the United
States struggled to get China to take
the collision seriously and questioned
if Beijing even knew the collision occurred. The Special Assistant to the U.S.
Ambassador to China recounted: “While
we in the Embassy were trying without
success to reach officials at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National
Defense, the U.S. Pacific Command
made the incident public in a brief,
neutrally worded press release posted
on its Web Site.”47 If a collision between
Chinese and U.S. aircraft was posted on a
Web site before any official diplomatic or
military communication was established,
a similar uncertainty should be expected
in the future.
Three Policy Recommendations
First, America’s political leaders and
policymakers must aim to better understand the structure of China’s nuclear
forces and its military decisionmaking
process.48 The United States must
ensure a well-intentioned plan or
military action does not inadvertently
appear as a preemptive strike on China’s
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
nuclear forces.49 Years ago, when China
needed to develop its command and
control organization for its nuclear
forces, China’s Second Artillery Corps,
also known as Strategic Rocket Forces,
were deemed highly capable and given
the task. As a result, nuclear and nonnuclear forces are physically collocated
and share the same command and
control structure. John Lewis and Xue
Litai, writing in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, describe a plausible
scenario: China launches a conventional
missile in a crisis or conflict, and the
United States counterstrikes against
Chinese collocated conventional and
nuclear systems and “force[s] the much
smaller surviving and highly vulnerable
Chinese nuclear missile units to fire
their remaining missiles.”50 Resolving
incongruous Sino-U.S. perceptions
about the employment of the Second
Artillery Corps is possibly the single
most influential aspect of avoiding
nuclear miscalculation.
Second, a reliable second-strike
capability is a predominant factor for
dissuading first strikes, and therefore the
United States should take care to avoid
explicitly targeting—and the appearance
of targeting—China’s developing SSBN
capability. The U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission recently
stated, “The JL-2 [Julang-2], when
mated with the [People’s Liberation
Army] Navy’s JIN-class nuclear ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN), will give
China its first credible sea-based nuclear
deterrent.”51 If China can achieve reliable
second-strike capability through deployment of its SSBNs, it may be ready to
divide its conventional and nuclear forces
to achieve a greater margin from nuclear
miscalculation.
Third, the potential for conventional
crisis or conflict with nuclear-capable
powers requires matching military means
to political ends in a fundamentally
different way. The United States must
consider not approaching a Sino-U.S.
engagement with expectations to establish large areas of military dominance.
Dominance requires flawlessly attacking
Chinese antiaircraft missile sites and command and control nodes that also serve
China’s nuclear forces. Flawless military
plans are fiction, and based on what the
United States knows of China’s Second
Artillery Corps, the dangers of trying and
failing could result in tactical victory but
ultimate strategic defeat.52 To prevent a
potential Sino-U.S. conventional conflict
from becoming nuclear, the United
States should aim to keep the engagement zone away from mainland China.
American political and military leaders
must be prepared for heavy losses of
personnel and military ships and aircraft,
and while unnecessary loss is abhorrent,
aiming for a blinding victory risks nuclear
retaliation that could lead to more catastrophic loss.
Deterrence during Nuclear War
In the unlikely but not impossible case
that nuclear deterrence fails, if the
United States has not prepared methods
or plans to de-escalate in advance, the
results could be far more calamitous
than necessary. By developing and
potentially announcing broad methodologies for how the United States
would reluctantly fight a nuclear war,
it is perhaps possible to reach China’s
breaking point sooner, allow China to
communicate when the breaking point
is reached, and conclude hostilities
earlier than if the conduct of a nuclear
war were never discussed at all. For
purposes of this analysis, assume China
employed a nuclear weapon by some
means and that the United States or its
allies faced continued nuclear threats
from China.
Four Policy Recommendations
First, how does the United States avoid
using more nuclear weapons than necessary to achieve its military and political
objectives? One way is to promote
interval attacks that allow for conflict
resolution between each attack. China
is not yet capable of executing mutually assured destruction doctrine like
Russia, and based on the reliability of
military or political communications
between China and the United States,
the United States could choose to
launch successive attacks within a matter
of hours or a matter of days. If China
Forman
39
Test launch of LGM-25C Titan II ICBM from underground silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base during
mid-1970s (U.S. Air Force)
attempted attacks at a rapid pace, and
if a failure of U.S. theater or national
missile defense allowed China’s attacks
to be successful, the pace of U.S. launch
could be adjusted accordingly.
Second, Washington could consider
how to rapidly shift to deterrence by
denial. How would the United States
take away China’s nuclear capability
altogether? China has been historically
assessed to have a “minimum retaliatory
strike deterrent” designed to dissuade
40
other nations, but most specifically the
United States, from blackmailing or
using nuclear weapons against China.53
If China uses nuclear weapons to attack
the United States or a U.S. ally, America’s
political leaders might feel compelled
to use all of the Nation’s capabilities to
eliminate China’s ability to launch any
further nuclear attacks.
An important aspect of deterrence
by denial is ballistic missile defense.
According to the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Essay Competitions / Deterrence with China
Defense Review, “China is one of the
countries most vocal about U.S. ballistic
missile defenses and their strategic implications, and its leaders have expressed
concern that such defenses might negate
China’s strategic deterrent.”54 What was
potentially destabilizing in peacetime—
better U.S. missile defenses may cause
China to develop more missiles—can rapidly become essential to ending a nuclear
conflict. As both China’s launch capability and U.S. missile defense capability
evolve over the years, U.S. ability to negate China’s deterrent in peacetime may
fluctuate. While ballistic missile defenses
alone may be overwhelmed by China’s
arsenal, conventional attacks on China’s
launchers combined with missile defense
may be adequate to protect the United
States from a nuclear weapon. Protecting
the United States from attack will enable de-escalation much sooner than if a
nuclear weapon lands on U.S. soil.
Third, the United States should assess how nuclear war could be ended
by nonnuclear and nonmilitary means.
To assume nuclear weapons can only be
answered with nuclear weapons is a false
premise. Depending on the circumstances
of the engagement, the United States
does not necessarily need to respond in
kind. If the United States can achieve its
political and military objectives without
using its own nuclear weapons, then it
should do so.
Various political methods exist to
convince China to end the conflict. As
one example, despite the current cold
relations between Washington and
Moscow, some in Russia support a concept of “the Great Strategic Triangle”
between the United States, Russia, and
China.55 Russia might gain elevated
international influence following a SinoU.S. nuclear conflict, and while Moscow
should not be expected to directly support Washington’s interests, Russia may
still have interest in ending the conflict
quickly. Russia might be in a position
to use its own political and military ties
with China and the United States to
enable Sino-U.S. communications from
its third-party perspective. Depending
on the character of the war, such interlocutors may be needed to avoid further
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
unnecessary escalation or sustained
nuclear attacks.
Fourth, while conceptualizing the end
of a nuclear war with China, a secondary
issue to consider is the uncertainty of
the assumption that the United States
could communicate with China’s political
leadership. Even in peacetime, the United
States doubts the robustness of China’s
nuclear command and control structure.
The burden and chaos of nuclear war
may cause the United States to further
question China’s political control of its
nuclear arsenal. If China’s command and
control fails during nuclear conflict, it
might become impossible to deter China,
and the U.S. President will be left with
little choice but to use military force to
disarm China of its nuclear arsenal.
Conclusion
Nuclear deterrence and nuclear war
are two fundamentally different acts,
yet they must be considered together
to support proper analysis and policy.
As the Sino-U.S. relationship moves
forward, nuclear deterrence should not
be relegated to the sidelines. China
developed nuclear weapons to prevent
U.S. coercion, but now a clear power
struggle in the Asia-Pacific creates the
potential that military conflict could
begin and subsequently grow out of
control. If the United States takes
proactive measures in peacetime and
has prepared for unwanted but possible transitions to conventional and
nuclear conflict, then some risk could
be mitigated. Unfortunately, the limited
bandwidth of policymakers has not yet
allowed meaningful consideration of
nonpeaceful contingencies for China.
The United States clearly does not want
war; nuclear war with China would be
an unfathomable calamity. However,
even though the United States can
influence the probability of a conflict,
in the end, Washington does not have
the final word. Therefore, prudence
requires the United States to prepare
for the worst in a way that does not
make nuclear war a self-fulfilling prophecy. Preparations must not lead to the
very endstate the United States is trying
to avoid.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
The road ahead is long, and the issues presented here could be pertinent
for decades. Solutions that seem impossible now may become more plausible
over time, and the United States should
continue to evaluate reasonable methods
to lower the risk of nuclear conflict. War
is possible but not inevitable, and as Vice
President Joe Biden recently quoted his
father, “The only conflict worse than
one that is intended, is one that is unintended.”56 JFQ
Notes
1
Clark A. Murdock, The Department of
Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st
Century (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2008), 13.
2
Many international organizations, such as
the World Trade Organization, International
Monetary Fund, and United Nations are heavily influenced by American views on economics, human rights, and government. Between
President Richard Nixon’s famous trip in 1972
to Beijing and 2011, China’s gross domestic
product grew from 19th globally ($1.28 billion) to 3rd ($4.2 trillion). See United Nations,
“GDP and its breakdown for all years—sorted
alphabetically, All countries for all years—sorted
alphabetically,” National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, available at <http://unstats.
un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp>.
3
Victor Cha, “The Sinking of the Cheonon,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, April 22, 2010, available at <http://
csis.org/publication/sinking-cheonan>.
4
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 6 (November
1, 2013), available at <http://thebulletin.
org/2013/november/chinese-nuclear-forces-2013>.
5
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,
“Chinese nuclear forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 66, no. 134 (2010), 139.
6
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, 2013), 31.
7
Avery Goldstein, “First Things First,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), 53.
8
Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age,
Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics
(New York: Times Books, 2012), 257.
9
T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 13. Renowned economist
Thomas Schelling made popular the concept
of a “tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons”
within the theory of nuclear deterrence.
10
Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April
2010), viii. In this report, the United States
created a negative security assurance for
several countries. The United States declared
it “would only consider the use of nuclear
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners” (viii–xi) and that it “will not
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states that are party to
the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations” (viii).
11
Bill Gertz, “Guess Who’s Coming to
Dinner, Chinese general who threatened nuclear strike on U.S. visits Washington this week,”
The Washington Free Beacon, March 4, 2013.
12
Terry Diebel, Foreign Affairs Strategy:
Logic for American Statecraft (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 143.
13
Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed MartinBuilt Trident II D5 Missile Achieves a Total
of 148 Successful Test Flights Since 1989,”
September 24, 2013, available at <www.
lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2013/september/924-ss-FBM.html>. To
verify reliability, the Air Force annually removes
nine launch cables from randomly selected
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
reconnects them to test equipment to verify
correct launch signals are sent to the missiles. The launch signal is also tested from E-6
aircraft to verify connectivity with the Airborne
National Command Post, a vital element of the
contingency control system governing nuclear
launch. Additionally, once a year the Air Force
removes the warhead from a Minuteman III
ICBM and actually launches the missile. The
Navy also removes the warheads from four
submarine-launched ballistic missiles every year
and conducts four launches to fully test the reliability of the launch signal system and missile
launch capability.
14
Kathleen C. Bailey, The Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty: An Update on the Debate (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy,
2001), 8.
15
Cole J. Harvey, “Nuclear Stockpile Modernization: Issues and Background,” Nuclear
Threat Initiative, February 15, 2010, available
at <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nuclearstockpile-modernization/>.
16
Quarterly testing reports are available at
<http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/sspquarterly>.
17
Nevada National Security Site, Stockpile
Stewardship Program (Las Vegas: National
Nuclear Security Administration, 2013), available at <www.nv.doe.gov/library/factsheets/
DOENV_1017.pdf>.
18
David Holley, “Seeking respect and
protection, Russia bolsters nuclear arsenal,”
Seattle Times, December 13, 2004, available
at <http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2002117512_russarms13.html>.
Forman
41
19
William F. Hoeft, Jr., “Deterrence: Now
More Than Ever,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 6 (June 2013), 26–31, available
at <www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-06/deterrence—now-more-ever>.
20
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), 77, available at <www.ctbto.org/
fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf>.
Although the CTBT of 1996 prohibits “any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion,” the treaty also provides
a procedure to seek approval of testing for
peaceful purposes. Specifically, Article VIII
states: “On the basis of a request by any State
Party, the Review Conference shall consider
the possibility of permitting the conduct of
underground nuclear explosions for peaceful
purposes.”
21
Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Air Force
Chief: Bomber Cost to Be Tightly Capped,”
Global Security Newswire, November 15,
2013, available at <www.nti.org/gsn/article/air-force-chief-bomber-cost-be-tightlycapped/>.
22
Robert Burns, “AP Exclusive: Commander Cites ‘Rot’ in Nuke Force,” The Big Story,
May 8, 2013, available at <http://bigstory.
ap.org/article/ap-exclusive-air-force-sidelines17-icbm-officers>.
23
Rear Admiral Richard P. Breckenridge,
testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, September 12, 2013, available
at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS28/20130912/101281/HHRG-113-AS28Wstate-JohnsonD-20130912.pdf>.
24
Amy F. Wolf, The New START Treaty:
Central Limits and Key Provisions, R41219
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, April 8, 2014), 20, available at <www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf>.
25
Bomber aircraft are not usually loaded
for nuclear strikes and can take a long time to
prepare for nuclear missions.
26
“A clearer view of the seafloor in Google
Earth,” Google.com, February 2, 2012, available at <http://google-latlong.blogspot.
com/2012/02/clearer-view-of-seafloor-ingoogle.html>.
27
Rhitu Chatterjee and Rob Hugh-Jones,
“Sounds of the sea: Listening online to the
ocean floor,” BBC News Magazine, January
16, 2012, available at <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-16555916>.
28
Goldstein, 75.
29
Ryan Burkhart, “The U.S., China,
and the Trans Pacific Partnership,” Diplomatic Courier, November 1, 2013, available at
<www.diplomaticourier.com/news/regions/
asia/1868-the-u-s-china-and-the-trans-pacificpartnership>.
30
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
February 6, 2006), 6, available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf>.
31
M. Elaine Bunn and Vincent A. Manzo,
Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic
42
Asset or Unusable Liability? Strategic Forum,
No. 263 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011),
5. Bunn and Manzo note four plausible scenarios where conventional prompt global strike
would clearly enhance U.S. security objectives:
“when terrorist leaders are located, WMD
transfers are suspected, missile launches are imminent, and ‘high-value’ targets (for example, a
national leader or command and control nodes)
are identified in larger military campaigns.”
32
Henry Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a
Necessity,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/
April 2012), 44–45, available at <www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-akissinger/the-future-of-us-chinese-relations>.
33
Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,
RL33153 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, October 17, 2012), 40,
available at <https://opencrs.com/document/
RL33153/>.
34
David C. Gompert, Sea Power and
American Interests in the Western Pacific (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), iii.
35
Ibid., xiii.
36
Dennis Ross, Statecraft and How to
Restore America’s Standing in the World (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 75.
37
Daniel Byman, “The Foreign Policy
Essay: Oriana Skylar Mastro on ‘China’s
ADIZ—A Successful Test of U.S. Resolve?’”
Lawfareblog.com, December 15, 2013, available
at <www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/theforeign-policy-essay-oriana-skylar-mastro-onchinas-adiz-a-successful-test-of-u-s-resolve/>.
38
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
39
Michael Pillsbury, “The Sixteen Fears:
China’s Strategic Psychology,” Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 (October–November 2012), 149–182, available at
<www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00
396338.2012.728351#preview>.
40
See, for instance, Jan van Tol et al., “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, May 18, 2010. The U.S. Navy
recently invested in next-generation jamming
capability for the EA-18B aircraft, and the Department of Defense refocused its attention on
antisatellite weapons in the summer of 2013.
41
Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context,
Conduct and Consequences of an American
Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 36, no. 3 (June 2013), 390.
42
T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic
Forum, No. 278 (Washington, DC: NDU
Press, June 2012), 4.
43
Steve Herman, “Rising Voices in S.
Korea, Japan Advocate Nuclear Weapons,”
Voice of America, February 15, 2013, available at <www.voanews.com/content/
Essay Competitions / Deterrence with China
rising-voices-in-south-korea-japan-advocatenuclear-weapons/1604309.html>; and M.J.
Chung, “Keynote: M.J. Chung, Member,
National Assembly of the Republic of Korea,”
panel, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy
Conference, Washington, DC, April 9, 2013,
available at <http://carnegieendowment.
org/2013/04/09/keynote-m.j.-chung-member-national-assembly-of-republic-of-korea/
fv9t>.
44
Douglas P. Guarino, “Study: Two Billion
Could Starve in Event of ‘Limited’ Nuclear
War,” Global Security Newswire, December 10,
2013, available at <www.nti.org/gsn/article/
study-two-billion-could-starve-event-limitednuclear-war/>.
45
William L. Ury and Richard Smoke,
“Anatomy of a Crisis,” in Negotiation Theory
and Practice, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey
Z. Rubin, 47 (Cambridge: The Program on
Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1991).
46
Ibid., 49.
47
John Keefe, “A Tale of ‘Two Very Sorries’ Redux,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 21, 2002, available at <www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/646427/posts>.
48
Samantha Hoffman and Peter Mattis,
“Inside China’s New Security Council,” The
National Interest, November 21, 2013, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/inside-chinas-new-security-council-9439>.
49
Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces:
Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command,
Control and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), iii.
50
John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making
China’s nuclear war plan,” The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 68, no. 5 (2012), 61, available
at <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23840/
Making_China’s_nuclear_war_plan.pdf>.
51
U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2013 Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 214.
52
Goldstein, 88.
53
Linton Brooks, “The Sino-American
Nuclear Balance: Its Future and Implications,”
in China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a
Global Relationship, ed. Abraham Denmark and
Nirav Patel, 64 (Washington, DC: Center for a
New American Security, 2009).
54
Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile
Defense Review Report, February 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010),
34.
55
Alexi Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The
Great Strategic Triangle (Moscow: Carnegie
Moscow Center, April 2013).
56
Joe Biden, “Remarks to the Press by
Vice President Joe Biden and Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe of Japan,” December 2, 2013,
available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/12/03/remarks-press-vicepresident-joe-biden-and-prime-minister-shinzoabe-jap>.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Forward deployed Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser
USS Cowpens launches Harpoon missile from aft missile
deck as part of live-fire exercise in Valiant Shield 2012
(U.S. Navy/Paul Kelly)
The Limits of
Cyberspace Deterrence
By Clorinda Trujillo
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.1
—SUN TZU
s a concept, deterrence has
been part of the military vernacular since antiquity. In his
History of the Peloponnesian War,
Thucydides quotes Hermocrates as
stating, “Nobody is driven into war
by ignorance, and no one who thinks
that he will gain anything from it is
A
Lieutenant Colonel Clorinda Trujillo, USAF, wrote
this essay while attending the Air War College, Air
University. It won the Strategic Research Paper
category of the 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
deterred by fear.”2 In the 2,400 years
since then, the domains for the conduct
of military affairs have expanded from
the original land and maritime domains
to air, space, and now cyberspace. As
warfighting expanded its scope, strategic theory did as well. Today, U.S.
doctrine declares that the fundamental
Trujillo
43
Figure 1. Cyberspace Components
Cognitive
(Users and Personas)
Software and Data
Hardware
purpose of the military is to deter
or wage war in support of national
policy.3 Therefore, military strategists
and planners have a responsibility to
assess how adversaries may be deterred
in any warfighting domain. Through
the joint planning process, planners,
working through the interagency
process, consider deterrent options for
every instrument of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic—across all phases of military
operations.4 However, most of the
thought and analysis in deterrence has
revolved around the use of conventional
and nuclear weapons.
In May 2009, President Barack
Obama acknowledged the United States
considers its digital infrastructure a
strategic national asset and declared that
protecting it would be a national security
priority.5 Besides working to ensure information and communication networks
are secure, this protection would also take
the form of deterring, preventing, detecting, and defending against cyber attacks.
As a result, American national and military policy has incorporated cyberspace
deterrence as a necessary objective and
has identified a need to use cyber capabilities to deter adversaries in or through
cyberspace. But is this an achievable objective and, if so, to what extent?
By providing an understanding of
the cyberspace domain and deterrence
theory, as well as reviewing existing
policy, this article shows that although
deterrence is a viable component of
strategic thought for conventional and
44
nuclear military operations, deterrence
in cyberspace is limited due to restrictions imposed by a lack of attribution,
signaling, and credibility. As a result, the
U.S. Government should strengthen its
cyberspace defenses, pursue partnerships,
and advance policy and legislative solutions, while undertaking further research
to overcome the limits inherent in cyberspace deterrence today.
Understanding Cyberspace
Cyberspace is a domain created through
the interaction of three different components: the hardware, the virtual, and
the cognitive (see figure 1). The physical reality of cyberspace is comprised of
the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures.6 This
includes all the hardware of telecommunication and computer systems, from
the routers, fiber optic and transatlantic
cables, cell phone towers, and satellites,
to the computers, smartphones, and,
ultimately, any device that contains
embedded processors such as electric
power grids and the F-22 Raptor. Some
of these systems might be connected
to local networks or the Internet some
or all of the time. Others might never
be physically connected but can receive
data input through connected devices
or external media. Cyberspace also has a
virtual component that encompasses the
software, firmware, and data—the information—resident on the hardware. This
includes the operating systems, applications, and data stored on the hard drive
or memory of a computing system.
This hardware and software are extremely complex, fast, and cheap. In the
past 40 years, the number of transistors
on a microprocessor has increased from
2,300 to over 2.5 billion. Storage devices
are 200,000 times the size of the first
computer hard drive. Aircraft flown by
the U.S. Air Force have evolved from the
F-4 Phantom, with 8 percent of its functions performed by software, to the F-22
Raptor, which is 80 percent dependent
on computer technology.7 Cyberspace has
become a global, pervasive environment
with everyone from users to corporations
to governments becoming more dependent on connectivity and access—and this
Essay Competitions / Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence
access is extremely fast. One computer can
connect to another on the other side of
the world in milliseconds. Furthermore,
the cost of entry into cyberspace has become negligible. Originally, only research
institutions and governments could afford
it, but now anyone can purchase a smartphone or a laptop computer and have
access to the environment, the billions
of users, and the millions of terabytes of
information resident in it.
The human, or cognitive, aspect is
the final element of cyberspace. Whereas
other domains are solely part of the physical environment, cyberspace, as the only
man-made domain, is shaped and used by
humans. Cognitive personas interact with
the virtual environment and each other.
In cyberspace, this human persona can be
reflective, multiplicative, or anonymous.
To access certain networks, for example,
researchers have developed identity
management tools to ensure the identity
is an accurate reflection of the person.
However, the same user can have a different persona, or many cyber personas,
in other systems—for example, multiple
email accounts. This leads to an element
of anonymity whereby one cannot always
positively identify the user of a system. It
is difficult to prove that a person using an
account is the person he or she claims to
be. Cognitive users of the cyberspace environment can be nation-state or nonstate
actors (such as users, hackers, criminals,
or terrorists).
When the architecture of cyberspace
was originally developed, its creators envisioned neither the proliferation nor the
advanced technologies that would evolve.
If he had a chance to do it again, Vint
Cerf, one of the “fathers” of the Internet,
has stated, “I would have put a much
stronger focus on authenticity or authentication—where did this email come
from, what device I am talking to.”8 The
limitations of cyberspace make it difficult
to protect and defend it. Although the
physical elements may reside within sovereign territorial boundaries, the virtual
spaces do not. Pakistan has cyber assets
in the United States; India has some
of its assets in Norway.9 This limits the
idea of a possible “Monroe Doctrine”10
in cyberspace, especially when private
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
and foreign entities own so much of the
infrastructure, data, and virtual components. In many ways, the capabilities and
uses inherent in cyberspace are limitless,
restricted only by existing hardware and
software restraints. To address successfully whether the concept of cyberspace
deterrence is feasible, however, requires a
framework for deterrence theory itself.
Understanding Deterrence
Deterrence, according to joint doctrine,
is the prevention of action by either the
existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction or the belief
that the cost of action outweighs the
perceived benefits.11 In other words,
deterrence is successful when an actor
is convinced that restraint from taking
an action is an acceptable outcome.12
It is a state of mind in the adversary.13
Although the U.S. military can take
actions with intent to deter, it is the
adversary who determines whether
the actions are successful. Deterrent
options can be either latent (passive) or
active. Latent deterrence is a defensive
measure also referred to as deterrence
by denial. Active deterrence is achieved
through the threat of retaliation—or
rather, deterrence by punishment.14
Edward Luttwak in The Political Uses
of Sea Power proposed a typology for
the political application of naval power
that addressed the breadth of military
purpose from deterring to waging war.
This typology is applicable to the cyberspace domain and succinctly depicts
both of these deterrent options (see
figure 2).15 The first of these options
is latent deterrence where there is no
directed effort by an actor to deter
another. In cyberspace, if a hacker
wanted to break into a wireless network
but the administrator had changed the
default password, the hacker might be
initially deterred. However, the administrator was not actively deterring the
hacker. Instead, he or she had taken
basic cybersecurity actions to protect,
or defend, the network. As a result,
the security and resiliency of computer
systems provide a possible deterrent to
actors in cyberspace. The second deterrent option is active deterrence. In this
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Figure 2. Edward Luttwak’s Armed Suasion Typology
Armed Suasion
Latent
Active
(reactions evoked by routine
or undirected deployments)
(reactions evoked by any
deliberate action or signal)
Deterrent
Mode
Supportive
Mode
Supportive
Coercive
(reaction: target
is reassured)
Latent Deterrence:
- Unaware of reaction; undirected/unintended reactions
Positive
(Compellance)
Negative
(Deterrence)
Active Deterrence:
- Effects evoked by deliberate exercise of armed suasion
(e.g., deploying forces and issuing warnings)
- Objective not achieved by direct application of force
case, the deliberate exercise of military
influence evokes deterrent effects. For
example, if the United States issued
warnings or threats to an adversary, this
would be an active deterrence act.
Successful active deterrence, however,
requires attribution, signaling, and credibility.16 A target for deterrence must
be identifiable (or attributable). For
example, in the nuclear arena, the United
States has matured its capability in forensics to determine the origin of nuclear
material regardless of the source.17 It
can attribute the material to a particular
nation or actor, which thus becomes
the target to which deterrent actions are
tailored. Signaling is the effort to communicate the message to the intended
audience. Credibility requires maintaining a level of believability that proposed
actions might be used. If the United
States claims that a response would be
full spectrum, the target needs to believe
it. This also requires a demonstration of
capability. To deter a target actively, one
has to have the means to threaten the target into inaction. In a nuclear scenario, all
nations are aware of the American ability
to attribute a nuclear attack to its source,
U.S. retaliatory policy, and its demonstrated nuclear abilities. The United
States has the clear capability and credibility to follow through with this threat
and has provided signaling to any who
would challenge it. However, nuclear
deterrence strategy does not translate
well to other domains. To address some
of these concerns in today’s asymmetric
environments, Washington revised its
deterrent options to a tailored deterrence
concept focused on specific state or nonstate actors.18 Nevertheless, cyberspace
policy and doctrine have not evolved as
smoothly.
Cyberspace and Deterrence
in Policy and Doctrine
In 2009, Lieutenant General Robert
Schmidle, Jr., USMC, then the first
deputy commander for U.S. Cyber
Command, summarized the state of strategic thinking for the newest warfighting
domain: “There is a real dearth of doctrine and policy in the world of cyberspace.”19 At that time, cyberspace strategic thought was limited in scope and,
in some cases, classified. More than 10
years earlier, President Bill Clinton had
identified the importance of and vulnerability present in American systems when
he issued an executive order in 1996 on
critical infrastructure protection.20 In the
ensuing decade, however, terms such as
computers, cyberspace, or networks barely
received mention in American national
strategic policy. For example, the 2005
National Defense Strategy touched on
cyber assurance support. In addition,
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
declared the Department of Defense
(DOD) would “maintain a deterrent
posture to persuade potential aggressors
that objectives including cyberspace
would be denied and could result in
Trujillo
45
Table 1. Deterrence and Cyberspace in Policy
Policy
Summary
2010 National Security
Strategy
Prevent/deter state and nonstate actors:
• identify and interdict threats
• deny hostile actors’ ability to operate within borders
• protect critical infrastructure and key resources
• secure cyberspace (invest in people/technology and strengthen partnerships).
Recognizes some threats cannot be deterred.
2011 National Military
Strategy
Military role is to deter and defeat aggression.
Enhance deterrence by having capability to fight through degraded environment and improving ability to attribute and defeat
attacks on systems and infrastructure.
Military must provide broad range of options to ensure access and use of cyberspace and hold malicious actors accountable.
Need for resilient cyberspace architecture employing detection, deterrence, denial, and multilayered defense.
2011 International
Strategy for Cyberspace
Dissuade and deter with overlapping policies that combine network resilience with vigilance and credible response options.
The United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as to any other threat to the country through the use of any
available means.
2011 DOD Strategy for
Operating in Cyberspace
Support 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace.
Deter/mitigate insider threats through workforce accountability and internal monitoring.
Enables collective self-defense and deterrence through development of international shared situational awareness and
warning capabilities.
Table 2. Deterrence and Cyberspace in Joint Doctrine
Joint Publication
Deterrence and Cyberspace Summary
3-0, Joint Operations
Role of deterrence in general: “Deterring adversaries is a [U.S.] goal.”
Role of deterrence in joint operational planning process
Cyberspace only mentioned in inclusion of U.S. Cyber Command and its mission.
3-12, Cyberspace
Operations
Does not mention deterrence specifically or directly.
Cyberspace defensive actions include protect, detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate to secure, operate, and defend network.
Cyberspace attack actions are deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and manipulate to create direct denial.
Cyberspace capabilities are integrated at all levels and in all military operations.
Cyberspace operations are conducted across the range of military operations.
3-13, Information
Operations
Effective employment of information-related capabilities (including cyberspace operations) during shape and deter phases of
an operation or campaign can have significant impact.
Cyberspace capabilities deny or manipulate decisionmaking.
3-14, Space Operations
Space deterrence is accomplished by:
• promoting/demonstrating responsible behavior in space
• pursuing partnerships that encourage restraint
• contributing to quick attribution for attacks
• protecting space capabilities and infrastructure
• implementing appropriate responses should deterrence fail.
3-27, Homeland Defense
Offensive capabilities with defensive may deter adversary from threatening or attacking the homeland.
Environment presents unique challenges for joint force commander (JFC) in selection and engagement of targets in cyberspace.
Because specific attribution and geographic location are often difficult to determine, JFC must abide by rules of engagement.
5-0, Joint Operation
Planning
Includes examples of deterrent options for each instrument of national power.
Informational flexible deterrent options include protecting friendly communications systems and intelligence assets through
computer network defense, operations security, and information assurance.
Deterrence Operations
Joint Operating Concept
Published in 2006, but not a standard joint publication. It was scheduled for an update in 2008.
Identified that network defense capabilities could play important role in deterrence operations.
overwhelming response,”21 but did not
build upon this, and neither did military
doctrine. Although President George W.
Bush did not address cyberspace in the
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS),
he did mention deterrence. First, there
is a preeminent focus on weapons of
mass destruction and the importance to
deter their use whenever possible. The
2002 NSS highlights the military’s role
in deterring these threats against U.S.
interests and theorizes that traditional
concepts of deterrence will not work
against terrorists.22 Furthermore, the
2002 NSS identified a requirement to
detect and deter international industrial
espionage but did not present this task
as a military role. Instead, this is covered
under the task of enforcing trade agreements and laws against unfair practices.
Since President Obama’s statement
in 2009 emphasizing the importance of
46 Essay Competitions / Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence
cyberspace to national security, policy
and doctrine for the cyberspace domain
and cyberspace deterrence have advanced
significantly. Although not consistent
with each other, the 2010 NSS, the
2011 National Military Strategy, and
other policy documents have begun to
address cyberspace and define objectives
for cyberspace deterrence (see table 1).
Joint doctrine also varies in its maturity
and consistency in referring to deterrence
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
or the cyberspace domain (see table 2).
For example, Joint Publication (JP) 3-14,
Space Operations, includes ways through
which space deterrence is accomplished.
Although some of these would be applicable to the cyberspace domain, JP
3-12, Cyberspace Operations, does not
address deterrence at all. Moreover, cyberspace doctrine for the military Services
is not consistent with joint doctrine. It is
continuing to mature through military
exercises and the evolution of the U.S.
Cyber Command force development
construct. For instance, the relevant doctrine for the Air Force was last updated in
2011—2 years before the publication of
the joint doctrine—and does not address
deterrence in a useful capacity.23
Based on this existing policy and
doctrine and additional scholarly efforts,
proposed cyberspace deterrent options
include:
involves investing in digital literacy, developing secure technologies, and mitigating
the insider threat. Enhancing resilience
is a latent deterrent that helps one “fight
through” in a degraded environment.
Aligned with this is strengthening defense
by protecting infrastructure, denying
adversaries the ability to operate within
one’s borders, improving the ability
to defeat attacks, sharing situational
awareness, and improving attribution.
Some authors suggest deception serves
as a deterrent because cyberspace operations have the ability to manipulate
decisionmaking. However, deception
is not a deterrent; it is an intentional
act designed to gain an advantage and
inherently serves a different purpose than
deterrence.25
•
•
Cyberspace characteristically provides
limitations to many of the proposed
cyberspace deterrent options. The
first of these is the attribution challenge compounded by the speed of the
domain. In 2012, then–Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta stated, “Potential
aggressors should be aware that the
U.S. has the capacity to locate them
and to hold them accountable for their
actions.”26 Nothing could be further
from the truth. In 2007, Estonia was
the target of “large and sustained
distributed denial-of-service attacks
flooding networks or websites . . . many
of which came from Russia,”27 but
who was responsible? Although the
attacks appeared to come from network
addresses within Russia, it was never
confirmed whether this was a statesponsored or nonstate effort. Some
authors argue that an obvious deterrent
to attacks, espionage, or criminal activity in cyberspace is to identify publicly
the countries where these efforts
originated, thereby leading others to
regard that nation as a risky place to do
business.28 Nations could also pursue
sanctions against those harboring these
actors.29 Unfortunately, many countries,
including the United States, do not
have the resources or the legal standing
to validate the identity of the attackers
•
•
•
•
•
develop policy and legal procedures
develop other credible response
options
pursue partnerships
secure cyberspace
enhance resiliency
strengthen defense
conduct cyberspace deception.
Each of these deserves a brief explanation. Developing policy serves as a
signaling component of deterrence and
provides credibility when supported by
demonstrated action. Closely integrated
with policy is enhancing legal procedures
to apprehend and prosecute criminals and
nonstate actors. Other credible response
options include demonstrating capabilities to identify and interdict threats, to
conduct offensive actions in cyberspace,
and to implement appropriate responses
should deterrence fail. The notion of
pursuing partnerships drives an environment where multiple states and nonstate
actors can work together for the improvement of all those involved. This can be
accomplished through strengthening international norms for cyberspace, but can
also further a framework for constructive
deterrence.24 In this situation, adversaries
are co-opted into a relationship, preventing them from taking the action one is
working to deter. Securing cyberspace
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Barriers to Cyberspace
Deterrence
or to take actions against them. The difficulty of attribution is also a significant
challenge to a cyberspace response.
Any rapid counterstrike is likely to hit
the wrong target, but hesitation could
lead to increased vulnerability and
exploitation.
A second limitation to cyberspace
deterrence is that the first-strike advantage cannot be deterred. Sun Tzu wrote,
“Know the enemy and know yourself,”30
but in cyberspace, many vulnerabilities
are unknown. In 2007, both American
and British government agencies detected a series of attacks codenamed
“Titan Rain.”31 These attacks, reportedly one of the largest scale infiltrations
known at the time, had allegedly been
going on undetected since 2002.32 This
is only one example, but it demonstrates
how the complexities of the domain
make it impossible to be aware of all
vulnerabilities or to monitor all systems.
Existing cyberspace capabilities, defenses,
and forces (both law enforcement and
military) also fail to deter opponents. In
2012, Symantec, a cybersecurity company, identified a 58 percent increase in
mobile malware and over 74,000 new
malicious Web domains.33 Moreover,
there is a healthy market for zero-day
exploits with prices ranging from $5,000
to $250,000.34 In a related study on
the cost of cybercrime, the Ponemon
Institute found a 42 percent increase in
successful cyber attacks on companies
in 2012—a number that continues to
move upward, although this trend could
be attributed to businesses being more
forthcoming on criminal activity.35 Both
Symantec and McAfee have provided estimates on the annual cost of worldwide
cybercrime ranging from $110 billion to
$1 trillion,36 though determining accurate costs is difficult as many companies
do not want to report incidents due to
possible business repercussions, and others may not be aware of criminal activity.
Accordingly, it is difficult to show where
deterrent actions deny either state or
nonstate actors benefits.
Third, there is a risk of asymmetric
vulnerability to attack in cyberspace—that
is, the threat that the use of a capability
could backfire. As one actor develops
Trujillo
47
Workers prepare for launch of third Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite, a jointService system that provides survivable, near worldwide, secure, protected, and jam-resistant
communications for high-priority national military operations (Courtesy Lockheed Martin)
offensive and defensive capabilities,
other actors will strive to improve their
offensive and defensive skills as well.
This continuous endeavor could push
a model that leads to a cyber “arms
race.”37 In 1998, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) director announced the
United States was developing computer
programs to attack the infrastructure
of other countries.38 By then, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office estimated over 120 state and nonstate actors
had or were developing information warfare systems.39 Information on exploiting
vulnerabilities and attacking networks is
readily available on the Internet,40 and
with American dependency on cyberspace
being greater than most, the United
48 Essay Competitions / Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence
States is taking a risk by developing advanced cyberspace capabilities.
Credibility is also a significant issue in
cyberspace. Credibility is dependent on
proof, but attacks that work today may
not work tomorrow. Even though the
United States has “pre-eminent offensive
cyberspace capabilities, it obtains little or
no deterrent effect”41 from them for two
reasons. First, claiming to put a specific
target at risk from a cyber attack will
likely result in that asset receiving additional protection or being moved offline
and placed out of risk.42 Second, secrecy
may be working against American interests. General James Cartwright, USMC,
stated, “You can’t have something that’s
secret be a deterrent. Because if you
don’t know it’s there, it doesn’t scare
you.”43 Once introduced, cyberspace
weapons become public property, which
quickly renders the capability useless.44
Stuxnet, the malware that destroyed
centrifuges in Iranian nuclear facilities, is
a perfect example. After its identification,
responses resulted in two separate reactions: companies patched vulnerabilities
in their software exploited by Stuxnet,
and variants of the malware began to
appear. Unlike kinetic weapons, cyber
weapons, once released, can be analyzed,
understood, and modified by other actors, thereby eliminating the deterrent
element of the cyberspace capability.
Credibility is also dependent on action. However, the United States has
a poor track record of responding to
cyberspace incidents due to delayed
detection, inability of attribution, and
limited, if any, action45 as the boundaries of proportionality are still evolving.
In 2009, then–Major General William
Lord, commander of the Air Force Cyber
Command (Provisional), noted, “It’s easier for us to get approval to do a kinetic
strike with a 2,000-pound bomb than it
is for us to do a non-kinetic cyber activity.”46 Even though President Obama,
through the International Strategy for
Cyberspace, has stated the United States
reserves the right to respond to hostile
acts in cyberspace with any instrument
of national power, and the Pentagon has
declared that a computer attack from a
foreign nation could be considered an
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
act of war, both have left unclear what
the response would be.47 The U.S.
Government, its citizens, and private
organizations are on the receiving end
of millions of cyber intrusions per day,
but the United States has established a
precedent of limited action to and tolerance of these incidents. The 2007 Estonia
incident also depicts one aspect of this
credibility challenge. As a result of the
alleged Russian cyber attacks, Estonia declared its security threatened and sought
support from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.48 However, many Alliance
members, including the United States,
did not share this perspective. There had
been no physical violence, casualties, or
territorial invasion, and Russia did not
claim responsibility for the incidents.
Tolerance to crime, espionage, and other
cyberspace acts has established a high
threshold preventing the use of force in
domains other than cyberspace to date.
Lastly, cyberspace actors have a
different risk tolerance than those acting in a physical domain due to their
perceived anonymity, invulnerability,
and global flexibility. Neither policy nor
legal recourse is sufficient to deter state
or nonstate actors from their objectives.
For example, no one has officially claimed
responsibility for the development and
deployment of Stuxnet. Additionally, last
year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
published a Cyber Most Wanted list.49
Although there are Federal arrest warrants on these people, it is likely none of
them are in the country or committed
their crimes while in it. In many cases, the
actors’ goals are to defy authority or gain
prestige.50 Existing guidance is neither
credible nor enforceable and antiquated
legal procedures have not kept up with
technological advances to meet this challenge. Then-commander of U.S. Cyber
Command, General Keith Alexander,
USA, stated in 2012, “Last year we saw
new prominence for cyber activist groups,
like Anonymous and Lulz Security that
were encouraging hackers to work in unison to harass selected organizations and
individuals.”51 Besides being insufficient
to deter state and nonstate actors, U.S.
or international cyberspace policy challenges American interests. Washington
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
wants to maintain freedom of action in
cyberspace, which includes the ability to
conduct espionage and exploitation for
diplomatic and military reasons. Pursuing
partnerships, especially in the international commons, challenges this desire.
In December 2012, the International
Telecommunications Union revised
governing agreements with a negotiated
global telecommunications treaty. On
the day before the scheduled signing, the
United States rejected it for two reasons:
the interrelationship between telecommunications and the Internet,52 and an
expansion of the United Nations’ role in
Internet governance.53 Even though the
agreement would not have been legally
binding, the United States believed
the former reason could have led to
restrictions on free speech and the latter
would drive a government-led model for
Internet oversight. Instead, the United
States prefers the multi-stakeholder
model in place today that allows for government, commercial entities, academia,
and others to deliberate and establish
Internet standards. If Washington is
serious about international partnerships
in cyberspace, it needs to find a way to
overcome its realist angst in this domain.
The impetus to maintain cyberspace freedom of action limits the option to hold
a nation accountable for cyber activities
within its borders.
These barriers to deterrence delineate
problems with attribution, signaling, and
credibility—all characteristics of active
deterrence. Moreover, the technology
and architecture of the cyberspace domain—the complexity, vulnerability, and
attribution problems—limit the success
of credible response options for deterrence as well. However, even though the
cyberspace domain is not 100 percent
defensible, latent deterrence options
through cyber defense do provide a viable
option for use in cyberspace.
Recommendations
Successful cyberspace deterrence needs
to be a whole-of-government effort
to defend the military, the public
and private sectors, and international
partners and allies. Based on the
assessment presented, feasible options
for cyberspace deterrence comprise
strengthening defense to include securing cyberspace and increasing resiliency,
pursuing partnerships, and advancing
policy and legislative solutions. Today,
these options are restricted to the realm
of latent deterrents. Further research,
however, may yield opportunities that
eliminate the attribution, signaling, and
credibility restrictions of the cyberspace
domain.
To support defensive actions, private
and public organizations need to identify
critical assets and build up resiliency of
those systems including ensuring nonhomogeneity in systems technology.
For example, rather than standardizing
software and hardware across a network,
organizations should install different
operating systems for key backup systems.
Unfortunately, recent efforts are headed
the other way. DOD is developing a
single integrated network with an expectation that it will be more cost effective
and can be more easily defended. Instead,
this centralizes vulnerabilities and makes
it easier for adversaries to exploit. For
instance, the Air Force’s unclassified
network desktop and server solution is
built around the Microsoft Windows
operating system, but this operating
system has thousands of known (and
unknown) vulnerabilities. The unclassified network routers are a standardized
Cisco product, yet Cisco has identified
and published 560 security advisories for
its systems.54 As a result of identifying a
new vulnerability in either the Microsoft
or Cisco systems, a cyber actor can exploit or attack all areas of the network
dependent on those products. On the
other hand, this actor would be unable to
affect the F-22’s Integrated Management
Information System directly as it runs on
a different operating system.
In addition, the military needs to
defend priority systems and expand the
forces available to conduct mission assurance. Mission assurance is the ability
to ensure a mission is successfully accomplished even when under attack or
in a reduced operating environment.
Although all military systems depend on
cyberspace, not all systems have equal
priority. Further efforts should be made
Trujillo
49
to exercise with degraded cyberspace
capabilities to identify critical priorities
and determine the necessary forces and
resources for defense. However, this
is not just a military issue. The critical
infrastructure of the United States is also
at risk. In coordination with DOD and
the Department of Homeland Security,
the National Guard conducts mission
assurance assessments for critical defense
industrial base and prioritized critical
infrastructure and key resource assets.55
Increased growth in this program would
expand the available defenses and resiliency for the Nation and increase its
latent deterrent capabilities.
To further strengthen defenses, the
U.S. Government should incentivize the
public and private sectors to take steps
that will compel them to assure others
they have not been maliciously compromised. Unlike the pursuit of regulatory
solutions, incentives would drive an
increase in cybersecurity. For example,
U.S. Transportation Command has
modified contracting language to require
companies to provide information assurance data and report compromises.56 In
return, the command shares information
with contractors to enhance their cybersecurity. This effort could be enhanced
by linking contracting bonuses or profit
opportunities to specific cybersecurity
postures. The U.S. Government, on the
other hand, could establish guidelines to
provide tax breaks or subsidies for compliance with certain standards.
In the pursuit of partnerships,
Washington should engage internationally to establish cyberspace norms. Lack
of norms has led to a substantial gray
area exploited by state and nonstate actors alike. In 2011, China, Russia, and
others submitted an International Code
of Conduct for Information Security to
the United Nations as a possible starting point for the development of these
norms.57 The United Kingdom has also
hosted two international conferences on
the subject.58 However, different nations
have different priorities and interests
in the pursuit of the normalization of
cyberspace. The United States seeks to
ensure freedom of access while enhancing
the security of networks. Other countries,
50
such as Russia and China, focus on the
risk of freedom of access to their political
stability. One recommendation would
engage the United States with those
countries, whether they are allies, partners, or friends, who have similar interests
to address these issues from a common
platform. Although a broad agreement
may not be possible at this time, steps are
needed toward improving overall security
in the cyberspace environment.
Another area to improve is advancing policy and legal options. Legislation
lags behind the speed of innovation in
cyberspace. The development of warfare
and corresponding law for other domains
has been refined over decades, as in the
case of air and space, or centuries. In cyberspace, technological progress has been
exponential, but corresponding domestic
and international law is decades behind
schedule. This status quo hinders the
pursuit and prosecution of criminal actors
due to the global nature of cyberspace.
The U.S. Government needs to assign
greater resources to address this problem
today. Policy can also support deterrence
goals, but it needs to be clearly stated,
credible, and consistent.
Lastly, the U.S. Government and
DOD should advocate for greater
research and development to increase
attribution and systems security and to
support an evolution of the cyberspace
domain toward a more secure and robust
environment. For example, improvement in identity management has shown
significant results in deterring attacks.
Implementation of the DOD Common
Access Card reduced intrusions into
military networks by over 50 percent.59
Ultimately, cyberspace attacks are possible
only because networks and systems have
flaws.60 If the United States can eliminate
those flaws, additional cyberspace deterrent options may become available.
Conclusion
In 1982, an American satellite detected
a large blast in Siberia that turned out
to be an explosion of a Soviet gas pipeline.61 This explosion, which was the
result of a deliberate action by the CIA
to tamper with the software in the computer control system, represented the
Essay Competitions / Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence
first cyber attack of its kind in history.
This attack demonstrated the use of a
weapon that ignored physical defenses
and deterrent threats and showed “the
U.S. was willing to use malware against
a hostile, nuclear-armed superpower
without concern of attribution or threat
of retaliation.”62 If the United States is
not deterred, how can it ensure others
would be?
Deterrence through cyberspace by
means of cyberspace is limited due to its
inherent character and purpose. The anonymity, global reach, scattered nature, and
interconnectedness of the domain reduce
the effectiveness of deterrence and can
render it useless.63 In this environment,
developing deterrents or a deterrent
strategy against state or nonstate actors
does have some utility. Even though the
man-made nature of the domain hinders
the attribution, signaling, and credibility
required for active deterrence, all cyber
actors do want to accomplish something,
and defensive deterrence is more effective
in cyberspace than attempting to impose
costs.64 Defensive deterrence, however, is
a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation
effort. The U.S. military is focused on
defending its own networks, but there is
a lack of effort to defend the national infrastructure. Through understanding the
limits of cyberspace deterrence, strategists,
policymakers, and planners can advance
policy and doctrine that will rise to the
challenges presented in this warfighting
domain. Nevertheless, additional research
may one day overcome these limits to
cyberspace deterrence. JFQ
Notes
1
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel
B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press,
1963), 77.
2
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian
War, trans. Benjamin Jowett, available at
<www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Pers
eus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0105%3Abook%3D4%
3Achapter%3D59>.
3
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August
11, 2011), I-1.
4
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 11, 2011),
E-1.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
F-15 Eagle departs during mission employment phase exercise at Nellis Air Force Base that incorporates Air Force capabilities in diverse scenarios
including aircraft with space and cyberspace assets (U.S. Air Force/Brett Clashman)
5
The White House, “Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure,” May 29, 2009, available at <www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-on-Securing-Our-Nations-CyberInfrastructure>.
6
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms (Washington,
DC: The Joint Staff, April 2001), 64.
7
Kadir Alpaslan Demir, “Challenges of
Weapon Systems Software Development,”
Journal of Naval Science and Engineering 5,
no. 3 (2009), 106.
8
Joseph Menn, “Founding father wants
secure ‘Internet 2,’” Financial Times, October
11, 2011, available at <www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/2/9b28f1ec-eaa9-11e0-aeca-00144feab49a.html#axzz2nm8mMPNV>.
9
“Where There is Smoke, There is Fire:
South Asian Cyber Espionage Heats Up,”
ThreatConnect.com, August 2, 2013, available at <www.threatconnect.com/news/
where-there-is-smoke-there-is-fire-south-asiancyber-espionage-heats-up/>; Norman Shark,
“Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian
Cyberattack Infrastructure,” NormanShark.
com, May 2013.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
10
Bob Brewin, “NSA Director Calls for a
Cyberspace Monroe Doctrine,” Nextgov.com,
May 6, 2009, available at <www.nextgov.com/
cybersecurity/2009/05/nsa-director-calls-fora-cyberspace-monroe-doctrine/43773/>.
11
JP 3-0, GL-9.
12
Department of Defense (DOD), Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Ver.
2.0, December 2006, 3.
13
John B. Sheldon, Space Power and Deterrence: Are We Serious? Policy Outlook (Washington, DC: The George C. Marshall Institute,
November 2008), 1.
14
Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and
Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009),
7.
15
Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses
of Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974), 4.
16
Peter Marquez, “Space Deterrence: The
Prêt-á-Porter Suit for the Naked Emperor,” in
Returning to Fundamentals: Deterrence and
U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, 10
(Washington, DC: The George C. Marshall
Institute, August 2011).
17
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and
U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combat-
ing WMD and Standing Joint Force Headquarters–Elimination, “Nuclear Forensics and Attribution,” available at <www.dtra.mil/Missions/
NuclearDetectionForensics/Forensics.aspx>.
18
Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, DC: DOD, February 6, 2006),
4.
19
Sandra Erwin, “Cyber Command
Wrestling with Unresolved Technology Policy
Issues,” National Defense, March 2, 2011,
available at <www.nationaldefensemagazine.
org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=341>.
20
President William J. Clinton, Executive
Order 13010, “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Federal Register 61, no. 138 (July 17,
1996), available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
FR-1996-07-17/pdf/96-18351.pdf>.
21
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 25.
22
The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (Washington, DC:
The White House, September 2002), 15.
23
Air Force Doctrine Document 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, July 15,
2010, incorporating change 1, November 30,
2011), mentions deterrence only in a description of the purpose of the “offensive” principle
Trujillo
51
of joint operations: “Disrupt, degrade, deny,
deter, seize, retain, and exploit initiative.”
However, the example cyberspace operation is a
distributed denial of service attack on Estonia
in 2007, which is not an example of deterrence.
24
Michael E. Vlahos, “Shadows of Globalization: A Guide to Productive Deterrence,”
in Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2006,
191–193 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University, 2006).
25
Joseph W. Caddell, Deception 101—
Primer on Deception (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2004), available at <www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.
cfm?pubID=589>.
26
Leon E. Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security, New
York City,” October 11, 2012, available at
<www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=5136>.
27
Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday,
Today, and Tomorrow,” Atlantic Council
Issue Brief, February 2012, available at <www.
atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/
natos-cyber-capabilities-yesterday-today-andtomorrow>.
