Locating foresight
Attila Havas
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
paper presented at the Foresight Summit, Budapest, 27-29 September 2007
1 Foresight programmes and other approaches to future‐oriented analyses
Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socioeconomic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to
influence it for their advantage. They used very different approaches and methods from
spiritual/ religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning.1 Without
going into details here, it is worth recalling some of the major methods/ approaches in order
to locate – and distinguish – foresight programmes:
• visionary thinking (in ancient times by prophets, more recently mainly by consultants)
• forecasting (at different levels, using different methods, e.g. trend analysis,
extrapolation)
• futures studies (for academic purposes)
• prospective analyses (for business or policy purposes, e.g. [technology] roadmapping,
list of critical/ strategic/ key technologies)
• strategy formation (at firm, sectoral, regional or national levels)
• scenario planning (at a firm level; see e.g. Godet, 2001)
• indicative national planning
• central planning (at a national level)
• foresight programmes.2
Obviously, the above approaches have a number of common characteristics. All of them (a)
deal with the future(s) in one way or another; (b) collect and analyse various pieces of
information, and (c) can apply a wide range of methods, mainly scientific ones. Three key
features can be used to differentiate the above approaches, and thus distinguish foresight
programmes from other methods. These approaches can:
• be action-oriented vs. ‘contemplative’ (passive)
• be participatory vs. non-participatory
• consider alternative futures vs. a single future state (already ‘set’ by external forces).
Action-oriented endeavours aim at shaping/ influencing/ acting upon the future, 3 while
passive ones are ‘contemplating’ about it (e.g. ‘pure’ futurologist studies, without any policy
1
Hence, a special chapter of the history of mankind can be devoted to these different attitudes, methods and
approaches towards the future.
2
The term ‘foresight programme(s)’ is used throughout this paper as an attempt to distinguish individual
(personal) foresight and ‘collective’ foresight programmes, i.e. the ones launched (and sponsored) by an
organisation (or several ones), and conducted by a number participants. Moreover, an increasing number of
articles published by researchers working in the field of future studies, in which ‘foresight’ is used as a new label
for their work (although still following the ‘futures studies’ or futurology paradigm), see e.g. the recent issues of
Futures, especially Vol. 36, No. 2. It does not seem to be a productive, promising dispute trying to establish the
‘real’ meaning of foresight, and then attempting to ‘enforce’ it across various communities of practice.
3
E.g. the slogan of the first UK Foresight Programme was: “Shaping our future”.
implications. In other words, the latter ones merely try to develop a better-informed
anticipation of the future, e.g. for being better prepared by having more precise information.
Participatory future-oriented programmes/ projects meet all the three following criteria: they
(i) involve participants from at least two different stakeholder groups (e.g. researchers and
business people; experts and policy-makers; experts and laymen); (ii) disseminate their
preliminary results (e.g. analyses, tentative conclusions and policy proposals) among
interested ‘non-participants’,4 e.g. face-to-face at workshops, electronically via the internet
with free access for everyone, or in the form of printed documents, leaflets, newsletters; and
(iii) seek feedback from this wider circle (again, either face-to-face or in a written form).
Conversely, if any of these criteria is not met, that activity cannot be regarded a participatory
programme or project.
Finally, certain approaches are based on the assumption that the future is not pre-determined
yet; and thus the future can evolve in different directions, to some extent depending on the
actions of various players and decisions taken ‘today’. In other words, there is a certain
degree of freedom in choosing among the alternative, feasible futures, and hence increasing
the chance of arriving at the preferred (selected) future state. Clearly, there is a close link
between being action-oriented and considering alternative futures.5 Other approaches, on the
contrary, can only think of a single future, already ‘fixed’ by certain factors, and thus the task
is to explore (forecast, predict) ‘the’ future scientifically.6
In sum, foresight programmes are action-oriented, participatory and consider alternative
futures.
2 Focus of foresight programmes
Foresight programmes may have rather dissimilar foci, ranging from the identification of
priorities in a strict S&T context to addressing broad societal/ socio-economic challenges.
Georghiou (2001) and (2002) identified three generations of prospective/ strategic
technological analyses. This classification is used here as point of departure to develop a
typology of foresight programmes to analyse their potential and actual role in policy-making.
The first generation is the classical technological forecasting, aimed at predicting
technological developments, based on extrapolation of perceptible trends.7
The main aim of a second-generation foresight programme is to improve competitiveness by
strengthening academy-industry co-operation, correcting the so-called market failure8 and
trying to extend the usually too short time horizon of businesses.9
4
‘Non-participants’ are those persons who have not been members of panels or working groups set up by the
programme, and have not been involved directly in any other way, e.g. by answering (Delphi) questionnaires.
