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This article is a first attempt towards building an integrative analytical framework to study goaloriented transformative change (GOTC) processes, defined as system-transforming processes that are guided by the ambition to resolve current... more
This article is a first attempt towards building an integrative analytical framework to study goaloriented transformative change (GOTC) processes, defined as system-transforming processes that are guided by the ambition to resolve current or expected future societal challenges. GOTC can only start once a broad range of possible major overarching goals are considered by key stakeholders and major relevant actors are committed to act. Hence, there is a need for widening the scope of the extant, partial conceptual models to consider the co-evolutionary interactions between technology, economy, and society to better understand and effectively guide and/or assess GOTC. This claim is based on our focussed review of Innovation Studies, Social Innovation, and Sustainability Transitions research. We offer four building blocks for an integrative framework to analyse GOTC: its overarching goal and specific objectives; objects, types, and levels of change; mechanisms of change; and a set of criteria to assess change.
We contribute to the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) literature in two ways: (i) we consider how societal aspects are taken into account in research and innovation (R&I) activities in four fundamentally different scenarios, as... more
We contribute to the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) literature in two ways: (i) we consider how societal aspects are taken into account in research and innovation (R&I) activities in four fundamentally different scenarios, as opposed to analysing current practices; and (ii) put the emphasis on the political conditions of the interactions among the actors, as opposed to focussing on RRI principles and instruments. In the Kingdom of RRI citizens participate directly in decision-making processes; Fortress Europe depicts a libertarian system; Failed Democracy is a populist regime; while Benevolent Green Eurocrats describes a technocratically coordinated strong state. The scenarios offer novel insights into the nature and repercussions of possible policy problems, that is, efficacy; efficiency; legitimacy of R&I activities; societal involvement; equity; and freedom of research. Meaningful interactions between lay people and professional actors in an innovation system can be safeguarded even in the harshest ideological and political framework.
Forward-looking activities (FLAs) can influence innovation systems in various ways to a significant extent. This paper focuses on changes induced by FLAs in the innovation policy governance sub-system(IPGSs) of a given national innovation... more
Forward-looking activities (FLAs) can influence innovation systems in various ways to a significant extent. This paper focuses on changes induced by FLAs in the innovation policy governance sub-system(IPGSs) of a given national innovation system. Our knowledge is surprisingly limited even on this subset of FLA impacts, despite several decades of practice and non-negligible analytical efforts. We identify key features of FLAs and IPGSs in order to explore hypotheses on the likely ‘fit’ between different types of FLAs and various IPGSs. Countries selected to illustrate the relevance of our analytical framework include Germany, Greece, and Hungary. Our intention is to contribute to a more refined conceptual framework concerning the role and likely impacts of FLAs. Further, as a better understanding of impacts supports the design of more appropriate and effective FLAs, as well as more insightful evaluations of FLAs, this approach is of practical relevance, too.
This article reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation with the aim of drawing lessons for measuring social innovations, and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS)... more
This article reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation with the aim of drawing lessons for measuring social innovations, and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicators, in principle, could be useful in settings where the dominant mode of innovation is based on R&D activities. In practice, however, both R&D and non-R&D-based modes of innovation are important. IUS, therefore, only provides a partial picture. Social innovations can also rely on R&D-based technological innovations; their essence, however, tends to be organizational, managerial, and behavioural modifications. The IUS indicators do not capture these types of changes. Second, an assessment of the 81 indicators used to compile the Global Innovation Index reveals that it would not be fruitful to rely on such indicators to capture social innovations. Third, given the diversity among innovation systems, a poor performance signalled by a composite indicator does not automatically identify the area(s) necessitating the most urgent policy actions; only tailored, thorough comparative analyses can do so. Finally, analysts and policy makers need to be aware of the differences between measuring (i) social innovation activities (or efforts); (ii) the framework for social innovations (pre-requisites, available inputs, skills, norms, values, behavioural patterns, etc.); and (iii) the economic, societal, and environmental impacts of social innovations.
Business-academia (B-A) collaborations have been analysed by an extensive body of literature, taking many different angles, and using various sources and types of information (patent statistics, the Community Innovation Survey data,... more
Business-academia (B-A) collaborations have been analysed by an extensive body of literature, taking many different angles, and using various sources and types of information (patent statistics, the Community Innovation Survey data, evidence from specific surveys, interviews, or case studies), but usually a given paper is relying on a single method, addressing one or two major research questions. In contrast, this paper tackles both R&D and innovation collaborations among businesses and academia relying on information from different statistics and interviews. The latter source also allows exploring motivations for, and major features of, B-A co-operation. The paper argues that mapping B-A collaborations by using multiple methods and multiple sources of information can significantly improve the reliability and richness of our understanding, and can offer insights on dynamics and qualitative features of these co-operation processes. Interviews conducted in Hungary – in line with other research findings – have also confirmed that (i) motivations, incentives for, and norms of, conducting R&D and innovation activities diametrically differ in business and academia; and (ii) different types of firms have different needs. Thus, more refined policy measures are to be devised to promote B-A collaboration more efficiently, better tuned to the needs of the actors, based on a relevant taxonomy of their co-operations. Evaluation criteria for academics should also be revised to remove some major obstacles, currently blocking more effective B-A co-operation. Several findings presented in this paper can be generalised beyond the cases considered, but the research design to analyse B-A collaborations and the concomitant policy recommendations always need to be tailored to the innovation systems in question.
A közgazdasági iskolák ma már egyetértenek abban, hogy az innováció meghatározó mértékben járul hozzá a versenyképesség javításához és a gazdasági növekedéshez, de különbözőképpen értelmezik az innovációt, és eltérő alapelveket ajánlanak... more
A közgazdasági iskolák ma már egyetértenek abban, hogy az innováció meghatározó mértékben járul hozzá a versenyképesség javításához és a gazdasági növekedéshez, de különbözőképpen értelmezik az innovációt, és eltérő alapelveket ajánlanak a tudomány-, technológia- és innovációpolitika (TTI-politika) megalapozásához. Az EU TTI-politikáját nagymértékben az innováció tudományvezérelt modellje határozza meg, pedig számos elemzés azt mutatja, hogy a tudás más típusai és formái legalább olyan fontosak az innovációs folyamatok sikeréhez, mint a K+F-eredmények. Az ilyen szemléletű szakpolitika tetemes elmaradt haszonnal járhat. A cikk öt szakpolitikai következtetést fogalmaz meg: 1. a TTI-politika hatásosabb lehet, ha minden tudásintenzív tevékenységet ösztönöz, függetlenül a vállalatok ágazati besorolásától és a felhasznált tudás típusától, formájától és forrásától; 2. a rendszerbeli kudarcok elemzése és a megfelelő szakpolitikai intézkedések kidolgozása jelentős szakmai feladat; 3. az innovációs folyamatokat egyes szakpolitikák a TTI-politikánál erősebben befolyásolhatják, ezért több szakpolitika céljait és eszközeit is össze kell hangolni; 4. a rangsorokból csak nagy körültekintéssel szabad szakpolitikai tanulságokat levonni; 5. az egyes szakpolitikai programok értékelését jelentősen befolyásolhatja, hogy melyik közgazdasági iskolát választják az elemzés elméleti megalapozására.
This paper reflects on the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change and to support decision-makers and other stakeholders in anticipating and dealing with transformations. It does so by critically reflecting on... more
This paper reflects on the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change and to support decision-makers and other stakeholders in anticipating and dealing with transformations. It does so by critically reflecting on the selected papers for this special issue as well as on the discussions that took place at the fourth Seville International Conference on Future-oriented Technology Analysis. Considering the potential roles of FTA in enabling a better understanding of complex situations and in defining effective policy responses leads to the understanding that appropriate FTA practices are needed to enable FTA to fulfil such roles. Dealing with disruptive changes – and grand challenges in particular –, therefore, raises several conceptual, methodological and operational issues. Two of them are general, while further two are specific to the so-called grand challenges: i) distinguish known unknowns, unknown knows and unknown unknowns, ii) combine quantitative and qualitative approaches in a relevant and feasible way, iii) understand the complex and systemic nature of grand challenges, and iv) orchestrate joint responses to grand challenges. After a brief explanation of these issues, the paper outlines the main ideas of the papers published in this special issue. These present various methodological aspects of FTA approaches as well as some advances needed in practice to assist FTA practitioners and stakeholders in comprehending transformations and in tackling the so-called grand challenges.
Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures of various S&T fields or socio-economic systems by bringing together the perspectives of various stakeholder groups, and thus assists the... more
Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures of various S&T fields or socio-economic systems by bringing together the perspectives of various stakeholder groups, and thus assists the decision-making processes at different levels. However, in order to avoid hypes – and subsequent disappointments – about what foresight can deliver, the potential contributions to decision-making processes by foresight should be clearly understood. The paper puts foresight into this broader context of policy-making processes, with a particular emphasis on innovation policy: it describes the evolution of different policy rationales since the 1950s, develops a framework to classify the impacts of various types of prospective analyses, and reviews the evaluation results of several national foresight programmes by using this framework. On that basis, future directions of how foresight might evolve are considered to spur discussions.