28
David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal
(New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2012), 268.
29
Franklin D. Kramer and Melanie J.
Teplinsky, “Cybersecurity and Tailored Deterrence,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, December
2013, available at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/
images/publications/Cybersecurity_and_Tailored_Deterrence.pdf>.
30
Sun Tzu, 84.
31
Richard Norton-Taylor, “Titan Rain—
how Chinese hackers targeted Whitehall,” The
Guardian.com, September 4, 2007, available at
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/
sep/04/news.internet>.
32
Paul Cornish et al., On Cyber Warfare—
A Chatham House Report (London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 8.
33
Symantec Corporation, Internet Security
Threat Report 2013—Volume 18, April 2013,
10, available at <www.symantec.com/content/
en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_
main_report_v18_2012_21291018.en-us.pdf>.
34
Andy Greenberg, “Shopping for
Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers’ Secret
Software Exploits,” Forbes.com, March 23,
2012, available at <www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zerodays-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-softwareexploits/>.
35
Ponemon Institute Research Report,
“2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United
States,” Ponemon Institute, October 2012, 1,
available at <www.ponemon.org/local/upload/
file/2012_US_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_Study_
FINAL6%20.pdf>.
36
Paul Hyman, “Cybercrime: It’s Serious, But Exactly How Serious?” Communications of the ACM 56, no. 3 (March 2013),
18, available at <http://cacm.acm.org/
magazines/2013/3/161196-cybercrime-itsserious-but-exactly-how-serious/fulltext>.
37
Yang Jian, “Deterrence Has No Place in
Cyberspace,” China-U.S. Focus.com, February
28, 2013, available at <http://chinausfocus.
com/peace-security/deterrence-has-no-placein-cyberspace/>.
38
John Christensen, “Bracing for Guerrilla
Warfare in Cyberspace,” CNN.com, April 6,
1999, available at <http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/eon/ei/elabs/security/cyberterror.htm>.
39
Ibid.
40
Kathryn L. Gauthier, China as Peer
Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space,
and Information Warfare, Maxwell Paper No.
18 (Montgomery, AL: Air War College, July
1999), 27.
41
John Markoff, David E. Sanger, and
Thom Shanker, “In Digital Combat, U.S.
Finds No Easy Deterrent,” The New York
Times, January 26, 2010, available at <www.
nytimes.com/2010/01/26/world/26cyber.
html?_r=0>. Dr. Lewis also reiterated his point
on November 15, 2012; see “Jim Lewis of
CSIS speaks at Stimson on Cyber Deterrence,”
November 15, 2012, available at <www.stimson.org/about/news/jim-lewis-of-csis-speaksat-stimson-on-cyber-deterrence/>.
42
Libicki, 52–53.
43
Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Ex-U.S. general
urges frank talk on cyber weapons,” Reuters,
November 6, 2011, available at <www.reuters.
com/article/2011/11/06/us-cyber-cartwright-idUSTRE7A514C20111106>.
44
Sarah Weiner, “Searching for Cyber-Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 26, 2012, available
at <http://csis.org/blog/searching-cyberdeterrence/>.
45
Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,”
Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2009), 39.
46
Quoted in Kevin R. Beeker, “Strategic
Deterrence in Cyberspace: Practical Application,” graduate research project, Air Force
Institute of Technology, June 2009, 82.
47
Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes,
“Cyber Combat: Act of War—Pentagon Sets
Stage for U.S. to Respond to Computer
Sabotage with Military Force,” The Wall Street
Journal, May 31, 2011, available at <http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405
2702304563104576355623135782718>.
48
Peter W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs
to Know (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
January 2014; uncorrected advance reading
copy), 102.
49
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Cyber’s
Most Wanted,” available at <www.fbi.gov/
wanted/cyber>.
50
Patrick M. Morgan, “Applicability of
Traditional Deterrence Concepts and Theory to
the Cyber Realm,” in Proceedings of a Workshop
on Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing Strate-
52 Essay Competitions / Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence
gies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, 58
(Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, 2010).
51
General Keith B. Alexander, commander,
U.S. Cyber Command, “Statement Before the
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” March 20, 2012.
52
Eric Pfanner, “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty,” The New York Times,
December 13, 2012, available at <www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14ihttreaty14.html?_r=0>.
53
James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community,” House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, April 11,
2013, 2–3.
54
Cisco, “Cisco Security Advisories,
Responses, and Notices,” available at <http://
tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x>.
55
National Guard, “Critical Infrastructure
Protection Mission Assurance Assessments,”
fact sheet, available at <www.nationalguard.
mil/media/factsheets/2013/CIP-MAA%20
-%20March-2013.pdf>.
56
Rita Boland, “Command’s Cybersecurity
Crosses Domains, Directorates,” Signal.com,
June 1, 2013, available at <www.afcea.org/
content/?q=node/11124>.
57
Yang.
58
Timothy Farnsworth, “Is There A Place
for Nuclear Deterrence in Cyberspace?” Arms
Control Now: The Blog of the Arms Control Association, May 30, 2013, available at <http://
armscontrolnow.org/2013/05/30/is-there-aplace-for-nuclear-deterrence-in-cyberspace/>.
59
Commission on Cybersecurity for the
44th Presidency, “Securing Cyberspace for the
44th Presidency,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2008, 62.
60
Libicki, xiii.
61
“Cyberwar: War in the fifth domain—Are
the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of
conflict?” The Economist, July 2010, available at
<www.economist.com/node/16478792?story_
id=16478792&fsrc=rss>.
62
Richard B. Andres, “The Emerging
Structure of Strategic Cyber Offense, Cyber
Defense, and Cyber Deterrence,” in Cyberspace
and National Security, ed. Derek S. Reveron,
89 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2012).
63
Tang Lan and Zhang Xin, “The View
from China: Can Cyber Deterrence Work?” in
Global Cyber Deterrence: Views from China, the
U.S., Russia, India, and Norway, ed. Andrew
Nagorski, 1 (New York: EastWest Institute,
2010).
64
M. Elaine Bunn, Can Deterrence Be Tailored? INSS Strategic Forum No. 225 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, January 2007), 3.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Ground Self-Defense Force soldiers
stand in formation with fixed
bayonets during opening ceremony
Orient Shield XI, a 2-week exercise
in Kami-Furano, Japan, which
partners Japanese military with
U.S. forces (U.S. Army)
Opportunities in Understanding
China’s Approach to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
By Bradford John Davis
n 2010, two Japanese coast guard
vessels and a Chinese fishing boat
collided in the disputed waters near
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, sparking
increasingly confrontational behavior
by both China and Japan.1 The pattern
I
of escalation continued in 2012 when
Japan nationalized several of the disputed islands by purchasing them from
the private owner. China promptly
responded by sending warships to the
area in a show of force.2 Although
Lieutenant Colonel Bradford John Davis, USA, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army War
College. It won the Strategy Article category of the 2014 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic
Essay Competition.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
escalation to the point of war is
unlikely, these incidents underscore the
destabilizing regional effects of the disputed islands and associated maritime
boundaries. China’s territorial claims
are rooted in historical context, nationalism, national security, and economic
interests.3 By understanding China’s
perspectives, motives, and approaches
to resolving this dispute, the United
States can anticipate the current pattern
Davis
53
Yasukuni Shrine
of escalation, forecast future Chinese
behavior, and identify opportunities for
conflict management and eventual deescalation to improve strategic stability
in the region.
Named the Senkaku Islands by Japan
and the Diaoyu Islands by China, the
group of eight small uninhabited islands
in the southern end of the Ryukyu
Island chain comprise a mere 7 square
kilometers of land.4 In the context of
increasingly contested sovereignty in the
East China Sea, these seemingly unimportant islands have a far greater strategic
significance than size and location would
otherwise warrant. The Sino-Japanese
friction over maritime resources has created a dangerous military competition in
which both countries are applying a zerosum-gain approach based on sovereignty.5
As the current pattern of escalation continues, the risk of destabilizing the region
also increases.
54
Regional instability in the East China
Sea carries several significant risks to U.S.
strategic interests. First, increased militarization of the dispute generates pressure
for both China and Japan to invest in
weapons technologies and additional platforms. Second, as more ships and aircraft
operate in the area while China and Japan
endeavor to demonstrate administrative
control of the maritime boundaries, the
likelihood of an incident sparking rapid
escalation increases. This carries significant alliance implications for the United
States vis-à-vis the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security with Japan.6
Third, American corporations have economic interests in keeping the sea lines
open to international shipping and ensuring access for future energy exploration.
Finally, the United States needs to maintain healthy diplomatic relations with
China to encourage Chinese acceptance
of international norms and promote
Essay Competitions / China’s Approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
global economic stability.7 Because these
are vital interests to the United States, it
is important to understand China’s approach to the dispute when developing a
regional strategy.
China’s historical claim to the uninhabited islands dates back to the Ming
Dynasty, when the Ryukyu Kingdom
served as a vassal state from the 14th to
17th centuries and tribute payments continued until 1875. During this period,
Chinese fishermen used these islands as
shelter and navigational aids. As Chinese
power waned during the Qing Dynasty
and Japanese power grew as a result of
the Meiji Restoration, Japan formally annexed the islands as part of the Okinawa
Prefecture in 1895. The Cairo and
Potsdam Declarations led China to believe the Allied Powers would expel Japan
from the Ryukyu Islands at the conclusion of World War II. Instead, the United
States retained administrative control and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
eventually returned the Ryukyu Islands,
including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
to Japanese administration in 1972.8 The
Chinese connect the current territorial
disputes to a greater historical context of
past treatment by the great powers.9
The “Century of Humiliation” is a
powerful narrative in Chinese modern
culture invoking nationalism and strong
emotions against the great powers.
China’s agitation and protests over
Japanese textbooks that China feels underemphasize war atrocities and official
ceremonies at the Yasukuni Shrine, where
individuals convicted of war crimes by
the International Military Tribunal of
the Far East are enshrined, reinforce and
exemplify these deep-seated historical
grievances.10
Nationalism builds a strong narrative
in China’s domestic views toward the
dispute.11 As Japan’s relative economic
power declines and China experiences
a surge in patriotism with its newfound
economic strength, the narrative of the
disputed islands increasingly has become
one of national pride and just restoration
of what rightfully belongs to China.12
Elite power struggles within the Chinese
Communist Party, a slowing of the
economy, or Japanese actions undermining the legitimacy of the current rulers
could increase the sense of nationalism
among the Chinese population or even
cause China’s political leaders to promote
anti-Japanese sentiment to deflect attention from domestic political rancor.13
This sense of nationalism reduces China’s
political flexibility in de-escalating or
resolving the dispute and may promote
inflammatory rhetoric aimed at placating
China’s domestic audience at the risk of
sending undesirable signals to the international audience.14
National security is also a significant
factor in China’s approach to the dispute.
The U.S. alliance system along the First
Island Chain stretching from Japan to
Taiwan to the Philippines,15 and arguably as far as Australia with proposed
American basing initiatives, serves as a
de facto line of containment using an
offshore control strategy. While this
strategy seems defensive in nature from
the U.S. perspective, it directly threatens
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
China’s economic survival by giving
the United States the ability to readily
interdict China’s shipping.16 Strategically,
China would want to prevent total containment17 within the First Island Chain
and ensure access to its self-proclaimed
exclusive economic zone. In these terms,
China’s desire to exert sovereignty over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can be
viewed as a natural defensive strategy
to protect shipping lanes supporting
China’s energy and economic interests.
Additionally, China has established a
pattern of using military force as a means
of signaling in its offshore territorial
disputes.18 This pattern of aggressive military signaling increases the potential for
incident and conflict.
In understanding the historic context, the strong narrative of nationalism,
and the military framing of the dispute,
the United States can work toward
several opportunities for de-escalation.
Foremost, it is essential that the United
States maintain a strong alliance with
Japan to persuade it from developing a
more aggressive national defense force
or a nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the
United States should continue a policy of
strategic ambiguity over the disputed territory and encourage China and Japan to
leave the disputed islands unoccupied and
not pursue unilateral resource exploration
and development.19 China and Japan have
already initiated negotiations for energy
development in areas of the East China
Sea, but confrontation over the disputed
islands disrupted the negotiations.20
The United States could also improve regional stability by promoting
joint Sino-Japanese security patrols and
development of the economic resources
as a means to de-escalate tensions. Joint
patrolling builds trust, and joint development can work to decouple use of the
resources from the issue of sovereignty.21
China established precedence for joint
development vis-à-vis a 2004 agreement
for energy exploration in the South China
Sea with the Philippines. Although the
joint exploration project failed to produce
results and was eventually discontinued,
it demonstrated the potential of joint development initiatives as opportunities for
de-escalation.22 Additionally, a narrative
constructed from joint cooperation can
work to assuage a small portion of the
anti-Japanese sentiment in China.
The United States can also help China
and Japan establish bilateral institutions
to serve as a mechanism to resolve disputes. For example, a joint Sino-Japanese
commission active from 2006 to 2010
reviewed the historic claims to the islands,
enabling a shared understanding of the
dispute.23 Additionally, bilateral institutions can develop policy and establish
frameworks to peacefully resolve disputes,
thus eliminating the need for risky military signaling. Although China is unlikely
to engage in multilateral institutionbuilding at this time because its relative
power is greatly reduced in a multilateral
environment, opportunities to increase
regional security cooperation through
multilateral institutions such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum may arise as bilateral
institutions mature.24
Final resolution of the dispute will
take time, patience, and commitment
by all parties to develop and adhere to
a resolution process. In developing this
process, the first step is reframing the
problem from unilateral enforcement of
perceived sovereignty into cooperative
enforcement of international norms in
accordance with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS). Strict adherence to international norms would not only reduce the
risk of the current dispute escalating into
a conflict, but also decrease uncertainty
for corporations wanting to participate
in joint ventures developing offshore resources.25 In reframing the dispute, China
and Japan can change their approach
from the current win-lose dilemma into
a win-win solution acceptable to both
countries.
By understanding China’s perspectives, motives, and approaches to
resolving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
dispute, the United States can help “create a context in which [China and Japan]
can choose to construct a mutually acceptable framework of common practice
in the East China Sea.”26 It is in U.S.
strategic interests to promote regional
stability, maintain strong Asia-Pacific
Davis
55
Aerial Photo of Kita-Kojima (left) and Minami-Kojima of Senkaku Islands, Ishigaki City, Okinawa,
Japan (Courtesy National Land Image Information)
alliances, safeguard international shipping
lanes, and ensure access to energy resources. The United States is in a unique
position to de-escalate the dispute by
encouraging China and Japan to institute
joint patrols, joint resource development,
bilateral institutions, and adherence to
UNCLOS norms. If managed carefully, the United States could assist in
de-escalating the Sino-Japanese dispute
while simultaneously building a stronger
diplomatic relationship based on strategic
cooperation between Washington and
Beijing.27 JFQ
Notes
1
Tim Giannuzzi, “Three Boats Making
Waves in East China Sea,” The Calgary Herald,
September 16, 2010.
2
Mure Dickie, “Beijing Attacks Deal to
Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands,” Financial
Times, September 11, 2012; “China Sends
Warships after Japan Announces Purchase of
Disputed Senkaku Islands,” Asian News International, September 11, 2012.
3
Shihoko Goto, “Introduction,” in Clash of
National Identities: China, Japan, and the East
China Sea Territorial Dispute, ed. Tatsushi Arai,
Shihoko Goto, and Zheng Wang, 5 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2013), available at
<www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/ files/
asia_china_seas_web.pdf>.
4
Marianne Lavelle and Jeff Smith, “Why
are China and Japan Sparring over Eight Tiny,
Uninhabited Islands?” National Geographic
News (Online), October 26, 2012, available at
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
energy/2012/10/121026-east-china-seadispute/>.
5
Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu
Island Controversy,” Naval War College Review
66, no. 2 (Spring 2013), 27–44.
6
Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial
and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes
Involving China: Issues for Congress, R42784
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, December 10, 2012), 27–30.
7
Ibid., ii.
8
Daqing Yang, “History: From Dispute
to Dialogue,” in Clash of National Identities,
22–24.
56 Essay Competitions / China’s Approach to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
9
Zheng Wang, “Perception Gaps, Identity
Clashes,” in Clash of National Identities, 14.
10
James J. Przystup, Japan-China Relations
2005–2010: Managing Between a Rock and a
Hard Place, An Interpretative Essay, INSS Strategic Perspectives, No. 12 (Washington, DC:
NDU Press, October 2012), 4.
11
Thomas J. Bickford, Heidi A. Holtz,
and Frederick Vellucci, Jr., Uncertain Waters:
Thinking About China’s Emergence as a Maritime Power (Washington, DC: Center for Naval
Analyses, September 2011), 56.
12
Goto, 6.
13
M. Taylor Fravel, “The Dangerous Math
of Chinese Island Disputes: If History Is Any
Guide, There’s a Real Risk Beijing Will Use
Force Against Japan Over the Senkakus,” Wall
Street Journal (Online), October 28, 2012.
14
Jessica Chen Weiss, “Powerful Patriots:
Nationalism, Diplomacy, and the Strategic
Logic of Anti-foreign Protest” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of California at San Diego, 2008),
13.
15
Bickford, Holtz, and Vellucci, 15.
16
T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic
Forum, No. 278 (Washington, DC: NDU
Press, June 2012), 5.
17
Bickford, Holtz, and Vellucci, 74–75.
18
Fravel.
19
Shinju Fujihira, “Can Japanese Democracy Cope with China’s Rise?” in Clash of
National Identities, 44.
20
Przystup, 18–19.
21
Tatsushi Arai, “Transforming the Territorial Dispute in the East China Sea: A Systems
Approach,” in Clash of National Identities, 93.
22
Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in
Asia,” in International Relations of Asia, ed.
David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, 2nd ed.
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014),
10.
23
Yang, 26.
24
Akihiko Kimijima, “From Power Politics
to Common Security: The Asia Pacific’s Roadmap to Peace,” in Clash of National Identities,
62–64.
25
O’Rourke, 52.
26
Akio Takahara, “Putting the Senkaku
Dispute into Pandora’s Box: Toward a ‘2013
Consensus,’” in Clash of National Identities,
77.
27
Phillip C. Saunders, The Rebalance to
Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security, Strategic Forum, No. 281 (Washington,
DC: NDU Press, August 2013), 10.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Marine Corps High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
conducts dry-fire exercise during exercise Rim of the
Pacific 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Aaron S. Patterson)
Cyber Security as a Field of
Military Education and Study
By Eneken Tikk-Ringas, Mika Kerttunen, and Christopher Spirito
nformation and communication
technologies are acknowledged
as enablers and the core arsenal of
military capabilities, functions, and
operations.1 An increasing number
of nations pursue improved fluency
and agility of armed forces personnel
in information and communication
technology, its contemporary uses, and
relevant defense and security implications. Underdeveloped terminology and
I
concepts, combined with recognized
functional needs and national ambitions
to control the relatively new battlespace
and domain, create ambiguity and even
anxiety among the current generation of
planners and leaders. Particularly challenging is the balance between technical
in-depth knowledge requirements and
strategic understanding of the cyber
domain desirable for joint planners, field
commanders, and senior decisionmakers.
Dr. Eneken Tikk-Ringas is a Senior Fellow for Cyber Security at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies–Middle East. Dr. Mika Kerttunen is the Director of the Department of Leadership at the Baltic
Defence College. Christopher Spirito is the International Cyber Lead at The MITRE Corporation.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Several conceptual and practical
questions must be resolved by military
education institutions through cyber security and defense as a field of study and
education. Based on empirical observations on joint and senior-level education,
this article addresses the problems of conceptual confusion and contextual diversity
in military cyber education.2 It offers
views on curriculum development and
tentative ways to address the problems
and develop both content and methods
of education with emphasis on officer
career courses at military academies and
defense and war colleges.
Tikk-Ringas, Kerttunen, and Spirito
57
Key Problems
Students and decisionmakers find it
difficult to understand the term cyber.
Cyber security and defense referring to
and dealing with tangible concepts such
as computers, networks, and information
assurance are understandable; however,
alternatively cyber is used to cover anything based on Internet protocol (IP)
traffic, comprising the users as part of the
definition, or being coterminous with
electricity or electromagnetic spectrum.3
The essence of education easily remains blurred as key concepts are either
undefined or incommensurably defined
by different epistemic communities or
administrative entities. One only need ask:
what is the relation of “cyber security”
and “cyber defense”; how does a “cyber
attack” relate to “cyber warfare”; or does
“cyber war” actually mean anything, or is
it an intentionally constructed flickering
illusion?4 Indeed, it remains to be seen if
cyber as a term survives or will be rejected
over time, not least because of the conceptual confusion that remains even within
Western countries as to what it means.
Terminological and conceptual
confusion is aggravated by the lack of
taxonomy and missing links between
allied and national doctrines. One need
also critically examine whether or which
2,000-, 200-, or 20-year-old theories of
war and operational concepts translate
into the age of information and precision.
Clausewitzian concepts such as hatred,
center of gravity, or the superiority of
defense over offense might appear different, even outdated, in the cyber era and
space. Contemporary armed forces need
to possess situational awareness beyond
their immediate tasks and duties. For
example, the Schmitt test to determine
if an incident meets the threshold of use
of force or armed attack requires competence often not belonging to an officer’s
area of expertise or available within and
from the domain immediately under their
command.5 The speed and stealth of
cyber maneuvers and effects intensify the
presented challenges.
These inconsistencies make it difficult
to make officer cohorts understand cyber
as a concept and address it in a constructive manner, yet they should not be seen
58
as diminishing the need to grasp the role
of advanced technology in the current
and future role of armed forces. Any
contemporary operation or mission and
up-to-date combat, combat support, and
combat support service function is likely
to involve cyber components or capabilities and therefore require a fundamental
understanding of technology and a developed understanding of its use.
Right now, the level of awareness of
cyber as an environment and as a tool
typically is low among the audience,
making it difficult to introduce more
sophisticated and complex issues and to
design far-reaching education and training strategies. However, it must be noted
that the lack of general understanding is
a generational issue, and the problem of
current leadership not having proficiency
in or even a basic understanding of the
cyber domain should be to some extent
resolved within the next decade.
National requirements sent to cyber
warriors and cyber-savvy officers vary
from country to country. Usually in
smaller countries, officers are educated as
generalists expected to cover broad fields
of expertise during their service. They are
often required to perform functions up
to two levels above their rank. Similarly,
national and cultural values and habits
are reflected in command and control
and leadership functions. One only needs
to compare the Nordic interpretation
of mission command emphasizing the
independence of the subordinate to the
U.S. Army interpretation focusing on
the control aspect to realize the different
educational preferences.6 The diverse
background of joint or international officer courses and varying levels of prior
knowledge of students further underline
the educational and conceptual challenge
of creating lectures and discussions to
match the requirements and target audience’s justified expectations.
In leader education, the questions
of autonomous decisionmaking and
independent thinking and action are paramount. Since the cyber domain and cyber
operations require agility, adaptability,
and creative and critical thinking, students
with a common military mentality and an
expectation of clear concepts, templates,
JPME Today / Cyber Security and Military Education
and orders-based execution that previously served them well may find they are
not thinking out of the box but operating
out of their comfort zone.7
Observations on Curricula
Comprehensive cyber defense and cyber
security curricula for military education
are still works in progress. Many professional military educational institutions
tend to offer either tactical/technical
(information assurance and security)
or strategic/conceptual (policy and
doctrine) level training and education,
whereas joint and operational studies
remain in the background as difficult to
compile and deliver.8
However, understanding available
cyber capabilities and assets and their
potential use as well as threats is essential
for service and joint level staff officers
and commanders. Officers, regardless
of their rank or position, must be able
to assess their operational environments
from a cyber perspective and be aware of
the basic platforms and cyber capabilities.
Field commanders are required to actively
pursue cyber options in their missions and
within their area of operations. They need
to understand how to deliver a cyber
effect and know the potential political
and legal consequences of the decisions
and actions—for example, wiping out all
local communications— and especially
relating to third party infrastructure.
Commanders must be able to estimate
when it is safe to assume or accept a cyber
risk. Without such a skill, officer students
cannot qualify as commanders, planners,
or decisionmakers. Furthermore, it is
important to be able to implement footprint control—that is, to assess electronic
exhaust and determine how much one
leaves behind or gives away. Commanders
need to ask about IP security, patching,
or radio frequency identification attacks
against their own systems as they need
to be aware of casualties, consumption,
or morale. Joint and senior level cyber
curricula must discuss appropriate levels
of decisionmaking. This discussion of
responsibilities and cyber rules of engagement easily returns to a conceptual
jargon-talk; thus, tangible field examples
must be found or developed.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Elements and aspects of cyber security
and defense form an important part of
higher level education. “Cyber capabilities
and their use in war and peacekeeping”
and “planning the use of cyber capabilities” should constitute the core themes of
any joint and senior level officer course.
Recognizing mutual spectrum co-dependency in a conflict provides two parallel
perspectives on cyber operations that officers must grasp: how to defend against
attacks and how to exploit spectrum
dependency to execute attacks.9
Currently, due to the lack of prior
systematic cyber security and defense
education, the joint and senior level audience is often required to work through
weeks of learning and study material
in a few days or even hours. However,
it could be estimated that to combine
the required cadet, service, joint, and
strategic level studies, cyber security and
defense themes would easily add up to
5 to 6 weeks of intensive studies.10 Any
curricular planning should therefore
focus on the full cycle of officer education
rather than attempt to revisit the same
items at all level of studies.
The Baltic Defence College’s model
reference curriculum on cyber security and cyber defense forms a matrix
between the four levels of officer education—cadet/junior officer, intermediate/
service, joint operational, and senior—
and four identified interdisciplinary core
study areas—fundamentals, capabilities,
operations, and additional aspects—that
seek to logically proceed from general to
specific and from academic to military. At
the first level of studies—cadet/junior officer education—the emphasis is on basic
technical and scientific foundations and
basic cyber hygiene as well as the individual contribution to cyber security and
defense. At the service/joint operational
levels, the emphasis is on service-specific
and joint capabilities and the planning
for and use of those capabilities in operations. At the senior level, strategy and
policy formulation, international relations, diplomacy, and campaign design
will be more thoroughly addressed. The
reference curriculum is hoped to provide
developed understanding of training
and education needs as well as a solid
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Soldier connects with call manager during Cyber Endeavor, annual exercise designed for
multinational operations in European theater (U.S. Army/Shawnon Lott)
foundation to develop a handbook on
cyber defense.
Separating cyber as an area of studies
should be seen as an interim solution on
the way to treating the cyber domain and
information and communication technologies as an essential and omnipresent
aspect of all operations and functions. To
create full cyber awareness, it is of utmost
importance not to treat cyber themes as
a separate area or discipline that one can
enter and leave. As incoming students
gradually become more competent and
confident, more demanding and specific
cyber security and cyber defense topics
can be introduced into the curricula.
Educational Ways Forward
A simple solution to the abovedescribed problem of basic computer
and Internet illiteracy is to include
competency tests and selected readings
before lecture sessions. To create technical competency and make students
comfortable with the domain, it would
also be beneficial to have hands-on,
engaging, and “fun-tech” courses
before or between other classes. It is
also preferable to decisively show what
is gained from each element of study
and how it is tied to particular requirements an officer actually needs to know,
understand, and do.
To make cyber security and cyber
defense more concrete and understandable, identifying relevant capabilities at
small unit, larger brigade, air wing or
corps size formations, and national levels
is helpful. Investigating how these capabilities have been or can be used in the
core functions of military operations such
as command and control, intelligence,
maneuver, interdiction, targeting and fire,
logistics, and sustainment makes students
comprehend cyber as an omnipresent and
essential aspect.
Cyber defense and military cyber security need to be outlined in the context
of the full spectrum of cyber security
concerns reaching from basic cyber hygiene to civil-military cooperation and
cyber diplomacy without overstretching
the proportion of it. National strategies
and service doctrines can be analyzed,
compared, and critically scrutinized to
understand different political and bureaucratic frameworks and factors and to
appreciate different views and solutions
to cyber operations and capabilities. Such
an approach would integrate the notion
of cyber to essential, concrete, and familiar concepts and practices; conceptual
themes would become real and hopefully
better appreciated and acknowledged.
We also advise distinguishing nonorganic, reach-out cyber capabilities
Tikk-Ringas, Kerttunen, and Spirito
59
such as advanced intelligence from integrated, organic capabilities. Naturally,
the focus and levels of learning at officer
courses differ from those at technical
and specialist courses. Whereas the
latter focus is on hands-on, in-depth
technical and tactical skills, officer education particularly at joint and senior
levels aims to develop understanding of
concepts, knowledge of the use of cyber
capabilities in military operations, and
the ability to design and define strategies, policies, and future capabilities.
A culture and mindset of reporting
and individual responsibility similar to
organic or delegated resources need
to be created within cyber operations.
Questions such as “what constitutes
cyber in war?” and “who is considered a
cyber warrior with what responsibilities
in a particular organization and organizational culture?” must be addressed when
preparing the curriculum.
Investigation of known incidents and
modi operandi enables one to combine
conceptual issues to real capabilities
and operations; this will increase motivation to learn. There is a demand
for well-researched, theoretically anchored, and thoroughly documented
cyber case studies. Loose references to
“Estonia,” “Georgia,” or “Stuxnet”
that only support individual prejudice
or organizational bias are not hallmarks
of high-quality education.11 Alongside
truthful, credible accounts of the attacks and operations, speculative what
if and normative what should questions
both test students’ competence and take
discussions further. In this context, the
demanding issue of civil-military roles, responsibilities, and interaction in the cyber
domain can be addressed.12
There is a pressing need for comprehensive, well-referenced study materials
to comprise the essentials of all levels
of study and provide links to existing
materials, concepts, and discourse.
Such materials should link the concepts
of cyber security and cyber defense to
military theories and, more importantly,
operationalize the theories, ideas, and
concepts according to strategic, operational, and tactical levels and service and
joint functions and operations.
It is plausible to conclude that officer
cyber education must address and depart
from the principal debates within cyber
defense discourse. First is the education debate between a narrower focus
of protecting and enabling one’s own
networks and network-based service and
a wider interpretation, recognizing cyber
as an asset by using those networks and
services also to deliberately cause, enforce,
and project hostile cyber effect on the
adversary’s systems and networks. Second,
officer education needs to deal with the
diverging views of the cyber element as an
integral aspect or a separate function. As
pointed out, demands of understanding
and awareness of cyber concepts, capabilities, and threats do not fundamentally
differ from the cognitive and educational
requirements of mastering other operating environments, capabilities, and
effects. Third, the interrelated roles and
responsibilities between individuals,
armed forces, and civilian society, including the private sector, must be examined
and understood. Addressing these three
debated and most practical areas would
help to clear the terminological and conceptual fog of cyber as well as broaden
and deepen understanding of cyberspace
and the use of cyber capabilities. Finally,
grasping cyber requires a broad set of educational methods. To be able to provide
hands-on experience, thought-provoking
readings and lectures, group discussions,
debates, and exercises in which conceptual
knowledge can be applied demands due
consideration by military educational
institutions of investments into the skills
and competence of their directing staffs.
Understanding the multifaceted nature of
cyber security and defense and the broad
requirements it sets for any military officer
is the first step forward. JFQ
Notes
1
See, for example, General Sir Nick
Houghton observing that the British armed
forces are critically deficient in the capabilities
that enable the joint force, including intelligence, surveillance, and compatible communications. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Defence
chief: UK armed forces have good equipment
but not enough people,” The Guardian, De-
60 JPME Today / Cyber Security and Military Education
cember 18, 2013, available at <www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/18/defence-chiefuk-armed-forces-equipment-nick-houghton>.
2
Our experience and observations are based
on designing and implementing information assurance and cyber security and defense courses,
modules, and workshops for joint and senior
level officer and civil servant courses as well as
for targeted national authorities and external
customers in the Nordic-Baltic region, Gulf
region, and the United States.
3
The use of the term cyber derives from
U.S. diplomatic culture and has been implemented into U.S. military doctrine as a domain
control ambition involving nonstate actors as
potential adversaries and targets. In contrast,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
doctrine restricts the use of cyber to protection
of networks and strategic information assurance. See NATO, “Defending the Networks:
The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense,” 2011,
available at <www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/
pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policycyberdefense.pdf>.
4
See, for example, Martin C. Libicki,
“Don’t Buy the Cyberhype: How to Prevent
Cyberwars from Becoming Real Ones,” Foreign
Affairs, August 14, 2013, available at <www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-clibicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype>.
5
Michael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network
Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework,”
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 37
(1998/1999), 890–937.
6
On the concepts of mission command and
command and control, see, for example, Field
Manual 6-0, Mission Command: Command
and Control of Army Forces (Washington, DC:
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003);
and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6,
Command and Control (Washington, DC:
Headquarters Department of the Navy, 1996).
7
On the cognitive and intellectual challenges
at joint and senior level officer education, see,
for example, Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating
America’s Military (London: Routledge, 2013).
8
Observations based on study visits to several
U.S. and all Nordic defense and war colleges.
9
James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski,
“The New Reality of Cyber War,” Survival 54,
no. 4 (August–September 2012), 107–120.
10
An estimate based on the work on the
Reference Curriculum on Cyber Security and
Defense to be mentioned later.
11
On the demands of proper case study
methodology, see Robert K. Yin, Case Study
Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage,
2014).
12
As examples of national cyber security
strategies emphasizing interagency cooperation,
see The National Cyber Security Strategy (The
Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice, 2011);
and Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy (Helsinki:
Secretariat of the Security Committee, January
24, 2013).
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Natural dam created by minerals in water over
millions of years ago at Band-e-Amir National Park,
Bamyan Province (U.S. Army/Ken Scar)
Why Military Officers Should
Study Political Economy
By Rebecca Patterson and Jodi Vittori
Colonel: Afghanistan may have one trillion dollars’ worth of minerals! This is great for Afghanistan!
Staff Officer: Sir, we need to talk. . . .
Lieutenant Colonel Rebecca Patterson, USA, is an
Assistant Professor in the College of International
Security Affairs at the National Defense
University (NDU). Lieutenant Colonel Jodi Vittori,
USAF, Ph.D., is a Policy Adviser for Global Witness,
a nongovernmental, not-for-profit organization
that focuses on the nexus of natural resources,
corruption, and conflict. She is also an Adjunct
Professor at NDU.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
he exchange above paraphrases
a typical conversation between
most military officers and
those with a background in political
economy and economic development. Conventional wisdom would
suggest that mineral-rich states such
as Afghanistan have great development potential; after all, government
T
revenue from the development of
natural resources should pay for social
services and poverty reduction, as well
as salaries for government employees
(including security forces). This could
in turn improve security, quell various
illicit power structures, and solve the
variety of grievances that help stoke
and perpetuate conflict.
Patterson and Vittori
61
Officers with an economics background, however, know differently;
other issues are at play. First, there is the
likelihood of the “resource curse,” the
contention that states lacking in rule
of law and stable institutions are more
susceptible to various forms of nonstate
violence and have low levels of economic
and political development while their
elites and institutions are more likely to
engage in rentier behavior. Second, development generally is a multigenerational
undertaking. The average state takes 40
years to graduate from low-income status
to low-middle-income status—a timeline
well beyond the interest of most external
powers currently involved in Afghanistan,
for example.
These insights and other political
economy concepts are vital for military
officers to comprehend if they are to
understand the context of the wars they
engage in. The concepts are equally critical to the development of postconflict
military strategies targeting recovery. This
article argues that today’s military officers
could be at a disadvantage for the types
of wars they are currently fighting and
are likely to face in the future. There is
much new research that pertains to the
intersection of politics and economics
and their role in conflict, especially in
fragile states, but little of this has trickled
down to most military officers. At the
same time, military officers are far more
involved in the economic and political
development of failed and fragile states
than in previous decades. They have been
given new economic tools with which to
“fight” counterinsurgency and promote
stability but have received little information or education on how to use these
tools. At best, the result has been poorly
allocated money and missed political and
economic opportunities. At worst, U.S.
military officers have inadvertently helped
delegitimize governments, increased the
instability in already conflict-prone places,
and helped put such states on the path to
yet another cycle of violence.
It is not that military officers are indifferent to political and economic issues
in warfare. Military officers have had a
long history of involvement in economic
issues, especially in what are now termed
62
“stabilization operations” in postconflict
environments. The most illustrious example is perhaps General George Marshall,
who, as Secretary of State, devised the
European Recovery Program. The socalled Marshall Plan was largely credited
with bolstering using economic aid
friendly Western European governments
in the face of mass protests and a rising
tide of leftist groups. Likewise, General
Douglas MacArthur adroitly addressed
issues of political economy in recrafting
Japanese institutions after World War II.
Similarly, some of today’s generals display
impressive acumen when it comes to
economic and political effects of strategic
policies. General Stanley McChrystal
argued that corruption within the Afghan
government was an important concern
in his astute review of the conduct of
the Afghan war in 2009. His successor, General David Petraeus, published
specific rules governing the conduct
of contracting in a counterinsurgency
environment, recognizing how U.S.
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) contract spending could inadvertently delegitimize stability efforts
in Afghanistan. These commanders
understood that hard-power capabilities
are beneficial but have their limits—an
important realization when creating longterm stability plans for conflict zones.
President Barack Obama highlighted
these issues in his 2013 counterterrorism
strategy, stating that by “addressing underlying grievances and conflicts that feed
extremism,” the United States could best
“reduce the chances of large-scale attacks
on the homeland and mitigate threats
to Americans overseas,” accomplishing
the goal of political stability and security
more effectively than by employing additional troops.1 Transitioning from a
security focus to a development focus,
in the words of General Petraeus, “reset
the conditions for progress,”2 namely
promoting economic development and
reducing corruption as two target areas
for U.S. support. Most academic evidence supports the connection between
terrorism, some criminal activity, and
underdevelopment. According to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, terrorism “comes
JPME Today / Military Officers and Political Economy
from hatred born of exclusion, ignorance
and prejudice, injustice and alienation,
feelings of hopelessness and despair,”3
which are then “exploited” by terrorist
leaders and organizations. Thus, while
development does not address the immediate security threats posed by these
groups, tackling issues such as poverty,
education, health care, and other social
services “deprive[s] terrorists of popular
support, addressing the conditions terrorist leaders feed on”4 to maintain their
credibility with the local population.
Nevertheless, most military officers
display a lack of knowledge about political economy, economic and political
development, and corruption. This is
at the same time that officers are empowered with a host of monetary and
contracting tools to ostensibly use as
economic levers of power. For instance,
findings based on various economic
models and some limited studies argue
that unemployment is an important
cause of violence and conflict, as being
unemployed lowers the opportunity costs
of choosing to join a rebellion versus
seeking gainful employment, especially in
an area with a shortage of jobs.5 Likewise,
Radha Iyengar, Jonathan Monten, and
Matthew Hanson found that in postconflict Iraq, a 10 percent increase in
labor-related spending generated a 15
to 20 percent decline in labor-intensive
insurgent violence, suggesting that laborintensive programs can reduce violence
during insurgencies. As a result, commanders were given new tools with which
to hopefully de-incentivize insurgents
from taking up arms against coalition
forces and host governments through
various economic assistance programs.6
Commanders were also tasked to assist the host government in addressing
grievances of the population with the
belief that doing so would legitimize the
government, thus gaining the public’s
gratitude and support. According to Field
Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency:
The U.S. military has increasingly used development projects as a strategic weapon to
fight ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters. The
approach is predicated on a hypothesis that
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
such projects—which are commonly implemented by the domestic government and
allied entities and deliver basic services and
infrastructure—can improve economic
outcomes, build support for the government, and ultimately reduce violence as
sympathies for the insurgency wane.7
As evidenced by its prominence in
FM 3-24, the hypothesis now constitutes
a major component of current U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine. Despite
the ongoing application of the strategy,
there is limited empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of development projects in
countering insurgencies.8 Informed by
doctrine developed to address communist
or anti-colonialist revolutions, the manual
concludes that the effectiveness of counterinsurgencies is strongly influenced by
the nature of interactions between the
domestic government, foreign forces,
and the civilian population. Specifically,
foreign forces can bolster the authority of the government, which is seen as
a legitimate actor that represents the
well-being of the state’s population, but
it is the government’s provision of basic
security and public goods that primarily
determines the population’s support for
the insurgency.9
The U.S. counterinsurgency plan,
therefore, was to use “money as a weapons system.” In Iraq and Afghanistan,
commanders were given special authorities to fund projects both to hire
locals—especially military-aged males—
and to address grievances through the
provision of economic assistance. The
idea was that economic assistance could
be used as a type of weapon, legitimizing
the host government, buying the support
of the local populace, and delegitimizing
the insurgent forces that could not outspend or outgovern the host government.
The foremost military spending
tool was the Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP), a military
fund controlled by the Department
of Defense (DOD) that allowed commanders discretion in using money
toward reconstruction projects that
could “immediately assist the indigenous
population and that the local population
or government can sustain.”10 The ideal
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
project for CERP funding would be
quickly executable, employ and benefit
the local populace, and be highly visible,
including target development areas such
as transportation, sanitation, education,
irrigation/agriculture, telecommunications, civic works, and health care. The
genesis of the program was the seizure
by U.S. forces of approximately $900
million from various locations during the
invasion of Iraq. The funds were then
used for various reconstruction projects,
although DOD later contributed additional funds to sustain CERP over the
years going forward.
Although CERP began as a program
to build and repair the social and material
infrastructure of Iraq, it grew into the
Defense Department’s flagship reconstruction program, receiving more than
$3.8 billion in U.S. appropriations by the
end of 2010.11 CERP made it possible
for U.S. commanders to improve life by
quickly repairing roads and bridges, rebuilding schools, improving health care,
and removing trash. The program came
to play an important and high-profile role
in U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. Much of this economic aid was disbursed by battlespace
commanders, often with input from
members of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs).
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
were initially formulated by the Coalition
Joint Civil-Military Task Force in 2002,
intended for noncombat reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan, based on the work
of earlier Civil Affairs teams. Their initial
mission was to strengthen the capacity
of the Afghan National Security Forces
while also providing humanitarian assistance, undertaking reconstruction,
and maintaining local governance.12 The
success of the teams in Afghanistan led to
their expansion to Iraq, where the intent
was to transition the lines of operation of
governance and economics at the provincial level from the military to the PRTs,
tasking these groups with developing
the political and economic environment
within each province.13
Over time, CERP has been widely
criticized, specifically for its enormous
bureaucratic process (the new standard
operating procedure is 165 pages) and
over doubts about its effectiveness.14 But
the provision of economic aid by the
U.S. military in general has been controversial for a number of other reasons.
First, development experts have been
concerned that neutral aid agencies might
be associated with the military forces that
also distribute aid or be seen as a subset
of military efforts. This could taint the
neutrality of many aid agencies and put
their missions and members’ lives in danger. Second, military commanders rarely
have had an economics background,
thus having neither the understanding
of best practices for disbursing aid nor
much knowledge of the local environment. Third, there was an overall lack of
coordination among the various international donors, especially in Afghanistan.
The military and aid fields were rife with
stories of poorly designed or coordinated
projects; villages might be the recipients
of multiple schools within a small area,
for instance, but no teachers or other
resources would be assigned to staff and
maintain them.
Compounding this criticism and controversy was the U.S. counterinsurgency
strategy of clear-hold-build, a strategy in
which security forces retake a geographical area from insurgent control and win
public loyalty while securing the territory
from further insurgent attacks. As defined
by the U.S. Army, this strategy encompasses information warfare, civil-military
operations, and combat operations; the
end goal is for local police to maintain
the authority established by the armed
forces.15 This strategy highlights the use
of indigenous forces, who are especially
knowledgeable about the local terrain
and who will ultimately maintain security
in contested areas. The efficacy of using
indigenous forces, particularly in the challenging tasks of holding and building,
quickly became apparent.
The dilemmas presented by using
economic aid as a stabilization tool are
many, and which strategy is the most effective remains an open question. Many
argue that aid should only be provided in
the more secure areas, both as a reward
to that populace for its loyalty to the
government and as a demonstration of
Patterson and Vittori
63
the benefits of working with the host
government, as opposed to largely siding
with insurgent or criminal elements. Aid
was often distributed in more insecure
areas, however. The premise for the first
attempt, made in Marjah, Helmand
Province, Afghanistan, in the winter and
spring of 2010, was that the area would
be cleared of Taliban and then a “government-in-a-box” would arrive. In theory,
the surge of civilian governance achieved
by immediate provision of services at the
local level by said government would
demonstrate to the local population both
government legitimacy and effectiveness.
Unfortunately, the security situation
was never as stable as hoped; what little
service provision did occur happened
in a highly insecure environment. The
Afghan government never deployed the
so-called government-in-a-box, and there
was always a lack of competent Afghan
government workers willing to deploy to
that area. The result was that aid agencies
found the area too insecure to operate
in, the Afghan government largely failed
to provide services, and the U.S. military
was left to provide much of the aid and
oversight.
Afghanistan is especially unique because it is the only locale where DOD is
authorized to disburse State Department
funds. As a result, DOD controlled a substantial budget for “development.” One
example is the Afghanistan Infrastructure
Fund, a $400 million fund (usually
provided on an annual basis) approved
by Congress for large-scale infrastructure development projects, including
restoring power supplies and building
large-scale roads.16 Another example is
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,
which uses funds to train Afghan police
as part of the clear-hold-build campaign,
charging these forces with maintaining
security particularly around infrastructure
projects.17 These funds were used not
only for small-time projects like those of
CERP but also for massive infrastructure
projects like the 2010 Salang Tunnel restoration project.
In September 2009, as a part of
Operation Mountain Blade, DOD contributed $12.1 million in CERP funds
to the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) for construction
of the Ring Road because it was deemed
a “vital economic trade link” and a “key
component to stability and unity in
Afghanistan.”18 As a result, a trend that
began in Iraq expanded exponentially
in Afghanistan. Whereas economic
development used to be the role of
organizations such as USAID, various
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and intergovernmental organizations
such as development banks, the U.S.
military had an increased role in deciding
on projects and disbursements. In 2010,
$154 billion (with $1.2 billion in CERP
funding alone) in overall war funding was
provided to DOD, compared to the $9
billion given to the State Department and
USAID.19 From 2001 to 2011, DOD
spent $757 billion in Iraq and $416
billion in Afghanistan, while the State
Department did not even match a quarter
of that spending.20
The U.S. military was engaged in
everything from small local projects to
major infrastructure projects. Given the
poor security situation, military members also increasingly found themselves
serving an advisory role to district and
provincial governments and in a host of
national-level ministries. Initiatives such
as the Afghan Hands Program, which
sought to use military members with
some additional language, history, and
counterinsurgency training who would
then be “placed in strategic positions
where they can make an immediate impact,”21 were tasked not only to PRTs but
also to a variety of nonsecurity ministries
such as the Ministry of Mines, Ministry
of Finance, and Ministry of Power and
Water. While one of their roles was to
act as a vital liaison and information
conduit between NATO forces and these
ministries, their other role was to provide
technical assistance to those ministries.
With the expansion of military tools
such as money as a weapons system,
CERP funds, and the increase in military
personnel assigned to advisory positions
to indigenous government institutions,
the need for adeptness at political and
economic concerns has ballooned. The
result has also been a military whose
success in terms of campaign outcomes
64 JPME Today / Military Officers and Political Economy
is greatly tied to economic and development issues from the tactical through
the strategic levels. Military leaders were
often major decisionmakers on multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects, not
only for the security issues that would
come with them but also from a governance perspective. The more the military
realized the connection between a sustainable economy and security, the more
it felt it had to be involved in economic
development.
Recent Research
Even as military leaders are increasingly
involved in economic development,
most are unaware of the cutting-edge
research that challenges the way the
military has approached the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore,
such research provides important
insights as well as potential tools. A
great deal of research that addresses the
intersection of economics and contemporary conflict has emerged in the last
decade. What follows is a synopsis of
such research.
For decades, the study of rebellion
and insurgency largely focused on the
role of grievance in fostering the conditions for rebellion. Notable scholars
such as Ted Robert Gurr argued that
perceptions of relative deprivation, ethnic or racial exclusion, and disparities in
wealth were cited as primary reasons for
rebellion.22 The underlying assumption
that internal rebellions are grievancebased led to the creation of U.S. military
doctrine that focused its members on
bolstering host government capabilities,
in particular to deliver services. Another
significant assumption made in current
U.S. counterinsurgency and stability
doctrine has been that a host government in a stabilization, conflict, or
postconflict environment has a desire
to legitimize itself and merely lacks the
tools, capacity, and resources to bring
good governance to its people and sufficiently solve their grievances. Not only
has this been the focus of counterinsurgency and stabilization doctrine, but
it has also largely been the assumption
implicit in much of the overall economic
development discipline.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
While we do not discount the
importance of grievance in fostering
rebellion, lessons from various military
interventions as well as recent economic
research point to additional causes of
rebellion. One of these has been the role
of opportunity in rebellion, sometimes
described as “greed.” The greed theory
of conflict asserts that actors who resort
to violence (insurgents, for example) are
motivated by personal economic gain and
seek to appropriate material resources
controlled by the government.23 In this
framework, powerbrokers fight not
necessarily to alleviate grievances, but
instead because doing so provides them
with significant benefits, especially money
and power. Hence, even if all grievances
were alleviated by the government, rebels
would still have an incentive to fight, as
instability fosters their power, and indeed,
a stable environment can be highly detrimental to their interests.
Subsidiary theories that focus on
economics instead of political grievances include the “bargaining model”
approach24 and the “opportunity cost”
theory of conflict.25 The bargaining
model builds upon the greed theory
by assuming that material gain is the
primary motivation for insurgent activity,
but contends that violence occurs only
when conflicting parties fail to negotiate
a peaceful division of resources. Thus, information asymmetries, caused by power
shifts among conflicting parties and/
or by changes in the value of contested
resources, can provoke conflict. The
opportunity cost model places emphasis
on the costs, rather than the benefits, of
participating in conflict. This theory predicts that an increase in the income of the
population raises the opportunity cost of
participating in the conflict.
More recent scholarship has concentrated on the interests of governing
elites, recognizing that some governing
elites may have just as much interest in
fostering instability as the rebels they
are supposed to be fighting. Taking
from Anne Krueger’s recognition of
the role of rents for some governments
and elites and the part institutions play
in directing those rents, new scholarship has focused on the fact that some
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
governing elites may not necessarily have
the interests of the country at heart.26
Instead, as Paul Collier has noted, some
countries are more akin to “survival of
the fattest” rather than survival of the
fittest, where the powerbrokers who
can amass the largest war chests and
patronage networks are best placed to
run governments.27 These powerbrokers
focus on collecting rents for themselves
and their followers. Governments are
not neutral arbiters working toward the
public good but instead are seeking as
much benefit from the public trough as
quickly as possible. Winning an election
is not necessarily an opportunity to prove
that one’s party and personalities are particularly adept at governing, but rather,
to borrow from the title of Michela
Wrong’s book, elections mean “it’s our
turn to eat” for the winning coalition,
with losers excluded or worse.28
A few authors are particularly notable
for the insights their work can provide
to a wide variety of actors seeking to
improve governance in the developing
world and the security implications that
the current regimes in the developing
world exhibit. Perhaps the most noteworthy are Douglass North, John Wallis, and
Barry Weingast, whose book Violence and
Social Orders differentiates between two
types of states: natural states and modern
states.29 Natural states limit violence by
political manipulation of the economy to
benefit privileged individuals, hindering
economic and political development.
Conversely, modern states create open
access to economic and political organizations, which fosters competition and
results in greater developed states both
economically and politically. This book,
building upon decades of work by each
author in the fields of economics, democratization, and development, argues
that politics and economics are iterative
in governing regimes.30 Unfortunately,
these authors are writing exclusively for
an academic audience. As such, their
work is perhaps beyond the grasp of
many well-educated military officers.
Fortunately, other authors do provide
more accessible versions of their research.
Perhaps the book most familiar to military
audiences is Paul Collier’s The Bottom
Billion, in which he summarizes decades
of his work on opportunity versus grievance in the instigation and perpetuation
of conflict in an accessible manner with
current, real world examples. Collier
concludes that four traps keep countries
poor and undeveloped: natural resources,
geography, bad governance, and—most
important to a military audience—conflict. The book includes recommendations
for addressing these traps.
