The Social Problem of Depression:
A Multi-theoretical Analysis
Rich Furman
Kimberly Bender
Colorado State University
School of Social Work
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the social problem of depression from a
multi-theoretical perspective. It explores depression through the lens of two
psychologically based theories of human behavior, existential theory and
cognitive theory, as well as through the vehicle of two sociological theories,
Marxist theory and the theory of oppression. By understanding how each
of these theories explains depression, social workers may be helped to see the
complexity of treating the problem. It is the belief of the authors that social
work literature, which is often dominated by reductionist, quantitativelybased research studies, has increasingly ignored theoretical explorations of
key social problems such as depression, to the determent of the profession
and the disciplines which inform it.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the social problem of
depression from a multi-theoretical. This work has been undertaken for several reasons. First, each of the four theories presented
in this article form a piece of the puzzle for understanding depression as a psychosocial phenomenon. By understanding how
each of these theories explains depression, social workers may
be helped to see the complexity of treating the problem. Second,
the increasing hegemony of psychiatry and privatization in the
United States, through the vehicle of managed care, has led to the
medicalization of many problems that often have psychosocial
etiologies. Thus, other explanations to depression have received
little recent interest or articulation. Third, it is the belief of these
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authors that social work literature, which is often dominated by
reductionist, quantitatively- based research studies, has increasingly ignored theoretical explorations of key social problems. This
is lamentable, as theoretical scholarship has had an important
place in the building of a social work knowledge base.
The problem of depression
Depression is so prevalent that it has been referred to as
the “common cold” of mental illness (Turnbull, 1991). However,
unlike the common cold, depression can be fatal, and has been
referred to as the world’s number one public health problem
(Burns, 1980). Social awareness and concern regarding depression
can be evidenced by the proliferation of self-help books written
on the subject over the past decade (Carrigan, 1997; Greenberger
& Padesky, 1995; Larsen, 1989; Katzenstein, 1998; Kramer, 1993;
Rosen & Amador, 1996). Since depression is so prevalent, all social
workers, regardless of their practice setting and specialization,
must be familiar with various aspects of the syndrome.
Depression has been a social problem throughout history.
The biblical tale of King Saul, and Homer’s suicidal character
of Ajax depict examples of major depressive disorders (Kaplan &
Sadock, 1998). Depression is seen throughout history in literary
and medical arenas (Goodwin & Guze, 1996).
Freud’s conception of depression prevailed for the first half
of the twentieth century. While the psychoanalytic view of depression is far more complex and detailed than can be presented
here, the perspective stresses unresolved conflicts from the past,
locked away in the unconscious, as the main determinant of the
disorder. Social workers working from this perspective, the diagnostic school, sought to treat depression by helping their clients
uncover and resolve repressed conflicts.
The work of Jesse Taft (1933) and the functional school of
social work represented a major shift in how depressive moods
and other emotional experiences were seen. Taft and the functionalists rejected the notion that emotional problems were the
result of unresolved conflicts and intrapsychic pathology. For
Taft (1939), emotions were to be accepted and experienced, not
changed or blunted. In Taft’s conception of maturity and health,
the highly functioning individual is able to tolerate a high degree
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125
of emotion without reactivity, without the need to “act them out.”
Ideally, emotions are to be tolerated and processed through our
consciousness prior to any action.
Challenging the dominance of the diagnostic and the functional schools in the interpretation of depression was the developing medical model. With the advent of modern psychiatric
medication, depression began to be seen as a medical disease.
Today, the medical model stands as the dominant model for
understanding and treating depression. Psychopharmacological
developments, through the study of antidepressant medications
and their effects on depressive symptoms, have supported the
biomedical view of depression and other mental disorders. Medical research has sought to demonstrate that depression is caused
by fluctuations in levels of neurotransmitters, which lead to the
subjective experience of depression. The medical model seeks to
increase levels of these neurotransmitters in an effort to decrease
depressive mood. (Kaplan & Sadock, 1998).
For the general United States population, Boyd and Weissman
(1983) report that at some point in their lives, 8–12 percent of men
and 20–24 percent of women will meet the diagnostic criteria for
major depression. Prevalence of depression varies greatly within
the population however. Egeland & Hostetter (1993) found the
incidence for all types of depression within the Amish community
to be less than 1 percent. This variance across populations points
to the importance of social and cultural influences in the definition
and expression of depression.
