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Élôfej páratlan cím
95
Social Democracy and the Nationalities
Question
GÁBOR EGRY
The Hungarian Social Democratic Party’s (MSZDP) 1903
Declaration of Principle’s fourth point included the party’s
rather laconically formulated political objective: “To
achieve total equality of all nations living in the country.”1
Although the Serbian delegates’ proposal to also include
the demand of self-government2 gives insight into the
theoretical setting, the nationalities issue itself unquestionably carried much less weight in this decisive program
of Hungarian social democracy than it actually did socially
and politically. This reticence is all the more conspicuous
with respect to the 1899 Brunn Program of the Austrian
sister party and Karl Renner’s relevant works of Austromarxism.3 It is important to note, however, that the nationnationality problem is not an integral part of Marxist social
theory, in spite of the fact that Marx and Engels discussed
the problem of national independence in detail primarily in
connection with 1848, hence it does not necessarily occur
in party programmes.
At the turn of the century social democratic parties took
a position on the question of nationalities only when they
were forced to do so, either by political competition, societal transformation, or, in close relation to these, by
organisational matters of the movement. In this regard, the
“extra-theoretical” nature of the national question could
have been both an asset or a liability. The problem could
have been neglected based on the primacy of class struggle,
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or a serious theoretical Marxist treatment could have been
given to the issue, in which case the evident lack of authentic interpretation would have been most favourable.
When the Declaration of Principle was issued, the ways
the two social democratic parties of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy approached the problem were diametrically
opposed. This was due to their distinctive organisation, differentiation, along with their different positions within the
political institutional structure in the first place. The
Austrian party had already been a highly organised parliamentary party with a mass appeal, represented in the Imperial Council (Reichsrat) and in the legislative assemblies
(Landtag). National conflicts intensified inside the party
too, since it practically operated as the federation of
national (German, Czech, Polish, Italian, South Slav and
Ruthenian) subparties.4 In Austria the national struggle
jeopardised not only the movement’s unity but also the
effectiveness of the tactics based on parliamentary representation. The persistent obstruction, which might have
been called forth by the plan to introduce bilingualism in
Bohemia or by the establishment of a Slovenian secondary
school in Maribor, paralysed legislation and, as social
democrats were concerned, it hindered social reforms.
In contrast, as a result of census suffrage and its weaker
structure the Hungarian party did not stand a chance of
ensuring parliamentary representation; it was taking the
preliminary steps towards it. Poorer organisation had not
led to the need for fragmentation or national division yet;
societal transformation was evidently the primary objective.
Furthermore, the institutional structure did not offer scope
for national particularism either; it did not provide a framework similar to the crown territories (Kronland) in Austria.
At the same time, it is clear to see that both parties
considered adaptation to changing circumstances and
answering topical questions of primary importance. This is
what the opposite views of the two parties may be traced
back to as regards one of the most important questions of
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the turn-of-the-century politics as well, not independent of
the nationalities problem or its solution: the Austrian party
proposed a customs union, whereas MSZDP supported the
notion of a separate customs territory and resolved to
uphold this stance in the teeth of Austrian opposition.5
Two parts of the Monarchy, two parties, two fundamentally different views and problem-solving strategies; two
viewpoints, two ways of tackling the same problem—as we
can see, the parties had the chance to freely form their own
opinions about the nationalities question. Having said that,
it is rather conspicuous to what limited extent Hungarian
social democracy was fertilised by the national theory of
Austromarxism and its proposal for solution.
The future of the Danubian basin
and the nationalities question
The problem of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s future
had become most acute after the turn of the century.
Following the attempt to introduce bilingualism in Austria,
all obstacles to the reconciliation of the Czech-German
conflict became obvious. In Hungary the drafting of an
economic compromise encountered fierce opposition and
the success of the coalition questioned dualism itself.
Due to national disagreements threatening the party, and
the Austrian parliament’s occasional hiccups, and also
because they believed that there was a danger of millions of
Germans becoming a provincial minority, the Austrian
social democrats also joined the not so small camp of those
who devised plans for the future of the Empire. Among the
ideas that presented themselves were the maintenance of
dualism, personal union, any version of federalism (either
that built on the crown council, or that of an ethnic basis)
and centralism. Starting from the analysis of the practical
consequences of the nationalities question and drawing
conclusions of universal validity, from the above options the
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social democrats proposed a unique, mixed version of federalism which entailed the compromise of sharing total state
sovereignty.6
There was a special division of labour between the two
most influential theoreticians, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer.
While Renner laid emphasis on practical political analyses
and political law, Bauer conducted empirical-historical
investigations and tried to construct the comprehensive
theory of the nation-nationality problem on a Marxist basis.
Their results reciprocally influenced each other, although
Renner’s political and practical proposals were of an earlier
origin, and, therefore, they provided the foundation for
Bauer’s suggestions.