Anthropologist Robert Bates also
provides an insightful examination of why
some states fail while others succeed. His
book Prosperity and Violence explores the
relationship between political order and
economic growth and finds that although
political structures can be used for destructive ends, they are also important for
ensuring the peace needed for prosperity.31 His follow-on book When Things
Fell Apart examines political violence
from its origins “at the top.” Instead of
probing into the motivations of rebels,
the book asks why governments adopt
policies that impoverish their citizens by
tracing political disorder to crises in public revenues.32
In their article “Ethnicity, Insurgency,
and Civil War,” David Laitin and James
Fearon reject the common explanations—changes in the international
environment, more ethnic or religious
diversity, and more political grievances—
for the increase in civil wars after the end
of the Cold War.33 Instead, they argue
that the causes of civil war lie with insurgency theory—weak governments, rough
terrain, large population, and access to
weapons and support for the insurgency.
They conclude that political opportunity
is the greatest predictor of insurgencies.
Another recent book is Daron
Acemoglu and James Robinson’s Why
Nations Fail. While North, Wallis, and
Weingast have argued that politics and
economics are deeply intertwined in
the success or failure of state institution building, Acemoglu and Robinson
posit that political institutions are solely
to blame and that economic success or
failure is a dependent rather than an
independent variable. Why Nations Fail
argues that states are poor not because
of geography or culture, but because a
Patterson and Vittori
65
fields. It goes on to examine how conflict affects the politics and economics
of societies, especially focusing on why
most countries in significant periods of
civil war or criminality today continue in
cycles of violence, while those countries
that have not seen conflict in decades are
statistically highly unlikely to experience
conflict. It concludes by offering insights
into how international organizations,
including military forces, can place such
countries on the path of development
and stronger institutions.
Many of these studies are found in
the economic development, political
economy, and sociology fields rather than
in counterinsurgency or military history.
Their focus on nation-building rather
than warfighting has meant that few
military scholars are familiar with these
topic areas. Nevertheless, they provide
significant insight into the issues military
officers face today, not only as NATO
transitions in Afghanistan in 2014, but
also in ongoing or potential conflicts in
Mali, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and even North
Korea. They provide new understandings
into what is fueling many ongoing conflicts and the unstable regimes that help
perpetuate these situations. The studies
also provide additional policy recommendations for mitigating the impact
of destabilizing actors and situations.
Without exposure to these fields of study,
military officers are essentially creating
strategy and fighting modern wars with
one hand tied behind their backs.
Why Military Officers Should
Study Political Economy
U.S. Marines escort U.S. and British geologists through rugged terrain in Helmand Province to find
rare minerals in attempt to boost Afghanistan’s economy (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher R. Rye)
small set of elites have organized society
for their own benefit at the expense of
the rest of society. Like Collier, Acemoglu
and Robinson have taken years’ worth of
serious scholarly work and rewritten it in
a manner accessible to most intelligent
readers, with copious historical examples.
While the book is certainly controversial,
there is no doubt that at least some of
the trends they describe ring very true
66
for officers who have worked in fragile,
conflict-ridden states.
Many of the insights from these studies were compiled in the World Bank’s
World Development Report 2011: Conflict,
Security, and Development. This report
explicitly distills the lessons learned from
the studies above, as well as copious
statistical analyses and best practices from
the development and conflict resolution
JPME Today / Military Officers and Political Economy
The military will inherently have an
impact on security, governance, and
economics.34 Current doctrine even
suggests that the military deliberately should plan to foster economic
growth.35 FM 3-0, Operations, dated
February 2008, references “economics”
more than 50 times including a discussion of critical factors to consider in
planning.36 Similarly, FM 3-24 contains
guidance about the economic component of counterinsurgency as well as
integrating civilian organizations into
these operations. It does not, however,
explain how military commanders at
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
the tactical, operational, or even strategic level should attempt to influence
the economic development of a postconflict society.
U.S. military officers have been given
great discretion in disbursing military aid
and/or planning complex reconstruction
projects in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they
have received little or no training. Just as
with a traditional weapons system, troops
well trained, resourced, and practiced on
a weapon can use it to great advantage
against an enemy. Conversely, troops
poorly trained and resourced on a new
weapons system cannot take advantage
of its capabilities fully. Indeed, they may
proverbially shoot themselves in the foot
or be so inept that the weapon becomes
a liability rather than an advantage. The
concept of money as a weapons system is
no different. Used well, money and the
influence that comes with it have great
potential. To fully realize its potential,
one must understand the mechanics of
the weapons system, its advantages, its
disadvantages, the unwritten quirks, and
the environment in which it will be operating. One must understand how money
can be employed well, and conversely,
how it can be employed poorly. One
must understand the damage that can be
done from poor employment, and how
to recognize whether the money is being
employed well. Risks for using money as
a weapon must be understood, and risk
mitigation strategies developed. Similarly,
one must understand when not to use
a weapon. Just because one is armed
does not necessarily warrant using one’s
weapons. Otherwise, as witnessed in Iraq
and Afghanistan, leaders at any level can
find that their plans have gone horribly
wrong. Worse, their prescriptions to fix
problems may actually, inadvertently,
make matters worse.
A number of additional tools are
being developed for military leaders. For
example, the United States Institute of
Peace has developed handbooks for practitioners facing such environments. Many
of these handbooks are co-authored
by military leaders or those well versed
in military issues. Other organizations
such as RAND, the National Defense
University, and the Command and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
General Staff College Foundation have
also published useful practitioner-focused
handbooks.37
The Asia Foundation published
an excellent paper on how political
settlements between elites work in
conflict prone societies titled Political
Settlements: Implications for International
Development Policy and Practice.38 The
authors argue that actors in conflict
situations create political settlements
to limit the violence and disburse the
rents to various powerbrokers. In such
environments, there is a lack of trust,
and as such, all major factions remained
armed. Institutions in these countries are
malleable and reflect the interests of powerbrokers rather than being independent
actors or representing the national interest
overall. As such, they argue that many development strategies have failed because
they seek to decrease the power of the
very powerbrokers that are critical to the
initial political settlement. This particular
paper is especially noteworthy because it
provides practitioners advice on how to
map the various networks that keep these
actors in power, as well as strategies for
marginalizing them and bringing reformist actors more to the fore.
Likewise, NGOs provide a number of
resources, some of which are explicitly for
security professionals. The NGO Global
Witness, for instance, has long published
studies on how resources affect conflict
and provides practical policy recommendations. Transparency International has a
London-based Defense Studies Program
that trains select NATO officers before
they deploy to Afghanistan. It also publishes handbooks on understanding and
evaluating corruption inside defense ministries and defense industries. In October
2013, it published Corruption and
Peacekeeping: Strengthening Peacekeeping
and the United Nations for senior military leaders on how corruption affects
peacekeeping operations.39 A handbook
is forthcoming for military officers in the
field on how corruption affects stability
operations and what security professionals
can do to mitigate such a situation.
Fortunately, the American military
has recognized that special skill sets are
required in some stabilization operations
and has created a few organizations
and programs to address the challenges
inherent in complex operations. For
instance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
established the Task Force for Business
and Stability Operations in Iraq in 2006.
Initially, the organization focused solely
on Iraq, but over time, its mission expanded to include Afghanistan. With
an eye on private sector development,
the organization prioritized sustainable
investment and development mining and
oil in Afghanistan.
In tandem, initiatives such as Afghan
First sought to bring in reputable local
contractors for U.S. Government contracts in Afghanistan in the hopes of
empowering new economic actors and
stimulating the economy. Likewise, in
2010, Task Force Shafafiyat (the Dari and
Pashto word for transparency) was created to counter rampant corruption that
threatened the Afghan government and
its economy as well as the legitimacy of
the overall NATO mission there. In the
wake of the massive Kabul Bank scandal,
examining the interplay of economics
and patronage networks became one
of its lines of effort. Likewise, NATO
established a two-star general officer
position at the International Security
Assistance Force, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Stability, whose responsibility
was to focus on nonmilitary aspects of the
campaign in Afghanistan. This included
coordinating with international organizations and NGOs as well as ministries
of the Afghan government such as the
Ministries of Finance, Mining, Public
Works, and Commerce and Industry.
Outside deployed regions, organizations such as the U.S. Army War
College’s Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute produce studies
and doctrine dedicated to postconflict
concerns that U.S. military personnel
will likely face. Established in 1993, its
focus includes peacekeeping and stability
operations at both the strategic and the
operational levels of war. This includes
improving civil-military integration and
collecting lessons learned. Likewise, the
National Defense University’s Center for
Complex Operations works with a variety
of NGOs, U.S. Government agencies,
Patterson and Vittori
67
and outside experts to bring the latest
understanding and international best
practices to military professionals.
A Syllabus for Further Study
While some elements of DOD have
embraced the role of political economy
and economic development, it is important that doctrine and education catch
up with the operations that military
professionals face. Some argue that the
lessons learned from working in fragile
and failed states will be unimportant
in a post-Afghanistan U.S. military.
Budget cuts and public weariness mean
that the U.S. military will avoid nationbuilding in the future. The most recent
change in national security prioritization, which orients the focus toward
Asia, will likely emphasize conventional
warfare, unlike the challenges faced
in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and
Somalia. Nevertheless, critics seem to
forget the dictum that “the enemy gets
a vote.” One need only look at major
ongoing conflicts to understand the
role that political economy will likely
play. The Arab Spring has led to sectarian strife in Syria, Egypt, and Libya. All
were corrupt, relatively predatory governments, and all are increasingly operating on some form of war economy.
One cannot operate in such environments or make viable military strategies
without understanding the role elite
powerbrokers play and how they can act
as spoilers to any conflict resolution.
Political economy concerns are equally
important in traditional state-on-state
conflict. For instance, North Korea has
long been viewed through a traditional
state conflict lens. However, current
scholarship amplifies the role the various
senior families play in maintaining the
North Korean regime, as well as offering a better examination of what may
occur when that regime eventually collapses. Hence, even traditional national
security threats are not immune from
the lessons from the recent conflicts in
Afghanistan or Iraq.
Given the centrality of political economy concerns to contemporary conflict,
we propose the following focus areas for
military officers throughout their careers.
The first is a basic understanding of
political economy, which goes beyond
standard supply-and-demand curves
taught in undergraduate programs. While
these are important, equally important is
to explicitly study the role of economics
in conflict. Such an understanding should
stretch beyond the more traditional study
of the role of economics in fostering a
military industrial complex. In many
nations in which the United States has
fought or will fight, there are few industrial complexes, and the official military
may not be much more than a militia
by another name. Hence, the political
economy of conflict in developing countries should be studied as well.
Second, military officers should be
schooled on the financing and resourcing of various illicit actors. These include
not only insurgents, but also criminal
organizations, warlords, and gangs.
In particular, criminality continues to
evolve. What was once considered a
law enforcement problem increasingly
looks like a military problem, in what
some have termed a criminal insurgency.
For example, in Central America and
Mexico today, criminal organizations use
methods and tactics akin to insurgencies,
not necessarily for political gain, but to
maintain their freedom of movement for
material gain. Such criminal insurgencies
now have violence levels and body counts
that rival those of civil war or insurgency.
Law enforcement agencies usually cannot
cope with such crises without the assistance of military forces.40 Our military
leaders should be prepared for these
contingencies.
Likewise, officers should be given a
basic education in the current best practices in economic development, both on
micro and macro levels. The goal is not
to turn military officers into development
experts—development should never become a core function of the U.S. military.
Military officers should, however, be able
to understand political economy issues
related to development and apply those
to strategy and tactics. They should also
have the educational background necessary to be able to effectively coordinate
with development bodies. They should
understand the security ramifications of
68 JPME Today / Military Officers and Political Economy
various development strategies so that
these security issues are recognized and
planned for rather than responded to in a
knee-jerk fashion.
In conjunction with education,
doctrine must be modified to reflect the
world in which our military leaders currently operate. For instance, FM 3-24 is
a great handbook of the lessons learned
from history for counterinsurgency operations. It is also a hallmark of cooperation
between the military and academia,
namely the Belfer Center at Harvard
University. Its great weakness for today’s
conflicts, however, is that it assumes, in a
counterinsurgency, the host government
wants to legitimize itself. While issues
such as corruption are discussed, host
governments are viewed as a situation
where some corruption gets in the way
of development and security. Lessons
learned from a variety of developing
country situations indicate that many
elites, unfortunately, are not out to legitimize themselves beyond the minimum
necessary and have their pocketbooks
and power at heart rather than those of
their nations. FM 3-24 remains silent on
even the concept of such a government,
and hence provides a military professional
no insights on how to recognize such an
environment or what to do about it. The
same holds true for doctrine such as FM
3-07, Stability Operations, where much
of the focus is on the interagency process
and provides little insight into how to
function in environments where the host
government is predatory and highly corrupt. Such doctrine needs to be modified
to ensure the lessons learned from over a
decade of war are codified for the future.
Great military leaders such as George
Marshall and Douglas MacArthur understood the importance of issues of political
economy in their military careers. This
reality is no different today. Military officers continue to be confronted with
issues at the intersection of the political
and the economic as they operate globally. As good stewards of American
resources, further integration of these
areas into military doctrine and education
is required. JFQ
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Notes
1
“Remarks by the President at the National
Defense University,” Washington, DC, May 23,
2013, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/remarks-presidentnational-defense-university>.
2
David H. Petraeus, “Setting—and
Capitalizing on—Conditions for Progress in
Afghanistan,” Army (October 2010), available
at <www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2010/10/Documents/Petraeus_1010.pdf>.
3
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention (Paris:
OECD, 2003).
4
Ibid.
5
The World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 79;
Eli Berman et al., “Do Working Men Rebel?
Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and the Philippines,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 55, no. 4 (March 2011), 496–528.
6
Radha Iyengar, Jonathan Monten, and
Matthew Hanson, “Building Peace: The Impact
of Aid on the Labor Market for Insurgents,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17297, August 2011.
7
Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006).
8
Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben
Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds
through Development? Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Afghanistan,” Policy Research
Working Paper 6129 (Washington, DC: The
World Bank, July 2012); International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) Counterinsurgency
Advisory and Assistance Team, Less Boom for the
Buck: Projects for COIN Effects and Transition
(Kabul: ISAF, 2011).
9
Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in
Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 41,
no. 8 (August 2008), 1043–1068.
10
Department of the Army, Commander’s
Guide to Money as a Weapons System (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2009).
11
Rebecca Patterson and Jonathon Robinson, “The Commander as Investor: Changing
CERP Practices,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March
2011), 115–126.
12
William Durch, ed., Twenty-First-Century
Peace Operations (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, 2006).
13
Tim Ripley, Operation Enduring Freedom:
America’s Afghan War 2001 to 2002 (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2012).
14
Ibid.
15
Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004).
16
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
May 2013), available at <http://asafm.army.
mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/
BudgetMaterials/FY14/OCO//aif.pdf>.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, RL 33110 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, March 29,
2011), available at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>.
20
Ibid.
21
Matthew Chlosta, “AFPAK Hands Begins
Immersion in Afghanistan,” ISAF Public Affairs
Office, April 23, 2010, available at <www.isaf.
nato.int/article/news/afpak-hands-beginsimmersion-in-afghanistan.html>.
22
See, for instance, Ted Robert Gurr, Why
Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1970); and James M. Olson, C. Peter
Herman, and Mark P. Zanna, eds., Relative
Deprivation and Social Comparison (Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986).
23
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On
Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50, no. 4 (1998), 563–573; and
“Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford
Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004), 563–595.
24
James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49,
no. 3 (1995), 379–414; Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,”
Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002),
1–30; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment
Problem,” International Organization 60, no.
1 (2006), 169–203.
25
Hershel I. Grossman, “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections,” American
Economic Review 81, no. 4 (1991), 912–921;
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Civil
War Termination,” Working Paper, Stanford
University, 2008.
26
Anne O. Krueger, “The Political
Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” The
American Economic Review 64, no. 3 (June
1974), 291–303.
27
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007).
28
Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The
Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (New York:
Harper, 2009).
29
North, Wallis, and Weingast actually posit
a third order—the foraging order, which are
small groups characteristic of hunter-gathering
societies. However, as this order is not relevant
to most security-related strategy and planning,
it is not discussed here. Douglass C. North,
John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast,
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual
Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
30
Ibid.
31
Robert H. Bates, Prosperity and Violence:
The Political Economy of Development (New
York: Norton, 2001).
32
Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart:
State Failure in Late-Century Africa (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
33
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February
2003), 75–90.
34
Anne Ellen Henderson, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with
Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons
Learned,” Washington, DC, United States
Institute of Peace, April 2005, available at
<www.usip.org/publications/the-coalitionprovisional-authoritys-experience-economicreconstruction-in-iraq-lessons>.
35
FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the
Army, 2008).
36
FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC:
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008).
37
Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study
of Interagency Cooperation, Interagency
Handbook for Transitions (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Command and General Staff College
Foundation Press, 2011); Kelvin Ong, Managing Fighting Forces: DDR in Peace Processes
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace, 2012); Colette Rasuch, ed., Combating
Serious Crimes in Postconflict Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace,
2009); Keith Crane et al., Guidebook for Providing Economic Assistance at the Tactical Level
During Stability Operations (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2008).
38
Thomas Parks and William Cole, Political
Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice, Occasional Paper
No. 2 (Washington, DC: The Asia Foundation,
July 2010), available at <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/PoliticalSettlementsFINAL.pdf>.
39
Transparency International, Corruption
and Peacekeeping: Strengthening Peacekeeping
and the United Nations (London: Transparency
International, October 2013).
40
Hal Brands, “Crime, Irregular Warfare,
and Institutional Failure in Latin America: Guatemala as a Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 34, no. 3 (February 2011), 228–247.
Patterson and Vittori
69
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin E. Dempsey addresses
students attending National Defense
University at Fort McNair, Washington, DC,
October 5, 2011 (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)
Low Cost, High Returns
Getting More from International
Partnerships
By Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert
nbeknownst to most Americans,
over 8,000 international military
personnel are trained or educated annually in the United States at
the invitation of the U.S. Government,
studying every aspect of the military
profession. The most select officers with
U
future leadership potential are invited
to participate in senior Professional
Military Education (PME) courses
alongside U.S. officers at schools such
as National Defense University (NDU)
and the Army, Naval, Air, and Marine
Corps War Colleges. Many of these stu-
Russell S. Thacker is Alumni and Outreach Manager for International Programs in the International
Student Management Office (ISMO) at the National Defense University. Paul W. Lambert is an
Assistant Professor in ISMO.
70
JPME Today / Getting More from International Partnerships
dents are funded by the United States
through security assistance programs
such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program,
which has an annual cost of over $100
million. This is a significant investment
of time and treasure by the United
States, and as we will show, the initial
returns of these programs are high.
However, despite the significant
investment, once courses end, the U.S.
Government expends very little effort
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Theory of Success for
International Military Education
In the two decades since the fall of the
Iron Curtain, participation of international military students in U.S. programs
has exploded. At NDU, the number of
students enrolled in our international
programs grew from 12 per year in 1991
to 46 by the end of the decade. Following the September 11 attacks, a new
wave of students focused on counterterrorism and homeland defense brought
student totals to over 100 by 2010 (see
figure 1). This rise is indicative of trends
across U.S. PME and training schools.
Currently, over 140 countries send students to study alongside the U.S. military each year at upwards of 180 U.S.
military schools and facilities.2
What is the objective of these security assistance programs? As stated
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Figure 1. Growth of International Military Students at NDU*
140
120
100
80
60
40
2013
2011
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
0
1987
20
1985
to maintain relationships with these
international graduates and use them as
potential strategic partners. The lack of
attention is surprising, not only because
we are divesting when our returns would
be their highest but also given the way
Departments of State and Defense leaders view these programs. Said Admiral
Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Security cooperation through PME is an investment in
the future of both the selected students
and the nations being engaged. Like all
investments, an optimal return on our
investment is sought.”1 Unfortunately,
we are not seeing an “optimal” return in
the long run when benefits could be the
greatest.
We argue that the United States can
do better by maintaining long-term
relationships with these graduates. While
we think increased alumni outreach
would be beneficial for all IMET and
PME programs, the focus of this article
is increased engagement with international graduates of Intermediate and
Senior PME programs. Our analysis and
recommendations for improvement are
drawn primarily from our experience
working with the international programs
at National Defense University, a senior
PME school.
*Includes students attending the College of International Security Affairs, Information
Resources Management College, National War College, and Dwight D. Eisenhower School for
National Security and Resource Strategy.
the intent of Congress in establishing
the IMET program was to improve the
ability of allied and friendly countries
to achieve self-reliance in their security
objectives, increase awareness of basic issues involving internationally recognized
human rights and civil-military relations,
and develop greater understanding and
fraternity between participants and participating nations.3 Capacity-building,
reinforcement of established norms and
values, and a fostering of relationships
all constitute ways in which the United
States has retained influence with partner
nations. Such military-to-military contact,
which some call “defense diplomacy,”
represents a powerful alternative to traditional instruments of power.4
Capacity-building. Much as technical training programs such as aircraft
maintenance aim to raise the skill set of
countries’ armed forces, the education
offered to students at PME schools aims
to bolster the leadership and strategic
thinking capabilities of future leaders of
partner nations. This education offers
opportunities for greater interoperability,
making countries more capable of working with the United States and within
the international community by drawing
from a shared curriculum and language.
According to the State Department, one
of the goals of the IMET program is to
“enhance the ability of friends and allies
to participate in coalition, humanitarian,
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and
counterinsurgency operations.”5
Recognition of Human Rights.
International PME programs also aim to
instill recognition of established norms
in human rights and civil-military relations through exposure of officers to U.S.
values of equality, democracy, and civilian
control of the armed forces. This experience comes through visiting institutions
such as media outlets, universities, government agencies, and business locations
around the United States and by engaging officers in discussion of these themes.
For example, at NDU, international
officers join a year-long academic course
on American identity that addresses these
concepts, and they participate in a robust
Field Studies Program, traveling to over
15 locations around the country where
they are hosted by representatives from
every sector of U.S. society.6
Relationships and Improved
Understanding. Arguably, the most
important outcome of PME programs
is the strength of relationships formed
between the international officers and
their classmates, sponsors, or other
contacts here in the United States. Both
U.S. and international representatives
view these relationships not simply as
personal friendships—although in most
cases, they are—but as enablers of future
Thacker and Lambert
71
Figure 2. Percentage Increase in Student Confidence
35
30
31.1
27.5
25
25.3
24.8
23.1
22.4
20
22.0
15
10
10.4
5
0
the English
Language
U.S.
Government
Institutions
U.S. Political
Process
Democracy
U.S. Judicial
System
U.S.
Educational
System
U.S.
Healthcare
System
U.S. Foreign
Policy
U.S. Culture
Figure 3. How Do You Think Your Country Ranks
in Its Respect for Human Rights?
60
50
47.8%
40
Pre-Survey
Post-Survey
38.2%
30
29.4%
20
21.7%
23.9%
23.5%
10
8.8%
4.3%
0
One of the Best
Above Average
cooperation, influence, and advancement
of interests between their countries. At
NDU, heavy emphasis is placed on bonding, networking, and socializing among
classmates outside of schoolwork. The
international officers form a tight-knit
bond with each other and a working
relationship with their U.S. counterparts
after a year of intense studying, debating
in the classroom, and sharing of cultures
and perspectives. These outcomes are in
line with what the Department of Defense
(DOD) has stressed in implementing
IMET programs: a desire to develop “rapport, understanding, and communication
links” between U.S. and partner armed
forces.7 This network, coupled with a
Average
Below Average
2.2%
0%
One of the Worst
surer understanding of and familiarity
with the U.S. system, means international
graduates are ahead of the curve in their
future associations with the United States.
General (Ret.) Mieczysław Cieniuch,
former Chief of General Staff of the Polish
Armed Forces, stated, “NDU helped me
learn about the American way of life and
doing business. This understanding and
appreciation of the U.S. culture certainly
helped me to establish a good relationship
with all my partners and interlocutors
from the United States.”8
Evidence of Success. Efforts to measure
the impact of these programs on international students have been encouraging
and illustrate an initial high return on the
72 JPME Today / Getting More from International Partnerships
U.S. investment. In 2011, a study was undertaken to measure the impact of NDU’s
international programs on the resident
international students’ attitudes and understanding of the U.S. Government and
culture as well as their commitment to
democracy and internationally recognized
human rights. The study was built around
two survey instruments that measured
these factors upon the students’ arrival
to NDU and again at departure to their
home country a year later. The study
showed that international students’ understanding of the U.S. governing system
improved significantly and that students’
views of democracy and internationally
recognized human rights became more
nuanced after their year at NDU.9
As shown in figure 2, the students’
confidence level in understanding the
U.S. Government, institutions, and
culture at the conclusion of their time at
NDU significantly increased, especially
the understanding of culture (an increase
of 31.1 percent). The study also found
that international students developed
a more critical analysis and view of
democracy and human rights in their
own countries during the year enrolled
in the program. The students generally
saw their home countries as somewhat
democratic in the arrival survey, but they
became slightly more critical in the departure survey. In reference to human rights,
the question was asked, “Compared to
the rest of the world, how does your
country rank in its respect for Human
Rights?” Figure 3 illustrates the clear
downward shift between the arrival and
departure surveys. In the arrival survey, a
majority of students indicated that they
saw their home country as better than
average in the realm of Human Rights
(69.5 percent). In the departure survey,
this dropped to 52.9 percent.10
In addition to the statistical evidence
in this and other survey instruments we
have used, there are countless testimonials from students and graduates that
illustrate the effectiveness of the programs in promoting understanding and
building capacity. One student remarked,
“Exposure to American society has
enhanced my knowledge on American
culture, history, and politics so that I am
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
better able to understand how the United
States sees the world.” Another said,
“The education I received at NDU gave
me new skills to better analyze events
and make decisions. The knowledge I
received allows me to better analyze every
situation, critically think about problems,
and think strategically to find solutions
with the collaboration of partners in the
security community.”
Our experience and studies such as
these give us confidence that the international programs at NDU and other
PME schools are creating a high initial
return from the U.S. investment in the
students and their countries. While here
in the United States, strong partnerships
of understanding, respect, and commitment to human right and democracy are
developed and strengthened among our
international friends. But what becomes
of those partnerships when these officers
return home and take positions of influence in their country?
The Problem: Failure to Maintain
Key Relationships Through
Continued Engagement
We suggest that international PME
programs are largely meeting their objectives during the students’ time in the
program. However, once students leave
these institutions, there is a dismal track
record of maintaining contact with them.
The reality is the majority of graduates
are never tracked, contacted, or heard
from again in their home countries. For
U.S. policymakers, agencies, and schools,
this not only means losing our ability to
continue to achieve program objectives
over time but also failing to accurately
measure what has been achieved. Longterm return on investment for international military education remains unrealized, or at least unknown.
How few graduates are actually being
followed? Beginning in 2001, U.S. law
explicitly mandated that records be kept
on each IMET student to include the
type of instruction received, whether it
was completed successfully, and “to the
extent practicable” his or her subsequent
career and current position.11 Despite the
mandate, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) estimates DOD has actually
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
maintained updated information on only
1 percent of graduates, focusing on the
small percentage who reach certain positions of prominence.12 The online Defense
Security Assistance Management System
(DSAMS) was created partly to maintain
this information, but it contains at best
only snippets of data and is not regularly
updated or used for this purpose. There
is also no requirement to collect contact
information for graduates, and many
graduates have simply slipped out of
reach. Individual schools may be collecting this information more successfully, but
they are doing it in an ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion.
Even still, simply collecting the
right data on graduates falls short of the
intent of IMET and international PME
programs, which is to create long-term
relationships with graduates and establish
global networks of security practitioners. When graduates leave schools
like NDU, they largely take with them
positive impressions of their time and
a deeper understanding of the United
States. They are motivated to stay in
contact with American classmates, their
school, and their international classmates. They are primed to be effective
partners in their home country, able to
communicate with U.S. representatives
and understand the domestic political,
economic, and cultural context in which
American foreign policy occurs. They are
also positioned to provide useful feedback and experience to the schools from
which they graduated. Unfortunately,
too little effort is made to utilize graduates for these advantages, thus limiting
the full realization of program goals.
Roots of the Problem. This problem of
tracking graduates is not new. In a 1990
report on the IMET program, GAO also
reported “no system for monitoring use
of IMET graduates” and no accurate way
for DOD to measure the effectiveness
of the program.13 GAO echoed many of
the same concerns in a 2011 report as
well as extending this line of thinking to
U.S. graduates in a 2013 review of PME
programs, saying schools must place a
greater emphasis on continuing education and lifelong learning for graduates.14
Awareness within the security assistance
community may finally be dawning.
In the recent Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Strategy for International
Professional Military Education, the
Chairman places greater emphasis on the
need to “facilitate long-term relationships” with international graduates, in
order to “enhance our ability to foster
peace and security.”15
Despite the greater awareness, the
current PME system is simply not designed to produce vibrant continuing
contact with graduates. In talking with
other intermediate and senior PME
programs around the country, we have
found this engagement happening at
different levels. Most schools have opted
to do nothing and have lost contact with
nearly all graduates; some have built
small alumni activities into their current
operations but are unable to commit any
resources to a formal program; and a
few schools have a formal program with
innovative efforts under way but are limited in their ability to accomplish its full
potential. The common theme through
the feedback is that all agree we need to
do more to maintain contact with graduates, but lack of policy guidance, limited
resources, poor coordination, and an
overall absence of focus on this aspect of
education constrain these efforts.
Lack of Guidance. The problem
begins with an absence of clear guidance
as to who should be maintaining contact
with graduates. Is it the schoolhouses, the
Embassies, or other independent offices
within DOD or the State Department
that should undertake this effort? Until
recently, the only formal guidance on this
subject available to schools like NDU was
found in a single paragraph of text in the
Joint Security Cooperation Education and
Training Regulation stating that schools
are encouraged to maintain contact
through either periodic mailings of school
newsletters or a 1-year subscription to any
relevant professional publication.16
Limited Resources. Lack of guidance
translates into limited or no resources
available to conduct this outreach. There
are often no manning billets or positions for continuing engagement within
schoolhouses and no dedicated funding
streams for alumni activities. Further,
Thacker and Lambert
73
Table. Benefits of Continuing Contact with International Alumni
Value to
Graduates
Value to
Schools
Value to U.S.
Government
•
•
•
Access to continuing education (for example, school library network)
Access to network of security practitioners
Greater voice through direct link to U.S. Government
•
•
•
Access to graduates for assessment of training program
Larger pool of alumni subject matter experts to draw upon for experience
Graduates help build reputation of program and
raise quality of students over time
•
•
•
Improved interoperability with allies and partners through shared curriculum
Visible symbol of continuing investment in allied and partner countries
Ability to cut through bureaucratic “red tape” with
direct contact to allies and partners
Opening of diplomatic doors
Access to those who understand and are comfortable
interacting with the United States
•
•
because all funding for international
students comes through a reimbursable
model of tuition funds, it is quite difficult
for schoolhouses to justify dedicating
funding or personnel to alumni activities at the expense of current students
to whom tuition dollars are tied. To
work around this issue, some institutions
have turned to non-official personnel
to conduct this outreach, by working
through nonprofit organizations or
private foundations affiliated with the
college or university. This may be a successful model; however, recent experience
shows schools must be careful in allowing
outside organizations such as foundations
to perform “inherently governmental
functions.”17
Lack of Coordination and
Information-sharing. Finally, lackluster
coordination between the key actors
in the system remains a key obstacle
to staying in contact with graduates.
In the security assistance universe, the
main touch-points for international
students are the U.S. offices of defense
cooperation (ODCs) in Embassies where
personnel assist in selecting, vetting, and
sending students, and at schoolhouses
where international student offices support their education experience. ODCs
have been primarily tasked with keeping
accurate graduate information in that
country by seeking reports from the defense ministry on the current position of
graduates and updating this information
online. However, we have found that due
to the frequent turnover of ODC personnel and an abundance of tasks on their
plates, this information is rarely sought
and obtained, let alone communicated
74
back to the schoolhouse. There is also
little incentive for countries to actively
report information to the ODC, and occasionally even a disincentive if countries
are suspicious of U.S. motives in obtaining this.
When graduate information is
obtained, it is rarely shared, either
horizontally or vertically. International
students often have attended multiple
PME programs, and schools would
benefit from knowing their backgrounds
as well as any outreach efforts of other
schools toward them. Graduate information is also rarely shared “up”
between schools and DOD or the State
Department. “Despite its potential value
as part of a broader IMET evaluation
effort, training managers do not systematically share this information with State
and DOD and are only required to share
information on the small percentage of
IMET graduates.”18
Potential Benefits of
Alumni Outreach
At NDU, we have faced many of these
same constraints on alumni engagement
but have nonetheless tried increasing
our efforts to reach out to graduates.
Two years ago, we created a dedicated
alumni position, mobilized staff on
specific alumni projects, became more
active online and in social media, began
conducting continuing education
seminars, and started seeking updates
on graduates in earnest. We have seen
substantial benefits come from this
engagement and anticipate many other
benefits are within reach with additional
efforts (see table).
JPME Today / Getting More from International Partnerships
For graduates, maintaining contact
is beneficial in providing both further
education and access to a broad network
of classmates and alumni. Our graduates
have increased their use of educational
resources available on campus, such as
lifetime access to the NDU library and
collaboration with faculty and researchers, and have stayed current on security
issues by participating in continuing
education seminars and forums. Alumni
have also found that using the graduate
network opens doors to excel in their
positions and benefit their countries. For
example, 2 years ago, a Russian graduate
who was serving as head of the aviation
security agency in Moscow contacted
our office with a desire to broaden his
agency’s capabilities through learning
from the U.S. system. Using connections at NDU, we helped arrange a
counterpart visit between him and the
Transportation Security Agency regional
director in Washington. Similarly, one
of our graduates from the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) was assigned to create
the new National Defense University
of UAE. His first action was to reach
back through alumni channels to NDU
and ask for assistance, resulting in a
long-standing collaboration between
the U.S. and UAE defense universities.
Many other graduates have used channels
directly to their classmates. When the
political crisis erupted in Libya in 2011,
one of our alumni from Austria led the
removal of all Austrian citizens from the
country. After encountering issues at the
Egyptian border with the chaos of many
people fleeing, he contacted his NDU
classmate, a general in the Egyptian Army
who provided the necessary arrangements
to ensure the Austrian citizens passed
smoothly. In many cases, the graduates’
connection to NDU or their classmates
has allowed them to bypass significant
red tape to achieve positive gains for their
country.
For schools, the value of alumni
engagement flows from their improved
ability to assess outcomes and draw on
the experience of graduates. At NDU,
we have used assessment tools such as
surveys, interviews, and feedback sessions to observe whether graduates have
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
used skills obtained at NDU, introduced
new ideas into the workplace, published,
achieved flag officer rank, and stayed
in contact with classmates. Schools are
also able to draw from a pool of alumni
subject matter experts working around
the world to provide perspective on issues and enrich curriculum. Graduates
have been able to return and lecture at
NDU, help faculty in their research, and
write for publications. In several cases,
alumni have opened doors to NDU
student or faculty groups traveling overseas, augmenting their itineraries with
visits to places that would otherwise be
inaccessible.
Finally, continuing engagement has
value to the U.S. Government over
time from a practical and strategic level,
although this is most difficult to measure.
Graduates are able to work in a more
interoperable way with U.S. and international partners. Strategically, the United
States is able to nurture relationships with
those in key positions of influence. From
NDU alone, there are 11 international
graduates currently serving as chiefs
of defense or secretaries of defense, 15
acting as chiefs of service within their
armed forces, and numerous others in
key governmental, diplomatic, or business positions around the globe. When
expanded to all senior or intermediate
PME schools, the success of graduates
comprises an enormous network of
senior leaders with whom the United
States could engage. Referencing Indian
graduates specifically, one U.S. Pacific
Command country director wrote:
We are looking to ensure we have the visibility on these folks as they emerge . . . into
senior leadership positions. From the middle
of 2011 until the end of 2013, the three
Indian service chiefs were all U.S. PME
graduates . . . plus many other influential
two and three stars. The Indian chiefs of
service personally hand select the attendees
to U.S. PME—it is that important to them.
Furthermore, we can tell within three to
five minutes the Indians that have been
through our courses; they are broadly strategically minded, have a good understanding
of jointness, and understand our systems
(which are quite different from theirs).19
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Even if graduates are not in key policy
positions, they can still play a valuable
strategic role. For example, several former
U.S. ambassadors at NDU have said they
wished they had information on NDU
international graduates in countries
where they served as ambassadors, as they
often looked for government or armed
forces officials with a familiarity with the
United States and an established level of
trust with whom to engage. Similarly,
at NDU we have been contacted many
times by unified commands or task forces
asking for information on graduates in
their regions—information they were
seeking by contacting every senior PME
school one by one. While we have been
able to provide the information for these
requests, we believe if information on
graduates was more readily and systematically available to officials abroad, many
more benefits would arise from employing the experience of these graduates.
Recommendations
We have distilled several recommendations to help individual schools and the
U.S. Government as a whole achieve
greater returns on their investments
in international military education
programs.
Raise Emphasis on Continuing
Engagement by Assigning Guidance
and Resources. In many cases, specifics are still lacking as to how the U.S.
Government can and ought to maintain
these relationships. How do individual
schools maintain contact with graduates
overseas? What personnel, resources, and
opportunities are available to assist in this
mission? There is a need for more specific
guidance from the agency level to schools
and to ODCs specifying what information managers should collect, how they
should do it, and how it can be appropriately used. Greater guidance would
unlock more resources for schools to use
in reaching graduates—covering costs of
communications systems, publications
and materials, alumni events or seminars,
recognition ceremonies, and personnel.
Some graduates have raised the idea of
building in a percentage of each IMET
student’s tuition cost to cover future
alumni connectivity and attendance at
alumni seminars. Though not an IMET
program, DOD’s Combating Terrorism
Fellowship Program provides a good
model of a program that has built-in provisions for alumni outreach and provides
funds for dedicated staff positions, events,
and communication tools.
Take a Joint Approach to Graduate
Engagement. The successes of international education programs are repeated
many times over at many PME institutions around the country. Currently,
other than DSAMS, no common data
management system exists to access,
update, and share information on graduates. Such a system would enable schools
to share information horizontally and
enable them to easily communicate to
higher levels of State Department and
DOD officials what graduate resources
are available in certain countries or positions, instead of expecting decisionmakers
to painstakingly track this information
from each school. This data sharing
has occurred on a smaller scale in ways
that can be replicated. For example, the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s
five regional centers now use the same
student management system, which allows for full visibility of the background
of international students between the
centers and allows the centers to easily
share information.
Although graduate engagement
should be headquartered at each school,
many alumni activities can be carried out
in a joint manner. For example, at previous NDU regional continuing education
seminars, we have partnered with the regional centers to invite their graduates to
participate in the event. Likewise, Army
War College graduates have occasionally
joined. This only enriches the alumni
network and opens more opportunities
to individual graduates. Whereas U.S.
Armed Forces are culturally divided along
service lines, in the eyes of our international partners, any of these schools act as
representatives of the United States.
Shift Focus from Tracking
Information to Building Relationships.
We regret that most U.S. efforts to date
in reaching graduates have focused on
collecting information, not building
relationships. Narrowly focusing on
Thacker and Lambert
75
data collection can imply we are only
interested in monitoring graduates for
one-way benefit, as if it were an intelligence gathering effort. Instead, focusing
on genuinely building relationships
through engagement will ultimately
provide more lasting and mutual benefits.
This engagement ought to happen with
all levels of graduates, not just those occupying prominent or strategic positions.
The way in which we build relationships is first by communicating and
then finding ways to work together.
The most important information that
can be retained on graduates is their
contact information, such as a simple
email address. An email or social media
address opens up a range of tools such as
e-newsletters, webinars, instant messaging, and real-time feedback. Social media
cannot be overlooked as a crucial way
to maintain relationships, although not
all graduates are capable of or comfortable with communicating in this way. In
addition to online outreach, regional or
U.S.-based seminars or conferences allow
these relationships to be maintained and
strengthened over time.
We work together when we find ways
to leverage graduates, both as ongoing
resources to schools and as potential partners in their home countries, and allow
graduates access to our networks and
resources. Just as international students in
PME courses are often expected to offer a
different perspective in a U.S.-dominated
academic environment, international
graduates can make a unique contribution to schools by enriching their
curriculum, contacts, publications, and
opinions. For example, one school we
spoke to plans to invite international
graduates back on campus each year to
sit in on courses and give feedback on
whether the curriculum is keeping pace
with security issues around the world.
Likewise, U.S. officials should be aware
of these graduates and seek out their
assistance and perspective on matters of
U.S. policy in their countries. Graduates
can be relied on as sounding boards by
U.S. officials who need feedback on new
ideas or proposals, and they can be effective interlocutors on the other side of
the table. Moreover, graduates should be
76
encouraged to reach out and utilize U.S.
opinions, contacts, and resources to the
greatest extent possible as full partners.
There are many other potential ways to
use alumni we have not yet discovered.
Our experience in senior PME international programs convinces us that we
are gaining a good return on investment
when the students are in residence, both
in achieving learning outcomes and influencing perceptions of students. However,
in failing to maintain these relationships
in the long run, we are missing out on
the highest returns and fullest potential of
these programs. Effective engagement of
graduates across PME schools is entirely
possible, but it requires the development
of more sound policy, dedication of
resources, collaboration, and a creative
approach to utilize and engage graduates
as part of a robust graduate network.
It is hard to argue against the value
of strong international partnerships in
today’s security environment. Declining
U.S. resources and drawdowns of defense
budgets continue to bring security cooperation to the forefront in terms of value
and effectiveness. There has never been a
better time for the U.S. Government to
invest in the relationships that have been
formed with the body of international
military students who have attended
PME institutions. This is a low-cost,
high-return way to keep our international
partnerships strong. JFQ
Notes
1
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
“International Professional Military Education
(PME) Strategy,” CJCS Guide 1800, August
31, 2011.
2
U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), International Military Education and
Training: Agencies Should Emphasize Human
Rights Training and Improve Evaluations, GAO12-123 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2011), 4.
3
Foreign Assistance Act, 22 USC §2347b
(1961), “Congressional Declaration of Purpose,” available at <www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/text/22/2347b>.
4
Wolfgang Koerner, “Security Sector
Reform: Defence Diplomacy,” Parliamentary
Information and Research Service, May 17,
2006, available at <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/
LOP/researchpublications/prb0612-e.pdf>.
JPME Today / Getting More from International Partnerships
5
U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification: Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2010), 142.
6
U.S. Department of Defense, United
States Field Studies Program (FSP) for International Military and Civilian Students and
Military-Sponsored Visitors, DOD Instruction
5410.17 (2006).
7
Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
Security Assistance Management Manual,
C10.6.3.1, available at <www.samm.dsca.mil/
chapter/chapter-10>.
8
General Mieczysław Cieniuch, remarks
at NDU Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony,
Washington, DC, January 10, 2012.
9
Adam Jungdahl and Paul Lambert, “Winning Hearts by Broadening Minds: Measuring
the Impact of International Military Assistance
at the National Defense University,” The
DISAM Annual 1 (2012), 153.
10
Ibid.
11
Foreign Assistance Act, 22 USC §2347g
(1961), “Records Regarding Foreign Participants,” available at <www.law.cornell.edu/
uscode/text/22/2347g>. The GAO uses the
term “monitor” to refer to tracking alumni
in-country. Because this word is often associated with surveillance, we prefer instead to talk
about maintaining accurate records or staying
in contact with graduates.
12
GAO, International Military Education
and Training, 19.
13
GAO, Security Assistance: Observations
on the International Military Education and
Training Program, GAO/NSIAD-90-215BR
(Washington, DC: GAO, 1990).
14
GAO, Joint Military Education: Actions
Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for
Enhancing Leadership Development, GAO-1429 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2013).
15
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
International PME Strategy, A-1.
16
Joint Security Cooperation Education
and Training, 10-54 (2011) Army Regulation
12-15, SECNAVINST 4950.4B, AFI 16-105.
10-54, 186–187.
17
Office of the Naval Inspector General,
Report of Investigation: Senior Official Case
201103025 (2012), available at <www.secnav.
navy.mil/ig/Pages/FOIA/ReadingRoom.
aspx>.
18
GAO, International Military Education
and Training, 19.
19
LTC Christopher M. Coglianese, email
message to author, December 6, 2013.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
President Obama and Afghan President Hamid
Karzai exchange documents at Presidential
Palace in Kabul after signing Enduring Strategic
Partnership Agreement (White House/Pete Souza)
Asymmetry Is Strategy,
Strategy Is Asymmetry
By Lukas Milevski
uch of the strategic studies literature of the past two decades
identifies profound novelty in
the conduct and challenges of modern
war, novelty that ultimately calls into
question the nature and even existence
of war. War has allegedly now been
transformed from a regular, conventional, purportedly symmetric exercise
M
into an irregular, unconventional,
asymmetric event, which must be
understood anew.
Of all the new descriptors for war,
“asymmetric” is among the broadest. It
has even been suggested that asymmetry
does not bear definition: “to define the
term defies its very meaning, purpose,
and significance.”1 Some, undeterred
Lukas Milevski is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Graduate Institute of Political and International Studies at
the University of Reading, United Kingdom.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
by such extreme pronouncements, have
attempted at least to categorize various
existing and potential concepts of asymmetry. Thus, Jan Angstrom has identified
four different prisms through which
asymmetry may be interpreted: “power
distribution, organisational status of the
actor, method of warfare, and norms.”2
Yet despite claims of newness, it has
also been observed that asymmetry has
infused nearly every, if not every, war in
recorded history. (Possibly only the hoplite phalanxes of ancient Greece could be
Milevski
77
considered properly symmetrical in nearly
all respects, for geography, demographics,
and so forth make all polities fundamentally asymmetrical to some degree.)
Misunderstanding asymmetry poses
significant dangers: “our misuse of the
terms asymmetry and asymmetric distorts
those vital processes and leads us to make
major strategic blunders. For example,
by focusing on threats rather than enemy
strategies we fail to understand their strategic nature, goals, and overall concepts
of operations.”3
The question thus arises: how may
one fruitfully discuss asymmetry as a
separate phenomenon? Perhaps the time
has come to abandon the endeavor as unhelpful and rather suggest that asymmetry
in war, and even asymmetric strategy, are
redundancies. Asymmetry is strategy, and
strategy is asymmetry. This article argues
the point in three parts. First, it suggests
that observations of a novel change are
overexaggerated. Second, it maintains
that no matter the form war may take, the
function of strategy is eternal. Third, it
proposes that contemporary asymmetric
conflicts are all comprehensible through
the lens of strategy.
Form over Substance
Theorists of contemporary conflict,
whether describing asymmetric or
unconventional wars, war among the
people, or other iterations of modern
armed conflict, usually posit significant
change in the character, if not actual
nature, of war. Many of them accurately
identify and analyze the characteristics
of modern interventions. In perceiving
significant differences between modern
war and wars past, however, they caricature historical conflict.
Thus, Rupert Smith argues that “war
as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field between
men and machinery, war as a massive
deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”4
Martin van Creveld propounds the notion that “the demise of conventional
war will cause strategy in its traditional,
Clausewitzian sense to disappear.”5
Fourth-generation warfare theorists such
as T.X. Hammes identify generations of
78
warfare with particular styles of conducting war; third-generation warfare is, for
example, maneuver warfare, and fourthgeneration warfare “uses all available
networks—political, economic, social,
and military—to convince the enemy’s
political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too
costly for the perceived benefit. It is an
evolved form of insurgency.”6
Yet their theories on the changes
in war depend upon caricaturing what
came before. They have succeeded
somewhat in part because many centers
of strategic education similarly caricature
historical war. These caricatures rely on
a Eurocentric perspective of strategic
history. Smith’s war as a battle in a
field between men and machinery and
Hammes’s third-generation warfare as
maneuver warfare, for example, both
rely on the World Wars, especially World
War II. These wars were fought among
European or Western polities, all of
which have similar strategic cultures. Yet
modern interventions primarily take place
between Western powers and polities
elsewhere in the world, with significant
differences in strategic culture. Theorists
of change in war are comparing apples
with oranges and perceiving change
based on such flawed comparisons, which
serve only to churn various fashions in
strategic thought.
To analyze interventions, comparisons to the Third Afghan War of 1919
or the Rif War of 1919–1926 would
much more accurately demonstrate how
much war has actually changed. Similarly,
conventional war must be compared
to conventional war. Notably, Russia’s
2008 invasion of Georgia did not trigger a Georgian insurgency against the
Russians, or even against the Abkhazians
or South Ossetians. The war remained
conventional throughout. The Iraq War
of 2003 did transform into an insurgency,
but not immediately. The period of a few
months between the end of conventional
operations and the serious beginning of
the insurgency was terribly squandered by
the United States, which visibly failed to
begin righting the country. Although it
would be incorrect to say that this great
Commentary / Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry
strategic and political failure caused the
insurgency, it certainly exacerbated it.
Hew Strachan has suggested that “the
real problem may well be that our policy
has failed to recognise war’s true nature,
and so has mistaken changing characteristics for something more fundamental
than they actually are.”7 This mischaracterization is frequently manifested in the
belief, as apparent before Iraq in 2003
and during some of the advocacy for
intervention in Syria in 2013, that war
is not adversarial, that enemies do not
reciprocally interact with, and against,
each other. The character of any war is
not unilaterally set by any one implicated
polity, but by the reciprocal hostility of all
those involved. Thus, in not accounting
for the enemy’s own initiative against
us, the Western powers are blindsided
by actions that are then interpreted as
integral to the structure of contemporary
war rather than as the consequence of
something inherent in war, which is more
fundamental and eternal.
Asymmetry and Strategy
That which is eternal is strategy, the
purposeful threat or use of violence to
achieve desired ends. Strategy has no
permanent form, although it always
retains its enduring substance and function. Strategy has always been practiced,
even though before the word’s rediscovery in the 1770s, strategies explicitly
labeled as such may not have been
expressly planned or implemented.8 The
core task of strategy may be identified
as Everett Dolman does: “strategy, in
its simplest form, is a plan for attaining continuing advantage.”9 Dolman
rightly observes that the strategist’s
task is usually aided more by advantage
than disadvantage. “Advantage,” like
strategy, is not defined by a particular
form. Advantage may take the form of
materiel, political will, a superior grasp
of how to translate forces deployed into
aims achieved, or so on. Understanding
war and all the influences on it is necessarily multidisciplinary; therefore, asymmetry may manifest itself in a similarly
wide range.
Strategy may be thus cast in a
more absolute manner than merely the
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Special Forces Soldier crosses roof of compound during combat with Taliban forces in Bahlozi Village, Maiwand District, Kandahar Province (DOD)
achievement of continuing advantage.
Rather, strategy may be interpreted as the
generation and exploitation of asymmetry
for the purposes of the war. Roger Barnett
complains that:
asymmetries arise if opponents enjoy
greater freedom of action, or if they have
weapons or techniques available to them
that one does not. Perpetrators seek to void
the strengths of their adversaries and to
be unpredictable. They endeavor to take
advantage of an ability to follow certain
courses of action or to employ methods that
can be neither anticipated nor countered
effectively.10
Yet this is the very essence of strategy.
Strategy is an adversarial act; the enemy
also has a will, a capability, and a vote in
the outcome. This reciprocal nature of
strategy is a primary source of strategy’s
nonlinearity, for defeat may beget renewed defiance and alternative attempts
to achieve one’s goals, rather than the
desired submission. Thus, Edward
Luttwak, for instance, identifies the very
pinnacle of strategic performance as “the
suspension, if only brief, if only partial,
of the entire predicament of strategy.”11
The predicament of strategy is the enemy.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
The pinnacle, therefore, is the removal of
the enemy’s ability, however temporarily,
to influence outcomes. Suffering from
a position of weakness in an asymmetric relationship restricts one’s abilities
to influence outcomes based on that
relationship. To generate asymmetry effectively is to be, although not necessarily
the only way to be, a skilled strategist.
The generation of asymmetry is the
basis of much, if not most, strategic
theory, particularly power-specific theories such as those pertaining to seapower
or airpower. Command of the sea or of
the air cannot mean anything other than
the generation of a major operational
asymmetry in either of those warfighting
domains relative to the enemy. Similarly,
the very idea of massing and applying
one’s forces against the decisive point, a
theme in both Antoine-Henri Jomini’s
and Carl von Clausewitz’s works, is
to generate asymmetry in a particular
location, to achieve the desired wider effects. The debates about the revolution
in military affairs and transformation
are also ultimately about generating
significant asymmetry, albeit in the form
of a particular silver bullet. Cold War
nuclear strategy was similarly meant to
establish asymmetries of commitment,
even when theorists might not be able to
make operational sense of asymmetries of
capability, particularly in the theories of
Thomas Schelling. The strategic theories
of Basil Liddell Hart were so steeped in
the generation of asymmetry that it apparently affected his understanding of the
moral component of strategy. He focused
relentlessly on the indirect approach to
create situations in which the enemy
would be utterly helpless, therefore hopeless, and so would surrender without
undue bloodshed, thereby removing
killing from the concept of morality in
strategy. Instead, “strategy is the very
opposite of morality, as it is largely concerned with the art of deception,” in
reality not because killing had no place in
morality, but because killing had no place
in his idea of good strategy.12
Asymmetry is thus clearly compatible with conventional warfare, simply
because it is good strategy. During World
War II, the conventional war par excellence, the Allies ultimately established
major asymmetries in military-industrial
production and logistics, on the sea,
and in the air over all the Axis countries.