Kaelber, Moul & Farmer (1995) compared epidemiological
research on depression in dozens of countries and geographic
regions. They note that incidence rates for depression range from
as low as 1.1 percent in Italy to 12.4 percent in Africa. While
depression and other affective disorders are universally shared,
their expression varies. Geertz (1973) observes that emotions are
indeed “cultural artifacts.”
Existential and cognitive theory: Explanations for depression
Existential theory
Existentialism is a tradition with deep and ancient philosophic roots, shaped by the hopelessness and despair of post-
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WWII Europe (Mullan, 1992). Mullan (1992) comments that at
the core of existentialism is man’s “quest for a reason for existing
without recourse to religion or outside authority” (p.554). Man
is born into a state of nothingness, out of which he/she creates
meaning. Existentialists contend that ideas, including the notion
of God, are creations of man’s existence (Sartre, 1957).
Sartre (1957) comments that this supposition often leads critics and layman alike to view existentialism as pessimistic in its
conception of human nature. However, existentialists contend
that just the opposite is true. Sartre (1965) calls this the first
principle of existentialism: “Man is nothing else but what he
makes of himself”(p. 15). The “authentic man,” comes to grips
with the reality of his/her existence; he/she chooses to define
him/herself and creates him/herself in every action; develops
meaning and purpose for him/herself. Existential novels depict
characters as finding meaning and purpose in spite of the pain
and suffering that surrounds them. Thus, human beings are free
to seek meaning and joy in spite of difficult and even oppressive
circumstances.
The notion of meaning is central to the existential conception
of depression. To Camus (1955), the sense of feeling lost, characteristic of depression, is inherent in the human dilemma; because
we are meaning seeking creatures in a world with no meaning,
man’s position is ultimately “absurd” and can lead to instability.
Sartre (1957) believes that man is forlorn due to his/her being
“condemned to freedom.” That is, without a God that bestows
upon us a prior meaning, we are totally and utterly responsible
for our own meaning and joy; a painful realization which each
human being needs to come to grips with, or escape, through
addiction, self-destruction or anti-social acts. Yalom (1980) calls
the work of Victor Frankl the most important on the existential
notion of meaning. Frankl (1963) observed that those who did not
find meaning in concentration camps rarely survived. They gave
up hope, were forlorn, and displayed vegetative and dysphoric
systems of depression.
Yalom (1980) posits that depression is more a function of
an individual’s lack of acceptance for personal responsibility
in life. He attributes this sense of responsibility to the concept
of locus of control. That is, one who accepts responsibly for
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127
creating meaning in his/her life and for his/her own actions
can be said to possess a high degree of internal locus of control.
Conversely, an external locus of control is a sign of “bad faith,”
or rejection of responsibility for one’s behavior and affect. In his
review of empirical research, the author found significant support
for the hypothesis that depression and external locus of control
are positively correlated.
Cognitive Theory
The earliest roots of cognitive theory can be traced to the
Roman and Greek Stoic philosophers. Stoic philosophy can best
be summarized by Epictatus (Ellis, 1962) when he proclaimed,
“Men are not influenced by events, but by the views they take of
events.” The Stoics believed that man’s rational thinking could be
used to overcome the uncertainties of emotions and various problems of existence. This notion lies at the very heart of cognitive
theory.
Modern cognitive theory developed along several separate
epistemological tracks. This is noteworthy, as cognitive theory
is actually a meta-theory incorporating many different theories,
each well defined and distinct in its own right (Werner, 1986). The
binding thread of each is the centrality of conscious thought in the
shaping of human behavior, emotion, and change. Additionally,
each of these schools have de-emphasized a positivist perspective
in favor of a constructivist view, focusing on the importance
of each person’s perception in the construction of his/her own
reality and psychopathology (Payne, 1991).
Cognitive theory, as with existentialism, eschews the ridged
determinism of psychoanalytic and behaviorist schools of thought
in favor of a conception of men and women as actors in the drama
of their own lives.
Albert Ellis’s (1958) Rational Emotive Theory (RET) marks a
seminal occurrence in the development of cognitive theory. Ellis’s
theory holds that people’s emotional disturbances are caused
by idiosyncratic philosophies and constructed beliefs that lead
clients to unhappiness and pain.
Another pioneer in the development of cognitive theory,
Aaron Beck (1979), provides one of the most comprehensive yet
simple definitions stating that cognitive theory:
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consists of all the approaches that alleviate psychological distress
through the medium of correcting faulty conceptions and selfsignals. The emphasis on thinking, however, would not obscure
the importance of the emotional reactions which are generally the
immediate source of depression. It simply means that we get to the
person’s emotions through his cognitions. By correcting erroneous
beliefs, we can damp down or alter excessive, inappropriate emotional reactions. (p. 214).