Establishing and upgrading research infrastructures (RIs) have always been relatively expensive projects, even in those years when the absolute costs were much lower than nowadays. Further, running large RIs can also be rather costly.... more
Establishing and upgrading research infrastructures (RIs) have always been relatively expensive projects, even in those years when the absolute costs were much lower than nowadays. Further, running large RIs can also be rather costly. Thus, although RIs are usually not in the limelight, they can take up a considerable chunk of regional or national R&D budgets, and in some cases they can only be financed via international co-operation, given the funds required. Yet, RI policies have tended to be devised behind close doors, involving only a handful of experts and policy-makers – when national security or prestige has been at stake, politicians, too. The article first discusses five policy challenges which call for a radical overhaul of these old decision-making practices. Then it argues that foresight is a relevant policy tool to support these changes, by presenting major features of foresight.The core arguments of these two sections can be summarised as follows: Decisions on building...
Research Interests:
Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific knowledge, but other actors have also become major research performers. Meanwhile, the notion of research has been extended considerably, and the... more
Universities have traditionally been key players in producing and validating new scientific knowledge, but other actors have also become major research performers. Meanwhile, the notion of research has been extended considerably, and the environment of universities is also undergoing fundamental changes. Thus, it is timely to consider alternative futures for them, to be better prepared for their new roles. A review of recent works on the future of higher education shows that the starting point in these exercises is either an existing or an abstract university. This approach has three major shortcomings: (i) the broader socio-economic systems, in which universities operate, are not addressed in these analyses, and thus neither the potential changes in these broader settings, nor their impacts on higher education can be explored; (ii) the huge diversity of higher education systems and individual universities cannot be reflected; (iii) the role of other research actors, and more importantly, the links among universities and those other research players are often disregarded.This article offers an alternative approach, using the case of EU universities as an example, to rectify these shortcomings. A set of ‘cascading’ visions are devised to demonstrate the close links between three levels. First, alternative futures are developed for the EU by considering (i) the overall rationale of EU policies; and (ii) the standing of the EU vis-à-vis the Triad. Second, the different directions are identified, in which the European Research and Innovation Area can evolve. Third, skipping the national level, futures are built for the universities themselves, focussing on their research activities.The modest intention of the futures presented in this paper is to demonstrate how to use the proposed new approach, and initiate meaningful and lively dialogues among stakeholders. Their diverse accumulated knowledge and experience, as well as distinct viewpoints are indispensable for building policy-relevant visions. The proposed three-level structure of futures – or ‘cascading’ visions – offers several advantages for policy-makers at various levels, the stakeholders of universities, as well as academics interested in prospective analysis of innovation systems.
Resumo A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga... more
Resumo A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é relevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras. A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuame...
Resumo A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga... more
Resumo

A Hungria lançou seu primeiro Programa de Prospecção Tecnológico (PPT) em 1997. Foi um programa de prospecção holístico, baseado em atividades desenvolvidas em painéis de especialistas e em uma consulta Delphi realizada em larga escala, com forte ênfase nas necessidades socioeconômicas. O documento discute por que um exercício em prospecção é  elevante para um país em transição, em seguida descreve o que foi feito (organização, métodos e resultados), e como o processo se desenvolveu na Hungria. São oferecidas também conclusões políticas, lições metodológicas e questões para pesquisas futuras.
A herança deixada pelo sistema anterior, o próprio processo de transição e o nível atual de desenvolvimento socioeconômico tiveram um papel decisivo em todo o programa. O PPT foi estabelecido como um programa controlado por especialistas não ligados ao governo; o grupo diretor, por sua vez, concedeu bastante autonomia aos painéis de especialistas. Dessa forma, os métodos foram continuamente refinados. Devido às fundamentais mudanças socioeconômicas ocorridas na Hungria e a ampliação da União Européia, forte ênfase foi dada nas ‘visões’ (futuros) – tanto em nível macro quanto em nível dos painéis de especialistas – e grande quantidade dos enunciados Delphi retrataram uestões
não-tecnológicas. Entretanto, o desenvolvimento de visões ualitativamente diferentes e o alinhamento de macrofuturos e futuros previstos no painel demonstraram ser uma tarefa difícil e desafiadora.

Abstract
Hungary launched his first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organisation, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
The heritage of the former system, the transition process itself and the current level of socioeconomic development all played a decisive role throughout the programme. TEP was set up as a programme controlled by non-governmental experts, and in turn, the Steering Group delegated a great deal of autonomy to the expert panels. Thus, methods were refined continuously. Given the
fundamental socio-economic changes in Hungary and the enlargement of the European Union a strong emphasis was put on ‘visions’ (futures) – both at macro and panel levels –, and a large number of Delphi-statements featured non-technological issues. However, developing qualitatively different visions, and aligning macro and panel futures, proved to be a difficult and challenging task.
Hungary launched its first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper... more
Hungary launched its first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organization, methods and results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons and questions for further research are also offered.
The political and economic transition posed a complex, tremendous challenge in Hungary in the beginning of the 1990s. Not only macroeconomic stabilisation was required, but fundamental organisational and institutional changes were also... more
The political and economic transition posed a complex, tremendous challenge in Hungary in the beginning of the 1990s. Not only macroeconomic stabilisation was required, but fundamental organisational and institutional changes were also needed to transform the country into a stable, middle-income economy, capable of catching up with the more advanced ones in the longer run. Having completed the first round of transition, Hungary has again reached a cross-roads. While the one-party system has been replaced with a multi-party parliamentary democracy and the planned economy with a market economy based on private ownership, the world has significantly changed during this historically short period of time.
Hungary now has to consider what role to play in the globalising learning economy, i.e. what future it envisions for herself. To be more specific: does the country passively accept the fate of a mere surviving economy, drifting without having its own strategy? Or, by implementing a clear strategy, does Hungary intend to be prosperous country, where in 15-20 years most citizens will enjoy high living standards, good health and a clean environment? The paper argues that a sound, coherent innovation policy is one of the cornerstones of an overall development strategy, required if a country is to excel. Yet, in spite of a number of efforts/ trials in the 1990s, no such policy document was approved in Hungary.
The article first provides a brief overview of the transition process, emphasising the simultaneous need for systemic changes and macroeconomic stabilisation in order to improve economic performance. Its core section analyses recent changes in the S&T decision-making system, various efforts to draft S&T and innovation policy documents, as well as the inputs and outputs of R&D and innovation. It concludes that the lack of an explicit innovation policy may hinder long-term development as such a policy is required to signal the main policy directions and commitments of the government, to strengthen the national innovation system – thus anchor FDI – and to align all public and private efforts/ resources for development.
This article is aimed at shedding some light on the on-going re-structuring process in the Hungarian car parts industry. The performance of this sector can be regarded as a sort of proxy variable to gauge the success of transition to... more
This article is aimed at shedding some light on the on-going re-structuring process in the Hungarian car parts industry. The performance of this sector can be regarded as a sort of proxy variable to gauge the success of transition to market economy: Hungarian car parts suppliers have lost their former principal market with the collapse of CMEA but just then major foreign investors have entered the Hungarian market. Thus the new market opportunities are there for the Hungarian companies; it is now their task to seize this chance for re-structuring and survival. A closely related issue is the speed and extent of the diffusion of a new production paradigm, namely, lean production, and that of new products, processes, management and organisational culture and techniques, e.g. just-in-time, total quality control, as required by foreign buyers. Will an archipelago of relatively advanced suppliers emerge, with these new developments being locked into an enclave, or can these new products, processes and management techniques diffuse in a wider circle through second and third tier suppliers? More generally, can this ‘on-the-job training’ accelerate the badly needed market re-orientation and transition? What is, and, should be, the role of the Hungarian government to facilitate this process?
This article, based on an extensive literature survey and interviews with managers, cannot provide comprehensive answers to these questions. Yet, it is hoped that the most significant issues can be addressed despite the lack of statistical data on this sector and the limited number of interviews, and hence informed guesses can also be formed about the most likely developments in the near future.
In the industrialized countries the diffusion of laser technology has been a fairly quick and far-reaching process. Although Hungarian laser R&D has a long history, and has respectable achievements to its credit, the diffusion of laser... more
In the industrialized countries the diffusion of laser technology has been a fairly quick and far-reaching process. Although Hungarian laser R&D has a long history, and has respectable achievements to its credit, the diffusion of laser technology has not been that successful in Hungary. The findings of the paper indicate that under the old economic system both demand and supply factors hindered dissemination. The author concludes with an assessment of the likely impact of ongoing transition on the sector.
The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation: far... more
The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation: far more competitive and powerful foreign competitors can now enter both its former single most important market, i.e. the former Soviet Union, and the domestic market. Thus accumulated knowledge of R&D and production engineers as well as the experience of the highly skilled blue-collar workers, albeit of primary importance in this industry, might become completely worthless and disappear. Combined with fresh capital, access to new markets, recent technologies and up-to-date management methods, however, it can (and should) be regarded as a major asset and the indispensable basis for successful restructuring. This paper suggests that sweeping changes in size, ownership, internal organisation, and product range are also inevitable so as to be able to adjust to the new environment.
This chapter revisits the Extended Social Grid Model based on empirical work exploring the model. It summarizes the main findings around four basic points: first, the need to move beyond economic space as markets if social innovation for... more
This chapter revisits the Extended Social Grid Model based on empirical work exploring the model. It summarizes the main findings around four basic points: first, the need to move beyond economic space as markets if social innovation for the marginalized is to be analysed in its full complexity and the variety of provision appreciated beyond a reductive focus on business. Second, the importance of a reflexive use of power in recognition of the reproduction of marginalization (as well as the multi-level opportunities that emerge once this move is made). Third, the role of considering beneficiaries in social innovation not only as participants but also as patients, and hence the need to consider the role of (justified) paternalism in social innovation. Fourth, a note of caution regarding systemic structural change and in favour of the value of niches.