World War I was a bloody stalemate on
the Western Front for so long in large
part because until 1918 neither side was
Milevski
79
able to generate the asymmetries required
to break it. The belligerents who generated the most important asymmetries
ultimately won. Not all asymmetries are
equal; some may be more immediate
than others, some may be ultimately
more damaging to one’s ability to achieve
desired goals than others, and so on.
Effective asymmetry, like effective strategy, is context-sensitive.
Asymmetry is strategy, strategy is
asymmetry. Conrad Crane of the U.S.
Army War College is reputed to have
suggested that “there are two types
of warfare: asymmetric and stupid.”13
Generating effective asymmetry is good
strategy. To condemn rhetorically our opponents for generating asymmetry reveals
our conditioning born of understanding
recent history through the prism of wishful thinking, of expecting one’s enemies
to be poor strategists such as those faced
in 1990–1991, 2001, and 2003. Wishful
thinking, operationalized as unrealistically
optimistic assumptions, does not usually
lead to strategic success, as our experience
of the variably labeled “war on terror” or
“Long War” clearly indicates.
One might counter that conventional
asymmetries on land, sea, and air are
far more easily understood than unconventional asymmetries such as guerrilla
warfare. This may indeed be the case, but
so what? One may understand a threat
and still be incapable of countering it.
German General Fridolin von Senger
und Etterlin, who had participated in
the Italian campaign of 1943–1945,
once likened operating under Allied air
supremacy to playing chess against an
opponent who could play three pieces
each turn to his one. No amount of
understanding of the threat can help alleviate a situation if that understanding
cannot be turned into operational plans
and successful outcomes. This is just as
true of conventional asymmetries as of
unconventional ones. In fact, conventional asymmetries are usually the more
dangerous of the two for their ultimate
political effects are usually greater, as
the experience of warlords from Darius
III to Napoleon to Adolf Hitler may
attest. Each lost his empire to enemies
who were ultimately more capable of
80
generating effective asymmetry. Relatively
few unconventional asymmetries have
had the historical effect equivalent to
losing an empire. One of the few pertinent, albeit inexact, examples is the
American Revolutionary War, but even
that war was “hybrid” rather than purely
unconventional.14
Strategy in Contemporary War
Asymmetry today is most commonly
associated with insurgency and irregular foes. Contemporary theories on
strategies for counterinsurgency also
implicitly emphasize the generation
of effective asymmetry against the socalled asymmetric enemy. Unlike the
generation of conventional asymmetries,
many of which tend to be domain-oriented, contemporary counterinsurgency
theory emphasizes asymmetry from the
perspective of the population’s support,
through the provision of security and
other services, including effective
governance. David Galula is frequently
identified as the progenitor of this
theory. It is nevertheless significant
that his proposed strategic blueprint for
counterinsurgency only begins with the
destruction or expulsion of insurgents
as an organized body and ends, after the
organization of local communities into
effective and self-sustaining political
entities, with the destruction of the last
of the insurgents.15
Force does not lack utility against a
foe that is generating unconventional
asymmetry. Indeed, the very form of
that asymmetry reveals a significant
concern about one’s own conventional
military superiority over the insurgent.
Unconventional asymmetry is guerrilla
warfare, arising from military weakness and infused with concern for the
survival of the insurgent force. Without
that force, the insurgency is likely to
fail. Galula noted that “in any situation,
whatever the cause, there will be an active
minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the
cause.”16 A neutral majority will acquiesce
to whichever party appears most likely to
succeed. One of the most publicly visible
features of such a measurement is the
apparent effectiveness of the respective
Commentary / Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry
armed forces. The truism that the counterinsurgent loses if he does not win, but
the insurgent wins if he does not lose, is
indicative of this. Once the counterinsurgent, superior in strength, fails to win and
so withdraws from the conflict, the only
remaining viable power in the country
will be the insurgent force. This truism is,
of course, true only in the context of intervention because the counterinsurgent
ultimately must leave; it is not an iron law
of insurgency as such, as the example of
Sri Lanka may attest.
This observation is not new to contemporary war. C.E. Callwell, one of
the major luminaries of historical British
strategic thought on small wars, offered an
explanation at the end of the 19th century:
“It is a singular feature of small wars that
from the point of view of strategy the regular forces are upon the whole at a distinct
disadvantage as compared to their antagonists.” In battle, however, regular troops
have the tactical advantage: “Since tactics
favour the regular troops while strategy
favours the enemy, the object to be sought
for clearly is to fight, not to manoeuvre,
to meet the hostile forces in open battle,
not to compel them to give way by having
recourse to strategy.”17 The imbalance of
military power between intervener and
insurgent was, and remains, the basis for
the guerrilla’s choice of strategy.
It is noteworthy in this context that,
of the four great theorists of insurgent
warfare, T.E. Lawrence, Mao Zedong,
Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto “Che”
Guevara, only Lawrence did not theorize
the eventual transition from guerrilla
to relatively, if not absolutely, conventional warfare for the final campaigns
definitively to seize power from the
government forces. Lawrence, of course,
fought as part of a larger conventional
operation commanded by General
Edmund Allenby and so had no need to
turn his fighters into a conventional force.
This is not to argue that members of the
Taliban are running around the Hindu
Kush with Mao’s little red book in their
pockets, but rather that these authors
identified the limits of guerrilla warfare.
Thus, not even insurgency may violate
the fundamental truth which J.C. Wylie
observed: “the ultimate determinant in
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
war is the man on the scene with the gun.
This man is the final power in war. He is
control. He determines who wins.”18
The enemy relies upon unconventional asymmetry if he believes himself
unable to succeed without it. The Taliban
in Helmand Province only turned back to
tried-and-tested guerrilla tactics after suffering disastrous casualties in futile frontal
assaults on British bases. This adaptation
coincided with the loss of widespread
local support, as “the cost of aligning
themselves with the Taliban turned out
to be very high for many communities in
terms of destruction and loss of life,” as
well as with consequent Taliban attempts
to regain some local legitimacy and support.19 The generation of asymmetry
through guerrilla tactics has both advantages and disadvantages, which must be
examined with respect to the function
of strategy, that is, the conversion of violence into desired political effect for both
the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.
The basis of strategy is war, the purpose of which “is some measure of control
over the enemy.” Control is a rarely
defined term whose limits are quite broad,
being “neither so extreme as to amount
to extermination . . . nor . . . so tenuous
as to foster the continued behavior of the
enemy as a hazard to the victory.”20 The
pattern of events in war is driven by the
reciprocal interaction of adversaries, “a
contest for freedom of action.”21 Since
control pertains to freedom of action, one
might identify three different categories
of control. The weakest form of control is
merely the denial of control, or preventing the enemy from unduly restricting
one’s own freedom of action. Once a
belligerent is relatively strong enough, he
may attempt to take control and threaten
actively to limit his opponent’s freedom of
action. The final type of control is its exercise after having taken it, to prosecute the
war to a successful conclusion. Much of
strategic theory assumes that a belligerent
without freedom of action or the ability
to pursue his political goals will ultimately
abandon his endeavor.
Unconventional asymmetry is capable
only of denying control to the superior
enemy. Despite being the weakest form
of control, it remains potent. A strategy
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Special Forces Soldier exits building during operations in Arghandab District, Afghanistan (U.S.
Army/Gino Palu)
based upon the accumulated effect of
minor actions and continued elusiveness
to deny control of the operational pattern
of the war presents significant difficulties for the opposing side. Presenting no
single set of targets and acting against and
among civilians across geographies larger
than their opponents may completely
secure provide the counterinsurgent with
a wide array of potential choices, whose
strategic worth may be estimated but
hardly known. Thus, Harry Summers
caustically noted that during the Vietnam
War, the United States identified up to
22 different wartime objectives.22 This
plethora of choice encourages unproductive or even counterproductive actions
and contradicting policy goals on the
part of the conventionally superior
force. For instance, in Afghanistan, U.S.
policies simultaneously require the local
warlords to be liquidated for purposes
of state-building and to be preserved
to fight the Taliban.23 Unconventional
asymmetry targets the stronger foe’s
strategy rather than the enemy himself.
The counterinsurgent, if unable to bring
force or other tools effectively to bear
to weaken the insurgency, merely marks
time with blood. Time is a precious
commodity in strategy and must be used
wisely, but the substantial intellectual
challenge facing the counterinsurgent
places significant obstacles on the path of
so doing.
Despite its deleterious effects on the
stronger opponent’s strategic performance, unconventional asymmetry is a
serious strategic gamble. Although it denies control to the enemy, the insurgents
themselves also do not gain control over
the pattern of the war. Both sides tend
to have the maximum freedom of action possible in an otherwise reciprocally
adversarial context. The Viet Cong might
skulk into Saigon to plant explosives, but
the Marines could hold Khe Sanh, within
spitting distance of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, which was absolutely vital to the
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese
army in South Vietnam. In such a situation, barring any dramatic changes, rarely
Milevski
81
M1 Abrams tanks maneuver in streets of Tall Afar, Iraq, as they conduct combat patrol (U.S. Air Force/Aaron Allmon)
is there a clear indication of who holds
the advantage until the conflict itself actually ends.
Strategy poses a difficult challenge
due to the nonlinearities involved, many
of which stem from the active presence
of an independently acting adversary. Yet
on the sliding scale of difficulty, the generation of asymmetry through guerrilla
warfare may almost be a leap of faith.
Although the skilled guerrilla retains
initiative in being able to choose his own
battlefields, the power of decision is preserved for his foe. The denier of control
has no direct influence on the perception
of his efforts in the opposing headquarters; he cannot impose a victory, but can
only wait until his opponent acquiesces
to defeat. Although today insurgents are
able to fight figuratively in the media as
well as literally on the ground, the pressure of public opinion seems to count
for less in wartime than in peacetime
because of the other pressures war generates: “The declaration of war, and more
82
immediately the use of violence, alters
everything. From that point on, the demands of war tend to shape policy, more
than the direction of policy shapes war.”24
The generation of asymmetry
through use of guerrilla tactics may be a
strategy that Western powers find difficult
to defeat, despite more than a decade of
constant experience with attempting to
combat it. It is nevertheless fundamentally the same phenomenon as generating
asymmetry through commanding the
sea or the air and may be understood
with the same basic toolbox of strategic
concepts. British mastery of the seas
largely bewildered French attempts to
defeat it for over a century and resulted
in the French development of a number
of methods by which to strike at British
command of the sea without directly
challenging it, including the guerre de
course and the later jeune école, which was
obsessed with the potential of torpedo
boats. Today the roles are reversed, for
the weaker belligerent has bewildered the
Commentary / Asymmetry Is Strategy, Strategy Is Asymmetry
Western powers and left them scrambling
to determine how to combat the threat.
Many time-tested methods of
defeating guerrillas directly are unacceptable to liberal powers today. As David
Kilcullen puts it, “Indeed, any given
state’s approach to counterinsurgency
depends on the nature of the state, and
the concept of ‘counterinsurgency’ can
mean entirely different things depending on the character of the government
involved.”25 These methods may also be
inappropriate for the specific conditions
in which Western powers find themselves.
Treating counterinsurgency as social work
is more amenable to Western sensitivities
than treating it as war. Although counterinsurgency definitely is the latter, it may
well be both. Violence remains the base
coinage of strategy, but this does not rule
out the utility of counterfeits or other
instruments of political power. One must
remember that these tools are merely used
as replacements for violence in specific
circumstances where they may effectively
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
take the place of force. War is war, but war
is also politics. The other instruments of
political power do not lose relevance once
violence begins, but their utility is tempered by the introduction of force.
Moreover, it may be possible that
today, compared to all prior historical experience, it is easiest for liberal powers to
track and target insurgents. This is due to
a number of factors, including the widespread use of new communications and
other technologies, and new techniques
to use this technology.26 Taking the fight
directly to the insurgents has become a
plausible option for liberal democracies
in a way that would not have previously
been allowed, with massive cordons
and conscription of locals to serve in
temporary militias. With an increasing
ability to strike desirable insurgent targets
directly and relatively precisely comes an
opportunity, in theory but also necessarily
tempered by the actual circumstances of
practice, to render relatively ineffective
the generation of asymmetry through
guerrilla tactics. The particular character
of specific asymmetries does not change
the fact that they all may be comprehended through the lens of strategy.
vote on the character and outcome
of the war. Lawrence Freedman once
defined strategy as “the art of creating
power.”29 Given that power is a necessarily relational quality—for one cannot have
power in the absence of an entity on or
against which it may be exercised—the
generation of asymmetry is the restriction
and minimization of the enemy’s effective
power vis-à-vis oneself and the multiplication and maximization of one’s own
against that adversary.
Labeling only a certain segment of
strategies as asymmetric risks obscuring
the enormous real asymmetric advantages liberal democracies have over those
insurgents who purportedly employ
the asymmetric strategies. This practice
threatens conceptually to detach asymmetric warfare from war and strategy by
treating it as something else, and in doing
so it contributes toward preventing the
Western powers from fully and effectively
employing force against weaker challengers, as the popularity of asymmetry
in strategic literature is a self-reinforcing
symptom of our diluted grasp on strategy.
Asymmetry will ever remain strategy, and
strategy will ever remain asymmetry. JFQ
Conclusion
Rupert Smith is skeptical of the idea of
asymmetric warfare. He rightly indicates
that “the practice of war, indeed its ‘art,’
is to achieve an asymmetry over the
opponent. Labeling wars as asymmetric
is to me something of a euphemism to
avoid acknowledging that my opponent
is not playing to my strengths and I am
not winning.”27 Smith’s euphemism
implies that the opponent is practicing
strategy better than the Western powers
are; since the practice of strategy determines how any particular polity engages
in warfare, the implications of poor strategic practice are grave.
Asymmetry as now commonly used—
to denote a supposedly particular new
type of war—is not a useful term and, for
some, implies strategic ethnocentric hubris that “assumes there is only one truth
and model for warfare, and that we alone
have it.”28 In fact, today and historically,
most strategies seek to generate asymmetry as a way of minimizing the enemy’s
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Notes
1
Jesse G. Chace, “Defining Asymmetric
Warfare: A Losing Proposition,” Joint Force
Quarterly 61 (2nd Quarter 2011), 124.
2
Jan Angstrom, “Evaluating Rivalling Interpretations of Asymmetric War and Warfare,”
in Conceptualising Modern War, ed. Karl Erik
Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø, 31 (London: Hurst
& Company, 2011).
3
Stephen J. Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric
Threats (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2003), v.
4
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art
of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin
Books 2006), 1.
5
Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of
War (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
6
T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On
War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press
2004), 2, 3.
7
Hew Strachan, “Introductory Essay: The
Changing Character of War,” in Conceptualising
Modern War, 25.
8
Beatrice Heuser, “Strategy Before the
Word: Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World,”
RUSI Journal 155, no. 1 (February/March
2010), 36–42.
9
Everett C. Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power
and Principle in the Space and Information Age
(New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 6.
10
Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare:
Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2003), 15.
11
Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic
of War and Peace (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
2001), 4.
12
Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York:
Meridian, 1991), 220.
13
Quotation from Emile Simpson, War
from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century
Combat as Politics (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), 140.
14
Williamson Murray, “The American Revolution: Hybrid War in America’s Past,” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from
the Ancient World to the Present, ed. Williamson
Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, 72–103 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
15
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 2006), 55.
16
Ibid., 53.
17
C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles
and Practice (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1996), 85, 91.
18
J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General
Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1989), 72.
19
Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The
Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency,
2004–2012,” International Affairs 89, no. 4
(2013), 854.
20
Wylie, 66, 70.
21
André Beaufre, An Introduction to
Strategy, trans. R.H. Barry (London: Faber and
Faber, 1965), 110.
22
Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York:
Presidio Press, 1995), 98.
23
Mark Peceny and Yury Bosin, “Winning
with Warlords in Afghanistan,” Small Wars
& Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (September 2011),
603–618.
24
Hew Strachan, “Strategy in the TwentyFirst Century,” in The Changing Character of
War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers,
508 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
25
David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency
(London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 155.
26
Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and
Thomas L. Cantrell, “Employing ISR: SOF Best
Practices,” Joint Force Quarterly 50 (3rd Quarter
2008), 56–61; Mark Urban, Task Force Black:
The Explosive True Story of the SAS and the Secret
War in Iraq (London: Little, Brown, 2010).
27
Smith, 4.
28
Blank, 15–16.
29
Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Studies
and the Problem of Power,” in War, Strategy
and International Politics: Essays in Honour of
Sir Michael Howard, ed. Lawrence Freedman,
Paul Hayes, and Robert O’Neill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
Milevski
83
Senior Airmen program Wireless Gate Release
System before airdrop at Bagram Air Field
(U.S. Air Force/Evelyn Chavez)
Is Military Science “Scientific”?
By Glenn Voelz
he term military science generally
describes the body of theories,
concepts, and methods for
employing armed forces. However, as
an academic discipline it is ill defined,
drawing from a patchwork of curricula including history, foreign affairs,
security studies, leadership, operations
management, and systems engineering, as well as other elements of the
physical and social sciences. Notably,
the Department of Defense dictionary does not even provide a definition.
T
Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Voelz, USA, is Chief of
the Intelligence Control Division, Directorate for
Intelligence (G2), U.S. Army Africa.
This vague categorization is somewhat
reflective of the term’s diminished
status from its 19th-century usage when
Military Science was frequently capitalized and placed alongside Physics,
Philosophy, and other well-established
academic disciplines.
An irony of the term’s decline is that
it occurred over a period when military
professionals increasingly conceptualized their discipline in the terminology
and metaphors of science. This transformation was driven in part by the
institutionalization of officer education
programs emphasizing the formalized
study of military theory. A second factor,
rapid industrialization, firmly established
science and technology as the central
84 Commentary / Is Military Science “Scientific”?
pillars of American military power and
arguably the foundational elements in approaches to doctrine and planning. These
trends reinforced the proposition that the
practical application of military theory,
as expressed through strategy, doctrine,
and planning, was becoming more of a
science and less of an art. This perspective
has reached an apex in recent decades,
epitomized by doctrinal methodologies seeking to reduce decisionmaking
to formulaic processes—not unlike the
methods used by chemists mixing compounds for desired effect. In particular,
there has been a tendency toward instrumental applications of descriptive theory
attempting to distill complex social dynamics into bounded problem statements
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
that fit neatly into proscribed planning
schemas and process solutions.1
Military science certainly shares some
basic traits with the physical sciences
in the use of observation, description,
measurement, and structured analysis
supporting causal inferences or explanatory hypotheses. However, military
science remains distinct from the physical
sciences in significant ways, most notably
in the absence of controlled, replicable
experimentation as means of validating
theory. For this and others reasons, the
conceptual foundations of the field reside
more appropriately in the realm of the
social sciences. While this conclusion may
be intuitively obvious to most military
professionals, its practical implications
are increasingly overlooked and are
reflective of a deep and persistent strain
of “scientism” within the intellectual
foundation of American approaches to
military theory, doctrine, and planning.2
Origins of American
Military Scientism
Observers have long suggested a distinct techno-scientific orientation as
the defining characteristic of American
approaches to strategy, doctrine, and
planning. Early military theory in the
United States was based largely on
inherited European traditions profoundly influenced by Newtonian logic
with emphasis on deterministic relationships and predictable linear interactions
between forces.3 Discovery of laws
describing the natural universe led to
the search for similar constants governing interactions among armies in the
field. Such early examples of “military
scientism” reflected a growing belief
that warfare, like other natural phenomena, could be analyzed to reveal basic
patterns and predictable characteristics.
These precedents deeply influenced
early American approaches to military
theory requiring that authoritative scientific principles serve as the basis for
doctrinal approaches, while technological innovation came to be viewed as the
transformational element in the history
of warfare. The founding of West Point
in the early 19th century reflected these
influences, particularly under the early
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
leadership of superintendent Sylvanus
Thayer, who firmly entrenched a technical
and engineering-based curriculum as the
preferred intellectual foundation for military leaders. This approach was reinforced
under Professor Dennis Hart Mahan, who
was instrumental in transferring European
knowledge and practices to the Academy
with particular emphasis on engineering,
fortifications, ballistics, and topography as
core elements of military education.
Within this context, military theorist
Baron de Jomini emerged as perhaps the
most influential theorist in 19th-century
America. The Swiss-born officer held that
all strategy was “controlled by invariable
scientific principles” and attempted to
reduce its conduct to prescriptive rules
deeply rooted in empirical methods and
analysis of historical example.4 Indeed, his
“scientifically” derived concepts of mass,
maneuver, and lines of operation remain
central to American doctrine and military
theory to this day.
Carl von Clausewitz was the other
dominant influence on late 19th-century
American military thinking. With his
emphasis on complexity and ambiguity, Clausewitz is often viewed as the
theorist more relevant to modern
“nonlinear” warfare, yet his vocabulary
also reflects the powerful influences of
Renaissance-era science, particularly
his use of Newtonian analogies—force,
mass, center of gravity—to describe
the nature of armed conflict.5 Indeed,
central to Clausewitzian thought is the
concept of “friction,” illustrating the
role that chance and uncertainty play as
determining factors in war. Like Jomini,
Clausewitz shared the view that knowledge of science combined with practical
experience and deep study of history was
fundamental in preparation for command. However, he was less convinced of
the utility of universal principles and sacrosanct theory as guides to the conduct
of war. Rather, Clausewitz suggested that
the purpose of theory was to educate the
mind of a leader rather than “accompany
him to the field of battle.”6 Furthermore,
he cautioned against the tendency for
theory to furnish commanders with
positive doctrines and systems to be used
“like mental appliances.”7
Within this intellectual milieu evolved
the concurrent phenomena of military
professionalization and industrialization, both serving to reinforce America’s
emerging techno-scientific approach
to warfare. Lessons of the Civil War
awakened theorists to the criticality of
mobility, logistics, and industrial production as central aspects of strategic
calculation. Additionally, the decades
prior to World War I marked a period
of intense scientific, technological, and
industrial innovation transforming the
practice of warfare with the introduction
of radio, submarines, airplanes, automobiles, machineguns, and high explosives.
Theorists and planners were not only
embracing the promise of new technology
but also examining how scientific methods and modern management practices
could be transferred from the laboratory and factory floor to the battlefield.
Development of the modern staff system
and functional specialization reflected
this impulse, necessitated in part by the
increasingly complicated management
tasks associated with mass mobilization
and logistical demands of industrial age
warfare. This evolution also demanded
more formalized systems of military training and education with an emphasis on
structured methodologies and codified
doctrine. Just as scientific management
practices rationalized the process of
industrial production, military theorists
attempted to bring “order, regularity, and
predictability” to the practice of war.8
Among influential 20th-century
military theorists, B.H. Liddell Hart was
one of the more devout believers that the
scientific study of warfare would reveal “a
few truths of experience which seem so
universal, and so fundamental, as to be
termed axioms.”9 Though best known for
his advocacy of the “indirect approach”
and tenets of maneuver warfare, Hart’s
thinking reflected an increasingly influential pedagogical perspective viewing history
as the laboratory of military science. “If
the study of war in the past has so often
proved fallible as a guide to the course and
conduct of the next war,” he noted, “it
implies not that war is unsuited to scientific study but that the study has not been
scientific enough in spirit and method.”10
Voelz
85
New York Air National Guard’s 109th Airlift Wing flies LC-130 over Greenland on mission to resupply remote science research outposts (DOD/Fred W. Baker II)
J.F.C. Fuller, another dominant intellectual influence of the interwar period,
took this notion to its logical conclusion and argued for direct application of
scientific methodologies to the study of
warfare, asserting nothing less than his
desire “to do for war what Copernicus did
for astronomy, Newton for physics, and
Darwin for natural history.”11 Through exhaustive historical analysis of warfare from
antiquity to the modern era, Fuller became convinced that such methods would
“enable the student to study the history of
war scientifically, and to work out a plan
of war scientifically, and create, not only a
scientific method of discovery, but also a
scientific method of instruction.”12
The views of Hart and Fuller reflected a growing confidence in the
promise of scientifically managed warfare
based on technological innovation and
empirically derived approaches. This
phenomenon was not limited to land
warfare. Strains of such thinking were
clearly present in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
theories on seapower and the interplay
of technology, geography, and tactical
principles. Airpower theory was equally
driven by techno-scientific approaches
exemplified by influential thinkers such
as Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and
Hugh Trenchard, who variously promoted strategies based on innovative
technologies linked with theoretical yet
largely unproven principles of employment and effect.
World War II came closer than any
modern conflict to validating the notion that the coupling of technology
and scientific management could deliver
desired and predictable strategic ends.
Paul Kennedy’s recent study of the conflict masterfully depicts a “scientists’ war”
highlighting the remarkable achievements
of mid-level engineers and managers who
developed technical, organizational, and
process innovations to overcome many
of the war’s biggest challenges. Kennedy
focuses particularly on issues such as
convoy security, strategic bombing, and
86 Commentary / Is Military Science “Scientific”?
amphibious landings, where rapid fielding of technical solutions combined with
doctrinal and tactical adaptability delivered
significant and measurable advantages that
proved decisive in winning the war.13
By this analysis, World War II may be
read as vindication of the techno-scientific
approaches advocated by Jomini, Hart,
and Fuller. However, one must consider
whether the war represented an exemplar
or an isolated aberration. First, one is
struck by the remarkable symmetry in
means and method of the major combatants, particularly in terms of technological
sophistication, industrialization, organizational structures, and, to some degree,
doctrinal approach. Certainly when contrasted with other conflicts of the modern
era, it is the similarities between combatants more than the differences that seem
noteworthy. Moreover, Kennedy notes
that many of the central military challenges of the conflict—issues of time,
distance, and production—were problems particularly well suited to structured
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
analysis and technical and managerial
solutions. Multiple elements central to
wartime strategy such as convoy security
and strategic bombing provided relatively
straightforward feedback loops enabling
clear analysis, unambiguous experimentation, and rapid implementation of
functional solutions.
In any case, lessons of victory
profoundly influenced subsequent approaches of the Cold War era. From
the tactical to the strategic level, the
military turned to applied science, operations research, and systems analysis
to address the most complex national
security challenges of the postwar period.
Characteristics of the principal Cold War
adversaries—structured, homogenous, hierarchical, and doctrinally based—served
to reinforce the conclusion that military
planning and decisionmaking might be
mastered through algorithms and process
models. The field of intelligence as much
as any other became defined by such approaches. Technical collection capabilities
managed by centralized bureaucracies
proved remarkably effective at producing
detailed information on highly structured
conventional threats. In other respects,
the rise of the Cold War–era technoscientific regime was necessitated by the
increasingly complicated demands of
managing a massive and widely dispersed
standing military. Theorist Martin van
Creveld observed that the expanding
scope of military operations, logistics
networks, and occupational specialization increasingly demanded centralized
control and the leveraging of science,
mathematics, and advanced communications to enable effective coordination
on such a massive scale.14 This trend
naturally reinforced reliance on systems
analysis, operational research, and statistical methodologies as basic tools for
military decisionmaking and planning.
These trends had a profound influence during the Vietnam conflict
on approaches employed by Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara, particularly
efforts to translate tactical feedback into
quantifiable metrics for analyzing and
guiding strategic level decisionmaking.
Antoine Bousquet describes the concept
of “cybernetics” evolving out of World
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
War II that engendered an “understanding of war which strove to frame the use
of military force into an activity totally
amenable to scientific analysis, to the
detriment of other forms of thought.”15
However, these shortcomings did little
to challenge the prevailing notion that
warfare could be analyzed and managed
with scientific precision. Bousquet cites
as a high point of this trend the advent of
theories formalized under the rubric of
“revolution in military affairs” (RMA) in
the decades following Vietnam.
The essence of RMA maintained that
technological innovation and integrated
advances in weapons, information processing, communications, organizational
management, and doctrinal approaches
would be the primary drivers of future
military advantage. RMA emphasized
operations research and systems analysis
to frame strategy and planning decisions
as engineering problems to be solved
through data collection and analysis, presuming that measurable risk and outcome
probabilities could be estimated with
reasonable confidence through adherence
to doctrinal methods. These processoriented methods became increasingly
formalized and to this day dominate the
pedagogical approach to professional
military education.
Even with the end of the Cold War,
military theory and doctrinal development continued to reflect the persistent
influence of the techno-scientific approaches, notably with concepts such as
network-centric warfare and effects-based
operations, ideas closely related to the
cybernetic methods of the Vietnam era
and later RMA efforts. These doctrinal
theories were premised on analyzing the
battlefield environment as a holistic system of interdependent nodes and causal
linkages that could be identified and
acted upon with measured and predictable effect. This process was enabled by
conceptual models such as operational net
assessment and system-of-systems analysis.
These models apply computational tools,
algorithms, and data-intensive analyses
to disaggregate key dynamics of a given
operational environment and then revisualize their environments as coherent and
holistic systems.
After a decade of conflict defined by
unconventional adversaries, complex environments, and ambiguous operational
endstates, a new era of military scientism
is already taking form. The contours of
this next evolution might be described
as “post-Newtonian, post-Jominian.”
Army Design Theory has emerged as
the conceptual basis of a new approach
to planning in complex environments.
Meanwhile, military theorists are looking
to fields such as advanced mathematics, theoretical physics, and biology for
insights into complex system behavior
and modeling intervention strategies.
Other efforts are exploring chaos theory
and related fields for tools to analyze
environmental propensities of conflict
zones, emergent security instabilities,
and mapping system dynamics of terrorist networks and insurgencies. Despite
a new vocabulary, the essence of these
approaches remains firmly grounded in
the basic presumptions of the technoscientific regime. By all evidence, military
scientism remains as powerful an influence as ever in the American tradition.
Fatal Striving: Hayek,
Scientism, and the Limits
of Useful Knowledge
Friedrich Hayek identified a similar
phenomenon in his own field of economics, notably articulated during his
1974 Nobel Prize lecture in which he
cautioned colleagues against misapplication of scientific-like methods to tasks
for which they were unsuited. Hayek
expressed concern that “confidence in
the unlimited power of science is only
too often based on a false belief that the
scientific method consists in the application of a ready-made technique, or in
imitating the form rather than the substance of scientific procedure, as if one
needed only to follow some cooking
recipes to solve all social problems.”16
His criticisms were directed at the intersection of the social sciences and public
policy where he saw vague imitations of
scientific methodologies applied inappropriately to management of complex
social phenomena. He labeled such
practices intellectual “charlatanism”
intended primarily for the purpose of
Voelz
87
lending legitimacy and pretense of precision to policy proscriptions amounting
to little more than blind tinkering in
areas where fundamental uncertainty
prevailed. Indeed, Hayek could well
have been speaking of military science
when he described the curious task of
economics as demonstrating “to men
how little they really know about what
they imagine they can design.”17
As a young soldier in the AustroHungarian army along the Italian front
during World War I, Hayek certainly did
not lack exposure to the complexity and
arbitrariness of armed conflict. Later in
his career, he described the inherent challenges of decisionmaking in environments
characterized by fragmentary information. He was particularly interested in
how such systems resisted submission to
hierarchical, centralized planning—a notion directly challenging the fundamental
premise of deliberate design.18 Though
not a military theorist per se, Hayek’s
insights into the use of knowledge, function of complex systems, and dangers of
scientism all offer important lessons for
the contemporary strategist, planner, and
student of military theory.
A foundational element of Hayek’s
worldview relates to his observations concerning the “unavoidable imperfection of
man’s knowledge.”19 The phrase should
not be misunderstood as resignation to
intellectual nihilism. Rather, it reflects
a profound insight about the nature of
information, particularly pertaining to
environments where data is dispersed,
tacitly understood, or in forms resistant
to detection, collection, and analysis,
thus rendering it too subjective to be a
basis for scientifically valid conclusions.
In this sense, Hayek describes the essence behind Clausewitz’s famous dictum
that intelligence reports in war are often
“contradictory; even more are false, and
most are uncertain.”20 As a result, theory
formation in the social sciences is often
a function of information availability.21
This situation naturally promotes forms
of selection bias when information critical
to understanding system behavior is too
disaggregated for systematic collection or
simply ignored due to its uncertain significance. Bousquet as well as military theorist
Martin van Creveld identified such “information pathologies” during the Vietnam
conflict where pseudo-scientific approaches to strategy evolved based on the
most easily quantifiable characteristics of
the battlefield, thereby conflating counting with understanding.22
A widely circulated recent paper
concerning intelligence in Afghanistan
noted that even after a decade of war, the
American military still finds “itself unable
to answer fundamental questions about
the environment in which we operate.”23
The authors posit that a central problem
has been the inability to aggregate useful
information existing at the lowest levels
for use by higher level decisionmakers,
noting that the ground soldier or local
development worker is generally best
informed about their particular environment, while the path “up through the
levels of hierarchy is normally a journey
into greater degrees of cluelessness.”
The paper identifies the central obstacle
to gathering and acting upon relevant
information as a matter of inadequate
organizational structure. Conversely,
Hayek would say that the basic issue is
not a result of flaws in organizational
structure, but rather something more fundamental about the nature of knowledge
in complex systems. He points out that
circumstances defining outcomes in complex environments are rarely, if ever, fully
accessible to the social scientist, policymaker, or military planner, no matter how
information is collected and acted upon.
To some degree, this situation reflects
the inescapable reality of military science
and the fundamental epistemological
challenge of analyzing complex social
phenomena. With historical example as
its laboratory, military theory relies on ex
post facto analysis of what are essentially
natural experiments. This entails several
limitations. As a mode of analysis, historical narrative is fundamentally linear and
deterministic by nature. Its aim is to find
causality, thereby minimizing the role of
chance. It veils complexity and shies from
ambiguity. Its vernaculars tend toward
the anecdotal, interpersonal, and spectacular. History does not always know what
it does not know. Ultimately, what it provides is reasoning by induction—drawing
88 Commentary / Is Military Science “Scientific”?
general rules from specific examples. It is
non-empirical in that it relies on uncontrolled data. Perhaps most importantly, as
a basis for applied theory, it lacks mechanisms of validation through experimental
replication—the essence of scientific
methodology.
In his recent book, Jim Manzi suggests the limited practical utility of the
nonexperimental social sciences, noting
these fields are generally “not capable of
making useful, reliable, and non-obvious
predictions for the effects of most proposed policy interventions.”24 However,
in the case of military science, historical
interpretations often become proxy for
theory or, at the very least, the basis for
instrumentalist approaches to operational
decisionmaking. Unlike in the physical
sciences where a hypothesis may be proposed, tested, and potentially disproved,
military science generally does not offer
falsifiable propositions. This characteristic,
according to Karl Popper, is what distinguishes science from pseudo-science and
separates technical prediction from mere
“prophecy.”25 Clausewitz was sensitive to
these limitations as well, noting that “no
empirical science, consequently also no
theory of the art of war, can always corroborate its truths by historical proof.”26
Notwithstanding General George Patton’s
assertion that the successful soldier must
know history, recent scholarship by Daniel
Kahneman, Phillip Tetlock, Nassim Talib,
and others suggests substantive limitations in applying historical pattern analysis
as a basis for predictive decisionmaking,
particularly in the case of unstructured
problems and complex systems.
Much of Kahneman’s work on bias
and systematic error in expert judgment
focuses on the limitations of derived
heuristics in fields dependent on analysis
of historical case study.27 This mode of
theorizing reinforces a powerful human
tendency to think in terms of association,
metaphor, and inferred causality, with
cognitive strategies giving rise to rules of
thumb based on crude pattern recognition. Kahneman suggests such techniques
feed overconfidence based on the certainty of hindsight, leading planners to
view the world as far more coherent and
orderly than it is. Others have termed this
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Command element from Arkansas Army National Guard’s 142nd Fires Brigade looks over map of Woodruff County in eastern Arkansas in effort to deploy
troops in support of evacuation operations due to flooding (DOD/Chris Durney)
tendency “folk science” whereby humans
naturally create “illusions of explanatory
depth” in their analysis of complex functions, often entirely unaware how this
masks inaccuracies in understanding.28 All
of these factors entail what Kahneman calls
the “planning fallacy,” or tendency to underestimate the difficulty of implementing
a plan while simultaneously overestimating
one’s ability to shape future outcomes.
However superficially military planning methodologies may resemble
scientifically derived processes, Hayek
reminds us that the enormous predictive
power of the physical sciences is based on
laws derived from experiments with relatively few variables that may be isolated
and carefully measured, whereas complex
social phenomena inevitably involve
indeterminable variables either unmeasurable or unknown to the observer.
Even in the best of circumstances, use of
scientific-like methods of analysis offer
little more than crude pattern prediction
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
or only a generalized understanding of
system dynamics.
Clausewitz famously observed that
“three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of
greater or lesser uncertainty.”29 Hayek certainly would agree. He reminds us that in
fields where essential complexity exists, the
planner must understand that “he cannot
acquire the full knowledge which would
make mastery of the events possible.”30
Even as the methodologies of the physical
sciences are lavishly imitated, the nature of
the problems facing military planners cannot produce equally structured outcomes.
One significant reason is that intelligence
can never resemble the process of data collection in a laboratory, no matter the level
of technical sophistication.
Conclusion
Having rediscovered the primacy of
Clausewitzian ambiguity, some theorists
now propose Army Design Theory as a
means to disentangle complex causality and deliver improved strategies of
intervention. It is at this point where
caution is warranted. An unfortunate
symptom of military scientism has been
the tendency for planners to conflate
the precision of their tools (weapons
and systems) with the methods of their
application (theories and doctrine).
While the technologies of modern
warfare function primarily in a Newtonian universe, methods of their
application still reside stubbornly in
a Hayekian one. Confusion over this
point gets to the heart of the dilemma
with military scientism.
Arguably much of what passes for
military planning is less analytically rigorous than what meets the eye. The fixtures
of doctrinal orthodoxy have created an
aura of pseudo-scientific infallibility in the
military planning process, rendering its
outputs impervious to rational critique.
However, too often doctrine is little more
Voelz
89
than a fig leaf concealing a process driven
by gut-feeling heuristics and unsubstantiated causal suppositions. Whereas
doctrine should serve the useful function
of providing a common language and
frame of reference, it also has the undesirable effect of reinforcing the cult of
expertise, thereby discouraging integration of diverse tools and nontraditional
thinking. This is where it becomes dangerous. As Malcolm Gladwell has noted,
whereas incompetence is the malady of
the novice, overconfidence is the disease
of the expert.31 And it is generally the expert who possesses the greatest potential
for creating disasters.
Clausewitz was well aware of the potential dangers of scientism and warned
that “much greater is the evil which
lies in the pompous retinue of technical terms—scientific expressions and
metaphors” that “lose their propriety,
if they ever had any, as soon as they are
distorted, and used as general axioms,
or as small crystalline talismans.”32 In
this respect, a healthy dose of Hayekian
thinking provides a natural “dampening
effect” against unrealistic aspirations.
While Hayek’s insights dealt primarily
with functions of economic markets, the
same dynamics apply to military conflict
or any other human activity defined
by conditions of uncertainty, analytical
ambiguity, and predictive indeterminacy.
What a Hayekian worldview demands is
that one trade certainty for humility, appreciate the limits of useful knowledge,
and recognize that plans do not represent
extension of the will. Skepticism must be
the order of the day, placing the burden
of proof on the doctrinarian.
As proscription for correcting the
worse abuses of military scientism, leaders
might benefit from considering methods
from other fields that at first glance may
not seem intuitively similar to military
operations such as biology, epidemiology, or meteorology. These disciplines
may offer helpful examples for how
military planners can better appreciate the
natural limitations of their craft, improve
techniques of meta-cognition, and gain
greater sensitivity to the uses and abuses
of probability. Likewise, repositioning
military science as an academic discipline
of equal stature with established social
sciences will invite both scrutiny over
our methods as well as beneficial crosspollination and improved awareness of
our biases.
In the end, we must seek a defensible
space between helpless indifference and
the present hubris that drives the lofty
ambitions of many military planners. One
must appreciate that in some situations
intuition, training, and experience are
simply not enough to endow one with
sufficient awareness to predict outcomes
with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Indeed, the ability to recognize these limits and approach them with humility and
intellectual honesty is perhaps the truest
mark of a professional. JFQ
Notes
1
Descriptive theory based on retrospective
analysis where variables and environmental
conditions cannot be fully known or controlled,
versus predictive theory offering falsifiable
propositions subject to experimental testing
and validation.
2
Scientism as applied by Friedrich Hayek,
Karl Popper, and others to describe inappropriate application of scientific-like methods to
contexts where they do not clearly fit or with
insufficient empirical evidence to support scientifically valid theories; also processes designed
to appear science-like yet lacking rigorous
procedural, methodological, or analytical
standards.
3
Notably in Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the
Battlefields of Modernity (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009).
4
John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern
Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
ed. Peter Paret, 146 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986).
5
Among others, see Alan Beyerchen,
“Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17, no.
3 (1992), 59–90, available at <www.clausewitz.
com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm>.
6
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans.
James John Graham (London: Trübner, 1873),
book 2, chap. 4.
7
Ibid.
8
Bousquet, 30.
9
B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy of the Indirect
Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1954),
234, available at <http://archive.org/stream/
strategyofindire035126mbp#page/n15/
mode/2up>.
90 Commentary / Is Military Science “Scientific”?
10
B.H. Liddell Hart, Why Don’t We Learn
from History (Ann Arbor: Hawthorn Books,
1972), 16, available at <http://pkpolitics.
com/files/2008/05/liddell-hart-why-dontwe-learn-from-history.PDF>.
11
J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the
Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926),
available at <www.cgsc.edu/Karl/download/
csipubs/FoundationsofScienceofWar.pdf>.
12
Ibid., 35.
13
Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The
Problem Solvers who Turned the Tide in the
Second World War (New York: Random House,
2013).
14
Martin van Creveld, Command in War
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1985), 106.
15
Antoine Bousquet, “Cyberneticizing the
American War Machine: Science and Computers in the Cold War,” Cold War History 8, no. 1
(2008), 77–102.
16
Friedrich Hayek, “The Pretense of
Knowledge,” American Economic Review 79,
no. 6 (1989).
17
Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The
Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 76.
18
Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review,
4 (September 1945), 519–530, available at
<www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.
html>.
19
Ibid., 530.
20
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 117.
21
Hayek, “Pretense of Knowledge.”
22
Van Creveld, 240.
23
Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and
Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for
Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security, 2010), available at <www.cnas.org/
files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_
Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf>.
24
Jim Manzi, Uncontrolled: The Surprising
Payoff of Trial and Error for Business, Politics,
and Society (New York: Basic Books, 2012), xi.
25
Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism
(New York: Routledge, 2002).
26
Clausewitz, On War, trans. Graham,
book 2, chap. 6.
27
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and
Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2011).
28
Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil, “The
Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An Illusion of Explanatory Depth,” Cognitive Science
26, no. 5 (2002), 521–562.
29
Clausewitz, On War (Princeton), 104.
30
Hayek, “Pretense of Knowledge,” 7.
31
Malcolm Gladwell, C-SPAN interview
with Brian Lamb, November 30, 2009.
32
Clausewitz, On War, trans. Graham, book
2, chap. 6.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Chairman and Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, USN,
commander, U.S. Pacific Command, talk before
departing Camp Smith, Hawaii (DOD/D. Myles Cullen)
The Best Man for the Job?
Combatant Commanders and
the Politics of Jointness
by R. Russell Rumbaugh
he U.S. military today fights
jointly. A joint commander—
reporting to the Secretary of
Defense—commands all Service components during military operations.
And as a key sign of this jointness, com-
T
R. Russell Rumbaugh is Director, Budgeting for
Foreign Affairs and Defense, and Senior Associate
at The Stimson Center, Washington, DC.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
batant commanders no longer come
solely from a single Service as they once
did. In fact, the combatant commanders and their control of operations are
often considered the greatest expression
of jointness.
Yet the historical record suggests
combatant commanders are not as joint
as thought; a review of all combatant
commanders by Service shows that each
military branch has been represented
roughly equally for the past 30 years.
This consistent balance strongly suggests
that Service-based prerogatives still play a
role in selecting who commands even the
operational commands. If inter-Service
politics pervades even the selection of
combatant commanders, how much
more might it affect those parts of the
military commonly acknowledged as less
joint—especially acquisition?
Such visible evidence of inter-Service
politics belies the more hopeful claims
for jointness, underlining that jointness
Rumbaugh
91
is not a synonym for a unified military
but rather a description of a loose collaboration among the Services. The U.S.
military must stop using jointness as a
euphemism and accept a loss of Service
prerogative to ensure more effective
defense administration and, more importantly, a more effective fighting force.
The Combatant Commands
and Jointness
Combatant commanders sit at the
pinnacle of operational command in
the U.S. military system. Though the
U.S. military is organized, trained, and
equipped by the four Services—the
Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force—it
is used by the combatant commanders.
That is, when forces are tasked to a
mission, they come under the charge of
the combatant commander who plans
and executes operations using forces
from all the Services together. Combatant commands are divided between
geographic and functional commands.
For the geographic commands, the U.S.
military divides the entire world into
six commands that oversee all forces
conducting missions in those regions:
European, Pacific, Central, African,
Northern, and Southern. The functional commands are Transportation, in
charge of getting troops and equipment
around the world; Strategic, responsible
for operating all U.S. nuclear forces;
and Special Operations, not surprisingly,
in charge of all special operations forces.
During operations, the combatant commander is responsible for effectively
using and integrating forces from all
Services. But when not tasked to a
mission, these forces all belong to an
administrative command, which reports
through the chain of each distinct
Service.
In the past, that administrative
chain owned by the Services tended
to overshadow the operational chain.
Even in World War I, General John
Pershing, commander of the American
Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France,
jockeyed with General Peyton March, the
Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington,
over what each had responsibility for and
what the reporting chain was. According
92
to Pershing’s Chief of Staff General James
Harbord, as quoted by Kenneth Allard:
General Pershing commanded the AEF
directly under the President and Secretary
of War, as the President’s alter ego. No
military power or person was interposed between them. . . . No successful war has ever
been fought commanded by a staff officer
in a distant capital. . . . The organization
effected in our War Department . . . scrupulously preserves the historic principle that
the line of authority runs directly from the
highest in the land to the highest in the field.
Allard notes, however, that “that principle was not as clear to some people as
it apparently was to General Harbord.”1
In World War II, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) arose as the body to adjudicate between the needs and desires of the
theater commanders—though one of the
four chiefs was Admiral William Leahy
who was Chief of Staff to President
Roosevelt, not one of the Services. After
the war, the JCS was enshrined statutorily, creating blurry responsibility for the
Service chiefs who were in charge of both
the overall welfare of their Services and
U.S. military operations.
President Dwight Eisenhower set out
to clarify this confusion in 1958 when his
reorganization plan explicitly made the
chain of command direct from President
to Secretary of Defense to combatant
commanders, cutting out the Service
chiefs. But this clarity existed only in
theory because, in practice, the Service
chains continued to exercise significant
influence over the Service component
commands overseen by each combatant command. The Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 explicitly acknowledged this
subversion of Presidential and legislative
intent and succeeded in ending it.
Supporters of jointness rightly point
to Goldwater-Nichols as a watershed
moment in empowering the combatant
commanders and true joint operations.
Since then, most agree U.S. military
operations have more effectively drawn
on forces from all Services and wielded
them as a powerful force that cuts across
all domains. Combatant commanders no
Commentary / Commanders and the Politics of Jointness
longer represent their parent Service but
the national interest. They are the best
expression of how joint the U.S. military
has become.
The Combatant Commands
and the Services
Sitting at the pinnacle of operational
command and exemplifying military
jointness, combatant commanders are
assumed to be chosen solely based on
who is the best person for the job,
regardless of what Service the commander comes from. Yet the consistent
proportionality by Service of combatant
commanders suggests that the Service
they come from, and not only merit,
matters in selection.
All the men (it has been only men so
far) who have served in these positions
have been accomplished people who have
achieved a great deal in their careers,
as one would expect. But considering
these people individually ignores that
the pool from which commanders are
pulled only includes accomplished people
with significant achievements; thus,
such achievements may not tell us much
about how or why each officer is selected.
Acknowledging each officer as individually accomplished does not explain the
continuity over time.
In the rare times when combatant
commanders and their selection are
considered systematically rather than
individually, it is usually from a Servicecentric perspective that bemoans an
underrepresentation by one Service
or another. For instance, a 2008 Air
Force Magazine article titled “Why
Airmen Don’t Command” purported
to chronicle that Air Force officers are
underrepresented in regional combatant
commands.2 Another example is a 2007
article in which “Retired Army Maj. Gen.
Robert Scales, former head of the Army
War College who holds a Ph.D. in history from Duke University, said he could
find no prior period when the Army was
so engaged overseas and so underrepresented at top levels.”3
These arguments not only miss but
also obscure the most important aspect
of who has commanded combatant
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Chart. Combatant Commanders by Service
Traditional Era
Year
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
USEUCOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
USPACOM
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
USSTRATCOM/SAC
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
69
USSOUTHCOM/CARIBCOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
USJFCOM/ACOM/LANTCOM
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
USNORTHCOM/SPACECOM/
ADCOM/CONAD
USSOCOM/REDCOM/STRICOM
USCENTCOM (FECOM)
A
A
A
A
USTRANSCOM (NECOM)
USAFRICOM (ALCOM)
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
Chart. Combatant Commanders by Service (continued)
Traditional Era (continued)
Rise of the Marines
Year
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
USEUCOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
USPACOM
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
USSTRATCOM/SAC
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
USSOUTHCOM/CARIBCOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
USJFCOM/ACOM/LANTCOM
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
USNORTHCOM/SPACECOM/
ADCOM/CONAD
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
USSOCOM/REDCOM/STRICOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
M
M
M
A
A
A
M
F
F
F
F
F
13
USCENTCOM (FECOM)
USTRANSCOM (NECOM)
USAFRICOM (ALCOM)
F
F
F
F
F
F
Chart. Combatant Commanders by Service (continued)
Rise of the Marines (continued)
Post-Rumsfeld
Year
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
USEUCOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
A
A
A
N
N
N
F
USPACOM
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
USSTRATCOM/SAC
F
N
N
F
F
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
M
A
A
USSOUTHCOM/CARIBCOM
A
A
A
A
A
M
M
M
M
A
A
A
A
A
N
N
F
F
F
USJFCOM/ACOM/LANTCOM
N
N
M
M
M
N
N
N
A
A
N
N
N
F
F
M
M
M
A
USNORTHCOM/SPACECOM/
ADCOM/CONAD
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
N
N
F
F
F
N
N
USSOCOM/REDCOM/STRICOM
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
N
N
N
N
N
N
USCENTCOM (FECOM)
M
M
A
A
A
M
M
M
A
A
A
A
A
A
N
*
A
A
M
M
A
USTRANSCOM (NECOM)
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
USAFRICOM (ALCOM)
F
F
F
F
F
F
A
A
A
A
A
A
Legend: A-Army, N-Navy, F-Air Force, M-Marine Corps
* For the majority of 2008, U.S. Central Command did not have a confirmed commander. Disestablished commands in parentheses; lineal descendants demarked by
slashes. U.S. European Command, 1947–; U.S. Pacific Command, 1947–; U.S. Strategic Command, 1992–; SAC (Strategic Air Command), 1946–1992; U.S. Southern
Command, 1963–; CARIBCOM (Caribbean Command), 1947–1963; U.S. Joint Forces Command, 1999–2011; ACOM (Atlantic Command), 1993–1999; LANTCOM (Atlantic
Command), 1948–1992; U.S. Northern Command, 2002–; SPACECOM (Space Command), 1985–2002; ADCOM (Air Defense Command), 1975–1986; CONAD (Continental
Air Defense Command), 1954–1975; U.S. Special Operations Command, 1987–; REDCOM (Readiness Command), 1971–1987; STRICOM (Strike Command), 1962–1971;
U.S. Central Command, 1983–; FECOM (Far East Command), 1947–1957; U.S. Transportation Command, 1987–; NECOM (Northeast Command), 1950–1956; U.S. Africa
Command, 2008–; ALCOM (Alaska Command), 1947–1975
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Rumbaugh
93
commands: leaders representing an even
balance among the military Services.