While both existential and cognitive theories provide much
insight into the nature and treatment of depression, cognitive
theory’s literature is far more extensive. In fact, cognitive based
therapies are often considered the treatment of choice for many
kinds of depression (Turnbull, 1979).
Beck (1972 & 1976) concludes that the central element of
depression is the experience of loss. The depressed individual
regards him/herself as missing something that is necessary for
his/her happiness. For Ellis (1973), depression is largely caused
by irrational beliefs that lead to the experience of worthlessness.
Irrational beliefs are those that are both untrue in nature and
which lead to feelings that are not helpful to an individual’s
well-being and survival. The core irrational beliefs that lead to
depression are “global evaluations of worth” and “awfulizing.”
A “global evaluation of worth” is a belief that people can be rated.
According to Wallen et al. (1980) people become depressed as
they rate themselves as being less than, or no good, based on
some of their behaviors, or on their inability to achieve certain
goals. Thus, instead of sometimes failing, one becomes a failure.
Each successive failure becomes proof of the depressed person’s
inherent inadequacy.
“Awfulizing” cognitions also result in depression. “Awfulizing” refers to beliefs that exaggerate the “badness” or severity
of a situation. For example, an inconvenience or a mild problem
becomes a catastrophe. Both of these irrational beliefs can work
together in creating/supporting depression. For instance, if someone exaggerates a problem that he/she created, he/she may then
evaluate themselves as being a complete and total failure.
While irrational beliefs help us understand how cognitive
content can make people depressed, the cognitive view holds that
certain cognitive structures or processes can contribute to depres-
The Social Problem of Depression
129
sion as well. People who are depressed tend to make the cognitive
distortions of selective abstraction (viewing only negative aspects
of their behavior), dichotomous thinking (seeing themselves in
good and bad terms), and over-generalization (viewing one instance of loss or failure as indicative of an overall pattern of
worthlessness) (Bernard and Joyce, 1984).
Marxist theory and the theory of oppression:
Explanations for depression
Marxist Theory
Perhaps no thinker in human history has had a greater impact, or has been more misunderstood, than Karl Marx. Fromm
(1961) notes that Marx’s conception of mankind has been distorted in the United States largely for political reasons. Due in
large part to the cold war, Marx’s thinking has been discredited
and devalued in American thought. When it is discussed, it has
largely been relegated to economics or politics. However, according to Fromm, Marx’s main concerns were for the liberation of
man/women; his focus was the overcoming of alienation and
the restoration of his/her capacity to be fully human. Fromm
sees Marxist thought as constituting a “spiritual existentialism in
secular language,” opposed to the coercive and alienating effects
of capitalism. Marx’s main concern was not economics, but the
relationships and effects of economic structures on man and his
social relationships. For Marx (Ollman, 1971), a society’s mode of
production is the determining factor in the creation of consciousness and human relationships. Therefore, economics and labor
were not necessarily important as an end in themselves, but as
means of understanding human consciousness.
Central to Marx’s view of human kind, and most relevant
to our analysis of depression, is the notion of alienation. Marx
(1844) theorized that, through the processes of the division of
labor, the structural hallmark of capitalism, work shifted from
being an expression of one’s creative capacity to being an activity
that made him/her isolated from him/herself. Work becomes
merely an object, a means to an end, and stands in opposition
to workers’ best interests or life plans. This sense of estrangement and disengagement creates a sense of alienation, in that the
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object (work) is external, hostile, and powerful independent of
the worker. Thus, the worker is oppressed and subjugated in the
process of this alienated labor. Work, which was once an outlet
for self-expression and a sense of pride, now becomes an alien
means toward meeting the economic goals of ruling class elites.
Therefore, the worker becomes estranged (alienated) from their
work, and in the process from themselves.
According to Fromm (1961) alienation, or estrangement,
means that man/woman does not feel that he/she is a part of
the world, but that he/she remains alien and separate from the
world, from other men and women, and from him/herself. The
alienated man/woman is “empty, dead and depressed” (p. 44).
Seeman (1959) breaks alienation into five main components:
powerlessness, self-estrangement, isolation, meaninglessness,
and normlessness. Mirowsky and Ross (1989) assert that the loss
of control and power caused by alienation is a central component
to many experiences of depression. They associate depression
with the social variables of powerlessness, structural inconsistency, alienated labor, and dependency.