The chapter deals with the trajectory of social housing as a social innovation in European countries from the nineteenth century to the present. The long-term analysis of this comprehensive case study is guided by the Extended Social Grid... more
The chapter deals with the trajectory of social housing as a social innovation in European countries from the nineteenth century to the present. The long-term analysis of this comprehensive case study is guided by the Extended Social Grid Model (ESGM). Following a short description of seven different phases of social housing, the chapter turns to the role of social powers and the capability approach. All in all, the involvement of various actors and social networks in shaping a successful innovation becomes visible. Another important point is the insight that social innovations have to adjust to ever changing contexts du their trajectory. The analysis sheds light on supporting conditions of successful social innovations and reflects on the co-evolution of social and business innovations.
The chapter analyses the specific features of social innovation for marginalized (SIM) or even socially excluded people, using the example of a social microcredit programme. It offers a review of the marginalization of the Roma in... more
The chapter analyses the specific features of social innovation for marginalized (SIM) or even socially excluded people, using the example of a social microcredit programme. It offers a review of the marginalization of the Roma in Hungary, considering the major factors of becoming marginalized as well as the processes reproducing marginalization, stressing the impacts of interactions between institutions, networks, and cognitive frames, showing that the complex nature of the reproduction of marginalization requires complex interventions, including empowering and capability building. The chapter highlights several policy and practical implications, including trade-offs to be considered when planning and implementing SIMs—in particular, those between exact targeting in a SIM versus building inter-community connections; the degree of assistance provided versus the short-term empowerment effect; and the degree of marginalization of the participants versus the costs of a given SIM.
This chapter addresses key issues that public policy seeking to support social innovation faces. Combining theoretical insights of the Extended Social Grid Model with empirical results obtained from EU policy surveys and case studies, it... more
This chapter addresses key issues that public policy seeking to support social innovation faces. Combining theoretical insights of the Extended Social Grid Model with empirical results obtained from EU policy surveys and case studies, it identifies key policy implications and recommendations. It first introduces key notions for social innovation policy, including the multifaceted landscape into which support is inserted; the necessity to recognize its political character; to what extent insights from business innovation studies can be useful; and why successful support of social innovation must imply institutional change. The chapter then outlines a series of recurrent policy dilemmas such as whether horizontal support should be preferred; the trade-off between degree and costs of marginalization that wish to be targeted; the difficulty to promote a capability to associate; and how the subsidiarity principle may clash against the need to overcome marginalizing processes.
Both business and social innovations have been studied for several decades by now. Yet, these two communities still seem to live in their own fiefdoms. This review aims at stressing the need and possibilities for more interactions and... more
Both business and social innovations have been studied for several decades by now. Yet, these two communities still seem to live in their own fiefdoms. This review aims at stressing the need and possibilities for more
interactions and exchanges between these two ‘tribes’. As a first step, lessons from business innovation studies are highlighted below, indicating opportunities to refine the analytical tools and methods we use, and thus improve our understanding of social innovation processes. These insights
– on the degree of novelty, level of change, the ‘dark side’ of innovation, policy rationales to justify interventions, and policy implications – can be useful for practitioners, social innovation scholars, policy analysts and policy-makers.
Foresight can be a highly useful tool to address the opportunities and challenges triggered by the next production revolution. As shown by the various country cases considered in this chapter, it facilitates debating and systemic thinking... more
Foresight can be a highly useful tool to address the opportunities and challenges triggered by the next production revolution. As shown by the various country cases considered in this chapter, it facilitates debating and systemic thinking about multiple futures and helps shaping the future through the process of participation and engagement. Given its participatory nature, key actors are mobilised to form shared views about the future, negotiate their future stakes and interests, and agree on actions aligned to their shared vision. The next production revolution requires quick and proactive policy-making, as well as better orchestration across different policy domains. Foresight can assist policy-makers by providing foundations for robust policies, fostering new framing of policy issues, as well as translating long-term concerns into aligned policy priorities. Furthermore, policy implementation is likely to be faster and more effective when key stakeholders are involved early on in shaping these policies. Foresight benefits, however, are far from being automatic: the chapter considers eight factors critical to achieving those. An astute embedding of a foresight process into policy-making enhances the likelihood of impact, but foresight recommendations are no substitute for policy decisions and actions.
Universities are among the oldest known formal organisations, and they had undergone fundamental changes several times in the last few centuries. Yet, due to economic and societal pressures, their mission, teaching and research methods,... more
Universities are among the oldest known formal organisations, and  they had undergone fundamental changes several times in the last few centuries. Yet, due to economic and societal pressures, their mission, teaching and research methods, as well as management structures and financial models need to be renewed yet again. Systematic prospective analyses can contribute to these efforts by considering the wide-ranging and complex factors, shaping the future of the higher education systems and individual HE organisations. ‘Futures’ (images of the future) are often devised at the level of a single university or at a national level for the overall higher education system. However, the bulk of trends and driving forces are international in their nature and universities operate in broader socio-economic and S&T systems. Hence, futures devised in a multi-level structure would better assist decision-makers and stakeholders. This approach is a demanding one in several respects, but offers several advantages: (i) the potential changes in the social, economic and S&T systems, in which universities are embedded, as well as their impacts on higher education can be considered systematically; (ii) the substantial diversity of higher education systems and individual universities can be taken into account; and (iii) the likely impacts of different policy options can also be analysed. The chapter also considers the major features and benefits of the various forward looking techniques, and concludes that foresight offers specific advantages.
Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures of various S&T fields or socio-economic systems, based on the views of various stakeholder groups, derives recommendations, and thus assists... more
Foresight has evolved as a distinct prospective analytical tool: it considers alternative futures of various S&T fields or socio-economic systems, based on the views of various stakeholder groups, derives recommendations, and thus assists the decision-making processes at different levels. Since its inception in Europe in the 1990s it has acquired prominence in supporting both public policies and business strategy development. This is reflected, for instance, in the range of domains to which the initial national technology foresight approach has been transferred over the past few years: (i) multi-country; and (ii) regional levels, as well as (iii) sectoral perspectives; and (iv) various policy areas, beyond STI policies.
In spite of this apparent success, the perspectives for foresight are far from clear. The notion of “hype – disappointment cycles”, originally developed to describe the changing attitudes towards emerging technologies, might be applicable to foresight, too: initial enthusiasm has been replaced by scepticism in several countries, and a more realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various types of prospective analyses is also highly demanded.
To prevent ‘disillusionment’, potential contribution of foresight to decision-making processes should be clearly understood, and inherent tensions should be taken into account when foresight processes are designed and conducted. The chapter first ‘locates’ foresight among different types of prospective analyses, and then develops a framework to classify the impacts of foresight on policy preparation processes. Foresight is often associated with consensus building – real life cases, however, reveal several types of tensions, e.g. among participants, as well as between participants, sponsors, and policy-makers. A tentative typology of these potential tensions is also presented.
Hungary, just as all the other Central European countries (CECs), is facing a number of interrelated challenges: the changing dynamics of globalisation and the concomitant re-arrangement of the international division of labour, as well as... more
Hungary, just as all the other Central European countries (CECs), is facing a number of interrelated challenges: the changing dynamics of globalisation and the concomitant re-arrangement of the international division of labour, as well as joining the European Union, where cohesion with the more developed members is a crucial issue for both the EU and national policy-makers. The starting point of this chapter is that innovation – new technological, organisational and managerial solutions – is a must to strengthen international competitiveness and thus improve quality of life. Although innovation is mainly a matter for companies, public policies should assist both the creation and exploitation (diffusion) of knowledge. Science, technology and innovation policies, therefore, can, and indeed should, play a significant role in meeting the above challenges – together with a host of other policies, of course, such as education, competition, industrial, investment promotion, regional develo...
The principal challenge for Hungary is to achieve cohesion with the advanced member states of the EU, and thus being able to improve quality of life. International competitiveness should therefore be significantly enhanced, i.e. it should... more
The principal challenge for Hungary is to achieve cohesion with the advanced member states of the EU, and thus being able to improve quality of life. International competitiveness should therefore be significantly enhanced, i.e. it should - and can - not merely be based on low production costs. Hungary is already squeezed in a ‘nut cracker’ formed by advanced countries, on the one hand, and dynamic industrialising countries on the other. The former are capable of controlling international production networks and markets via new technologies, financial muscles and superior business models, while the latter are characterised by extremely low wages and highly disciplined work forces.
It is crucial for Hungary to escape this trap. That requires a wide range of technological and non-technological innovations to raise productivity and enter new markets. Macro-economic pressures also call for a successful, competitive economy. Hungarian decision-makers do not realise the close links between domestic R&D efforts, innovation and economic performance. Given the lack of an explicit, coherent innovation strategy and the low level of R&D expenditures, overall economic policies – especially macroeconomic and investment promotion ones – and strategies of foreign-owned companies operating in Hungary are likely to play a much more decisive role in influencing economic performance than science, technology and innovation policies. This is not to suggest, however, that it would be worthless to devise and implement a sound, explicit innovation strategy. On the contrary, an astute innovation strategy should be one of the cornerstones of a comprehensive socio-economic development strategy, aimed at speeding up the cohesion process.