To demonstrate how well balanced
across the Services the combatant
commanders have been, we have to
acknowledge two points: because the
number of combatant commanders is so
small we cannot just consider any given
moment in time, and there have been
changes over time in how the Services are
represented in the combatant commands.
Once we have accounted for these two
points, we can offer an objective, quantitative comparison to see if inter-Service
politics does affect how combatant commanders are chosen.
On the first point, there are currently
only 9 combatant commanders, as many
as there have ever been except for the
4 years after the creation of U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM) and before
the dissolution of U.S. Joint Forces
Command (USJFCOM), when there
were 10. That means changes of just
one commander can cause big swings in
the percentage by Service, and since the
average commander’s tenure is less than
3 years, there are a number of changes
in the slate of commanders. At any given
moment, such changing rosters can give
the impression of an unbalanced slate
of commanders, substantiating those
looking to believe a Service is underrepresented. To correct for these swings, we
need to look at the combatant command
rosters over time, which is easily done
by considering the roster by combatant
command by Service by year. So our
basic unit is a flag officer from whichever
Service held a combatant commander
for the bulk of every year (commanders
by Service by year). Even then, there is
only a small sample size. But we can look
over any time period we want and have a
standard way to compare the balance of
commanders by Service. See the chart for
the history of the combatant commanders displayed this way.
As to the second point, times have
changed since the original Unified
Command Plan (UCP) was signed in
1946. But we must sort out what has
changed. I argue there have been three
distinct periods in the history of the combatant commands: the traditional era up
until 1986, the rise of the Marines from
1986 until 2001, and the post–Donald
Rumsfeld era since.
Traditional Era
In the traditional era from 1946 until
1986, combatant commands were
largely extensions of the Services. Each
had its role in the world, the unified
commands were how it executed that
role, and therefore the commander of
each command came from that parent
Service. This is not to say that the commanders did not command forces from
all the Services. In fact, the UCP was
intended to acknowledge one Service’s
dominance over the others in region
or mission, as the official history of
the UCP states: “The impetus for the
establishment of a postwar system of
unified command over US military
forces worldwide stemmed from the
Navy’s dissatisfaction with this divided
command [between General of the
Army Douglas McArthur and Fleet
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz] in the
Pacific.”4 The initial UCP did not
actually resolve which five-star flag
officer was in charge of the other,
instead enshrining separate commands
for the Army and Navy in the Pacific
and further cementing the connection
between the military Services and commands. Though jockeying continued
between the Services over the shape of
the commands and what regions or missions each controlled, five commands
lasted throughout the 40 years of the
traditional era: the Navy had Pacific
Command and Atlantic Command,
the Army had European Command
and what became Southern Command,
and the Air Force had the Strategic
Air Command. The Army had two
other commands: McArthur’s Far East
Command, which was disestablished in
1957, and Strike Command, which was
created in 1961, transitioned to Readiness Command, and eventually served
as the administrative basis for U.S.
Special Operations Command. In addition, the Air Force was responsible for
various air defense commands.
Over the entire 40 years, there was
only one instance where a commander
94 Commentary / Commanders and the Politics of Jointness
did not come from the traditionally associated military Service: from 1957 to
1962, the Air Force’s Lauris Norstad
commanded U.S. European Command
(USEUCOM), a traditional Army
command. The chart shows the long,
unbroken years of single-Service combatant commands. Of course, we should not
be surprised that during this traditional
era the combatant commands were dominated by the Services. The traditional
era is defined by the dominance of the
Services over the combatant commands,
and ending that dominance was one of
the major goals of the 1953 and 1958 reorganizations, the recommendations of a
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970, and
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
The Rise of the Marines
Goldwater-Nichols did succeed in
breaking Service dominance of the
combatant commands, but the legislative victory alone did not alter the
pattern of who commanded each combatant command. Instead, the break
required the rise of the Marine Corps as
a full-fledged Service. Of the first four
commands to be commanded by an
officer not from its traditionally associated Service, three were commanded
by Marines. The chart shows the late
appearance of the Marines in red, at the
first permanent break in the traditional
affiliations.
The first Marine combatant commander was General George Crist of U.S.
Central Command (USCENTCOM),
who assumed command in November
1985, nearly a year before GoldwaterNichols was signed into law. Maybe
the more important law was the one
signed in October 1978, which made
the Commandant of the Marine Corps
a full member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. A year later, the Commandant
exercised this new authority to join
the Chief of Naval Operations in opposing the other members of the Joint
Chiefs and arguing for creating the
predecessor to USCENTCOM rather
than assigning forces for the Middle
East to the Army-controlled Readiness
Command. This argument led to the
creation of USCENTCOM’s predecessor
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
under a Marine lieutenant general.
Though an Army general commanded
USCENTCOM when it was formally
established in 1983, Crist then assumed
command after which a “longstanding
gentlemen’s agreement among the service chiefs called for an Army general to
relieve the Marine.”5 This rotation held
for 20 years until Army General John
Abizaid replaced Army General Tommy
Franks in the middle of the Iraq War.
The next break in traditional arrangements came in 1994 when a Navy
admiral assumed command of the newly
created U.S. Strategic Command, successor to the Air Force–run Strategic Air
Command. With the end of the Cold
War, the Navy was willing to subordinate
its nuclear submarines to a consolidated
Strategic Command, with the provision
that the command would rotate between
the Navy and Air Force.
The end of the Cold War and the
new jointness of Goldwater-Nichols also
underpinned the next Marine combatant commander, General John Sheehan
at Atlantic Command in 1994. Under
direction of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Colin Powell, Atlantic Command
had begun a transition from a predominantly maritime regional command to
what was called a “joint force integrator” command. Reflecting this change,
“Speculation in the past had been that
[the present commander’s] replacement
would come from the ranks of the Army
or Air Force, even though the command
has been considered a maritime command for nearly 50 years.”6 However, the
Marine was given the job, which meant
the Marines had assured their ascension
by keeping a combatant command even
as USCENTCOM rotated back to the
Army.
Three years later, a Marine was
the fourth break in the traditional
relationship between the Services and
commands, as General Charles Wilhelm
took the traditionally Army-dominated
U.S. Southern Command. The traditional era was over, and the Services no
longer could assume control over the
commands that had once seemed like
hereditary fiefdoms. Goldwater-Nichols
created the statutory authority, the end
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
of the Cold War created a strategic break
from past assumptions, and, maybe most
importantly, the rise of the Marine Corps
proved a dramatic internal force to break
the traditional relationship between
the military services and the combatant
commands.
Post-Rumsfeld Era7
Though the next break in traditional
arrangements came before his tenure,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
forced the advent of a new era that
seems to be holding.
Ironically, the next break after the
rise of the Marines could be described
as a rearguard action to restore the
prerogatives of the military Services. In
2000, Air Force General Joseph Ralston
replaced Army General Wesley Clark at
USEUCOM, a traditional Army command. Though seemingly an example of
breaking traditional relationships, Clark
has implied that because he defended a
combatant commander’s prerogatives
in the face of Service resistance, he was
replaced by a commander more inclined
toward a Service perspective.8 In this case,
one effect of Goldwater-Nichols may
have overshadowed another.
But when Secretary Rumsfeld came
to office, he was clear about his intention
to break the traditional associations. As
Andrew Hoehn, Albert Robbert, and
Margaret Harrell state, “Rumsfeld was
unsure, especially in the case of service
leadership, that officers chosen by the
current leadership—and, potentially,
in the image of the current leadership—were best suited to question the
status quo and lead a major transformation effort.”9 Also, Secretary Rumsfeld
succeeded in putting nontraditional
officers into commands: Marines were
put into U.S. Strategic Command and
USEUCOM, traditionally Air Force
and Army commands, respectively. Navy
admirals were put into U.S. Southern
Command (USSOUTHCOM) and
USCENTCOM, which despite the
rise of the Marines had remained the
province of generals from the ground
forces. Another Navy admiral commanded U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM), in charge of the
continental United States and traditionally the province of the Air Force for air
defense. And an Air Force general was the
first non–sea Service commander of U.S.
Joint Forces Command, the descendant
of Atlantic Command. All these changes
are reflected in the hodgepodge the chart
becomes after Rumsfeld takes office.
However, Secretary Rumsfeld’s failure
may be the most interesting case. In
2004, Rumsfeld nominated Air Force
General Gregory Martin to head the U.S.
Pacific Command (USPACOM), which
had only been led by Navy admirals since
its inception in 1947. One news story
commented: “The Navy will cash a lot
of chips to keep this from happening,” a
retired general officer stated. “Get ready
for the fight of the century.”10 After
questioning at his confirmation hearing
by former Navy officer Senator John
McCain about his role in awarding the
air refueling tanker contract, General
Martin withdrew his name, and a Navy
admiral eventually took command of
USPACOM, which to this day has only
been commanded by a Navy admiral.
With the departure of Secretary
Rumsfeld, the selection of combatant
commanders reverted to a process closer
to the traditional one. No further challenge to the Navy’s hold of USPACOM
has appeared, and Strategic Command
has reverted to command by the Air
Force. But the new jointness still holds.
Since Rumsfeld’s departure, a Navy admiral was given USEUCOM, an Air Force
general USSOUTHCOM, and an Army
general USNORTHCOM, all firsts.
Frustrated Jointness
Times have changed. The combatant commanders’ role in U.S. foreign
policy and their relationship to the
military Services have changed. But
having acknowledged that change and
by looking over time, we can assess
whether inter-Service politics plays a
role in selecting combatant commanders. The military Services today are represented in the combatant commands
almost evenly, suggesting inter-Service
politics still matters, though not in the
same way as during the traditional era.
Rumbaugh
95
Table. Combatant Commanders by Service by Year
By Numbers
By Percentage
Traditional
Rise of
Marines
PostRumsfeld
Traditional
Rise of
Marines
PostRumsfeld
1947–1985
1986–2000
2001–2013
1947–1985
1986–2000
2001–2013
Army
109
47
32
37
35
27
Navy
77
32
36
26
24
30
Air Force
111
39
38
37
29
32
Marine Corps
0
15
14
0
11
12
297
133
120
During the traditional era, the
Army, Navy, and Air Force allocated the
combatant commands based on Service
prerogatives. The Navy had fewer years
of combatant commands because it did
not share in the changing air defense
commands the Air Force held or the
functional command of first Strike and
then Readiness Command the Army held.
Of course, that was because the Navy did
not want to be included in these commands: “The Navy and Marines wanted
the Unified Command Plan to state that
STRICOM [Strike Command] would
consist only of Army and Air Force units.
[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara
refused but did not integrate Navy and
Marine units into the command.”11
During the traditional era, inter-Service
politics and their effect on combatant
commands were blatantly open.
Yet despite a supposed decrease in
Service influence, the balance of commands among the Services is more
pronounced in the periods since the traditional era. With the rise of the Marines,
the balance of command among the big
Services closed to within 6 percentage
points. The Navy kept its slightly smaller
number and the Army had a slightly
greater number by having three full-time
combatant commands and its rotation in
USCENTCOM. The Marines—newly
represented from 1986 on—receive less
than half the commands than the other
Services receive in any period, but are
actually disproportionately represented
compared to the Corps’ share of the
number of general officers, which is
slightly under 10 percent.
The trend toward balance continued in the post-Rumsfeld era with ever
96
greater parity, even though Secretary
Rumsfeld had set out to diminish Service
influence. In fact, during Secretary
Rumsfeld’s tenure, the Army, Navy, and
Air Force, respectively, had 18, 18, and
19 commands by year, with the Marines
getting the other 8. The table displays the
combatant commanders by Service by
year, and the numbers and percentages
show how evenly the commanders are
pulled from the Services.
This balance is not just about appearances. The historical data are statistically
consistent with a pattern of the three big
Services each getting 3 out of 10 commands and the Marines getting the tenth.
That is true for every period since the traditional era: from 1986 on, from 1986 to
2000, during Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure
from 2001 to 2007, or from 2001 on.12
In fact, even the geographic combatant
commands are shared roughly evenly
from 2001 on with no statistically significant difference. The Air Force is getting
a greater share of geographic commands
today than ever before, a reality nearly the
opposite of the Service-centric concern
cited earlier. As mentioned, the sample
is a small one, so swings of one or two
can have a big effect on the distribution across Services. Yet when the slate
of commanders is considered over time
rather than just as a snapshot, there is a
remarkable consistency of balanced representation among the Services.
The consistency suggests there is a
need to treat the Services equally when
combatant commands are allocated.
Because, over time, each Service gets
its share of men assigned to combatant
command, there is only a slight change
on the “rotating schedule that gave the
Commentary / Commanders and the Politics of Jointness
services ‘turns’ placing their top talent
into specific positions, whether or not
the person selected was the best fit for
the position. This custom afforded each
service a fair share of the top military
positions,” which Hoehn, Robbert, and
Harrell argue existed before Secretary
Rumsfeld.13 Though it is highly unlikely
that this balance among the Services is
by chance, the balance itself does not
prove that Service prerogatives cause it.
But I would argue each Service is treated
equally because today, more than a quarter of a century since Goldwater-Nichols,
the Services still have independent political power, and the Secretary of Defense
and President must be sensitive to that
power. The Services in their own turn
accept a fair share division of plums like
combatant commands in order to keep
the peace among themselves. This peace
prevents significant inter-Service rivalry,
but does so by accepting a shared and
constrained role rather than forcing a
full debate for the benefit of the civilian
policymakers on the best man or Service
or joint force for any given task.
Why It Matters and What to Do
If inter-Service politics still affects the
most joint aspect of the U.S. military—the combatant commands—it
most likely affects other aspects of the
military, maybe even the outcomes of
operations. To placate Service prerogatives, a commander or even the President may accept a less than strategically
optimal set of forces or tasks. By doing
so, a commander may, in turn, compromise U.S. national security objectives.
Though almost no one argues that the
skewing by Service interests today is
as bad as it was in operations such as
Grenada in 1983, it can still matter.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran reported an
example from Afghanistan and claims it
affected the entire war effort:
The Marine commandant, Gen. James
Conway, was willing to dispatch thousands
of forces to Afghanistan as soon as the president approved a troop increase [but his]
stipulations effectively excluded Kandahar.
. . . Helmand was the next best option, even
if it was less vital. . . . The consequences
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
were profound: By devoting so many troops
to Helmand instead of Kandahar, the U.S.
military squandered more than a year of
the war.14
When inter-Service politics interferes
with U.S. national security objectives, it
is a matter of grave concern.
Affecting actual operations is the most
severe effect of inter-Service politics, but
it appears to be a rare occurrence. Much
more common is the effect inter-Service
politics has on the day-to-day running
of the Pentagon, especially acquisition,
where few observers would claim jointness has made much headway. Though
Goldwater-Nichols attempted to reform
the administrative side of the Defense
Department as well as the operational, it
was less successful. Inter-Service politics
remains a potent force. For instance,
a team from the Institute for Defense
Analyses stated, “we found no instance in
which the [Joint Capabilities Integration
and Development System (the military’s
joint requirements generating)] process
significantly altered any solution originally proposed by a military service.”15
Requirements in turn have been cited as
the primary cause for cost growth, and
even irrelevancy, in acquisition programs,
suggesting inter-Service politics lies at
the heart of the administrative problems
within the Department of Defense.
Maybe the presence of inter-Service
politics is not so bad, and nothing
needs to be done. After all, the Services
represent hundreds of years of tradition
and, for the most part, have achieved
U.S. national security objectives. But the
presence of inter-Service politics does
undermine two popular theories: First,
jointness has successfully integrated the
four Services into an almost unified fighting force and achieved efficiency and
commonality through the administrative
and acquisition systems. Yet the presence
of strong inter-Service politics suggests
that jointness has served more as cover to
allow the Services to remain dominant in
their traditional roles and missions without fear of encroachment. And second,
it suggests that the Services offer their
unique paradigms of war to compete
for who can best achieve U.S. national
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
security objectives. Yet instead of encouraging competition, inter-Service politics
seems to have created a form of collusion
among the Services despite their distinct
strategic paradigms, and—as in the case
of Afghanistan—that collusion may even
affect operations.
At the least, we should stop pretending that jointness has fundamentally
eroded Service political power and the
Services serve as independent checks on
each other. By questioning the platitudes
that obscure operational and administrative choices, more salient factors such as
cost, Servicemembers’ lives, and national
security objectives can better inform policymakers’ decisions.
At the most, those in the uniformed
military should more openly acknowledge their parochial concerns and either
argue that their parochial perspective
better achieves U.S. national security
objectives than others’ perspectives or
abandon them. The Secretary of Defense
and his staff should consider inter-Service
politics the primary problem facing U.S.
defense and look to weed out its clouding of policy choices. And the President
and Congress should consider whether
structural reform is needed to change the
bargaining advantages that create today’s
inter-Service politics.
Today, the United States enjoys operational commanders with more authority
than ever before to assemble and wield
a joint force. Once selected, the combatant commanders represent national
authority, not their parent Service. But
even in this area of the greatest advance
in jointness, inter-Service politics still
intrudes. Though each of our combatant
commanders has been an accomplished
individual who has served his country
well, he has also represented the underlying inter-Service politics that characterizes
U.S. national defense. In other areas with
less progress toward diminished Service
political power, inter-Service politics
looms even larger, creating many of the
outcomes bemoaned so often. Until the
U.S. military can truly be considered as
a whole force, and not as distinct and
separate baronies, U.S. national security
will suffer. JFQ
Notes
1
C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control,
and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 84–85.
2
Rebecca Grant, “Why Airmen Don’t
Command,” Air Force Magazine, March 2008.
3
“Army Brass Losing Influence,” Associated Press, June 15, 2007.
4
Ronald H. Cole et al., The History of the
Unified Command Plan: 1946–1993 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995),
11.
5
Bernard Trainor, “Now Chiefs Fight for
Command Nobody Wanted,” The New York
Times, July 22, 1988.
6
Jack Dorsey, “Marine Expected to Win
Top Post with Atlantic Command,” The
Virginian-Pilot, August 26, 1994.
7
The latter two eras could be combined
and called the joint era and it would still be
an analytically descriptive distinction from the
traditional era. But the extra division highlights
the development of the changes and the acceleration under Secretary Rumsfeld.
8
David Kaiser, “The General in His Labyrinth,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2001.
9
Andrew R. Hoehn, Albert A. Robbert,
and Margaret C. Harrell, Succession Management for Senior Military Positions: The Rumsfeld
Model for Secretary of Defense Involvement
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 23.
10
Elaine Grossman, “Rumsfeld Set to Shake
Up Leadership at Two Key Combat Commands,” Inside Defense, May 13, 2004.
11
Cole et al., 4.
12
Performing a Chi-square test with three
degrees of freedom, each period, respectively,
has a p-value of 0.681, 0.392, 0.908, and
0.828. No period is statistically significant
compared to the null hypothesis.
13
Hoehn, Robbert, and Harrell, 8.
14
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Obama’s troop
increase for Afghan war was misdirected,” The
Washington Post, June 22, 2012. Excerpt from
Little America: The War within the War for
Afghanistan (New York: Knopf, 2012), 64–66.
15
Gene Porter et al., The Major Causes of
Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition, IDA Paper
P-4531 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense
Analyses, December 2009), ES-11.
Rumbaugh
97
YJ-62 antiship cruise missile
launched by transporter erector
launcher (Courtesy Sino Defense)
A Potent Vector
Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile
Developments
By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan
Dennis M. Gormley is a Senior Lecturer and Cruise
Missile Expert in the Graduate School of Public
and International Affairs at the University of
Pittsburgh. Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate
Professor in the Strategic Research Department
at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Jingdong Yuan
is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Government and International Relations at the
University of Sydney. This article draws on the
authors’ book A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier:
Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (NDU
Press, 2014).
he numerous, increasingly
advanced cruise missiles being
developed and deployed by the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) have
largely flown under the public’s radar.
This article surveys PRC cruise missile
programs and assesses their implications for broader People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) capabilities, especially in a
Taiwan scenario.
T
98 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments
This article draws on findings from
a multiyear comprehensive study of
Chinese cruise missiles based exclusively
on open sources. More than 1,000
discrete Chinese-language sources were
considered; several hundred have been
incorporated in some form. In descending level of demonstrated authority, these
Chinese sources include PLA doctrinal
publications (for example, Science of
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Campaigns) describing how cruise
missiles might be used in operational
scenarios; specialized technical analyses
(Winged Missiles Journal) from civilian
and military institutes detailing many
specific aspects of such weapons and their
supporting infrastructure; didactic PLA
discussions (Modern Navy and People’s
Navy); generalist deliberations on the development trajectory and operational use
of cruise missiles (Naval and Merchant
Ships and Modern Ships); and unattributed speculation on a variety of Web sites.
To be accessible to a general audience,
this article includes only a fraction of the
several hundred citations found in the
full study, together with several related
sources.
These Chinese sources were
supplemented with a wide variety of
English-language sources, including—in
descending level of demonstrated authority—U.S. Government reports, analyses
by scholars and think tanks, and online
databases. The authors drew on their
combined technical, arms control, and
Chinese analysis experience to compare
and assess information for reliability.
The result is a study whose details
must be treated with caution, but whose
larger findings are likely to hold.
Overview
China’s military modernization is
focused on building modern ground,
naval, air, and missile forces capable of
fighting and winning local wars under
“informatized conditions.” The principal planning scenario has been a military
campaign against Taiwan, which would
require the PLA to deter or defeat U.S.
intervention. Beijing is now broadening
this focus to its Near Seas (Yellow, East,
and South China seas) more generally.
The PLA has sought to acquire asymmetric “assassin’s mace” technologies and
systems to overcome a superior adversary
and couple them to the command,
control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems necessary for swift
and precise execution of short-duration,
high-intensity wars.
A key element of the PLA’s investment in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
AD) capabilities is the development and
deployment of large numbers of highly
accurate antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs)
and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)
on a range of ground, naval, and air platforms. China’s growing arsenal of cruise
missiles and the delivery platforms and
C4ISR systems necessary to employ them
pose new defense and nonproliferation
challenges for the United States and its
regional partners.
Military Value
Chinese writers rightly recognize cruise
missiles’ numerous advantages. Cruise
missiles are versatile military tools due
to their potential use for precision
conventional strike missions and wide
range of employment options. Although
China appears heavily focused on
precision conventional delivery, cruise
missiles could also be employed to
deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons. Due to their superior aerodynamic flight stability compared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles—by conservative estimates—enlarge the lethal area
for biological attacks by a factor of 10.
Modern cruise missiles offer land,
sea, and air launch options, allowing a
“two-stage” form of delivery that extends the already substantial range of the
missiles themselves. They may also be
placed in canisters for extended deployments in harsh environments. Because
cruise missiles are compact and have
limited support requirements, groundbased platforms can be highly mobile,
contributing to prelaunch survivability.
Moreover, cruise missiles need only rudimentary launch-pad stability, enabling
shoot-and-scoot tactics.
Since cruise missile engines or motors
do not produce prominent infrared signatures on launch, they are not believed to
be detectable by existing space-warning
systems, reducing their vulnerability to
post-launch counterforce attacks. The
potential combination of supersonic
speed, small radar signature, and very low
altitude flight profile enables cruise missiles to stress naval- and ground-based air
defense systems as well as airborne surveillance and tracking radars, increasing
the likelihood that they will successfully
penetrate defenses.1 Employed in salvos,
perhaps in tandem with ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles could saturate defenses
with large numbers of missiles arriving at
a specific target within a short time.
At the same time, optimal employment of cruise missiles imposes significant
requirements: accurate and timely intelligence, suitable and ideally stealthy and
survivable delivery platforms, mission
planning technology, command, control,
and communications systems, and damage assessment. China has lagged in these
areas, but its experts recognize their
importance, and the relevant Chinese
organizations are working hard to make
progress.
Institutional and
Organizational Actors
China began introducing ASCMs into
its inventory in the late 1950s. The
Fifth Academy under China’s Ministry
of National Defense was assigned the
lead role in coordinating national efforts
in ASCM research, design, and licensed
production. Established in 1956 with
U.S.-trained scientist Qian Xuesen as
its first director, the Fifth Academy was
instrumental in China’s cruise missile
development. Acting on guidance from
the Central Military Commission, in
1958 the PLA Navy (PLAN) headquarters built an ASCM test site at Liaoxi,
Liaoning Province.
Following several bilateral agreements, the Soviet Union transferred Type
542 KS-1 Komet (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [NATO] designation:
SSC-2A Salish) shore-to-ship and Type
544 P-15 Termit (NATO designation:
SS-N-2A Styx) antiship missiles, models,
and technical data to China beginning in
1959. Moscow was to assist Beijing with
these and other missile programs. The
P-15 would provide the basic foundation for China’s future development of
more advanced ASCMs and eventually
LACMs.
In 1960, Nanchang Aircraft
Manufacturing Company established an
assembly line to initiate ASCM production; it would later produce Shangyou-,
Haiying-, and Yingji-series ASCMs.
Despite the departure of Soviet advisors
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan
99
in September 1960, China conducted its
first successful missile test that November.
In 1964, China’s first ASCM, a licenseproduced version of the P-15, passed
factory tests. The following year, its first
flight test was successful. In late 1967,
the resulting “Shangyou-1” missile was
approved for production, and it entered
service in the late 1960s.2
As part of China’s efforts to develop an indigenous defense industry
base, cruise missile programs received
high-level political support from the beginning. In 1969, Zhou Enlai reportedly
approved the establishment of a Military
Industry Enterprise Base to produce
ASCMs. Top leaders allocated funding
and human capital and helped protect
programs from political interference during the Cultural Revolution.
Yet this support has an important
caveat: political leaders placed the highest
priority on nuclear and ballistic missile
programs given their strategic deterrence
function. Cruise missiles, while prioritized more highly than aircraft and some
other armaments, suffered from their
logical application as armaments for the
air force and navy and were subordinated
to ground forces. Moreover, as the early
Nanchang connection indicates, ASCMs
were initially developed within China’s
aviation industry. This fact, and the
industry’s connection to a politically suspect PLA Air Force (PLAAF), imposed
significant limitations.
Cruise missile programs therefore encountered more problems and registered
slower progress than their ballistic missile
counterparts. Not until the late 1960s
and early 1970s was China able to produce its own modified derivatives of early
Soviet-model cruise missiles. While recent
years have witnessed remarkable progress
in ASCMs such as the YJ-62 and LACMs
such as the YJ-63/AKD-63 and DH-10,
China continues to rely on foreign technological support—particularly Russian
and Ukrainian design assistance.
To address persistent problems in
its defense research, development, and
acquisition system, China has converted
numbered ministries to corporations, encouraged competition (with
mixed results), and separated military
100
requirements and evaluations (General
Armaments Department) from civilian defense industry management and
production (formerly the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense, now the State
Administration for Science, Technology,
and Industry for National Defense).
China has simultaneously worked to
maximize access to foreign technology
and employs an extensive bureaucracy to
facilitate its transfer (very effectively) and
absorption (less effectively).
China’s cruise missile design, research, development, and manufacturing
are now concentrated in a single business
division within one of two state aerospace
conglomerates, the China Aerospace
Science and Industry Corporation
(CASIC) Third Academy. One of seven
design academies under CASIC—which
has over 100,000 employees—the Third
Academy is China’s principal research and
development (R&D) and manufacturing entity for cruise missiles; all others
are secondary. Established in 1961, the
Third Academy has been involved in the
design and development of 20 types of
cruise missiles, including the indigenous
Haiying- and Yingji-series and their
export versions.3 Today, it boasts 10 research institutes and 2 factories, with over
13,000 employees, including 2,000 researchers and around 6,000 technicians.
China’s aviation industry remains
involved in cruise missile R&D and
production. Hongdu Aviation Industry
Group (formerly Nanchang Aircraft
Manufacturing Company), under
Aviation Industry Corporation of China,
produced Feilong-series cruise missiles
for export.4
Finally, for three decades China
has marketed a wide range of indigenously produced cruise missiles (and
other weapons systems) through China
Precision Machinery Import and Export
Corporation (CPMIEC), the CASIC
Third Academy’s export management
branch. Established in 1980, CPMIEC
is a member of the Xinshidai Group
and jointly owned by CASIC and the
Chinese Aerospace Science and Technical
Corporation.
Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments
Antiship Cruise Missile
Developments
Like other nations, China has come
to regard ASCMs as an increasingly
potent means of shaping the outcome
of military conflicts and thereby also
strengthening peacetime deterrence.
China has developed its own advanced,
highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series)
while also importing Russian supersonic
ASCMs, which have no operational
Western equivalents. (See table 1 for a
list of Chinese ASCMs.)
China’s most sophisticated and
threatening imported Russian ASCMs
include the 3M80E and 3M80MVE
Moskit (NATO designation: SS-N-22
Sunburn) and the 3M54E Klub (NATO
designation: SS-N-27B Sizzler). China’s
Sovremenny-class destroyers (Project
956E and 956EM) boast the supersonic
Sunburn ASCMs that were first delivered
to China in 2000–2001. The Project
956E ships carry the early 3M80E missile with a range of 120 kilometers (km),
while the Project 956EM destroyers
have the 3M80MVE that has an optional
longer range (240 km) through the
incorporation of a second, high-altitude
flight profile setting. But this longer
range comes at a price, as a 3M80MVE
missile using the higher altitude profile
would be detectable at much greater
distances and thus more vulnerable to attacks from advanced air defense systems,
such as Aegis. Both missiles execute
sea-skimming attacks at an altitude of 7
meters and perform terminal maneuvers
to reduce the target’s point defense
systems effectiveness. The Sunburn is
reported to have a speed of Mach 2.3
and has a 300-kilogram (kg) semi-armor
piercing warhead.5
Eight of China’s Kilo-class submarines are Project 636M variants fitted
with the Klub-S missile system, which
includes the 3M54E/SS-N-27B Sizzler
ASCM—also known earlier as Novator
Alpha. This missile is unique in that it
combines a subsonic, low-altitude approach with a supersonic terminal attack
conducted by a separating sprint vehicle.
The 3M54E’s cruise range is 200 km at a
speed of Mach 0.6–0.8. This is followed
by the release of a solid-rocket-propelled,
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
sea-skimming sprint vehicle that travels
the last 20 km to the target at a speed of
Mach 2.9. The 3M54E ASCM has a 200kg semi-armor-piercing warhead.
As in so many other areas, even as
China seeks the best foreign systems
available, it continues to develop increasingly capable indigenous systems. Of
China’s foremost indigenous ASCMs,
the YJ-82 and YJ-83/83K are the most
widely deployed, while the YJ-62 is
among the most advanced. The YJ-82
is a solid-rocket-propelled, submarinelaunched missile contained in a buoyant
launch canister that is, for all intents
and purposes, identical to the U.S.
submarine-launched Harpoon. While
credited with a range of 42 km, the lack
of a solid-rocket booster, as with the
surface-ship-launched YJ-8/8A, strongly
suggests that the YJ-82’s range will be
shorter. The missile has a speed of Mach
0.9 and a terminal sea-skimming attack
altitude of 5 to 7 meters, and it carries
a 165-kg high-explosive fragmenting
warhead.6
The YJ-83/83K missile represents an
evolutionary improvement over the YJ8/8A and the exported C802. Entering
service with the PLAN in 1998–1999,
the YJ-83 missile has the same propulsion system as the export C802 missile
but uses an indigenous CTJ-2 turbojet
instead of the French-made TRI 60-2.
By replacing the bulky electronics and
inertial reference unit (IRU) of the YJ8/8A/C802 with digital microprocessors
and a strap-down IRU, additional volume
was made available to increase the YJ-83’s
range to 180 km at a speed of Mach 0.9.
The air-launched YJ-83K has a rated
range of 250 km at the same speed. Both
the YJ-83 and 83K possess a slightly
larger high-explosive fragmenting warhead of 190 kg. The YJ-83 is the main
ASCM of the PLAN and is currently
outfitted on virtually every surface combatant in active service. The YJ-83K can
be carried by large and small aircraft alike
and has been seen on JH-7/A fighterbombers and H-6 bombers. The export
variant of the YJ-83/83K is the C802A
and the air-launched C802AK.7
In September 2005, China unveiled
the C602 ASCM for the first time. The
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Table 1. PLA Antiship Cruise Missiles (Major Systems)
Type
Manufacturer
Launch
Platform
YJ-7 (C-701)
CASIC Third
Academy
YJ-62 (C-602)
and YJ-62A
Guidance
(inertial/
terminal)
Range (km)
Payload (kg)
Speed
Ground, ship,
air
25
30.5
Subsonic
Electrooptical/active
radar
CASIC Third
Academy
Ship—
Luyang II,
ground
280–400
(YJ-62A)
210
Subsonic
Inertial/
active
terminal
guidance
YJ-8 series
(CSS-N-4
Sardine/C-801)
CASIC Third
Academy
Ship,
submarine,
(YJ-82), air
(YJ-81)
42
165
Subsonic
Inertial/
active
terminal
guidance
YJ-83 (CSS-N-8
Saccade/C-802)
multiple
variants
CASIC Third
Academy
Ship, ground,
air
120
(ground/
ship), 130
(air)
165
Subsonic
Inertial/
active radar
YJ-83A/J
(C-802A)
multiple
variants
CASIC Third
Academy
Ship,
submarine
(?), ground,
air
180
(ground/
ship), 250
(air)
165
Subsonic
Inertial/
active radar
YJ-91/KR-1
(Kh-31P)
Zvezda-Strela,
Russia;
indigenized by
China
Ship, air
(PLAAF/
PLAN)
15–110
87–90 kg
HE blast/
fragmentation
Supersonic
Passive/
Anti-radiation
AS-13 Kingbolt
(Kh-59MK)
Raduga, Russia
PLAAF
Su-30MKK
45–115
320 kg AP
HE or 280 kg
cluster
Subsonic
Inertial
and TV/
electro-optical
SS-N-22/
Sunburn
3M80E Moskit;
3M80MVE
(improved
variant)
Raduga
(Russia)
Ship;
Project 956
Sovremenny
destroyers;
3M80MVE
on Project
956EM
Sovremenny
destroyers
120–240
(3M80MVE)
300
Supersonic
inertial/
active/
passive
SS-N-27B/
Sizzler
Novator
(Russia)
Submarine—
Kilo Project
636M
200
200
Supersonic
INS/active
Submarine—
Song, Yuan,
Shang, to be
deployed on
Tang
?
?
?
?
CH-SS-NX-13
Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s
Cruise Missle Ambitions (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2014), 18–19.
small-scale model was clearly larger than
the one of the C802 nearby, and the system brochure boasted of a longer range
(280 km), global positioning system
(GPS) guidance—an unprecedented
claim—and a larger semi-armor-piercing
warhead (300 kg). The missile size was
roughly consistent with large round
launch canisters that had started showing up on coastal defense test sites and
the Type 052C destroyers then under
construction in 2004. The indigenous
YJ-62 is very similar to the YJ-83
technologically and largely reflects an
evolutionary change in size. While many
journals, articles, and Web sites quote
the YJ-62’s range as 280 km, this value
is only appropriate to the export C602.
China has limited the range of its export
cruise missiles in conformance with the
Missile Technology Control Regime
restrictions of 300 km. The YJ-62 itself
has a true range on the order of 400
kms. The long range likely necessitated
the need for satellite navigation, and the
YJ-62 is described as having the ability to
use both GPS and Beidou constellations.
The missile’s speed is between Mach 0.6
and 0.8, and it executes a sea-skimming
terminal attack at 7 to 10 meters. With
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan
101
Table 2. PLA Land-attack Cruise Missiles
Type
Manufacturer
Launch
Platform
Range (km)
Payload (kg)
Speed
Guidance
Subsonic
INS/(?)/
Passive
Electrooptical
terminal
guidance
YJ-63/KD-63
CASIC Third
Academy/
CHETA
Air (H-6H
and H-6K
bomber)
DH-10/CJ-10
CASIC Third
Academy/
CHETA
Ship, ground
(3 canister on
TELs)
1,500+
500
Subsonic
INS/Sat/
TERCOM/
Probable
DSMAC for
terminal
guidance
KD-88
CASIC Third
Academy/
CHETA
Air
180–200
165
Subsonic
Inertial;
active
terminal
guidance
KD-20/
YJ-100
CASIC Third
Academy/
CHETA
Air
1,500–2,000
500
Subsonic
INS/Sat/
TERCOM
Possible
DH-2000
CASIC Third
Academy/
CHETA
Submarine
?
500
Subsonic
?
YJ-91/KR-1
(Kh-31P)
ZvezdaStrela,
Russia;
licenseproduced by
China
Air (PLAAF/
PLAN)
15–110
87–90 kg
HE blast/
fragmentation
Supersonic
Passive/
Antiradiation
AS-13
Kingbolt
(Kh-59MK)
Raduga,
Russia
PLAAF
Su-30MKK
115
320 kg AP
HE or 280 kg
cluster
Subsonic
Inertial and
TV/electrooptical
200
500
Source: Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan, 25–26.
the exception of the Type 052C destroyers, the YJ-62 is only deployed in mobile
coastal defense batteries.8
Finally, China has been working
diligently on producing its own supersonic cruise missiles after the failed
YJ-1/C101 and HY-3/C301. Both the
YJ-12 and YJ-18 are undergoing tests
and represent the next phase in China’s
ASCM capabilities. The YJ-12 appears
to be a considerably lengthened Russian
Kh-31–type missile and is speculated
to have a range of 250 km and a speed
of Mach 2.5. The YJ-12 is probably an
aircraft-carried weapon only. Thus far,
only certain H-6 bombers have been seen
with a long pylon necessary to support a
large missile with an integrated ramjet/
booster propulsion system.9
The YJ-18 appears to be a Chinese
copy of the 3M54E Klub. This missile
has been described as having a cruise
range of 180 km at Mach 0.8 and a sprint
range of 40 km at Mach 2.5 to 3.0. It has
been reported to be submarine torpedo
tube–capable, which is consistent with
the CH-SS-NX-13 missile discussion in
the Department of Defense’s 2010 and
2011 annual reports to Congress. The
YJ-18 has also been characterized as
being able to be launched from a surface
ship’s vertical launching system (VLS),
which is consistent with the capabilities
of the generalized or universal VLS being
fitted to the new Type 052D destroyer.10
Along with the growing improvements in ASCM performance, the PLAN
has begun to expand its training and has
become more diverse and realistic in recent years with increasing focus on cruise
missile operations. Beijing has furnished
its ASCMs with improved guidance and
has started to implement satellite navigation capabilities. Most of the PLAN
warships now have a dedicated over-thehorizon (OTH) targeting system, either
the Russian-supplied Mineral-ME, or the
indigenous version. Still, OTH targeting
remains a challenge.
Chinese researchers are studying how
to best overcome Aegis defenses and
target adversary vulnerabilities. ASCMs
102 Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments
are increasingly poised to challenge U.S.
surface vessels, especially in situations
where the quantity of missiles fired can
overwhelm Aegis air defense systems
through saturation and multi-axis tactics.
More advanced future Chinese aircraft
carriers might be used to bring ASCMand LACM-capable aircraft within range
of U.S. targets.
A consistent theme in Chinese writings is that China’s own ships and other
platforms are themselves vulnerable to
cruise missile attack. But China appears
to believe it can compensate by further
developing its capacity to threaten enemy
warships with large volumes of fire.
Land-Attack Cruise
Missile Developments
China has deployed two subsonic
LACMs, the air-launched YJ-63/
AKD-63 with a range of 200 km
and the 1,500+ km-range groundlaunched DH-10. (See table 2 for a
list of Chinese LACMs.) Both systems
benefited from ample technical assistance from foreign sources, primarily
the Soviet Union/Russia. The firstgeneration YJ-63 is an air-launched
LACM that employs an electro-optical
(EO) seeker with man-in-the-loop
steering via a command data link.
This missile reportedly reached initial
operating capability in 2004, was first
seen in 2005 in Internet photography,
and is right at the cusp as to when
China incorporated satellite navigation
in some of their weapons systems. It
is currently unknown if the YJ-63/
AKD-63 has this ability.11 In addition
to the YJ-63, two other LACMs use
some sort of a command data link to
feed back the data gathered from the
EO sensor: the YJ-83KH and the K/
AKD-88.12 The second-generation
DH-10 has a satellite navigation/inertial guidance system, but may also use
terrain contour mapping for redundant
midcourse guidance and a digital scenematching sensor to permit an accuracy
of 10 meters. Development of China’s
Beidou/Compass navigation-positioning
satellite network is partly intended to
eliminate dependence on the U.S. GPS
for guidance.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Beijing has purchased foreign systems
and assistance to complement its own
indigenous LACM efforts. From Israel, it
has received Harpy antiradiation drones
with standoff ranges of 400+ km. It is
conceivable that China may also have
the Russian Klub 3M-14E SS-NX-30
LACM, which can be launched from
the PLAN’s Project 636M Kilo-class
submarines and deliver a 400-kg warhead to a range of 300 km. But there is
little evidence at present to support this
possibility.
While current DH-10 ground-launch
cruise missiles and YJ-63/AKD-63 airlaunched systems are most relevant for
a Taiwan contingency, there are strong
signs that China is expanding its inventory to include both air-launched and
ship-launched LACMs. An air-launched
version of the DH-10, called the CJ-20,
has reportedly been tested on the H-6
bomber, which has the capability to carry
four CJ-20 LACMs externally.
China’s Weapon Test Ship Dahua
892 has experimented with on-deck canister launchers that contain either YJ-18
ASCMs or DH-10 LACMs for at-sea
testing.13 Although most PLAN surface
combatants have a limited capacity of 8 to
16 canister launchers—meaning tradeoffs
between ASCMs and LACMs—China’s
apparent interest in a sea-launched
DH-10 strongly suggests that future
PLAN destroyers, such as the new Type
052D, will likely be equipped with a new
vertical launching system, with a greater
capacity to carry both ASCMs and
LACMs.
Should China add large numbers
of air- and sea-launched LACMs to its
already substantial inventory of groundlaunched cruise missiles, it would
significantly extend the range of the
PLA’s capacity to employ LACMs to
deal with contingencies beyond Taiwan
and the rest of its immediate maritime
periphery.14 Time and dedicated effort
will increase the PLA’s ability to employ
LACMs, even in challenging combinedarms military campaigns.
Cruise Missile Platforms
A given type of cruise missile can typically be launched from many different
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
platforms. Over the past decade, the
PLA has commissioned numerous new,
modernized ships, submarines, and
aircraft capable of launching cruise missiles. China has produced a new array
of frigates and destroyers that carry
sophisticated medium- to long-range
ASCMs, and some PLAAF/PLAN
aviation aircraft can carry LACMs
in addition to ASCMs. Song-, Kilo-,
and Yuan-class diesel submarines are
equipped with Russian and indigenous
ASCMs. Shang-class nuclear-powered
submarines have or will have ASCMs,
as will their Type 095 follow-ons when
they enter service.15 China thus appears
to be making a concerted effort to
develop its delivery capabilities from
air, surface, and subsurface platforms
simultaneously. In the near term, China
will likely continue to expand its cruise
missile inventory and precision delivery
capabilities.
Cruise Missile Employment,
Doctrine, and Training
China’s new ASCM and LACM programs—like its current military modernization efforts more broadly—are
focused on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and other
proximate disputed areas, which clearly
include the possibility of U.S. intervention. The land, sea, and air components
of such a contingency would involve
ASCMs and LACMs. China appears to
believe in the value of large-scale attacks
in all three domains.
Since President Bill Clinton’s decision
to deploy two aircraft carriers to waters
near Taiwan in response to China’s
March 1996 ballistic missile tests, PLA
planners have focused on U.S. aircraft
carriers as the main threat to the success
of such PLA missions. Chinese strategists
have thus sought ways to target U.S.
carrier strike groups (CSGs); Chinese
specialists are acutely aware of carrier
vulnerabilities, having conducted a wide
variety of research directed toward threatening aircraft carriers with “trump cards”
such as cruise missiles. Aegis ships are
also viewed as essential targets; without
their protection, carriers are much more
vulnerable to attack.
Various Chinese writings and the
logical employment of forces China
has been developing suggest that in the
event of a maritime conflict with U.S.
forces, the PLAN is likely to undertake
massive multi-axis ASCM attacks against
U.S. CSGs and their Aegis air defense
perimeters. The PLAN’s focused experimentation and training in long-range sea
strike, its variety of indigenous ASCM
weapons, and modernization of ASCM
delivery platforms may yield a high probability of success for this effort.
Potential Employment
in a Taiwan Scenario
Chinese ASCMs and LACMs could be
used in conjunction with other A2/AD
capabilities to attack U.S. and partners’
naval forces, land bases, and sea bases
that would be critical for U.S. efforts to
respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
While cross-Strait relations are relatively
stable at present, Beijing worries that
that could change, and in any case
wants to achieve reunification in peacetime, supported in part by its increasing
military advantage over Taiwan.
Operating in tandem with China’s
huge inventory of conventionally armed
ballistic missiles, LACMs could severely
complicate Taiwan’s capacity to use its air
force to defend against Chinese attacks.
Chinese military planners view LACMs
as particularly effective against targets
requiring precision accuracy (for example,
airfield hangars and command and control facilities). They also view large-salvo
attacks by LACMs and ballistic missiles
as the best means to overwhelm enemy
missile defenses.
Chinese planners emphasize the shock
and paralytic effects of combined ballistic and LACM attacks against enemy
airbases, which could greatly increase the
effectiveness of follow-on aircraft strikes.
These effects depend significantly on the
number of launchers available to deliver
missiles. China currently has between
255 and 305 ballistic missile and LACM
launchers within range of Taiwan, which
are capable of delivering sustained pulses
of firepower against a number of critical airfields, missile defense sites, early
warning radars, command and control
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan
103
JH-7A fighter-bomber carrying KD-88 land-attack cruise missiles and drop tanks (Courtesy Sino Defense)
facilities, logistical storage sites, and critical civilian infrastructure such as electrical
distribution.16
Proliferation Implications
If China’s past record of proliferating
ballistic missiles and technology is any
indication of its intentions vis-à-vis
cruise missile transfers, the consequences could be highly disruptive
for the nonproliferation regime and in
spreading A2/AD capabilities. China
has sold ASCMs to other countries,
including Iran. Beijing is suspected of
furnishing Pakistan with either complete LACMs or components for local
assembly.
China is not a full member of the
34-nation Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) but has pledged to adhere to the MTCR’s guidelines for missile
and missile technology exports. Beijing
began seeking MTCR membership in
2004 but has thus far been denied due
to concerns about its poor proliferation
record. The reason why China represents
a critical wildcard regarding the further
spread of cruise missiles is that Beijing’s
current compliance with its pledge to
104
follow MTCR guidelines is problematic,
especially regarding cruise missiles and
unmanned aerial vehicles. China needs
not only to improve its commitment to
address shortcomings in implementation
and enforcement but also to work with
exporters on improving their compliance with export control regulations and
increase its own governmental capacity
to deal with the explosive growth of
exporting industries across China’s huge
landmass. This would require significant
efforts on China’s part. However, if
China becomes a fully compliant MTCR
member, it would be an important
achievement in limiting widespread
LACM proliferation.
Conclusion
China has invested considerable
resources both in acquiring foreign
cruise missiles and technology and in
developing its own indigenous cruise
missile design and production capabilities. These efforts are bearing fruit in
the form of relatively advanced ASCMs
and LACMs deployed on a wide range
of older and modern air, ground, surface-ship, and subsurface platforms.
Features / Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments
To realize the full benefits, China
will need additional investments in all
the relevant enabling technologies and
systems required to optimize cruise missile performance. Shortcomings remain
in intelligence support, command and
control, platform stealth and survivability,
and post-attack damage assessment, all of
which are critical to mission effectiveness.
To employ cruise missiles to maximum
effect, the PLA needs to be able to locate
targets at a distance, to deploy its air,
surface, and submarine platforms within
range of those targets, and then to execute a complex, carefully orchestrated
joint air and missile campaign—potentially over many days. Operational success
also requires accurate, near-real-time
intelligence and post-attack assessment
capabilities.
A successful campaign depends on
both human and technical factors—extremely well-trained military personnel
who have practiced these routines in
diverse ways over many years and the
command and control architecture
needed to deal with complex combinedarms operations. Chinese planners
envision establishing a Firepower
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Coordination Center within the Joint
Theater Command, which would manage
the application of air and missile firepower. Separate coordination cells would
be created to deal with missile strikes,
airstrikes, special operations, and ground
and naval forces. Absolutely critical to
achieving the delicate timing separating waves of missile strikes designed to
leverage the effectiveness of subsequent
aircraft attacks is developing the skill to
coordinate and deconflict large salvos of
missiles and waves of aircraft operating in
multiple sectors. Chinese doctrine calls
for such attacks, but the PLA’s ability to
execute such a complex joint campaign
against a capable adversary has never been
demonstrated.
The future development of China’s
cruise missile systems will depend on
multiple factors. One is the role of
ASCMs/LACMs in Chinese defense
doctrines and military campaign strategies
and their relative cost-effectiveness compared to other weapons systems. Second,
cruise missile development, and indeed
China’s overall defense modernization,
will be determined by the government’s
priorities as Beijing assesses its economic, social, and defense needs against
the security environment and real and
perceived threats. Third, U.S. military
developments, including missile defenses,
its own deployment and use of offensive
weapons, and its intentions, will influence
how China will react and thus the role of
cruise missiles within PLA doctrine and
force structure. Finally, the capabilities
of China’s defense industry will continue
to be a critical factor in whether Chinese
cruise missiles can continue to develop
and close the technical gap with other
major powers such as the United States
and Russia.
ASCMs and LACMs have significantly improved PLA combat capabilities
and are key components in Chinese
efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities
that increase the costs and risks for U.S.
forces operating near China, including in a Taiwan contingency. Effective
ASCMs give the PLAN an expeditionary
capability and the ability to deploy and
take on other navies. LACMs give China
new conventional strike options. These
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
apply most to Taiwan, where ground-,
air-, and sea-based systems could be employed, but some Chinese LACMs also
have the range to reach Japan and the
U.S. territory of Guam and will provide
a limited capability wherever the PLAN
can deploy. China plans to employ cruise
missiles in ways that exploit synergies
with other strike systems, including using
cruise missiles to degrade air defenses and
command and control facilities to enable
follow-on airstrikes.
Defenses and other responses to PRC
cruise missile capabilities exist, but they
require greater attention and a more
focused effort. They include the development of more effective missile defenses,
technical countermeasures, and creative
operational responses. Missile defenses
against large-volume Chinese LACM
threats will need special attention, if the
poor U.S. performance against Iraq’s
primitive and small number of LACMs in
Operation Iraqi Freedom is an indicator of
U.S. weaknesses vis-à-vis such threats. JFQ
Notes
1
To be sure, the combination of all three of
these aspects is difficult to achieve. A supersonic
missile is usually not stealthy, particularly from
an infrared perspective, and such missiles tend
to fly higher to get decent engagement ranges.
To delay detection and thereby reduce reaction
time, subsonic missiles typically use low-altitude
flight profiles. Combining all of them into one
missile is difficult to do, and China currently
lacks a missile with all three of these characteristics. Information presented by Christopher
P. Carlson at the Workshop on Open Source
Exploitation, sponsored by Naval War College
and Potomac Foundation, Vienna, VA, March
3, 2014.
2
A good synopsis of Chinese antiship cruise
missiles (ASCM) development can be found in
Wang Wei, “Development of the PLA-Navy’s
Anti-ship Missile,” Shipborne Weapons 5 (May
2008), 35–47.
3
For instance, the HY-2/4 ASCMs have
been exported as the C-201/201W.
4
This series is essentially defunct, having
not competed well with the export versions of
the HY and YJ series.
5
Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI
Century Encyclopedia—Naval Weapons, Volume
III (Moscow: Arms and Technologies Publishing House, 2001); Machine Building Design
Bureau marketing brochure—3M80E antiship
attack missile-weapon complex. For 3M80MVE
characteristics, see the Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC Web site at <http://eng.ktrv.ru/
production_eng/323/507/541/?PHPSESSID
=b56ca0fa59423f9a752a0ccdc67eb72a>.
6
Christopher P. Carlson, “China’s Eagle
Strike—Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: YJ-81,
YJ-81, and C802 (Part 2),” Defense Media
Network, February 6, 2013, available at <www.
defensemedianetwork.com/stories/chinaseagle-strike-eight-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-yj81-yj-82-and-c802/>.
7
Ibid.