Bauer’s definition became the subject of heated debate
within the international workers’ movement. His national
ideal was both cultural and historical. He believed that the
nation was a community of destiny and character, which
takes shape in national culture, and consequently in national history. Bauer’s nation was not based on blood relations, thus, it was not a community of race, however, it
was rooted in traditions. At the same time, he described it
as a formation of modernisation, when he said that only
those who were the vehicles of national culture could be
part of the nation. In capitalism, these are primarily the
members of the citizenry and the intelligentsia.7
Bauer, in conformity with the modernising interpretation of the nation,8 differentiated between historical and
non-historical nations, which corresponds to the dichotomy of state-forming and stateless nations in Hungarian
political theory. Historical nations are present all
throughout history and their ruling classes embody their
national culture and class interests. Non-historical nations
do not have ruling classes, or a national elite, consequently, they do not cultivate and articulate a national high
culture. For Bauer, change was not irreversible: a historical
nation can become a non-historical one, while a non-historical nation can turn into a historical one through
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advancement and the spreading of capitalism.9 Nations
become participants in history again as a result of capitalism’s culturally equalizing and unifying role and a widespread dissemination of culture.
The awakening of non-historical nations, as Renner put
it, makes the fight of nations for the state imperative. Renner distinguishes between the so-called atomistic-centralised and the organic state organisation. Absolutism destroyed corporate-communal organisations and connected
the citizens individually to state power. This was also
accepted by liberal state philosophy, which composed the
theory of individual rights and which did not transform the
state organisation inherited from absolutism.10 Since absolutism does not acknowledge national differences, it contributes to the awakening of non-historical nations with
cultural reforms, especially with the introduction of public
education. The liberal state and its constitution recognise
only the individuals and provide for their protection (freedom of language use, freedom from obligatory language
learning, etc.). However, citizens organising into nations
can only expect the furtherance of their national culture
from the state owing to the fact that they do not have the
right to impose or collect taxes. As a national majority—
German, Polish, or Czech—is given in each legislation, culturally disadvantaged nations can only hope to have their
national culture acknowledged and supported by canvassing the help of the legislative majority; this inevitably
leads to the nations’ fight for the state.11
The solution, which was worked out by Renner and was
adopted by Bauer with some alterations, and which transcended the Brunn program’s territorial self-determination,
was the recognition of collective rights. Each nation can
acquire collective rights, irrespective of their territorial
position, based on a national cadastre to be set up. The
national communities thus established can elect their
national council, which would have the exclusive right to
organise the communities’ cultural life. This would be
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made possible by the right of taxation. Obviously, Renner
aimed to confine the conflicts paralysing the workings of
the Austrian parliament—administrative language use,
school matters—not least with respect to the future of
Germans in Bohemia.
At the same time his plan included other radical transformations. The most important alteration is the possibly
nationally separated, regional divisions, which are based on
real democratic self-government. Regional self-governments are, one the one hand, the executive bodies of the
central government, and, on the other hand, autonomous
institutions of social administration. National separation
for the most part solves the problems of administrative language use. Wherever it does not do so—as Renner estimated, this is 10 percent of the regions to be founded—the
inhabitants, grouped into national chambers, would elect
and handle their business in their mother tongue. These
national regions and national chambers would make up
national collectives, which would elect national councils.
With such a method, only the significantly bilingual
regions’ educational administration should be doubled.
Nonetheless, in the transformation of the components of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy he assumed a more
prominent role to other, primarily eco-geographically
organised units, which would only partially correspond to
national territories. He would separate the South Slavs with
the coastline in Cisleithania, the Alpine lands inhabited by
Germans, the Czech lands, and Galicia combined with
Bukowina. These regions would deal with economic matters, and everything else which does not fall within the
competence of the Imperial Parliament. He would integrate Hungary in the same way as well, emphasising the
fact that the later they start the transformation—whose conditio sine qua non is universal suffrage—the more likely it
would be that the restructuring of the country could only
be done on a national basis.
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Renner would also democratise the management of common affairs. He would not widen their present scope, but
he would introduce real parliamentary supervision, naturally
in the form of an Imperial Parliament. Democratisation,
even in a forceful manner applied by the dynasty, would
extend over Hungary as well.12 Universal suffrage would be
introduced, by which Hungarian “oligarchic” and “feudal”
state organisation would be eliminated. Thus, we have an
overall picture of widespread democratisation, decentralisation with an obscure content, and collective rights to
nationalities. The base of all this is the Monarchy’s economic
unity, which requires the existence of a customs union.
Renner has another argument, left unsaid: the maintenance
of the Monarchy is necessary in view of a European balance.
Democratisation would facilitate the expansion of national culture into the proletariat as well. A true national
unity could be created under the condition that the proletariat’s vernacular culture is developed, strengthened, and
the integration of the proletariat into the national culture is
achieved. This would also mean the implantation of real
class struggle, while the tackling of the national problem
would lead to the unity of the proletariat. Neither Renner,
nor Bauer questioned the fact that national struggle would
make it impossible for workers to fight against exploitation
in the hope of success.
Renner, Bauer and the Austrian social democrats, conforming to current political realities, consistently represented these notions up until 1918. Similarly, Hungarian
social democrats held rather strong views about this
problem, too.