Central European (CE) policy-makers have to work in a very demanding context: given the constant macroeconomic tensions since the early 1990s, they cannot devote sufficient intellectual and financial resources to address long-term issues.... more
Central European (CE) policy-makers have to work in a very demanding context: given the constant macroeconomic tensions since the early 1990s, they cannot devote sufficient intellectual and financial resources to address long-term issues. This is a genuine danger, indeed, since long-term drawbacks – stemming from neglecting the long-term issues – cannot be felt immediately, by definition. Innovation can play a significant role in accelerating the catching-up process. In the meantime, the science-push model of innovation is still influential. By criticising policy misconceptions derived from this model of innovation and the closely related ‘high-tech’ hypes, the chapter argues that CE policy-makers should understand the non-linear, complex relationships between (domestic) R&D efforts, innovation, and competitiveness. Then they can define appropriate goals in a broad innovation system framework, understanding the importance not only of knowledge creation, but also that of the exploita...
ABSTRACT Automotive investment projects across borders have significantly intensified in recent years, as companies have attempted to cut costs via relocation of production, and to get closer to final customers in emerging markets. This... more
ABSTRACT Automotive investment projects across borders have significantly intensified in recent years, as companies have attempted to cut costs via relocation of production, and to get closer to final customers in emerging markets. This chapter analyses the impacts of this global re-structuring process in three Central European countries: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. The Czech and Polish automotive industry has been privatised via ‘brown-field’ investment projects: foreign investors have simply taken over existing companies. In other words, these indigenous, long-established production complexes are being replaced and displaced by Western companies. The process inevitably entails conflicts between traditional and new management methods and work practice. In Hungary, by contrast, car assembly has been re-established via green-field investment projects: there was no ‘old’ industry to be replaced. Hence there was no room for conflicts between traditions and new practices either. It resembles the Japanese practice: all their transplants in the US and UK had been located in the ‘desert’, i.e. in regions with no automotive tradition – precisely in order to avoid the sorts of conflicts that are inevitable on a brown-field scenario. It is argued that Central European governments need to (i) provide adequate funds for education and training, (ii) promote R&D capabilities and (iii) offer investment incentives geared towards lean production so as to avoid being locked into a low-wage, low-tech, low-value-added ‘development’ path.
Central European countries highlight the importance of institutions as they are of somewhat different nature in this diverse group of countries, given their different history. Briefly, before World War II there was a market economy in... more
Central European countries highlight the importance of institutions as they are of somewhat different nature in this diverse group of countries, given their different history. Briefly, before World War II there was a market economy in place in Central Europe – as opposed to most Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics – based on private property. These economies were linked to the wider European economic space via foreign trade, subsidiaries of, and joint ventures with, foreign firms operating there and subsidiaries of Central European firms active abroad. Then they went through the planned economy period and right now the transition process. As three rather distinct socio-economic systems and their impacts on the national system(s) of innovation can be observed in these cases, it is a ‘living’ laboratory where evolving institutions, including re-emerging old ones, can be explored. Thus it seems worthwhile studying these cases in-depth as they might provide a number of important, perhaps eye-opening, lessons for more general theorising.

This chapter analyses institutional changes in Hungary from the point of view of science and technology (S&T) policy by pulling together some recent theoretical developments in the economics of innovation and a fairly descriptive approach. The underlying question is whether it is possible to devise a coherent, feasible S&T policy and implement it in an efficient – or at least a satisfactory – way in a transition economy, or whether S&T policy, together with other major institutions, is also evolving. In other words, is S&T policy an outcome of conscious, well-designed and co-ordinated efforts in this period (can it be?), or should it be seen as a resultant of deliberate and unintended consequences of actions and interactions of a host of actors?

Theories and models of innovation as theoretical foundations for S&T policy are briefly outlined in section 2. Then section 3 describes the legacy of central planning in Hungary. Recent changes in the science and technology system are analysed in section 4, and policy conclusions are presented in the final section.
This paper compares the evolution of CE4 countries’ (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) national innovation systems, as well as their innovation performance. Its analytical framework draws on evolutionary (and institutional)... more
This paper compares the evolution of CE4 countries’ (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) national innovation systems, as well as their innovation performance. Its analytical framework draws on evolutionary (and institutional) economics of innovation.
Given the structural features and the level of socio-economic development in the CE4 countries, as well as the dominant way of thinking since the cold war, Western politicians, business people, analysts and journalists tend to share a ‘block’ view of these countries. Further, there is a noticeable – and certainly understandable – ‘drive’ also from the academic community to produce findings that can be generalised across the new EU member states, but at least for the CE4 countries, that is, to focus on identifying shared or similar features. Yet a closer look at the structure of the national innovation systems in these countries, as well as at their innovation performance, points to a different direction. While the structural composition of the research sub-systems of the CE4 countries showed a great diversity already in 2000, fairly significant changes have occurred since then in all countries, adding more colours to the observed diversity. Neither a similar structural composition of the research sub-system can be observed, nor a move towards a similar structure. Their innovation performance is also diverse.
Given the diversity among innovation systems, one should be very careful when trying to draw policy lessons from the ‘rank’ of a country as ‘measured’ by a composite indicator. The CE4 countries, therefore, need to avoid the trap of paying too much attention to simplifying ranking exercises. Instead, it is of utmost importance to conduct detailed, thorough comparative analyses, identifying the reasons for a reasonable or disappointing performance.
We develop a new model of social innovation (SI) inspired by the multi-channel interactive learning model of business innovation. As opposed to the linear models of innovation, this model does not identify ‘stages’ of business innovation.... more
We develop a new model of social innovation (SI) inspired by the multi-channel interactive learning model of business innovation. As opposed to the linear models of innovation, this model does not identify ‘stages’ of business innovation. Rather, it stresses that innovation is an interactive process, in which collaboration among various partners are crucial, as they possess different types of knowledge, all indispensable for successful innovation activities.
Having considered numerous definitions of SI, first we propose a new one, then adapt the multi-channel interactive learning model to SI. To do so, we identify the major actors in an SI process, their activities, interactions, modes of (co-)producing, disseminating and utilising knowledge. We also consider the micro and macro environment of a given SI.
We illustrate the analytical relevance of the proposed model by considering three real-life cases. The model can assist SI policy-makers, policy analysts, as well as practitioners when devising, implementing or assessing SI.
This paper describes a Hungarian social microcredit programme, called Kiútprogram (Way out Programme) and discusses the major lessons drawn from its operation. It was launched some 10 years ago as an adaptation of the Grameen model to the... more
This paper describes a Hungarian social microcredit programme, called Kiútprogram (Way out Programme) and discusses the major lessons drawn from its operation. It was launched some 10 years ago as an adaptation of the Grameen model to the Hungarian circumstances to decrease the level of prejudice and discrimination against the Roma and improve their living conditions in the most remote, deprived areas of Hungary; microlending has been understood and introduced as a device to achieve these aims – and not as a profit-seeking business activity.
During the almost ten-year long learning process, from the simple adaptation of the Grameen model the Kiútprogram has arrived to the denial of the most important features of joint liability in group lending, namely the application of the devices of social collateral. Experience has also shown that a loan itself is not sufficient to assist escaping from the poverty trap. Without knowledge transfer and without inter-community connection building – at least in the case of discriminated minorities – the effect of the loan may even be detrimental. In a modern society not only physical, but also social and cultural capital is needed to run a successful business in the formal sector of the economy.
In the Kiútprogram’s model the loan plays a crucial role in escaping from the aspiration trap, and thus helps overcome learned helplessness. Loans without any – financial or social – collateral signal that the lender trusts the client, not only in her honesty, but also in her abilities. This method of lending strongly suggests to the clients the conviction that she is able of achieving a business success. Neither financial aid, nor loan with (social) collateral is suitable to reach this effect.
The recent increase of unexpected crises and the complexity and urgency of the extraordinary policy challenges they give rise to, highlights the fact that foresight must not be a luxury. Indeed, more than ever before in history, foresight... more
The recent increase of unexpected crises and the complexity and urgency of the extraordinary policy challenges they give rise to, highlights the fact that foresight must not be a luxury. Indeed, more than ever before in history, foresight has become an essential pre-requisite for proactive, informed and collective action. Foresight provides a systematic approach to support a deeper reflection on where changes of policy direction are needed, how to engineer required transitions, flagging potential barriers, and meaningful engagement and empowerment of end users.
Foresight processes and advice at European level are not developed in a vacuum but complement and compete with other strategic policy advice mechanisms, including for example informal expert groups, Horizon 2020 Advisory Groups, the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM) and the Research, Innovation and Science Expert Group (RISE). The added value of foresight is to provide analysis in terms of forward-looking framing of key challenges (for example, transition to the bio economy, the migration-climate change nexus, Industry 4.0) through the consideration of trends and weak signals of change, sense-making of these trends and weak signals, the exploration of alternative scenarios and through co-design processes.
The Expert Group worked on four work streams to develop:
- Foresight guidelines for strategic programming of research, in particular in support of the next Framework Programme (cf. bringing foresight closer to the policy-making process).