8
“C602: Anti-Ship Missile Weapon
System,” China National Precision Machinery
Import and Export Corporation marketing
brochure, 2010.
9
Christopher P. Carlson, “YJ-12 Photographic Analysis,” February 2014; “Chinese
YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Revealed,”
Chinese Military Review, January 2013, available at <http://chinesemilitaryreview.blogspot.
com/2013/01/chinese-yj-12-supersonic-antiship.html>.
10
Christopher P. Carlson, “Deciphering
the Eagle Strike-8 Family of Anti-Ship Cruise
Missiles,” presentation at Workshop on Open
Source Exploitation.
11
“PLA’s Tactical Air-To-Surface Missiles (Part 1),” SinoDefence, February 18,
2014, available at <http://sinodefence.
com/2014/02/18/plas-tactical-air-to-surfacemissiles-part-1/>.
12
Pan Wenlin, “Small Gas-Turbine Unit
and China’s Antiship Cruise Missiles,” Shipborne Weapons 8 (August 2010), 14–25; “KD63 (YJ-63), K/AKD-63,” Jane’s Air-Launched
Weapons, January 28, 2014, available at <www.
janes.com>.
13
“Navalized DH-10 LACM,” China Defense Blog, July 25, 2012, available at <http://
china-defense.blogspot.com/2012/07/navalized-cj-10-lacm.html>.
14
James C. Bussert, “China Destroyer Consolidates Innovations, Other Ship Advances,”
Signal, December 1, 2013, available at <www.
afcea.org/content/?q=node/11972>.
15
Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,
Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 4,
available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_
china_report_final.pdf>.
16
Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2009,
available at <www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf>. Figures were derived from the chart on page 66 of
the 2009 report. Only CSS-6 and CSS-7 missile
launchers and DH-10s were considered. As the
most important factor in delivering pulses of
power, missile launchers (not missiles) were the
focus. Like aircraft launched from carriers, missiles launched are the appropriate measure of
the intensity of fire within a unit of time.
Gormley, Erickson, and Yuan
105
In addition to their daily duties within
Combat Logistics Battalion 6, Marine
Expeditionary Brigade–Afghanistan,
Marines also serve as FET members
to establish rapport with locals (U.S.
Marine Corps/Justin Shemanski)
Blurred Lines
Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
By Megan Katt
llowing women in combat is
a highly controversial subject.
Yet regardless of their official military occupational specialty
(MOS), female Servicemembers have
often found themselves in combat
situations—most recently in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In both combat zones,
male and female Servicemembers alike
A
Megan Katt is a Research Analyst in the Center
for Stability and Development at the Center for
Naval Analyses. She is a co-author (with Jerry
Meyerle and Jim Gavrilis) of the book On the
Ground in Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency in
Practice (Marine Corps University Press, 2012).
106
Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
have conducted counterinsurgency and
stability operations—so-called irregular warfare activities that lack clearly
defined “frontlines” against enemies
who do not wear uniforms. These
types of operating environments forcefully negate any biological sex combat
restrictions as the lives of both men and
women are at risk.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Along with the highly trained
and capable special operations forces
(SOF) operating in remote locations
throughout Afghanistan, lesser known
teams of female Soldiers, Marines, and
Sailors have worked to develop enduring relationships with Afghan women.
These enabling units, which evolved
from earlier female engagement efforts and ultimately became known
as Cultural Support Teams (CSTs),
have supported SOF units conducting village stability operations (VSO).
While skirting Department of Defense
(DOD)-imposed restrictions on women
in combat that had been in place since
1994, the women on CSTs faced substantial personal and physical risk. By
stepping “outside the wire” to converse
with locals, they placed themselves in
harm’s way,1 engaged in firefights, and,
in some cases, were specifically targeted
by insurgents. At a time when the U.S.
military is pulling back from a large-scale
irregular warfare mission in Afghanistan
and trying to rebalance the Armed
Forces for more traditional operations, it
is worth examining whether these types
of all-female teams will be relevant to
future operating environments.
Based primarily on author interviews
with CST and SOF personnel,2 this
article describes the CST program; why
it was created and how it evolved from
previous efforts; how some CST members were selected and trained; the types
of activities that members of these teams
conducted; the challenges that arose;
and the lessons that can be drawn from
their experiences. While this article does
provide some background on gender
policy restrictions, it does not argue
either for or against making combat positions available to women. The nature
of conflict in these types of environments
belies the idea that women can simply
be kept out of combat. Therefore, this
article focuses on what some female
Servicemembers were able to accomplish
executing population-focused operations
under the combat restrictions in place at
the time. It concludes by discussing potential implications of the sexual policy
restrictions debate on the future of a
CST-like capability.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Moving across “Frontlines”
Women’s roles in the military have
necessarily evolved over the past several
decades, while still limited by DOD
restrictions on the types of positions
they could fill. In 1988, DOD created
the so-called Risk Rule, which excluded
women from units that had a high
probability of engaging in ground
combat, hostile fire, or capture.3 In
1994, DOD replaced that regulation
with the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, otherwise
known as the DOD Combat Exclusion
Policy, which restricted the assignment
of women to units below the brigade
level whose primary mission was to
engage in direct ground combat.4
According to the policy, female Servicemembers were restricted from jobs
in a primary MOS of ground combat,
such as in the infantry. Yet with these
rules in place, women have increasingly
been allowed to serve in a wider range
of combat support roles, including as
explosive ordnance disposal technicians,
military police, interpreters, drivers,
and working dog handlers. In irregular
warfare, where frontlines are nonexistent, many of these supporting jobs can
take women into the line of fire, often
with little ground combat training.
Counterinsurgency and stability
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan challenged U.S. forces to identify friend from
foe as they operated among civilians,
including many women and children.
Perceived indiscriminate use of force and
culturally prohibited contact between
male Servicemembers and local women
(for instance, during night raids) angered
local populations and proved counterproductive to the overall mission. In an
effort to avoid these confrontations and
show more respect for the local culture,
U.S. forces largely ignored the female
population. Insurgents, in turn, took
advantage of these cultural sensitivities by
disguising themselves in women’s clothing to avoid detection during searches.
Men wearing traditional burkas—full
body cloaks worn by some Muslim
women—could escape the military’s
grasp by blending in with women.
To counter this insurgent tactic in
Iraq, the U.S. military developed what
became known as the Lioness Program.
As part of this initiative, the military
posted female Soldiers and Marines at
control points to interdict and search
women for weapons, explosives, and
other contraband. However, these teams
were staffed in ad hoc fashion by female
Servicemembers who were pulled from
their regular duties and who received
minimal training for these new responsibilities. In addition, the narrowly focused
program did not provide opportunities
for persistent engagement with the female population.
In an attempt to develop better relationships with Iraqi women and identify
sources of instability, the Marines developed the Iraqi Women’s Engagement
Program. Unfortunately, not much is
written about the program—in part possibly due to potential controversy over
women being placed in combat situations. What little is known is that a group
of female Civil Affairs (CA) Marines reportedly began the program in Al Anbar
Province in 2006. The uniformed women
aimed to build trust with local women
by discussing their concerns over cups
of tea. Later, these efforts also included
talking to women during sewing clinics
and medical engagements. The indirect
effect of these engagements was a nascent
dialogue on the factors of instability in
the area.
Providing Opportunities
for Engagement
The Iraq experience, although limited,
highlighted the positive effects of
female engagement in that type of
environment and the need for a similar
tool in Afghanistan. In a society with
limited women’s rights and restrictions
on contact between the sexes, Afghan
women were culturally off-limits to
outside men. Male Servicemembers ran
the risk of showing disrespect to locals
if they engaged with women during
patrols, raids, or other operations. As in
Iraq, Soldiers and Marines realized there
was a need to fill that gap, as well as to
build rapport with the female portion
of the population. This requirement
Katt
107
FET Team 11 members in Helmand Province listen to other Marines talk about their deployment experiences (U.S. Marine Corps/Katherine Keleher)
resulted in the Female Engagement
Team (FET) initiative, which combined the Lioness Program’s efforts to
search women with the Iraqi Women’s
Engagement Program’s efforts to
address underlying causes of instability,
merging them into even broader operational roles.
The Army and Marine Corps assembled FETs on an ad hoc basis upon
the request of maneuver units. As a
result, female Servicemembers already
on the ground were pulled from their
regular jobs and had little or no time to
train for their additional FET responsibilities. Moreover, because these women
did not have a ground combat MOS or
any of the training that would accompany
it, some have argued that this staffing
put them and the men serving alongside
them at greater risk.5
The first reported FET was assembled
on an ad hoc basis to support a specific
cordon and search operation in western
Afghanistan in February 2009. The team,
which consisted of female Marines and
108
a female interpreter, provided the same
search function that the Lioness Program
had in Iraq. Yet the team also visited with
Afghan women in their homes and distributed humanitarian supplies in an effort to
develop goodwill. Later that year, a similar
FET was established after insurgents were
able to escape a military cordon by dressing like Afghan women. These early FETs
largely conducted short-term search and
engagement missions.
In late 2009, the commander of the
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) institutionalized the FET concept
by directing all deploying military units
to create all-female teams to develop
and improve relationships with Afghan
women. To quickly fill the requirement,
initial FET training was limited and
ranged from just a few days to months.
Generally speaking, training focused on
combat activities but also included some
instruction on Afghan culture, language
(Dari or Pashto), use of interpreters, and
other softer skill sets relevant to operating
among the population.
Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
By 2010, the Army and Marine
Corps began to send dedicated FETs,
which ranged from two to five women
per FET, to support battalion and
company commanders across an area of
operation. The first trained, dedicated,
and full-time Marine FETs arrived in
Southwest Afghanistan in the spring of
2010. Depending on the need, FETs,
sometimes augmented by a female interpreter or medic, accompanied all-male
infantry patrols in Helmand Province.
Similar to the Afghan women who
needed to be escorted by a male relative
in public, female Servicemembers needed
to be escorted by their male colleagues
outside the wire due to force protection restrictions.6 This created resource
constraints for units every time they took
FETs outside the wire. While FETs were
generally sent to areas that had largely
been cleared of insurgents, they still took
a combat-training refresher course and
carried M-4 carbine rifles with the full
expectation that they would be exposed
to combat situations.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Marine FETs conducted a range of
engagements during their 7-month tours.
Generally, after a team arrived in a village,
female Marines went door to door to
engage women and learn about the area
and villagers’ concerns. Once inside an
Afghan compound, they removed their
weapons and body armor as a sign of
respect. They also replaced their helmets
with headscarves to be culturally sensitive. In many areas, the FETs found that
Afghan men were also willing to engage
with them. Yet while the FET members
could listen to the concerns and issues
raised by villagers, in many cases they did
not have the authority or capability to address them. In addition, some criticized
the FET program because the teams were
unable to create lasting effects due to the
episodic and temporary nature of their
engagement as coalition forces moved
through an area, never to return.
In addition to engagement, each
FET was tasked with a variety of responsibilities—perhaps more than the name
of the program implies. In addition to
engaging with and gathering information
from Afghan families, they distributed
information, facilitated CA programs (for
example, distributed school supplies and
opened schools or clinics), supported
female-focused governance and development projects (developing women’s
centers, providing micro-grants), held
key leader engagements and women
only-shuras, conducted medical outreach,
assisted with cordon and knock operations, and searched women.
Developing a SOF-Specific
Female Engagement Capability
Meanwhile, similar female engagement capabilities were quietly being
developed within the special operations
community to fit mission requirements.
The ISAF commander began to pressure U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) to develop its own FETlike capabilities to embed with SOF
units to assist with engaging Afghan
women in support of direct operations. Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command (MARSOC)
was one of the first to experiment with
using an FET in 2010 by pulling one
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Marine officer, two enlisted personnel,
and a Navy corpsman from their day
jobs to support a Special Operations
Task Force (SOTF) in this new role.7
Because these women lacked specific
training and were pulled from their
regular duties, the effort was less than
seamless; however, this did not dissuade
MARSOC from the concept. Instead,
MARSOC deployed a female unit with
the sole purpose of conducting the
FET mission in an organic capability to
support a SOF unit in June 2010.
The SOF female engagement program was formally created in 2010 under
the direction of the USSOCOM commander. The United States Army Special
Operations Command, Naval Special
Warfare Command, and MARSOC expanded on the FET concept by developing
what became known as Cultural Support
Teams (CSTs). The term itself took sex out
of the equation; however, the teams still
solely comprised female Servicemembers.
The primary difference between the
two was that FETs were used to soften
coalition forces’ footprint as they moved
through an area, whereas CSTs were designed to provide persistent presence and
engagement—a key tenet of populationfocused operations conducted by SOF.
These two-person CSTs were given
a wider mission set to support SOF
conducting “non-direct ground combat
missions,” specifically village stability operations. As part of VSO, small SOF teams
aimed to disrupt the insurgency and foster
stability in relatively remote villages where
the Afghan government was not represented by its own security forces. Special
operators engaged influential local leaders
in an effort to recruit community defense
forces, empower local governance, and
bolster economic development—all in an
effort to expand the reach of the Afghan
government and disrupt insurgent influence. The CSTs provided an opportunity
for SOF to communicate with Afghan
women, something they had been limited
from doing previously due to cultural
sensitivities. In short, VSO became a
loophole for female Servicemembers
to operate alongside the most highly
trained—and exclusively male—forces on
the battlefield.
Identifying Suitable Candidates
Per USSOCOM’s directive, each of
the Services began to recruit female
Servicemembers to work alongside
the military’s most elite units. Some
Services solely recruited volunteers,
whereas others, which had larger operating requirements, reportedly assigned
personnel to these teams. Because these
CSTs are designed to support SOF
teams at the lowest levels, the qualification requirements and selection process
of these women has been demanding.
Each Service conducts a thorough
assessment to locate candidates who are
both physically and mentally fit. Like
special operators, the Services look for
specific selection criteria in identifying
suitable candidates. Many women have
reportedly been turned down during
the assessment process.
MARSOC evaluators held female
candidates to the standards similar to
MARSOC male special operators, known
as Critical Skills Operators (CSOs), since
they would be working alongside each
other. MARSOC candidates needed top
physical fitness test and general technical
scores. Prior deployment experience was
also a factor. If women met these criteria,
MARSOC psychologists then administered the same four psychology exams that
potential CSOs receive to ensure that their
personalities and psychological profiles
were compatible with the individuals with
whom they would deploy and that they
could make the necessary adjustments to
keep up with the distributed, fast-paced
nature of the Afghanistan mission. Finally,
MARSOC evaluators conducted an oral
interview with eligible candidates to gauge
interest and determine whether they could
“think on their feet” to make quick decisions on the ground.
The qualified Marines ultimately
selected for MARSOC CSTs came from
a variety of occupational specialties,
ranging from judge advocate to military
police officer to automotive maintenance technician. The most common
occupational fields included logistics,
communications, and military police, investigations, and corrections. Most were
enlisted personnel ranging from sergeant
to gunnery sergeant. In addition, Marine
Katt
109
teams were also often supplemented
by medically trained Sailors, such as
Independent Duty Corpsmen.
Preparing Women to
Be SOF Enablers
Subtle differences also existed in how
each Service trained its female candidates for the mission. According to
many accounts, individual augmentees
received varying amounts of training to
fill the emerging requirement. As the
program expanded, the Services slowly
developed their own formalized training packages for CSTs. For example,
MARSOC developed a series of training
organized into blocks. For a total of
109 days, its female volunteers were
trained to the same standards as other
MARSOC enablers:
•
•
•
The first block of instruction began
by focusing on engagements and
rapport-building with an Afghan
focus. MARSOC hired female
subject matter experts in negotiations and Afghan culture (tailored
to the region in which the women
would deploy) for both discussion and practical application. CST
members learned about Afghanistan,
Afghan values, and the nuanced roles
of women in that society.
The second block of instruction
taught female Servicemembers the
basics of how CSTs would fit into
the MARSOC intelligence process,
as well as additional instruction on
combative training, riot control,
and increased observation and
situational awareness. In addition,
CST candidates participated in the
MARSOC intelligence course’s
culminating exercise, which not only
gave them a chance to practice what
they had learned but also allowed the
MARSOC students the opportunity
to leverage every asset available to
them to complete their mission.
The third block of instruction
focused on civil-military operations
(CMO). MARSOC sent its candidates to the Marine Corps Civil
Military Operations School to receive
CMO training, at the end of which
•
•
students received an additional MOS
in CA. CMO skills are particularly
useful in an irregular environment
and provided CSTs with an additional capability they could bring to
their assigned SOF team if CA personnel were unavailable.
The fourth block of instruction
consisted of the basic MARSOC
special operations training course,
which all MARSOC enablers attend
in order to prepare for the rigors of a
combat deployment with a MARSOC
SOTF, company, or team. There,
CST candidates received an introduction to SOF operations and learned
how CSOs operate. In addition, the
course provides a basic combat skills
refresher course (that is, “shoot,
move, and communicate”) to dust off
those skills and add a special operations approach. CST candidates were
also trained to master the weapon (an
M-4 rifle and/or a pistol) that they
were assigned and would carry with
them during their deployments. Even
though CSTs have supported nondirect combat missions, they have still
operated in a combat environment.
As an integrated member of a special
operations team, each CST member
had to be prepared to engage in
direct combat in case a situation took
a kinetic turn.
The fifth block of instruction
included MARSOC’s full-spectrum
survival, evasion, resistance, and
escape course, which incorporates
field survival basics, including
hostage and detainee operations.
In addition to preparing them for
survival, it helped prepare them
mentally and physically by gaining
a better understanding of the other
women they would deploy with and
their limitations.
Additionally, CST candidates received
training in tactical questioning, basic
medical skills, and tactical driving—all
of which made them more useful to the
special operations team to which they
would be attached and created additional
opportunities to get outside the wire
to engage with the local population.
110 Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
Finally, MARSOC provided them with
interactive software and books so that
they could learn Dari. By August 2013,
a total of 18 Marines and 5 Sailors had
completed MARSOC’s CST training
program, which then deployed with even
higher numbers from the other Services.
Deploying with SOF
The first formalized CSTs from the
Army and Marines began to deploy in
two-woman teams in early 2011. Due
to DOD restrictions below the battalion
level, CSTs were formally attached to
larger special operations units—generally SOTFs—and then distributed
throughout the battlespace as needed.
Not every VSO site and SOF unit
received a CST. Instead, attachments
were based on demand. After a special
operations team secured a VSO site and
identified a need for a CST, the SOTF
attached one based on the team’s capabilities. In addition to initially attaching
them to units, the SOTF could rearrange CSTs based on mission requirements and CST members’ individual
skill sets. In many cases, teams have
been split—sometimes over different
districts—to divide responsibilities and
leverage particular skill sets based on
local needs (such as medical care).
CSTs have supported a broad spectrum of activities across all three lines
of operations: security, governance, and
development. Special operations teams
have incorporated CSTs differently into
their missions depending on the local
situation. As designed, many have accompanied special operators into villages
on patrols to engage and help build rapport with local women, much like FETs.
There have also been cases in which
CSTs have effectively engaged women
and children after alleged civilian casualty
incidents. By developing relationships
with the local population and sharing the
information (sometimes time-sensitive
information) that they gather with their
teams, special operators can develop a
more complete picture of the operating
environment than was previously attainable. Like FETs, CST activities include
providing medical support and humanitarian assistance, conducting key leader
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Afghan children gather around FET member during shura to discuss current local issues (U.S. Marine Corps/Andrea M. Olguin)
engagements, exploring girls’ education
issues, and performing searches on the
female population. In many cases, CST
members have established rapport with
locals, exchanged cell phone numbers,
and been invited to visit women’s homes.
Their capabilities are also broader than
those of FETs. CSTs can follow special
operators into areas after they have been
secured, including after raids. In those
situations, CSTs then use search and
seizure techniques to find hidden items
on females (for example, weapons or contraband)—and, like FETs, occasionally
uncover a militant dressed as a woman.
CST activities can be largely
dependent on location and the permissibility of the environment. In northern
Afghanistan, for example, governance
and development were primary goals in
2012. At one site, a CST member with
medical training focused on conducting medical engagements. At another
site, her CST partner worked with the
Ministry of Education to reform education syllabi. Around the same time in
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
western Afghanistan, CST accomplishments included opening a clinic and a
girls’ school, in addition to organizing a
women-only shura. CST members also
worked with government ministries, such
as the Department of Women’s Affairs
and the Labor Union, in an advising role.
Finally, a CST member could also
provide value to the team by conducting
tasks related to her MOS, such as communications, CA, or driving.
Recurring Challenges
CSTs, like their predecessors, have
received mixed reviews. While their
operational impact is difficult to
measure, many special operations teams
have spoken highly of the enabling
capabilities they have provided in the
execution of VSO in persistent situations, particularly in gathering information. In other cases, special operations
teams either have not known how to
best use their capabilities or have not
been able to due to limitations based
on the security situation. Like other
enabling capabilities, there has also been
the risk that abilities did not measure
up to expectations or that personalities
would clash.
In my discussions with both CST
and SOF members, a number of recurring challenges emerged. CST members
discussed challenges with integrating
into teams, misperceptions of their capabilities, and a lack of capable female
interpreters. Special operators identified additional challenges such as site
selection, security limitations and considerations, and sexual tension between CST
and SOF members.
Some CST members indicated that
it could be difficult to integrate with a
special operations team as an outsider
to a “band of brothers”—a concern
similarly raised by members of other enabler units (for instance, CA) as well. In
northern Afghanistan, one CST Soldier
described her team’s integration with an
Army Operational Detachment–Alpha
(ODA) as a train wreck. The SOF unit
had misperceptions about the capabilities
Katt
111
Marines practice speed and tactical reloads while training to become augments for FETs (U.S. Marine
Corps/Ryan Rholes)
of her team. In situations such as those,
CSTs can run the risk of turning into a
hindrance for the special operations team
and can therefore be underutilized. In
that case, it took time for the women to
gain the operators’ trust and understanding. That same CST was later moved to
a different site where the resident ODA
made the team an extension of its own
team. She believed that the primary difference between the two experiences was
that the second ODA was already familiar
with the capabilities they could provide
and how best to use them.
Finding qualified female interpreters
was another issue identified by several
interviewed CST members. In some
areas, such as western Afghanistan, it may
be culturally acceptable to use a male
interpreter. However, that is generally
not the case in ethnically Pashto areas.
And while it can be relatively easy to find
male interpreters, there are generally far
fewer mentally and physically fit female
interpreters. One CST started its deployment with a young female interpreter who
spoke a different dialect from the one spoken in their assigned area. That same CST
later received a different interpreter with
impressive language capabilities; however,
she was older and her physical ability was
limited, which in turn limited team mobility. At another location, a CST member
112
indicated that her team’s interpreters
could not keep up on long patrols, in effect slowing the special operators down.
Therefore, without a good interpreter, the
CST could not effectively do its job.
According to some special operators,
security has been a limiting factor in
assigning CSTs to different sites. Some
operators suggested that CSTs could
potentially be more useful to gain buy-in
by engaging with female villagers during the initial stages of VSO when the
area is less permissive. However, due to
DOD-imposed restrictions, CSTs were
instead introduced to the village later
when the area was relatively secure and
male Servicemembers had already developed local relationships. Similarly, some
areas were more receptive to CSTs. At
some of the locations where CSTs were
assigned, Afghan women were either
uninformed or unwilling to share information, which hindered a CST’s ability
to complete its mission.
Ultimately, in some situations, special
operators determined that the costs of
using CSTs outweighed the benefits—
that is, in some cases, CSTs were not
worth the risk for the team due to protocols and security considerations. One
special operator explained that it could
be manpower-intensive to bring CST
members out to a shura or on a mission.
Features / Cultural Support Teams in Afghanistan
If a CST member took up a seat, it meant
that she had taken the place of another
operator (with his own supplementary
capabilities). In addition, taking a CST
member anywhere usually required bringing along an interpreter and a security
patrol. As a result, even though two
women were on each CST, often only one
would go out on each mission. That made
it easier for the team to patrol and meant
that they did not need to take additional
operators with them for security purposes,
possibly requiring an additional vehicle.
Finally, operators expressed concerns
about sexual tension and activity impacting unit effectiveness, an argument
frequently cited in studies on women
in combat. Working long hours in close
quarters and in sometimes austere conditions has the potential to bring people
together in any job. Some have suggested
that sexual relationships have had the potential to impact daily operations and unit
cohesion. In addition, there have been
some complaints about a lack of maturity
of both men and women. Yet this issue
may have been mitigated at VSO sites
that had strong leadership.
Implications for the Future
The FET and CST programs were
emergent mission-specific requirements, which the Services met by
initially recruiting female Servicemembers out of hide from other units as
individual augmentees. In particular,
CSTs in Afghanistan opened the
door for female troops to operate
alongside special operations units in
the battlefield. They were specifically
selected and trained to work with SOF
as part of VSO. The Marine Corps
ended its use of CSTs in Afghanistan
in 2013 because of the drastic change
in mission when SOF moved out of
villages into overwatch positions.
However, as the U.S. military continues to withdraw from Afghanistan and
looks to prepare and posture itself for
the future, it should consider whether
CSTs are truly an enduring requirement for SOF, which will continue
to conduct irregular warfare activities
around the globe and could benefit
from this enabling capability.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
reflect the likely future of combat—nonlinear and population-focused—and will
increasingly place female Servicemembers
in combat situations. Both men and
women have fought and died in these
combat environments. Partly as a result,
DOD has recently relaxed its restrictions on women in combat. In February
2012, DOD modified the 1994 Combat
Exclusion Policy to increase the overall
number of positions available to women.8
Then, in February 2013, DOD eliminated the exclusion policy and began to
allow each Service to determine any
restrictions specific to its members.9
Each Service is now examining potential
roles for women in future operating
environments.
The results of these studies may help
the Services determine whether FETs
and CSTs are necessary in future operating environments. For example, if the
Services do choose to open all positions
to women, these all-female teams may
not be necessary once units are fully
integrated; more trained women will potentially be available on the battlefield to
regularly engage with female counterparts
during patrols and meetings or after raids.
If they do choose to leave restrictions in
place for women in combat, the Army
and Marine Corps may want to consider
institutionalizing an FET-like capability
within each infantry battalion, with special attention to the CA skill sets found
necessary in Afghanistan. The resource
commitment would be relatively small
and would maximize a unit’s effects in
population-focused operations. Similarly,
USSOCOM may ultimately decide
that female Servicemembers should not
be allowed to serve in a special operations–specific MOS. If that is the case,
the potential still exists for SOF to benefit
from CSTs in other theaters.
Regardless of the policy restrictions
debate and the Services’ findings, the
need for a CST-like capability will endure
as SOF continue to operate in irregular
battlefields all over the world. While the
VSO mission was designed expressly for
Afghanistan, its roots are in traditional
SOF missions, such as counterinsurgency, stability operations, and foreign
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
internal defense. In these populationcentric missions, CSTs can help provide
access to roughly half of the population
through engagement activities. In addition, CSTs could be enormously
beneficial during SOF training missions
with partner nations. In countries that
have female soldiers or police, the addition of women to an otherwise all-male
team could give them greater access and
placement during a Joint Combined
Exchange Training event.
Looking ahead, the question ultimately becomes whether the military
believes that this enabling capability is
worth keeping at a time when every
program is increasingly scrutinized due
to ongoing budget cuts. However, if
the program is dissolved now and the
capability is needed again in the future,
it will cost a lot of resources—in both
money and manpower—to begin anew.
Therefore, by evolving the program to
provide SOF with this type of enduring
enabling capability, it may ultimately save
resources in the long run.
As part of this evolution, the SOF
community should ensure that the
lessons learned in Afghanistan are institutionalized. Ultimately, the bulk of the
challenges identified herein have little to
do with gender policy restrictions. Some
of the issues, such as capability misperceptions and clashing personalities, are
similarly faced by other types of (all-male)
enablers and can possibly be resolved as
the CST program matures. For example,
challenges of CSTs integrating into special operations teams may be overcome
with additional combined training opportunities. In addition, CST assignments
would need to be monitored by leadership and adjusted as needed. While the
issue of deploying CSTs in heavy fighting
areas may possibly be a result of policy
restrictions, it may also be a command
decision. With limited numbers of CSTs,
it is practical for a commander to ensure
that they face less risk.
SOF may need to examine the need
for CSTs on a mission-by-mission basis.
Some have argued that the culture in
parts of the Middle East and South Asia
may be somewhat unique in terms of sex
segregation. In many parts of the world,
male Servicemembers may be able to
converse freely with female locals without
the same traditional cultural implications. Yet in any culture, women may
generally feel more comfortable being
engaged with—and, when necessary,
searched by—other women. Even in the
United States, women prefer and often
insist on female Transportation Security
Administration staff patting them down
at airports, if necessary. It is not unreasonable to expect similar preferences in
other countries. Therefore, the special
operations community should more
closely examine how it could use or retool this enabling capability for different
types of environments. JFQ
Notes
1
In October 2011, First Lieutenant Ashley
White, USA, became the first Cultural Support Team member killed in the line of duty
when an improvised explosive device (IED)
detonated in southern Kandahar Province. See
David Zucchino, “A Counterinsurgency Behind
the Burka,” Los Angeles Times, December 11,
2011. More recently, First Lieutenant Jennifer
Moreno, USA, was killed in an IED attack in
October 2013. See Gretel C. Kovach, “Female
Soldier Killed on SpecOps Mission,” San Diego
Union Tribune, October 8, 2013.
2
The author also researched open source
material and the Marine Corps Lessons Learned
System for additional information.
3
David F. Burrelli, Women in Combat:
Issues for Congress, R42075 (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, May 9, 2013),
available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
R42075.pdf>.
4
Department of Defense (DOD) Memorandum, “Direct Ground Combat Definition
and Assignment Rule,” January 13, 1994.
5
See, for example, Lia B. Heeter, “Women
in Combat: Policy Barriers are Being Removed,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2013.
6
Ann Jones makes this observation in
“Woman to Woman in Afghanistan,” The Nation, October 27, 2010.
7
Trisha Talton, “MARSOC Looks to
Women for New Mission,” Marine Corps
Times, November 14, 2009.
8
DOD, Report to Congress on the Review of
Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the
Service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed
Forces, February 2012.
9
DOD Memorandum, “Elimination of the
1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and
Assignment Rule,” January 24, 2013.
Katt
113
Laser-guided bombs line flight deck of
aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy in
preparation for air strikes against Iraq
during Operation Desert Storm (PH2 Lipski)
Determining Hostile
Intent in Cyberspace
By Ramberto A. Torruella, Jr.
kay, bogies have jinked back
at me again for the fifth time.
They’re on my nose now. Inside
of 20 miles.”
This was the report made by
Commander Steven Collins, USN, Radar
Intercept Officer (RIO) of Gypsy 207,
prior to arming his F-14’s radar-guided
missiles. Two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers
O
Commander Ramberto A. Torruella, Jr., USN,
is the Joint Staff J8 Models and Analysis
Information Technology Support Branch Chief.
were inbound to the John F. Kennedy
Carrier Strike Group. Two F-14 Tomcats
of VF-32 were assigned to intercept.
The Tomcats flew low, lost in the radar
clutter kicked up by the sea’s surface,
maneuvering several times to stay out
of the Libyan fighters’ engagement
envelope. The Americans maintained
a constant fire control lock on their
opponents. The MiGs matched each
American maneuver unerringly, ignoring
the radar lock warnings growling in their
cockpits. Because the radar on the MiG
fighters could not detect the Americans
114 Features / Determining Hostile Intent in Cyberspace
through the clutter, the Libyans relied on
guidance from shore-based radar stations
for a ground-controlled intercept. The
MiGs kept their noses pointed toward
the Americans, hoping their radar would
burn through the clutter and give them
a chance to shoot first. It was clear the
Libyans wanted a fight. It was clear they
had hostile intent.
“13 miles. Fox 1! Fox 1!” the RIO
shouted as the missiles left the rails of the
Tomcat, initiating an engagement that
would end with two MiGs destroyed and
two Libyan pilots lost at sea (paraphrased
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
from “Splash Two MiGs,” an account of
the 1989 Gulf of Sidra Incident).1
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
hostile intent is defined as the threat of
imminent use of force against the United
States, U.S. forces, or other designated
persons or property.2 It is the indication, the belief, a commander has that an
adversary is about to attack. That belief
provides the groundwork for “anticipatory self-defense,” an American legal
concept that allows a commander to attack before being attacked.3
From the point of view of the
American pilots, the Libyan pilots showed
hostile intent by flying a vector toward
the American Carrier Strike Group,
constantly maneuvering to threaten the
American interceptors, and ignoring the
obvious warning signal of American fire
control radar locked onto their aircraft.
Libyan actions gave the Americans the
belief that an attack was imminent. The
Americans launched their own missile
strike as a result: a clear case of anticipatory self-defense, a preemptive attack that
spoils the anticipated attack of an enemy.
Interestingly, from the Libyan point of
view, the Americans also clearly showed
hostile intent by constantly illuminating
the Libyan fighters with their fire control
radar, the last step the Libyans would
detect prior to an American missile attack.
Determining hostile intent is often
not this clear, but in this instance, within
the physical realm of fighter jets, radars,
and missiles, the evidence strongly suggests that both parties demonstrated
hostile intent.
This is rarely the case in cyberspace.
Information as a Weapon,
Cyberspace as an Abstraction
The cyberspace realm is an abstraction,
with components located in a physical space but operations occurring in
a nonphysical space, where the terrain
is data and information is used as a
weapon. This is not new. The ancient
Phoenicians pioneered information as
an abstraction when they laid the foundation for our alphabet, an abstraction
necessary for transmitting concepts via
the written word. Medieval Arabs developed our number system, an abstraction
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
necessary to communicate complex
calculations. Commanders from Alexander the Great to Napoleon used both
of these abstractions to send dispatches
in clear text and code—to communicate
with subordinates, coordinate actions
in real space, and hide their intentions
from opponents. Eventually, special
signal corps evolved to encrypt, transmit, receive, and handle messages, first
at the rate of the written word and the
horse, then at the rate of signal flags,
telegraphs, and flashing lights. Code
breakers ancient and modern fought a
silent war to understand enemy signals
and gain access to enemy information.
But it was not until the late 20th
century, when improvements in communication and computing technology
raised the volume and velocity of data
flow from dozens of words per minute
to 1.5 trillion words per minute, that the
information domain gained enough significance to be treated as a warfare area in
its own right.4 An adversary with access to
a commander’s data flow now possessed
a far richer set of information regarding intentions and operations. More
importantly, if an adversary could deny
the commander necessary information
or, better yet, change information needed
to make a decision, disastrous effects
could occur in real space. For instance,
what if the Libyans were able to fool the
American radars and combat systems into
believing their MiGs were farther away or
on a different vector? Would confusion
have ensued? Would the world be lamenting (or celebrating) a different outcome?
This is not the first time, and probably
not the last, that a change in technology caused an abstraction to evolve into
a warfighting domain. Consider the
concept of the high ground. In the 6th
century BCE, the military philosopher
Sun Tzu plainly articulated the benefit
of operations from the higher ground;
a commander has greater visibility over
enemy movements and is better situated
to defend against attack.5 It was even
axiomatic in ancient times that military
possession of higher ground would
greatly increase the chance of combat
success. During the late 18th century,
however, the French Revolutionary
Army experimented with a technology
that turned that land-based abstraction
(hold the high ground) into the start of
a useful warfighting domain; it started
using balloons for aerial reconnaissance
of the battlefield.6 Soon, other countries
experimented with using balloons for
observation, bombing the enemy, or
increasing the range of communications.
Most experiments met with modest
success; the technology simply was not
robust enough to deliver consistent
battlefield results.
But once the airplane was invented,
everything changed. Aerial reconnaissance became consistent and soon was
vital to events on the ground. Artillery
spotting was added to the airman’s list of
vital tasks as well as reconnaissance deep
inside of enemy lines. Change occurred
again when the first airman aimed a pistol
at an enemy observer in another aircraft.
An arms race quickly ensued—planes
increased in number, specialized in
purpose, and carried specially developed
weapons meant to shoot down other
aircraft. They flew faster and higher
and fought for dominance of the air.
Commanders now prioritized effects in
the air over direct effects on the ground,
and air warfare, a new warfighting domain, was born.
Hostile Intent in an
Abstract Domain
Cyber warfighters learn from the evolution of other domains, especially with
regard to the legal authorities associated with the use of force and armed
combat, the Law of Armed Conflict.
Just as aviators learned to apply the Law
of Armed Conflict in their new domain,
so will commanders who operate in the
cyber domain.
Cyberspace has its own unique challenges. Attributing a cyber attack is
difficult at best because commanders are
rarely ever sure of the source of an attack
or intrusion, and establishing the forensic
evidence needed to be certain is a timeconsuming and often imprecise science.
Intentions are even harder to discern.
For example, does malware beaconing
to an Internet protocol address in China
indicate an attempt to steal data? Is it a
Torruella
115
F-14D Tomcat conducts mission over Persian Gulf region (U.S. Air Force/Rob Tabor)
precursor for establishing a botnet? Is
the malware even Chinese? Is placing
malware even considered a use of force?
Unfortunately, there is little to no international consensus on what constitutes a
use of force in cyberspace.7
This article discusses the legal authorities to use force in cyberspace. It
discusses what constitutes the use of force
in cyberspace and how a commander can
determine if an opponent intends to use
force against the United States or its assets
and interests. The article builds on a rubric developed by Michael Schmitt to help
identify hostile intentions in cyberspace
and, using a spectrum of cyber activity
developed by Gary Brown and Owen
Tullos, suggests in general what may be
appropriate responses to hostile intent.
Finally, the article briefly addresses the
legal roles, responsibilities, and authorities
required for addressing the different types
of cyber attacks with an eye to identifying
and responding to hostile intent.
116
Classifying Use of Force
in Cyberspace
Article 2, Paragraph 4, of the United
Nations (UN) Charter specifically states
that “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.” Force, in this case,
does not mean coercion, but the use
of armed force as a tool of coercion or
persuasion. Matthew Waxman notes
that the framers of the UN Charter did
not set out to end coercive behaviors in
international relations, but to end war
as a legitimate tool of policy except in
the case of self-defense. The prohibition
against force is a prohibition against
armed attack.8
Waxman also notes that when the
framers set about to prohibit the use of
force, they took an instruments-based
Features / Determining Hostile Intent in Cyberspace
point of view instead of an effects-based
point of view of limiting coercion.9 This
means that the framers intentionally
sought to limit how coercion could be
performed in international politics, not
limit the effects of coercion on a target
nation. For instance, armed attacks and
kinetic strikes are not authorized, nor
are blockades, bombardments, or any
other classic use of military power, except
in self-defense or as authorized by the
UN Security Council for the peace and
security of the international community.
However, diplomatic isolation and economic coercion are perfectly authorized
by the charter. A nation can target an
embargo against another nation, but it
cannot conduct a naval blockade without
the express authorization of the Security
Council. Both actions may have the same
effect on the targeted nation—severe
economic damage as a form of coercive
pressure—but the charter explicitly prohibits a blockade and not an embargo.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
This creates a difficulty when dealing
with potentially hostile actions that occur
in cyberspace. By their very definition,
cyber actions occur in an abstract realm of
data representation, not physical force. So
even if a cyber action causes tremendous
destruction by overloading an electric
grid or shutting down a critical energy
pipeline, legally speaking, the cyber action is not necessarily a prohibited use of
force.
Andrew Folz notes that several legal
frameworks have evolved that address the
gap in the way international law views
force in cyberspace. Almost all shift away
from a strictly instruments-based view.
The first is an effects-based approach
where the “quantum of damage and not
the means of attack” determines if an
action in cyberspace is a prohibited use
of force.10 This approach only looks at
the damage done as a result of the attack
and ignores how an attack was delivered. While this framework is relatively
simple to apply, it represents a major
break from the way the international
community already deals with issues of
force by completely setting aside the
instruments-based framework. Blockades
and embargoes would essentially become
the same thing, and the international
community would lose major tools in
conducting international relations. What
is worse, it would lead to a subjective
assessment of what constitutes a hostile
action in cyberspace. If a quantum-ofdamage approach is used, the critical
question would be who determines what
a sufficient amount of damage is to constitute a prohibitive use of force. Each
nation, having different strengths and capabilities in the cyber realm, would draw
different conclusions.
Another framework is to consider
the “kinetic equivalency”11 of a cyber action, where an action in cyberspace only
constitutes the use of force if the damage
caused by the action could also have been
caused by kinetic attack.12 Overloading an
electric grid or shutting down an energy
pipeline with a cyber action can now be
considered a use of force because those
effects could also have been accomplished
with a missile or bomb. While this test
stays more true to the instruments-based
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
view of prohibited coercion, it really
does not address all actions in the cyber
realm, such as painting false targets in an
opponent’s radar. No damage was done
so there is no kinetic equivalency. Those
areas still remain gray.13
Duncan Hollis also considers a
“target-based” framework, where any
attack, cyber or kinetic, on a nation’s
critical infrastructure should be construed
as a prohibited use of force.14 However,
this framework suffers from the same
limitations as the quantum-of-damage
framework in that each nation will define
what is considered critical infrastructure
based on the strategic interests of the
nation. A cyber attack on gold mining
production in the United States may be
treated as a routine crime, but South
Africa may consider its gold mining infrastructure critical to its national interests
and would construe such an attack as a
prohibited use of force.
The Schmitt Analytical
Framework
One framework that stays true to the
instruments-based method of determining what force is prohibited, yet provides an effective metric for determining
whether a cyber action constitutes a use
of force, is that presented by Professor Michael Schmitt of the Naval War
College. After an interview, Andrew
Folz noted that Professor Schmitt’s
framework had bridged the gap
between an instruments view of force
and effects in cyberspace:
Professor Schmitt recognized that discerning the use-of-force threshold is really about
predicting how states will characterize
and respond to cyber incidents in light of
prevailing international norms. To aid
in such predictions, his framework bridges
the instrument and consequence-based approaches. In keeping with the Article 2(4)
instrument based standard, his model consists of seven factors that represent the major
distinctions between permissible (that is,
economic and political) and impermissible
(armed) instruments of coercion.15
Schmitt’s framework takes the
view that the more closely an action in
cyberspace approximates economic or
political coercion, the less likely it will be
viewed by a nation as an armed attack.
Conversely, the more likely an action in
cyberspace approximates armed force,
the more likely it will be perceived as an
armed attack, and hence an illegitimate
use of force.16 Schmitt’s seven factors
seek to differentiate between what makes
armed force inappropriate and what
makes economic and political coercion
appropriate. Consider, for example, the
differences in characteristics of an oil embargo and a blockade.
Schmitt’s seven factors are as follows:
•
•
•
•
Severity: Armed attacks threaten
physical injury or destruction of
property, while economic and political coercion do not. Cyber operations that threaten physical harm are
more likely to be viewed as a use of
force. This includes such characteristics as scope of the action, duration,
and intensity.
Immediacy: The damage due to an
armed attack usually occurs immediately, while damage due to other
forms of coercion develops more
slowly. This gives the target nation
time to respond to the pressure before
damage can takes place. Cyber actions
whose consequences are immediate,
leaving no time for a target nation to
respond to pressure or mitigate the
consequences, are more likely to be
viewed as a use of force.
Directness: Armed attacks can be
linked directly to the damage they
cause, and other forms of coercion
less so. The more directly a cyber
action can be linked to its consequences, the more likely the action
will be viewed as a use of force.
Invasiveness: In an armed attack, the
action usually crosses into a target
nation’s territory; other forms of
coercion generally stay beyond the
target’s borders. So even though
armed attacks and economic/political acts may have roughly similar
consequences, the armed actions
usually are, in the words of Schmitt,
“a greater intrusion on the rights of
the target state and, therefore, [are]
Torruella
117
Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict
Strategic
Nuclear
War
Support for
Insurgencies and
Counterinsurgencies
Major
Theater
War
International
War
Domestic
Disaster
Relief
Domestic
Civil
Support
Security
Assistance
Peacemaking
Counter
Terrorism
Strikes
•
m
ba
t
Arms
Control
Peace
Building
Environmental
Operations
ac
e
Nation
Assistance
Pe
Limited
Conventional
Conflict
Raids
Co
Level of Combat
Counterinsurgencies
Mil-to-Mil
Contacts
Tactical
Nuclear
War
Humanitarian
Assistance
Counterdrug
Show of
Force
Peacekeeping
Peace
Enforcement
•
Sanctions
Enforcement
Noncombatant
Evacuation
Operations
Level of Violence
Note: Figure adapted from Army Vision 2010 (Washington, DC: Headquarters
Department of the Army, n.d.), 5, available at <https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/CE5F5937-49EC-44EF-83F3-FC25CB0CB942-127411089825
0/aledc_ref/army_vision_2010.pdf>.
Figure 2. Spectrum of Cyber Conflict
Enabling Operations
Cyber Disruption
More Stealthy
Cyber Attack
Less Stealthy
Source: Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos, “On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations,” Small
Wars Journal, December 11, 2012, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/on-the-spectrum-of-cyberspace-operations>.
Table 1. Potential Actions in Cyberspace
Ping map
Change or delete data
Probe
Distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS)
Implant malware
Email bomb
Erase logs
Influence operations in social media
Email fishing
Disable critical infrastructure
Access networks
Damage critical infrastructure
Access email
Attack financial industry
Steal data
Attack military command and control (C2)
118 Features / Determining Hostile Intent in Cyberspace
•
more likely to disrupt international
stability.” The more a cyber operation violates or impairs the territorial
integrity or sovereignty of a state, the
more likely it will be viewed as a use
of force.
Measurability: While the consequences of armed attack are usually
easy to determine, the actual negative consequences of other forms
of coercion are harder to measure.
States are more likely to view a cyber
operation as a use of force if the consequences are easily identifiable and
objectively quantifiable.
Presumptive legitimacy: In almost
every nation, violence is an inappropriate response unless done in selfdefense. However, all other forms
of coercion are considered lawful
unless specifically prohibited by law
or treaty. Even actions prohibited by
national law, such as espionage, are
still considered a legitimate international practice to a certain extent.
Cyber actions such as espionage,
influence operations, psychological
operations, and propaganda, which
are legitimately accepted between
states, are generally not considered a
prohibited use of force.
Responsibility: The more closely a
cyber operation can be tied to a state,
the more likely it will be viewed as a
use of force.
These factors are not an exhaustive
list; they are a starting point for further
analysis. Nor should they be treated as
anything but a holistic approach to characterizing the use of force in cyberspace.
Using the Schmitt framework helps set a
metric from which to start characterizing
potentially hostile actions in cyberspace.
Spectrums of Physical
and Cyber Conflict
Armed conflict is not a bi-stable; it does
not exist in a state where a potential
adversary’s action is either a use of force
or it is not. In reality, conflict occurs
across a spectrum where it is not always
clear if an action should be considered
hostile or just plain resistant. Figure 1
illustrates this complexity. In the figure,
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Table 2. Example of Completed Schmitt Analysis
Cyber action
Ping map
Severity
Immediacy
Directness
Invasiveness
Measurability
Presumptive
Legitimacy
Responsibility
1
1
5
7
7
1
3
Probe
2
1
5
7
7
2
3
Implant malware
3
4
5
7
7
3
3
Erase logs
5
5
5
8
7
6
4
Email fishing
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
Access networks
4
5
6
8
5
6
5
Access email
4
5
6
8
5
6
5
Steal data
6
6
6
9
8
6
6
Change or delete data
7
6
6
9
8
8
6
Distributed denial-ofservice attack (DDoS)
7
7
7
9
8
8
7
Email bomb
7
5
6
7
7
6
5
Influence operations in
social media
6
7
6
6
7
5
7
Disable critical
infrastructure
9
8
8
9
8
8
8
Damage critical
infrastructure
9
9
8
9
8
8
8
Attack financial
industry
8
9
8
9
8
8
8
Military command and
control attack
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
there are two shapes: one to the left
that represents the spectrum of peace,
the other to the right that represents
the spectrum of combat. Both use the
same sliding scale with level of effort
on the left and level of violence across
the bottom. Note the overlap near
the center. Actions that occur in that
overlap region may have different connotations depending on the strategic
situation. Does the commander, for
instance, desire de-escalation to maintain the peace, or escalation to maintain
pressure in accordance with a UN Security Council directive? Any determination of hostile intent in cyberspace must
include an understanding of the strategic situation, especially as it pertains to
the spectrum of conflict.
Gary Brown and Owen Tullos suggest a spectrum for cyber activity that is
based on the effects of actions in cyberspace (see figure 2).17 They postulate
that cyber actions fall into three basic
categories: enabling actions, which have
little impact on the operations of a nation’s information infrastructure but can
set the stage for future operations and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
attacks; cyber disruptions, which may interrupt the flow of information or disrupt
the operation of information systems but
not cause physical damage or injury; and
cyber attack, which may cause physical
damage to property or injury to people.
Enabling operations tend to be stealthy,
and cyber attacks tend to be easily attributable, at least to the point of origin if
not the nation responsible.
The Brown and Tullos spectrum
is meant to be used in concert with
Schmitt’s framework. Schmitt’s framework provides a detailed metric that is
excellent for operational-/strategic-level
forensic analysis of an attack but may be
too complex for use at the tactical level.
Brown and Tullos completely abandon
the instruments-based metric for determining if use of force is warranted, but
the spectrum is helpful, especially when
combined with the overall strategic
picture, in establishing what immediate
actions are appropriate when a cyber
action is detected. Taken together—
Schmitt for the strategic analysis and
understanding the operational landscape,
and Brown and Tullos for deploying
appropriate countermeasures—we create
a solid framework for determining hostile
intent in cyberspace.
Determining Hostile
Intent in Cyberspace
Establishing that framework starts with
understanding the strategic situation.
Where is the Nation or joint force
operating with regard to the spectrum
of conflict (figure 2)? How do partner
nations and potential adversaries view
the strategic situation? Understanding
this landscape helps establish priorities
and appropriately weighs factors during
the Schmitt analysis.
Conducting the Schmitt Analysis.
The analysis begins with a list of potential
actions in cyberspace (see table 1). This
list of actions is not meant to be specific
or exhaustive but strategic and general,
similar in manner to how the Standing
Rules of Engagement issued by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff start
out as strategic and general but are modified with more specificity by commanders
closer to the conflict. The list should
generally and broadly cover the body of
Torruella
119
Figure 3. Example of Schmitt Analysis Stack
70
Responsibility
Presumptive Legitimacy
Measureability
Invasiveness
Directness
Immediacy
Severity
60
50
40
30
20
actions that may occur in cyberspace that
have impacts in the theater or area of
operations.
Schmitt did not intend for his model
to be a quantitative tool but rather to be
used as a heuristic. Keeping that in mind,
an analyst would use the seven factors
to perform a qualitative analysis of each
action on the list; each action would be
evaluated for each Schmitt factor on how
close the effects of that action would be
to the kinetic effects of an armed attack.
For simplicity’s sake, analysis would use
a scale of 1 to 10—where a 1 means that
characteristic is far away from a kinetic
effect and a 10 is exactly like a kinetic
effect. Once each action is evaluated for
each factor (see table 2), the results could
then be stacked to give a reasonable
comparison of which cyber action is more
hostile compared to another.
Attack military C2
Attack financial industry
Damage critical infrastructure
Disable critical infrastructure
Influence ops social media
Email bomb
DDoS
Change or delete data
Steal data
Access email
Access network
Email fishing
Erase logs
Implant malware
Ping map
0
Probe
10
Determining Response with the
Brown-Tullos Spectrum. The Schmitt
Analysis Stack (figure 3) gives a good
indication of what a commander can
consider a hostile act in cyberspace.
Figure 4 takes the stack of actions,
from least hostile to most hostile, and
lays them on the Brown-Tullos Cyber
Action Response Spectrum. Using the
three general categories in Brown-Tullos
(enabling operations, cyber disruption,
cyber attack), a commander can develop
general responses appropriate to the level
of hostility indicated by the action. More
importantly, the commander can add
or subtract responses, or even move responses up and down the spectrum based
on the strategic environment in the theater. For instance, an adversary’s access to
an unclassified network may be considered enabling operations in a theater at
120 Features / Determining Hostile Intent in Cyberspace
peace, so the response may be to simply
monitor and report the covert access. As
tensions rise in the area of responsibility,
the response may be adjusted to block
and report, or even to conduct a counter
cyber action against the adversary.
When used in conjunction with one
another, the Schmitt Analysis and BrownTullos Cyber Action Response Spectrum
provide a commander with a flexible
tool to determine an appropriate range
of responses to a range of cyber actions.
Additionally, both can be useful in coordinating cyber responses from different
agencies with differing legal authorities.