First and foremost, it is worth noting that the Austrian
and Hungarian social democrats’ viewpoints were fundamentally different: Hungarian social democrats, and even
members of the Hungarian left wing analysed the problem
of the Monarchy’s future, with the nationalities question
involved, with a view to Hungarian detachment. In the
reception of Renner and Bauer’s works in Hungary a key
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role had been assigned to the rejection of the ideas of
constitutional unity and economic unity; in fact, this was a
predominant element in social democratic reaction.13
MSZDP supported the idea of a separate customs territory
and the coalition’s national programme (partly for the sake
of franchise reform), and after the agreement between the
Crown and the coalition the party turned into its fiercest
and most resolute critic, not least as a result of the concessions made in this respect.14 The party did not assert the
views of the empire in the nationality issue either; it confined itself to investigating the Hungarian situation, and similar to other political powers, it ignored the fact that ultimately, on the Monarchy’s scale, the future of dualism is a
nationalities question, that of the Hungarian nationality.
Before World War I, the nationalities question had often
been reduced to a theoretically approached, strategic-tactical problem: how long could nationalities and parties be
allied to social democracy in the fight for the direct aim of
universal suffrage, or in a wider sense, in class struggle.
This was accompanied by the daily problems of party organisation and agitation, especially among non-Hungarian
workers and in the agrarian proletariat. However, it is
important to point out that the integration of nationalities
inside the party, in spite of all conflicts, might well have
been an effective method of tackling the problem.
Evidently, this approach was based on a solid theoretical
and methodological foundation. While the Hungarian
comrades’ views were not particularly influenced by Austromarxist notions, they tried to weigh up the possibility of
an alliance between nationalities and the proletariat on a
sociological basis. The significance of this matter is clearly
indicated by the fact that several writings were dealing with
it in the first volume of the party’s theoretical magazine
entitled Szocializmus (Socialism).
The most extensive work was Ernô Bresztovszky’s fivepiece study, which dealt with the phenomenon of assimilation.15 He tried to depict the process of “Magyarisation”
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through the social structure of each nation, the differences
in demographic data and their distribution based on settlement types and regions. As a result, he defined assimilation
as a phenomenon of modernisation, a concomitant of social
progress. His report revealed that the focal point for Hungarian processes were towns, where “Magyarisation” based
on an increase in wealth and in cultural consumption made
up a substantial share of national “profit.” He finally concluded: however much absolutistic politics strikes nationalist notes or attempts to instigate national action (such as
colonisation), in effect, it protects the interests of latifundia, keeps the masses in ignorance, and deprives them of
the opportunity for education and social mobility; therefore, it is a “nation-killing” policy. This corresponds precisely to the interpretation of Austromarxists.16 Clearly, a
remedy for this situation would be to elevate the working
class and involve them in cultural life.
The other pivotal question, with which statements of
theoretical character were dealing in detail, looked at the
possibilities of and limitation to an alliance between nationality parties and social democracy. Although many
people shared the view that in the fight for the topical political objective—universal suffrage—national movements
and the workers’ movement were each others’ natural
allies, opinions about the possibilities of a future cooperation differed greatly.
Jenô Rozványi explained that since nationalities do not
have their own bourgeoisie—they assimilate into the
Hungarian bourgeoisie because of their class interests—and
the petty bourgeoisie cannot assure a livelihood for the
intelligentsia, besides the fight for universal suffrage the
nationalities cannot withdraw themselves from the language struggle either.17 Until they succeed in that struggle,
their existence is also dependent on the situation of the
national proletariat. Even though state positions would
open up for them with the conclusion of the language
struggle, since they do not have a bourgeoisie, they will
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remain much more connected to their own proletariat than
the Hungarian bourgeoisie.
Others, such as József Strasser18 and Lajos Tarczai19 regarded a cooperation possible only after the franchise
struggle had been resolved. After that, in their opinion,
class interests would set the proletariat against the nationality parties of civil recruits. However, Tarczai and Rozványi agreed that in the given situation the nationality
clergy—or its influence on the nationality proletariat and
smallholders—could not be described as reactionary, since
the common goals of the national case corresponded to the
class interests of the oppressed classes.
Tarczai’s short book review20 provides a clue as to the
current explanation of the point of equal rights of nationalities in the social democratic program. With reference to
the argumentation of a moderate Romanian author, he
remarked that after the bloodshed in Cernova, the implementation of the Nationality Law could no longer satisfy
the nationalities. He believed that a complete freedom of
language use would be the only solution.
In the next half decade, theoretical interest in the nationalities problem declined and it only revived during the
restoration of the Croatian constitutionality and the negotiations between István Tisza and the Romanian National
Committee. Zsigmond Kunfi brought up this question in
two of his works: can Tisza come to a compromise with the
Romanians?21 He arrived to the conclusion that the attempt
was hopeless. Although it would be possible to reach a
compromise among the national bourgeoisies, the national
intelligentsia and the Hungarian elite (in a way realising
Tarczai’s idea of providing language rights), the majority of
the nationalities is comprised of those smallholders and
poor peasants, who are oppressed by the system and the
ruling classes because of their social status. This social
oppression would not weaken due to a compromise of the
elite, and since it is an immanent element of the system,
there is no chance to mitigate or eliminate it.
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In the period before the world war, the key to approach
the problem of nationalities was class struggle. They considered national conflicts as factors obstructing class struggle,22 however, they could not put forward a better solution
than raising awareness of this fact through agitation among
nationalities, which was not necessarily an effective
method. The situation was further aggravated by the fact
that, as is shown in Bresztovszky’s study, the party did not
reject the notion of a peaceful assimilation of nationalities.
Moreover, this was emphasised quite frequently, as necessitated by political tactics—to join forces with parties
adopting the national policy in the franchise struggle—presenting the movement itself as a melting pot and a valuable
tool of assimilation.23
Even when they made gestures towards nationalities, it
never went beyond the administrative treatment of the
problem. They marked democratisation as an answer to the
problem, thereby sharing the illusion of the liberals of
the reform era: nationalities would be loyal and devoted if
their freedom was granted. This became vital in handling
the situation. The extension of suffrage, societal reforms,
and the eradication of social and economic oppression
might have been able to put an end to the misery of nationalities.
As for Hungarian social democratic visions, there is an
apparent lack of plans on the imperial level, or of future
goals for the Monarchy. Obviously, social democrats
espoused the undermining of dualism and the introduction
of economic self-determination, nevertheless, these steps
were not accompanied by a comprehensive concept. Unlike
the Austrian party and movement, Hungarian social
democracy had simply never been confronted with these
problems in political battles. Hungary’s territorial integrity
had never been questioned publicly by any national movement, thus, the country had been able to evade having to
take a carefully designed theoretical stance.
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However, the war forced the pace on taking a stand
about the possible transformations after the advent of
peace. The victory of both the Entente and the Central
Powers promised changes: the relations between the
Monarchy and the Balkans, Poland, which was to be reconstructed, the Mitteleuropa program, the restructuring of
the Monarchy in accordance with Woodrow Wilson’s principles; they all signalled sweeping changes.
Peace without annexation was the basic principle of
Hungarian social democracy. In addition, they often
emphasised national self-government, although this was
accompanied by the intention to at least partially preserve
the Monarchy.24 At the same time—along the lines of Kunfi’s
pre-war stance—they viewed nationality struggles as antithetical to class struggle, espoused the policy to create bigger
economic units, while rejecting the Mitteleuropa program.
This rather eclectic view and the changes in world politics are reflected in the works published in Szocializmus in
the last year of the war.25 Jenô Varga, still rejecting dualism,
argued for a renewed Monarchy, organised on the basis of
self-determination for nationalities, a more close-knit
cooperation, and democratic parliamentarism for settling
common affairs. However, he failed to fully define the concept of self-determination. Consequently, a parallel could
just as well be drawn between these ideas and the civil
radical transformation program and its principle of integrity, or Renner’s widely known theories, or even the concepts of the Austrian party’s left wing.
Traditionally, the common element in all of these cases is
the upholding of the principle of territorial integrity.
Neither the proclamation published in Népszava (The
Voice of the People) on October 8, 1918, nor the opinions
issued afterwards defined the scope of freedom of nationalities and national self-determination. This stance is
characteristic of the politics of social democrats coming
into power during the October Revolution.26 It includes the
quoting of Wilsonian principles and the ambition to hold
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107
referendums that would help implementing them. This is
not incomprehensible and cannot be termed as national
imperialism or chauvinism, although under those circumstances it was without a doubt a case of entertaining illusions. It is quite clear, however, that Hungarian social
democracy did not and actually could not come up with a
viable alternative to secession in order to put national selfdetermination into practice. This remains to be a serious
problem, even if we know that neither the mature concept
of Austromarxists nor Jászi’s “Eastern Switzerland Plan” of
cantonal autonomies could prevent the dissolution of the
Monarchy and Hungary.
Hungary’s situation in the Danubian Basin
Naturally, after the Treaty of Trianon, the nationalities
question was raised in a completely different way. The fact
that Hungary lost two-thirds of its lands, the minority of
three million in the successor states, and the trauma caused
by the injustice of the peace treaty all pointed to a small
state-small nation perspective. In the remaining area there
was a mere 10 percent minority, therefore, the weight of this
problem in internal politics fell off, foreign policy gained in
importance, and instead of pressing assimilation, emphasis
shifted to the protection of minorities. At the same time the
objective of the revision provided a more complex framework for the matter. None of the legal parties gave up the
idea of remedying the injustices of the peace treaty, which
strengthened the role of plans of a future set-up in the
Danubian or Carpathian Basin.
The Social Democratic Party also advocated the necessity of revision. In keeping with governmental policy and
accepting international realities at the start, the party did
not deal with the matter openly, however, when foreign policy grew more and more active, standpoints on the question of revision came to be published. Nonetheless, the
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need for a theoretical approach to the problem was still
lacking. The affirmation (if qualified) of the revision and
the provision of its necessary conditions, the treatment of
the country’s minorities, especially the Germans carrying
substantial weight among the party’s supporters, and the
rearrangement of the region constituted the framework of
action. After Hitler’s coming into power, but mainly after
the Anschluß and during the war the idea of national independence accompanied this policy.
The problems related to minorities in Hungary were primarily presented by Vilmos Zuschlag on the pages of Szocializmus; he was also the one who commented on the plan
conceived in Magyar Szemle (Hungarian Review), called
the “New Hungary Plan” by László Ottlik.27 Zuschlag
levels strong criticism at the nationality policy of Bethlen
and its continuity of pre-war policy. His criticism is
twofold: on the one hand, he objects to the “Magyarising”
tendencies of the educational policy; on the other hand, he
regards nationality struggles as an obstacle in the fight for
democratic transformation. As for the educational policy,
he not only argues against restricting education in the
minorities’ mother tongue, but by reviving pre-war arguments he points out the connection between “Magyarising”
education, low cultural standard, and a high illiteracy rate.