- An operational plan for a flexible and informal European network of foresight experts for research, science and innovation policy that could address the Commission's need for strategic intelligence and sense-making.
- A 'Rapid Response'-Mechanism (RRM). This included the provision of pilot rapid response sense-making of signals that change in society, economy, and technology is occurring on issues deemed relevant for R&I policy.
- A frame for the better use of foresight in selecting R&I topics and doing R&I policy in a bottom-up, inclusive mode.
This compilation contains the nine background papers drafted by members of the European Commission's Expert Group 'Strategic Foresight for R&I Policy in Horizon 2020' (SFRI). All papers have been finally endorsed by the entire group. They... more
This compilation contains the nine background papers drafted by members of the European Commission's Expert Group 'Strategic Foresight for R&I Policy in Horizon 2020' (SFRI). All papers have been finally endorsed by the entire group. They are the basis for the group's final report, entitled 'Strategic Foresight in EU R&I Policy: Wider Use – More Impact'.
This paper reviews recent economic theorising on innovation from the angle of analysing social innovations (SI). It is structured as follows: Some of the basic notions used in innovation analyses are considered in section 2, focusing on... more
This paper reviews recent economic theorising on innovation from the angle of analysing social innovations (SI). It is structured as follows: Some of the basic notions used in innovation analyses are considered in section 2, focusing on the subject, objectives and levels of change. Section 3 reviews how innovation is understood in particular models of innovation and analysed by various schools of economics highlighting the types of actors and knowledge perceived as relevant in these various approaches. The notion of innovation systems (national, regional, sectoral, and technological ones) and its analytical and policy relevance is explored in section 4. Lessons relevant for analysing social innovation are drawn at the end of each sub-section, and the most important of those are reiterated in the concluding section.
This paper reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation from the angle of capturing social innovations and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicators in... more
This paper reviews various approaches to measuring business innovation from the angle of capturing social innovations and offers several methodological and policy conclusions. First, the Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) indicators in principle could be useful in settings where the dominant mode of innovation is based on R&D activities. In practice, however, both R&D and non-R&D-based modes of innovation are fairly important. IUS, therefore, only provides a partial picture. Social innovations can certainly rely on R&D-based technological innovations. Their essence, however, tends to be organisational, managerial and behavioural changes. The IUS indicators do not capture these types of changes. Second, an assessment of the 81 indicators used to compile the Global Innovation Index reveals that it would neither be a fruitful effort to rely on those indicators to capture social innovations. Third, given the diversity among innovation systems, a poor performance signalled by a composite indicator does not automatically identify the area(s) necessitating the most urgent policy actions. Only tailored, thorough comparative analyses can do so. Fourth, analysts and policy-makers need to be aware of the differences between measuring (i) social innovation activities (efforts) themselves, (ii) the framework conditions (pre-requisites, available inputs, skills, norms, values, behavioural patterns, etc.) of being socially innovative, and (iii) the economic, societal or environmental impacts of social innovations.
Analysis of business-academia (B-A) collaborations typically relies on a single method, addressing one or two major research questions. In contrast, this article tackles both R&D and innovation collaborations among businesses and academia... more
Analysis of business-academia (B-A) collaborations typically relies on a single method, addressing one or two major research questions. In contrast, this article tackles both R&D and innovation collaborations among businesses and academia relying on information using multiple methods and multiple sources of information to offer insights on dynamics and qualitative features of these co-operation processes. Interviews conducted in Hungary – in line with other research findings – have also confirmed that (i) motivations, incentives for, and norms of, conducting R&D and innovation activities diametrically differ in business and academia; and (ii) different types of firms have different needs. Thus, more refined policy measures are to be devised to promote B-A collaboration more effectively, better tuned to the needs of the actors, based on a relevant taxonomy of their co-operations. Evaluation criteria for academics should also be revised to remove some major obstacles, currently blocking more fruitful B-A co-operation. Several findings can be generalised beyond the cases considered, suggesting the need for a deeper understanding of the role of intermediaries in the Triple Helix and for broader comparative analysis of innovation policies. The research design to analyse B-A collaborations always needs to be tailored to the innovation system in question, just as the concomitant policy recommendations.
Given the economic, societal and environmental relevance of innovation, this paper contrasts various models of innovation, compares how innovation is understood in mainstream economics and evolutionary economics of innovation and... more
Given the economic, societal and environmental relevance of innovation, this paper contrasts various models of innovation, compares how innovation is understood in mainstream economics and evolutionary economics of innovation and juxtaposes the concomitant policy rationales. By discussing two monitoring tools used by the European Commission to assess its member states’ innovation performance, it argues that the science-push model of innovation is still highly influential in the EC STI policy circles, in spite of the significance of non-R&D types of knowledge in innovation processes. Then it explores various types of opportunity costs stemming from the persistent high-tech myth, considers possible historical and sociological reasons for its perseverance and discusses policy implications of the systemic view of innovation, with an emphasis on the case of the EU10 countries. Policy conclusions include: i) several policies affect innovation processes and performance, perhaps even more strongly than STI policies, and hence policy goals and tools need to be orchestrated across several policy domains; ii) STI policies should promote learning and knowledge-intensive activities in all sectors, including low- and medium-technology industries and services; iii) analysts and policy-makers need to avoid the trap of paying too much attention to simplifying ranking exercises; iv) new indicators that better reflect the evolutionary processes of learning and innovation would be needed to support analysis and policy-making; v) the choice of an economics paradigm to guide policy evaluation is likely to be decisive.
This report first reviews the current discussion about innovation, looking at its definition and theoretical underpinnings from different angles. It is followed by an analysis of the rationale, goals, instruments and organisational... more
This report first reviews the current discussion about innovation, looking at its definition and theoretical underpinnings from different angles. It is followed by an analysis of the rationale, goals, instruments and organisational framework of innovation policies in the Visegrad Countries. The report argues that the Visegrad Countries tend to focus on a narrow understanding of innovation – expressed in the science-push model of innovation, as well as in mainstream economics – as opposed to the broader understanding promoted by the evolutionary approach. The latter approach would provide more appropriate guidelines for developing innovation systems, improving performance and achieving more pronounced and favourable impacts on socio-economic development in general.
Against the backdrop of a strong plea for evidence-based policy, this paper juxtaposes how innovation is analyzed in mainstream economics and evolutionary economics of innovation, as well as their concomitant policy rationales. By... more
Against the backdrop of a strong plea for evidence-based policy, this paper juxtaposes how innovation is analyzed in mainstream economics and evolutionary economics of innovation, as well as their concomitant policy rationales. By discussing the indicators selected for the Innovation Union Scoreboard and another major EU report, it argues that the science-push model of innovation is still highly influential in the EU STI policy circles, despite a rich set of research insights stressing the importance of non-R&D types of knowledge in innovation processes. In conclusion, the chapter highlights the potential drawbacks of the persistent obsession with high-tech, considers possible reasons for its perseverance and discusses policy implications of the systemic view of innovation. Those include: i) STI policies should promote knowledge-intensive activities in all sectors, including low- and medium-technology industries and services; ii) it is a highly demanding set of tasks to identify systemic failures, devise appropriate policies to tackle those, and organize the required stakeholder dialogues, too; iii) several policies affect innovation processes and performance, perhaps even more strongly than STI policies, and hence policy goals and tools need to be orchestrated across several policy domains; iv) analysts and policy-makers need to be careful when interpreting their country’s ranking on ‘scoreboards’; v) the choice of an economics paradigm to guide policy evaluation is likely to be decisive.
This report identifies five main science, technology and innovation (STI) policy challenges in Hungary. The first two ones can be understood as symptoms, which are important enough to consider them on their own; the third is an ‘early... more
This report identifies five main science, technology and innovation (STI) policy challenges in Hungary. The first two ones can be understood as symptoms, which are important enough to consider them on their own; the third is an ‘early warning’ signal; while the last two are not only important symptoms, but also major reasons to be considered when explaining poor innovation performance.
- Low level of innovation activities, especially that of the SMEs;
- Low occurrence of co-operation in innovation activities among key actors;
- Insufficient quantity of human resources for R&D and innovation is forecast by 2015;
- Unfavourable framework conditions for innovation, especially unpredictable business environment, high administrative and tax burden, competition not conducive to innovation;
- Shortcomings in STI policy: lack of political commitment; instability; shortfalls in implementation; and slow, insufficiently informed policy learning processes.

Two main reasons of the poor innovation performance have also been identified. One of these points outside the narrowly defined STI policy domain: the framework conditions for innovations influence firms’ behaviour with such a power that STI policy schemes cannot offer strong enough incentives to overrule those unfavourable effects. Thus, major policy efforts are needed to create favourable framework conditions, notably a stable macroeconomic environment; endurable administrative and tax burdens on firms; strong demand for new products; a sufficient supply of skilled people for RTDI projects; appropriate regulations and standards; effective IPR policies; etc. Further, policies affecting these conditions need to be aligned with STI policy efforts to make a difference.

The second set of factors can be grouped together as shortcomings in policy-making, including lack of political commitment. R&D and innovation needs to be perceived by politicians as a major contributor to socio-economic development, as opposed to the current – although implicit – understanding, when it is taken as a burden on the budget, and thus becoming the first ‘victim’ when budget problems must be solved. Frequent changes in the structure of the STI policy governance sub-system has lead to organisational instability, which, in turn, affects negatively policy formation and implementation as it hampers organisational learning and imposes unnecessary burdens on RTDI performers, too. Hence, this sub-system needs to be stabilised.