Figure 5 gives an example of how such
authorities may be specified. Note that
this matrix shows responsibility for action. The Defense Information Systems
Agency or the National Security Agency
may respond to a ping map or probe
on a Department of Defense (DOD)
network, but has no legal authority to
pursue the perpetrator who resides in the
United States; law enforcement would
be responsible for that action, and DOD
entities would have to coordinate with
law enforcement to take action.
Conclusion
Use of force is not simply in the eye
of the beholder; there is a rugged,
tested framework that is reflected in the
United Nations Charter that governs
what is acceptable coercion and what is
prohibited use of force. Staying as close
to that framework as possible when
determining hostile intent in cyberspace
means we stay close to the use-of-force
lessons and applications of the past six
decades. An evolutionary development
of the legal basis is more appropriate
than a revolutionary development.
Some issues of concern remain: even
though it is useful for evaluating the
strategic/operational cyber landscape, the
Schmitt framework was never meant for
real-time battlefield analysis. The analytical framework presented is meant to give
the commander a feel for how hostile a
cyber action is and help plan appropriate
responses ahead of time. The analysis is
also not meant to be static but dynamic,
based on continuous analysis of the
cyber landscape. New tools, techniques,
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Figure 4. Example of Brown-Tullos
Cyber Action Response Spectrum
ry
ry C
2
Att
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ck f
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Att
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Dam
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nfr
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Cyber Attack
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Cyber Disruption
nd
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Im p
lan
t
ap
Pro
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gm
Pin
Enabling Operations
Cyber Response
Figure 5. Responsibility for Threats in Cyberspace
Title 6
Homeland Security
Title 10/32/50
National Defense
Ping map
Ping map
Probe
Probe
Implant malware
Implant malware
Erase logs
Erase logs
Email fishing
Email fishing
Access
network/email
Access
network/email
Steal data
Steal data
Influence Ops
Twitter/Facebook/SMS
Change or
delete data
Change or
delete data
Change or
delete data
DDoS
DDoS
DDoS
Email bomb
Email bomb
Treaties
Signatory Parties
Nation States
UN Charter
UN Security Council
Less Destructive
E
Op nab
er lin
at g
io
ns
Title 18
Law Enforcement
Notes
e
Cyber Action
Mo
vulnerabilities, and mitigations must be
continuously taken into account with
the strategic situation to accurately stack
all the factors and give a commander the
right situational awareness. Additionally,
the Brown-Tullos spectrum starts out as
an effects-based spectrum and only takes
into account the instruments of force
after Schmitt has been applied. Both must
be used together, therefore, one for the
strategic/operational analysis, the other
to communicate immediate actions at the
tactical level.
The real test for any method of determining hostile intent is how it works
operationally—that is, how easily it can
be employed on the battlefield. The cyber
battlefield is not physical; it is abstract,
but its effects have real consequences in
the physical world. The results of tests
can be quickly seen and applied, and the
method improved in a short period of
time. JFQ
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
C
Di ybe
sr r
up
tio
Attack Critical
Infrastructure
Attack Critical
Infrastructure
Attack Critical
Infrastructure
Attack Military C2
Attack Military C2
Attack Military C2
C
At ybe
ta r
ck
“Splash Two MiGs,” Fly.Historicwings.
Com, January 4, 2013, available at <http://
fly.historicwings.com/2013/01/splash-twomigs>.
2
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3121.01B, “Standing Rules of
Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for U.S. Forces,” Washington, DC, June
13, 2005.
3
International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, VA: U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Center and School, 2012).
4
Jude E. Franklin, “CCRTS C2 Plenary
Panel,” June 30, 2006, available at <www.
dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/presentations/1_Panel.pdf>.
5
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. James
Clavell, trans. Samuel B. Griffin (New York:
Delacorte Press, 1989).
6
“The Hot Air Balloon,” Century-of-flight.
net, available at <www.century-of-flight.net/
new%20site/frames/balloons_frame.htm>.
7
Andrew C. Folz, “Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber ‘Use-of-Force’ Debate,”
Joint Force Quarterly 67 (4th Quarter 2012),
40–48.
8
Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber Attacks and
the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article
2(4),” The Yale Journal of International Law
36, no. 42 (2011), 421–459.
9
Ibid.
10
Folz, 40–48.
n
1
More Destructive
Hard to Attribute
Attribute with Forensics
Overt
11
Duncan B. Hollis, “Why States Need an
International Law for Information Operations,”
Lewis and Clark Law Review 11, no. 4 (2007),
1023–1061.
12
Folz, 40–48.
13
Ibid.
14
Hollis, 1023–1061.
15
Folz, 40–48.
16
Ibid.
17
Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos,
“On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations,” Small Wars Journal, December 11,
2012, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.
com/jrnl/art/on-the-spectrum-of-cyberspaceoperations>.
Torruella
121
Asymmetric Warfare Group Advisor takes cover with
Soldiers while man-portable line charge system is
detonated during training exercise near Forward Operating
Base Zangabad, Afghanistan (U.S. Army/Alex Flynn)
Understanding the Enemy
The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic
Exploitation
By Thomas B. Smith and Marc Tranchemontagne
he escalation of improvised
explosive device (IED) incidents
and related casualties during
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom led to a new intelligence
T
Captain Thomas B. Smith, USN, is Commanding
Officer of the Naval Surface Warfare Center
Indian Head, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Technology Division. Commander Marc
Tranchemontagne, USN (Ret.), was an Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Officer. He is currently an
Associate with R3 Strategic Support Group.
122
field related to technical intelligence
(TECHINT) called weapons technical
intelligence (WTI), which combined
technical and forensic IED exploitation techniques to link persons, places,
things, and events. WTI operationalizes technical and forensic activities
by fusing the technical, forensic, and
biometric disciplines to produce actionable intelligence for countering threat
networks. It is an especially powerful
tool against terrorist organizations
that rely on IEDs as a primary weapon
Features / Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation
in their arsenals. Given the enduring
nature of the IED problem, careful
consideration is required to ensure that
we have the necessary counter-IED
capability and capacity to meet future
threats across the range of military
operations. Across this range and at
each level of war from tactical to strategic, TECHINT and WTI make critical
contributions to joint warfare and military decisionmaking.
WTI development has been incremental and idiosyncratic and has led
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
to the fielding of a number of new
capabilities including Counter-IED
Task Forces, Counter-IED Operations/
Intelligence Centers, Combined
Explosives Exploitation Cells (CEXCs),
Expeditionary Forensic Labs (EFLs—
formerly Joint Expeditionary Forensic
Facilities), and Weapons Intelligence
Teams, all of which contribute to WTI.
A few capabilities have been written into
doctrine or have become programs of record, such as the CEXC platoons, which
deploy small footprint expeditionary laboratories for the technical exploitation of
IEDs and other ordnance, and the Army
EFLs, which perform expeditionary forensic exploitation of IEDs as their name
implies.1 The relationships among these
organizations, however, remain largely
ad hoc; in the maritime domain, they
are untested. These exploitation capabilities—technical and forensic, with the
related discipline of biometrics—should
be tested with multi-Service concepts of
operation, exercised jointly, integrated
into joint operational planning, and codified in joint doctrine that addresses the
exploitation enterprise holistically.
The need for improved planning and
interagency cooperation in counter-IED
operations is well documented. A recent
Government Accountability Office report found that Department of Defense
(DOD) strategic planning does not
adequately document the milestones and
metrics required to achieve desired goals.2
Additionally, Presidential policy directs
interagency efforts toward effectively
exploiting IED materials, advancing our
information analysis, and maintaining
our deployable counter-IED resources,
among other activities.3 For the foreseeable future, terrorist use of IEDs is
expected to “pose a fundamental, significant and enduring threat.”4
Discussion
Across the range of military operations,
traditional TECHINT takes primacy in
conventional conflict, and WTI takes
primacy in irregular warfare.5 Traditional TECHINT products are used to
“prevent technological surprise, neutralize an adversary’s technological advantages, enhance force protection . . . [and]
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
support the development and employment of effective countermeasures,” as
well as inform acquisition priorities and
shape strategic decisionmaking.6 The
Army, for example, maintains antiarmor
and antiair task forces that analyze battle
damage to identify enemy capabilities,
friendly technological gaps, countervailing tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs), and areas for product improvement. Although a single weapons system
is seldom decisive on its own, new or
enhanced technologies can be disruptive. U.S. military superiority serves as
a strategic deterrent to war, and U.S.
technological superiority underpins that
military advantage.7
WTI allows operational commanders
to interrupt an enemy’s decision cycle
and interdict IED tactical employment
in real time. Simply put, it can mitigate
the costs of technical surprise in terms
of personnel, equipment, and dollars by
placing better information in the hands
of warfighters when prioritizing and
planning operations. Its five outcomes—
force protection, targeting, component
and material sourcing, support to
prosecution, and signal characterization—contribute to operational success
in irregular warfare. WTI supports
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
in current contingencies, but could also
contribute to peace enforcement, counterpiracy, maritime security, promoting
the rule of law, and countering other irregular challenges. At the operational and
tactical levels of war, WTI contributes directly to the doctrinal counter-IED lines
of operation: attack the network, defeat
the device, and train the force.8 In some
cases, due to lack of either international
agreement or deployed capacity, valuable
information is lost when captured material is disposed of where it is found rather
than being routed to a forward WTI
facility for analysis.
Terrorist and insurgent groups
have used IEDs so effectively in Iraq
and Afghanistan that they have been
called “weapons of strategic influence.”9
Terrorists have been proficient at synchronizing IED attacks with information
operations to weaken public confidence
in the government, demonstrate terrorist
effectiveness, and damage coalition morale. On March 11, 2004, for example,
terrorists simultaneously detonated
bombs on four trains near Madrid 3
days before Spain’s general election. The
incumbent president had a small lead in
opinion polls going into the election and
was favored to win in spite of his unpopular decision to contribute Spanish troops
to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The attacks killed 191 people, wounded 1,800,
and changed the outcome of the election, which led to Spain withdrawing its
forces from Iraq. Strategically, terrorists
have also used IED attacks to influence
U.S. public opinion and undermine the
Nation’s political resolve.
In October 2011, the Department of
Justice unsealed an indictment describing
the illegal export of electronic devices
to Iran. Four men from Singapore
purchased 6,000 radio frequency (RF)
modules through a Singapore front
company, which were forwarded to Iran
through third countries and ended up in
IEDs in Iraq. Between 2008 and 2010,
the U.S. military recovered 16 of the
RF modules from IEDs in Iraq. By locally exploiting the recovered IEDs, the
U.S. Government was able to trace the
RF modules by serial number from the
United States to Iran and then to the
IEDs in Iraq.10 This success is an example
of the strategic implications of technical
exploitation—in this case, exposing third
country support to an insurgency—and
the importance of a continuum from
collection through out-of-theater exploitation with connections to the broader
Intelligence Community.
At the operational level of war,
TECHINT and WTI inform military decisionmaking by supporting intelligence
preparation of the operational environment and helping to protect friendly
critical requirements, identify enemy critical vulnerabilities, and attack the enemy
center of gravity. Insurgent reliance on
IEDs in Iraq created an opportunity for
coalition forces. For the insurgents, IEDs
were a critical requirement—the most
lethal, effective, and fearsome weapons
they possessed—that also proved to be
a critical vulnerability. Initially regarded
primarily as a force protection issue, the
Smith and Tranchemontagne
123
IED came to be viewed more properly
as an intelligence opportunity that could
yield key information about the network
of bomb designers, builders, emplacers,
triggermen, financiers, component suppliers, trainers, planners, and operational
leaders who made up the web of actors
who execute IED attacks.11
WTI contributes to defeating the
enemy center of gravity because it provides insight into the network—how
it is led and sustained and how it operates—that is critical to defeating it.
Attack-the-network operations fit neatly
within the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate (F3EAD) architecture
developed by the special operations
community during counterterrorism
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
When synchronized with biometric
enrollment and detention operations,
WTI creates synergy that deepens the
operational commander’s knowledge
of the adversary. Forensic information
correlated to biometric databases allows
coalition forces to associate a specific
IED to a discrete individual, link clusters
of devices to a specific bombmaker or
IED cell, recognize patterns of insurgent
operations, and identify named areas of
interest against which commanders can
plan operations. Technical exploitation
of IED components can indicate where
a bombmaker learned his technique and
whether IED components were obtained
locally or imported.
For democracies such as the United
States, political will and public support
tend to be critical vulnerabilities—possibly even the friendly center of gravity
at the strategic level. IEDs are used by
the enemy in part to sow fear, create
a perception of host nation weakness,
undermine troop morale, split coalitions,
provoke overreaction by security forces,
alienate local populations, and erode
political will. WTI has been used extensively to support rule of law initiatives
that demonstrate the effectiveness of the
host nation’s judicial system and reinforce
public confidence in the legitimacy of the
government. Identifying the perpetrators
of attacks on civilians can help to isolate
insurgents from the populace and undermine their propaganda.
In terms of joint functions,
TECHINT and WTI support command and control (now replaced by
mission orders in Army doctrine), fires,
movement and maneuver, intelligence,
sustainment, and protection.12 In counterinsurgency, understanding the enemy
network allows commanders to develop
actionable intelligence and exercise
“disciplined initiative” consistent with
commander’s intent.13 Understanding
how the enemy perceives the operational
environment can inform a commander’s
decisions on such matters as arranging
forces, designating operational areas,
achieving effective span of control, and
synchronizing operations. The fusing
of technical, forensic, and biometric
information into actionable intelligence
permits precise fires to shape the operational environment, including supply
chain interdiction, counterthreat finance
operations, information operations,
cache destruction, and the capture of
high-value individuals. Landmines,
IEDs, and naval mines are antiaccess
and area-denial weapons that serve as
impediments to both movement (for
example, the reception, staging, and
onward integration of coalition forces)
and maneuver. Moreover, mines and
IEDs are often used to prevent sustainment and resupply of friendly forces. At
the strategic level of war, naval mines can
be used to blockade critical ports and
target commercial shipping in a strangulation strategy. Technical exploitation
of these weapons informs strategic and
operational planning and facilitates the
development of countermeasures and
countervailing TTPs.
Operational analysis demonstrates
that WTI yields measurable effects on the
battlefield and can be used by commanders to set operational priorities. Recent
analysis in Afghanistan, for example,
showed that removing bombmakers from
the battlefield led to statistically significant reductions in IED attacks in a given
area for a quantifiable period of time.
Other generally accepted metrics such
as cache destruction and route clearance
showed no statistically significant effect.14
Compelling statistical evidence that detaining even relatively low-level insurgent
124 Features / Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation
bombmakers produces measurable effects
won over skeptical commanders and
resulted in a marked increase in evidencebased targeting.15 Bombmaking requires
special skills and training that are not easily replaced.
Technical exploitation is critical to
ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces
maintain a technological advantage
against any adversary. Across all phases
of operations from peacetime-shaping
through stability operations and enabling
civil authority, technical exploitation
and foreign material acquisition functions provide critical TECHINT on an
enemy’s ordnance order of battle. An
understanding of adversary strengths
and weaknesses gained from exploitation of enemy ordnance may influence
operational planning and force protection.16 During World War II, for instance,
Germany developed bomb fuzes with
antihandling mechanisms to target British
bomb disposal personnel during the
blitz. Exploitation of recovered fuzes led
to countermeasures that allowed clearance operations to continue. It also led
to tighter operational security regarding
bomb disposal procedures. Recovering
captured enemy equipment—including
enemy ordnance—is both a combatant
command and national requirement and
is doctrinally performed at the operational level by a Joint Captured Material
Exploitation Center with reachback and
collaboration across the interagency.17
The forensic aspect of exploitation,
which links persons, places, things, and
events, supports theater strategic goals of
reestablishing the rule of law by supporting criminal prosecutions. While getting
bombers off the street or battlefield is a
positive end in itself, demonstrating the
effectiveness of the host nation’s judicial
system reinforces public confidence in
the legitimacy of the host nation government. Identifying the perpetrators of
attacks on civilians helps cut insurgents
off from the populace and undermines
their propaganda. The public’s faith in its
government and civic institutions’ ability
to deliver positive social goods is essential
to winning in counterinsurgency, where
the goal is less to defeat the insurgent
than to make him irrelevant.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Exploitation can also provide a powerful metric for evaluating policy. In Iraq,
fingerprint matches from recovered IEDs
have demonstrated that the recidivism
rate among released detainees was higher
than believed and that Iraq’s amnesty
program had returned many bad actors to
the street. In Afghanistan, evaluation of
recovered homemade explosives (HME)
provides insight into the effectiveness
of programs to ban the importation of
certain fertilizers used in HME production. While the in-country exploitation
of IEDs is considered operational, it
provides the crucial linkage to strategic,
national, and special exploitation capabilities, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Terrorist Device
Analytical Center, National Ground
Intelligence Center, U.S. Army Criminal
Investigation Laboratory, and other national resources.
One way exploitation can influence
strategic decisionmaking is by providing
early indication of third-country participation in a conflict or state sponsorship
of a terrorist organization. For example,
the technical exploitation of explosively
formed penetrators (EFPs) during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, corroborated
by other intelligence, provided an early
indication that EFPs were not being
manufactured in Iraq but were imported
from a third country. Metallurgy helped
confirm that the high-purity copper
EFP liners were not produced in Iraq.
Differences in the liners indicated the
kind of press that was required to fabricate them—a heavy press not commonly
seen in Iraq—as well as an indication of
the number of different presses that were
being used.18 Similarly, identifying thirdcountry conventional ordnance in a war
zone might belie that country’s claims
of neutrality. In an insurgency, foreign
ordnance might indicate external support, arms smuggling, or the presence of
foreign fighters. Such evidence can shape
strategic decisionmaking.
Technical exploitation can provide
evidence of violations of international law
and treaties. In countering the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), identifying
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
the country of origin of recovered,
seized, or contraband weapons would
be a necessary precursor to diplomatic
or other action under the Proliferation
Security Initiative. Moreover, characterizing the extent of the threat posed by
WMD requires an understanding of the
level of sophistication of such weapons.
In peace enforcement operations, the
recovery and exploitation of banned
weapons might provide evidence of ceasefire violations. Likewise, the exploitation
of recovered drifting mines can provide
evidence of violations of international
norms and treaties—in this example, the
Hague Convention of 1907.
The presence of naval mines in the
northern Arabian Gulf was one factor
that prevented an amphibious landing at Ash Shuaybah, Kuwait, during
Operation Desert Storm. Later technical
exploitation of these mines showed that
many were neither active nor laid effectively. In fact, many lacked batteries and
sensors.19 Had this technical information been available earlier, it might have
influenced operational and, perhaps,
theater-strategic planning.
At the tactical level of war, WTI outcomes help to predict, prevent, detect,
neutralize, and mitigate IED attacks.
They have been essential in the development of electronic countermeasures for
radio-controlled IEDs and have created
new opportunities for commanders to
gain tactical advantages in novel ways.
WTI outcomes are used to target insurgents, develop force protection measures,
formulate counter-IED TTP, design
countermeasures, provide indications
and warnings of IED attacks, interdict
supplies and precursors, and support
prosecution by the host nation. The exploitation of an IED incident also yields
important information about incident
geometry that can help friendly forces
understand where an insurgent is likely
to emplace an IED or how he might
trigger it.20 Not only do WTI products
help friendly forces develop TTP to avoid
IED ambushes, but they also enable
commanders to target the insurgents who
employ the devices. WTI allows tactical
forces to seize the initiative and become
the hunter rather than the hunted.
The Way Ahead
Lessons learned from technical and
forensic exploitation in Iraq and
Afghanistan have created new capabilities, interdisciplinary methodologies,
and operational units for the technical
and forensic exploitation of explosives, explosive hazards, and foreign
ordnance. The institutionalization of
these capabilities—directed by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council—
has been incremental, and no joint
operating concept for their employment exists. Nor is there an operating
concept or doctrine for organizing and
employing the various technical and
forensic organizations, disciplines, functions, and processes resident in DOD
and the Interagency.
Many stakeholders exist across DOD
and the other Federal agencies. The
Defense Intelligence Agency has primary
responsibility for intelligence activities
and programs related to forensics.21
The Navy is the DOD Single Manager
for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
technology, which includes technical
exploitation of recovered explosives,
explosive devices, and other explosive
hazards. The Navy executes this responsibility through the Indian Head EOD
Technology Division.22 The Army is the
DOD Executive Agent (EA) for forensic
disciplines relating to DNA, serology,
firearms and tool marks, latent prints,
questioned documents, drug chemistry,
and trace materials, as well as forensic
medicine disciplines.23 It is also the EA
for biometrics, a separate but related and
complementary field that uses measurable
biological and behavioral characteristics to uniquely identify people.24 The
Air Force is the EA for Digital and
Multimedia Forensics relating to computer and electronic device forensics,
audio forensics, image analysis, and video
analysis.25 Counter-IED operations in
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom have also relied on coalition
partners, particularly the British, who
have a lot of experience with WTI.
The Services have developed a variety of modular, scalable, deployable
laboratories for overseas contingencies,
including those used by the Navy CEXC
Smith and Tranchemontagne
125
Afghan and coalition security force uncovers Taliban weapons cache containing materials for constructing IEDs, including ammonium nitrate, homemade
explosives, and detonation triggers, during operation in Helmand Province (DOD/Justin Young)
platoons and Army EFLs. The Army
also maintains heavy and light mobile
laboratories to conduct field confirmatory chemical, biological, and explosive
analysis and near-real-time chemical air
monitoring. Experience in Operations
Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom
demonstrates that an in-country exploitation capability provides a degree
of responsiveness due to physical and
psychological proximity to the warfighter
that a U.S.-based capability cannot match
while providing a comparable level of
exploitation. Laboratory exploitation in
recent operations has taken place in large
bases as well as austere forward operating bases. Extension of these operations
continues in U.S. Naval Forces Central
in support of Combined Task Force 56,
for example, moving a comprehensive
capability outside Iraq and Afghanistan
for the first time to assist in partnering
efforts. Moving a scaled-down laboratory
126
element forward for a major operation
could improve timely intelligence delivery
to the warfighter even further. Scaling
these laboratories for ground transport
on heavy vehicles, intertheater lift, and
seabasing has recently been exercised and
is already supporting combatant command exercise and engagement plans.
Technical and forensic exploitation
operations have not been exercised in a
maritime context. Maritime operations
might include operating from a seabase,
supporting maritime security operations, supporting a Marine Air-Ground
Task Force ashore, and conducting WTI
operations for underwater threats. The
Navy has only a minimal capability to
collect forensic evidence in the aftermath
of an underwater explosive incident
such as the terrorist IED attack against
the destroyer USS Cole or the sinking
of the South Korean corvette ROKS
Cheonan by a North Korean submarine.
Features / Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation
It lacks appropriate doctrine, procedures,
training, and equipment to conduct site
exploitation and postblast investigation
underwater to support WTI—a task that
only Navy EOD technicians can execute
due to the diving requirement. The FBI
runs an underwater postblast investigation course, but it does not provide
unit-level training.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) identified several key initiatives to ensure that DOD is prepared
to provide appropriate support to civil
authorities. Regarding counter-IED operations, it states, “to better prepare the
Department to support civil authorities
seeking to counter potential threats from
domestic IEDs, DOD will assist civil
authorities with counter-IED TTPs and
capabilities developed in recent operations.”26 This contingency has not been
exercised and the authorities have not
been worked out, but it would seem that
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
DOD’s expertise in counter-IED technical and forensic exploitation operations
would be an important asset for defense
support of civil authorities. Immediate
military support to civilian authorities by
EOD forces is allowed by U.S. law but
is also ad hoc. As recently demonstrated,
the Army’s 387th Ordnance Company
responded to 64 “call outs” during the
Boston Marathon bombing.27 Mindful
of the Posse Comitatus Act, we should
provide a seamless system that credentials
and integrates military EOD operations
in support of civil authorities nationally.28
The proliferation of IED knowledge
suggests that these devices will continue
to be used by terrorists, insurgents, and
criminal elements at home and abroad.
The Army’s EFLs and the Navy’s
Technical Support Detachment with its
subordinate CEXC platoons would be
well suited to fulfill the QDR priority of
enhancing domestic counter-IED capabilities. The Armed Forces have a large
body of combat-tested military EOD
technicians experienced in the IED fight
who could quickly mobilize to support civilian efforts in the aftermath of an event
similar to the Boston and Oklahoma City
detonations, or worse, a sustained terrorist bombing campaign. Formal training
and credentialing to facilitate their employment in support of civilian authorities
in the event of a significant disaster are
among the easier options.
Summary
The exploitation of enemy ordnance
has important strategic implications for
preventing technological surprise and informing strategic decisionmaking. At the
strategic level of war, scientific and technical intelligence and WTI can help to:
•
•
•
•
ensure U.S. technological advantage
and its implicit deterrent effect
prevent a future enemy from benefiting from disruptive new technologies
or counter those technologies once
fielded
support operational and theaterstrategic planning
indicate third-country involvement
in hostilities
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
•
•
•
•
•
indicate state sponsorship of terrorist
organizations
provide evidence of violation of
international norms and treaties
provide metrics for evaluating theater-strategic and national policies
support development of formal international partnerships
enable combatant command theater
security cooperation plans.
At the operational level of war,
TECHINT and WTI contribute to:
•
•
•
•
•
the three counter-IED lines of operation and F3EAD: attack the network,
defeat the device, and train the force
operational planning (Joint Operation Planning Process, Military
Decision Making Process, network
planning process)
intelligence preparation of the operational environment
host nation rule of law
enabling formal data and information
exchanges.
At the tactical level of war,
TECHINT and WTI provide information used to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
target insurgents
develop force protection measures
develop friendly TTPs
develop countermeasures
provide indications and warnings of
IED activity
interdict supplies and precursors
support prosecution by the host
nation.
Conclusion
An operating concept for conducting
expeditionary technical and forensic
exploitation would provide commanders with a framework for organizing
and employing joint force technical
and forensic exploitation capabilities. It
would provide a holistic, synchronized
approach to integrate multiple organizations, disciplines, functions, and
processes that support technical and
forensic exploitation. It would provide a
joint task force commander a framework
for planning, organizing, and executing technical and forensic exploitation
operations including those in a maritime
environment. Using lessons learned
from Iraq and Afghanistan, a concept of
operations would identify best scientific,
technical, and operational practices for
experimentation and future Service
and Joint doctrine. While a number of
new organizations and capabilities have
emerged to confront IEDs, no complete doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solution exists for
planning and executing technical and
forensic exploitation operations across
the range of military operations. Given
the proven value of technical and forensic exploitation operations across this
range and at every level of war, with the
related discipline of biometrics, these
exploitation capabilities should be tested
with multi-Service concepts of operation, exercised jointly, and codified in
joint doctrine that addresses the entire
exploitation enterprise. JFQ
Notes
1
In 2008, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) directed the institutionalization of CEXC and the Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facilities (now EFL) through
a doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Request, JROCM
128-08. Joint Staff Memorandum, JROCM
128-08, Joint Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) Defeat DOTMLPF Change Recommendation, June 20, 2008.
2
U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), Defense Forensics: Additional Planning
and Oversight Needed to Establish an Enduring Expeditionary Forensic Capability: Report
to Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC:
GAO, June 2013), 9, available at <www.gao.
gov/assets/660/655546.pdf>.
3
The White House, “Countering Improvised Explosive Devices,” Policy Statement,
February 26, 2013, 3, available at <www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
cied_1.pdf>.
4
Presidential Policy Directive 17, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (Washington,
DC: The White House, June 15, 2012), 2.
5
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization, Weapons Technical Intelligence
Handbook, Version 1.1 (Washington, DC: DIA,
October 2010), 9.
Smith and Tranchemontagne
127
New from
NDU Press
for the Center for Strategic Research
Strategic Perspectives 17
The Indian Jihadist Movement:
Evolution and Dynamics
by Stephen Tankel
India has
been confronting a
jihadist threat
from Pakistan
for decades.
Expeditionary
terrorism
typically
receives the
most focus, but indigenous actors
benefiting from external support
are responsible for the majority of
jihadist attacks in India. The Indian
mujahideen network, which announced its presence to the public
via media in 2007, is the latest and
most well known manifestation of
the indigenous Islamist militant
threat. As Stephen Tankel details
in this paper, however, its members
were active before then. Moreover,
a small number of Indian Muslims
have been launching terrorist
strikes—with and without Pakistani
support—for more than two
decades. The dynamics of Indian
jihadism and the nature of India’s
evolving counterterrorism response
are not easy to comprehend. This
is understandable given that, even
among Indian security officials and
analysts, a knowledge gap exists.
Visit the NDU Press Web site for
more information on publications
at ndupress.ndu.edu
6
Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Joint Intelligence (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June
22, 2007), B-6.
7
At the strategic level, TECHINT is called
scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI); JP
2-0, B-6.
8
The term attack the network is gradually
being replaced by countering threat networks.
For additional information on counter-IED
lines of operations, see JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 9, 2012),
III-5.
9
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO), “Official Website of
the Joint IED Defeat Organization,” available
at <www.jieddo.dod.mil/index.aspx>. According to the mission statement, “JIEDDO leads
DOD [Department of Defense] actions to
rapidly provide Counter Improvised Explosive
Device (C-IED) capabilities in support of the
Combatant Commanders and to enable the
defeat of the IED as a weapon of strategic
influence.”
10
Peter Finn, “U.S. Parts Illegally Used for
Iraq Bombs: Trigger Modules Were Smuggled
to Iran, Indictment Charges,” The Washington Post, October 26, 2011, A9, available at
<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201110-25/world/35277242_1_hossein-larijanihia-soo-gan-benson-iranian-procurement-networks>.
11
For a discussion of critical factors (capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities) and
center of gravity, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning, and Naval Warfare Publication
5-01, Naval Planning. JP 5-0 defines critical
vulnerability as “an aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct
or indirect attack that will create decisive or
significant effects.” JP 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,
August 11, 2011), III-23–25.
12
“Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help
JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint
operations. Functions that are common to joint
operations at all levels of war fall into six basic
groups—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment.” JP
3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The
Joint Staff, August 11, 2011), chapter III.
13
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations,
Change 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 22, 2011), 5-2.
14
Colonel Leo Bradley, USA, commander,
Combined Joint Task Force Paladin, “Personal
Observations,” lecture, Defense Strategies
Institute, EOD/IED and Countermine Symposium, July 24, 2013.
15
Lieutenant Sarah Turse, USN (former officer-in-charge, CEXC Afghanistan), interview
by Marc Tranchemontagne, August 27, 2012.
16
JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence
Support to Military Operations (Washington,
DC: The Joint Staff, October 7, 2004), III-32.
128 Features / Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation
17
Ibid. The Joint Captured Material
Exploitation Center is one of three doctrinal
Joint Exploitation Centers, along with the Joint
Document Exploitation Center and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center.
18
Commander Scott Kraft, USN (former
officer-in-charge, CEXC Iraq, Baghdad),
interview by Marc Tranchemontagne, October
18, 2011.
19
DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
Final Report to Congress, April 1992, 286, available at <www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_
and_plans/PersianGulfWar/404.pdf>. “Many
deployed mines lacked sensors or batteries
which prevented their proper operation. During
MCM operations, 95 percent of the UDMtype acoustic influence mines were evaluated
as inoperable. Several moored contact mines
were recovered on the bottom and apparently
13 percent of the moored mines broke away
from their moorings. However, even the poorly
planned and improperly deployed minefields
caused damage to two combatants and were
one of several reasons the amphibious invasion
was not conducted.”
20
DIA, 23–29.
21
DOD, DOD Forensic Enterprise (DFE),
DOD Directive 5205.15E (Washington, DC:
DOD, April 26, 2011), 2, available at <www.
dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520515e.
pdf>.
22
In 1947, the Bureau of Naval Weapons
established the first unit for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of explosive ordnance disposal EOD equipment at the
U.S. Naval Powder Factory within the EOD
School. It eventually became the EOD Technology Center and, presently as NSWC Indian
Head EOD Technology Division, has had joint
service responsibility for EOD RTD&E since
1951, as directed in DODD 5160.62, Single
Manager Responsibility for Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technology and Training (EODT&T).
23
DOD, DOD Forensic Enterprise, 1, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/520515e.pdf>.
24
DOD, DOD Biometrics, DOD Directive
8521.01E (Washington, DC: DOD, February
21, 2008), 1, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/852101p.pdf>.
25
DOD, DOD Forensic Enterprise.
26
DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010),
20, available at <www.defense.gov/qdr/
qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF>.
27
Rick Crawford, “Testimony,” House
Armed Services Committee, EOD Priorities for
FY2012 NDAA, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2012,
available at <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130508/100806/HHRG113-AS00-Wstate-C001087-20130508.pdf>.
28
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 18
U.S.C. §1385, as amended, limits the power of
the Federal Government to enforce laws using
Federal military personnel.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Marshal Josip Tito (right) stands with his Cabinet
Ministers and Supreme Staff at his mountain
headquarters in Yugoslavia on May 14, 1944
(Imperial War Museum)
Challenges in Coalition
Unconventional Warfare
The Allied Campaign in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945
By J. Darren Duke, Rex L. Phillips, and Christopher J. Conover
Lieutenant Colonel J. Darren Duke, USMC, is G2
for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations
Command, Camp Lejeune. Major Rex L. Phillips,
USA, is en route to a tour with Special Operations
Command Central, MacDill Air Force Base. Major
Christopher J. Conover, USAF, is en route to the
Air Staff at the Pentagon and is currently serving
as a Joint Branch Chief for the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
uring World War II, operatives
and military advisors of the British
Special Operations Executive
(SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was a precursor to both the current Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces,
conducted a challenging unconventional
D
warfare (UW) campaign against the
Axis forces with and through guerrilla
resistance elements in Yugoslavia. The
resistance movement effectively fixed in
place 35 German and Italian divisions,
consisting of roughly 660,000 soldiers
in the western Balkan region during
1941–1945.1 This campaign rendered
Duke, Phillips, and Conover
129
them strategically irrelevant by preventing their use in other theaters. The combined United Kingdom (UK)–United
States (U.S.) contingent achieved this
effect with never more than 100 Allied
personnel on the ground in the denied
area. The number of Axis personnel
killed in the Balkans is estimated at
450,000.2 This extremely favorable force
ratio and its associated effects commend
UW as a low-cost, high-reward method
of warfare.
Although ultimately successful, the
campaign experienced difficulties. British
and American policymakers, primarily
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Winston Churchill, chose
with great risk near-term military goals
over long-term postwar political strategic
interests. Failures in operations security,
differences in policy goals, difficulties in
command relationships, and disparities in
talent and skill among Allied personnel
often strained the British-American relationship at multiple levels. Clandestine
operatives on the ground inside
Yugoslavia dealt with an increasingly vicious civil war among factions within the
resistance movements that was rooted in
longstanding political and ethnic differences. Contemporary policymakers and
UW planners considering unconventional
options can benefit from an examination
of these challenges, experiences, and lessons learned from the Balkans Campaign
of World War II.
Unconventional warfare is activities
conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or
overthrow a government or occupying
power by operating through or with an
underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force
in a denied area.3 Special operations forces
(SOF) conduct and support unconventional warfare. U.S. Army Special Forces,
Green Berets, are the lead SOF Service
component for its doctrine and conduct,
while other Service components of U.S.
Special Operations Command are tasked
with conducting operations in support of
UW efforts. Currently, no doctrine for
joint or combined UW operations exists.
However, history shows us that combined
UW not only is possible, but also can be
highly successful, even if fraught with
challenges. The combined UK-U.S. UW
campaign in the former Yugoslavia offers
several important lessons that should inform and help shape continued efforts to
improve UW doctrine.
The Balkan Campaign
Formed out of the upheavals of the
Balkan wars of the early 1900s and the
fallout from World War I, Yugoslavia
was a patchwork state cobbled together
by treaty and riven by political and
ethnic strife. In the spring of 1941,
when Adolf Hitler realized that Yugoslavia’s weak cohesion as a state would
not allow him to keep it in the Tripartite
Pact and to protect his southern flank
in preparation for his invasion of Soviet
Russia,4 he ordered the German-led
blitzkrieg attack by Axis forces on April
6, 1941, which brought Yugoslavia into
the war. Organized Yugoslavian military
resistance rapidly evaporated, and the
government capitulated after only 11
days. Armed guerrilla attacks on German
and Italian units began in earnest by
early July.5 These attacks—eventually
recognized as the most successful guerrilla movement in occupied Europe—
created sufficient concern within the
German government that counterguerrilla operations were conducted to
address the threat. These resulted in
severe reprisals against Yugoslavian civilians as early as October 1941.6
Early in the war, Churchill expressed
a desire to “set Europe ablaze.” When
he learned of the resistance operations,
he directed the SOE to assess the possibility of providing support to these
groups to open up an additional front
against the Axis regimes across Europe.
The SOE and British secret service had
access to an array of regional experts with
language abilities and operational skills
to provide this assessment. As early as
1939, the British government developed
a well-established clandestine presence
in Yugoslavia that remained active until
the Axis invasion in April 1941.7 One of
these former operatives, and an excellent
example of the British talent, was Captain
D.T. “Bill” Hudson.
Bill Hudson arrived in Yugoslavia in
1935 to manage an antimony mine. By
130 Recall / Challenges in Coalition Unconventional Warfare
1938, he was fluent in Serbo-Croatian,
joined the British secret service, and recruited a network of saboteurs in Croatia
for operations against Axis shipping
along the Dalmatian coast. Inserted into
Yugoslavia by submarine on September
20, 1941, his mission was to determine
whom the British government could trust
and how it could help disrupt the Axis
occupation forces.8
His initial findings were not encouraging; old ethnic animosities and
new political differences deeply divided
the two primary Yugoslavian resistance
groups. A Serbian military officer named
Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailovic led disparate elements of varying loyalty to the
Yugoslavian monarchy-in-exile called
Chetniks. Josip Broz Tito led a second
group of communist resistance units
known as the Partisans. These two groups
fought each other in a fierce civil war.
British intelligence and the SOE took 2
years to determine which side to back
against the Axis powers.
By the summer of 1943, SOE field reports and signals intelligence9 convinced
Churchill to suspend support to the
Chetniks and to expand cooperation with
and support of Tito and his Partisans.
This decision was highly controversial
and taken with a clear realization of the
impact on the postwar political order in
Europe. The suspension of support for
the Chetniks meant the abandonment of
a government previously recognized by
the UK and a monarch related to British
King George VI. Moreover, it meant the
tacit recognition of a movement with
unambiguous intentions of establishing
a communist state in postwar Yugoslavia.
No other country where the SOE and
OSS facilitated resistance and guerrilla
operations presented as severe a challenge
in negotiating the deep divide between
resistance factions or in weighing the risks
of postwar interests in favor of near-term
strategic ends.
In the United States, OSS Director
Brigadier General William J. Donovan
began to consider strategies in the
Balkans designed to fracture the
Tripartite Pact. Nevertheless, none of
these efforts proved successful. With
British facilitation, Donovan had visited
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Belgrade in January of 1941 and communicated to both the Yugoslavian
government and its armed forces that
the United States was ready to support
resistance to German aggression.10 This
offer was rebuffed. In fact, during that
very visit, a Yugoslavian delegation was
putting the ink on an agreement to join
the Axis Powers. In the end, all of these
efforts came to naught in the wake of the
Axis invasion later in April 1941.
The separate streams of Allied interest came together again during summer
and fall of 1943 after the fall of Benito
Mussolini. With Italy falling away from
the Axis, the Allies now had an opportunity to exploit the Balkan situation
to their advantage by convincing Hitler
that the Allied push into Europe might
come via the central Mediterranean
coast. Donovan received approval
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to
initiate unconventional warfare operations in Yugoslavia in September 1943.
Simultaneously, Churchill authorized
SOE to expand contacts with Tito and
his Partisans and to assess their capabilities and requirements. The OSS provided
operatives to this UK-led effort as well
as attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to
conduct its own operations.
Command of the UW effort in the
Balkans was given to Brigadier Fitzroy
MacLean. MacLean had no previous
military training prior to World War II
but had served the British Foreign Office
during the 1930s as a diplomat in the
British embassy in Moscow. Through his
experiences in the Soviet Union, which
included reporting on the purges and
show trials under Joseph Stalin and extended solo travel into the Caucasus and
Central Asia, MacLean developed a keen
understanding of the communist movement, Eastern European culture, and
political-military affairs in general. Upon
the outbreak of the war, he resigned
his diplomatic position and eventually
found his way into the newly organized
British Special Air Service, conducting
raids and long-range reconnaissance
against German and Italian forces in
North Africa and then establishing a UW
network in Tehran as a hedge against
possible Nazi domination of Iran. This
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Sigfried Uiberreither, Martin Bormann, Adolf Hitler, and Otto Dietrich in Maribor, April 26, 1941
(Deutsches Bundesarchiv)
rare combination of experiences made
MacLean the perfect man for the job.
Throughout 1944 and into mid1945, the Allies established and operated
numerous clandestine and expeditionary
airfields, drop zones, and beach landing
sites. Through these facilities, the SOE
and OSS teams brought in tons of weapons, explosives, and ammunition directly
to the subordinate Partisan formations.
They provided training to Partisan units
in demolitions, marksmanship, and tactics. Allied advisors accompanied Partisan
forces on raids and sabotage missions
against Axis lines of communication.11
During all of these activities, they provided detailed intelligence reports of the
situation in Yugoslavia and conducted
combined planning with the Yugoslavians
for future operations and—with less success—unilateral efforts to establish agent
networks in Austria for future UW missions within the Third Reich’s territory.12
National Tensions
The success in the Yugoslavian campaign was achieved in spite of forces
and factors working against the Allied
efforts. Allied pilots from America and
Great Britain, Royal Navy ships, and
submarines transported personnel and
materiel with no regard for national
origin or flag. OSS officers served as
advisors to Partisan formations under
orders from MacLean with loyalty
and focus even to the point of ignoring operational proposals from OSS
headquarters that threatened to distract
them from the goal of helping the Partisans defeat the Axis.13 It is a testament
to the leadership of the U.S. and Allied
governments, the SOE and OSS, and
the professionalism of the majority of
field operatives and officers that none of
these elements rose above the level of
irritant against the goal of Axis defeat.
One of the most obvious sources of
tension was the overwhelming disparity in the level of expertise in Balkan
regional affairs, culture, and language
possessed by the operatives on the
ground. As noted above, the British
possessed talented men such as Hudson
and MacLean with deep regional and
professional knowledge. To the contrary, the Americans lacked regional
expertise and were almost solely
dependent upon Yugoslavian or British
translators to facilitate communications.
This gap led to tensions between Allied
personnel as British officers marginalized Americans by holding meetings in
Serbo-Croatian—which the Americans
could not speak—or forbidding unescorted American access to senior Yugoslavian leaders.14 The situation worsened
Duke, Phillips, and Conover
131
William J. Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945 (U.S. Army)
over the course of time, particularly
as UK and U.S. policy goals diverged
toward the end of the war. The result
was the eventual establishment of separate American and British missions just
prior to the end of the war.15
A second source of national tension
was the difference in organization and
operational authorities adopted by the
United States and UK. Fitzroy MacLean
served not only as a military advisor and
coordinator of Allied military support,
but also as the direct emissary of the
British government to Tito. He enjoyed
direct access to Churchill and was personally consulted by the prime minister at
major junctions in the decisionmaking
132
process. American OSS operatives were
limited in authorities to military technical advice and assistance only. William
Donovan may have enjoyed frequent
access to President Roosevelt, but he
was still required to submit his plans for
approval by General George Marshall as
well as the State Department for all of his
global operations.
A third and final source of tension for
considerations of combined UW was the
inevitable competition between waxing
and waning global powers. By 1943,
with the U.S. war effort in full swing,
America’s rise to the status of global
power was clearly under way. British prospects of preserving their empire, however,
Recall / Challenges in Coalition Unconventional Warfare
were less assured. Yet it was the British
who, by virtue of at least two centuries
of colonialism and imperialism, amassed
the experience and human capital for influencing global affairs. America was the
new kid on the block and was learning
many of the hard lessons in the laboratory of global war, to include how to
play the games of politics, espionage, and
coalition warfare.
Donovan realized that the OSS was
dependent on the British secret service to
provide training in tradecraft and expertise
for clandestine operations. He also knew
that national self-interest would necessitate the United States striking out on
its own. He did this on several occasions,
drawing sharp criticisms from his former
British mentors for the unskilled way the
OSS attempted operations. To be fair,
while the British evinced an attitude of
imperial superiority and possible ethnic
and religious bias against the OSS and
Donovan personally,16 the Americans gave
them plenty of reason to complain. The
OSS headquarters that oversaw the early
stages of the Balkan Campaign in Istanbul
was penetrated by the German intelligence
agency, the Abwehr, making the British
unwilling to share sensitive information on
their operations. Donovan also invested
more hope in the advertised abilities of the
Chetniks because he lacked talented officers such as Hudson and MacLean to give
him solid assessments of their intentions
and capacity. The return on this investment by the end of the war was poor, and
the United States wasted time in the erroneous belief that the ancient internecine
hatreds of the Balkans could be healed by
Allied efforts. Had the Americans possessed a MacLean-like figure, they might
have saved themselves the effort.
The British-American competition
manifested itself in disputes over communications as Americans had to send
their OSS traffic over SOE nets using
SOE codes, limiting their ability to
communicate in OSS channels only.17
Donovan himself was also rejected by
Churchill as a potential commander of
the Yugoslavian effort, was refused entry
into the Yugoslav theater on occasion,18
and lacked access to Yugoslavian leaders,
as previously noted. By the end of the
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
war this competition developed to the
point where, unbeknownst to British
authorities, the OSS placed an agent in
London who reported information on
British government intentions toward
Yugoslavia after the armistice.19 The
special British-American relationship survived the war and far beyond, but it was
clear that where the clandestine arts were
concerned, “the cousins”—as Donovan
liked to call them—had become an alliance of equals.
Strategic Choices and Risks
The thorniest of all the challenges
facing the Allies in the conduct of the
Yugoslavian campaign was the decision to support the Partisans. Tito was
clearly a committed communist intent
on establishing a postwar political order
consistent with those beliefs. At the
same time, he was a highly effective and
tenacious guerrilla leader who attacked
the Germans and their allies without
hesitation. Whatever the decision, there
would be second- and third-order
consequences for Allied (particularly
British) interests and for the future of
the Yugoslavian peoples in the face of a
communist revolutionary threat clearly
intent on exploiting the political turmoil
in liberated areas of Eastern Europe to
its advantage.
Churchill’s final choice to suspend all
support to Mihailovic and his Chetniks
in favor of Tito and the Partisans was a
conscious acceptance of risk to long-term
interests of the democratic West in order
to achieve a more rapid defeat of Nazi
Germany. Although it is clear in historical hindsight that other factors may have
mitigated this risk, such as MacLean’s
excellent handling of relations with Tito,
it must be remembered that at the time,
there was at least one other course of action. An effort was proposed that sought
to heal or at least ameliorate the ChetnikPartisan rift by bringing the two groups
under the Combined Allied Command.
This course of action offered the possibility of avoiding any ceding of Yugoslavia
to the Soviets after the war. Both of
these options had their adherents among
British and Americans alike and at multiple levels of command. The correctness
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
of the decision can be measured by the
result: The Partisans effectively used the
support provided by the Allies to achieve
the most critical campaign objectives.
Additionally, Churchill’s recognition and
assistance of Tito’s government contributed to the moderation exhibited by Tito
toward the West during the Cold War.
Lessons for Future Efforts
The challenges associated with combined UW operations during World
War II in the former Yugoslavia present
today’s UW policymakers, planners,
and practitioners with several relevant
lessons for consideration. The first is
the importance of precrisis intelligence
and intelligence-sharing. Intelligence is
critical to the success of any endeavor,
but the breadth and specificity of intelligence required to support UW operations are unique challenges because the
disciplines used to collect intelligence
for UW require a long time to bear
fruit. Unlike general military intelligence
related to conventional operations,
the admixture of political and cultural
factors creates the need for detailed
intelligence long before the crisis erupts.
When considering coalition partners,
an imbalance in each side’s ability either
to participate in or conduct independent intelligence operations can create
tension similar to that seen between
the United States and UK throughout
the campaign. The British superiority
in intelligence operations, both in their
pool of talent and the way they put
their talent far forward into the denied
area, gave them an advantage that bred
envy and distrust, however well it may
have been suppressed by Donovan and
others in the OSS. The Americans, on
the other hand, had little understanding
of the areas required to conduct UW
and had limited means to collect the
intelligence to educate them. The OSS
analysts were also kept in the United
States, severely hampering their ability
to bring their expertise and understanding to bear on day-to-day operations or
to effectively support policymakers.
Fortunately, the United States and
UK were committed to sharing intelligence with each other so that both
governments were aware of developments achieved by the other. This sharing
included sensitive sources and methods.
The lesson here is that coalition members
must develop ways to share the important
information required for operational success promptly and in a way that builds
confidence in the relationship. This level
of sharing is built through commitment
over time. The United States must develop mid- to long-term operational and
intelligence assessments of likely areas of
future operations long before crises arise
and create intelligence networks and partnerships for effective intelligence-sharing
in those potential areas of operation.
The second lesson for the future is
the criticality of unity of command and
the coordination of policy and plans.
As the American subordination of OSS
operatives to the SOE shows, the Allies
were able to maintain an essentially unified command structure throughout
the campaign until the very last stages
of the war. The key to this success was
the ability of both British and American
leaders to suppress national and personal
ambitions and to maintain the priority on
the defeat of the Axis. All of this occurred
under the steady and calm leadership of
President Roosevelt, who recognized
and ably measured the risks of pursuing
unilateral American goals until the appropriate time. Consequently, he deferred
to Churchill and the British as senior
partners in the endeavor. Differing views
were allowed and debate was encouraged,
but serious threats to smooth operations
were dealt with quickly by American
leaders. Additionally, American leaders at
the tactical level demonstrated the ability
to avoid national agendas and diversions
of time and effort on nonessential tasks.
An excellent example of this focus is
American Franklin Lindsay’s resistance to
OSS proposals for propaganda operations
in favor of supporting MacLean’s plan
for facilitating Partisan lethal operations
against the Nazis. The unity of command
demonstrated by the Allies allowed for
collegial planning that consequently allowed resources to flow efficiently to the
decisive places on the battlefield.
The third lesson is the criticality of
talent at the operational level for the
Duke, Phillips, and Conover
133
art of balancing strategic choices and
risk. Churchill’s decision to support the
Partisans was confirmed by signal intercepts, but intelligence on Chetnik failures
to act was only half the story. Without
the reporting from men such as Hudson
and MacLean, Churchill would not have
known if there was any other resistance
group worthy of support. Furthermore,
the ability of those British SOE officers
to provide useful insights on the military
and security affairs within Yugoslavia
was not developed at the Royal Military
Academy at Sandhurst. In fact, none of
these SOE officers had formal military
training. On the American side, none of
the operatives showed any indication of
prior assessment and selection for this
particular mission other than meeting the
general OSS requirements. Many were
sent because of their personal prewar
ties to Donovan. OSS officers lacked
education in strategy, and although a few
possessed native language proficiency,
they brought ethnic bias along with it,20
thus limiting their usefulness in some
aspects. In UW campaigns, the political, strategic, and tactical considerations
of warfare all converge at a single focal
point. Those serving in the denied area
at that point in time and space not only
require technical military knowledge but
also must possess the understanding of
cultural, political, and social dynamics
driving the conflict. Whether by personal
acquaintance, reputation, or professional
development in a vetted process, these
UW operatives must have the confidence
of senior policymakers who rely on
their reporting to inform good strategic
decisions. The British SOE clearly possessed all of these traits, and the success
of the campaign rested on the personal
qualifications of these extraordinary individuals. This demonstrates the veracity of
the “SOF truths” that people are more
important than hardware and that competent special operations forces cannot be
created after an emergency occurs.
Closely related to this principle is the
final lesson: the strategic benefit of tactical karma. While the controversy over
Churchill’s decision to back the Partisans
still lingers today and while many of
Tito’s postwar actions in establishing
and ruling communist Yugoslavia were
inconsistent with previous promises, the
rapport that SOE and OSS operatives
established with their Partisan counterparts explains well Yugoslavia’s relative
openness to the West during the Cold
War. Shared privation and danger with
the Partisans cemented ties already
developed through national commitments. MacLean demonstrated many of
the same strengths in his dealings with
Tito and maintained this rapport when
the relationship suffered due to political
differences. These SOE and OSS men
persuaded the Allies to expand aid and
support Partisan operations. Their efforts
paid off not only in defeating the German
forces in the Balkans but also in engendering goodwill toward the West that
endured well into the Cold War era.