To Marx (Ollman, 1971), alienation did not begin in capitalist
societies, but it was within the context of early industrialization
that man/woman became most estranged from his/her labor, and
thus from him/herself. Marx saw the work of the industrialization as being labor for the sake of production of things not for
the purpose of man/woman expressing his/her true nature. In
other words, labor became the end, and man/woman became
the means. Under previous modes of production, man/woman’s
use of tools in manufacturing objects was a direct expression of
him/herself, controlled by his/her own hands and will. Under
industrialization, the machine controlled man/woman’s motion;
his/her expression and use of intelligence was negated. Postman
(1992), in his psychohistorical account of technology, affirms that
new technologies, and our relationship to them, affect the way
we feel about our lives, others and ourselves.
Theory of Oppression
Research exists which correlates membership in an oppressed
group with susceptibility to various mental illnesses, specifically
depression (Burns, et al., 1995). Being a member of an oppressed
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131
group makes one susceptible to life circumstances and stressors
that leave one vulnerable. Oppression becomes a multiplying
psychosocial factor that can lead to an increase in depressive
symptoms.
Depression is one of the main impacts of oppression (Allport,
1954; Bulhan, 1985; Chodoff, 1997; Dubois, 1993). Allport (1954)
developed the concept of the “intropunitive” response in his analysis of the effects of discrimination. “Intropunitive” responses are
the internalization of beliefs about oneself that are propagated
by the dominant group. According to the theory, when it is not
safe for an oppressed group to express their rage from being
the targets of prejudice outwardly, they become “intropunitive”
or self-punitive. Allport observed that oppressed people who
become “intropunitive” tend to feel intensely insecure, guilty and
ashamed, hallmarks of depression.
Foster (1993) calls this perspective the “mark of oppression”
theory. He notes that “mark of oppression” theorists focus on
the psychological damage created by experiences of oppression.
Franz Fanon (1963) an Algerian psychiatrist, observed this phenomenon with clients in Northern Africa. He found that the
oppression caused by racism and colonialism was responsible
for many types of mental health disorders, including depression.
According to Fanon, oppression leads to a “negation of the self,”
causing one to lose touch with who he/she is. Oppression strips
one of his/her humanness, leading to a sense of confusion and
despair.
Other commentators in other contexts have observed the internalization of negative concepts about the self as a response to
oppression. Passive acquiescence and its concomitant depression
are not merely dysfunctional reactions, but necessary for survival
(Allport, 1954). For instance, African American slaves who were
perceived to be too empowered and too optimistic were treated as
mentally ill. Slaves who were passive and exhibited a dysphoric
affect were far more likely to survive or escape torture.
The theory postulates that a goal of oppressive systems is to
make oppression self-perpetuating. That is, the continuation of
oppression is far more likely if the oppressed become their own
psychological jailers. In his discussion of the history of slavery
and racism in the United States, Burgest (1973) notes that, “the
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Africans’ psychological and cultural destruction could be perpetuated without much physical coercion for the African’s view
of himself was dictated by the oppressor” (p. 40).
This phenomenon is not only evident in the context of the
third world or historical slavery. For instance, Titmuss (1959)
demonstrates that the elite of modern welfare states, who control
the means of mass communication, perpetuate notions about the
laziness and inferiority of the poor as a means of social control.
The welfare state, which primarily benefits the wealthy, is perpetuated in part by the poor’s internalization of these social “myths”
and resultant actions. By ignoring the structural arrangements of
oppression, individuals will tend to blame themselves.
While both Marxist theory and theories of oppression are
often seen as arcane, this is more a reflection of current socio/
political realities and conservative tendencies within both society
and social work, than it is of their utility. In fact, Marxist theory
is very relevant today. Postman (1992), utilizing essentially a
Marxist analysis, chronicles the changes that are occurring due
to industrialization. In countless ways our lives are being altered
due to current changes in the means of production. For example,
the advent of cyberspace may change the very way people’s
work lives are organized, and may very well mean a continued
deterioration of geographical communities. With the continued
deterioration of communities, one might predict increased feelings of isolation, and possibly related depressive symptoms. It
has even been postulated that, as geographical or organic communities deteriorate, social work could lose its context for service
provision, spelling the “end of social work” (Kreuger, 1997).
Integration
A strength of social work lies in its ability to utilize theories
from other disciplines. One of its weaknesses lies in developing
conceptual systems for integrating such diverse pools of knowledge. The theories presented here each contribute significantly
to understanding the phenomenon of depression, as well as the
context of treatment, and subsequent intervention. Can these
theories be integrated into a cogent whole?
The Social Problem of Depression
133
It is our practice experience that the meta-perspective of cognitive theory can be an organizing principle for each of the theories examined in this paper, as well as other theories of social
work practice. This section will present the beginning of a model
that goes beyond traditional limitations of cognitive theory, which
some construe as “blaming the victim.” It is our hope that subsequent investigation may lead to a better defined model that
can be validated empirically. Historically, social work has been
criticized for producing knowledge that is not cumulative in
nature (Greenwood, 1957). It is a limitation of this paper that this
integration represents merely the beginning of a process.
Previous work towards the integration of some of these
theories has been conducted. Goldstein (1982) argues for an
existential-cognitive social work theory. He contends that existential concepts are largely cognitive phenomenon and are essential
for social workers to address.
One of cognitive theory’s key precepts is that all human
knowledge is codified in our beliefs, philosophies and other types
of thinking. As we have seen, different types of oppression do not
haphazardly affect human emotion and behavior; nor do they do
so directly. Instead, oppression affects an individual’s cognitive
content and structures. As a child internalizes racist messages,
he/she develops a negative schema about him/herself, what is
possible for his/her future, and the nature of his/her world.
Mirowsky & Ross (1989) observed that conditions of powerlessness and alienation can lead to a learned sense of helplessness
and the development of an external locus of control.
Kessler and Cleary (1980), as sited in Mirowsky and Ross
(1989), make an important contribution to the relationship between distress and social class that has profound implications
for practice and this integration. They found that members of
lower socioeconomic classes are more effected by life stressors
and failures than members of the middle and upper class. They
found the variable was not class per say, but the perception
of experiences of self-efficacy and control. That is, those in the
upper classes had more experiences of efficacy, and thus were
less likely to become depressed in response to distressing life
events. The poor, however, develop passive styles of coping that
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perpetuate their belief in their lack of control. The authors note
that medication management for this population may perpetuate
the notion of powerlessness. These findings lend support to our
belief that clinical and ethical issues in the treatment of depression
are interrelated, and need to be part of every client assessment.
Thus, social structures, including medically oriented mental
health treatment, can create the belief that one does not have
the capacity to regulate his/her own feelings. Oppression creates
the sense that one is not able to control his/her fate, and that
it is perhaps better not to even try. Social conditions can thus
contribute to the creation of beliefs that can be characterized by
the existential notion of “bad faith.”
Conclusion
These implications lead to several important conclusions for
social work practice on both the direct and indirect levels. Clinical
social workers must help clients to understand the social context
of their depression if they are to be empowered to act to change
their lives. Clients who learn to deconstruct the social roots of
their depression or other psychosocial problems may be more
likely to become involved in their communities to enact change.
As social encounters are essential for clients who are depressed,
social activism can be seen as a type of clinical intervention, not
merely political activism. Further, while we are not arguing that
the medical profession is intentionally medicating dissidents or
those with alternative political agendas, we may be tranquilizing those who might be more politically active or radicalized if
they did find a social explanation for their depression. In this
sense, system maintenance is severed though the medicalization
of depression. Social workers thus have an obligation to help
clients make the important connection between their personal
conditions and social phenomenon as a means of social change.
Practice that helps the individual become socially active bridges
the often segregated worlds of micro and macro practice.
Social workers must also challenge the hegemony of managed
care and its treatment protocols. Too often, managed care has
dictated treatment for mental health disorders in terms of types
of treatments provided, how many sessions are necessary or even
the types of theories preferred (Miller, 1994).
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135
In closing, the synthesis of these systems creates several possibilities for the treatment of depression and other emotional difficulties. It allows for an explanation of how social factors directly
impact an individual. Further, it points to universal concepts (i.e.
bad faith, low frustration tolerance, awfulizing and generalizations) that are causal to emotional problems, and can provide a
guide to the treatment process. Additionally, as previously stated,
by placing the etiology of these cognitions into the context of
the social structures, clinicians can help clients take responsibility without blaming themselves. Lastly, the well-developed
methodologies of cognitive therapies can be used to challenge
these beliefs; helping to alleviate the painful symptoms caused
by the social problem of depression.
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