Combining these explanatory factors, there seems to be no ‘panacea’ or a simple ‘quick fix’ to improve RTDI performance. Conscious co-ordination of major economic and STI policies is needed, guided by an overarching socio-economic development strategy. Foresight processes would be useful to underpin these strategies. These dialogues can also highlight how RTDI processes – advanced by appropriate STI policies – can contribute to overall socio-economic development. Policies affecting RTDI processes and performance need also to be orchestrated. Up-to-date decision-preparatory methods – most notably thorough analyses of innovation performance, combining census, R&D and innovation data; evaluation of individual policy measures, as well as that of the policy mix as a whole; and technology assessment – should be relied upon when devising and implementing STI policy measures, also assisted by recurring consultations with the major actors of the national innovation system.
ABSTRACT This paper explores several potential factors, which can explain an intriguing puzzle observed in Hungary: there are a large number of apparently relevant policy schemes to foster RTDI activities, and yet, innovation performance... more
ABSTRACT This paper explores several potential factors, which can explain an intriguing puzzle observed in Hungary: there are a large number of apparently relevant policy schemes to foster RTDI activities, and yet, innovation performance is rather poor. To indicate the dimensions of this “Hungarian paradox”, first the breadth of policy measures is presented, followed by an overview of the economic and innovation performance in international comparison. Then six factors are considered, leading to a conclusion that several of them should be combined for a plausible explanation. The most important one of these factors, however, point outside the narrowly defined STI policy domain: the framework conditions for innovations seem to play a decisive role. These conditions influence firms’ innovation activities with such a power that STI policy schemes cannot offer strong enough incentives to overrule their unfavourable effects.
The main objective of the ERAWATCH Analytical Country Reports 2010 is to characterise and assess the evolution of the national policy mixes in the perspective of the Lisbon goals. The assessment focuses on the national R&D investments... more
The main objective of the ERAWATCH Analytical Country Reports 2010 is to characterise and assess the evolution of the national policy mixes in the perspective of the Lisbon goals. The assessment focuses on the national R&D investments targets, the efficiency and effectiveness of national policies and investments into R&D, the articulation between research, education and innovation, and on the realisation and better governance of ERA.
It seems unlikely that the R&D investment targets (GERD at 1.8% of GDP, while BERD at 0.9% of that by 2013) can be achieved simply by providing more public funding. The impact of STI policies aimed at leveraging R&D investments can only be enhanced if framework conditions are also significantly improved. Notably, the macroeconomic situation, the ‘two-tier’ structure of the economy, the intensity and type of competition, the overall entrepreneurship culture, the quality and directions of projects conducted by the publicly financed R&D units have unfavourable impacts on RTDI activities of firms. The incentives provided by the STI policy schemes cannot counterbalance those effects. Structural reasons, which are difficult to address even by overall economic policies, let alone STI policies, can also be seen as obstacles. The bulk of BERD is performed by foreign-owned firms, and their RTDI activities are largely determined by their parents’ strategies, while domestic STI policies can play a relatively minor role.
The science, technology and innovation (STI) policy governance structure has been reorganised at least once by every government since the 1990s, including the highest level policy-making bodies. Moreover, the latter ones have only worked intermittently: in certain periods had been ‘dormant’ for years. Hence, policies affecting the RTDI processes – notably education, STI, macroeconomic, industrial, investment promotion and regional development policies – could not possibly be designed and implemented in a strategic, coherent and integrated framework. The implementing agencies are also frequently reorganised. These permanent changes in governance structures prevent organisational learning of policy design and implementation bodies, and this lack of stability also hampers the efficient functioning of these bodies.
The 84-page government programme, approved in May 2010, devotes 8 lines to R&D and innovation.
This paper reports on the findings of interviews conducted with Hungarian firms on their overall business and innovation strategies and innovation activities to pursue three interconnected aims: a) better understand firm behaviour by... more
This paper reports on the findings of interviews conducted with Hungarian firms on their overall business and innovation strategies and innovation activities to pursue three interconnected aims: a) better understand firm behaviour by analysing qualitative features of innovation processes (motivations, dynamics, linkages among driving factors and collaboration among actors); b) identify and sharpen hypotheses and research questions for quantitative analyses; derive policy implications.
A brief overview of the Hungarian NIS is offered in Section 2, and the major performance indicators are presented in international comparison in Section 3. Then the sample is described and the major interview findings are summarised in Section 4. The concluding section highlights implications for innovation surveys’ methods, further quantitative analyses, as well as innovation policies and policy analyses.
Most of the papers in this special issue were presented at the Third International Seville Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) that took place in October 2008. They address a wide variety of issues in FTA including... more
Most of the papers in this special issue were presented at the Third International Seville Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) that took place in October 2008. They address a wide variety of issues in FTA including methods and policy and governance impacts with discussions and demonstrations at the regional and corporate levels.
The Expert Group's assessment is that the CREST-OMC has achieved important results as a new policy instrument for unfolding the vision of the Lisbon strategy and the European Research Area. However, there is additional potential in the... more
The Expert Group's assessment is that the CREST-OMC has achieved important results as a new policy instrument for unfolding the vision of the Lisbon strategy and the European Research Area. However, there is additional potential in the Open Method of Coordination that remains unexploited. Therefore the CREST-OMC needs to evolve to become a strategic learning and coordination policy instrument, rather than remaining a tool for the exchanging of information. This report suggests as well that the scope of OMC-CREST needs to be broadened beyond research issues, and points at a series of process-oriented improvements, all of which would raise the value-added of this policy instrument. On the basis of the above, this report puts forward a set of specific recommendations.
The Hungarian NIS has gone through a significant transition process since the early 1990s. The expansion of business R&D, both in terms of total expenditures and the number business R&D units, indicates a stronger base relying on which... more
The Hungarian NIS has gone through a significant transition process since the early 1990s. The expansion of business R&D, both in terms of total expenditures and the number business R&D units, indicates a stronger base relying on which innovation capabilities can be improved, albeit from a low level. But the low hare of innovative firms and the huge difference between the foreign-owned and indigenous firms’ innovation activities highlight major challenges of the NIS. These figures suggest that Hungary continues to suffer from a dual economy syndrome: it is composed of highly productive and technologically intensive foreign-owned large firms, and fragile, financially and technologically weak indigenous SMEs. The period of 1990-2007 has not been long enough to find an appropriate position for science, technology and innovation (STI) in government policies and integrate this field effectively into an overall socio-economic development strategy. The low level of co-ordination and integr...
The Hungarian NIS has gone through a significant transition process since the early 1990s. The expansion of business R&D, both in terms of total expenditures and the number business R&D units, indicates a stronger base relying on which... more
The Hungarian NIS has gone through a significant transition process since the early 1990s. The expansion of business R&D, both in terms of total expenditures and the number business R&D units, indicates a stronger base relying on which innovation capabilities can be improved, albeit from a low level. But the low hare of innovative firms and the huge difference between the foreign-owned and indigenous firms’ innovation activities highlight major challenges of the NIS. These figures suggest that Hungary continues to suffer from a dual economy syndrome: it is composed of highly productive and technologically intensive foreign-owned large firms, and fragile, financially and technologically weak indigenous SMEs. The period of 1990-2007 has not been long enough to find an appropriate position for science, technology and innovation (STI) in government policies and integrate this field effectively into an overall socio-economic development strategy. The low level of co-ordination and integration across policies results in ad hoc policy formation and implementation. In spite of the impressive number and range of STI policy measures, for most innovation performance indicators Hungary is lagging considerably behind most EU countries. A number of hypotheses can be put forward concerning the root cause of this major challenge. The most plausible one stresses the chief role of the so-called framework conditions. The macroeconomic situation, the structure of the economy, the level and type of competition, the overall entrepreneurship culture, and human resources have so unfavourable impacts on innovation activities of firms that the incentives provided by STI policy schemes cannot counterbalance those effects.
The Hungarian national innovation system is challenged by the pressing need that the country should move from the dominance of low cost economic activities towards an innovation-driven economy. Several weaknesses of the current NIS inhibit this fundamental strategic move: low demand for innovation and R&D, slow diffusion of innovations, poor co-operation capabilities, and ineffective governance.
Research Interests:
Macroeconomic imbalances have been particularly pressing since 2006 in Hungary. The global economic and financial crisis has further aggravated the prospects for recovery, and access to capital has become even more difficult. Although... more
Macroeconomic imbalances have been particularly pressing since 2006 in Hungary. The global economic and financial crisis has further aggravated the prospects for recovery, and access to capital has become even more difficult. Although overall conditions for doing business have improved in recent years, administrative and tax burdens on firms are still high compared to the OECD average. The regulatory environment is characterised by frequent and unpredictable changes. These conditions are not favourable for long-term and high-risk activities, such as RTDI.
Only one fifth of firms operating in Hungary are innovative. The majority of companies (59%) do not innovate due to the lack of demand for new products and services. Researchers at universities and PROs are not sufficiently motivated to carry out economically relevant research. This, in turn, hinders exploitability of knowledge, and therefore may not provide sufficient incentives for private co-financing of research performed in the public sector.