Conclusion
If the United States is sincere in its
expressed desire for increasing the
burden-sharing among our international
partners in military and security operations around the globe, every operating
domain and method of warfare must
come to grips with the complexities
and caveats of operating across national
boundaries. Because of the unique
way that national policy, strategy, and
tactical concerns come together in UW
operations, this method of warfare,
perhaps more than any other, requires
the development of new ways of sharing
intelligence, defining operational
authorities, forging effective command
structures, and building rapport within
the coalition and with the indigenous
guerrilla forces, undergrounds, and
auxiliaries. The means to this end will
be people: men and women with the
right combination of skills, experiences,
and courage in the spirit of MacLean,
Hudson, Donovan, and many others.
Finally, if the United States is successful in increasing the burden borne by our
allies and friends in future conflicts, then
it is reasonable to conclude that America
will conduct UW operations within coalitions. Furthermore, in spite of modern
Americans being more globally aware
than the World War II generation, pervasive media and information technologies
134 Recall / Challenges in Coalition Unconventional Warfare
will require the United States to partner
with nations who can operate clandestinely in denied and politically sensitive
areas. Under these conditions, the lessons
from the past remain relevant. The record
of these OSS and SOE allies presents a
useful, accessible, and detailed case study
for how combined UW operations can
be done successfully and how to manage
relationships among partner nations and
mitigate strategic risks. The United States
would be wise to invest more thought
and study in order to successfully apply
history’s lessons. JFQ
Notes
1
Nikola Kapetanovic, Tito and the Partisans: What Really Happened in Yugoslavia from
1941 to 1945 (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Knjiga,
1952), 45–46.
2
Ibid.
3
Mark Grdovic, “Developing a Common
Understanding of Unconventional Warfare,”
Joint Force Quarterly 57 (2nd Quarter 2010),
136–138.
4
Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero
(New York: Times Books, 1982), 156.
5
Ilija Jukic, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974), 99.
6
Ibid., 99–100.
7
Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and
the Allies, 1941–1945 (Rahway, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1973), 28.
8
M.R.D. Foot, “Obituary: Colonel D.T.
Hudson,” The Independent, November 14,
1995, available at <www.independent.co.uk/
news/people/obituary—colonel-d-t-hudson-1581911.html>.
9
“Off the Page—Fitzroy Maclean,” STV,
December 16, 2010, accessed at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=j2bR6T2kilE>.
10
Brown, 156–157; Jukic, 45–46; and Jozo
Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001),
35–36.
11
Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993),
76–87.
12
Ibid., 149–165.
13
Ibid., 27.
14
Roberts, 142–143.
15
Brown, 453.
16
Ibid., 457.
17
Roberts, 142–143.
18
Brown, 456–457.
19
Ibid., 663.
20
Lindsay, 12, 25.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
You Cannot Surge Trust:
Combined Naval Operations
of the Royal Australian Navy,
Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and
United States Navy, 1991–2003
Principal Investigator: Gary E. Wei
Editor: Sandra J. Doyle
Naval History and Heritage Command,
2013
345 pp. $38
ISBN: 978-0945274704
Reviewed by Dov S. Zakheim
Y
ou Cannot Surge Trust is a valuable review of the unique relationships that bind the U.S. Navy
and its British, Canadian, and Australian counterparts. Edited by Sandra
Doyle of the Naval History and Heritage Command, the book is a collection of essays by naval historians from
the United States, Australia, Canada,
and United Kingdom (UK) that
provide insights drawn from common
experiences derived from combined
peace support operations between 1991
and 2003. These insights offer useful
pointers for the U.S. Navy leadership
as it seeks to establish close cooperative
arrangements with other navies around
the world.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
As all the essays make abundantly
clear, two key factors lie at the heart
of the U.S.-UK-Canada-Australia
cooperative relationship. The first, so
obvious it rarely is mentioned in the essays, is common language and heritage.
Communication is far easier when the
communicants speak the same language,
share the same values, and, to a great
extent, draw upon a common heritage.
As an example of the latter, this author
recalls that at a Pentagon meeting of
British and American planners during the
1982 Falklands War, the senior U.S. Navy
representative was a direct descendant of
Captain John Strong, who claimed the
islands for the British.
The second factor is a history of cooperation. The Anglo-American “special
relationship” generally is dated from
World War II, but it had its informal start
in the previous world war. Thus, by the
time the U.S. and Royal navies worked
as a combined team to enforce sanctions
against Iraq by conducting maritime
interdiction operations in the aftermath
of the 1991 Gulf War, they had nearly a
century’s experience of cooperating with
each other.
The U.S. Navy’s relationship with its
Canadian and Australian counterparts
dates to World War II as well. The U.S.
and Canadian navies fought side by
side in the Atlantic; the American and
Australian navies did the same in the
Pacific. In the case of American combined operations with both Canada and
Australia, as indeed with their mother
country, Britain, formal arrangements
were supplemented by close personal and
professional ties among the sailors in all
four fleets.
Nevertheless, despite these ties, effective and successful combined operations
among them have never been a foregone
conclusion. Each of the case studies—the
aforementioned maritime interdiction
operations and those that followed during Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation
Sharp Guard off the coast of Yugoslavia
during the Balkan Wars; Operation
Stablise in East Timor; and maritime
operations in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom—highlights the
complications caused by politically driven
variations in national rules of engagement
and by a lack of clarity regarding command relationships in ad hoc coalition
operations. Either, and certainly both,
of these factors could have prevented
the four operations from achieving their
goals.
What was remarkable, however, was
the degree to which those constraints
were overcome in operations that were
joint as well as combined, involving
air and/or land forces. As Sarandis
Papadopoulos, author of four of the
book’s chapters, writes in his introduction, “coalitions always have seams,
especially in politically complex situations,
but the trust built on common doctrine,
shared training, and technically interoperable systems minimized any fraying
of relations” (p. 14). Indeed, as all the
authors point out to a greater or lesser
extent, sailors from the four fleets often
had to overcome shortfalls in interoperability as well, rendering their success that
much more remarkable.
Papadopoulos’s observations are borne
out throughout the volume, one of whose
most valuable features is its presentation of
the same operations from both American
and allied vantage points. Thus, Stephen
Prince and Kate Brett, of the UK Naval
Staff, offer their perspectives on Sharp
Guard alongside that of Papadopoulos’s
recounting of the U.S. Navy’s role in that
operation. David Stevens, of Australia’s
Sea Power Centre, and Papadopoulos do
the same in evaluating the performance
of their respective maritime forces, notably including amphibious forces (pp.
130–131), in supporting land-based
operations that ensured Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor. Two essays by
Jeffrey Barlow, of the Naval History and
Heritage Command, on the U.S. Navy’s
role in coalition maritime operations in
the Arabian Gulf from 1991–2001, and
on its support for maritime interdiction
operations in the first 2 years of Operation
Enduring Freedom, complement that
of Robert Caldwell, of the Directorate
of History and Heritage at Canada’s
National Defence Headquarters, who carries the story up to 2008.
Unlike the twinned chapters relating
to the other operations, which follow
Book Reviews
135
immediately upon each other, Barlow’s
review of Arabian Gulf operations, the
first such essay in the book, is not collocated with his other chapter and that
of Caldwell. Instead, it is followed by
intervening chapters that address the
other operations. As a consequence, the
reader will not obtain as clear a sense of
comparative Canadian and American perspectives as would have been the case if
the three chapters appeared in succession.
But this is a minor quibble.
All the essays provide the historical
context for each operation and recount
the challenges that had to be overcome
in every case, not least of which was the
fact that other allies also were involved in
these efforts, and, like the four English
speaking navies, were subject to their
own national rules of engagement. In
addition, every chapter bears out the
critical and central role of the U.S. Navy,
whose resources have long outstripped
those of its allies. Even in those cases, like
Operation Stabilise, where the Navy did
not lead the operation, its role was crucial
as a unique provider of intelligence and
logistics support without which success
could not have been achieved.
Summarizing the volume’s main findings, Edward Marolda, formerly of the
Naval History and Heritage Command,
reprises and underscores its central thesis.
His observation deserves to be quoted at
length:
The key to the success of several post–Cold
War multinational naval operations
involving Australian, Canadian, British,
and American navies was the trust, understanding, and mutual respect of leaders
and commanders for one another in often
challenging situations. Years of experience
with combined . . . operations, at-sea exercises, shore-based education and training,
and professional and social interaction
had created a corps of allied naval officers
confident in the abilities of their foreign
counterparts. The human element was and
is the key factor that binds the operations of
[the four navies] (p. 279).
With the ongoing shrinkage of its
force levels, which now comprise about
half that of its order of battle in the
136
Book Reviews
1980s, the U.S. Navy must work even
more closely than before with allied
and partner navies worldwide. It would
do well to draw upon the lessons of its
successful combined operations with its
sister navies from Britain, Canada, and
Australia, and apply them to others with
whose countries America shares common interests. The fact that English is
the international lingua franca for most
partner navies creates opportunities for
ever tighter and more fruitful operational relationships between them and
the U.S. Navy.
The Navy already conducts numerous exercises with its partners across the
globe. But exercises are not enough. The
Navy should redouble its efforts to make
its communications technology in particular available to more allies and partners.
Even the three close partners highlighted
in this volume have difficulty accessing
technologies that would significantly
enhance their ability to pursue combined
naval operations with the United States.
In addition, and in line with the principle that “you cannot surge trust,” the
Navy should sponsor more professional
and educational exchanges between its
officers and their many counterparts. In
a budget-constrained environment, such
exchanges are tremendously cost-effective. Relatively speaking, they are low cost
items. Yet they provide the foundation
for creating the kinds of relationships that
have enabled the navies of the United
States, Britain, Canada, and Australia to
work so closely and well together.
With the Navy likely to play an increasingly important role in a variety of
operational contexts for the foreseeable
future, its ability to work with a host of
different partners will be critical to its
success. You Cannot Surge Trust demonstrates how that success can be achieved.
It should be required reading for all
officers who aspire to lead combined
maritime operations some time in their
careers. JFQ
Dov S. Zakheim, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the
Center for Naval Analyses. He served as Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) from 2001 to
2004.
Engineers of Victory: The
Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the
Second World War
By Paul Kennedy
Random House, 2013
436 pp. $30.00
ISBN: 978-1846141126
Reviewed by Bryon Greenwald
est-selling author and historian
Paul Kennedy, the Dilworth Professor of History and Director of
International Security Studies at Yale
University, has written a stimulating
book about the middle—the middle
years of World War II, the middle or
operational level of war, and the middlemen, problem-solvers, and midlevel
commanders that made victory possible. In doing so, he focuses attention
on a largely unexplored portion of the
war’s history and provides professional
historians and general readers a deeper
understanding of how and why the
Allies won World War II.
Much of the English-language history of World War II obscures or bypasses
Kennedy’s “middle.” The war’s numerous
general histories gloss over how the Allies
solved their thorny operational problems,
B
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
and the volumes recounting the war’s great
strategic decisions or detailing its tactical
maneuvering far outnumber studies of organizational, technological, or operational
innovation in the middle. Moreover, few
such studies delve as extensively into this
critical middle world filled with a multitude
of organizations, weapons and technology,
Service and joint doctrines, and theater
planning efforts that connect the lofty
endstates and big ideas of statesmen to the
vital combat action on the ground, in the
air, and on and under the sea.
Paul Kennedy examines that middle
ground in an easy yet erudite manner and
explains in five information-filled and engaging chapters how the Allies solved the
five operational tasks essential to victory:
crossing the Atlantic, winning command
of the air, stopping the Blitzkrieg, seizing an enemy-held shore, and defeating
the “tyranny of distance.” Building on
the excellent work of other historians,
particularly the Military Effectiveness
series by Allan R. Millett and Williamson
Murray, Kennedy highlights who, what,
where, when, why, and how the United
States, United Kingdom, and Soviet
Union achieved these tasks and defeated
the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in a
war fought on six of seven continents and
most of the world’s oceans.
The majority of the book focuses
on the middle years of the war, approximately the 18 months from the
Casablanca Conference in January 1943
to the launching of the first B-29 bombing mission from Tinian on the day after
Thanksgiving (November 24) 1944.
As such, Kennedy analyzes the Allied
transition from losing to winning in
every domain of warfare (land, sea, and
air) and every major theater of war—the
Atlantic, North Africa, Russia, Northwest
Europe, and the Pacific. His emphasis
on the operational level of war as well
as the organizational and technological
innovations required to tip the balance is
refreshing and long overdue.
Kennedy is a master of deconstructing problems into their discrete elements
and discussing in detail the decisions and
actions that solved them. For such an
easy read, the book is intellectually dense.
(Indeed, his footnotes, commentary, and
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
bibliography are equally valuable.) One
example should suffice to prove the norm.
Getting adequate quantities of fuel,
weapons, munitions, troops, and foodstuffs to England was the first essential
step toward the defeat of Germany.
Appropriately, the book opens with a
thorough discussion of how synergistic
innovations in doctrine, technology,
materiel, training, and leadership significantly reduced U-boat attacks on
merchant shipping and won the Battle of
the Atlantic. To put this struggle in perspective, U-boats sank 6.3 million of the
7.8 million tons of Allied merchant shipping lost in 1942, a total that virtually
nullified the 7 million tons of shipping
mass-produced in America that year. Left
uncorrected, this strangulation meant
that the Allies would never marshal sufficient supplies, weapons, and men in
England to attack Germany and that the
British people would most likely starve
or freeze to death. Kennedy dissects
this dilemma and deftly describes each
problematic strand of this knotty challenge. He then adroitly details how the
use of drop tanks, additional escort craft,
and the development of miniaturized
microwave radar and the deployment
of Hedgehog antisubmarine munitions
allowed the Allies to “find, fix, and finish” U-boats before most launched their
deadly torpedoes. The rest of the book is
equally compelling and illuminating.
Engineers of Victory is an important
book that should encourage further study
of World War II by all readers. Seventyseven years after the war began (if one
includes the 1937 Japanese attack into
Manchuria), the middle remains a vast
untapped area of historical inquiry. By
necessity, Paul Kennedy only scratches the
surface in explaining the key Allied operational-level questions of the war. In a fluid,
well-researched, and insightful volume,
he inspires us to ask and answer more
questions about the problem-solvers, the
“tweakers,” and the “culture of innovation” that enabled the Allied victory. JFQ
Dr. Bryon Greenwald is a Professor in the Joint
Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff
College, at the National Defense University.
Next-Generation Homeland
Security: Network
Federalism and the Course
to National Preparedness
By John Fass Morton
Naval Institute Press, 2012
416 pp. $36.95
ISBN: 978-1612510880
Reviewed by Katie Kuhn
he threats to U.S. national
security have evolved, but the
means to respond to them lag
far behind. After 9/11, Hurricane
Katrina, and countless other natural
and unnatural disasters, now is the
time to rethink U.S. security strategy.
John Fass Morton’s Next-Generation
Homeland Security could not be timelier in proposing an overhaul of the
Cold War–era system. Policy change,
he argues, will not be enough; we must
change the structure of national security governance because the Cold War
structures reflect only the strategic conditions that were relevant at that time.
The United States can no longer rely on
the forces that made it powerful in the
second half of the 20th century, as the
international system has changed, so too
must our national security system. As
T
Book Reviews
137
globalization has reshaped the meaning
of sovereignty, nations are no longer
the only important actors. In today’s
strategic environment, states play a coequal role in policy development and
strategy formation, and so they must
also play a co-equal role in national
security governance.
Morton’s recommendations follow
extensive, impressively thorough research
on the evolution of emergency management and national preparedness. His
inside perspective on the struggles to
reform homeland security in the wake of
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina shows us
the difficulties in making effective policy
changes and the need for a change to the
whole structure of our security system.
“This federal-centric homeland
security system we have right now is a
single point of failure,” Morton tells
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge.
We need a self-reliant citizenry to get
away from this single point of failure.
Currently, the Federal Government is
responsible for national security yet owns
neither the problem of homeland security
threats nor the solution to them because
the private sector owns critical security
infrastructure. The structure and process
of homeland security therefore needs
buy-in from the Federal Government’s
“mission partners”: nongovernmental
organizations, the private sector, and state
and local authorities. For local authorities
to be effective, Federal authorities must
respect what Morton calls a fundamental truth—that is, local government is
the level most responsive to the will of
American citizens. We have seen what
happens when this truth is ignored: In
the aftermath of the BP oil spill, for
instance, crisis management efforts at
the local level were undermined by
Federal authorities, leading to frustrated
efforts by the Okaloosa County Board
of County Commissioners to contain
the crisis. Morton suggests improving
coordination through the application
of network theory—taking insights on
decentralization from the information
technology world and applying them to
management and organization.
The network that Morton proposes
revolves around 10 regional nodes.
138 Book Reviews
Regional, private-sector organizations
on national security are not new; since
the early 1990s, multicity and multistate
associations have collaborated in largescale disaster relief efforts. Such regional
collaborations, though, must form the
basis of the U.S. homeland security
system rather than supplementing a
national government–dominated system.
Intergovernmental relationships should
be not only vertical (Federal, state, and
local) but also horizontal (interstate,
interlocality). This setup means that
top-down command models are not appropriate; the Incident Command System
(ICS) is far more suitable for the management of incidents involving multiple
jurisdictions and levels of government.
The ICS blends hierarchical and network
organizational models by serving as a
temporary hierarchical authority that
establishes a clear chain of command in a
disaster to coordinate responses at each
level of government. The ICS assigns section chiefs to five major functional areas:
command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration, with
intelligence/investigation as the sixth
functional area in the case of a terrorist
event. Incidents are managed by a single
Incident Commander (IC) if only one
jurisdiction is involved, or by a Unified
Command (UC) if multiple jurisdictions
are affected. The IC or UC assumes the
top position in a temporary hierarchy and
determines strategies and resource allocations to respond to the incident, and
the authority of the ICS recedes after the
incident’s resolution.
Morton recommends that a regionally
based national preparedness system form
through a “maturing-by-doing” process
whereby homeland security professionals
at each level work to resolve three problem areas: risk assessment; operational
planning and exercise validation; and use
of homeland security preparedness grants
to target, develop, and sustain state and
local capabilities. Though these three
goals must be met at the local, state, and
Federal levels, it is Federal regions that
should play a central role in coordinating
collaboration among states and localities. The Federal Government also has
a central role in financing the national
preparedness system; that is, it holds the
financial burden for providing states and
localities adequate resources for national
catastrophic planning and assessments.
Morton’s plan is ambitious but
sound. He does not claim that he or
his book are the final authority on the
design of a regionally based national preparedness system, but Next-Generation
Homeland Security launches a debate that
is long overdue: how to reform outdated
Cold War–era structures into a security
system that can meet the strategic challenges of today’s world. The security of
the American people and the political and
economic stability of the international
system are at stake, so this book is a mustread for anyone interested in homeland
security. JFQ
Katie Kuhn recently completed her Ph.D. in
Political Science from The George Washington
University. She specializes in International
Politics with a focus on Latin American Politics.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Sailors inspect catapult before launching F/A-18F Super
Hornet from Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson,
deployed supporting maritime security operations and
theater security cooperation efforts in U.S. 5th Fleet area
of responsibility (U.S. Navy/Travis K. Mendoza)
Implementing Joint
Operational Access
From Concept to Joint Force Development
By Jon T. Thomas
trategic guidance issued to the
U.S. military over the past 5
years explicitly cites the emerging
challenge to what has been a significant
advantage for American and partner
forces for decades: the unfettered
ability to project military force into an
operational area with sufficient freedom
of action to accomplish a designated
mission.1 In some instances this ability
includes access to sovereign territory,
S
Brigadier General Jon T. Thomas, USAF, is Deputy
Director of the Joint Staff J7 Future Joint Force
Development.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
but in all cases it requires access to the
global commons.2 Potential enemies
are developing antiaccess/area-denial
(A2/AD) capabilities3 that could
threaten access and jeopardize missions.
Concept development, as the bridging
mechanism from strategic guidance to
operational capabilities, has played a
key role in the past few years to guide
joint and Service force development
activities in this area. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) and the
recently signed Joint Concept for Entry
Operations4 are examples of where
strategic guidance to overcome A2/AD
challenges is translated into operational
concepts intended to guide how the
U.S. military is organized, trained,
equipped, and employed.
Less visible perhaps but equally
important are the processes whereby
the ideas embodied in these concepts
are transitioned into specific force development activities arrayed across the
entire spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel, facilities, and
policy (DOTMLPF-P). These activities,
actioned by Service, Joint Staff, and
Defense agency sponsors and accomplished in a timeframe that accounts
for the complexity of the task and the
Thomas
139
scope of the work required, are what
institutionalize the change demanded by
strategic guidance documents. In other
words, concepts without accompanying
implementation plans typically end up as
nothing more than “books on a shelf.”
Moreover, these force development
activities always occur within a resourceconstrained environment, which implies
a need to prioritize efforts necessary to
implement the concept.
Over the past year, the Joint Staff in
conjunction with the Services, combatant
commands (CCMDs), and key stakeholders in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) developed an implementation plan for Joint Operational Access
(JOA) that prioritizes efforts and identifies specific actions to institutionalize the
ideas in the JOAC. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the plan on
August 29, 2014.
Why a JOA
Implementation Plan?
The JOAC is the principal concept
guiding U.S. military efforts to counter
opponent A2/AD strategies. It
describes how joint forces will achieve
operational access in the face of armed
opposition by potential enemies and
under a variety of conditions as part of
a broader national approach. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey signed the JOAC on
January 17, 2012. Less than 2 weeks
prior in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) issued by then–Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta, specific direction
was provided to “implement the Joint
Operational Access Concept.”5 Thus,
development of a plan to implement the
JOAC is simply following orders.
The need for a JOA Implementation
Plan (JIP), however, runs deeper than
simply the direction provided in the
DSG. As mentioned, multiple strategic
guidance documents explicitly identify
the need to prepare for and overcome opponent A2/AD strategies, and the joint
force started taking action immediately.
In some cases, these actions are part of
a large-scale effort (the multi-Service
Air-Sea Battle [ASB] Concept and its
associated implementation activities are
140
a good example), while in other cases
Services, CCMDs, and agencies are
focusing efforts on specific aspects of
the A2/AD challenge. Missing from the
overall effort is a mechanism to bring all
of these actions together to foster coherence among all the ongoing activities
across the joint force. First and foremost,
enhancing coherence among operational
access efforts is the practical outcome of
developing an overarching JIP.
Notably, some valuable second-order
effects are derived from conducting an
effort to produce coherence. First, the
visibility generated by documenting all
operational access efforts within one
overarching plan generates opportunities
for synergy among ongoing (or planned)
actions across the joint force. Interrelated
activities can be accelerated or decelerated, or content added or subtracted,
based on this added visibility. Second,
having an overarching plan provides
an opportunity to prioritize efforts and
maximize the return on resources committed to the effort. Such a prioritization
must be carefully supported with analysis
and vetted with key stakeholders, but
once produced can be a powerful tool to
inform multiple DOTMLPF-P governance processes across the Department of
Defense (DOD). Finally, pulling all of the
various activities together related to JOA
may result in new discovery that informs
the way ahead.
Such new discovery could take three
forms. First, in an organization as large
as DOD, it is possible for all actors to assume that an activity, already recognized as
necessary, is being accomplished by someone else, when in reality these assumptions
have led to no single organization actually
initiating the activity. Collectively, a key activity has somehow been overlooked and a
new effort must be initiated to accomplish
the necessary action. Second, after reviewing the volume of efforts within a given
required capability area, a conclusion
may be reached that the collective effort
has missed something and a new effort
should be initiated to address the newly
discovered need. Third, documenting
all activities related to a JOAC required
capability may reveal that one or more
stakeholders is performing similar actions
Joint Doctrine / Implementing Joint Operational Access
that could potentially be combined, or
one activity curtailed, so as to facilitate
economy of effort. In the development
of the 2014 JIP, the first two examples of
new discovery (recognized but overlooked
necessary activities or specific missed actions) manifested themselves, but the third
example (duplication) is likely to manifest
in future updates to the plan.
What the 2014 JIP Does
At this point, it is worth explaining why
the term Joint Operational Access is used
rather than Joint Operational Access
Concept implementation plan. While
the 2014 plan focuses on the required
capabilities in the JOAC6 as the organizing construct, future updates in 2015
and beyond are intended to incorporate
additional required capabilities from
supporting approved joint concepts.7
By orienting the implementation plan
to the broader subject of JOA, there is
room left for inclusion of other capabilities as joint concepts further mature.
The central elements of the 2014 JIP
are a prioritization of the 30 required
capabilities described in the JOAC and
then a matrix of specific force development actions that, if completed, would
significantly contribute to achieving the
associated required capability. Because
this prioritization is intended to inform
multiple DOTMLPF-P governance
processes across DOD, the 2014 JIP
carefully describes the analytic process
used to derive the prioritization of the
JOAC required capabilities. This process
leveraged multiple existing mechanisms such as the Comprehensive Joint
Assessment (CJA); Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Service chief, and combatant commander posture statements and
congressional testimony; combatant command Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs);
and the Capability Gap Assessment
(CGA). Due to its central role in the
overall DOD requirements process,
the Joint Capabilities Board reviewed
this portion of the 2014 JIP, and the
prioritization of required capabilities was
endorsed via a JROC memorandum.
With respect to specific force development actions, the 2014 JIP includes
activities related only to the 10 highest
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
USS Abraham Lincoln, Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Cape St. George, and Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS
Guadalupe conduct replenishment at sea (U.S. Navy/Travis K. Mendoza)
priority JOAC required capabilities due
to the scope and magnitude of the task
at hand in relation to the time available to develop the first iteration of the
plan. The decision to address only those
actions associated with these top 10
priorities should not be construed to
mean that no efforts are currently under
way or planned to address the remaining
20 JOAC required capabilities. Future
updates in 2015 and beyond are planned
to include a broader set of force development actions as additional required
capabilities are addressed.
The 2014 JIP identifies 165 discrete
DOTMLPF-P force development actions8 to be accomplished by specific
sponsors within the Services, CCMDs,
Joint Staff, combat support agencies, or
OSD. This execution matrix describes
the action to be taken, the output of that
action, the sponsor (referred to as the
office of primary responsibility [OPR]),
other stakeholders with which the action
must be coordinated, and the timeframe
in which the action is to be completed
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
(an estimated completion date [ECD]).
While some actions are to be completed
within 1 year, many of these force development actions will not be completed
for several years due to the magnitude of
the effort. This level of detail within the
execution matrix permits a key additional
step—assessment of progress.
The assessment plan included in the
2014 JIP simply seeks to determine what
progress was made in completing the
actions described in the plan. Primarily
consisting of self-reporting of progress by
OPRs, the individual results of this annual
assessment will be compiled and then
used to inform the subsequent update
to the JIP. In most cases, actions will be
completed on schedule or remain on track
when the ECD extends beyond the current year. In some cases, circumstances
during execution may delay completion by
the ECD. The assessment process will seek
to determine the cause of the delay and
how to respond to it. In either case, the
2014 assessment will inform adjustments
to priorities and actions in the 2015 JIP.
Finally, the 2014 JIP includes a
description of the process for communicating to audiences both internal and
external to DOD as to why and how the
plan was developed, how actions will
be implemented, and how progress will
be assessed. The purpose of this communication is to encourage collaboration
among all stakeholders through improved
understanding of joint force development
activities related to operational access.
While the JOAC itself is an unclassified
and publicly available document, the
2014 JIP is classified due to the detailed
manner in which it addresses capability
shortfalls. As a result, distribution of the
2014 JIP will be limited consistent with
established classification procedures.
Some unclassified metrics, however,
can shed light on the content in the
2014 JIP execution matrix. First, of the
165 actions in the matrix, a majority (64
percent) consist of ongoing activities
within DOD. This is understandable
given that strategic guidance related to
A2/AD challenges has been in place
Thomas
141
for years, and the joint force has already
begun many efforts to address the issue.
Second, 84 percent of the 165 actions
listed in the execution matrix are related
to non-materiel activities. That is, the
vast majority of actions in the 2014 JIP
are not focused on building new things,
but instead are focused on finding ways
to better employ the materiel capabilities
currently planned for the joint force, an
approach consistent with the ideas in
General Dempsey’s assessment of the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.9
Third, the force development actions
identified in the 2014 JIP are spread
across the entire range of possible OPRs:
approximately 50 percent across the military Services, about 25 percent for the
Joint Staff, and the remaining 25 percent
allocated across the CCMDs, OSD,
and support agencies. So in addition to
the volume of actions (165) associated
with just 10 of the 30 JOAC required
capabilities, this spread of OPRs is a
clear indication of the significant scope
of the force development effort required
to address the A2/AD challenge to operational access. Together, these metrics
highlight the broad, inclusive nature
of the 2014 JIP, a pattern that can be
expected to remain as the plan is updated
in future annual cycles.
Relationship to Air-Sea Battle
While the JOAC is the principal
concept guiding U.S. military efforts
to counter opponent A2/AD strategies, the ASB Concept developed in
May 2012 contributes to this effort as
a multi-Service concept. ASB focuses
on ensuring freedom of action in the
global commons in order to enable
concurrent or follow-on power projection operations.10 A complementary and
supporting relationship exists between
the ideas in ASB and those articulated
in the JOAC. Because ASB represents a
subset of the overall joint approach to
ensuring operational access, the 2014
JIP includes many of the ongoing activities associated with implementation of
ASB. As JOA implementation and ASB
implementation processes mature, it is
reasonable to expect further convergence of these efforts.
Way Ahead
The force development effort described
in the 2014 JIP will take years to fully
execute. This duration is a direct function of the scope and complexity of the
overall joint force development effort.
During 2014, execution of ongoing
actions will continue and new activities will begin through the processes
that govern DOTMLPF-P portfolios.
Assessment of progress made on the
actions documented in the 2014 JIP
will occur and, combined with analysis
derived from the fiscal year 2015 CJA,
IPL, and CGA processes, will inform
the development of the 2015 update.
This method for annual updates to the
JIP is intended to be responsive both
to the amount of progress made in
prior plans as well as to changes that
inevitably occur in the evolving strategic
environment. While the joint force may
achieve a significant advance in operational access capability within a given
year, it is more likely that major progress over the coming years will accrue
as a result of sustained, focused effort
guided by the JIP.
Summary
General Dempsey’s approval of the
2014 Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan was a significant milestone in joint force development of
required capabilities to maintain operational access in defense of the Nation
and its partners. Developing a formal
process to move the concept off the
shelf and into formal action was new
to the Joint Staff, Services, combatant
commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. With the 2014 JIP,
there now exists a documented process
and an initial set of actions to generate
coherence and synergy of prioritized
efforts across the joint force. Annual
updates to this plan will broaden the
effort and are likely to result in new
discovery that uncovers additional
opportunities to overcome A2/AD
challenges. With key stakeholder commitment to this process, progress will
be made to the endstate of a joint
force capable of achieving operational
access in the face of armed opposition
142 Joint Doctrine / Implementing Joint Operational Access
by potential enemies under a variety of
conditions as part of a broader national
approach. JFQ
Notes
1
National Security Strategy (Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2010); The National Military Strategy of the United States 2011:
Redefining America’s Military Leadership (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February
2011); Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, January 2012).
2
The term global commons is defined as “areas of air, sea, space and cyberspace that belong
to no one state. Access to the global commons is
vital to U.S. national interests, both as an end in
itself and as a means of projecting military force
into hostile territory.” See Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), annex A (Glossary), 42.
3
Antiaccess (A2) refers to those capabilities, usually long range, designed to prevent an
advancing enemy from entering an operational
area. Area denial (AD) refers to those capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to
keep the enemy out but to limit his freedom of
action within the operational area. See JOAC,
annex A (Glossary), 40.
4
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey signed the Joint Concept
for Entry Operations (JCEO) on April 7, 2014.
5
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 5.
6
JOAC, 33–36.
7
JCEO is a prime example of where required capabilities from a subordinate concept
will be addressed in the 2015 update.
8
In several instances, the 2014 Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan also identifies
necessary “precursor actions” that are necessary
to further refine and test ideas and approaches to
force development before moving forward with
actual adjustments in DOTMLPF-P elements.
Examples of these precursor actions include additional concept development, wargaming, and
technology demonstrations.
9
Quadrennial Defense Review, March 2014,
58–64.
10
“ASB [Air-Sea Battle] is a limited objective
concept that describes what is necessary for the
joint force to sufficiently shape A2/AD environments to enable concurrent or follow-on power
projection operations. The ASB Concept seeks to
ensure freedom of action in the global commons
and is intended to assure allies and deter potential
adversaries. ASB is a supporting concept to the
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), and
provides a detailed view of specific technological
and operational aspects of the overall A2/AD
challenge in the global commons.” See Air-Sea
Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges (Washington, DC:
Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013), 4.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Khas Kunar chief of police was charged with misuse
of his position (1 year in prison) and logistics officer
was charged with corruption (61 months and
fine) during rare public trial at Kunar provincial
courthouse (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Marasky)
Dealing with Corruption
Hard Lessons Learned in Afghanistan
By Richard J. Holdren, Stephen F. Nowak, and Fred J. Klinkenberger, Jr.
Corruption is the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan.
—GENERAL JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC
peration Enduring Freedom has
exacted a tremendous cost on
the United States in terms of
both blood and treasure. By the end
of fiscal year 2013, the financial toll
O
had reached $645 billion. While we
have made a significant investment in
rebuilding Afghanistan, certain actors
have seen our sacrifice as an opportunity to enrich themselves by stealing
Colonel Richard J. Holdren, USA, is Senior Analyst and Study Team Lead in the Joint and Coalition
Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division of the Joint Staff J7 Future Joint Force Development. Stephen F.
Nowak is an Analyst and Writer in JCOA. Fred J. Klinkenberger, Jr., is a Writer-Editor in JCOA.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
money and materiel intended to aid in
the rebuilding of the country.
A recent study has indicated that these
corrupt actions threaten the future of
Afghanistan. According to the Joint and
Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA)
report titled Operationalizing Counter/
Anti-Corruption Study, “Corruption
alienates key elements of the population,
discredits the government and security
Holdren, Nowak, and Klinkenberger
143
forces, undermines international support,
subverts state functions and rule of law,
robs the state of revenue, and creates barriers to economic growth.”1 Corruption,
in other words, undermines the very
essence of those attributes required
to establish and maintain a legitimate
government.
There is no universal definition or
criterion as to what encompasses corruption, with many describing it as,
“You know it when you see it.”2 After
years of struggling with the corruption
problem in Afghanistan, the term has yet
to be defined in joint doctrine. Part of
the difficulty is that each culture defines
behaviors and attitudes that it considers
“normal,” and these vary greatly from
one group to another. Acceptable behavior in one culture may be anathema to
another, while merely boorish to another.
In some cultures, paying a gratuity may
be frowned upon, while in others it is
seen as appropriate in certain situations.
In the United States, for example, the
wait staff in restaurants depends on tips
for a majority of their wages. Taxi drivers
expect to be tipped and are not afraid to
explain tipping etiquette to passengers
who fail to grasp the concept. On the
other hand, attempting to offer a gratuity
to a police officer or a judge is considered
a corrupt practice.
Afghans, on the other hand, have
become accustomed to paying additional
fees, which they call baksheesh, for goods
and services as a matter of routine. It
is important to note that baksheesh is
not a token of gratitude for a job well
done, but a payment that is required
before a service is rendered, even if the
provider is already being paid to perform
that service. According to the United
Nations, Afghans pay $3.9 billion per
year in bribes and similar “gratuities.”
Given that Afghanistan has a total gross
national product of only $14 billion per
year, corruption consumes 28 percent
of the Afghan economy; roughly half of
Afghan citizens reported paying a bribe
for a public service. Among the most
outrageous examples of baksheesh are
documented cases of wounded Afghan
soldiers starving to death because military
hospital staff refused to feed (or even
144
treat) patients until the appropriate gratuity was paid.3
Afghanistan is not unique in suffering
from corruption. In its report published
in 2013, Transparency International assessed 177 nation states, and 122 (69
percent) were identified as having a
serious corruption problem. Of these,
Afghanistan, North Korea, and Somalia
were tied for last place as the three most
corrupt.4
Why is corruption such an important
issue? It is reasonable to expect that in
future military engagements, we will
continue to face the problem of corruption. Corrupt governments are often
ineffective and unstable, making them
likely candidates to fail and require intervention. We need to heed the costly
lessons learned in Afghanistan to be better prepared to deal with corruption in
the future.
A Brief History of Corruption
during Enduring Freedom
To understand corruption in Afghanistan, we must understand the execution
of Operation Enduring Freedom and the
prosecution of the war. This contextual
understanding may be helpful in making
the lessons of the operation more
readily adaptable to future situations.
In October 2001, the United States
initiated Enduring Freedom after the
Taliban government refused to hand over
al Qaeda leaders implicated in the 9/11
attacks against the United States. U.S.
Special Forces and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) operatives allied with
warlords from the Northern Alliance—a
well-organized Afghan resistance group
already fighting the Taliban—to engage
the group as a proxy force. This phase
of the strategy was successful, and the
Taliban and al Qaeda were driven out of
Afghanistan’s population centers.
Unfortunately, with the intense
focus on defeating al Qaeda, little attention was paid to the pervasiveness and
potential consequences of corruption
in Afghanistan. The U.S. military’s support of and patronage to the Northern
Alliance enabled the warlords to operate
without constraint. With the void left
by the absence of the Taliban, there was
Joint Doctrine / Dealing with Corruption
no organized rule of law in the country.
Unfettered by legal or other challenges,
the warlords leveraged goods they had
received legitimately from the United
States as well as those acquired through
criminal acts in order to amass political
power.
When Afghanistan’s new constitution
was signed in 2004, Hamid Karzai—
through a series of political deals—was
named the country’s interim president.
The 25 ministries of the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
offered him a perfect opportunity to
dispense patronage, and Karzai appointed
various warlords to fill key government
positions. Karzai also had the authority
to appoint all governors and the mayors
of key cities. While patronage allowed
Karzai to consolidate his powerbase,
his continued political security was dependent on the continued support of
warlords. As one advisor explained, “He
and his family started making deals with
the various warlords in order to keep
themselves in power, and [they have]
certainly done so.”5
Once established within ministries
and other government posts, the warlords
who had become government officials
used their positions to divert resources
to their constituencies to strengthen
the reach and power of their networks.
This convergence of power and money
under the warlords’ control created what
became known as criminal patronage networks, which offered a conduit through
which both legal and illegal gains were
blended so that the warlords now had the
ability to conduct illegal activities under
their own protection.
As the U.S. military presence grew, it
faced a logistical challenge: “Afghanistan
. . . is a landlocked country whose
neighbors range from uneasy U.S. allies, such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan,
to supposed adversaries, such as Iran.
Thirty years of war have devastated what
little infrastructure the country had.”6
To ensure a steady flow of the materiel
required to sustain its forces, the United
States contracted with Afghan companies
to provide secure long-haul trucking
services. The result was that the “responsibility for the supply chain was almost
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
entirely outsourced to local truckers and
Afghan private security providers.”7
These transportation and security
contracts represented a significant investment—in 2010, the Department
of Defense contracted $2.16 billion for
truck transportation. The contract went
to eight companies as prime contractors,
none of which were known for expertise
in logistics (and in fact were suspect). In
fact, “several of the prime contractors
. . . [did] not own trucks and subcontract out all of their trucking needs. In
other words, they essentially [served]
as brokers to the local Afghan trucking
companies.”8 Also, “one of the prime
contractors . . . was founded by the son of
the Afghan Defense Minister and had no
direct experience with managing trucking
before this contract.”9
The trucking companies were required to provide their own security, for
which they relied on private militias that
were largely controlled by the warlords.
According to the JCOA report, the
“private security companies . . . are typically warlords, strongmen, commanders,
and militia leaders who compete with
the [Afghan government] for power and
authority. . . . The contractors have little
choice but to use [the security companies] in what amounts to a vast protection
racket.”10 Transportation and construction companies, as well as security escorts,
pay the Taliban not to be attacked. In
December 2009, then–Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton acknowledged before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
“one of the major sources of funding for
the Taliban is the protection money.”11
Funding to Afghanistan was provided
primarily to support the Afghan Security
Forces, but money was obligated for
other purposes as well. One example was
for the repair or construction of badly
needed infrastructure. Local U.S. military
commanders initiated projects, but were
not able to see them to completion due
to normal deployment cycles. As a result,
many projects were planned and maybe
even begun, but few were finished.
Meaningful measurement of progress
during wartime is difficult because it is
dependent upon objective, quantifiable
data. One metric that was quantifiable
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
was the distribution of Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP)
funds. One officer noted, “When [senior
commanders] believed that putting
cash in people’s hands was the way
to win hearts and minds, they graded
[lower-level] commanders on the number of CERP projects they could get
obligated.”12 As a former member of the
Commission on Wartime Contracting
explained, “They got a whole bunch
of CERP projects; none of which were
completed and most were barely under
way when that commander rotated and
the new commander came in. What’s
[the new commander’s] incentive? To go
fix all of the old CERP projects or do a
bunch of his own.”13
The sheer amount of money for direct
aid and contracted services flowing into
Afghanistan overwhelmed its economy;
there was so much American cash that it
could not all be spent. According to the
JCOA report, “An economy can only
absorb a certain amount of inputs until it
becomes saturated. Additional input goes
somewhere else, usually capital flight,
usually illicit. In Afghanistan, absorptive
capacity [was] reached in the first year of
operations. That led to the corruption
eruption.”14
When the United States realized the
severity of the situation, it sought to
correct it but faced an insurmountable
hurdle. It could not impose sanctions on
the trucking companies or the security
forces; the warlords had become so well
entrenched that any imposed sanctions
would have impeded U.S. logistics.15
To ensure U.S. forces continued to be
supplied, the criminal activities of the
warlords were largely ignored.
The problem, however, was not
limited to activities controlled by the
warlords. Financial aid from the United
States and other coalition members
was deposited directly into the Afghan
treasury, and materiel, such as medical
equipment and supplies, was turned over
to the various Afghan ministries.16 At that
point, the United States transferred all
legal rights of the cash or materiel to the
sovereign state of Afghanistan. It was the
government’s to use or dispose of as it
saw fit.17
There were no treaties or other enforceable agreements in place to control
the money or materiel after transfer.
When U.S. officials observed materiel
being misused or stolen, they referred it
to the Afghan government to resolve, but
the usual response was that there was no
problem to correct. When the Americans
pressed Afghan officials to conduct an
investigation, their response was that
the United States was interfering with
Afghan sovereignty.18
The Lessons
Over time it became obvious that even
with massive U.S. financial investment,
the expected results were not being
achieved. The military hospital was not
performing as planned. Fuel was being
diverted before reaching its intended
destination. Afghan officers were
reportedly using military helicopters for
questionable purposes. Ultimately, this
led to various investigations and analyses, the results of which may prove as
important for future operations as they
did for resolving the problems experienced in Afghanistan.
In retrospect, it may seem that correcting corruption in Afghanistan was
not a high priority. However, the priority
for finding answers during armed conflict
is to solve combat problems; defeating
improvised explosive devices will win out
over auditing funds given to a construction company every time. If there was
limited capacity to address problems,
protecting American troops always took
precedence.
By 2010, Afghanistan’s corruption problem was being examined
by the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, whose report was critical of the U.S. provision of
reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan
“without the benefit of a comprehensive
anticorruption strategy, and that U.S.
anticorruption efforts had provided relatively little assistance to some key Afghan
institutions.”19 To solve a problem, one
must understand it, so in March 2013
General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC,
commander of U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,
requested, through the U.S. Central
Command chain of command, “a study
Holdren, Nowak, and Klinkenberger
145
Anti-corruption interview team from 101st Sustainment Brigade talk with local trucker about conditions on road (U.S. Army/Peter Mayes)
examining counter/anti-corruption
(CAC) operational challenges and
provide recommendations to inform
planning, operations, and decisionmaking for the final stages of Operation
[Enduring Freedom], the follow-on
mission, and to capture best practices for
future doctrine.”20
The Joint Staff J7’s JCOA Division,
in cooperation with the Joint Center for
International Security Assistance Force
Assistance, executed the task. After interviewing 66 key individuals and reviewing
relevant material from over 500 literature
sources, the study was completed and
signed on February 28, 2014.
Among the report’s key findings are
the following four points.
Allying with the Warlords and
Overwhelming the Afghan Economy
with Cash Fostered Corruption. The decision to ally with the Northern Alliance
was driven by the military objective of
defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban. Such
short-term alliances of convenience can
lead to long-term problems. (In 2002,
there was little expectation that military
operations in Afghanistan would continue
for so many years.) In the future, it would
be prudent to anticipate that short-term
operations are going to take far longer
than initially expected.
Commanders must also be aware that
there will be second- and third-order consequences of their decisions. Initially the
Northern Alliance’s role as a proxy force
was beneficial, but ultimately it became a
powerful obstruction to U.S. interests. It
is important to realize that military issues
and goals do not exist in a vacuum. To
analyze the composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect
a commander’s decisions, we need to
include political, military, economic, social,
information, and infrastructure factors.
The civil war that followed the
withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 left
Afghanistan and its economy in shambles.
146 Joint Doctrine / Dealing with Corruption
What little remained was absent a central
government and central bank to support
an economic system. Most of the modest
infrastructure that had once existed had
been destroyed. Outside of agriculture,
there was little potential for legitimate development or employment. It would have
been wise to consider these economic
factors in the analysis of the operational
environment. In Afghanistan, if we had
been more aware of these issues, we may
have had an earlier understanding of the
overall influence of the warlords and the
impact of corruption.
Corruption is a cultural, economic,
and legal issue. To the joint force commander, however, the key consideration
is how corruption will affect the desired
endstate. In Afghanistan, a successful
endstate was dependent upon the successful transfer of responsibility to a
legitimate Afghan government—something that has not been the norm in the
past century.
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
Actions performed in a foreign
country need to be considered in the
context of that country and not purely
from the U.S. perspective. In 2002, the
United States pumped $20 billion into
an economy that normally operates with
less than $15 billion dollars per year,
which totally overwhelmed the Afghan
economy. Nevertheless, the next year, we
continued to pump in more. What were
the consequences? How has it impacted
Afghan businesses that need to transport
their products by truck now that U.S.
contracts have driven up the price? What
has this done to the price of fuel or
building materials? What will happen as
coalition military forces (and the money
spent to support them) leave? The CIA
estimates that Afghanistan’s economy
grew 6.1 percent in 2011 and 12.5 percent in 2012, but the growth rate fell to
3.1 percent in 2013.
There Must Be Rule of Law to
Combat Corruption, and There Must Be
Processes and Mechanisms That Monitor
Where Money Has Gone and What It Is
Being Used For. There was no effective
rule of law at the beginning of Operation
Enduring Freedom. After the Soviet
military left, the Taliban had enforced
order through local courts, but after the
Taliban’s defeat, there was no national
legal system until the Afghan constitution
was ratified in January 2004. Without the
rule of law, behaviors and actions may be
influenced, but they cannot be directed.
In addition, property rights are not defined and there is no prosecutorial power
or punishment for infractions, no matter
how outrageous they may seem.
How could the United States have
better managed the money and materiel
it supplied for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan? Declaring martial law (to
secure the disbursement) would have
come at a tremendous political cost that
could have encouraged a more unified
insurgency. A more pragmatic approach
would have been to disburse money and
materiel with a clear understanding of
expected outcomes, with future payments
dependent upon prior performance.
Tracking money and materiel and
measuring performance, however, require
an appropriate monitoring and reporting
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
system, which was woefully lacking in
Afghanistan. A simple paper-based system
that host-nation personnel could understand and use would be far more effective
than a sophisticated computerized system
they do not understand. We should also
leverage the expertise of Servicemembers
experienced in law, supply management,
finance, and contracting—granting them
the commensurate authority to monitor
and measure the effectiveness of our supporting funds and materiel.
Until There Was an Understanding
of Afghan Corruption, There Was Little
We Could Do to Correct It. Afghanistan’s
corruption is a complex issue. The
unexpected consequences of early decisions—such as the empowered warlords
being appointed to senior government
positions—are caused by the failure to
adequately understand the problem.
Every military officer who is expected
to deploy has the potential to be operating in an environment that includes
corruption. To effectively deal with corruption, an understanding of its causes
and effects should become part of every
officer’s skill set. Professional military
education should introduce the topic of
corruption and other economic factors
early and reinforce them throughout
every officer’s career. Including the significance of economic factors into exercises
and wargames would be beneficial. While
economics is not a traditional focus of
military operations, like cyber, it may soon
be a critical component of the battlespace.
All Parties Must Work Together
toward a Common Goal. Economics
is recognized as one of the elements of
national power and is dependent on a
whole-of-government approach. Unity of
effort would benefit if the highest levels
of government provided clear guidance
as to the need to address corruption. As
seen in Afghanistan, the potential damage caused by corruption is significant
and demands effective action. Legislation
to sanction corrupt nation-states would
provide a powerful tool. The Leahy Law,
which restricts support for nations that
violate human rights, would be an appropriate model.
Working toward a common goal with
government partners is a frequent theme
for the military. The Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020
places the responsibility on the military to
“identify those agencies with whom Joint
Forces will work most often and develop
common coordinating procedures.”21
Guidance such as this may provide a way
to operationalize combined efforts toward a common goal.
Conclusion
Every generation of military leaders
builds on the lessons of those who came
before, and future leaders expect that
their views of operating environments
will be even more comprehensive. To
the map and binoculars, we have added
computers and reconnaissance aircraft.
Now we need to add social and economic factors such as corruption. Operation Enduring Freedom taught us that
corruption can have devastating effects.
To effectively deal with it, we must
incorporate a thorough understanding
of corruption into our education, training, and exercises. We need to be open
to other factors that we will identify in
the future as having an impact on our
effectiveness; however, we must remember that our decisions and actions have
unintended consequences. The better
we understand the operating environment, the faster we will identify problems that are more easily solved in their
early stages.
Corruption is a problem that does not
require a costly technological solution.
Instead, it is one that requires an open
mind with which to observe, analyze,
adapt, and address the problem in a
timely manner. JFQ
Notes
1
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
(JCOA), Operationalizing Counter/AntiCorruption Study (CAC) (Suffolk, VA: JCOA,
February 28, 2014), 1, available at <http://
nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Schools/
NIPCONS/nipcons-institutions/CIPS/Download%20Section/JCOA%20CAC%20Final%20
Report_U.pdf>.
2
Ibid., 53.
3
Maria Abi Habib, “At Afghan Military
Hospital, Graft and Deadly Neglect,” The Wall
Street Journal, September 3, 2011.
Holdren, Nowak, and Klinkenberger
147
4
Transparency International, “Corruption
Perceptions Index 2013,” Transparency.org,
available at <www.transparency.org/cpi2013/
results>.
5
CAC, 9.
6
Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Supplying
the Surge in Afghanistan,” National Journal,
February 20, 2010, available at <www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/supplying-the-surge-inafghanistan-20100220>.
7
CAC, 10.
8
“Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption
Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,”
Report of the Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair, Subcommittee on National Security
and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, June 2010, 13, available at <www.
cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf>.
9
Ibid., 12.
10
CAC, 11.
11
“Warlord, Inc.,” 37.
12
CAC, 13.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., 12.
15
Ibid., 11, 12.
16
“Dawood National Military Hospital,
Afghanistan: What Happened and What Went
Wrong?” Subcommittee on National Security,
Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 112-164, September 12,
2012, 65, available at <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-112hhrg76249/html/CHRG112hhrg76249.htm>.
17
Ibid., 56.
18
Ibid.
19
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to
the United States Congress (Washington, DC:
SIGAR, October 30, 2013), 43, available at
<www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/201210-30qr.pdf>.
20
CAC, v.
21
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations—Joint Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The
Joint Staff, September 10, 2012), 9, available
at <www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/
resources/JV2020_Capstone.pdf>.
148
Joint Doctrine / Dealing with Corruption
Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision
(to be signed within 6 months)
JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations
JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation
JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support
JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater
JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations
JP 3-26, Counterterrorism
JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control
JP 3-63, Detainee Operations
JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months)
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment (May 21, 2014)
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism (March 14, 2014)
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (January 3, 2014)
JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air
Operations (February 10, 2014)
JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land
Operations (February 24, 2014)
JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (February 21, 2014)
JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support (July 16, 2014)
JP 3-05, Special Operations (July 16, 2014)
JFQ 75, 4th Quarter 2014
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