As a result of these factors, the nation’s power inevitably
weakens along with the democratic movements.
Further on he puts the problem in the context of revision, too. He argues that if Hungary does not abide by the
regulations of the minority agreement, it has no right to
enforce it on minorities in Hungary either. With such a twofaced policy, people of the seceded territories could not be
won over, and any kind of “New Hungarian” concept,
which is not willing to transcend the limitation of pre-war
policy, and which considers the nationalities policy important
only until it has regained its lands, is perforce an illusion.
He also expresses his views about the issues of democracy, class struggle and the nationalities question. He believes
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that to establish the Germans’ own native culture in
Hungary, social development and prosperity are the most
essential conditions. At a time of oppression, this could
only be made possible through the set-up of a Hungarian
democracy. Consequently, the place of nationalities is
within the social democratic party, whose objectives could
lead to the realisation of those of the nationalities.
A similar line of thought can be observed in ensuing
standpoints. Zuschlag’s German brochure,28 a political
propaganda written before the 1939 elections, sets the goals
of realising minority agreements and—not independent of
the demands of the Volksbund based on nationalities—of
establishing the cultural autonomy of Germans. At the
same time, in his view the conquering of unemployment
and a fair distribution of lands should come before these
steps. His cultural and schooling demands included the
suggestion—which was unexpected given his earlier works—
that in the case of Germans living in or close to cities, the
introduction of bilingual education is unnecessary, as it
would be disadvantageous for them not to be able to assimilate into the Hungarian urban environment. Although
this proposition is suprising, it is not entirely incomprehensible, since the Volksbund aimed to take control of schooling
as well with the help of Nazi Germany. Zuschlag’s proposition served partially to avert this danger.
Others treat the problem in relation to democracy as
well, partly along with the nationality policy before Trianon, and partly as opposed to the aspirations of German
fascism. Sándor Lipcsei tried to present social democracy
as an authentic representative of the national ideal, maintaining that democracy is the only possible way to realise
social equality and freedom as opposed to fascism.29 Zoltán
Rónai criticised the former nationalities policy in relation to
Miklós Asztalos’s work entitled A nemzetiségek története
Magyarországon (The History of Nationalities in Hungary),
and denounced the methods of former imperialists. As contrasted with these views, he pointed up the legal protection
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of minorities, and set “the right of the weak” and democracy against “the right of the powerful”, represented by
Asztalos.30 Last but not least, he revived Bauer and Renner
and the ideal of cultural autonomy in reference to László
Buza’s work entitled A kisebbségek jogi helyzete (The Legal
Status of Minorities).
Another opportunity to revive Austromarxist theories
had arisen when Otto Bauer died on July 4, 1938 in Paris.
The authors of the lengthy commemoration in Szocializmus
—Zoltán Rónai and Manó Buchinger—took the opportunity to expound Bauer’s theory concerning the national
question (in a more professional way than László Rudas in
1907) and also to set it against fascism to some extent.31 It
was Buchinger in particular who stood for the idea that personal autonomy might have been able to solve the problems
of the Monarchy (or, in fact, of Austria).
Zuschlag’s proposition of cultural autonomy may well be
the sign of this short Bauer-renaissance, however, in 1939,
in the national euphoria following the First Vienna
Decision, the nationalities question did not figure among
the most significant issues. The emergent theoretical
approach was abandoned and the concepts of Austromarxists were no longer exemplary.
Népszava’s comments on the events of October 1938—
on the turns of the Hungarian-Slovakian negotiations—did
not differ from those of the other papers. The start of negotiations, the occupation of Ipolyság and of the train station
at Sátoraljaújhely were received similarly euphorically, the
breakdown in negotiations similarly bitterly.
The party welcomed the Vienna Decision and deemed it
appropriate, just like the re-annexation of North Transylvania. At the same time the future of the enlarged Hungary
in the Danubian Basin became more vital than the regulation of national minority issues. Not long after the reannexation of the southern part of the Northern Region
(Felvidék), László Ákos had already voiced his belief that
the enlarged Hungary was to assume a more decisive role in
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111
Central Europe. In his opinion, although a Hungarian and
Czechoslovakian bloc based on free trade did not seem
realistic, Bohemia was to gravitate economically towards
Germany, while Slovakia towards Hungary.32
Similar thoughts—of the mission of the enlarged
Hungary in the Danubian Basin—were expressed in the
article published in March 1943 in Népszava.33 The article
discussed the significance of the “complete and intact,”
that is, Saint Stephen’s Hungary. Within this country, the
foundations of minority reconciliation are equality before
the law, the predominance of a social way of thinking, solidarity and understanding. The idea that nationalities
should regard the country as their homeland did not differ
much from the concept of the dualist era represented by
Mocsáry or Jászi; nor did the illusions related to it, as I
mentioned earlier, from the analogous concepts of liberals
of the reform period. The reference to the topicality of the
Danubian Confederation, the cooperation of small nations,
links the article to Kossuth in particular. The importance of
this is emphasised by the fact that soon afterwards the
booklet entitled Kossuth demokráciája (Kossuth’s Democracy)
was published under the editorship of Árpád Szakasits,
which included Kossuth’s relevant works.
This school of thought, although the reference to the historical calling linked it to the official standpoint of the era,34
had obvious antecedents in the social democratic party. It
was Ernô Garami whose works dealt with the necessity of a
certain kind of economy-based association of the Danubian
nations, with Hungary as its natural centre as a result of its
eco-geographical position. Garami listed the practical difficulties of realisation; he consistently insisted that democratisation and the penetrability of borders are the ways to
solve national problems or at least establish a modus vivendi.35
The primacy of democracy was still the most essential
element of the social democratic vision. Party stands did
not go beyond that, however, there were some politicians
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who stressed the need for a more definite representation of
collective rights and nationality interests. József Junger
demanded, on the one hand, that state power be cleansed
of class interests. Partly following Renner’s thoughts, he
talked about the different classes’ fight for state power in
multinational states, and emphasised the importance of
state neutrality.36 On the other hand, he proposed considering the collective rights of nationalities.37
Zuschlag, who referred to Bauer as well, suggested a
change of party policy in the nationalities question in a
petition in 1943. He advised to clarify the concept of
“nation” based on Bauer’s definition, to express the principle of socialist national self-government, and to launch a
detailed action programme that would provide a differential
treatment to national minorities. At the same time he
rejected territorial autonomy.38 His proposition was partly
an evocation of the ideas supported by Transylvanians at
the congress debate of December 1942, which, in contrast,
aimed to build principally on democratisation.39
Pragmatism without theories
After the turn of the century the nationalities question was
not regarded as one of the principal problems by Hungarian social democracy. Inside the party, interest in the
theoretical fundamentals of the problem dwindled, and in
practice the social democratic stance was determined by
the possibilities of federal policy and franchise reform. Fear
of accusations of antinationalism, the overlaps between the
national programme of the independence opposition and
the economic program of social democrats (especially in
the question of a separate customs territory), and the lack
of an ally undertaking the nationalities programme did not
facilitate the drafting of a nationalities programme.
The social democratic party’s judgement of the problem
did not differ greatly from the patient schools of Hungarian
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113
political life, or from Mocsáry or Jászi. The question was
treated in a broader sense, extending over national institutions, primarily as an administrative and a schooling
problem. They trusted in the success of natural assimilation, moreover, they believed that democratic transformation would be vital to achieve this end.
Besides topical tactical changes the acceptance of the
priority of class struggle was a permanent element. Hungary’s social democrats, as opposed to those of Austria, did
not press for an immediate solution to the nationalities
problem; they wished to surpass that through socialism and
democratisation. Out of the two, democratisation was of
course more realistic in the first half of the previous century,
consequently, that was the overriding aim of Hungarian
social democracy.
The changes brought about by the world war and the
revolutions did enforce a more mature and comprehensive
theory encompassing the whole region, nevertheless, it did
not compare with Renner and Bauer’s theories with respect
to either its depth or its theoretical fundamentals. While the
implementation of these theories was motivated earlier by
the lack of external pressure as well as by the fear of a Great
Austria believed to have been hidden in them, after the
break-up of the Monarchy, the plans designed for it might
have seemed to have partly lost their topicality or their
authors might have deemed them outdated and set out to
realise a pan-German unity.
The fate of Hungarian minorities did not further the
party’s theoretical turn either. Between the two world wars,
besides the theories of revision, the protection of minorities
and national independence, the cooperation of the
Danubian Basin’s small nations constituted the framework
of the policy on nationalities. Although the party considered the consistent reciprocal realisation of minority protection crucial, the faith put into the necessity of revision
did not urge the elaboration of a universally valid standpoint on the issue of nationalities, apart from the empha-
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sising of the importance of class struggle, which came to be
the priority of democratisation.
After a brief Austromarxist renaissance, which did not
actually become the basis of the party’s official program,
and the re-annexation of lands, Hungary’s Central
European significance came to the forefront in social democratic concepts, too, similar to the influential, antiGerman, conservative and liberal groups of the political
social elite (see the memorandum of István Bethlen or the
Szegedy-Maszák memorandum). This could not have been
changed either by the sensitivity of the Northern-Transylvanian comrades towards this problem, or the urging by
Zuschlag, who feared to lose the remaining influence
among Germans living in the country.
The social democrats’ trust, lasting for almost half a century, in the problem-solving class struggle, leading to the
not so clearly defined freedom of nationalities, and in the
seemingly more easily realisable democratisation did not
prove to be well-founded. Although the stances adjusted to
emerging situations and the absence of a solid theoretical
basis did not prove to be less successful than the principled
policy-making of other political forces, they definitely highlight the shortcomings of the social democratic line of
thought, which we cannot let pass without a remark—even
if it was not part of the great ideology—especially in the
case of a party which nailed its colours to the mast of freedom. Nevertheless, it does have one advantage: our social
democratic predecessors did not bequeath the dead weight
of their authority to their late followers.
Translated by Ágnes Tóth
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115
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A magyar munkásmozgalom történetének válogatott dokumentumai
(Selected Documents of the History of the Hungarian Workers’
Movement), 3rd ed. (Budapest, 1995), 140. Karl Kautsky participated in the drafting of this point in the program.
Ibid.; also in Kende, János. A Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt
nemzetiségi politikája 1903–1919 (The Nationalities Policy of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party 1903–1919) (Budapest, 1973), 29.
See program in Bauer, Otto. Die Nationalitätenfrage und die
Sozialdemokratie (The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy)
(Vienna, 1907), 458. Renner’s most influential works until then:
Synopticus [Karl Renner], Staat und Nation (State and Nation)
(Vienna, 1899); Springer, Rudolf [Karl Renner]. Der Kampf der
Oesterreichischen Nationen um den Staat (The Austrian Nations’ Fight
for the State) (Vienna, 1902).
Máté, István. A nemzeti kérdésrôl. A nemzeti kérdés lenini elméletének
kialakulása 1896–1914. Bevezetés (On the National Question. The
Development of the National Question’s Lenin’s Theory. Introduction) (Budapest, 1988), 16.
See standpoint of Austrian social democrats in Otto Bauer’s book
above, or in Springer, Rudolf. Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der
Österreichischen-Ungarischen Monarchie. Politische Studie über den
Zusammenbruch der Privilegialparlamente und die Wahlreform in
beiden Staaten, über die Reichsidee und ihre Zukunft (The
Fundamentals and Development Objectives of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy) (Vienna and Leipzig, 1906); see Hungarian arguments—
partly against those of Bauer—in Varga, Jenô. “Az önálló vámterület
és az osztrák proletariátus” (Separate Customs Territory and the
Austrian Proletariat), Szocializmus (Socialism), no. 7, 1 (1906), 565.
See Otto Bauer above, Karl Renner. Grundlagen…, and Renner, Karl.
Der Deutsche Arbeiter und der Nationalismus (The German Worker and
Nationalism) (Vienna, 1910); Renner. Was ist Nationale Autonomie?
Was ist Soziale Verwaltung? (What is National Autonomy? What is
Social Administration?) (Vienna, 1913); Renner. Die Nation als
Rechtsidee (The Nation as Legal Concept) (Vienna, 1914).
See István Máté above; Gáll, Ernô. “Az újraolvasandó Otto Bauer”
(Otto Bauer Reread), in Kelet-európai írástudók és a nemzeti-nemzetiségi törekvések (Budapest, 1987), 189–211. At the same time Bauer’s
Marxism, materialism and, consequently, his historical positivism
invalidates this argument, since for him history is not an interpretation or a myth (an idea embraced by Andersen), but tangible reality.
95-118 Egry
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116
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
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GÁBOR EGRY
Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner are of a similar opinion. See also
Smith, Anthony D. “A nacionalizmus” (Nationalism), in Eszmék a
politikában: a nacionalizmus (Ideas in Politics: The Nationalism), eds.
Zoltán Bretter and Ágnes Deák (Pécs, 1995), 9–26; Plamenatz, John.
“A nacionalizmus két típusa” (Two Types of Nationalism), ibid.
52–67; Romsics, Ignác. Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és
Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században (Nation, Nationality and
State in Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe in the 19th and
20th centuries) (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1998), 9–15; Schultze,
Hagen. States, Nations and Nationalism. From the Middle Ages to the
Present (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 95–114.
Both processes developed in the case of Slovenes and Czechs. The
former turned into a non-historical nation in the 9th century, the latter after the Fehérhegy battle, and in the second part of the 19th century they became historical nations again.
This line of thought is not unique; it appeared first, among others, in
Tocqueville, Alexis de. A régi rend és a forradalom (The Old Regime
and the French Revolution) (Budapest, 1994). Tocqueville argued
that in effect it was absolutism which eliminated the collective bodies
of the order era, thereby making way for the individualism and the
omnipotent state power of the revolution.
His line of thought and argumentation on questioning the ethnic neutrality of the liberal state has much in common with the latest school
of liberal philosophy represented by Will Kymlicka. See Kymlicka’s
theory in Salat, Levente. Etnopolitika—a konfliktusoktól a méltányosságig (Ethnopolitics—from Conflicts to Fairness) (Marosvásárhely,
2001).
Contrary to Renner’s readings [See Jászi, Oszkár. A nemzeti államok
kialakulása és a nemzetiségi kérdés (The Formation of National States
and the Nationalities Question) (Budapest, 1986); Jászi. A monarchia
jövôje és a Dunai Egyesült Államok (The Future of the Monarchy and
the Danubian United States) (Budapest, 1918)], his ideas about the
national councils elected by the national cadastre differed both from
the idea of religious self-government and also from Kossuth’s constitutional plans on emigration. Kossuth imagined a primarily civil
organisation, which fell within the scope of the Assembly Act and did
not exercise governmental power; while Renner believed that the
sharing of state sovereignty and the replacement of territorial basis
with individual basis would have been a viable solution.
Varga. “Az önálló vámterület és az osztrák proletariátus”.
The reports about the economic compromise in Népszava in 1907 are
a good example of this. Civil radicals shared a similar view, too. Jászi,
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Social Democracy and the Nationalities Question
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
117
Oszkár. “Az új Magyarország felé” (Towards a New Hungary), in
Jászi Oszkár publicisztikája (Budapest, 1982), 89–106.
Bresztovszky, Ernô. “Adatok a nemzetiségi kérdéshez” (Figures of the
Nationalities Question), Szocializmus, no. 7, 1 (1906), 503–507;
555–558; 604–608; 631–635.
Criticism of the hypocrisy of national politics was not missing from
social democratic argumentation. For instance, Jenô Varga published
an informative compilation in 1918 about how much land was sold to
Romanian smallholders and landowners by Workers’ Party politicians
who propagated the need to secure national landed property. Varga,
Jenô. “Eladó ország” (A Country to Sell), Szocializmus, no. 12:
403–406.
Rozványi, Jenô. Dr. “Szociáldemokrata párt és a nemzetiségek” (The
Social Democratic Party and Nationalities), Szocializmus, no. 7, 1
(1906), 513–521; 545–550.
Strasser, József. “Érdekközösségeink” (Our Community of Interests),
Népszava, March 22, 23, 30 and April 14, 1907).
Tarczai, Lajos. “A politikai helyzet és a nemzetiségek” (The Political
Situation and the Nationalities), Szocializmus, no. 8, 2 (1907),
266–273.
Tarczai, Lajos. “Két könyv a nemzetiségi kérdésrôl” (Two Books on
the Nationalities Question), Szocializmus, no. 8, 2 (1907), 479–480.
Kunfi, Zsigmond. “A nemzetiségi béke és az országharc” (National
Peace and Class Struggle), Szocializmus, no. 14, 8 (1913), 97–106;
“Fajok és osztályok Magyarországon” (Races and Classes in
Hungary), Szocializmus, no. 14, 8 (1913), 337–347.
Kende. A Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt nemzetiségi politikája
1903–1919 , 42–43.
Ibid., 55–74.
Ibid., 83–89.
Varga, Jenô. “Gondolatok a monarchia jövôjérôl” (Thoughts about
the Future of the Monarchy), Szocializmus, no. 18, 12 (1917), 16–22;
“Az osztrák szociáldemokrata párt balszárnyának programja” (The
Left-wing Programme of the Austrian Social Democratic Party),
Szocializmus, no. 18, 12 (1917), 489–493.
Kende. A Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt nemzetiségi politikája
1903–1919 , 95–121; Vincze, Sándor. “Impressziók az aradi tárgyalásokról” (Impressions of the Arad Negotiations), Szocializmus, no. 18,
12 (1917), 555–558.
Zuschlag, Vilmos. “Új Magyarország felé. Egy-két szó az úgynevezett
nemzetiségi kérdésrôl” (Towards a New Hungary. A few words about
the so-called nationalities question), Szocializmus, no. 18 (1928),
95-118 Egry
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118
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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GÁBOR EGRY
463–467; Zuschlag. “A kisebbségi kérdés Németországban és
Magyarországon” (The Minority Question in Germany and in Hungary), Szocializmus, no. 19 (1929); Zuschlag. “A Bethlen-kormány
tízéves kultúrpolitikája nemzetiségi szempontból” (The Ten-year
Culture Policy of the Bethlen Government from the Perspective of
Nationalities), Szocializmus, no. 20 (1930), 243–246; Zuschlag. “A
magyarországi németség és a – politika” (The Hungarian-German
Population and Politics), Szocializmus, no. 21 (1931), 312–313.
Zuschlag, Wilhelm. Ziele und Vorderungen der deutschsprechenden
Sozialdemokratie (The Aims and Demands of German Social Democracy) (Budapest, 1939).
Lipcsei, Sándor. “Fasizmus, szociáldemokrácia és nemzeti eszme”
(Fascism, Social Democracy and National Identity), Szocializmus,
no. 28 (1938), 186–189.
Vándor [Rónai], Zoltán. “Kisebbségi múlt—kisebbségi jövô” (Minority
Past—Minority Future), Szocializmus, no. 25 (1935), 66–69.
Vándor [Rónai], Zoltán. “Otto Bauer jelentôsége” (The Importance
of Otto Bauer), Szocializmus, no. 28 (1938), 315–322; Buchinger,
Manó. “Otto Bauer küzdelmei és igazságai” (Otto Bauer’s Struggles
and Truths), Szocializmus 28 (1938), 322–328.
Ákos, László. “Új Közép-Európa felé” (Towards a New Central
Europe), Szocializmus, no. 28 (1938), 410–412.
“Magyar és szerb” (Hungarian and Serbian), Népszava, March 6,
1943.
See, for example, the so-called “Szegedy-Maszák Memorandum”, in
Juhász, Gyula. Magyar–brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban (HungarianBritish Secret Negotiations in 1943), (Budapest, 1978), 190–219.
Varga, Lajos. Garami Ernô. Politikai életrajz (Ernô Garami: A Political
Biography) (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1996), 267–269; 297–302.
The ideas tie in with the theoretical debates which took place in
Romania between the two world wars among the Hungarian minority
and in which the left wing actively participated, too.
Junger, József. “Állam és nemzet” (State and Nation), Népszava, May
22, 1941.
Tilkovszky, Lóránt. Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században (Nationalities Policy in Hungary in the 20th Century) (Debrecen,
1998), 115.
Ibid., 121.
Ibid., 117.