It seems unlikely that R&D investment targets, especially those of the private sector can be achieved simply by providing more public funding. The impact of strictly defined STI policies with the aim of leveraging R&D investments can only be enhanced if framework conditions for RTDI activities are also significantly improved. Given the economic crisis and lack of meaningful communication – let alone co-operation – among the major political parties, it is uncertain if fundamental reforms, needed to create more favourable conditions, can be implemented. Structural reasons, that are difficult to address even by overall economic policies, let alone STI policies, can also be seen as obstacles to induce R&D investments. The large chunk of BERD (around 70%) is performed by foreign-owned firms, and their RTDI activities are largely determined by their parents’ strategies, while domestic STI policies can only play a relatively minor role.
Macroeconomic imbalances have been particularly pressing since 2006 in Hungary. The global economic and financial crisis has further aggravated the prospects for recovery. Although overall conditions for doing business have improved in... more
Macroeconomic imbalances have been particularly pressing since 2006 in Hungary. The global economic and financial crisis has further aggravated the prospects for recovery. Although overall conditions for doing business have improved in recent years, administrative and tax burdens on firms are still high compared to the OECD average. The regulatory environment is characterised by frequent and unpredictable changes. These conditions are not favourable for long-term and high-risk activities, such as RTDI. Only one fifth of firms operating in Hungary are innovative. The majority of companies (59%) do not innovate due to the lack of demand for new products and services. Researchers at universities and PROs are not sufficiently motivated to carry out economically relevant research. This, in turn, hinders exploitability of knowledge, and therefore may not provide sufficient incentives for private co-financing of research performed in the public sector. It seems unlikely that R&D investment...
We investigate the likely future impacts of technology on food quality and health in six Central European countries using a key technology survey. We identify four common key technologies having a potentially large future impact upon food... more
We investigate the likely future impacts of technology on food quality and health in six Central European countries using a key technology survey. We identify four common key technologies having a potentially large future impact upon food quality and health. But we find considerable differences across countries and key technologies regarding to their impact on food quality health. Our Key Technologies Survey overcomes the usual shortcomings of this method. First, the different types of impacts of the investigated technologies have been clearly separated. Second, our respondents have been asked to assess the impacts of certain applications (not broad technologies). Given these specific methodological features our results can potentially offer more useful assistance to decision-makers, both in the public and private sectors.
Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socioeconomic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to influence it for their advantage. They have used very... more
Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socioeconomic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to influence it for their advantage. They have used very different approaches and methods from spiritual/ religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning. This paper is aimed at characterising foresight, first by locating this approach among the various approaches to future-oriented analyses, and then by identifying three types foresight programmes.
The paper first discusses alternative theoretical frameworks to analyse the impacts of FDI on host economies. Second, it provides an overview of major developments in the Hungarian automotive industry since the early 1990s, discussing... more
The paper first discusses alternative theoretical frameworks to analyse the impacts of FDI on host economies. Second, it provides an overview of major developments in the Hungarian automotive industry since the early 1990s, discussing both firm strategies and the macro level factors influencing the former ones, especially by highlighting the consequences of Hungary’s accession to the EU. A tentative taxonomy has also been developed, and applied when discussing the prospects for Hungarian suppliers. The paper concludes that diffusion models and the notion of sectoral system of innovation and production offer a more appropriate conceptual framework to capture the actual socio-economic impacts of FDI in this sector than the generally used spillover models. Notwithstanding the huge importance of globalisation, various elements and dynamics of national innovation systems still do matter. As for a major element of an NIS, namely government policies, it is more fruitful to create an attractive, favourable environment for R&D and innovation than focusing on the promotion of industry-specific R&D and innovation activities. It is also of crucial importance to co-ordinate several policies to enhance competitiveness.
This report addresses two main topics, R&D and innovation data availability and reliability in Hungary, as well as private sector R&D activities. Practically all relevant R&D data are collected in Hungary, but there are two major... more
This report addresses two main topics, R&D and innovation data availability and reliability in Hungary, as well as private sector R&D activities.
Practically all relevant R&D data are collected in Hungary, but there are two major problems. Only a limited set of data are published, and thus made available free of charge. Obviously, this practice prevents detailed analyses, required both for deepening our theoretical understanding of RTDI processes, as well as for policy purposes. Further, the way in which data protection is understood and implemented also poses a challenge from the point of view of theoretical investigations, policy analysis, and ultimately policy-making. For instance, the list of R&D performing companies is not available, and thus it is not possible to conduct even the most elementary calculations, e.g. to establish how many of the top exporters conduct R&D activities. It would be a fairly simple and cheap exercise, and given the weight of exporting firms in the small, open Hungarian economy, a rather pertinent one. It is not possible to analyse the impacts of R&D and innovation on micro-economic performance, either, although these three sets of data (R&D, innovation, and company performance data) are collected – but using different surveys and thus stored in different data sets, which cannot be linked for legal restrictions. In other words, public money is spent on collecting data, which cannot be used for analyses aimed at supporting public policies.
The sectoral case studies confirm the dominant role of foreign-owned firms in RTDI activities. Foreign-owned firms tend to be large, and thus the decisive share of BERD is performed by large enterprises.
Pharmaceuticals industry is the most R&D intensive sector in Hungary. The sectoral research system has been radically restructured during the past fifteen years as foreign pharmaceuticals firms became majority owners in most companies, pursuing global R&D strategies. In Hungary, they focus on the development of generic drugs. Thus, the number of research projects has decreased, but the allocation of R&D expenditures became more efficient.
The most important trends in the world’s medical instruments industry play a determining role in the innovation activities of the Hungarian companies. These trends include the increasing use of IT systems for the support of medical equipment, the revolution of digital imaging equipment and the expansion of the home-use appliances market. Besides research and development of the traditional equipment, Hungarian medical equipment manufacturers proved successful in the development and application of these product families.
Automotive industry has been traditionally less R&D intensive, yet, innovation, R&D and engineering skills are becoming decisive factors of success for automotive firms, too, given the fierce competition, requiring improved products in terms of safety, comfort, and fuel efficiency. Interviews suggest emerging co-operation between automotive firms, on the one hand, and university departments as well as other R&D units, on the other. More recently, some foreign investors are setting up either their in-house R&D units or joint research groups with universities. Besides professional excellence, there is a considerable cost advantage in this field, too. Further, various policy schemes have also been introduced to foster innovation activities in the automotive industry.
The reintegration into the political and economic systems of Europe – that is, accession to the European Union – has posed a complex, tremendous challenge for Central European countries (CECs) since the beginning of the 1990s. First, the... more
The reintegration into the political and economic systems of Europe – that is, accession to the European Union – has posed a complex, tremendous challenge for Central European countries (CECs) since the beginning of the 1990s. First, the demanding and socially rather costly process of political and economic transition had to be completed. Not only macroeconomic stabilisation was required, but fundamental organisational and institutional changes were also needed to transform these countries into stable, middle-income economies, capable of catching up with the more advanced ones in the longer run. These sweeping changes were reflected in the ownership, production, employment and trade structures in CECs in the 1990s, albeit at a different speed, and taking country-specific routes. These economies, in practice, had already been integrated into the EU markets in various ways – via foreign trade links, by joining international production networks, as well as by ownership links – to a large extent, even before becoming member states.
In the meantime, accession negotiations had been completed by the end of 2002, and all CECs – among the ten new member states – joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Harmonisation of the written rules has been a formidable task, indeed. Yet, adapting and adjusting the institutions, values and behavioural rules, remains a colossal task well after the formal entry into the EU. In other words, the real challenge is not just to achieve formal membership, but cohesion with the advanced, core member states of the EU. Having completed the first round of transition, CECs have again reached a cross-roads: the world economy, as well as the EU itself, have significantly changed during this historically short period of time. Moreover, the EU is going to be reshaped not just because of the global, structural changes, but as the result of the very process of enlargement as well.
CECs now have to consider what role to play in the globalising learning economy: do they passively accept the fate of a merely surviving economy, relying on extended and extensive EU assistance? Or, by implementing a sound and well-articulated strategy, do CECs intend to be prosperous countries in 20-25 years? In that future their citizens would enjoy high living standards, good health and a clean environment, and to sustain that, companies would become strong competitors, and thanks to that, CECs would become net contributors to the EU budget, supporting the cohesion of the even larger EU and its co-operation with neighbouring countries.
The paper, based on interviews with high-ranking policy-makers in 4 CECs, as well as on background documents and the relevant literature, reviews the current challenges and options for decision-makers in CECs.
Research Interests:
TEP, the Hungarian Technology Foresight Programme, was launched in 1997, as the first one in Central and Eastern Europe, to provide inputs to a national strategy by identifying socio-economic challenges and developing broad visions for... more
TEP, the Hungarian Technology Foresight Programme, was launched in
1997, as the first one in Central and Eastern Europe, to provide inputs to a
national strategy by identifying socio-economic challenges and developing
broad visions for the future. Specifically, it was aimed at analysing Hungary’s
current strengths and weaknesses, developing scenarios (visions)
and formulating policy proposals to improve quality of life and the long-term
international competitiveness.
