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Idiotism

A quick note on idiotism as the current default global mindset.

Idiotism Idiotism is by no means the prerogative of “idiots” in the psychiatric sense (i.e., of persons with substantially limited intellectual ability) to the extent that quite possibly someone with such limited intellectual means might be incapable of idiotism properly speaking. Thought through the history of being and as the 'idion' in its originary meaning — as one’s own, in which today’s human being inds itself within the ordering and enframing of the masses, idiotism is precisely the form of the modern intellectual, particularly the pseudo-scientiic intellectual. Idiotism is thus planetarism (globalism) as such. This ownness is the same, in which the other and everyone in whom ‘one’ inds one's 'self' and is reciprocally afirmed afirm only the same idiocy. Idiotism entails that one shifts what one considers one’s own to what belongs to everyone. For example: • the wholly generic sphere of broadcasting, where “no one” actually speaks, or its sublimation where a nobody speaks as if they were somebody; • the promotion of the nobody as an individual and the individual as a nobody, where for every insigniicant concert each violinist and trumpeter must be named by their irst and last names, and precisely by that gesture remain unknown, uninteresting and undiferentiable from those that are interesting and ought to be known; • the substitution of agreement and opinion for argument and discourse; • the substitution of description and explanation for understanding; • the inability of agreement/disagreement, opinion, description or explanation to lead to real decision. One inds oneself everywhere in one’s ownmostness, which belongs in exactly the same manner to everyone. Idiotism is the essential reduction of man's essence as global, i.e., as planetary. This reductionism includes dispensing with all understanding to the extent that such dispensation is not even acknowledged as a dispensing with, as little as the possibility of understanding itself is acknowledged or understood. Yet this this dispensing with as a dispensation is not only a dispensation by man (though it is that also, of course), but more insistently a dispensation of man. Man's essence can only be seen as essentially anonymous insofar as it is essentially shared, and this self-contradiction of the anonymous individual points to the shared, anything but anonymous self that it simultaneously hides.