5
Some foresight programmes, e.g. the second Swedish Technology Foresight Programme, consider alternative
futures with the explicit aim of identifying key choices confronting their ‘constituency’ or ‘target audience’, but
do not intend to single out any preferred future. In other words, these programmes do not follow a normative
approach. (This approach, and the example, has been mentioned by Göran Pagels-Fick among his comments on
an earlier draft.)
6
Cuhls (2003) offers an excellent, comprehensive discussion on the differences between forecasting, prediction,
planning and foresight. The possibility of a single future vs. “many” futures is a central element of her analysis.
7
These predictions are produced by a relatively small group of experts: futurologists and/or technological
experts (that is, other types of expertise or actors are not sought after in the process of forecasting): The main
objective is to predict which S&T areas are likely to produce exploitable results. Forecast results, in turn, are
used in economic planning, either at firm or macro level.
2
A third-generation foresight programme tackles broad/er/ socio-economic challenges, and
hence besides researchers and business people government officials and social stakeholders
are also involved.
Three ‘ideal types’ of foresight programmes can be defined as major ‘reference points’.
Identifying ‘ideal types’ is a long-established practice in social sciences (and somewhat
similar to ‘models’ used in all fields of sciences): “The fact that none of these three ideal
types (…) is usually to be found in historical cases in ‘pure’ form, is naturally not a valid
objection to attempting their conceptual formulation is the sharpest possible form.”10 (Weber,
1947, reprinted in Pugh, 1988, p. 16)
Note, however, that all three ideal types of foresight programmes should meet the criteria
defined above in Section 1: they should be action-oriented, participatory and should consider
alternative futures. The underlying difference among them is their focus:
• S&T issues: type A foresight programmes
• techno-economic issues: type B foresight programmes
• broad societal/ socio-economic issues: type C foresight programmes.11
Their further characteristics, in terms of their aims, rationales and participants, are
summarised in Table 1. One would notice immediately that these ideal types are not
distinguished by their themes (topics): for example, they all deal with S&T issues, but by
doing so, they pursue different aims, and follow different (policy) rationales. In other words,
they address different challenges, ask different questions, use different approaches/ ways of
thinking,12 and involve different participants. In other words, these ideal types should not be
thought of as “Russian dolls”: the biggest one, type C incorporating the middle one, i.e. type
B, and, in turn, type B encompassing the smallest one (the ‘core’), Type A.
8
In short, private returns on R&D are smaller than social returns (as firms cannot appropriate all the profits
stemming form R&D), and thus firms do not invest into R&D at a sufficient – socially optimal – level.
9
Accordingly, a different set of actors is involved in these programmes: researchers working on various S&T
fields and business people, bringing knowledge on markets into the process. These programmes are organised by
following the structure of economic sectors (various industries and services).
10
It is just a coincidence that Weber also talks of three ideal types when discussing legitimate authority.
11
In short, the most important modification compared to the three generations identified by Georghiou is to
replace technology forecasting with foresight programmes focussing on S&T issues. Technology forecasting
projects usually do not consider alternative futures, and most of them are not participatory either (as defined in
Section 1). However, there is no reason to assume that S&T issues cannot be tackled in a participatory manner,
considering alternative futures, and aiming at informing and influencing present actions. For example, the recent
Turkish Foresight Programme – the Vision 2023 Project – has focussed on S&T issues. (Tümer, 2004)
12
See e.g. Havas (2005) for more details on the differences in terms of questions, approaches – when analysing
the same theme (technological field).
3
Table 1: Foci of foresight programmes
S&T focus (type A)
Techno-economic
focus (type B)
Societal/ socio-economic
focus (type C)
Aims
Identify S&T priorities
(following the logic of
scientific discovery)
Identify research topics in
S&T, of which results are
believed to be useful for
businesses
Identify research topics in
S&T, of which results are
believed to contribute to
addressing major societal/
socio-economic challenges
Devise other policies – or
identify policy domains,
which are relevant – to
tackle these societal/ socioeconomic issues
Rationale
Boost national prestige,
achieve S&T excellence;
Following the linear
model of innovation,
socio-economic benefits
might also be assumed;
implicitly or explicitly
Business logic: improve
competitiveness
Correct market failures:
strengthen academiaindustry co-operation,
extend the short time
horizon of businesses
Improve quality of life
(enhance competitiveness
as a means for that)
Correct systemic failures,
strengthen the National
Innovation System
Participants
Researchers, policymakers (e.g. S&T and
finance ministries)
Researchers, business
people, policy-makers
Researchers, business
people, policy-makers,
social stakeholders (lay
persons?)
Potential users usually constitute a broader group than the actual participants; they might
include e.g. funding organisations, other policy implementation bodies and public service
providers (including ‘quangos’ [quasi-NGOs]), professional associations representing the
interests of their members (and thus involving them to some extent in strategy and policy
formation processes in various ways), venture capitalists, trade unions, etc. Depending on the
focus of a foresight programme (the types of challenges/ issues considered), as well as the
political culture of a given country or region, some of these potential users and stakeholders
might become participants, too. In any case, it is not possible to establish a one-to-one
relationship between an ‘ideal type’ of foresight and its participants beyond the ‘typical’
participants indicated in Table 1. The type and number of participants, the methods, channels
and for a used their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dialogues,13 as well as the intensity, quality and
impacts of these dialogues is obviously a question for the individual description, analysis or
evaluation of actual foresight programmes.
Types A and B programmes have a longer tradition, and thus in general they are better
known. Obvious examples are the Turkish Vision 2023 Project (type A) and the first UK
Foresight Programme (Type B). (Tümer, 2004, and Georghiou, 1996, respectively)
Therefore, only type C programmes are explained here in some detail. The shift in focus is
reflected in the structure, too: these programmes are organised along major societal/ socioeconomic concerns (e.g. health, ageing population, crime prevention in the case of the
13
Internal dialogues take place among the participants of a given programme, e.g. among panel members,
between panels, between panels and the management team, between the steering group and panels – or any other
internal groups of participants in case these ones have not existed. External dialogues are organised among the
participants and other stakeholders, clients, target groups, etc., i.e. those, who have not participated in the
programme in a direct way.
4
Hungarian, the first Swedish or the second UK foresight programmes; see Boxes 1-2 in
Section 4.3). A new element in the underlying rationale can also be discerned, the so-called
systemic failure argument: the existing institutions (written and tacit codes of behaviour, rules
and norms) and organisations are not sufficient to improve quality of life and enhance
competitiveness, and thus new institutions should be ‘designed’ by intense communication
and co-operation among the participants. In other words, the existing gaps should be bridged
by new networks, appropriate policies aimed at correcting systemic failures, and establishing
or strengthening relevant organisations. A foresight programme, based on this rationale, can
deliver solutions in various forms: by strengthened, re-aligned networks as ‘process’ results of
the programme, as well as by policy recommendations (‘products’).
An actual foresight programme is likely to combine certain elements from various types. In
most cases, however, one type of rationale would be chosen as a principal one; it thus would
underlie the more detailed objectives and structure of a programme, as well as the choice of
its participants. Otherwise, it would likely to lead to an incoherent – even chaotic – exercise,
characterised by tensions between (a) the various objectives, (b) elements of its structure, (c)
the objectives and methods, (d) the participants and objectives, and/or (e) among the
participants themselves. A certain level of tension, however, might be quite useful – or even
essential – to produce creative, innovative ideas and solutions, of course, but too intense and
too frequently occurring – structural, inherent – conflicts would most likely tear a foresight
programme apart.
References
Cuhls, K. (2003): From forecasting to foresight processes: New participative foresight
activities in Germany, Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 22, No. 2-3, pp. 93-111.
Georghiou, L. (2001): Third Generation Foresight: Integrating the Socio-economic
Dimension, in: Technology Foresight – the approach to and potential for New Technology
Foresight, Conference proceedings, NISTEP Research Material 77.
Georghiou, L. (2002): Policy rationales, sponsors and objectives, presentation at the
eFORESEE Workshop on Foresight Basics, Malta, 24-26 July 2002.
Georghiou, L. (1996): The UK Technology Foresight Programme, Futures, Vol. 28, No. 4,
pp. 359-377.
Godet, M. (2001): Creating Futures: Scenario planning as a strategic management tool,
London: Economica.
Havas, A. (2005): Terminology and methodology for benchmarking foresight programmes,
ForSociety Transnational Foresight ERA-Net, paper prepared for Tasks 1.4 and 3.1.
Tümer, T. (2004): Technology Foresight in Turkey: Vision 2023 Project, presentation at a
UNIDO seminar on Technology Foresight for Organizers, 13-17 December, Gebze,
Turkey.
Weber, M. (1947): Legitimate Authority and Bureaucracy, in: The Theory of Social and
Economic Organisation (translated and edited by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons), pp.
328-340, Free Press {reprinted in Pugh, D.S. (ed.) (1985): Organization Theory: Selected
readings, pp. 15-27, London: Penguin Group}
5