This paper first briefly defines the concept and methods of (technology)
foresight, and highlights some reasons why it is a useful policy tool,
followed by a brief account of the objectives and methods of TEP. Then,
summarising the results, Sections 3 and 4 provide an overview of the transition
process (institutional changes as well as economic developments) and
the current socio-economic challenges, respectively. Changing the time horizon,
3 long-term macro scenarios are discussed in Section 5, together with
policy recommendations developed by TEP so as to achieve the most desirable
– but still feasible – vision. Section 6 summarises the results of the dissemination
and implementation phase of TEP. Finally, the concluding section
highlights the benefits of foresight to assist decision-makers; some general
difficulties concerning its design, methodologies and implementation of
its recommendations; as well as specific Hungarian problems, due to the legacy of
planning.
With its broad variety of forward thinking activities (technology assessment (TA), science and technology foresights (TF), Europe is now more advanced than the US and Japan in this field. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, in spite of... more
With its broad variety of forward thinking activities (technology assessment (TA), science and technology foresights (TF), Europe is now more advanced than the US and Japan in this field. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, in spite of this increased importance for policy making and of a few notable co-operative efforts, Foresight activities and Foresight supporting policies have not yet reached the same state of integration, or complementary and relatedness, at EU level as many other policy fields have achieved during the last decades.
In fact, many Foresight exercises are simply repeating and duplicating efforts already made by others, more advanced in the Foresight process, without exploiting possible synergies, and thus missing the advantages of co-operation at European level, e.g. in the form of economies of scale, cost-efficiency and shared knowledge gains. In the medium to long term, this situation could impact negatively on the implementation of the 'Lisbon Strategy'.
This explains why the HLEG group has been set up to prepare a report on options for supporting a broad spectrum of Foresight related activities, which contribute to the implementation of ERA and the Lisbon strategy, and complement and strengthen related national and regional activities, including those that might be supported by the next Research Framework Programme (FP6, 2002-2006). Members of this group are both TF/TA practitioners and 'customers' from government and industry.
Hungary launched her first foresight programme in 1997. As the country is undergoing fundamental economic and social changes, major institutions are being currently shaped. Therefore is high time to think about medium and long-term... more
Hungary launched her first foresight programme in 1997. As the country is undergoing fundamental economic and social changes, major institutions are being currently shaped. Therefore is high time to think about medium and long-term issues. In other words, now it is possible to devise strategies aimed at improving the quality of life and the long-term international competitiveness. Foresight has seemed an adequate tool to bring together business, the science base and government in order to identify and respond to emerging opportunities in markets and technologies.
TEP is a holistic foresight programme, based on both panel activities (scenarios, SWOT analysis, recommendations, policy proposals, etc.) and a large scale Delphi survey. The two-year Programme will conclude in 1999.
The paper is aimed at analysing the reasons to launch TEP, its results achieved so far and some methodological issues, namely
• a strong emphasis on scenarios (‘macro’ and panel level),
• the structure and composition of panels (education and learning as input of competitiveness, employment as a unique issue, broad issues as panel topics),
• the importance of cross-cutting issues,
• the organisation and management of the programme,
• the socio-psychological legacy of planning in the foresight process.
As the legislation on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Hungary has been probably the most liberal in Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-1980s, FDI is the primary form chosen by Western firms to enter the Hungarian market. The... more
As the legislation on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Hungary has been probably the most liberal in Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-1980s, FDI is the primary form chosen by Western firms to enter the Hungarian market. The major channels of FDI include the privatisation of former state-owned enterprises and green-field investment projects. Portfolio investment and non-equity forms of co-operation can also be found in Hungary, yet, their significance is almost negligible compared to FDI.
A number of advantages, most importantly the highly skilled, experienced, yet, extremely cheap labour, and the geographical and cultural proximity to Western Europe give the Central European countries a certain competitive edge compared to other transition economies. On top of this, Hungary has opted for a unique approach to privatisation, i.e. sales of assets rather than voucher schemes, and offered a fairly liberal economic environment. Due to these factors, it has attracted roughly 45-50 per cent of the total amount of foreign capital invested in Central and Eastern Europe. These developments require a more detailed analysis. Major characteristics of the privatisation process, strictly defined, and the expansion of the private sector, including green-field investment projects, are discussed in Section 2. Sections 3-7 present the most important findings of sector studies, and identify major issues for further analysis.
Research Interests:
ABSTRACT Central European countries highlight the importance of institutions as they are of somewhat different nature in this diverse group of countries, given their different history. Briefly, before World War II there was a market... more
ABSTRACT Central European countries highlight the importance of institutions as they are of somewhat different nature in this diverse group of countries, given their different history. Briefly, before World War II there was a market economy in place in Central Europe – as opposed to most Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics – based on private property. These economies were linked to the wider European economic space via foreign trade, subsidiaries of, and joint ventures with, foreign firms operating there and subsidiaries of Central European firms active abroad. Then they went through the planned economy period and right now the transition process. As three rather distinct socio-economic systems and their impacts on the national system(s) of innovation can be observed in these cases, it is a ‘living’ laboratory where evolving institutions, including re-emerging old ones, can be explored. Thus it seems worthwhile studying these cases in-depth as they might provide a number of important, perhaps eye-opening, lessons for more general theorising. This chapter analyses institutional changes in Hungary from the point of view of science and technology (S&T) policy via pulling together some recent theoretical developments in the economics of innovation and a fairly descriptive approach. The underlying question is whether it is possible to devise a coherent, feasible S&T policy and implement it in an efficient – or at least a satisfactory – way in a transition economy, or whether S&T policy, together with other major institutions, is also evolving. In other words, is S&T policy an outcome of conscious, well-designed and co-ordinated efforts in this period (can it be?), or should it be seen as a resultant of deliberate and unintended consequences of actions and interactions of a host of actors? Theories and models of innovation as theoretical foundations for S&T policy are briefly outlined in section 2. Then section 3 describes the legacy of central planning in Hungary. Recent changes in the science and technology system are analysed in section 4, and policy conclusions are presented in the final section.
ABSTRACT The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited... more
ABSTRACT The Hungarian precision engineering industry, although fairly successful in the pre-war period and able to survive all the adverse corollaries of planning and CMEA orientation, might be wiped out by the long-awaited marketisation: far more competitive and powerful foreign competitors can now enter both its former single most important market, i.e. the former Soviet Union, and the domestic market. Thus accumulated knowledge of R&D and production engineers as well as the experience of the highly skilled blue-collar workers, albeit of primary importance in this industry, might become completely worthless and disappear. Combined with fresh capital, access to new markets, recent technologies and up-to-date management methods, however, it can (and should) be regarded as a major asset and the indispensable basis for successful restructuring. This paper suggests that sweeping changes in size, ownership, internal organisation, and product range are also inevitable so as to be able to adjust to the new environment.
The need and relevance of using FTA for decision-making in the private and public sector is becoming ever more apparent. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of issues that need to be addressed, and the inescapable attendant... more
The need and relevance of using FTA for decision-making in the private and public sector is becoming ever more apparent. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of issues that need to be addressed, and the inescapable attendant uncertainty, requires a very different approach from the traditional analysis of internal capabilities and external possibilities through strategic planning. What is increasingly required is a capacity to contemplate and engage with a number of possible futures, to draw on the intelligence and perspectives of a wide range of actors, and to apply these in a dynamic, pro-active fashion, in a continuous learning process. Under these circumstances, demonstration of the impact of the application of FTA and of means to enhance that impact, are paramount. Precise cost-benefit analyses, however, are inappropriate. FTA should be understood as a conceptual framework, an art (practice) and a set of tools. Therefore, a broader set of criteria is required to evaluate its impacts. The paper first provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks, in which the FTA impacts can be assessed. Then a new, but more simple, pragmatic approach is proposed for analysing the use of FTA, namely a distinction between the arguments used by FTA experts and the expectations of potential ‘clients’. The paper concludes that major efforts are needed to operationalise the existing theoretical frameworks to assist actual impact assessment projects, and thus making impact assessment a widely used practice. In doing so, the FTA community will be in a position to analyse the differences between the promised, expected and actual impacts. That would improve the design of FTA projects, and contribute to a more appropriate and wider use of FTA.
The need and relevance of using FTA for decision-making in the private and public sector is becoming ever more apparent. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of issues that need to be addressed, and the inescapable attendant... more
The need and relevance of using FTA for decision-making in the private and public sector is becoming ever more apparent. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of issues that need to be addressed, and the inescapable attendant uncertainty, requires a very different approach from the traditional analysis of internal capabilities and external possibilities through strategic planning. What is increasingly required is a capacity to contemplate and engage with a number of possible futures, to draw on the intelligence and perspectives of a wide range of actors, and to apply these in a dynamic, pro-active fashion, in a continuous learning process.
Under these circumstances, demonstration of the impact of the application of FTA and of means to enhance that impact, are paramount. Precise cost-benefit analyses, however, are inappropriate. FTA should be understood as a conceptual framework, an art (practice) and a set of tools. Therefore, a broader set of criteria is required to evaluate its impacts.
The paper first provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks, in which the FTA impacts can be assessed. Then a new, but more simple, pragmatic approach is proposed for analysing the use of FTA, namely a distinction between the arguments used by FTA experts and the expectations of potential ‘clients’. The paper concludes that major efforts are needed to operationalise the existing theoretical frameworks to assist actual impact assessment projects, and thus making impact assessment a widely used practice. In doing so, the FTA community will be in a position to analyse the differences between the promised, expected and actual impacts. That would improve the design of FTA projects, and contribute to a more appropriate and wider use of FTA.
Research Interests: